THE STRATEGY MAKERS

Beatrice Heuser

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Thoughts on War and Society from Machiavelli to Clausewitz

BEATRICE HEUSER

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For Cyril

Je conçus que la guerre est le premier des arts,
Et que le peintre heureux des Bourbons, des Bayards,
En dictant leurs leçons, était digne peut-être
De commander déjà dans l'art dont il est maître.
Mais je vous l'avoûrai, je formai des souhaits
Pour que cet art si beau ne s'exerçât jamais
Et qu'enfin l'équité fit régner sur la terre
L'impracticable paix de l'abbé de Saint-Pierre.

[I concede that warfare is the first of the arts,
and that the lucky painter of the Bourbons and the Bayards[1]
in drawing lessons {from their fighting} may merit
commanding in this art of which he is a master.
But I confide in you that I would hope
that this beautiful art will never be exercised
and that finally, equity would make reign on earth
the impracticable peace of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre.[2]]

(Voltaire about the writings of Guibert)[3]

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Preface and Acknowledgments

There are several purposes to this book. One is to resurrect wisdom long forgotten that is still of great relevance today. Some ideas in these early works are attributed currently to later, more modern authors, who either reinvented the wheel or actually took the ideas from these earlier texts. The excerpts printed here have been selected primarily because of their enduring relevance; texts or passages dealing with purely technical or tactical details, long overtaken by changing technology, have been omitted.

The second purpose is to find out something about the strategic thinking of the period, that is, for what political purposes and with what aims the authors thought wars could and should be waged. Passages of politico-military relevance have been included that give us information about strategic war aims, even though the text itself was aimed lower, perhaps at the level of the commanding officer, and not at that of the supreme political decision maker. Several texts provide an introduction to thinking about the purpose and conduct of war, against the background of different cultures, mentalities, and world views.

A third purpose is to make these texts accessible to readers unfamiliar with their languages, which, given today's use of English, includes even Elizabethan English. I have thus not only provided translations into English of texts and passages originally written in French, German or Spanish, Italian, Latin or Greek, but I have also modernized some English texts. Where the original words were quite different, I have inserted them in square [] brackets. Insertions for the clarification of the text are marked in {} brackets (parentheses). A four-dot ellipses (. . . .) indicates the end of

a sentence followed by an omission. A three-dot ellipses (. . .) indicates that the sentence itself is incomplete. Names of authors whose works are excerpted in this book are printed in bold letters at first mention. Already existing good accessibility has concomitantly been a chief *de*-selection criterion. Important works that would have merited inclusion but are readily available in modern English translations have been quoted from here, but they have not been included among the substantial excerpts. This applies to the books of Christine de Pisan, Niccolò Machiavelli, Maurice de Saxe, Henry Lloyd, Andreas Emmerich and Johannes Ewald, and of course Carl von Clausewitz.[4]

There are several friends, colleagues, and students whom I want to thank for their advice or whose contributions to this work I want to acknowledge. These include particularly Peter Randall and Victoria Clayton, who transcribed and modernized some of the English texts for me; Malte Riemann and Sophie Lick, who provided first drafts of translations; Susan Dixson, who helped with Mendoza; Michele Lucchesi who helped with tracking classical references; and Stefano Damiani, who helped me with Machiavelli. Dr. Rosemary Gill, Dr. Michele Margetts, and Dr. James T. Svendsen helped with particularly tricky Latin quotations. Dr. Frank Tallett and Professor Martin van Creveld deserve special thanks for reading earlier drafts of my introduction. And above all, our head of school, Dr. Philip Giddings, and our school administrator, Patricia Hicks, made it possible for me in the last year to bring this work to completion.

My thanks for support go to the staff of the following libraries: the Bodleian Library in Oxford; the British Library in London; the Staatsbibliothek in Berlin; the French National Library and the Bibliothèque Mazarine in Paris; the Spanish National Library in Madrid; the Codrington Library of All Souls College in Oxford; the librarian of the Führungsakademie in Hamburg, Karen Schäfer; the library of the Military History Research Office of the Bundeswehr in Potsdam (with its Bleckwenn collection of rare books on military subjects), especially the extremely competent chief librarian at the time, Dr. Annette Penkert; and the library of the University of the Bundeswehr in Neubiberg, especially their staff dealing with interlibrary loans.

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction: Themes and Context of Literature on Strategy

STRATEGY BEFORE THE WORD

Throughout the period we are dealing with here, a range of words was employed for the thinking, planning, and reasoning underlying the conduct of war. The Greek words *strategía* or *strategiké* were not yet commonly used in the West. While there is an explicit definition of tactics—"the science of military movements"—that can be traced back to the fourth century B.C.E.,[1] I have found usage, but no corresponding definition of *strategy* before the time of Emperor Justinian I in the sixth century. There, in an anonymous work, we read this:

> Strategy is the means by which a commander may defend his own lands and defeat his enemies. The general is the one who practices strategy…Strategy teaches us how to defend what is our own and to threaten what belongs to the enemy. The defensive is the means by which one acts to guard one's own people and their property, the offensive is the means by which one retaliates against one's opponents.[2]

Around 900, the Byzantine emperor Leo VI wrote a work on warfare, in which he used the word *strategía* to provide an overall term for the higher business of the *strategós.* For Leo, *strategía* encompassed subordinate tactics (the knowledge of how to move armed forces on land or sea and bring them to fight) and also fortifications; siegecraft; architecture and mechanics; logistics and mathematics; recruitment; and even medicine, astronomy, religion, philosophy, ethics, politics, and history.[3] Leo's work seems to have gone largely unknown in the Occident until the fall of

Constantinople in 1453, when many Greek intellectuals fled to the West, especially to Italy. When Roberto Valturio published his book on *Military Matters* in 1472, his treatment of the skills required by a general resembles that of Leo, suggesting that Valturio was acquainted with Leo's text in some form.[4]

In 1554 Sir John Cheke, Regius Professor of Greek at Cambridge, translated Leo's text into Latin. His problem with the translation was that the Greek term for strategy did not exist in Latin; for example, Frontinus, writing in Latin in the first century C.E., had to use the Greek term throughout his text, in Greek letters.[5] Cheke therefore used the awkward circumscription "the art of the general" or "the art of command" (*ars imperatoria*) for the Greek *strategía*.[6] Cheke's translation, printed in Basle, was read throughout Western Europe, for example by Count John of Nassau-Siegen (1561–1623), who cites it in his *Book of War*.[7] A further translation by Johannes Meursius followed in 1613.[8] Leo's work was in the library of the third Marquess of **Santa Cruz de Marcenado** (1684–1732). Without any evident knowledge of Leo's work, other writers used similar concepts: **Count de Guibert** (1743 or 1744–1790), for example, in his *General Essay on Tactics* (*sic*) published in 1770, wrote about "the science of a general," in which he included most aspects Leo had listed and that others would list in the following century under the caption "strategy." Guibert noted that this was "of itself everything,…because all other parts are only secondary" (see p. 161 below). So a concept of strategy—dominating the subordinate, more practical skills of tactics, fortifications, logistics, and so on—was known in Western Europe in the period we are discussing, even if the word was not used.

Until about 1800, most writers tended to speak less about strategy or tactics than about military matters, military instructions, or the art of war. Handbooks on the art of war or military matters, written in the style of the fourth-century Roman author Vegetius, were the most clearly recognizable genre of writing on war throughout this period. Vegetius was not the first classical author to have written such a handbook, but he was the last in the Western Roman Empire, and the only one widely known throughout the Occident until the Renaissance led to the rediscovery of other ancient texts. Several early modern authors explained specifically that they were writing about those skills a general needed to go about his tasks—echoes of the art of the general that can be traced back at least to Onasander in the first century C.E.[9] An ageless and classic summary is that given by the French chevalier of la Valière in his manual of 1666:

> To organise a camp, to deploy guards for the camp, to make an army march, lead it into battle, make it fight, to act against the sections or against enemy towns, to stage a blockade of a place and to attack it. Furthermore, it is necessary that a general know which artillery equipment he needs, proportionally to the strength of his army, and to his undertaking, that he know from where he will obtain his

victuals and war munitions, and what money he will have, as much in order to pay the soldiers and the works, as for the victuals, artillery, and hospitals.[10]

A Western word for *strategía* was invented only in the wake of Paul Gédéon Joly de Maizeroy's translation into French of Leo's book in 1771. Here, Joly underlined the conceptual distinction made by Leo between a higher "science of the general" (this is how Joly translated it originally) and the subordinate spheres of tactics: constructions of camps, fortification, logistics, and other specifics. In the body of the text itself, Joly still shied away from using the French neologism, but in a footnote on his translation explained that Greek authors had long recognized this need for multiple skills, and summarized the point this way: "*La stratégique* is thus properly said to be the art of the commander, to wield and employ appropriately and with adroitness all the means of the general in his hand, to move all the parts that are subordinate to him, and to apply them successfully."[11] In 1777 a translation into German boldly used the term *Strategie*.[12] Henceforth, use of the term, now in the form *Strategie* (German), *stratégie* (French), and *strategy* (English), including its political and ethical dimensions, spread throughout the West.

But our interest in this book is not merely what authors before the 1770s and after wrote about the art or science of the general. The concept of strategy has since taken on much greater dimensions, with a particular emphasis on greater political purposes and the use of military and other means, in peace and war, for the pursuit of these purposes.[13] This book shows that authors writing in early modern times did have valuable and complex thoughts about strategy, in this larger sense acquired only in the 20th century, even though they did not have a term for it.

GENRES OF WRITING ON WAR AND STRATEGY

Although little new was written about the art of war in the West between Vegetius in the late fourth century and 1400,[14] this did not stop some writers from pondering the higher purposes of war and the tasks of the prince or other political decision makers, above the supreme military commander, in going to war or in preserving or concluding peace. They built on the ideas of political philosophers of antiquity about the body politic, and its relation to its armed forces and their purposes, thus linking politics and the military tool. The few who did so in the West—for example Marsilius of Padua with his *Defender of Peace*—tended to avoid purely military issues. Then, shortly before 1400, one French cleric, Honoré Bonet, and following him, the Italian-born noblewoman Christine de Pisan (1365–ca. 1434) addressed them squarely. Christine de Pisan's works, easily accessible in modern English translations,[15] are truly remarkable; they draw on Vegetius, Honoré Bonet, and others, but add important new insights. Although Christine de Pisan was writing for a French audience during

the Hundred Years' War, her Italian origins are also important, given the many wars in Italy during that era. Following her, many Italian writers took up the subject of the art of war, albeit usually with less reference to political context. These included Leonardo Bruni or Aretino (ca. 1369–1444) with a treatise on the militia,[16] followed by writers of lesser interest.[17] It is not fortuitous that the next exceptionally important writer on strategy in modern times was again an Italian, Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527). He published his *Art of War* of 1521 under the pseudonym of Amadeo Niecoluci. It is structured like Vegetius's work (see discussion later in this chapter) but is cast as a Platonic dialogue.[18] This genre was most popular until the present—even Clausewitz's *On War* follows this pattern in Books III–VI—although the publication of such handbooks after 1800 gradually became something of a near monopoly of governments.[19] The existence of many other publications in Italian made it the leading culture for writing on war until the second half of the 16th century.[20] Machiavelli's is thus neither the first nor the last in this cluster of publications, but it is by far the most famous, and by far the most sophisticated since the writings of Christine de Pisan and of others in his own time, as a comparison with the works of authors in England or France before 1530 shows.[21]

A second genre was heralded by Valturio's popular and richly illustrated work of 1472, dealing mainly with matériel, impressive new siege engines, and fortifications,[22] as did the works of his followers through Sébastien Le Prêtre de Vauban (1633–1707) and beyond.[23] Unlike Machiavelli and the majority of other authors on war, writers of this matériel school tended to emphasize change through new technology; exceptions were Sir John Smythe, who famously argued against the musket and for reliance on the long bow and arrow, which at the time still assured a greater firing rate, and John Cruso, who thought that the Ancients had had a better approach to cavalry than his contemporaries.[24] Even the debate created by Guibert's revolutionary work in the 18th century curiously concerned mainly such technicalities.

A third genre was distinctly medieval in flavor and could be found mostly in French literature. A successor to the *chanson de geste,* it was the medieval predecessor of the *Bildungsroman,* a fictional or actual biography aimed at educating young noblemen or even princes. Examples of this are the possibly 13th-century Spanish half-fictional *Cantar de mio Cid;* the *Book of the Order of Chivalry,* possibly originating with the Majorcan Rámon Llull in the 13th century and then translated into several European vernacular languages; the 14th-century supposed memoirs of Bertrand du Guesclin, commander in chief of the Valois forces in the Hundred Years' War; the 15th-century fictional *Jouvencel* by Jean de Bueil; and the 16th-century biographies of the famous French superhero Bayard, the model "knight without fear and without reproach."[25]

A fourth, rare 16th-century genre consisted of published exhortations to fight, a cultural product of an era priding itself on rhetorical skills and

long public speeches.[26] A fifth genre, to which Machiavelli also contributed significantly with his *Discourses on the Works of Livy*, is that of commenting upon classical texts with or without translations.[27]

It is clear that, in coming so relatively early and writing books in two of these genres, Machiavelli was a dominant figure. In his *Discourses*, but also in *The Prince* and in his *History of Florence*,[28] he reflected on the political dimensions in war, which implicitly subordinated the use of force to higher political aims. But there is no one famous line by Machiavelli that sums this up. Nevertheless, his works—including his thoughts on war—were eagerly read by contemporaries and henceforth resonated through many publications, even if these coyly alluded to "the Florentine" or "the Secretary" so as to escape censorship because the Vatican had put Machiavelli on the index of forbidden works.[29]

Those who cited Machavelli's ideas either strongly supported or condemned them; regardless, his influence was monumental. **Raimond de Beccarie de Pavie, Seigneur de Fourquevaux** (1509–1574) drew on them openly, raising Machiavelli to the importance of Polybius, Frontinus, and Vegetius, reason enough to publish his own book anonymously. Frederick II (the Great) of Prussia (1712–1786) and Clausewitz (1780–1831) were avid students of Machiavelli. Whether disagreeing with his ideas (in the case of Frederick, who wrote an *Anti-Machiavell*) or agreeing with him (in the case of Clausewitz), Machiavelli's readers were encouraged to think about war in dimensions that went beyond the battlefield, and even beyond logistics, supply lines, and the geography of countries involved in war.

The genre of Machiavelli's political writings exemplified by *The Prince* also had a long ancestry and descent. *Mirrors of Princes* and other educational works for princes went back to Antiquity but were also popular in the Middle Ages. Preceding Machiavelli's work, but very much simpler in style and content, were Symphorien Champier's *Proverbs of Princes* and Robert de Balsac's *Ship of Battles*, which contained prescriptions for the prince on how to handle war.[30]

A different tradition was that of writers approaching war from a theological and legal background, such as the aforementioned Marsilius of Padua and Honoré Bonet. In the early modern period, the lawyers Justus Lipsius (1547–1606) and Hugo Grotius (1583–1645) in the Netherlands repeatedly discussed war in their works. Just as Roman law had developed concepts of a justifiable use of force, defined for the Christian world by Augustine of Hippo and codified by Thomas Aquinas, these lawyers were mainly concerned with the legality and legitimacy of warfare. Only a few exceptional writers in the tradition of Machiavelli merged these strands of thought on the art of war and the political purpose of war. These include **Matthew Sutcliffe** (1546 or 1547–1629) in England and **Bertrand de Loque** (1530 or 1540—after 1600) in France, a lawyer and a theologian by training. Some writers were both military officers and diplomats, including Fourquevaux and Guibert in France, and the Spaniards

Don Bernardino de Mendoza (1540 or 1541–ca. 1604) and Santa Cruz de Marcenado. Clausewitz read Guibert's works closely, and adopted from him central ideas about the relationship between the political culture of individual peoples or States and the way they wage wars.[31]

THE CHANGING LEAD CULTURE ON MILITARY MATTERS

The Italians dominated the literature on war until the 1580s, although works in Spanish[32] and French[33] were also read widely. The most interesting early French writer is Fourquevaux, who published his book on war, excerpted here, in 1548. The late 1580s and 1590s were a particularly productive period,[34] including the works of Mendoza, and Loque. This was the final period of the French Wars of Religion, and well into the Dutch Calvinist revolt against Spanish Catholic rule. Catholic Spain and Protestant England were intermittently at war, leading to a wave of English publications[35] including that of Sutcliffe, along with several translations into English of Spanish texts. The Spanish still had uprisings against their rule to contend with in the 17th and early 18th centuries, along with major war against France and their war of succession, reflected in the works of Santa Cruz.

Although Italian and Spanish works continued to be published well into the 17th century, this *grand siècle* and the following one were dominated by French literature on war, including the work of **Paul Hay du Chastelet** (1619–1682?), who described himself as a "military philosopher." By the time Guibert was writing, he could rightly claim that "the arms and precepts of France have set the tone for almost a century now, when almost all the technical terms of war are culled from our language" (see p. 161 below).

By contrast, the German-speaking authors were very late in coming up with interesting contributions. From the 16th to the 18th centuries, German works were at best technical, copying the approach of French works, with architects of fortifications, mathematicians, and artillerists such as Gerhard von Scharnhorst[36] setting the tone. Then, after the watershed of the Napoleonic Wars, Clausewitz's colleague and contemporary **August Rühle von Lilienstern** (1780–1847) changed this with his stunning handbooks for officers.

The concentration of this work within European authors is explained very simply in that it was a largely self-contained area of discourse. If there were important works that originated outside Europe in this period, they did not penetrate into this discourse, with few exceptions. One was the translation from Arabic into French of a work dating to about 1730 by a high-ranking officer of the Ottoman armed forces called Ibrahim Effendi. The book concerns tactics in our modern sense: military discipline and the training of the troops. Ibrahim claims to have read Latin and to have drawn his lessons specifically from Western writing on the subject.[37]

The other was a late 18th-century translation of Chinese works into French, including, famously, those if Sun Tsu.[38] Earlier, Sutcliffe had noted that Sultan Selim, presumably Selim II, had Caesar's works translated into Arabic (see p. 65 below). But intellectual communication between Europe and other advanced scholarly cultures was rare in this subject area.

MODERN TIME FRAME, ANTIQUE POINTS OF REFERENCE

The sources of this book fall in the time from Machiavelli to Clausewitz. Although Christine de Pisan, writing a century before Machiavelli, strongly merits inclusion, the writers between her and him are less interesting. The starting date for the works covered here is fluid, not least because Europeans throughout the Middle Ages and in the early modern period looked to the authors of classical Antiquity for guidance. This led to the famous quarrel over whether the Ancients or the Moderns had more to tell contemporaries, but the question of technological change versus eternal principles of warfare had troubled some writers previously when pondering the changes brought by new technology, new forms of administration, and new political patterns.[39] Nevertheless, while in the 20th century historians believed that the early modern period had seen a "Military Revolution,"[40] many contemporaries did not, instead seeing themselves as living in continuity with Antiquity, one that had been only temporarily obscured in the intervening times.[41]

The works of ancient historians were used extensively. Apart from Thukydides (ca. 460–395 B.C.E.), the one great favorite of political scientists even today, they included especially Polybius (ca. 200–ca. 120 B.C.E.), Livy (59 B.C.E.–17 C.E.), and Plutarch (ca. 50–125 C.E.). The Latin writers were preferred, unless the Greek works—especially those of Maurice and Leo VI in the 16th century—were available in Latin because far more Occidentals read Latin than Greek.

Other classical authors quoted included the philosophers Socrates (ca. 470–399 B.C.E.), his disciple Plato (ca. 427–348 B.C.E.), Plato's disciple Aristoteles (384–322 B.C.E.), Cicero (106–43 B.C.E.), and the Church father Augustine of Hippo (354–430 C.E.). Some classical authors actually wrote manuals on how to conduct war, including Aeneas the Tactician (fourth century B.C.E.) and the first-century C.E. Onasander, both of whom wrote in Greek and thus became known only in the Renaissance; the Latin author Frontinus (ca. 40–104 C.E.), who concentrated on stratagems and ruses; and two more Greek authors, Flavius Arrianus (after 85–after 160 C.E.) and his contemporary Aelianus Tacticus. Works by all these authors were printed for the first time in the 16th and 17th centuries, but none of them had the widespread readership of Vegetius.

The "General Rules of War" in Book III, chapter 26 of Vegetius's *Military Matters* foreshadowed Rühle von Lilienstern's and Carl von Clausewitz's

reflections on the dialectics of war: Vegetius opined that anything that benefits the enemy necessarily harms us and vice versa. He preferred bloodless victories through ruses, or through starving or surprising the enemy, over bloody battles, and he emphasized the need to keep one's own plans secret from the enemy for as long as possible.[42] Vegetius discussed the importance of good morale among the soldiers,[43] and of chance (*fortuna*), along with the luck of those who manage to exploit an unexpected opportunity.[44] Apart from echoes found of these (fairly obvious) points in later writings, Vegetius's enduring influence over the centuries lay in the structure of his manual, which in turn owed much to earlier works, some of which are lost. For 1,600 years and counting, his work has defined the style and the tone of field manuals.

