Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration (SHC), which is presented below:

\* \* \* The proposed changes would not involve an SHC because the changes would not:

1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The deletion of the power range, neutron flux, high negative rate trip will not adversely affect plant operations. As has been presented and accepted by the NRC Staff in previous docketed correspondence, the dropped RCCA [rod cluster control assembly] accident analysis does not rely on this trip to safely shut down the plant. The safety analysis of the plant is unaffected by the proposed changes. Since the safety analysis is unaffected, the calculated radiologicalreleases associated with the analysis are not affected. Therefore, the proposed changes will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The reactor trip system is used to mitigate accidents. There have been instances, during calibration of these units, where a single channel has generated a trip signal. Leaving this in place when it is not necessary could, therefore, cause a reactor trip. The deletion of one trip function will, therefore, slightly decease, not increase, this probability.

2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

The reactor trip system is used to mitigate accidents, and the only way that it can initiate an event is by causing the reactor to trip when it is unnecessary. This possibility of the generation of a false trip signal has already been evaluated in the safety analysis. This modification will physically remove or disable the power range, neutron flux trip and will therefore decrease the possibility for the generation of a false trip signal. Therefore, the proposed change cannot create a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The proposed change which deletes the power range, neutron flux, high negative rate trip will have no impact on the margin of safety. The current safety analysis for Millstone Unit No. 3 does not credit this trip for any events; therefore, removal of this trip from the technical specifications will not affect the margin of safety for any analyzed events.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Learning Resource Center,

Three Rivers Community-Technical College, Thames Valley Campus, 574 New London Turnpike, Norwich, CT 06360.

Attorney for licensee: Ms. L. M. Cuoco, Senior Nuclear Counsel, Northeast Utilities Service Company, Post Office Box 270, Hartford, CT 06141–0270.

*NRC Project Director:* Phillip F. McKee.

Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, et al., Docket No. 50–423, Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3, New London County, Connecticut

Date of amendment request: January 23, 1995.

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would revise the Technical Specifications (TS) by 1) adding a new Section 3/4.5.5 which provides a limiting condition for operation, an action statement, a surveillance requirement, and a corresponding bases section, for the trisodium phosphate (TSP) baskets which will be installed in the next refueling outage; 2) deleting Section 3/ 4.6.2.3 and Bases 3/4.6.2.3 related to the spray additive system which are no longer needed since the chemical addition tank is being abandoned; and 3) updating Index Pages viii, ix, and xiv to reflect the above changes.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration (SHC), which is presented below:

\* \* The proposed changes do not involve an SHC because the changes would not:

1. Involve a Significant Increase in the Probability or Consequences of an Accident Previously Evaluated.

The plant change affects the chemical composition of the QSS [quench spray system] flow and the method of sump pH control, which are important for containment heat removal/pressure mitigation (MSLB and LOCA) [main steamline break and loss-of coolant accident] and fission product removal (LOCA). However, this change does not affect the probability of occurrence of these accidents. Since the TSP baskets are passive devices located inside the containment, they cannot initiate a transient or affect the probability of occurrence of any previously evaluated accident.

The design change will not adversely affect the radiological doses for the DBA [design basis accident] LOCA at the Exclusion Area Boundary, Low Population Zone, Millstone Unit No. 3 Control Room, Millstone Unit No. 2 Control Room, and the Millstone Technical Support Center. Also, the change will not adversely affect the calculated peak clad temperature (PCT) for the DBA LOCA.

2. Create the Possibility of a New or Different Kind of Accident from any Previously Analyzed.

The change does not create a malfunction that is different from those previously evaluated. The TSP baskets are passive devices that have minimal impact on any other systems except through water chemistry. The change in water chemistry does not adversely affect any safety systems. The installation of the TSP baskets and the abandonment of the CAT [chemical addition tank] will not change the probability of a malfunction of safety-related equipment.

Potential malfunctions relating to the TSP powder, the 12 baskets which hold the TSP powder, the QSS and other systems, and equipment credited in the safety analysis were evaluated and determined not to be adversely affected by the change. Additionally, the transient pH behavior of the spray flow will not adversely affect metals, coatings and elastomers in the containment, and the performance of associated safety functions is not affected.

Finally, the change in the chemical composition of the QSS solution will not affect the operability of this system or its ability for containment heat removal and pressure mitigation.

3. Involve a Significant Reduction in the Margin of Safety.

The design changes do not adversely affect the ability of the QSS to perform the function of containment heat removal, pressure mitigation and fission product (iodine) retention. The design changes do not adversely affect any equipment credited in the safety analysis. Also, the design changes to not increase the calculated peak clad temperature (PCT) or the offsite doses due to the design basis LOCA. Therefore, there is no impact on the margin of safety as specified in the technical specifications.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Learning Resource Center, Three Rivers Community-Technical College, Thames Valley Campus, 574 New London Turnpike, Norwich, CT 06360.

Attorney for licensee: Ms. L. M. Cuoco, Senior Nuclear Counsel, Northeast Utilities Service Company, Post Office Box 270, Hartford, CT 06141–0270.

NRC Project Director: Phillip F. McKee.

Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, et al., Docket No. 50–423, Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3, New London County, Connecticut

Date of amendment request: January 24, 1995.