involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Reference and Documents Department, Penfield Library, State University of New York, Oswego, New York 13126.

Attorney for licensee: Mark J. Wetterhahn, Esquire, Winston & Strawn, 1400 L Street, NW., Washington, DC 20005–3502.

*NRC Project Director:* Ledyard B. Marsh.

Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation, Docket No. 50–220, Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Unit No. 1, Oswego County, New York

*Date of amendment request:* February 1, 1995.

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would revise Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.13, "Remote Shutdown Panels." TS 3.6.13 currently requires that if the valve controls or monitoring instrumentation on the Remote Shutdown Panels are inoperable, they must be restored to an operable status within 24 hours or the plant shall be shut down. The proposed change would require inoperable valve control functions be restored to an operable status within 30 days or the plant shall be shut down. The proposed change would also specify that required inoperable monitoring instrumentation functions be restored to an operable status within 30 days or that an alternate method of monitoring the parameter be established within 30 days and the required function be restored to an operable status within 90 days or the plant shall be shut down.

The proposed amendment would also make minor editorial changes to TS Table 3.6.13–1 so that the table entries would be consistent with the proposed revisions to TS 3.6.13.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

The operation of Nine Mile Point Unit 1, in accordance with the proposed amendment, will not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The remote shutdown panel monitoring instruments and controls are not initiators or precursors to an accident. The remote shutdown panels provide the operator with sufficient monitoring instruments and controls to place and maintain the plant in a safe shutdown condition from a location other than the control room. Therefore, the proposed changes to Specification 3.6.13, "Remote Shutdown Panels," cannot affect the probability of a previously evaluated accident.

The proposed changes, in part, require that one channel (on either panel) for each function be operable. This change could potentially avoid an unnecessary plant shutdown without affecting an operator's ability to cope with a control room evacuation. One channel of each function is adequate to assure a safe shutdown. The proposed changes would also allow 30 days to restore an inoperable function to an operable status. As indicated in the ITS [Improved Standard Technical Specifications], the allowed time of 30 days is acceptable based on operating experience and the low probability of an event that would require evacuation of the control room. With one or more monitoring instrument functions inoperable, the proposed change gives an operator an additional option. Specifically, the operator is allowed 30 days to establish an alternate method of monitoring the parameter and 90 days to restore the function to operable status. The use of an alternate method is acceptable since it will provide the operator with indication of the parameter of interest. The remote shutdown panels will not be required to be operable in hot shutdown because the plant is already subcritical and in a condition of reduced reactor coolant inventory energy. Because this Specification no longer applies to hot shutdown and to be consistent with the guidance provided in the ITS, Specification 3.6.13.d will require that the plant be brought to a hot shutdown condition (versus cold shutdown condition) in 12 hours. As indicated in the ITS, the 12hour completion time is reasonable based on operating experience. The Bases Section to 3.6.13 and 4.6.13 was revised to be consistent with the proposed changes to the Specification. The Bases currently indicates that one remote shutdown panel is required to be operable. As explained above, one channel of each required function is required to maintain remote shutdown operability. In summary, the proposed changes will not affect the ability of the Remote Shutdown System to provide the operator with sufficient instrumentation and controls to place and maintain the plant in a safe shutdown condition from a location other than the control room. Therefore, the consequences of an event requiring a control room evacuation will not significantly increase

Editorial changes were made to Table 3.6.13–1 to be consistent with the changes made to the Specification. Specifically, the word "INSTRUMENT" was changed to "FUNCTION" and the words "PANEL MONITORING" were changed to the words "PANELS FUNCTIONS." These changes make it clear that one channel of each function, on either panel is acceptable to maintain operability. The emergency condenser condensate return valve control and motor-operated steam supply valves control were relocated from Specification 3.6.13.b to Table 3.6.13–1 to be consistent with the proposed changes.

Based on the above, the consequences of an accident previously evaluated are not significantly increased.

The operation of Nine Mile Point Unit 1, in accordance with the proposed amendment, will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

The changes do not introduce any new accident precursors and do not involve any alterations to plant configurations which could initiate a new or different kind of accident. The proposed changes require that one channel of each function be operable to assure the remote shutdown panels can meet their intended function. No changes have been made which will affect the operation of the remote shutdown panels in a way which would create a new or different kind of accident. Therefore, the proposed changes will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

The operation of Nine Mile Point Unit 1, in accordance with the proposed amendment, will not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The proposed changes will not affect the ability of the Remote Shutdown System to provide the operator with sufficient instrumentation and controls to place and maintain the plant in a safe shutdown condition from a location other than the control room. The ability to respond to a control room evacuation is maintained with one channel operable for each required function. The allowed outage time of 30 days is acceptable based on operating experience and the low probability of an event requiring control room evacuation. Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

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Attorney for licensee: Mark J. Wetterhahn, Esquire, Winston & Strawn, 1400 L Street, NW., Washington, DC 20005–3502.

*NRC Project Director:* Ledyard B. Marsh.

Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, et al., Docket No. 50–423, Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3, New London County, Connecticut

*Date of amendment request:* January 10, 1995.

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment request would revise Technical Specifications by deleting the power range, neutron flux, high negative rate trip from Tables 2.2–1, 3.3–1, and 4.3–1, and delete the associated Bases Section 2.0.