The military reforms of the 16th and 17th centuries were seen or at least explained by the main innovators of the period—the Dutch Nassau princes of the late 16th century and Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden (1594–1632)[45]—as a return to the customs of the Ancients, above all to those of Vegetius. Innovations thus went hand in hand with a renewed yearning for Roman (Republican) virtues, discipline, and civic spirit. (Curiously, this was already Vegetius's intention in writing his own treatise: he, too, deplored the loss of older skills and practices, and called for a return to older skills as well as to Roman *mores* and *virtus*.)[46]

Neither Christine de Pisan nor her translator into English (no lesser man than Caxton himself) had shown awareness of the difference between the Roman *equester* and the medieval knight.[47] Machiavelli, the Renaissance man par excellence, was not interested in arms that had not existed in the late Roman Empire. For him and other contemporaries, their age was about the resurrection of ancient *virtú* and ways of war, about a shaking off of medieval malpractices, not about progress or innovation.[48] Gunpowder was changing the conduct of warfare incrementally, and it took centuries for this transformation to be complete; in the meantime, there were many dead ends. Thus, many of the authors of this time, from the Florentine Machiavelli to the Spaniards Sancho de Londoño and Diego Alava y Viamont, and the English member of parliament Thomas Digges, all writing in the late 16th century, to Frenchmen from the Marquis de Puységur (1655–1743) to Paul Gédéon Joly de Maizeroy (1719–1780), counseled against excessive trust in technical innovations and urged the emulation of classical examples.[49]

Gradually, however, it was not merely the matériel school whose adherents emphasized that times had changed. Among the earliest to speak out against "slavish adherence to custom" were Raymundo de Montecuccoli (1609–1680), a leading Habsburg general, and the French Marshal Maurice de Saxe (1695–1750).[50] The French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars (1792–1815) tipped the scales for good. Totally unlike the military revolution brought about by gunpowder, these wars were

perceived as a revolutionary watershed in warfare by contemporaries, albeit for reasons quite different from those identified by historians retrospectively.[51] Antoine Baron de Jomini (1779–1869),[52] Rühle von Lilienstern, and Clausewitz showed little if any interest in classical antiquity, by contrast taking the greatest interest in events of the previous 100 years or so. With this they set the new trend, that of political scientists writing about war,[53] who generally, even in the early 21st century, focus to an extreme extent on the recent past, ignoring other periods of history. It also explains the latter cut-off point of this book with the interpreters of Napoleon, especially Rühle and Clausewitz.

THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT, CA. 1500–1815

Traditional Causes of Wars

Until the French Revolution, Regnalism (a term introduced by Susan Reynolds)[54] prevailed in most parts of Europe as a personal loyalty among subjects not only to their immediate lord but to the prince, to whom they were tied by a metaphysical bond. In the Renaissance, this medieval concept was joined to the rediscovery of the Roman concept of the *amor patriae,* the love for the fatherland. Soldiers were expected by Fourquevaux, Mendoza, and Hay du Chastelet to be fighting "for their prince and their country." The idea that one was fighting not merely, or even less, for one's prince, but mainly for one's polity, that is, for one's commonwealth or fatherland (*patria*), gradually spread from the Italian city states, some of which were not monarchies or principalities but rather republics or oligarchies.[55] It spread to the discourses of the English and French revolutions, to be transformed into xenophobic nationalism after the period covered here. Nevertheless, the linkage between the native of a country and his commitment to defend it for his own, his family's, and his community's sake was invoked from Leonardo Bruni to Clausewitz in advocating militias and natives as soldiers, rather than foreign mercenaries: natives were credited with greater enthusiasm for defending something they had a stake in.

Rome passed on her universalist aspirations to the Western Roman Empire, later the Holy Roman Empire. This had met with resistance not only from the Eastern Roman Empire, which (rightly) saw itself as senior and the direct heir of Rome, but also from many other Christian princes unwilling to concede such primacy to an emperor. Charlemagne's descendants quarreled over it, as did the kingdoms that succeeded his and his successors' realms: the Frankish kingdom (later France), the many small entities within the Holy Roman Empire, and those caught in the rivalry between the two, from the North Sea and the estuary of the Rhine all along its course to the Alps. In Italy, the additional dimension of the rivalry between emperor and papacy and their two factions, the

Ghibellines and the Guelfs, exacerbated this quarrel well into the early modern era. It directly affected the life of Machiavelli and his family, who were caught up in this factionalism in Florence, where they had already moved to escape it,[56] and of Fourquevaux, whose ancestors had fled Milan in the 15th century to get away from it. It is not surprising to find writers—both Italian and French—deeply affected by the double-crossing politics of the period that called for vigilance particularly *after* a truce had been declared or a peace treaty signed.[57]

Another Roman inheritance was that of being on the receiving end of violent waves of immigration. The Germanic, Slav, and Hunnish migrations, which had pounded the Pax Romana, had brought about its fall in the West, and had over centuries brought war and misery to the Eastern Roman Empire, had ended in the High Middle Ages. So had the Arabic migrations unleashed by the birth of militant, expansionist Islam in the seventh century, which had pried the entire Middle East and North Africa away from Christian rule, temporarily along with Sicily and Spain; the latter were only returned to the Christian world when Machiavelli was 14 years old. Farther north, the Mongols invaded and then largely dominated most of Russia until the end of the 15th century.

But the violent migrations of the Huns' Turkic cousins, strengthened further in their martial predisposition by their militant religion, lasted well into modern times. This conquest of Christian territory by Muslims, with province after province being lobbed off the Byzantine Empire until its fall in 1453, was halted only temporarily with the Turkish defeat at the first siege of Vienna in 1529 and at the naval battle of Lepanto in 1573. Meanwhile, much of Eastern Europe had come under Turkish rule, making the defense against the Ottoman Turks, and against organized, bellicose Muslims in general, a central theme of European warfare even beyond the final defeat of the Turks in their second attempt to conquer Vienna in 1683. After our period, the Greek War of Independence and the many Balkan wars would result from this configuration, with the last Turkish conquest, that of northern Cyprus, effected in 1974.

The resultant viewpoint first formulated by the Roman and Byzantine Church fathers, and adopted by medieval and early modern Christians, was that the Christian Roman Empire had once dominated the world and had given it the *Pax Romana* before it was beset by heathen invaders. As Grotius put it, "There were many places formerly belonging to the Roman Empire, over which the Emperor has *at present* {emphasis added} no control."[58] The assumption, based on Roman just-war thinking going back at least to Cicero, was that it was morally right for Christian states to recover these lost lands. Thus for an entire millennium, and throughout our period, any Christian saw defense against Islam as the most just cause for any war (see Fourquevaux, p. 36 below).

Religious Wars

Religion was also crucial in intra-Christian wars of our period. Throughout the Middle Ages, the Orthodox and Roman Catholic churches had violently suppressed heretical sects. Such dissenters assumed recognizably Protestant and Puritan traits in the 15th century with the Hussites in Bohemia and the Lollards in England, contributing to a long period of religious wars that characterized the 16th and early 17th centuries. The French Wars of Religion (1562–1598) were the chief background for the writing of the Protestant Loque. Fourquevaux wrote before these wars got under way, but he would become heavily involved in them on the Catholic side.[59] The French Wars of Religion were initially the Siamese twin of the Eighty Years' War, in which the Dutch Protestants sought to establish their independence from Spain (1568–1648); this latter war eventually blended into the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648). The English were heavily involved in the early stages of the fighting in Flanders, providing background for the writing of Sutcliffe, Sir Roger Williams, William Garrard, Robert Barret, and Thomas Digges.[60] Some English works were even dedicated to the subject in their entirety.[61] The religious element of wars was present in the War of the Three Kingdoms (1641–1651), that is, the interrelated Bishops' Wars in Scotland, in the English Civil War, and in the Irish Confederate Wars. It was prominent in the largely bloodless Glorious Revolution of 1688, followed by William of Orange's brutal repression of insurgencies in Ireland; it permeated the Jacobite (Stuart) Rebellions of 1715 and 1745, which sought to return a Catholic king to the united thrones of Scotland and England. The religious element resurfaced at the end of our period as Roman Catholic resistance against the secularism of the French Revolution in the Vendée and against the French occupation of Spain under Napoleon.

Anti-Colonial Wars

Our period also stands in a long continuity of uprisings against foreign occupation forces and imperial powers. Welsh uprisings against English rulers had strong medieval roots, as did Scottish resistance against Plantagenet and later Tudor attempts to annex Scotland. Even less popular, if possible, was the rule of the Spanish Habsburgs. Protestants under their ultra-puritan and authoritarian Roman Catholic rule rose up especially in the Low Countries, resulting in the establishment of two separate states at the end of this Eighty-Years' War. Toward the end of this period of wars, in 1640, Catalonia and Portugal also rose up against the Habsburgs. Portugal reestablished its independence as a kingdom, while the Reapers' War, or Catalan insurgency, was repressed by Spain by 1652, even though the Catalonians had brought the French in to help them. Early in the 18th century, Spain's remaining North African provinces, now with predominantly

Muslim populations, rose up to shake off Spanish rule, and it was in this context that Santa Cruz de Marcenado wrote about insurgencies and how to contain them: as governor of Oran, he lost his life in the (temporarily successful) attempt to pacify this dependency.

The American War of Independence (1775–1783) also falls into this category of anti-colonial uprisings, as do the insurgencies against French occupation under Napoleon in Spain—the famous Guerrilla of 1808–1812, part of the Peninsular War—and the uprising against his Bavarian allies in the Tyrol (1809–1810).

Other Traditional Causes of Wars

Besides such ideologically driven wars, there were other traditional causes of war. There were the classic rivalries for power, land, and trade, which include the wars of the Italian states; the competition between Spain, Portugal, England, France, and the Netherlands for colonies from the 16th century onwards; the later Anglo-Dutch trade wars (1652–1654; 1665–1667; 1672–1674; and after a pause, 1780–1784); the Great Northern War (1700–1721) between Sweden on the one hand and Russia, Poland-Lithuania, Denmark-Norway, and Saxony on the other; and the French and Indian Wars, which began in 1754 and merged with European conflicts in the Seven Years' War (1756–1763) involving the French, Prussians, British, and other parties. The poor French performance in these wars stood in marked contrast to earlier French successes, and included several humiliating defeats, which spurred Guibert to call for major reforms.

The Seven Years' War was caused by a blend of several disputes, one of them dynastic. Dynastic wars recurred frequently from the Hundred Years' War (1337–1453) between the Plantagenets and the Valois over the French succession, which was the background for Christine de Pisan's writing, to the War of the Spanish Succession (1701–1714), which gave Santa Cruz de Marcenado his main experience of war, and to the War of the Austrian Succession (1740–1748), which pitted Frederick II of Prussia against Empress Maria Theresa. For the populations that changed hands in these wars, it mattered little who their rulers were; what mattered greatly was how they were treated. In principle, they did not yet care whether their rulers spoke their language. The princes throughout Europe were related to each other, and belonged to a class of semi-divine beings who were honored because of their descent, not for any personal achievements that endeared them to the population. Despite the memorable exceptions of Gustavus Adolphus, Frederick II, and Napoleon, princes rarely led their own armies into battle, and whether this was desirable was much debated.[62] And yet in most states—with the exceptions of some city-states ruled by oligarchies such as Venice or Geneva—princes were the supreme decision makers in everything. They decided on alliances and war; their subjects had to obey. Vassals were by definition required to fight and

make sacrifices for their prince, as Mendoza pointed out. Others fought for pay. Even in the 18th century, nationalism—a fervent, selfish love for one's imagined community defined as one's nation, over and above all others—as yet existed only in embryonic form, mainly in countries with a long continuity in their frontiers, such as England and to some extent France, or where there was a nobility that claimed to represent this nation to give it strength vis-à-vis the crown. Classical traditions of patriotism and communal spirit were known through the centuries, but in most other states resonated only among the educated few (e.g., Guibert).

The French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars

All this would change fundamentally with the American War of Independence and the French Revolution. An intellectual elite, chief among them Guibert, had prepared the ground for both events. His humanist attitude of seeing all men as equals, no matter what their fatherland was, was shared by many thinkers of the Enlightenment and indeed of the French Revolution, and stands in stark contrast to subsequent nationalism, the seeds of which were sown by Napoleon across Europe. Notwithstanding the change in spirit with Napoleon's expansionism, Rühle von Lilienstern, Clausewitz, and others saw these wars collectively as a watershed, but they spent little time on examining the impact of ideology on the conduct of war.

THEMES IN THE LITERATURE

Let us now turn to some of the main themes running through the publications of our period. All of them had in common that they were intended to have practical, or at least educative, applicability. The detached and abstract interest in war characterizing much 20th century international relations theory, or the notion that the study of warfare could be undertaken as *l'art pour l'art,* would have been alien to all writers of this period. Even Clausewitz, who made a point of theorizing on war, not merely prescribing how to conduct it, did so to teach a putative future reader—he had a general or prince in mind—how to think about war, so that he would make better decisions in war.[63]

Art of War or Science of War

A brief reminder of the etymology of the terms *art* and *science* is useful here, as the current usage of both terms in English is the exact opposite of their original meanings. The French and English word art hails from the Latin *ars,* the most important meaning of which, for our purposes, is skill, the practical ability to do something, a meaning reflected in the French and English word *artisan,* or skilled craftsman. Originally, the arts were thus

subjects that implied practical skills, like the ability to speak a language or to paint a picture (with the latter called fine art). The equivalent German word, *Kunst,* was related to the verb *können,* to be able to do something. The French and English word science, by contrast, originally implied abstract knowledge and reflection upon a subject, the theory as opposed to the practice of art. It is derived from the Latin *scientia,* wisdom, and has its equivalent in the German *Wissenschaft.* Abstract logic, mathematics, and theoretical reflections upon the laws of nature (i.e., physics) were all sciences, and stood in clear contrast to applied subjects (i.e., arts!) such as engineering, cannon-founding, constructing fortifications, or indeed, organizing for and waging war, the skill expected from a general. This does not mean, however, that everybody used these terms consistently. The Byzantines used both expressions, as in the odd, late-medieval text tackling the subject.[64] The (Milanese?) author Antonio Cornazano, who first published his *De Re Militari* in 1515, wrote in praise of "*l'arte militare*" (thus the title of his first chapter), but in line three described the flowering of this *scientia*.[65] Bartolomeo Cavalcanti opted for the science, Hieronimo or Girolamo Garimberto for the art.[66]

The subsequent two centuries saw a steadily growing interest in artillery, which in turn necessitated an increasing spread of mathematical skills among the officers practicing it. Mathematics in its practical application again married theory and practice, science and art, but authors continued to write about both. In the 17th century, Giovanni Battista Ciotti used the term art in the sense of artful application, or arms.[67] Henry Hexham wrote of "art militarie."[68] Henri Duke of Rohan was more interested in the "sciences of the general."[69] Hay du Chastelet once again combined both, writing about "military art" and "art of war," and about the "sciences of arms." Jacques François de Chastenet, Marquis de Puységur and marshal of France, in his *Art of War by Principles and Rules,* pointed to the methodical instruction and the existence of academies in ancient Greece and Rome where one could learn about the art of war, and regretted the absence of any similar institution in his own times. Like Sutcliffe (and other authors who wanted to sell their books) before him, Puységur argued that one could learn a good deal about war from books, and that these were useful especially if a long period of peace did not furnish alternative ways of gaining such knowledge.[70] (Those who did not share this conviction logically did not write this down.)

In the 17th century, military sciences began to be taught in military academies or war schools, and in the 18th, both academies and handbooks on the subject multiplied.[71] Probably the first, albeit short-lived, military academy was founded in Siegen, Westphalia, in 1617. An equally short-lived French military academy followed in 1629. The small kingdom of Savoy followed suit in 1677; Prussia started one in 1653 and another one of sorts in 1717. Frederick II founded a military academy, again of sorts, in 1765, which was defunct by the time a new academy for young officers

was put together in 1801, run by Gerhard von Scharnhorst and attended by Carl von Clausewitz. In 1810 the academy was reorganized and divided into three, one of which, designed for higher education, was left in Berlin; in 1816 it became the *Allgemeine Kriegsschule,* where Clausewitz was administrative director.[72]

In France, it was not Puységur, but one of his successors, Maurice de Saxe, who managed to persuade King Louis XV to found a military school, the École Militaire, which first began to educate officers in 1760, although its splendid buildings were not completed before 1780. In Britain, a Royal Military Academy to train military cadets was founded in Woolwich in 1741, followed by a Royal Military College in 1800, located in Camberley, which was for staff officers and later renamed the Staff College. With these military schools coming into being, the writing of manuals was commissioned by States, and official manuals began to compete with those written by private individuals. During the period considered in this book, both forms of manuals continued to be present, resembling each other quite closely. In both types, for example, the handbooks of Rühle von Lilienstern and of Joly de Maizeroy, the terms art and science continued to be used for warfare.[73]

The Prussian mathematician Dietrich Heinrich von Bülow (1752–1807) equated "science of war" with "theory," and "art of war" with its "application."[74] Confusion persisted, however, as to whether one was dealing with an art or a science. Guibert and Leo's French translator Joly de Maizeroy, like Leo, wrote both about "the art of war" and "military science."[75] It was Clausewitz who broke the deadlock on this debate by pronouncing that warfare was neither, but something more like "commerce," and—famously—an "act of policy."[76] This did not mean, however, that previous authors had been blind to the nexus of war, political aims, and ambitions.

Origins and Causes of War

To understand war, our authors sought to understand its origins and causes. The statutes of King Henry V of England named "covetousness" (*cupiditas*) as the principal cause of war, displeasing to God.[77] There was no change throughout this period in seeing war as result of man's imperfection: in 1799, Dietrich Heinrich von Bülow wrote that "the corruption of human being engenders war. War in turn feeds and increases corruption."[78] While Jean V de Bueil (1406–1477) in his *Jouvencel* dates the origins of war back to Cain and Abel, he also called it the "enemy of nature."[79] This was the opposite of the pseudo-biological reasoning adopted in the 19th century, according to which war was part of a natural Darwinian struggle for the survival of the fittest.

Concomitantly, Symphorien Champier, writing around 1500 and standing for many authors of the early modern period, emphasized that victory

came from God; he did, however, also counsel his prince to be ready at all times with a standing army to defend himself, even as he tried to avoid war if at all possible.[80] Mendoza agreed that victory was in God's hand, but like other contemporaries, he had difficulties explaining why God sometimes chose to give it to "those that have fought unjustly," trying to relate it to some secret purpose incomprehensible to man (see p. 90 below). In Champier's work, however, one can already see the pagan theme of Fortuna influencing war creeping in,[81] which we encountered in Vegetius's writing. This was also a favorite subject of Machiavelli's,[82] changed by Clausewitz into "chance."[83] Medieval thinking, by contrast, is still fully present in Hay du Chastelet's treatise of 1668, when he stated his belief in God's intervention in even the smallest detail in war (see p. 108 below).

Ever since the Church fathers and other early Christian scholars had debated this point, the question was whether, if war existed because of man's fallibility, God actually wanted man to fight, at least in certain circumstances. From Augustine of Hippo onward, the Roman Catholic Church had accepted that man must fight, as there were clear claims in the Old Testament that God had commanded it. This view resonated in the Middle Ages, and was taken up by Sutcliffe, and Loque, who cited most of the relevant passages usually invoked in this context (see p. 52 below). Loque, Sutcliffe, and half a century later the Puritan William Gouge,[84] were among those Protestants who regarded the pacifist convictions of the Anabaptists as dangerous, fully agreeing with Roman Catholic teaching on this matter, as spelled out by Hay du Chastelet.

Just Causes and Purposes

The requirement for a just cause in war can be traced back to pre-Christian Roman thinking, especially in the works of Cicero. Already in the first century C.E., we find Onasander, a Greek writing within and for the Roman Empire, invoking the displeasure of the gods if a war were fought without a just cause.[85] The Roman Catholic Church espoused this approach through the writings of Augustine of Hippo and Thomas Aquinas, who developed conditions for a just cause that were accepted throughout this period.

Count Jacopo/Giacomo di Porcia (1462–1538) summed up this point of view only three years after the death of Machiavelli: one should be assured of having an honest cause for war making; the only legitimate purpose was to have peace afterward and not to sow further discord or to gain riches; and it had to be the last resort, when all other measures had failed to persuade. This did not stop him, in the following sentence, from advocating preventive war against a prince "stronger or equal in power" who himself was preparing war,[86] a point on which Sutcliffe followed in advocating a preventive war against Spain with the invasion of the Spanish mainland (see p. 77f below).

Bernardino Rocca in 1582 and the French marshal Armand Gontault de Biron in 1611,[87] as well as Hay du Chastelet (see p. 109 below), agreed on this perception of war as the last resort and the need for a thoroughly just cause. As a scholar, Loque gave a more erudite summary of conditions for a just war (see pp. 52f and 58–60 below). Ambassador Mendoza thought a prince should leave it to his theologians to determine whether a war was just (see p. 89 below; see also Sutcliffe, (see p. 68f below). Giovanni Battista Ciotti in 1620 still emphasized that war was only legitimately undertaken by the State (republic or kingdom), and should not be waged for rapacious, fraudulent, or violent motives.[88] Fourquevaux, as a military man himself, like many before and after deployed the classic argument of medieval chivalry: turning of the other cheek was fine for "the Apostles and their like," but it was not appropriate for princes whose duty it was to defend their subjects, or indeed any good men who would otherwise be "devoured by the strong and the wicked." Fourquevaux conceded that arbitration, if accepted by both sides, would be much preferable to war (see pp. 37–39 below).

Although many authors such as Grotius asserted the need for a just cause before going to war, they were skeptical of the claims of princes to have justice on their side.[89] Hay du Chastelet disapproved of wars of conquest, especially where the conquerors had shown themselves as destroyers and tyrants (see p. 110 below). Frederick II of Prussia, when young and idealistic, had written in his criticism of Machiavelli that defensive wars were clearly the most just, while aggressive wars could at best be justified if they preempted an enemy's attack. At the time, he did not consider the pursuit of a prince's glory to be a just cause, and he even went as far as opining that a prince who started an unjust war was "more cruel than a tyrant."[90] In his own reign, however, he abandoned all these ethical precepts.

Linked to the justice of the cause was another issue that had been debated by early Christians: was the individual soldier personally responsible for the killing he undertook in war? The predominant view of the Roman Catholic Church had become that soldiers were not responsible if they merely followed their prince's orders. By contrast, all responsibility for starting and fighting an unjust war lay with the prince (see Fourquevaux see p. 36 below). This argument abrogating any individual responsibility would still be made by the soldiers and officers of the *Wehrmacht* four hundred years later. Interestingly, it was a point on which Sutcliffe disagreed: had not the Christian soldiers in the service of the apostate emperor Julian refused to draw their swords against fellow Christians? He thought soldiers could only be absolved from responsibility for an unjust war if the injustice was not blatantly obvious (see below p. 69f).

Purpose of War

Peace was the only acceptable aim of war in the Aristotelian and Roman tradition—a position fully espoused by Roman Catholic teaching.

