Afghan traffickers continued development of new trafficking routes through the Newly Independent States, supplementing existing routes through Pakistan and Iran.

Reports continue to allege the direct involvement of some factional leaders, particularly small-scale independent "commanders," in narcotics production and trafficking and the indirect involvement of others who provide security to the narcotics trade in return for payment.

There is no functioning bilateral agreement between Afghanistan and the United States. While Afghanistan ratified the 1988 UN Convention in 1992, it has made virtually no progress in achieving its goals.

The tremendous increase in poppy cultivation during 1994, combined with the inadequate efforts to eliminate cultivation and trafficking, precludes a determination that Afghanistan has cooperated fully with the United States or taken adequate steps on its own to meet the goals and objectives established by the 1988 Convention. The core problem in Afghanistan is the absence of a functional central government. Although the USG has vital national interests in fostering the re-establishment of a functioning central government that could cooperate with us on regional security issues and drug eradication, USG assistance for such purposes falls largely outside the definition of U.S. assistance that would be cut off by denial of certification, at least this fiscal year. Accordingly, denial of certification is appropriate.

Burma

Burma remains the world's largest producer of illicit opium and heroin and the Government of Burma (GOB) continues to treat counternarcotics efforts as a matter of secondary importance. Estimated opium production in 1993/94 was 2,030 metric tons and illicit poppy cultivation covered 146,600 hectares. Opium production fell by 21 percent, due principally to poor weather. There were some modest signs of greater government efforts in counternarcotics. One of the results of a Burmese Army campaign against the Shan United Army (SUA) of Khun Sa was to restrict the opium supply and drug trafficking routes of the SUA. The GOB has also begun to show signs of willingness to cooperate in counternarcotics efforts and has agreed to facilitate an opium yield survey in 1995 and to allow the UN Drug Control Program (UNDCP) to perform an aerial survey of project areas. Domestic enforcement efforts have also shown some marginal improvement with regional task forces under the Burmese police becoming more active in drug enforcement. These efforts, however, fall short of what is required to address seriously the drug problem in Burma.

The government's ability to suppress Burma's opium and heroin trade is severely limited by lack of access to and control over the areas in which most opium is grown and heroin processed. Well-equipped ethnic armies sheltered in these remote mountainous regions have been permitted wideranging, local autonomy in exchange for halting their active insurgencies against Rangoon. At the same time, opium poppy cultivation has soared in the base areas of the insurgent groups, especially in the Wa hills, despite nominal commitments by insurgents and the government alike that efforts would be made to reduce opium growing. Direct government complicity in the drug trade does not appear to be a problem among senior officials, but narcotics corruption is a problem among lower level officials.

Multilateral drug control projects in enforcement and alternative development under the UNDCP involving cooperative efforts between Burma, China and Thailand are underway. These projects continue to receive support from the international community. Project scale is small, however, and the overall impact of these efforts on the huge opium cultivation problem in Burma has been extremely limited so far.

Burma is a party to the 1988 UN Convention and has enacted some legislation in conformity with the Convention, but has not made a strong effort to enforce these laws. There has been no bilateral counternarcotics