chlorides and other impurities affecting conductivity must also be within their acceptable limits[''].

Since the conductivity is measured by grab sampling at least every 72 hours to verify that it is within limits, this will also verify that pH is within limits every 72 hours. If the conductivity should exceed 1.0 µmho/cm, pH measurements will be made to determine if the Tech Spec [Technical Specifications] pH limits have been exceeded. It should also be noted that inline conductivity instrumentation is very stable and reliable and is used to continuously monitor the reactor coolant per Tech Spec [Technical Specifications] requirements, with instrumentation connected to redundant sources (reactor water cleanup influent and reactor recirculation loop). Therefore, the proposed change will not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

II. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

As stated above, the pH limits on reactor coolant are not affected by this change. Since the conductivity is monitored continuously, to verify that it is within limits, this will also verify that pH is within limits. If the conductivity should exceed 1.0 μ mho/cm, pH measurements will be made to determine if the Tech Spec [Technical Specifications] pH limits have been exceeded. Therefore, the incorporation of this change will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

III. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The in-line conductivity instrumentation has been determined to be very stable and reliable in its use to continuously monitor the reactor coolant per Tech Spec [Technical Specifications] requirements. To maintain this reliability, this instrumentation is connected to redundant sources (reactor water cleanup influent and reactor recirculation loop). Based on this continuous monitoring of reactor coolant conductivity, as provided by this instrumentation, the incorporation of this change will have no impact on current safety margins, nor will it involve a significant reduction in the margin [of] safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Osterhout Free Library, Reference Department, 71 South Franklin Street, Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania 18701.

Attorney for licensee: Jay Silberg, Esquire, Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge, 2300 N Street NW., Washington, DC 20037.

NRC Project Director: John F. Stolz.

Pennsylvania Power and Light Company, Docket Nos. 50–387 and 50– 388, Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2, Luzerne County, Pennsylvania

Date of amendment request: March 31, 1995.

Description of amendment request: These amendments would delete from the Technical Specifications of each unit, the operational condition restriction in Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.d.7 which requires that 24hour emergency diesel generator testing be performed with at least one unit in operational condition 4 or 5 (cold shutdown or refueling).

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below: The proposed changes do not:

I. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The proposed change to permit the 24 hour testing of the emergency diesel generators during power operation does not increase the chances for a previously analyzed accident to occur. The function of the EDGs [emergency diesel generators] is to supply emergency power in the event of a loss of offsite power. As stated above [,] the diesel generator being tested has been determined to remain operable and available to supply the emergency loads within the required times. In addition, the three remaining EDGs will be operable during this test. Operations [Ôperation] of an EDGs [EDG] is not a precursor to any accident. If, however, an offsite disturbance were to occur that affected the operability of the DG [emergency diesel generator] being tested, the remaining EDGs are capable of feeding the loads necessary for safe shutdown of the plant. In summary, the proposed change does not adversely affect the performance or the ability of the diesel generators to perform their intended safety function. Therefore, the proposed change will not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

II. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

The proposed change to the 24 hour surveillance requirement will not affect the operation of any safety system or alter its response to any previously evaluated accident. The diesel generator will automatically transfer from test mode if necessary to supply emergency loads in the required time. The test mode is used for the monthly surveillances of these diesel generators, resulting in no new plant operating modes being introduced. In the event the EDG fails the functional test[,] it will be declared inoperable and the actions required for an inoperable diesel will be performed. The remaining three EDGs will be operable and are capable of feeding the loads

necessary for safe shutdown of the plant. Therefore, the incorporation of this change will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

III. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Changing the EDG test timing results is no reduction in the safety margin as defined in the design basis. Because loss of an EDG is not expected as a result of LOOP [loss of offsite power] or LOCA/LOOP [loss-ofcoolant accident with a loss of offsite power] during the 24 hour test, SSES [Susquehanna Steam Electric Station] remains within its design basis. In fact, because the test EDG loads the ESS [engineered safety system] bus 8.5 seconds earlier than the non-test EDGs during LOCA with LOOP, plant response is actually improved. Risk of operation during the 24 hour EDG test is certainly less than during the current 84 hour allowed outage time (AOT) because both the impact of the initiating events evaluated (EDG in test is not actually failed) and the frequency of the limiting plant condition (loss of two EDGs) are less. No increase in frequency or impact of design basis events, and no reduction in the safety margin occurs during the 24 hour EDG test. Therefore, the incorporation of this change will have no impact on current safety margins, nor will it involve a significant reduction in the margin to [of] safety

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

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Attorney for licensee: Jay Silberg, Esquire, Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge, 2300 N Street NW., Washington, DC 20037.

NRC Project Director: John F. Stolz.

Pennsylvania Power and Light Company, Docket No. 50–388, Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Unit 2, Luzerne County, Pennsylvania

Date of amendment request: March 31, 1995.

Description of amendment request: This amendment would change Susquehanna Unit 2 Technical Specifications (TS) by incorporating the General Electric (GE) NRC approved methodology for GE–12 type lead use fuel assemblies (NEDE–24011–P–A–10) into the list of references in Section 6.9.3.2. The licensee plans to insert four of these fuel assemblies into the Unit 2 core during the fall of 1995. The addition of the reference to the TS would allow the use of the GE methodology to document that all