This was universally accepted by the writers from Christine de Pisan to the French Revolution. Preempting Clausewitz, who is usually credited with this idea, Giacomo di Porcia noted that one should contemplate the end of war before beginning it. In the context of war, Porcia warned that friends might turn into enemies: one should know one's own and the enemy's strength, and how great one's own chance of winning might be.[91] Typically, Hay du Chastelet's book concludes with a desirable, all-satisfying peace as the end state of all war (see below, pp. 108f, 122). This would be in the ultimate interest of the people, as Guibert agreed in his *General Essay* (see p. 158 below). Even the hawkish Prussian general Konstantin von Lossau (1767–1848) wrote at the end of the Napoleonic Wars that it was natural for States to love peace and to hate war, and that the aim of war had to be peace. Echoing the Prussian apotheosis of the State that had become fashionable through Fichte and others, Lossau noted that it was paradoxical that the State, of the greatest benefit to men, also led to man's greatest suffering—war—for States had clashing interests.[92] This insight into the pernicious link between the selfishness of States and war had led men of previous centuries—from Sully to the Abbé de Saint Pierre to Guibert to Rousseau and Kant—to seek ways to check this selfishness, either by turning States into republics or by creating a super-State to mediate between them. Even though the 19th century did see some attempts to mediate between clashing interests, Fichte's and Lossau's views would predominate in the century and a half following the French Revolution. The era of nationalism, rampant collective selfishness, would replace the more enlightened views of the authors of previous centuries.

In the period covered in this book, however, there was consensus that war had to be the means to bring peace and settle quarrels. Ever since the Middle Ages, war—especially battle—like a duel had been seen as a means to bring in a divine judge where no human judge existed or was respected enough to impose his judgment. In modern times, the religious dimension gave way to a more secular understanding of war as a substitute for a trial. In 1631 William Gouge wrote that "war is a kind of execution of public justice, and a means of maintaining right."[93] Or as Rühle von Lilienstern would put it later, war replaces settlement in court when no international arbiter exists between sovereign States (see p. 180 below).

The ideal of an objective form of justice receded in the minds of many in the face of the French Napoleonic onslaught. Bülow conceded that "the purpose of all military operations is peace," but, he added, a peace "advantageous to us through the damage inflicted on the enemy, and for him disadvantageous, which one wants to coerce the enemy to accept."[94] At the height of the wars against Napoleon, the Austrian Archduke Charles wrote that

> the main purpose of war {is} the quickest possible attainment of an advantageous peace; in consequence, everything must aim to coerce the enemy as soon as possible to accept peace, by striking him decisively.[95]

At the time of Waterloo, Lossau also described war as the means of securing by force what one could not acquire in other ways, but references to justice, a just cause, or a justifiable claim were notably absent from his book.[96] In 1829, while Clausewitz was still writing his *On War,* his Prussian fellow general Johann Gottfried von Hoyer chose similar words: "War is the action of a State to obtain by the force what it cannot obtain through negotiations. This can only be done through the use of armed force, the army."[97] Clausewitz's succinct formulation that the object of war is to compel one's enemy to do one's will was thus a commonplace by the time he wrote it down.[98]

The pursuit of justice thus turned into pursuits of selfish interests, which would justify anything in the Realist worldview that would come to dominate the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The conquest of territory that did not amount to the recapturing of previously owned land was specifically one of them. Conquest as a motive of war was not new to later Realist thinking, but earlier authors did not count this as a just cause, even if they recognized its frequent occurrence. Berault Stuart (ca. 1452–ca. 1508), a French nobleman of Scottish extraction who was both a soldier and a diplomat, took wars of conquest for granted, but he advised against overstretch, citing the French adage, "He who embraces too much holds on to too little."[99] Giacomo di Porcia foreshadowed Frederick II of Prussia's views when he wrote in 1530 that it was the "duty" of any prince, in times of peace "to augment and defend his empire," except that Porcia did not prescribe war as the way to do so, but rather endorsed acquiring "new friends" and "purchasing their favour."[100] Blaise de Monluc, maréchal de France (1521–1575), saw advantages in sending one's unruly young noblemen to fight abroad to channel their lust for fighting and adventure away from their own war-torn country.[101] Mendoza noted realistically that "the desire of conquest is held to be a natural matter in all sorts of men, and more so in kings" (see p. 91 below). Bülow, who had conceded earlier that peace should be the aim of war, wrote further that in the real world, war was often waged in order to increase one's territorial possessions. He was an early proponent of geopolitics or geostrategy, arguing that the States of Europe were seeking to expand to reach their "natural" frontiers (e.g., mountain ranges, rivers). Once the major States had attained these natural frontiers, they might stop for they could not achieve anything more; thus, attaining such an objective might actually bring about "eternal peace," encouraging States to disband their standing armies, or else find that within Europe, defensive wars would be easier to win than offensive wars.[102] It is odd for somebody who had lived in America not to have seen competition over colonies as a new cause for war among the European powers.

Victory

At the beginning of the era considered here, not all authors supposed that men had much influence on the outcome of war—a notion that was

strong throughout the Christian Middle Ages and was still reflected by the ardent Protestant cleric Thomas Becon, writing in 1542:

> The psalmist said . . . "Some trust in chariots, and some in horses: but we will remember the name of the LORD our God. They are brought down and fallen: but we are risen, and stand upright."[103] Here we see that all the policies of war { = strategies and tactics} that the wits of men can invent are but vain, and of themselves not able in any point to get the victory.[104]

Inasmuch as authors supposed that human agency did have an influence on the accomplishment of victory, however, this was logically part of what they wrote about.

The educated would know their Plutarch, who in his *Nikias* had noted that "to use well a victory is better than to gain a victory."[105] Fourquevaux took this to mean that one had to exploit victory on the battlefield by quickly staging further battles. Yet he also drew attention to the uncertainty of victory and the need to eschew battle if in doubt (see p. 38f below). Sutcliffe, by contrast, saw victory in a wider context, just as writers of Antiquity had. Quoting Livy's famous dictum on Hannibal, that he was able to attain victory but was not capable of putting it to good use,[106] Sutcliffe, like authors today, underscored the ulterior purpose of victory, which in itself was "not the be-all and end-all" (see p. 79 below) that writers of the 19th and earlier 20th centuries had mistakenly considered it. Sutcliffe devoted considerable space to what should be done after a victory to bring it to political fruition. Like Sutcliffe, Santa Cruz pointed to the risks of losing the peace unless one acted with great circumspection even after a battle was won. Most authors from Fourquevaux and Loque to Santa Cruz devoted space to both what to do if one had won a battle and if one had been defeated, and in either case, how to make the best of the situation.

The most original and insightful examination of the concept of victory is found in Rühle von Lilienstern's handbooks: while Rühle recognized just war as an ideal, he argued convincingly that in reality, war served many purposes, and even military victory was not always the main aim. Rühle invalidated the entire flood of later writings, which, under the influence of the Napoleonic Paradigm, would be so obsessed with victory (see pp. 178–181 below). One cannot help but think that a greater acquaintance with Rühle's writings would have saved many 19th-century thinkers from greatly aberrant views on war, and the millions of dead to which this would lead in the world wars of the early 20th century.

How to Deal with the Defeated Enemy

Since late Antiquity, authors on strategy had underscored the need to show mercy to the defeated enemy. In pre-Christian times, the reason given for this by Frontinus, for example, is that it would hopefully lead

to emulation by the enemy,[107] thereby civilizing the overall practice of war. In Christian times it was enough to invoke divine approval to justify this position; no rational reason was usually given. Augustine of Hippo contrasted civilized behavior and savage cruelty, a line used much in our period of reference (see Sutcliffe, p. 69 below).

A particularly infamous case is that of the battle of Agincourt in 1413, when Henry V's Plantagenet forces put prisoners to death during the battle when they feared defeat. In a notable case of do as I say, don't do as I do, Henry V's own ordinances, which have come down to us through Nicholas Upton, expressly forbad the killing of prisoners.[108] Giacomo di Porcia, writing in 1530, described it as

> the duty and office of any political leader [*polityke capitayne*], after the battle is won and victory achieved, to save {spare those enemies'} lives who have not been excessively cruel and overly resistant. For what would be less gentle, indeed more like to the cruel and fiercely brutal beasts, than to handle your enemy without any mercy and meekness. Undoubtedly a leader acting thus will kindle the minds of men against him.[109]

Fourquevaux included in his ordinances the injunction never to kill anybody "unless in self-defence," (see p. 48f below) but it is unclear how this relates to enemy combatants. Sutcliffe likewise argued against cruelty, which to him included killing unarmed enemies or prisoners of war. Indeed, he argued for building "a bridge of gold" for the enemy to allow him to flee. However, he did not see the practice of starving enemy forces in order to bring about their withdrawal as barbarous (see pp. 77, 79 and 86 below).

Eighty years later, Hay du Chastelet placed particular emphasis on the good treatment of prisoners of war, especially if they were wounded, and on the honorable burial of the enemy fallen. He saw it as a particular sign of a general's strength and "glory" if he could afford to be so magnanimous as to let captive enemy soldiers go free after giving their word of honor that they would not rejoin their own forces (see p. 112 below). The practical problem of how to look after prisoners adequately when one's own soldiers were desperately needed elsewhere is a perennial one. A century after Hay du Chastelet, the Swiss Emerich de Vattel emphasized that, from a legal point of view, prisoners of war must not be put to death if one cannot guard and feed them; rather, they must be released on parole, that is, with the promise that they will not return to fight for their own side. As a particularly deplorable example, he mentioned the slaughter of French prisoner by the forces of Henry V at Agincourt. Only with savages might one resort to putting them to death "coolly and deliberately," and only if this was absolutely necessary.[110]

Practices varied in pre-Napoleonic times according to whether the enemy combatants were viewed as traitors (as in the Jacobite rebellions)

or as legitimate adversaries. In the former case, massacres of defeated enemy forces would often occur (such as after the Jacobite defeat at Culloden in 1746), while in the latter cases, adversaries were mostly treated in accordance with international conventions. Battlefield fatalities as a percentage of combatants were thus generally much lower in the period considered here than in the subsequent Napoleonic Wars.

How to Deal with the Population

Theory and practice in the treatment of noncombatants—women, children, the old, the infirm, and the clergy and other men not willing or able to fight—diverged often in the Middle Ages, but the general injunction that combatants had no business harming such noncombatants and were by definition enjoined to protect them has its firm roots in medieval texts.[111] The discrepancy between theory and practice is underlined by the notoriety gained by those military leaders who prevented pillage and rape, most famously the chevalier Bayard.[112] Following Machiavelli's views on this point, Porcia urged his commander to treat the populations of conquered areas well: to ensure that his kindness was not forgotten, the army should be ordered neither to plunder nor burn the country of a defeated enemy, nor any town that had yielded itself to a siege.[113]

Writing hardly two decades alter Porcia, Fourquevaux prescribed capital punishment for anyone who raped a woman or "abused people of the country where the war is waged, either in body or goods" (see p. 49 below). Bernardino Rocca, whose book was published in 1582, wrote extensively on the considerations of how to behave when moving through a province that was not your own, and the necessary military discipline in such a context. Pillaging, he thought, would lead a soldier to lose himself and his victory. The same applied to rape, which would degrade the triumph of victory and any glory. He devoted much space to the proper behavior toward enemy populations after sieges.[114] Sutcliffe was horrified by the Turkish practice of taking such civilians as slaves. After victory, he thought, only just rule and vigilance would keep the peace. His list of ordinances urged capital punishment for those who stole goods or housing from friend or foe. He pleaded for good treatment of all locals, and argued against any scorched-earth tactics. Murders and rapes committed by soldiers should be punished in war just as in peace (see pp. 69, 80, 86f below).

The Englishman Robert Barret in 1598 had his captain explain that in taking a "fort, city or town," the military commander

> should pursue the victory even until the enemy wholly yields, and rendered, and grants license to fall to sack and spoil: after which he shall deport himself in neither a cruel nor covetous manner, as a number of bad and graceless fellows do, without respect for God or man, leaving no kind of ravening cruelty uncommitted, with brutal ravishment of both women and maidens, and with merciless murder

of poor innocents: instead in such cases he shall show himself to be favourable and merciful to the humble vanquished, making arrangements to defend them, especially common [*simple*] women and maidens: for God, no doubt, will be well pleased in so doing.[115]

After the Thirty Years' War, Hay du Chastelet advocated not only taking hostages from conquered peoples and towns so as to assure their loyalty, but also "to caress the inhabitants," making them "happy under the new domination," with a restoration of their old laws and ways. A king should think that these peoples, "in becoming his new subjects, they have become his new children," and must treat them accordingly, "with all possible kindness" indeed to make them prosper, as long as they were prepared to cooperate (see pp. 117, 122 below). His contemporary, Marquess Annibale Porroni, who as an Italian was serving as major general in Poland, in his *Universal Treatise on the Modern Military* inspired by the style of Machiavelli's *Art of War*, reiterated all the injunctions against maltreating the population after a successful siege.[116] Half a century later, Santa Cruz de Marcenado admonished his readers to "spare the blood of the vanquished" and to punish only leaders who obstinately refused to submit (see p. 140 below). In 1758 Emerich Vattel wrote,

Women, children, feeble old men, and sick persons, come under the description of enemies; and we have certain rights over them . . . But these are enemies who make no resistance; and consequently we have no right to maltreat their persons, or use any violence against them, much less to take away their lives. This is so plainly a maxim of justice and humanity, that at present every nation, in the least degree civilized, acquiesces in it. If, sometimes, the furious and ungovernable soldier carries his brutality so far as to violate female chastity, or to massacre women, children, and old men, the officers lament those excesses: they exert their utmost efforts to put a stop to them; and a prudent and humane general even punishes them whenever he can. But, if the women wish to be spared altogether, they must confine themselves to the occupations peculiar to their own sex, and not meddle with those of men, by taking up arms. Accordingly, the military law of the Switzers, which forbids the soldiers to maltreat women, formally excepts those females who have committed any acts of hostility.[117]

The notable exceptions to the prescription of lenient treatment of enemy noncombatants were, first, in the context of the capture of castles, towns, or cities that had refused to yield in a siege. It was customary from the Middle Ages until at least the Thirty Years' War to maltreat the obstinate citizens in such cases; even strategists were not always opposed to this practice. Porcia advocated cutting off the hands of the townsfolk who had resisted a siege in order to encourage other towns to surrender faster, even though he also urged his readers to hold out in any siege. He also counseled increasing the besieging army's fervor by promising them that they could pillage to their heart's delight.[118] Fourquevaux thought ill

treatment of "declared rebels against the king," including noncombatants, quite acceptable (see p. 36f below). Sutcliffe declared it to be impossible to subdue rebels except by force, but he spoke out against massacres or rape of anyone who had surrendered; moreover, he espoused the Roman view that a just regime willingly embraced by its subjects was the most durable (see pp. 80, 86 below).

The second exception was that of the treatment of enemies in religious wars, when they could be portrayed as heretics. Loque thought that a prince might "chastise by war, or otherwise, his heretical subjects" but counseled "some moderation" (see p. 55 below).

Insurgencies and Counterinsurgency, Civil War

While the harsh treatment of rebels was a long tradition, there were also more enlightened and humanistic views. The well-read Christine de Pisan argued that insurgencies arise from poor governance.[119] Machiavelli agreed in essence with his countrywoman: in discussing the pros and cons of building fortresses to better control and suppress a local population, he warned that the ability to hide from the wrath of the local population in such a fortress

> makes you quicker to use, and less careful in using, harsh measures, and by such measures you make them long for your downfall, and they become so furious that, for this very reason, your fortress will afford you no protection. So obvious is this, that a *wise and good* prince never constructs fortresses if he wants to remain good and to avoid providing his sons with a reason for wanting to become bad, for he would have them rely not on fortresses, but on their subjects' goodwill.[120]

This is one of the passages where Machiavelli postulates ethical standards to be upheld by a prince. Characteristic of Machiavelli's thinking is the argument that the good prince, in treating his subjects well and thus winning their goodwill, serves himself and his sons well. So for Machiavelli, relations between prince and population are not a zero-sum game: both stand to benefit from benign cooperation. Although Machiavelli's reasoning has no need to invoke divine rewards for good actions or punishments for bad, it can easily be reconciled with the Jewish and Christian commandment to "love thy neighbor as thyself" because all sides stand to benefit in such a situation.[121] Interestingly, even pre-Christian classical authors occasionally felt the need to invoke the anger of the gods to warn against unjust behavior. Machiavelli thus attains a higher degree of detachment from religious arguments than even an Onasander. It is this sort of passage in Machiavelli's writing that illustrates at once why the Roman Catholic Church found him problematic, and why much later generations would not see him as immoral.

Fourquevaux, like Christine de Pisan and Machiavelli, thought that a prince had it coming to him if he behaved like a tyrant toward his people

(see p. 42 below). In dealing with an enemy society whose land one had conquered, Fourquevaux advocated "winning the hearts" of at least part of the population by doing them good, thus creating rifts between them and the parts remaining hostile, according to the old precept of divide and rule (see p. 46 below). Mendoza thought it "very dangerous to employ force against your own subjects." After victory, he urged that "justice be accompanied by clemency." While he conceded that the initiators of an insurgency should be punished, the rest of the population should be pardoned, "as it is not possible to punish a multitude."(see pp. 97, 102 below) Even though Hay du Chastelet's vocabulary indicates little sympathy with rebels, and prescribes their firm suppression, he conceded that civil wars would not occur if governance behaved impeccably. He debated the more lenient French and the more vindictive Spanish traditions in dealing with rebel leaders (see p. 119 below).

While Sutcliffe made little distinction between the treatments he advocated for pirates, robbers, and rebels (see p. 67f below), Grotius's views were more akin to those of Christine de Pisan, Machiavelli, and Fourquevaux, in that he raised rhetorical questions about whether it was reasonable and just to expect a people collectively to submit to slavery, or to surrender their (rebel) leader to an oppressive regime.[122] Santa Cruz deserves fame particularly for his extensive discussion of how to quell insurgencies and establish a lasting peace by addressing the population's grievances and making them prosper (see pp. 135–143 below). The Welsh soldier of fortune Henry Lloyd also showed himself sympathetic to insurgents, in good Roman Republican tradition, by invoking the Roman rebellion against Tarquinus Superbus in 509 B.C.E. "A people reduced to the necessity of taking up arm against their sovereign," he wrote under the heading of "Liberty,"

> {i}s obliged to exert itself by the fear of a revengeful master, death and slavery, and by the hopes of independency, and all the advantages which attend it; such powerful motives generally render their efforts successful. The first cause and object of a revolt is to repel injuries, real or supposed; the second is to provide for future security.[123]

Vattel defined civil war as a form of insurgency so that one might "pronounce that the laws of war were not made for rebels, for whom no punishment can be too severe." And while he agreed that no population has the right to show formal disobedience, let alone resort to violence, in extreme cases, "a denial of justice on the part of the sovereign," or too great and manifest oppression, can "excuse the furious transports of a people whose patience has been exhausted." Vattel therefore urged clemency on the part of the prince, and he argued that the Duke of Alba, who prided himself on having ordered twenty thousand executions in the Netherlands, would be remembered with "universal detestation" even if the Dutch revolt had not

been warranted. The best way to proceed, thought Vattel, was to give the disaffected people satisfaction.[124]

A completely different and highly original take on Small Wars can be found in Rühle (see pp. 176–178, 183–186 below).

Battle, Offensive versus Defensive War, and Stratagems

Both Symphorien Champier and Robert de Balzac, writing around 1500, clearly pronounced in favor of the defensive as the better position to hold in war—both morally and otherwise—than the offensive.[125] Machiavelli, by contrast, characteristically left out moral arguments when he considered the problem in his *Discourses,* substituting historical examples to illustrate what had been successful and unsuccessful in Antiquity. He summed up arguments for and against:

> He who takes the offensive shows more spirit than he who awaits an attack, and so inspires his army with more confidence; and, in addition to this, deprives the enemy of the power to utilize his own resources . . . {On the other hand}, to await the enemy's attack has many advantages; for, without any disadvantage to yourself, you can impose on him many disadvantages in the matter of provisions and of anything else of which an army has need; you can better thwart his plans owing to your having a better knowledge of the country than he has; and again, you can oppose him with stronger forces owing to the ease with which you can bring them altogether, which you could not do were they all at a distance from their homes; also, if you are routed, you can easily reform, both because a considerable part of your army will survive since it has a refuge at hand, and because reinforcements have not to come from a distance.

Moreover, if one had a "country well equipped with arms," one would be more difficult to overcome in one's own country. If by contrast one had "a country ill equipped with arms, . . . the enemy should be kept at a distance." War, in that case, would more profitably be carried into his territory. Thus

> a ruler who has people well armed and equipped for war should always wait at home to wage war with a powerful and dangerous enemy, and should not go out to meet him; but that one who has ill-armed subjects and a country unused to war should always meet the enemy as far away from home as he can.[126]

Porcia in 1530 asserted that "the greater boldness is thought to be in him that begins, than in him who defends against the attacks of his enemies." On the other hand, he warned against going to war rashly, as war brings many sufferings not anticipated in times of peace: "It is easy to stir up battle, but to leave with glory and renown is hard, and light sparks which we regard as nothing sometimes kindle a great fire."[127] This last point anticipates 20th-century concerns about escalation in war. Perhaps echoing Machiavelli, Porcia warned against giving battle, which should only be done in case of urgency and constraint, not merely because one

had "mastery," "lest fortune which now appears gentle and favourable hereafter shows herself unkind…[H]e who now rejoices as a victor may shortly after be vanquished, wailing and sorrowing."[128]

Fourquevaux, himself a soldier, devoted much space to determining when an offensive and the initiation of battle would be in one's favor, when it would be preferable to stand fast and await the enemy's onslaught, and when it would be best to retreat to a position better defended. Moral arguments played into his reasoning—defensive wars were a just cause, but so were offensives designed to recapture property unjustly seized by an enemy—and also practical arguments, and the historical examples cited to support them (see pp. 36, 39–41 below). Santa Cruz and Rühle von Lilienstern took a similarly even-handed approach, explaining how battles should be sought or avoided depending entirely on circumstances (see pp. 134, 186–190 below). As representative of the Enlightenment, Guibert saw defensive war as the quintessential war of the citizen-soldiers if they were attacked—but he also foresaw the force that could be mobilized if such a people were fully committed to a war fought for their own cause. In that respect, Guibert was a prophet not only of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars, but of all the wars in the era of nationalism (see chapter 8).

In contrast, for Sutcliffe, in dealing with the Spanish, even preemptive war seemed acceptable (see p. 75f below). Hay du Chastelet, an armchair strategist, was the odd one out in advocating the quest for battle as decisive moment in war at almost any cost (see p. 110 below). Finally, Archduke Charles had a strong preference for offensive warfare; in his view, it gave the greatest chances of obtaining one's war aim—a peace dictated to the enemy—quickly.[129]

An alternative to the standard strategies of offensive or defensive war was the stratagem or ruse. The classic argument for these was made by Diego de Alava y Viamont, writing in 1590, who reminded his readers that Homer had credited the fall of Troy not to the valor of Achilles or the strength of Ajax, but to the clever ruse of Ulysses, and that the Romans managed to subdue the barbarians through their discipline and military wisdom.[130] Both Giacomo di Porcia and his English translator, Peter Betham, underlined the utility of stratagems in the spirit of Ulysses, such as delaying battle so that the enemy would be weakened by starvation.[131] This position was echoed by Sutcliffe (see p. 78 below) and Loque (see p. 60 below).

Wisdom and cleverness had been central to the earliest surviving classical texts on war, especially, for example, to Frontinus's work on stratagems. This attitude of the Ancients toward ruses and stratagems continued not only through the Middle Ages, as David Whetham has shown in his recent study,[132] but also well into the 16th century. Robert de Balsac admonished his prince, however, not to employ the same strategy, tactic, trick, or ruse twice, for doing so would make him predictable to the enemy.[133]

Money and War, War Economics

Robert de Balsac's *Ship of Battles* was merely reiterating a well-known trope in stating that warfare depended on whether one had enough money to undertake the enterprise.[134] Cicero's famous adage that *nervi belli pecunia infinita* (unlimited money is the nerves of war) echoes through the literature of early modern Europe, and most writers other than Machiavelli agreed with Cicero (see Mendoza, see p. 91 below). The Florentine, who had presided over the establishment of a militia in his city, was exceptional in stressing that it was good soldiers, not money, that were the most vital prerequisite to success in warfare.[135]

It is not without irony for today's reader that the English authors on war were so concerned about making economies in their military spending. The English captain Thomas Digges (b.?–1595), who had fought in the Low Countries for Elisabeth I, actually started his work on the *Four Paradoxes* on war with these words:

> I confess sparing of treasure and all due providence for the preservation thereof to be a thing very necessary, especially in the wars of our age, where treasure is indeed become *nervus belli* and therefore by all reasonable provisions to be regarded.[136]

Sutcliffe's entire book turns on the need for a comprehensive reform of England's military establishment, its finance, organization, strategy, and above all recruitment and pay of soldiers (see pp. 70–73 below).

Alliances and Coalition Warfare

We also find astute views on conducting alliance warfare. Early writers affirmed a prince's or State's obligation to come to the aid of allies under attack with whom one had treaty commitments: *pacta sunt servanda*. Machiavelli for one had no quarrel with alliances and did not doubt that they were to be respected. He did, however, have legitimate concerns about whether alliances were effective in deciding collectively on which strategies to pursue, particularly if an alliance grew beyond a certain size. In discussing historical examples, Machiavelli found that an alliance or "league is governed by a council, which must needs be slower in arriving at any decision than are those who dwell within one and the same" country. Even then he opined that alliances should not exceed a certain number of members:

> Experience shows, too, that . . . a confederation has a fixed limit, and that there is no case which indicates that this limit can be transcended. Twelve or fourteen communities join together, and beyond that they do not seek to go.[137]

Machiavelli advised against half measures and compromises, viewing them as a "middle course" that might in many conflicts be worse than

either peace or a full commitment to a military campaign. He was well aware that they might lead to the creation of multiple and competing military commands. Yet he thought republics (at the time, oligarchies rather than full-fledged democracies) would make more reliable allies than princes who could change their minds about an alliance commitment.[138]

Porcia urged his captain to "purchase" allies (friends): "Such virtue and force is in friendship which is the only nourisher of mankind and relief of sorrow. Wherefore it is worse for a captain to be without friends than to lack treasure."[139] Consistent with this position, he urged his readers to keep faith with allies, and to help neighbors in need.[140]

Mendoza's experience as ambassador allowed him to make observations on alliances, including asymmetric ones, where one power was the protector and another the protégé, or on neutrality or uncalled-for (humanitarian, one might say) interventions on the part of an oppressed people (see below p. 95f)—a configuration with a surprisingly long pedigree. But it was Sutcliffe who produced one of the most elaborate and insightful analyses of alliances in war. He emphasized the importance of coalition building while counseling against overreliance on allied forces. Whether one's own government was in the lead in such an enterprise, or whether one was coming to the aid of an ally—weaker or stronger than oneself—Sutcliffe strongly advised against half measures: sending too small an army, he reckoned, would only prolong a war rather than bring about a decisive end, angering the enemy and increasing his resistance rather than inflicting serious pain. (see pp. 70–75, 76 below) In this context, Mendoza wrote explicitly about balance-of-power politics, which Guibert would deride two centuries later (see pp. 151, 156 below).

Finally, writing during the great century of Louis XIV, Hay du Chastelet produced an insightful categorization of different alliances, with a view to explaining how alliance forces might fight together (see p. 120f below). While he and the other authors who broached the subject assumed that alliances were something mainly for wartime, they all knew of more durable alliances in which one State was the long-term protector of another, weaker State, which might even be a client State. The concept of an alliance in peacetime, sometimes claimed to have originated with NATO, was thus known in this period. Moreover, Guibert, and after him, Immanuel Kant, conceived of a convergence of interest in peace, trade, and shared prosperity among nations that would assure peace among them quite naturally—if they were not ruled by selfish princes.

Naval Warfare

As one might expect, we find one of the earliest texts on naval warfare penned by an Englishman. Sutcliffe extolled the advantages for his country of the use of naval power, to the point of advocating an aggressive strategy toward England's great rival, Spain, so that the war would

be taken by sea onto Spanish territory, rather than for England to await a Spanish attack as it had done up to the time of the Armada in 1588 (see pp. 80–82 below). Arguably, his passages concerning maritime strategy stood as the most sophisticated until the late 19th century, when writing on this subject finally came into its own.[141] The contrast with Mendoza is striking: Mendoza dealt with naval warfare in very basic ways, so those passages are omitted in the excerpts. Characteristically, the French experience with naval forces was less fortunate, which finds reflection in the writings of Hay du Chastelet, who thought war at sea "an extreme expense, and one usually gains from it but very little utility" (see p. 118 below). Santa Cruz, by contrast, saw crucial advantages in having a superior naval power, and interestingly analyzed the problems that would come with wanting to build up a navy when confronted with other naval powers set on preventing such an achievement. In this context, he developed ideas about naval alliances that foreshadowed constellations of the following centuries (see p. 130f below).

Militias, Standing Armies, or Mercenaries?

An early plea for the introduction of militias and the abandonment of foreign conscript forces was made in the 15th century by Leonardo Bruni in Florence.[142] This was also a particularly famous aspect of Machiavelli's works, who, as we have seen, was charged, a century after Bruni's writing, with reorganizing the Florentine militia system.[143]

The topos that different countries bred men unequally fit for war goes back to Antiquity and was well known to the writers of our period. Fourquevaux disagreed with the prevailing view that some peoples were more warlike than others, usually put forward to advocate the hiring of foreign mercenaries. He favored native troops and thought it was up to the prince to make his own subjects hardy and wise enough for war. Fourquevaux was well aware of the importance of motivating forces to fight, but also of the importance of standing firm, without acting rashly, if the situation demanded it (see pp. 37f, 39 below). Morale was also a factor important to Mendoza, who urged his prince to show himself often to his troops to inspire loyalty in them (see p. 99 below).

Fourquevaux's inclination toward native soldiers matched his view that defensive war was by far the morally better cause than offensive war, and that natives had a greater stake in the defense of their own country (see below pp. 35–38), an argument developed further later on by Guibert. Sutcliffe agreed, but mainly to make the economic argument that Englishmen, Welshmen, and Irishmen were cheaper to maintain than hired foreign-mercenaries (see p. 72f below). Mendoza cited arguments for both options. His personal preference was also for a culturally homogeneous force, but on the condition that its soldiers could master all the different arms needed, which were seen as specialties of different ethnic groups (see p. 97f below).

The Thirty Years' War was in full swing when René Le Normant, Sieur du Bois, was given permission to publish his advocacy of the reestablishment of a militia system in France.[144] Twenty years after the war's end, Hay du Chastelet stated that the debate about indigenous militias or foreign mercenaries had been resolved in favor of the desirability of the former (see p. 107 below), and half a century later, Father Gabriel Daniel, S. J., wrote a history glorifying the (intermittent) French militia tradition from the Gauls to Louis XIV.[145] Guibert's writings, however, show that the debate had not yet been entirely settled (see chapter 8). Much as young Guibert had initially argued, Napoleon's *Maxims* had included the opinion that "a nation defended by the people is always invincible."[146] Bülow's lesson drawn from the Wars of the French Revolution was "that in the new wars, the masses, and not the superiority of troops decide wars."[147] Johann Friedrich von der Decken (1769–1840), a Hanoverian who served his prince-elector who was also the English and Scottish monarch, was an exception, coming down firmly on the side of professional forces such as those maintained by the crown in Britain.[148]

Conclusion

To sum up: our authors had many views and made a variety of comments that would come under the heading of *strategy* in its most modern sense. Many views of the authors whose works are excerpted in this book reflect general patterns of thought in their own times, some are unique to them. Either way, their views are applicable to situations known to us in our day: these authors had much to say on questions relating to strategy even in the 21st century, as the quotations and summaries in this chapter illustrate, and as the reader will discover through reading the excerpts in the subsequent chapters. As noted in the preface, several other authors would have greatly merited inclusion in view of the quality of their works had good modern translations or editions not been available: Christine de Pisan; Niccolò Machiavelli; Maurice de Saxe, the Saxon royal bastard who became marshal of France; Henry Lloyd, the Welsh mercenary who fought for various European monarchs; the partisan war specialists Andreas Emmerich and Johannes Ewald; and of course Carl von Clausewitz. All of these are well and widely known. The authors whose works are presented in this volume, however, are barely remembered, and their ideas and works merit much greater celebrity, as the reader will find in reading on.

CHAPTER 2

Raimond de Beccarie de Pavie, Seigneur de Fourquevaux (1548)

Raimond de Beccarie de Pavie, baron de Fourquevaux, was born in Toulouse in 1509 and died in Narbonne in 1574. He was lord over Damiatte (Tarn), La Villeneuvette (Hérault) et Laguian-Mazous (Gers), all in the very South of France, near the Spanish border. His parents were François de Beccarie de Pavie and Rose (de) Magnan. François hailed from a noble family from Milan who had moved to France under Charles VII to escape the wars between the Guelfs and the Ghibellins, which had also affected the family fortunes of Machiavelli.

In 1527 Raimond de Beccarie de Pavie enlisted with a local military company, fought for France in Italy, was wounded at siege of Pavia, was captured at the siege of Naples (1528), and was liberated at the peace of Cambrai in 1530. In 1534 Raimond had apparently succeeded his father, and as baron de Fourquevaux married Anne Anticamereta.[1] Commanding 1,000 men, he fought in Savoy, defending Fossano in 1536 together with the French dauphin Henry (the future Henry II). Raimond was back in Toulouse by September 1537, as a military officer, for the next ten years, gaining further military experience, both defensive and offensive in a small-scale border war with Spain. In 1547 he was sent to Scotland with a military company to help defend Marie de Guise, widow of King James V of Scotland. In 1548–1549 he was a member of a three-month ambassadorial mission sent once again to Scotland, and this time also to Ireland to woo those countries into an alliance with France.[2] Here we see Fourquevaux advancing from a military responsibilities to the ambassadorial duties that would dominate his later life, along with duties of civilian administration. It is not clear exactly when in these busy years he

found time to write his *Instructions on the Conduct of War,* but it was published in Paris in 1548.

Upon returning to the Languedoc, Fourquevaux, again in his military role, suppressed an uprising in Guyenne. In 1550 he was appointed commander-in-chief (*capitaine*) of Narbonne. But he may not have taken up the new post, for in November 1550, he was in Turin as a diplomat, with the Marshal de Brissac, for negotiations with the Duke of Parma. Fourquevaux's Italian background may have helped in this context. He then traveled to Bohemia in order to dissuade Emperor Maximilian II from conferring the title of king of the Romans upon his nephew Philip (II) of Spain. After that, Fourquevaux was charged with defending the Piedmont against papal and imperial forces, resisting a siege for 11 months.

In November 1551 Fourquevaux was appointed governor of Mirandola in Northern Italy,[3] and in 1552 he was charged with administering the finances of Parma. In the following year, he fought with Pietro Strozzi's army at the battle of Marciano, commanding an infantry corps. He was injured, captured, and imprisoned in Florence for 13 months, during which it was rumored that he was dead; his wife believed this and died of grief. After being freed, Fourquevaux served again as a French diplomat at the court of Ottavio Farnese in Parma to ensure that leader's loyalty to France. In June 1557 Fourquevaux was once again appointed governor of Narbonne, keeping the city calm by expelling all unruly elements: he announced that there would be a duel between two Spaniards outside the town, upon which all the vandals rushed out. At that point, Fourquevaux had the town gates closed, allowing only peaceful residents back in. As capitaine of Narbonne, he fought against a Huguenot insurgence in 1562 and freed Toulouse, organizing Catholic defenses, for which he was made a knight of the order of St. Michael. He subsequently defeated a Protestant army at the battle of Lattes, near Montpellier.

In 1558 Fourquevaux was married a second time, to Marguerite de La Jugie. In 1564 Catherine de Medici, the queen regent of France, sent Fourquevaux on a mission to the Spanish court in order to report on the movements of the Spanish fleet. When, in the following year, Philip II of Spain traveled to France, Fourquevaux received him in Narbonne and prepared the king's subsequent journey through France. In turn, Fourquevaux was sent to Spain as full ambassador in October 1565, and was well respected there; Queen Elizabeth of Spain was the godmother of his son, François, born in 1563. Fourquevaux negotiated the marriage of Charles IX of France with Elizabeth of Austria, daughter of Emperor Maximilan and cousin of Philip II, in 1569. In 1571, deeply in debt, Fourquevaux asked to be replaced, and he was recalled in 1572. He returned to Narbonne and was made commandant of Toulouse in 1573. On July 4, 1574, Fourquevaux died and was buried in the church of St. Just in Narbonne.

Fourquevaux, like his younger contemporary Bernardino de Mendoza,[4] was seen as a remarkable ambassador and a "perfect spy."[5] Over 400 of his letters and reports have been preserved. He also wrote a book on the military institutions of Florence, *Florence militaire,* which seems to have been lost. Fourquevaux had clearly read Machiavelli's *Art of War,* and his *Instructions on the Conduct of War* has roughly the same structure. The *Instructions* were first published anonymously, and later editions were falsely attributed to a Guillaume du Bellay, the French king's representative in Turin. The book proved to be very successful and was reprinted several times.[6]

Themes of *Instructions on the Conduct of War* include the importance of a just cause in war: among other issues, Fourquevaux grappled with the old Christian problem of what to do if a third party is threatened or subjected to violence. The prince, he argued, is given the sword by God to defend his subjects. Nevertheless, Fourquevaux was anything but gung ho. He conceded that the offensive position had great advantages over a defensive stance during a war; nevertheless, he argued that the defensive stance in general had more advantages, and he personally favored it on balance, giving arguments for avoiding battle in certain circumstances. Fittingly, Fourquevaux expanded on the subject of ruses and stratagems, but also on the need to keep your word to those who surrendered to you after meeting certain conditions. He was very concerned about imposing constraints on the conduct of war, giving long lists of rules to be followed, and of capital punishment to be imposed on breaches of military discipline.

The work was translated into Spanish, Latin, German, and English. The translation by Paul Iue or Ive (with wrong attribution of original ownership to General Guillaume de Bellay, Sire de Langey), made four decades after the original publication of the work, is used here as a starting point for the translation from the French. Ive was also the author of *The Practise of Fortification.*[7] For greater clarity, however, the present text has substituted modern terms where this seemed helpful. Pagination refers to the Ive translation.

The style of the book is difficult for today's readers to digest: like Mendoza, Fourquevaux tried to pack all his text into as few, but enormously long, sentences as possible. The Ive translation goes to some lengths to break up Fourquevaux's long sentences and I have followed this course even further.

* * *

Anon. [Raymond de Beccarie de Pavie, baron de Fourquevaux]: *Instructions sur le faict de la Guerre extraictes des livres de Polybe, Frontin, Végèce, Cornazan, Machiavelle* (Paris: Michel Vascosan 1548).[8]

Instructions for the warres, trans. Paul Iue (London: Thomas Man & Tobie Cooke, 1589).

PREFACE

Wherein it is debated whether it is lawful for Christians to wage war.

This question…is still open to dispute…Nevertheless, I believe that wars which are undertaken neither for ambition, nor for the desire of revenge, nor voluntarily, without the intent of usurping other men's goods, are just and lawful, especially for a prince, if it is to defend his country and subjects, for whose safety he is bound to risk his life.…{I}t serves no purpose that some allege the contrary, quoting Holy Scripture to say that a good Christian ought to suffer patiently the injuries and wrongs that are done unto him, without resisting those who would take away his goods, or would strike him.

…{S}uch advice was only given to the Apostles and their like. It was necessary for them to have humility and patience in all their business, if they wanted the doctrine they preached to bring forth good fruit and take root, because it was not for them to use force. It is true that to argue with humility is more virtuous than to make others believe by violence. But as for us who faithfully believe the Gospel, yet are not called to preach, and for those that govern people, I think it is lawful to use arms against those that would overrun us. For the sword was given to Princes to defend their subjects and good men from being devoured by the strong and the wicked. Consequently, they have authority to help themselves by arms, and through the force of their subjects, to make their God-given royalty worthy of esteem; it is not without cause that they bear the sword, nor without mystery. Because of this, in my opinion, Princes may justly take up arms for the defence of their subjects, and the subjects likewise for the maintenance of the authority of their Prince, and for this reason it should be lawful to levy men, and afterwards to make war.

This levy should not be made through volunteering, with men who go to the wars for bravery, or with the intent of making money from it. Instead, this levy should be made by the command of the Prince, and the subjects should neither be asked to volunteer nor to refuse to go wherever the Prince wants to send them, whether this be within his country to drive out an enemy, or for aggression {outside the frontiers}. As we see in France, the King levies his *Rierebans*,[9] and may compel them to go to any of the frontiers of his country for their defence, in which case there is no-one who may refuse, or excuse himself, but everyone must be there at the day appointed; if the excuse is not lawful.…{T}hese *Rierebans* may then go against the King's enemies and enter into battle against them without their conscience being burdened in any way, both for the natural reason that every man should defend his goods and his country: and also, as it is the King that commands us to go, unto

whom we are bound by the laws of God to obey, and to all others given command by him. A levy made thus is not . . . reproachable. So likewise should be thought of the service which the common people do unto their Prince, . . . those that are slain in this duty shall not be reproached for doing so before God.

This I will not say for those that go out of their country to seek adventures, or property, for their excuse cannot be based on any reason that I know. So, if the Prince compels them to go, they shall be much more excusable, than when they go of their own free will, as we owe all obedience to our kings . . .; whoever resists the King, resists the command and will of God. Because of this, if we commit any fault while obeying him, that is to say, if we offend his enemies as far as the laws of arms will permit, and no further, we must think that the fault shall not altogether be ours, but that he shall have his part in it. . . . {T}he strife, or quarrel, that exists between members of a party, is called a mutiny, and we all belong to one, that is to Christ. Therefore the strife that we sometimes have amongst ourselves is a mutiny, and ought not to be called by any other name. . . . {A}s often as we fall into this state, we ought to behave in such a way, and with such modesty, that we will not fall into civil war as a result of external incitement. As we carry one name, and profess to preach perfect friendship, saying that we are all one body in Christ, we should not become divided, as this is wholly contrary to what our name signifies, and . . . our laws.

. . . {Therefore} it is lawful for us to make wars, even though it is not lawful for any other intent, provided always that the cause that moves us to go to war is as it should be; and that the aim is not to kill those who might eventually believe. For it is not with the stroke of the sword that infidels convert and become Christians; but it is example and persuasion [*le parler*] that do more than force. The force which we may do to them, is only so we can defend our borders, or deliver the churches of the . . . countries {occupied by the Infidel}, out of the captivity that they are in.

If the infidel make further incursions, or will not freely depart from the lands they usurp, . . . we may go against them . . . , and fight a cruel and sharp war against them. But if we are victorious, we must nonetheless treat them as gently as we do one another in our wars, for they may perhaps be converted afterwards. . . . {N}o man was ever reproached for making an honest war, and for showing mercy to his defeated enemy. This then { = the defence against the infidel} is the most just war of all that a Christian may make; the defence of our prince and his realm is the next.

Likewise, a prince may go outside his country to assault another and take back anything that was wrongfully seized from him, or if anyone incited his subjects to rebel. As princes have charge of their subjects, and therefore may punish those who do wrong to one another, who shall forbid them to ask for what is theirs, and to recover with force anything which is kept

from them by force? They have nobody to take recourse to which is greater than themselves, or who is their superior. That would apply even to the king of France or any other who is his equal, if it were not lawful to take recourse to arms after having made {unsuccessful} appeals and protestations to the invaders [*détenteurs*] necessary in such a case.... {Then} the world would be full of sly tricksters [*rusés*] who seek to catch one another out,...sure that they should not suffer injury for the violence they commit. This is intolerable, because it would excessively upset the common peace.

...{I}f the king compels men to enter the lands of another man, no matter what ownership it is under, {his subjects} are not to enquire whether it is good or evil, nor are they as culpable as perhaps some will say they are, as they do it to obey the king....But the king in question is responsible [*se sera son faix*], and those that counselled him to do so.

Suppose...{a prince} has some interest in making a war, it is better, first, before anything is done, to seek advice from arbiters than to have the evils which necessarily follow war. If, however, the {other} party refused to discuss the matter [*refuse la Lisse*], or would not submit the dispute to neutral arbiters..., and if it behoves him to take up arms quickly for his own safety, and to invade his adversary{'s lands}, or those that do him wrong, it ought to be done following the principle [*maxime*], to make the least outrageous and bloody war that he can, and the shortest.

In consideration whereof, a prince...ought betimes to furnish himself with good soldiers who should not only be valiant men and well practiced, but moreover should be men of good life, so that he might in short time overcome his enemies, without too great a loss of his own people...

In order to do all this, throughout the book I have chosen for my chief guide the...customs which...have been observed by ancient soldiers, by whose example I govern myself more than after the manner that is now in use amongst us. Ours is far too different from that military discipline which ought to be observed among us for the better. And the reason that causes me to believe that {our ways are} so different and of less value than theirs, is that all things concerning this matter were done much better by them, than they are by us: their soldiers were more orderly, more careful [*pénible*], more virtuous, and better men of war than we are...

THE FIRST BOOK OF MILITARY DISCIPLINE [p. 1]

The 1st Chapter

How the King ought to make his wars with the force of his own subjects.

The authors who have hitherto established rules on war, prefer that the men whom a prince recruits should be levied in temperate countries, if he

wants them to be both valiant and wise. For they say that hot countries bear wise men, but they are cowards, and that cold countries bear hardy men, but they are fools. But I suppose that they have left us this counsel only to concern some monarch or mighty king, whose dominions stretch so wide that both these qualities may be found separately in the countries that are under his rule, and who has power to levy and chose his men from wherever he wishes, as the ancient emperors did at that time when almost all the world was under their rule. But here is a rule that can serve princes of moderate power: although their countries are situated in extreme hot or cold regions,…this consideration should not hinder such a prince from recruiting his own subjects, as he may make those who are naturally cowards more hardy, and those who are naturally fools he may make wise. [p. 2] We can plainly see by old examples that in all places, whether they be hot or cold, there may be good soldiers…

[p. 110]

THE SECOND BOOK OF MILITARY DISCIPLINE [p. 130]

The 2nd Chapter

What a lieutenant general ought to do after the winning or losing of a battle, and what considerations he ought to have before he enters into battle.

…Whoever wins ought to follow the victory with all diligence, imitating Caesar in this case, and not Hannibal, who lost opportunities when having the upper hand over the Romans, after he had vanquished them at Cannae, because he rested too much. Caesar would never rest at a victory, but drive on his enemies more fiercely; once he had broken their forces, he assaulted their interior. But when a battle is lost, a captain general must see if by his loss he may not have the means with which to hurt his enemies and repair his loss, especially if he has any people left with whom to do it. The opportunity may be given through the lack of care that an enemy often has after a victory, for they often become negligent, having no care for sentry duty, nor any regard that they may be surprised: whereby a captain general may then have means to repair his loss.…

And if a captain general could not help himself in this way, because of the vigilance of his enemies, he must study to make his loss the least damaging possible. If it were necessary, he should handle the matter so that his enemies might not follow his men, nor overtake them fleeing from the battle, but find some policy to hinder said enemies upon the way. As concerning the fleeing without being followed, or being followed not to be overtaken and utterly overthrown, he must imitate the example of Sertorius,[10] who being vanquished by Metellus,[11] knowing

that it would help him little to flee, ordered his captains and soldiers to retire to divers places, as scattered as dispersed as possible, having previously told them where to meet up again.…[p. 132] {This meeting place} would often be appointed before the beginning of a battle, if it were thought that the end of the combat might result in a defeat: but it should be announced {only} to the principal chiefs who have the greatest authority in an army, who afterwards might give notice to the captains when they see no likelihood of victory, and not before. This may be profitable, as the general of the enemy, being afraid to divide his army, might allow either all or the greater part of the vanquished enemy to escape. Furthermore,…one may cast one's gold and treasure behind oneself, sure in the knowledge that the enemy will slow down to gather this bounty, while one's army may have time to escape, and put ground between oneself and the enemy.…

[p. 133] A captain general ought never to take the risk of battle, unless he sees an advantage, or he is constrained into making such a decision. The advantage arises from his enemy's weariness, poor configuration in battles, or from being superior in numbers to the enemy, or from having better soldiers. A constraint arises from certainty that we will lose if we do not fight: the lack of money {to pay the soldiers} may cause an army to break or…force the general to risk a battle…It is also necessary to take the risk of battle when an army is at immediate danger of famine, or if the enemy is looking for new supplies quickly. In such a case a general ought to give battle, although advantage is not on his side, for it is better to see if fortune favours such a thing than not to try, and to suffer ruin as a result. A lieutenant general deserves as great a setback when he falls into such circumstances, as if he had a good opportunity to vanquish his enemies, and had not known it through his ignorance, or had lost it through his laziness. These advantages are sometimes offered by an enemy, and sometimes by our own wisdom. The advantages that an enemy gives come in many forms, such as when {his units} are separated and distant from one another…

[p. 134] A lieutenant general likewise causes his own downfall, when he sends any party out of the camp, lodging them far off in weak positions at the mercy of his enemies, and it only takes the enemy having knowledge of this for them to cut their throats, as it happened to Monsieur Bayard at Robecco[12]…

A wise captain ought to resist the violence of his enemies, rather than to assault them furiously. For {a} furious {onslaught} is easily resisted [p. 135] by fast and sure-footed men, and if it is withstood once, the rest is nothing, both because the attackers will be out of breath, and also as their order becomes disrupted, no matter how little haste they show in marching. Also, the first heat cools down when they see the constancy of the defending force…By the means of this patience in staying to receive the enemy's army without moving,…the Englishmen overthrew the Frenchmen at the Battle of Poitiers,[13] only because the former stood

firm while we {= the French} attacked . . . : yet staying to receive an enemy without moving a foot may sometimes be dangerous, especially when the attackers are good soldiers and expert men, and if their hasty marching does not disrupt their order. For all men have a natural heat in them, and a bravery of mind, which is set on fire by the desire to fight, which must be maintained by a captain general, and not cooled. . . .

Certain good chiefs, when their enemy's soldiers number more than their own, have given battle in the evening, with the intent that if they were vanquished, they might save the greatest part of their men through the darkness of the night. . . .

[p. 136] The wisest thing that a captain general can do is to keep a good number of faithful men around him, who are wise and experts in feats of war, with whom he might consult at all hours, and confer with them on the subject of his own forces and his enemy's, to discern which of them has the greater power, the best soldiers, is best armed, and has the best trained men, or which of their two armies can best withstand the strains of war. Likewise he ought to debate with said counsel whether he might trust his cavalry or his infantry most, and whether it would be most advantageous to put his army on the plain, or to hold the hills. Furthermore, whether the place that he is in is more advantageous for him or for his enemies, and to consider which of the two armies is the better supplied, and whether it is good to defer the battle, or to fight immediately, and what advantages the time of day either gives or takes. For often, when soldiers see the war is drawn out, they become discontented, and therefore wearied with pain and grief, and want to go home; they may be of a mind to defect. Above all things he ought to know the captain general of his enemy's army, and what people he has about him, and seek to understand whether he is rash or wary, a coward or valiant, and whether his men are new soldiers, or experienced, and what enemies they have faced, and whether said enemies were men of war or not. Furthermore the lieutenant ought to consider whether he might place his trust in his assistants and other foreign soldiers, or in his own countrymen, and consider in which of them there is the greatest promise. If it he sees his army demoralised, or without hope of vanquishing their enemies, perhaps he ought not to give battle. For a battle is most likely to be lost when soldiers have convinced themselves that their enemies cannot be overcome. . . . [p. 137] And when a captain general doubts that his enemy has so great a strength that he might . . . attack him in his trenches, there is no greater remedy for him than to leave the field, and to retire his men into strong garrisons, dividing up his troops, some one way and some another, with the intent that the trouble of besieging many towns and strong places might weary his enemies, so they waste their time, or at least to give himself respite to strengthen himself before returning to the field when the time is right. I do not think that it is possible for a chief to avoid battle (whatever happens) if his enemies

have the will for a fight, except if he always kept himself some twenty or thirty miles from them, with the intent of having enough time to withdraw from his camp before his enemy's coming, if it is the case that the enemy will assault him, as Fabius Maximus[14] did in keeping himself far away from Hannibal. . . .

The 3rd Chapter [p. 138]

How a captain general ought to put off combat with his enemies as much as possible, when said enemies are within his prince's country; and whether it is more dangerous to await one's enemies at home in one's own country, or to attack the enemy in his own country. And likewise, if said general is urged to fight by his soldiers, how we might avoid it, and how to encourage them, if they are afraid of their enemies.

It is a great point of wisdom to defer coming to battle, when a man is attacked in his own country, his enemies have better soldiers, and a greater number than he has. For if the battle is lost through attacking the enemy, the country would be in danger of being lost. . . . The surest way to make a defensive war is in providing for the frontier towns, and to cause the victuals that cannot be taken safely away to be spoiled. By doing this, our enemies shall be starved, or forced (if they do not retire) [p. 139] to seek to bring us to battle, no matter how much it is to their disadvantage. And we shall be able to choose when to accept or refuse battle, as we shall see it to be advantageous to us. . . .

It is said he who attacks has many advantages over his foe. I find that he who is attacked also has many advantages on his side. It matters little that some maintain that [p. 140] aggressors have more courage than defenders. Although this may sometimes be true, it is not always so, for a general may strengthen his men's resolve in many ways, so as to think little of those whom they first feared. Moreover, the just and holy quarrel that binds every man to defend his country may be explained to them. This is stronger than the desire . . . of the enemies to enrich themselves with other men's goods. One could argue that a prince who attacks another deprives him of his possessions, so that the country will be destroyed, and of the latter's subjects, so that he may no more be assisted by them. To this one may answer, although the possessions are lost, yet this does not alienate, nor turn the people's hearts from the affection that they bear unto their natural prince. But it is an occasion to increase {this affection}, and to stir them up and give them courage against those who have injured them, so that one who has lost his goods is worth four who have lost nothing, or who fight for the prince's private quarrel. . . .

There is an argument that a prince who is attacked is forced to be very careful when taxing his subjects, or in commanding them to do anything, lest his people refuse to do it, in the hope that they might join with his enemies if {their own} prince mistreats them, or threatens them. This argument may be resolved in one word: this assistance cannot be denied to a prince, unless he has lost all his lands and all his friends, for he will be supported in spite of his enemies…

[p. 141] {I}f a prince behaved like a tyrant toward his subjects, always evil in his behaviour, abusing them, then if an enemy assaulted him in his country, he might be at danger of being disobeyed by his people. In doing the contrary, however, there is nothing to be feared. There is one important thing for those who attack a country, which is that soldiers who find themselves in a strange country far from any refuge to return to, in such an extremity fight so much more resolutely, making a virtue of necessity. And yet this necessity cannot be compared with the need to fight virtuously that those who are attacked have, because they are in danger of suffering more extreme consequences than the aggressors, if said aggressors should overthrow them. For the loss of life, ransom, or imprisonment are the possible losses for the aggressors, whereas those that are attacked lose their goods, the honest reputation of their wives and daughters, and their lives. And if they escape death, they still have nothing but a life of perpetual servitude ahead…So the advantages on both sides can be clearly seen, and though the aggressor may have one strong advantage, the defender may have a better one. I…conclude that every prince ought to take heed before he enters the country of a neighbouring prince who is as mighty as him. Moreover he should make himself beloved and well obeyed by his subjects, as our King is.

And besides the aforementioned reasons, the defender may await the coming of his enemies into his country with a great advantage: for he may starve them, and deny them the use of all things pertaining to the creation of a camp, without the danger of having any lack of supplies on his own side. Moreover, he may withstand the operations of his enemies, and prevent them from being carried out, as the defender has better knowledge of the country and its passages than the aggressor. [p. 142]…{H}e may raise many men in a short time, because for each of those who will be ready at short notice to enter into battle to defend his own, there will be a hundred who are content to leave their own dunghill [*fumier*] with the intent of making war against other men. But let us suppose that a prince who is attacked in his own country is defeated. Every man knows that he may recover {his country} again soon, because the vanquished cannot be so utterly defeated that they will not save themselves, as they have a nearby retreat: moreover, his relief is not too far away for it to come to him. To sum up, the defender in his country can risk only part of his forces, but if the aggressor is overthrown, he does

not only put his people in danger, but also his State, goods, and subjects, notwithstanding that he is outside his own country. If he is captured, he will…remain prisoner for his remaining days, or do the will of his vanquisher. God only knows what conditions of peace will be imposed on those who now have the responsibility of making peace, and what ransom they must pay for their delivery before they are released.

Besides all these dangers, into what inconvenience would the attacker's country fall if he were slain? Would it be possible that a battle might be lost on another man's ground, without the slaughter of all the best captains and soldiers? Or that when his country was given notice of his death, and of the downfall of his men, would they not lose all hope of defending themselves if they were to be attacked {in turn} in the midst of all this trouble? All things considered,…he who attacks his neighbour is in greater danger than he who stays to resist attack.…

[p. 146] Concerning the motivation of soldier for combat, it is not amiss to make them hold their enemies in contempt and think little of them, by telling them that their enemies have insulted them, or to say what you know about the chiefs of their army; {to argue} that a great part of them are corrupted; also to camp in a place where the soldiers can see their enemies, and skirmish with them. Because when men see something daily, they acquaint themselves with it little by little. But we must handle these skirmishes wisely, so that our soldiers can always gain the upper hand over their enemies, [p. 147] for if they are beaten initially, it is certain that their fear and lack of courage will be increased. So what happens might be quite different to what the general meant to happen, who by approaching too closely, and skirmishing with the enemies, wanted to give courage to and not dismay {his men}. A general must work studiously so that nothing will take away his soldiers' hearts from doing well, no matter what accidents may occur.…{Thus the general} ought not to skirmish at all with his enemies, but to keep his men in their fort, until he sees an advantage, and seeing the advantage, they may sally forth from the fort and upon their enemies, and vanquish them. A lieutenant general may likewise show that he is angry with his people, and may make a speech for this purpose, by which he may reproach them for the little valour they have. To make them ashamed, he might say that he would fight his enemies even if he were alone, or if he {only} had such and such persons to follow him. As this is a situation where no-one wishes to be thought of as less estimable than another, all will present themselves; the others, to maintain their reputation, will show themselves all the readier to come to combat.…

[p. 199 *sic; should read 148*] {In Antiquity}, the reverence that men had for religion was very useful to keep soldiers in fear and obedience, and likewise, the oath which they made when they were led into the field. For then those who committed an offence, or those who did contrary to their oaths and promises, were not threatened as much by bodily pains, which

equity and law ordained, as they were by the threat of the indignation of the gods whom they worshipped. This, mingled with their other superstitions, was often a way in which chiefs at the time succeeded in their endeavours. In our day and age it would do no less if God were feared more than he is, and if we held Christianity with more respect than we do….

In the time of King Charles VII,[15] in the wars he had with the English, Joan the Maiden of France[16] was believed to be a divine person, and everyone affirmed that she was sent by God. But some say it was the king that invented this ruse, to encourage the French, bringing them to believe in the solicitude that our Lord had for their realm. Therefore the king took great pains that Joan might be proved true in her words, and that the most part of her enterprises would have good effects, for…which she armed herself, and was always among the knights in combat. The Frenchmen were so encouraged by the trust they had in her that from then on the English strength diminished, and theirs increased.

[p. 151] Moreover there may be means to make soldiers hold their enemies in low esteem, which King Agesilaus II of Sparta[17] did when he showed naked Persians to his soldiers, so that when they saw the white and delicate bodies of the Persians they would have no reason to fear them, but to see them as a weak force and effeminate people.

Other good captains in the past have made their soldiers fight using force, taking from them any hope that they might save themselves if they break, or seek to escape any other way than by being victorious. Agathocles[18] helped himself in this way in Africa, and it is also the surest way to make soldiers resolute. This resolution must be strengthened by the confidence that they will win, and also through the love that they have for their captain general, and for their prince. Confidence also comes from being better armed, or better configured than one's enemies, and from some battle fresh in the memory, and likewise from the good opinion one has of one's captain general. As for the love which soldiers have for their natural prince and country, it is caused by nature, as virtue is the cause of affection that soldiers bear for their captain general, which may have more effect than gifts or any other thing. And although a man might use other means to win the hearts of men of war, yet the requirement for a general chief to be a valiant and good man surpasses all others that can be named. The constraint on an army to vanquish its enemy or to die in the field is a fitting remedy for those who fight not for the love they bear for the prince that pays them, nor for the confidence they have in their general. All mercenaries fall in this category, who would never give one single thrust with a pike, if they were not forced to do so, or shamed into doing it, as for any other cause they will never put themselves in danger. It is therefore most certain that the service of those who fight for the love of their natural lord and their country is better and more assured: for besides this bond of amity, they shall be famed as valiant

men, which is of no less value to them, than force and constraint is with {mercenaries}.

THE THIRD BOOK OF MILITARY DISCIPLINE [p. 212]

The 1st Chapter

How a general may help himself in wars with diverse policies.

In this third book it shall be shown what means a lieutenant general may use to bring his wars to an end in a short time. Suppose that after he has beaten his enemies in battle…, a certain number {of enemies} remain in the field, or that there are certain towns which remain hostile, or others that are not to be trusted. The means for ending one, and being assured of the other are these: first of all, if there were any part of the country which was suspected of revolting,…the lieutenant general must consider carefully which practices might be profitable, and damaging to those he suspects {of being rebels}, such as to command them to beat down the walls of their towns, and to banish certain citizens, i.e. those whom he fears most. This order must be given in such a way that no town so commanded might think that this charge concerns others but only themselves. The commandment and charge must therefore be given in all {rebel} towns at the same time, with the intent that they might immediately obey, and not have time to consult one another. And as for the banishment of those who he thinks might make a commotion or rebellion in a town, they must be deceived in some way, so they are made to believe that they are to be employed in some business [p. 213] through which the lieutenant does them good, by giving them commission to do certain things far away, in some such place where they would have no means to trouble him, where a commission might stand in the stead of an honest…banishment. And as for those towns that are very powerful, and inclined to disobey, so that they would refuse the commandments of the general on every possible occasion, there is no better way than for the general to assure himself of them but to try to take them by surprise. And to disguise his actions, he must explain to them that he has some plan such as the conclusion of a truce, for which he needs their help. He must make a show of trusting them, of intending some purpose other than deceiving them. And in my opinion, they will be persuaded without any great difficulty. And once they have this opinion, they will surrender any number of their townsmen as the general requires….

[p. 214] If it is the case that {the general} has any suspicion of any members of his council, to wit, if they were betraying details of his secrets and his situation [*estate*] to his enemies, he cannot use a better policy than to

make use of the fraud of this traitor, by giving the traitor plans he has no intention of carrying out, and feigning fear of things which he does not fear, and that he wished that his enemies would do things which in reality he hopes they will not do. {As a result} said enemies may undertake something, thinking assuredly that they know his secrets, and as a result he might surprise them at his advantage, having deliberately deceived them.…

[p. 215] If the general wants his enemies not to perceive that his camp {contains a smaller number of soldiers than before}, he must leave the lodgings of {the troops that have left} in the same state they were always in, and the ensigns likewise and the same number of fires that were customary. Furthermore, the watch must be as strong as it ever was. On the other hand, if he to whom assistance is sent wishes to deceive his enemies, he must not enlarge his camp, nor allow any new lodgings to be made, nor make show of any insignia {of units} other than those which had previously been seen, but those which arrive last must lodge with {those already present}.…

[p. 216] If a prince were attacked in his own country and did not want to wait for the war to come to him, he may invade another part of his enemy's country, and through these means constrain the enemy to return to defend his own country, on condition that said prince's towns were stronger and better provided for, or his country was stronger and more difficult {to conquer} than his enemy's. If our general finds himself besieged by his enemies and he could not escape without shame, or loss, he may try to come to an agreement with them, and to negotiate a truce.…{T}hey will then become so negligent, that he may easily escape their hands, and in the meantime while such agreements are in hand, or while he has a truce, he might try to do his enemies a mischief. For it is then that they may be beaten better than at any other time. And when the mischief has been done, he may say: I have been deceived under the guise of goodwill [*trompé soubs vmbre de bonne foy*]. But it is a vain hope to think that an army that has been overthrown, or a place taken, while the fighting continues, should be repaid or restored by the deceiver.…

[p. 217] Said general ought to study all means possible how to make his enemies jealous, and to suspect and mistrust one another, and bear as great an envy to each other as possible. He may do this by sparing the goods and possessions of some of them, and destroying those of others, moreover, by restoring children, parents and friends that he has taken in wars, to some parents and families, without taking any ransom. This good deed will have the profit of either winning the hearts of those to whom the good has been done, or will cause dissension amongst those that have received it and others will dislike it. He may likewise cause many people to be ill thought of, through the use of forged letters, which can be made to fall into the enemy's hands when directed to certain of their leaders. [p. 218] The letters may make a show of the handling of

some practice with them, which may be an occasion that those to whom the letters were directed should…be seen with suspicion.…

Likewise,…the general should take care to divide the forces of the enemies, if their armies are composed of many sorts of peoples, especially having the means to make an incursion into some of their countries. For in sending a sufficient number of soldiers there, those left in the country will quickly call their men back again to defend their own country.…

The 2nd Chapter [p. 222]

The order that the General ought to keep in the besieging of a town.

If the general obtains control of a town through an agreement [*composition*], he ought to keep to all the articles that have been agreed upon between him and the townsfolk from point to point. For if he did otherwise, he would never get a town or man that would…trust his promise afterwards, but they would do all that they could imagine before letting their town fall into his hands. As I say, he ought to keep to his promise that he makes unto a town that yields to him, i.e. he should keep to it once he has given his word, using as much leniency and clemency as he possibly can for all those that he conquers. Above all he should avoid cruelty. For the true office of the conqueror is to pardon and to have pity upon the conquered. Yet it is reasonable that pardon should be given advisedly, lest he encourages them to begin the wars again when they feel like it. For often the clemency of a captain general is so great that they pardon all those whom they conquer and all those who have offended. Such light-handedness in pardoning causes {the defeated} often to commit new offences, as they expect to be pardoned as soon as they surrender.

In such cases…a middle way ought to be chosen: sometimes someone ought to be punished to deter the others [*pour faire peur aux autres*], especially those that revolt without great cause. Moreover,…those ought to be punished who are so foolish as to dare to defend a place which is not defensible but more like a dove-cot, {nevertheless} hoping to be delivered by mercy at all times, causing with this hope a great deal of ammunitions to be spent, and an army to spend time for a thing of no value.…{They should be sent} to the galleys forever.…[p. 256] This is not to say that faults should always be punished according to what they deserve, especially if he who has failed is otherwise a man of virtue. Moreover, great hearts show their greatness in many ways, especially to pardon a fault that touches them personally.…

A lieutenant general ought to shun cruelty after the winning of a battle, or after taking a town by force. After treading the enemy's insignia underfoot, sacking their camp, dispersing them, making them flee, and cutting their battalions into pieces in fury, what would be more

inhuman: to slay those who were not killed in battle in cold blood? Or after a breach is forced and those who stood in defence of their town are slain, to kill all those that surrender, the poor inhabitants both old and young, even though they are disarmed and innocent? To allow wives and maidens to be ravished, and sometimes slain, their churches pillaged, and their sacred things ravaged and converted for vile uses: in truth, that is more than cruelty! The general ought therefore to have a great concern about these disorders, forbidding his people to carry out such cruelty, not only while the battle is still raging. There should be men amongst the {soldiers} that forbid it. Moreover, if he wanted the people of a town to give the least resistance, after the entry {into the town} is forced, he should not force them to fight, as people do when they do not have a place to flee to, or thinking that the others are already all dead, to sell their lives dearly rather than being killed. Instead, he should allow one of the town gates to be opened to give them safe passage, and a proclamation should be made that his soldiers should not charge those that do not resist, nor hurt those who lay down their arms.…{I}f a general will be well spoken of by both his friends and his enemies, and be beloved by all men, after a victory he must cause the injured men of both sides to be provided for as carefully, as if they were his [p. 257] kinsmen. Furthermore it is required that he should recompense his men that carried out their endeavours well. At the least he should commend them publicly, and report their virtue to the king, attributing to every man his merits, and not to himself, as many do who do not speak of what their soldiers have done, but take the praise for themselves. And finally, he must behave in such a way towards all men, that it might not be thought that he made war with the intent of killing and murdering his enemies, nor to seize their goods, and to appropriate for himself the honour due to other men, but only to acquire a good reputation, and to serve his prince.…

The 3rd Chapter

How soldiers ought to govern themselves according to the laws of the wars: with the most important laws, and the manner of proceeding in judgement against the offender.

[p. 261] I accept all those military laws, which command men to live honestly upon pain of death:

- that no man should be injured without the permission of the general, so that the king might be humbly served;
- that the war is carried out as duty would have it;
- in summary, that the chief under whose charge they swear to serve, and for whom they fight should be obeyed in all things.

These points are general and cover many others, so that it is convenient to specify them individually, principally those that condemn them to death.

As for laws that do not extend to the taking of life, I refer them to the discretion of the provost and others who have power and charge to punish those that do not observe them. As for those guilty of capital {offenses}, they are as follows:

- First of all, whoever shall practice or commit treason against the king, in whatever manner they do so, or whoever councils or favours and aids his enemies.
- Item, whoever talks to his enemies, without the permission of his captain general or one of the principal chiefs.
- Whoever reveals the secrets of the council, be it to the king of his enemies, or to his own side, especially if any damage might result from the discovery.
- Whoever shall send letters or messages to his enemies, without permission from the lieutenant general.
- Whoever does not immediately report to his superior all that he knows concerning the king, his honour and profit, or his injury.
- Whoever deserts, and joins the enemies, or who is taken in the process of doing so.
- Whoever breaks a truce or the peace, without having express permission from those who have the right to give it.…[p. 263]
- Whoever kills his soldiers for his own pleasure, if those soldiers do not deserve to be maltreated.
- Whoever disobeys the call of the drums and the trumpets, especially if said calls are made on the pain of the heart, or on the pain of death.
- Whoever tries to prepare a mutiny.
- Whoever kills anyone, unless in self-defence.
- Whoever rapes any woman.
- Whoever shall take anything from the church, whether it is sacred or profane, without the permission of the general.
- Whoever allows himself to be enrolled in two armies at once.…[p. 264]
- Whoever flees from their position in battle, or marches too slowly when charging, or plays the coward in whatever manner.
- Whoever pretends to be sick, when he should be fighting the enemy.…[p. 265]
- Whoever abuses the people of the country where the war is waged, either in body or goods, except if they are declared rebels against the king.…[p. 266]
- Whoever does anything prejudicial to the king or his service, or damaging to his friends, in whatever manner it might be.
- And finally, whoever despises God, and blasphemes in the manner that they do these days.

CHAPTER 3

François de Saillans—Bertrand de Loque (1589)

There is a mystery surrounding the identity of François de Saillans. He is identified by his chief adversary, the Jesuit Bordes, with Bertrand de Loque, a pastor and "controversiste protestant." Loque was supposedly born in Champsaur in the mid-16th century. If this indeed is the same person as François de Saillans, he was in fact born in Valence, probably between 1540 and 1550, and was the son of Gaspard de Saillans, Seigneur de Beaumont (1513–1565), a fervent Catholic and notable at the beginning of the French Wars of Religion, and either his first wife, Catherine de Colombière, or his second wife, Romane de Charreton. Gaspard was treasurer of the King's salt mines, and his family was of recent nobility: Gaspard was the son of Jean de Saillans, Seigneur de Saint-Julien, who was knighted in 1512 by Louis XII, and of Jeanne de Johannis, and was also the nephew of a Catholic clergyman, Christophe de Saillans. Gaspard's brother, Jacques, was a doctor of law.[1]

François de Saillans thus hailed from an upwardly mobile Catholic family; he might have conformed to his father's expectations of him but for the fact that his paternal aunt, Catherine, had married a Protestant, Ennemond Bonnefoy, a professor of the University at Valence. François de Saillans may have converted to Protestantism under their influence. François was one of the signatories of a letter the Protestants of Valences sent to Geneva in 1559, asking for a second pastor to be sent to them. In 1561 François was among the 4,000 who took up arms that Easter at the Church of the Cordeliers in order to receive communion there, an act that was repressed bloodily by the Catholics, led among others by François' father, Gaspard Saillans, and a Catholic nobleman named La

Motte-Gondrin. La Motte-Gondrin was so close a friend of François' father that he habitually lodged in the elder Saillans's house when he was in Valence. It was thus in the Saillans's family's house that La Motte-Grondin was assassinated in 1562 when the Huguenots seized Valence. François' father was thrown into prison and had his possessions confiscated—or what was left of them after the Protestants had finished looting his houses in Lyon, Valence, and Beaumont. Gaspard's second wife is said to have died of grief over this upsetting experience. Upon release from prison, Gaspard disinherited François, which may have encouraged the latter to change his name. Gaspard was married for a third time in 1564, to Louise de Bourges, with whom he had a son, Jean-François, born in 1567 and presumably the heir instead of his older, eponymous half brother.

During this Huguenot assault on his family's property, François de Saillans himself escaped to a family fief near Annonay, and thence to Geneva. He studied theology there; his studies were paid for by the churches of Annonay and Peyraud. François de Saillans then disappears from the records, but ten years later, a Bertrand de Loque is found in Aquitaine, and, as noted previously, it was claimed this Bertrand de Loque was François de Saillans under an assumed name. Loque, whose other writings identify him as a Protestant theologian, made an appearance in a theological dispute between Father Maldonat, arguing on behalf of the Catholic Duke of Montpensier against the duke's Protestant daughter, who had married the Duke of Bouillon. In 1581, the Vicomte de Turenne sent Loque to Geneva as emissary. Ten years later, Turenne had become Prince of Sedan by marriage and brought Loque to Sedan as minister. In 1597 Loque was minister of Castel-Geloux, or Casteljaloux, when he was elected vice president of the Synod of Miremont in Aquitaine. He was married at some point and was still alive in 1600.

Loque published several books on the Mass and on the Church, engaging in written sparring contests with Jesuits. Under the name B. de Loque, he published his treatise on war and one on dueling. The uncertainties about his identity seem to have persuaded John Eliot, the translator, and John Wolfe, the publisher, not to attribute any name to the English version. The translation in this chapter follows closely that of John Eliot.

The French Wars of Religion resonate through Loque's work; it is clearly more concerned with the legitimacy of the use of force and the prince's ethical problems with war than with the tactical details so dear to military practitioners of his age. Loque's book on war is dedicated to the king of France: the newly-instated Henry IV was at this stage still a Protestant, but he would convert to Catholicism in 1593 to secure the French crown. At the time, both Protestants and Catholics claimed themselves to be representatives of the true Catholic Church, a terminology Loque adopted (e.g., p. 1), while criticizing "abuses . . . under the Popish rule' (p. 7)." He also showed himself as having sympathy with reasonable heretics who (like himself) are open to argument and, potentially, to conversion.

It is striking how squarely Loque stands in the Jewish-Catholic tradition of seeing war as just if commanded by God, rejecting the views of heretics that all war is an absolute evil (he mentions the Manichaeans and Donatists, who were branded heretics by the early Christian Church in the Roman Empire, but also the Anabaptists of his own time, who held views similar to the Quakers). Loque thus insisted that war could be God willed if it fulfilled all the criteria of being just, while emphasizing that war was in itself terrible and must not be incurred for any lesser reasons (chapter 4). Like Clausewitz long after him, Loque underscored that one has to have a good understanding of one's own war aims before planning a campaign and then executing it (chapter 2). A long section of his text dwells on ways to contain the horrors of war by treating vanquished populations and soldiers with clemency and by strictly observing military discipline (chapter 5). It ends on an exhortation to think little of one's life and to embrace death gladly, rather than live in dishonor and shame, a quotation taken from Pythagoras.

* * *

Bertrand de Loque (pseudonym for François de Saillans): *Deux Traitéz: l'un de la guerre, l'autre du duel* (Lyon: Iacob Ratoyre, 1589).

Discovrses of Warre and Single Combat, trans. I. Eliot (London: Iohn Wolfe, 1591), to which the pagination refers.

CHAPTER 1 [p. 1]

Whether it be lawful for a Christian Prince, or Magistrate, to make war.

Not all men believe that the Christian prince or civil magistrate can in good conscience wage war against the enemies of his state or of the Church. By contrast, I do, and I prove it by five reasons.

The first reason is because God has expressly commanded it…[2]

The second is that God himself has at sundry times counselled and taught his servants how they ought to conduct themselves in war.[3]

The third reason is because God himself in holy writ is called "the God of Hosts" and "the Lord God of Battles." Likewise, that just wars are called the "battles of God."[4]

The fourth reason is because many kings and princes [p. 2] are highly commended in holy writ for that they had waged war valiantly against their enemies.[5]…

The fifth is because Jesus Christ and his Disciples have allowed war.[6]…

[p. 3] It is then apparent by these five reasons… that it is lawful for Christian princes and magistrates to wage war when necessity requires it. And that which the Anabaptists reply to the contrary is most frivolous

and of no force. They say, it is written in the law of God, "Thou shalt not kill,"[7] and in the Gospell "Resist no evil."[8] And so likewise Christ said to Saint Peter, "Put up thy sword into thy sheath, for whoever shall smite with the sword shall perish with the sword."[9] I answer by these words of our Saviour, private revenge is forbidden, and not public revenge, which is executed by the magistrate, according to law, by the commandment of God. . . .

CHAPTER 2 [p. 3]

The causes that may move a Christian prince, or magistrate to make war.

See first that you have perfect knowledge of what you want to undertake . . ., and then put it into practice to effect it. Indeed, a man ought not to undertake any action unless good and lawful circumstances move him to do so: otherwise God pours out his anger on the action, and gives it his malediction. If then Christian princes or magistrates want to undertake war with some hope of success, the causes of the war must be set down beforehand in order for it to be just and lawful. There are two causes that may move one to war. One, that respects the goods of this world, and the natural life of man, and is of two sorts.

First, when it comes to the point of repulsing the violence and injury of tyrants which are the trigger. For it cannot be [p. 5] denied that, by the law of God and man, it is tolerable for the innocent to defend themselves by some means when they are injured and outraged, and it is equally undeniable that nature has grafted onto the hearts of all living creatures a desire to preserve and maintain their lives and goods. Who will deny that it is lawful for a prince to take arms and to go to the field to defend his estate, and to keep his subjects from the fury of invaders? Moses gives a very good example of this, fighting against the Canaanites, and against Og, the king of Bashan, who had attacked the Israelites.[10] . . .

Secondly, take the issue of relieving those who are allied and have concluded some league of friendship with us who are being wrongfully oppressed. Christian princes may conclude alliances with their neighbouring nations, so that nothing be done against the honour of God. . . . Some may argue that the borders and jurisdictions are distinct, and that is against all rights to invade one another. I answer that indeed it is wrong for one to invade another . . . But it is a different case . . . [p. 6] to invade . . . others, when one does so to defend the right of those allied and confederated to us. . . .

The second cause for Christian princes to go to war concerns religion. For those who say that war cannot be waged for the maintenance of Christianity deceive themselves. It is true that the Church is not usually forward and hasty in taking arms. But it is also true that it may justly be

defended and preserved by means of arms. It follows then that princes and Christian magistrates may wage war, first against apostates who turn from the faith.

There is an express commandment from God which touches upon this, that whoever turns away from God revolts against him and his service, and so shall be punished by war, and if rebellion and obstinacy continues, then it will be erased. In the third chapter we will thoroughly discuss this point, and show how far Christian princes and magistrates may constrain their heretical subjects by lawful war.

Secondly, Christian princes may go to war for the defence of the Church, when a prince who is an enemy of God and an idolater uses force against and oppresses the Church, with the aim of establishing [p. 7] a pseudo-religion, and to suppress the truth. For God has given them charge of the Church, and made a covenant with them, enjoining them to maintain it, and to take great care of it. This covenant is made not only with some particular members, but all of them and the entire body of {the Church}. For it is called the one Catholic or universal church, as in old times there was in Jerusalem just one temple, a figure and type of the same Church.

When Christian kings are consecrated, they promise and swear solemnly and faithfully to protect the Church, and to employ the temporal sword which is given to them for the safeguard and defence thereof. And for the same reasons, having the same sword in their hands, they turn themselves to the four corners of the world: towards the East, the West, the North and South, there vowing solemnly to perform the said promise. This ceremony is used by Christian kings to signify that they take into their protection and safeguard the universal Church, as much as they are able to do so, against all those that would attempt to assail and oppress the Church. This is to be understood of the true Church, notwithstanding the abuses under Popish rule.

Also all kings and Christian princes are, or ought to be, members of this Church. Therefore, they have a stake in it, so they are bound in conscience to preserve it safe and in good estate, and to keep it from danger. The pilot on the sea in his ship ought to stand in fear if shipwreck, because he is in jeopardy as well as the others. The governor of a city ought to fear the city being taken by surprise, because his is in as great a danger as the rest of the citizens. So Christian kings and princes, and all magistrates honoured for the true knowledge of God, ought to fear the ruin of the Church of God, for if it is ruined, with it they will be ruined as well.

But especially they ought to uphold it, because they are the tutors and guardians of it;[11] because they are the servants of God;[12] because the two tables of the law have been delivered into their hands;[13] because that to them belongs the care,[14] not only [p. 8] of the honest demeanour of the church, but also the zeal and godliness of it, as faith upholds holy scripture. . . .

[p. 10] God has strictly commanded princes and people whom he has elected to arm themselves to protect the land of Canaan, which was a figure of the Church, and of everlasting life. Who may therefore deny that princes today may with a safe conscience arm themselves, and their people, to keep possession and inheritance of the Church, and everlasting life, against all tyrants that are in union {against the Church}.

Piety, as the pagans hold, commands both princes and their subjects to expose their goods and lives for the preservation of their kingdoms, fiefs, and countries. How much more ought we Christians to think that the same piety both commands and binds us to do the same for the defence of the Church, which is the kingdom of God, and the true country of all good faithful Christians! If one's life and goods serve only piety, then why should one not do for piety what one would do for one's life and goods? It is said that the Church ought not to be defended by arms. But why then should it be attacked with arms? Is there any greater tyranny than that which is exercised against the soul? And is there then any war so lawful and just, as that which Christian princes wage, to repress so great a tyranny?

The Pope will have his Crusade, and his knights of Malta and of other places, to maintain the faith and the Roman {Catholic} Church against the Turks. Why then would he condemn the same power in other Christian princes, to defend by arms their true religion against the invasions of all tyrants and infidel princes?

Alphonsus, king of Aragon, a Christian prince,[15] had this pretty motto in all his armies and bands of soldiers: *pro lege* and *pro grege,* that is, for the law and for the people. This signified that he saw himself as called by God, not only to defend his country, but also to preserve the [p. 11] Church, the true faith and religion.…

CHAPTER 3

That a Prince may chastise by war, or otherwise, his heretical subjects, but with some moderation, and not before he has convinced them not to be heretics by the word of God.

Here knowledge and conscience are necessary. The Christian prince ought indeed to drive away all heretics from among his subjects, if any such are to be found amongst them; and he ought to chastise and punish them, either by war or else by some other form of justice, lawful and approved. For in this error were the Manichees and the Donatists,[16] that no man ought to be troubled or molested for his religion, much less punished, but that every one might live freely after his own fantasy. Saint Augustine himself was sometime of this opinion, but afterwards

retracted his error, approving that Christian princes might punish heretics as appears in the epistle that he wrote to Bonifacius.[17] . . .

[p. 12] {Thus} it appears that a Christian prince may, and ought to, suppress his heretical subjects, either by war or by any other lawful means, so long as it is done with judgement and some moderation.

First one must make a distinction between shameless, obstinate and stubbornly disobedient heretics, who are the arsonists, the disease spreaders, and chief captains, who consume, infect and lead others headlong into perdition; and between the poor ignorant people who are seduced and abused by them, [p. 13] and do not offend deliberately out of malice or obstinacy. The first are incurable, and without doubt ought to be persecuted by the prince as murderers and poisoners of the soul. However, even though no man may be compelled through violence to convert, the prince ought not to allow anyone to oppose the faith in public. Concerning the ignorant people, {however,} and those who offend not because of any malice or by their own self-will, and in whom there is still some hope of amendment and conversion, they ought not to be prosecuted with death immediately, but there should be prayers to God for them, and they must be instructed with patience, until they come to better understanding.

Secondly, the prince ought not to condemn, nor punish by war or otherwise any of his subjects for heresy, before he is convinced they are heretics by the word of God. It is clearly contrary to the duties of Christian princes and violates their laws and promises, if, having suspected or accused their subjects of heresy, and these {subjects} are willing to submit themselves to verify their teaching by the word of God, the princes, instead of hearing them, will stop their mouths and do not let them speak for themselves. {The same holds true if the princes} instead of arranging debates and quoting the holy scriptures to change the minds {of the heretics}, refuse and regard with contempt the holy scriptures; if instead of examining their arguments and reasons by the true analogy and proportion of the faith, {the princes} condemn them straight away as against the faith, persecute {the heretics}, massacre and burn them, go to war against them, and use all kinds of barbarous cruelty towards them. . . .

CHAPTER 4 [p. 14]

That because of the great inconveniences and harm that accompany war, princes ought not to attempt it, except in times of great extremity.

Agesicles, the Spartan king,[18] and Aristotle were wont to say that a king ought to govern his people as a father does his children. For in ancient

times kings were called by a Hebrew word, Abimelech, which means, "My father the king." The king then ought to rule his people in levity and godliness, and not in rigour: but he does the contrary when he suppresses them with war. For it is not to rule his people in [p. 15] piety and levity, if a king exercises such tyrannical governance over his people, namely by civil war, which is the scourge of the people, and far more unbearable and hurtful than foreign war waged by strangers. Let us see what harm war causes to a commonwealth in general.

War makes all things expensive and causes famine. For the soldiers tread down the fruits of the earth under their feet, spill the vines, steal, burn whole towns and villages, despoil and rob men's houses, take away men's cattle, forage in their barns, attack men on the highways, hinder the commerce, and commit many such mischiefs, which for the most part cause famine and scarcity.

War is the cause of great sicknesses, namely the plague and contagion. It brings great pain and turmoil. In war, men are housed poorly. They must eat what they find and drink what they can come by. Often the air is corrupted by the infection and stinking odours of an army, and by the number of dead carcasses, of men as well of horses, which lie scattered here and there not far from the camp.

War causes all laws and justices to cease, the true service of God to be corrupted, or the free course thereof to be hindered.

War makes all reason and equity yield to violence, abandons youth to wickedness, and loose living, causes grey hair to be despised and disrespected, bastardises all estates and causes them to degenerate, exalts men of small quality, brings low honourable estates, brings in innovations and dissolutions, maintains disorder and confusion, interrupts the universities, and makes all schools of learning (the seminaries of virtue) to cease or close down temporarily, sows the very seeds of all trouble and sedition, entertains and fosters the most villainous sort of people,…and some that have deserved the {hangman's} rope. {War} makes one neighbour not know another, eat and destroy one another. It takes away by force the ploughman from his [p. 16] tillage, and carries the artisan willy-nilly from his shop and family. No man is able to furnish so many contributions as {war} exacts. The poor man dies of hunger, the innocent suffer wrong, wives and maidens are ravished and defiled, thousands of children made orphans and fatherless, blasphemy and reviling the name of God are committed, murders, thefts and adulteries perpetrated daily. What mischief or villainy is to be named, wherewith the war abounds not?

If they love their people as good fathers love children, princes, who as Christians are privileged, ought not to wage war unless in great need, and in case of extremity; and then to use it as a very dangerous and mortal remedy, as is the searing and incision of any limb. As the skilful physician says: "extreme remedies must be applied to extreme maladies."[19]

But let us now see by what laws and rules they ought to wage war if it is necessary.

CHAPTER 5 [p. 17]

Certain rules and laws to be practiced by those that undertake to wage war, to the end that God may bless and prosper their action.

Do all things with advice, said Solomon, and you shall never repent. Three things, says Socrates, are contrary to good advice: haste, anger, and covetousness. Wars are often not taken in hand upon good and lawful occasions, and so are cursed of God's mouth; and even if they are waged for good and lawful reasons, it still comes to pass, that being poorly managed and being conducted in haste, or else being waged with excessive anger and hunger, or for a thirst of lucre and covetousness, or for envy, they are cursed by God. Princes therefore have these few rules and practices to follow.

1st Rule

That wars are not waged, unless for some great and important affair…

2nd Rule

That the prince is not troubled by every light occasion, but before he makes war, should by all means possible try to maintain peace and concord: for if the aim of the war is to seek to conclude peace again, as Cicero said,[20] without doubt the Christian prince ought to procure and seek all honest and lawful means which he can think of, to pacify all differences, before he proceeds to arms and war; and above all things, if he is well-advised, he ought [p. 18] to be very mild and patient above all things in {times of} sharpest affliction, and sorest temptation. When Plato was asked once how a wise man should be known, he answered, when he has great and various troubles, if he overcomes them with mildness, and with much patience.

3rd Rule

That no man should war with the aim of usurping the goods and inheritance of men. For that goes flatly against the commandment of God, which forbids stealing. Alexander the Great was equally a thief when he sacked any province, or when he usurped it with a strong and mighty navy.…But all the world is like one great bed furnished only with small covers and blankets, with each man, in covering himself, uncovering his next bedfellow.…

[p. 19] *4th Rule*

That the prince that will go to war against others first must know how to rule and overcome his own passions and affections. For, as Socrates said, "{it} is a matter of great difficulty, and a more virtuous act to

overcome one's own will, than to overcome one's enemy." And Plato said, "hardly will he overcome his enemy, who knows not how to overcome himself." Do not let the prince get carried away with his foolish passions, especially too much anger, by a particular desire of revenge, by hatred or [p. 20] by other similar affections, which hurt and hinder the true order of proceeding in right and justice. . . .

5th Rule

That when the prince is urged by necessity to go to war, he should choose wise captains and guides, well-experienced and valiant men. . . .

Nowadays some such are made captains that were never soldiers before, or at least, good soldiers. Hence, for lack of experience, before they have even been in field, they are very courageous . . . [p. 21] But when indeed they must lay about them and fight in good earnest, to give proof of their valour, they lose their courage . . .

6th Rule

That he also chooses for his men-at-arms and soldiers men that fear God. For the victory depends not on the number of fighting men, but on the grace and favour of God. . . .

[p. 22] *7th Rule*

That good and holy laws are upheld vigorously in civil armies, and not only in towns and cities, but also abroad in the middle of the campaign. For the adage that "the laws cease, and are of no force in war," is not God's but the Devil's.

[p. 23] But it is expedient that these laws be common to all, and that they apply not only to soldiers, but also to the chiefs and captains, from the least in the camp to the greatest, in such sort that no advantage be taken of these laws . . .

[p. 24] *8th Rule*

That the leaders and captains are valiant in all difficulties, such as those which come up in the exploits of war. The clever pilot is tried in tempestuous weather at sea: for in a calm every sailor can play the clever navigator. Metellus said that it was a common and easy matter to do well where there was no danger: but that the part of a brave and valiant man was to behave himself well in matters of great difficulty and danger.[21] . . .

[p. 25] *9th Rule*

That captains be diligent and careful, and in no way idle or sluggish. . . .

[p. 26] *10th Rule*

That nothing be enterprised or attempted without advice from the mouth of God. . . .

Prayer must be made to God before anything is attempted . . .

11th Rule

That the armies put their trust in God alone, and not in the help of man. . . .

[p. 27] The aid of men may deceive and delude those who put their confidence in them, as are the huge and mighty armies, the great force of people, the adroitness and swiftness of horses…But the aid and help of God is most sure to be trusted and infallible.…

[p. 29] *12th Rule*

That the armies above all things are Godly and holy, if we will have them work to good effect.…It is a maxim set down in the former rule, that if God is in the middle of our armies, to conduct and preserve it, the effect shall always be good…

CHAPTER 6 [p. 31]

Whether it is lawful in Christian wars to lay ambushes, and to use policy to surprise the enemy.

…I answer that it is, so long as promises made are not violated, nor piety and godliness offended.

For any private persons are expressly forbidden to kill or take vengeance, be it openly or in secret, and we have before alleged what God says: "You shall not kill; you shall not avenge your own quarrel."[22]…

[p. 32] But with regard to princes, captains, and officers in wars, in actions of their proper charge, namely in exploits of warfare, there is a consideration in part to be made. For it is lawful for them to take and hang the thief, the robber, the assassin, and others of similar quality, if they cannot execute them openly, why may they not do it secretly by ruse and policy—and if this can be done lawfully at home, why not abroad in war?…

[p. 33] But we must take heed that in such actions nothing is attempted or done against the faith, nor against godliness and piety.…It is inappropriate here to bring in Lysander's counsel: "if the skin of the lion will not serve, sow under it a piece of the fox's skin."[23] For we must make a distinction between subtlety and treachery. Treachery is always forbidden and condemned as not lawful to be used. "Whoever has once lost his faith has nothing more to lose," said Seneca, and Cicero said, "injury is offered in two ways, either by force, or fraud: fraud is proper to the fox, [p. 34] force to the lion; both ought to be far from a man, but fraud ought always to be detested." A worthy sentence, worthy for Christian men, yet spoken by a pagan. He said moreover, "that faith or promises are not made to be violated, even towards the enemy."[24]

So then let the chief captains and guides of war make no difficulty to use policy, and ruse of war, to surprise and fake their enemies for advantage if it is possible: for that by no means they violate their promise given, nor falsify their faith by any treachery or hostility.

CHAPTER 7

Of the resolution that men-of-war and soldiers ought to have, either to live or die, when they come to battle.

There is still one point yet to be handled, concerning the resolution that men-at-arms ought to have in martial affairs: and without all doubt, resolution may do very much in all circumstances. That is why physicians require a good heart of their patients, before they administer any treatment: a good heart and resolution might help them sooner recover health, and compensate any fault of medicine. I say then that the principle part of the wisdom of a warrior coincides with this wholly, and he resolves himself in any way not to fear death. On this point all the accomplishments of the philosophers coincide not by accident, but also the writings of the learned theologians agree, in exhorting us to condemn and despise death. The vulgar remedy against the fear and apprehension of death is not to think about it, but to receive death's wound without thinking or remembering it…

[p. 41] The warrior ought to take great heed not to be too rash, but to follow his vocation with magnanimity of courage ought to be sage and well advised to conserve the time, to take occasions offered in due time; and thereupon to resolve himself that, whatever should happen, his life or death will be in the hands of God, in his grace and favour, and so he shall never do wrong. So that great God of hosts, most mighty and powerful, perfectly good and wise, only the true God and father of our Lord Jesus Christ, be all dominion, power and glory, now and forever, Amen.

CHAPTER 4

Matthew Sutcliffe (1593)

Not much is known about Matthew Sutcliffe, even though he was a fairly productive writer. He was born around 1550, died in 1629, and was the second son of John Sutcliffe of Mayroyd or Melroyd in the parish of Halifax, Yorkshire, and Margaret Owlsworth of Ashley. He went to Trinity College, Cambridge, as a scholar in 1568, obtained a BA in 1571, and was promoted within the university until he obtained a major fellowship in 1574. He lectured in mathematics in 1579 and graduated with a doctorate in law (LLD) in 1581. He worked as a lawyer until he became archdeacon in Tauton, Somersex, in 1586–1587. In 1588 he moved to Exeter as dean of the cathedral. He was simultaneously vicar of Welt Alvington in Devonshire and had income from other ecclesiastic appointments. Sutcliffe was one of the chaplains, first for Queen Elizabeth and then for James I.[1]

In his *Practice, Proceedings and Lawes of Armes,* Sutcliffe claims repeatedly to have seen military action himself in France, Italy, Flanders, and Portugal. Perhaps he was a chaplain with Elizabeth's forces under the Earl of Essex, to whom he dedicated his book on warfare; perhaps he spent 1589–1593 with Essex on campaign.

Sutcliffe was not merely a Protestant cleric but a particularly fierce enemy of Spain, and of Catholicism in general. He saw the confrontation with Catholicism almost as a holy war, and viewed defeat for the Protestant side as a result of poor organization and a poor war economy and taxation, but also as the result of sinfulness and ungodliness shown on his own side.[2] Sutcliffe founded King James's College at Chelsea, a "polemical college," a sort of think tank and propaganda institution, with a library and the mission for "learned divines" to "study and write in maintenance of all controversies

against the papists."[3] James I was a patron and laid the first stone in 1609. Sutcliffe was the first provost, and had 19 research fellows under him, mostly clerics. The building was never completed, and the scheme proved a failure. The college went under with Sutcliffe's death; on its site currently is the Chelsea Royal Hospital for Soldiers. Apart from this effort, Sutcliffe took an interest in the settlement of Virginia and New England, and encouraged John Smith in his exploits. Sutcliffe lost James I's favor when he opposed a match between James's son and a Spanish princess.

Sutcliffe himself was married to Anne, daughter of John Bradley of Louth, Lincolnshire, and his wife, Frances, daughter of John Fairfax of Swarby. Sutcliffe and his wife had one daughter.[4]

Sutcliffe's works include several in Latin, mostly on religious matters. In the *Practice, Proceedings and Laws of Arms,* as elsewhere, he showed his erudition, drawing on examples from ancient history, the Hebrew Bible, and more recent events, omitted in this chapter to save space. He praised the very practical book on warfare of the Huguenot military leader François de la Noue, yet criticized it for lacking classical examples.[5] He belittled Machiavelli's work for being written by one without military experience, but agreed with him on many points. Throughout Sutcliffe's work, there seem to be echoes of Giacomo di Porcia's book that had existed in English translation since 1544, for example in the emphasis on the need for alliances.[6]

He discussed definitions of sovereignty—namely, the power over war and peace—that had become fashionable with the writings of Jean Bodin in the 1570s, but he emphasized the need for a just cause over which to go to war: his sovereign was still very much accountable to God. Sutcliffe perceived himself to be writing in a period of cold war, that is, a period of standoff between the English and the Spanish, when peace seemed little more than a preparation for the next war, given the profound ideological differences between Catholic Spain and Protestant England. Sutcliffe therefore exhorted his country's government to prepare for the next round of fighting, to the point of considering a preventive war. He either had the Earl of Essex's ear, or else he wrote what Essex wanted to read; either way, Essex launched an attack on Cadiz from the sea, three years after the publication of Sutcliffe's book.

Sutcliffe proposed a reorganization of the tax system along Roman models, so as to ensure a more effective, regular, and reliable pay plan for England's soldiers. Like Machiavelli, he was opposed to the employment of foreign mercenaries, and reckoned that English, Welsh, and Irish soldiers would cost his state less in terms of pay and maintenance. In turn, an army that was paid regularly would be more dependable and easier to discipline. Sutcliffe showed concern over the effects of plundering and forced requisitioning on the populations in whose lands a war was being fought. Likewise, he showed the classic Christian concern for the humane treatment of the defeated.

Sutcliffe was one of the earliest to write extensively about alliance politics. Alliances, for him, were to be respected, as were alliance commitments. But in the context of resource shortages or danger, Sutcliffe warned against relying on the altruism of allies, urging his prince not to engage in alliance warfare with inadequate means: allies would be likely to take advantage of one's forces—putting them in danger's way, denying them scarce food—if they were not a strong numeric, and thus political, presence. Again like Machiavelli, Sutcliffe thus warned against going to war with fewer forces than actually needed to carry out the task, and against the compromise and half measures found so often in reluctant, because collective, policymaking.

Sutcliffe defended the utility of written works in learning about warfare. He conceded that they did not replace actual experience of warfare, but he argued that even the most experienced captain would gain from systematic, guided reflection on his tasks.

* * *

Matthew Sutcliffe: *The Practice, Proceedings and Lawes of Armes* (London: Deputies of C. Barker, 1593).

All references to sources are Sutcliffe's, completed and amended where possible.

DEDICATION

To the Right Honourable Earl of Essex

{I}f we expect wars, then I see no reason to be silent in such doubt and expectation of wars. Even if we had wars neither with the Spanish nor anyone else, and if we were in no doubt about their intentions, we are unable to go many years without wars. Great countries and states cannot remain idle. If they have no enemies abroad, restless heads seek unrest [*work*] at home.[7] Therefore it can never be…the wrong time for debating these matters. If we enjoyed peace, we could not be assured that this peace would continue without arms: if we suspect our enemies' intentions, there is no safer course of action than to arm. "He that desires peace must prepare for war."[8] And "preparations for war made in times of peace give speedy victory in time of war."[9] Men do not easily provoke or attempt wars against a nation or country that is ready to resist, except to prosecute injuries. By contrast, peaceful and considerate countries are prone to be pillaged, and must rely on their neighbours' behaviour.…Suppose we yielded everything they want to our enemies, that is no way for us to obtain peace. For those who endure one injury only encourage their enemies to commit another.…

If wars are not proclaimed, it does not matter. For…"wars are either proclaimed, or made without proclamation."[10]…{S}ome distinguish assistance from confederacy, and disguise all our doings at sea as reprisals. If the king of Spain will ever be able to pay us back [*requite*], however, he

will let us know how little our distinctions will help us, and will treat [*use*] us as enemies. . . .

Some perhaps will not like this treatise . . . because they suppose that skill in arms is to be learnt by practice {rather} than {by} rules . . . It is true, . . . theorising [*speculation*] is worth nothing without practice. . . . But what sort of notorious folly is it to condemn art and reason, because practice does many things without reason or art? And what man who likes the effects can justly condemn the causes? Seeing that practice is dependent on certain reasons and rules, and is often uncertain by reason that similar things do not always have the same causes, let no man condemn rules and reason of warlike proceedings in respect of his own experience and knowledge. For although a man should be trained in wars from his infancy, he cannot know all the reasons of war from his own experience.

{H}owever great a man's experience is, he would learn much more by reading military discourses than his own experience could teach him. For this reason Scipio and Caesar, and other famous captains, spent much time reading of ancient deeds of arms . . .

Alphonso, a king of Spain, confessed that he learned both the practice and laws of arms from books.[11] . . . Selim, the barbarous emperor of the Turks . . . was very familiar with, and skilful in Caesar's commentaries translated into Arabic; and diligently read the histories containing the famous deeds of his ancestors. He who would say that the reading of Frontinus, Vegetius, Livy, Caesar, Xenophon, and other ancient histories and discourses of deeds of arms, both of Greeks and Romans, could profit nothing, nor add anything to his own experience, must be very arrogant.

Neither is it reasonable that the labours of all should be measured by the presumption of some who write of matters of which they have no experience, as Nicholas Machiavelli, and Robert Valturius a certain Italian pedant,[12] who had never seen the field {of battle}. Some others . . . leave out the most necessary points of war, such as preparing for the war, choice of soldiers, marching, encamping, fighting, retiring, besieging, or defending towns, ambushes, stratagems and suchlike necessary subdivisions [*factions*] of arms. Because of this, as I neither commend theorising [*speculation*] without practice; nor walk in the steps of others, but fill gaps [*make supply*] where they are defective, I trust my labours shall be read favourably, because they are not derived from vain theorising [*speculation*], but come from somebody who has too much experience in the disorderly wars of our time, and has no other aim [*respect*], than to redress disorders and the honour of his country.

. . . {T}hese rules might have had more weight if they had come from some great commander, a man of authority. For those deserve most credit above all men who are both writers and doers themselves. In this respect I honour above all others Caesar among the Romans and Xenophon among the Greeks; and of late writers Francis Guicciardini, a man employed in many matters.[13] . . . But what if men of authority have not, or will not, or

perhaps because of their many distractions and businesses cannot {write}: will those who do not know things themselves not hear the same reported by others? Great wise men in the past have not disdained to follow the advice of simple men.

But (may some reply) what do the examples of ancient Romans, and Greeks, and their proceedings in wars concern us, whose practice and style in wars is so greatly different? Those who ask this imagine that the reasons and rules of arms are changed, because of the use of artillery, lately invented, and that the Romans, had they lived in our times, would have had to seek new {rules}. But they are deceived [*much abused*], for the general rules are always the same. There is, and always has been only one order of supplying [*providing*], proceeding, marching, fighting, retiring, encamping, besieging and defending places. . . .

It will . . . be hard to turn back. For more recent customs are not easily rooted out; and desire of money has corrupted many men's minds. Without pay and provision the soldier is starved, the war {effort} slackens . . . Without these things how can the soldier march, fight or keep other orders of war? Who wants adventure without praise or reward? Who will serve his country when he sees in most countries those promoted [*advanced*] soonest, who pillage their country most to enrich themselves? For . . . some unworthy of the name of captains make gain from their positions, soldiers refuse all extraordinary labour, valiant captains and soldiers are considered little, and laws of arms lie silent, when there is no one to execute them, and few that know them. . . .

Without appropriate forces, what reason does anyone have to hope for improvement? For just as a little water sprinkled on a fire causes the fire to flame more, and spark, so small supplies kindle, and nourish wars, rather than end, or extinguish them. . . .

"The Romans subdued the world by the exercise of arms and their order of encamping, and practice of war."[14] . . . The Spaniards' recent achievements are due to their excelling above others in the observance of military discipline. . . .{T}he Turks could not have prevailed so much against Christians, had they not rewarded virtue highly, punished disorder severely, and kept strict order in the government of their camp and army. . . .

CHAPTER 1 [p. 1]

What causes make wars just or unjust, and what the effects of lawful wars are, and what solemn occasions, or circumstances are to be considered in defiance of our enemies, and how to start a war.

It is needless . . . to dispute whether it is lawful, either for Christian princes to make wars, or for Christians to serve in wars. Those who think

it is unlawful, as men beyond judgement in religion and state, are declared to be heretical… The lawfulness of war is apparent, as most godly and religious princes, such as Joshua, David, Jehosaphat, and Judas Maccabeus were great warriors, and their wars were allowed, as the spirit of God calls them the wars or battles of the Lord. Nor did this change with Christ's coming, as the Anabaptists imagine. The holy Apostle { = Paul} shows, that the magistrate does not carry the sword in vain.[15] But he should carry it in vain, if he might not as lawfully repel public force as he may punish private wrongs with it. When the soldiers came to John the Baptist, he did not exhort them to change their way of life, but to be content with their wages, and not to do wrong to anyone.… The true servants of God (St. Augustine says) "make wars, so that the wicked may be restrained, and good men may be relieved."[16] Besides, if wars against violent persons were [p. 2] unlawful, what State could endure any length of time in the context of notorious corruption and malice…? Without wars, who can protect us against spoil and injury? It is the law of nature and nations that put weapons in our hands for our defence; without wars, civil laws cannot be imposed against rebellious subjects… Ambrose says that "it is the office and role of justice by war to defend our country from the enemy, and to aid our confederates and those who require it because of their own weakness, against exploiters [*spoilers*], and oppressors."[17]… what gives us just cause of war…is an important matter…lest we be counted among those tyrants that rage and vex men without causes.

"If the cause of those who make wars is good, the issue cannot be evil," says Bernard {of Clairvaux}.[18] "The cause, if it is good or evil, either abates and breaks, or whets the soldier's courage."[19] And "good and just causes make men hope that they will receive the favour of God in the issue and trial."[20] "The event is often according to the justice and quality of the cause";[21] and "it is seldom that soldiers return safely, having drawn their swords and gone forth in evil quarrels."[22]…For this reason, says Philip of Commines, "when Princes want to quarrel with their neighbours, they pretend they have honest causes, although this is often untrue."[23]…{P}retences and shows cause great disputes between princes and states, while every man will try to make his cause seem good, and to do nothing without a good cause. Let us therefore now consider, what causes are sufficient to allow the taking of arms, what are counterfeit, and insufficient.

[p. 3] First it is lawful to use force, and take arms in defence of our country, our true religion, our liberty. "Reason teaches the learned, and custom instructs all nations thus much, which even the instinct of nature imprints in wild and savage beasts, that it is lawful to repel force threatening [*offered to*] our life, our person, and the state, with force, and by whatever other means we can."[24]…{S}eeing of late the Spaniards come to our coast with fire and sword, menacing the English nation with all the calamities that follow such invasions,…we have a just cause to put on arms in defence of our country, religion, lives, liberties and laws.…

It is likewise lawful to repress pirates and public robbers by force, if they will not surrender [*yield themselves*] to be tried by order of common justice. They are enemies of peace and civil government, and of the laws that they defy, and should be proclaimed as public enemies of states. Their bodies may be taken, and their goods taken as spoils, just as in wars with other nations. . . .

[p. 4] {T}hose that commit the first offence provide {the other side with} a just cause of war, not those who seek compensation by arms . . .

[p. 5] The injuries done to the subjects concerns [*redoundeth to*] the Prince, and reproaches and insults [*contumelies*] against ambassadors and messengers concern those who had sent them. Both these things give lawful cause for Princes and states to take arms. . . . {W}hen his ambassadors are violated . . . the injury is thought to be against the Prince's own person. . . .

The rebellion of subjects against their lawful Princes is also a lawful and sufficient [p. 6] cause for the prince to arm against them. He does not carry the sword for any other purpose except to repress the wicked and rebellious. . . .

Moreover it is a lawful and just cause for a prince or nation to arm their people in defence of their allies [*associates*], or those who flee to them for assistance when they are unjustly oppressed. Deliver those—says the wise man—that are drawn to death: "those who are wronged" (says Aristotle) "not only may, but ought for their honour's sake, to arm in defence of themselves, their allies, and friends, and to help their associates who are being oppressed."[25] Cicero . . . allows those wars to be lawful that are made . . . either for our own defence, or for defence of our friends, to whom we are bound by promise of help.[26] He also charges those with being unjust who do not repel injury when they are able to do so, just like those who do wrong themselves. . . .

[p. 7] Breach of treaties [*covenants*] is likewise numbered among the just causes of wars. We take up arms having either been deceived by our enemies, who do not behaved as promised, or being constrained {by them}. . . .

Many wise princes have an eye on their neighbours' greatness, and perceiving how prejudicial their encroachments might prove to be to them, have just cause to withstand them. . . .

[p. 9] Last of all, "whoever adheres to our enemies, and aids them with men, munitions, and supplies against us, is also our enemy and gives us just cause to go to war with him."[27] . . .

[p. 10] "As for wars undertaken because of ambition, and anger, and other such qualities, they are unjust, and the causes are unlawful."[28] Neither are those to be excused that, having been forced out of their own country by force, seek to use violence to take that which belongs to others. . . .

Yet to make just wars, it is not sufficient that the cause alone is just, but that they are undertaken [*enterprised*], first, by those who have the

authority of the sovereign; second, that they are not begun by those who invade others, without making demands for compensation or satisfaction, or denunciation; and last of all, that they are not prosecuted with barbarous cruelty. The first point is expressly set down in the terms of the Roman laws, and approved [*allowed*] by consent of all nations. Canon law also confirms this. And if it were in the power of others {to wage war}, great mischief would ensue. It is a special mark of sovereignty to have power over war and peace. . . .

Some men have been so scrupulous in this realm about taking action without orders [*stirring without commission*] that they have doubted whether they were allowed to levy forces to repress rebels without a commandment. This might seem too scrupulous, but they thought it better to be too slow than too forward. "For only those are to be counted as public enemies in war, who have been declared enemies by those who have supreme authority."[29] . . . Augustine says that "it is the order of nature best agreeing with the peace of states that the council and authority to make war should rest in princes."[30] Diverse reasons persuade us that aggressive wars are to be denounced. "There is a justice in wars to be observed," says {Marcus Tullius} Cicero [*Tully*], "which requires that wars are either denounced, or made after the denial of things demanded that have been unjustly taken from us."[31] He speaks of wars made by those who invade others. For to defend ourselves without more words is lawful both by natural laws and the law of nations; it would be ridiculous to threaten {with words only} those who have already begun a strike at us. . . .

[p. 11] In the execution of wars, this precept must be diligently remembered, that no cruelty should be used. There is moderation even in the execution of justice, not only in the other actions of war. Caesar in his victory against Pompey commanded his soldiers to spare the Romans; to delight in blood is the sign of a savage nature. "The desire of doing hurt, and cruelty in execution, also an implacable and savage mind is justly blamed in wars," says Saint Augustine.[32] . . . It is no victory to kill an unarmed enemy, nor justice to kill our prisoners in cold blood. . . .

[p. 12] "Women, children, and the elderly, by the order of war now observed in the Spanish camp, are exempt from the soldiers' fury in the sack of towns."[33] The present French king [Henri IV] deserves great praise for allowing the poor, and powerless people of Paris to pass through his army {i.e., civilians to evacuate the besieged Paris}, though it was to his own disadvantage [*prejudice*]. . . .

In sum, . . . wars are just and lawful when made by the sovereign magistrate, for lawful and just causes, being both declared [*denounced*] in an orderly fashion [*in case requisite*], and moderately prosecuted, to the end that justice might be done and an assured peace obtained. In which case it is lawful for any man to serve in wars with a good conscience. But if the wars are notoriously unjust, let every man take heed how he bathes [*embrewe*] his hands in innocent blood. The Christian soldiers that served

{the pagan Roman emperor} Julian the Apostate would not draw their swords against Christians, although they served him willingly against all others. Yet I do not make private men judges of princes' actions. But what need is there of any judgement where the facts are evident: and who shall answer for men that execute a prince's wicked commandments, before Christ's seat of tribunal? If the injustice of wars is not notorious, a subject is bound to pay and serve, and the guilt shall be laid at the charge that commands him to serve. "A good man may serve under a sacrilegious prince," says Saint Augustine, "as the duty of obedience makes the soldier innocent."[34]

[p. 13] Just wars have these effects. "Whatever we take or win from the enemy is justly ours, and is counted as such by the laws of nations as lawful purchase" and "Nothing is proper by nature, but either as a result of ancient possession and occupation, or victory,"[35] says Cicero. Therefore, whatever city or territory is taken in just wars is ours; similarly, whatever moveable goods come into our hands. Yet there is a great difference in this case between lands and goods. The lands come to the prince or State that commanded their seizure, to dispose of at their pleasure, either among the soldiers by whose blood they were won, or else after they are rewarded, among others for the benefit of the State.[36]…The spoils of the enemy are sometimes given to the soldiers, certain things excepted….

[p. 14] Last of all, many contentions and brawls come about the divisions of spoils, especially where there are many nationalities in one army.…{B}y the customs of France and Castile, the prince ought to have the kingdom, province, seigneurial {territory}, or city, and likewise the captured king. Other prisoners belong to those who take them, except the general and men of rank [*mark*] and quality, who being taken by others are nevertheless to be used for the benefit of the prince, provided that he who has captured them is honourably rewarded. All the insignia, artillery pieces, munitions, and treasure, are likewise the general's due.…The rest is to be divided among the soldiers; yet so, consideration must always be made of those who are most deserving.

If our goods are taken away by the enemy, and presently recovered again, [p. 15] then they return to the owner's possession.…

CHAPTER 2 [p. 16]

That before we begin wars, first provision of treasure, arms, munitions, ships, carriages, victuals, and all necessary furniture and instruments of war is to be made.

The consequences and effects of war being so dangerous and harmful, and the causes so many and so easily arising [*offered*], it behoves all princes

and states to make sufficient preparations [*provision*] for wars, and always to be ready; but especially when the enemy is close at hand, and threatens to invade us, which is now the case for England. He "that desires peace, must be armed for the wars and prepared, and those who obtain their rights soonest are those who have the necessary provisions to win them with force," as said a certain captain of the Romans.[37] "The provision of necessities is to be made long before, if you mean to obtain victory quickly."[38] Vegetius exhorts those who mean to start wars carefully to weigh and consider their stores and provisions [*charges*].[39]…The things that especially need to be provided before men are levied are as follows: first money, {secondly} arms, horses, carriages, ships, all munitions, and furniture of war, thirdly victuals and clothes, and lastly the help of confederates and friends. With money brave captains and soldiers are induced [*allured*] to serve, and maintained and paid for their service. All necessary military equipment is bought, victuals and clothes provided, intelligence about the enemy {gathered}, and many other commodities procured…As a result, wise men do not fear to call treasure "the sinews of war," without which they cannot proceed, or move at all, unless backwards.…{A}s the arms, legs, and extremities receive nourishment from the belly, and pine away if the belly is badly affected and infected, "likewise an army that is not maintained with money is easily broken, and dissolves by itself."[40]…

[p. 18] The means whereby money may be raised are diverse; either it is raised from lands belonging to the crown, or from inheritance, or confiscation, or conquest; or from rent, or penalties, or taxes [*imposts*], or other dues to the prince; or from subsidies, taxes, contributions and loans from subjects, or from our confederates and associates, or else from ransoms of our enemies' subjects, or countries.…

[p. 19] Where the ordinary revenues were insufficient, wise governors have had recourse to equal contributions, taxes and loans.…For the continuance of the public treasury {the Romans} had their lands and goods rated equally, and every man paid accordingly. If this {system of} equal proportion were to be observed today, I dare say it would not grieve any good subject to pay, even if it were twice as much as they now pay. Every man brought in the quantity of their land, and the value of it upon his credit; likewise the sum of his rents and money. Those who lived only on commerce [*traffic*] brought in the sum of their money and yearly profits, with the promise that what was left out would be confiscated and forfeit, and every time a false amount given in was punished by a fine of double.…

[p. 21] The reason that our small companies in France and Flanders have cost so much is that they are not able to encounter the enemy in the open field, {and instead} are shut up in some town and live on their wages, without doing themselves good or hurting the enemy. "If there is a mighty army in the field, what town or country is unwilling to redeem the favour of it?"[41]…{I}f wise men have the managing of it, wars will maintain themselves,

as Cato said[42]…The Romans in their extremities, to furnish their soldiers in war, economised on their personal expenses [*private charge*]….

CHAPTER 3 [p. 29]

Before we begin wars, we are to procure what strength or help we can from our neighbours or others; and to draw the same, as much is possible, {away} from our enemies.

As in private affairs associates receive mutual help from each other, confirming that "two joining together achieve matters more easily, than each man by himself,"[43] so in public undertakings [*executions*], where many are linked together, these are more easily executed, and are harder to break. Similarly friends and allies [*confederates*] contribute no less to the strength of states than forces and treasure….Neither should any prince or nation presume that they are so strong that they may refuse the aid of their friends….[p. 30] Furthermore, as we shall require the aid of our friends, so we must withdraw whatever aid we can from the enemy….Like a body is weakened by illness of its parts, a state with disagreement between its members is greatly weakened….

[p. 32] But while we seek to augment our forces with the assistance of our associates and friends; we are not to rely on them excessively, but must prepare sufficient forces from our own nation, both the resist the enemy, and if needs be, to command our associates, thereby following the wise proceedings of the Romans, who never admitted a greater number of associates, than they had citizens in their army, and always kept an eye on them, to ensure that they were not working [*practised*] with the enemy….

[p. 34] {T}he ends of wars are not only the beginnings of peace, but also of associations and friendships for the most part….{S}ome {alliances} are only defensive, some offensive, some with equal conditions on both sides, some with respect to one side. The differences {between alliance treaties} are as great as the diversities among states, and circumstances [*conditions of things*]….

CHAPTER 4 PART 8 [p. 70]

Wherein it is proved that soldiers chosen from our own nation are by far to be preferred to strangers and hired men.

Great dangers…have befallen many princes and states by foreign forces that have come in their aid…The soldiers therefore who are to be

employed in the defence of the realm I would choose from the natural subjects of the realm. Whether they are English, Welsh, or Irish, as long as they are subjects, it does not matter [*skilleth not*]. When I compare the people of this land to those of other nations, I see no reason why I should prefer any {others} to them. . . . {O}ur ancestors' acts [*steppes*] of prowess, as demonstrated in France, Flanders, Spain, Portugal, Scotland and other countries, cannot lie. If then the orders which our ancestors used to obtain glory or the rules of war were restored, who would not see that this nation would match any other. . . . {R}ecently . . . in France, Portugal, or the Low Countries . . . [p. 71] . . . our men would have been able to do much more . . . if {they} had been better provided for and furnished. Beside this, soldiers chosen from this nation are bound with a stricter bond to their prince and country than any stranger. They have more reason to fight, committed not only to defend their prince and country, but also their religion, laws, liberty, wives and children, and as a result, they are more patient in adversity, and have less cause to revolt. Even if they lack their pay, or part of their pay (which God knows they perhaps often do) they nevertheless continue to be constant and loyal. If they commit an offence, having their wives, children, lands, goods and friends behind them, they are more easily corrected. Finally, less pay contents our soldiers than any foreign nations. . . .

{By comparison,} there can be no trusting {of foreigners}. Their help is for sale, their hearts are faithless. They count a cause as best when they will get the most pay. "It is folly," says Polybius, "and lacking in judgement to put one's trust in strangers who are greater in number and strength than our own nation."[44] . . . [p. 70] Often strangers not only forsake their friends, but also join with the enemy and assault them. . . . Strangers are never satisfied with any pay, and yet they seldom do any service. . . . [p. 71] There is nothing more cowardly than strangers, when it comes to service. "They are not held by affection, nor do they have any regard for promises, and it does not shame them if they flee to save their own skins."[45] . . .

CHAPTER 4 PART 9 [p. 74]

Of the soldiers' pay.

Neither strangers nor subjects can be maintained for long without pay . . . As a result of lack of pay, many disorderly acts are committed, many opportunities intentionally ignored [*pretermitted*]. It is not possible, considering first the poverty of the common soldier, and then the small number of them, that either they can live on their own fortunes, or win anything from the enemy. When they lack pay they steal from [*spoil*] their friends and associates, their companions, and commit many outrages.

And who can bring justice against those who face a choice between starving and taking spoils? For lack of pay they sell their arms, their clothes, they become sick, weak, and unprofitable. On the contrary, if they had their pay, justice could be executed with more reason…

[p. 76] It is an improbable supposition that the burden of wars is greater now than in the past. For what necessities are there in war, except victuals, arms, clothes, horses, carriages and the such, all of which were no less necessary in the past, than they are now?…{P}owder and artillery had not been invented in the past. But the charge of {the Romans' siege} engines…which we now no longer use, was no less of a burden to them.…

I can see no reason except lack of military discipline for why an army should not be maintained and paid. For seeing that this land maintains so many millions at home, there is no reason that the same should not maintain [p. 77] thirty- or forty-thousand of the same number abroad, if the right discipline of arms is practiced. The greatest cost [*charge*] of an army is in meat and clothes [*apparel*]. But men spend no more on these abroad than they do at home.…{A}lthough this land lacks money, if the army was well-supplied with victuals and clothes by the prince's officers, then a great army might be sufficiently paid.…Compared with these, the expenses of munitions, and arms, and other matters are nothing.…The revenues of this crown, the contributions of the subjects, and aid of our friends are not so little, that sufficient maintenance might not be found, if men's goodwill and loyalty were not found wanting.

…{M}any crimes must be repressed: men desiring honour are to be appointed officers: the plunder [*rapines*] and theft [*filcheries*] of former times are to be sifted out by strict auditors and commissioners, and severely punished, as matters that bring disorder to all armies.…If those who kill a woman or a child of no importance deserve death, what do they deserve that cause the death of many valiant soldiers, and betray the realm and their prince into the hands of the enemy through their fraud, theft, and delays?…{I}t all comes to this end, that the captains shall pay their soldiers…[p. 78] It is a notorious abuse to give the pay of the common soldier to the centurion or captain of every band; {this was} never used by the Romans, nor any other nation.…

CHAPTER 4 PART 10 [p. 79]

Wherein it is declared, that there is no hope of good success in wars without a full army, and sufficient force.

…{T}o obtain victory, and to subdue our enemies, a just and full army must be employed. An {excessively} small number of men keep wars

going [*feed wars*], rather than end them, and anger the enemy, instead of hurting him.…

[p. 81] The wars of our times have no end. But where a sufficient{ly large} army goes, there is an end, either one way or the other. There is no end of cost [*charge*] in lingering wars. In these, if one army prevails, the victory maintains it; if it is overcome, there is an end to that army and its cost. The burden is only in the equipping [*setting out*] of the army, and maintaining it in the meanwhile.… If therefore any man hopes for the end of wars, or good success in France, Flanders, or other countries, let him try to do so employing sufficient means.…

CHAPTER 5 PART 2 [p. 96]

Within which it is proven that it is far better for the English nation, as things stand, to invade the Spanish, or any other enemy in his own country, than to receive their assault and invasion here at home, or to stay until we see the enemy on our own coast.

Many are…of a contrary mind, especially those who enjoy honor, wealth, and ease. These commonly desire peace and detest war…: they say we have neither towns or ports in Spain to receive us;[46] that the way to Spain is long, and uncertain as a result of the contrary nature of the winds, and that it will be hard to remedy any problems that befall our army because of the distance of the place. They further allege that we have no friends or confederates in the country, and that it will be more difficult to subdue the Spanish in their own country, than abroad, as every man fights more valiantly when his wife and children, and his own lands and goods are being fought for. Lastly, they suppose that the number of enemies will be so great that an army shall be exhausted [*wearied*] by killing them. On the other hand, if we only fight the Spanish here (they say), they shall have all these things against them; and we shall have all things favourable for us: men, munitions, and sufficient victuals; our wives, children, and country in our sight, safe places to retreat to.…

[p. 97]…{T}hese reasons are built on false grounds…He that first attacks [*chargeth*] his enemy has many advantages. It is {admittedly} a great folly if he is not well-provided with soldiers, mariners, arms, ships, horses, and all provisions for the wars. He may choose where to attack the enemy, and is able to simply proceed or even to begin where his enemy is at his weakest and worst-prepared [*unprovided*]. He may similarly choose his times, and seize opportunities. "Victory is obtained by prevention, and by the same, wars are often avoided," as King Alfonso II

of Naples said…[47] No man obtains better conditions of peace, than he who strikes first. In contrast it is dangerous to let the enemy attack [*come upon*] us.…

[p. 100] Suppose now on the other hand, that…an army of Spaniards were…to invade us, this would happen [*fall out*]: not knowing where the enemy will land, all the coast must be guarded [*furnished*] with soldiers. For to think that our trained men would be trained together in time to offer resistance is simple-minded. And if any port is left open, it is as good as leaving all disarmed. But this would be twice the burden of levying and furnishing an army for invading Spain. And the longer [p. 101] the enemy keeps us holding our breath, the greater the cost [*charge*] becomes. And all this for something of that I cannot see the effectiveness,…as it is neither possible to keep an army from landing, nor safe to fight at the enemy's landing place without a great advantage.

If the enemy should land, as he may well {be} coming with a great force, we have neither strong towns, nor many great rivers to stop his progress, nor any way to resist, other than by force of men in the open field.…

CHAPTER 5 PART 3 [p. 103]

Wherein certain advertisements are given to our soldiers sent in aid of foreign nations.

{A}ttack the enemy in his own country!…{T}he next best thing…when sending {soldiers} in small numbers to assist our friends who are being opposed by our common enemy, {is} not {to let them} proceed rashly. First…, wisdom requires that they go in strength. For in foreign countries, they are to fear the practices of two-faced friends {more} than the force of declared enemies.…

[p. 104] Whoever therefore means to win honour in the assistance of his friends abroad, let him do all he can to bring along a sufficient force. Small numbers are respected [*esteemed*] neither by enemies nor friends. They dare not go into the field, for they are too few and too weak; penned up in the cities they famish. If our friends are stronger than our aid, then we are commanded by them. If any of their leaders lack a good strategy [*gouvernment*], our men who are made to perform hard services pay the price of their folly. If any calamity happens to their army, our people feel it first. They see [*shift*] to themselves, being in their own country; our {troops} are slain [p. 105] both by the enemies and friends, and if victuals were scant our troops starve first.…The only way to assure ourselves of our friends is to have a sufficient force to dominate them, and correct their disloyalty.…

CHAPTER 10 [p. 148]

In which it is shown that as the assailants enter into the enemy's country, they are to seek that the matter may be tried in battle in the open field; thus the defendants, without a great advantage, are to avoid the trial; and by what means either may achieve their goals' purposes.

He that enters the enemy's country without intent of fighting, and taking risks, "let him henceforth keep his head warm at home, and entertain ladies."[48] Such adventures are for resolute and hardy men, as courage pricks such valiant men forwards. Their own profit requires, and necessity forces them, as soon as they can to come to trial { = battle}. The sooner, the better it will be for them. At first their men will be strong, their munitions, and arms whole and good, they will have sufficient supplies. If they do not; the greater is their error. Furthermore, their men are courageous, and have full stomachs. [p. 149] By contrast, the enemy is neither sufficiently provided with soldiers, nor supplies for war, especially if he does not look for war: neither is he resolute to fight. And what courage can he have, seeing his country in flames about him? . . .

To force the enemy to accept that which he would rather avoid [*shun*], the means are these: first, to pursue him, with all convenient speed. . . . Secondly, if the enemy has any courage: by passing through [*ranging*], and despoiling, and setting fire to whatever you cannot save for your own use, you shall either draw him forth into the field { = to give battle}, or break his heart. . . . [p. 150] If you cannot overtake the enemy by speed [*celerity*], nor move him to defend his country by spoiling the same, he will endure, until you take some of his principal cities. Shame and necessity will in the end force him to come to their aid. . . .

[p. 151] On the other hand, the defendants, taking the opposite course for safety of themselves and their country, ought to do as much as they can to linger and weary the enemy, and not to fight without manifest advantage. . . .

[p. 152] The way to wear the enemy without fighting is, first, with an army consisting mainly of lightly armed horsemen, artillerists [*shot*], targets, and lightly-armed halberdiers, to move at a distance from [*coast*] him, next, to spoil the country which he passes through; and to take all the cattle, corn, and provisions that may any way serve {the enemy} into strong towns; thirdly to store provisions in the towns of war, and assure them with strong garrisons; fourthly to destroy the bridges over the great rivers, and to seize all narrow and strait passages. The army that follows the enemy at a distance, although it may not join battle with him, even on suitable ground, still has many necessary uses; and without it all other impediments are easily passed. The same restrains [*bridles*] the

enemies' course, so that he dares not divide his army to send it to forage; it keeps supplies from the enemy, and defends the straits and passages of rivers; it aids towns that are besieged; it is apt to strip the enemy of all his advantages. . . .

[p. 153] Now I am to show how the enemy is to be wearied without fighting . . . But you must . . . always keep yourself and your company on the higher ground, and take heed that the enemy does not entrap you, nor go around [*compass*] you. Fabius[49] in the Second Punic War against Hannibal in Italy, and Licinius[50] in the wars against Hasdrubal[51] in Spain, have shown you by their example what you should do, and how you should guard yourself warily, and watch your enemy. . . .

[p. 154] Consider the loss and calamities that come of allowing [*suffering*] the country to be burned and spoiled, the danger [*hazard*] that towns are in if they are besieged by the enemy without hope of relief, the discouragement of our people who see an enemy whom they dare not encounter in the country. As a rule no country nor state can be well defended against a strong enemy for any long time, unless the country or state can field, or can procure, an army to encounter him . . . And therefore all valiant men who love their country should rather endeavour to overcome the enemy by force than to try to make him dull and weary him by patience and delays. . . .

CHAPTER 13 [p. 192]

On stratagems and ambushes.

Stratagems are infinite, and cannot be comprised within any certain rules. . . . One special and yet common stratagem is to conceal our plans [*counsels*] and enterprises by pretending to do the opposite. For by these means the enemy, looking . . . one way, is often taken in and mortally stricken in another place, and by other means. . . . [p. 193] Under the pretence of a peace treaty, many hostile practices can be applied. . . .

[p. 196] {W}ise leaders ought to devise and practice whatever tends to deceive, and abuse the enemy, or to encourage, and give advantage to our own soldiers, provided that they neither break oaths, nor promise nor offend against piety, or the laws of nations. . . . [p. 197] Likewise, ambushes well placed and managed work the enemy great displeasures, not only in cutting off stragglers, and such as go on foraging, but also in troubling an army marching or fighting. . . .

[p. 198] It is the part of a wise leader when he pursues, or tracks the enemy at a distance, to take the advantage provided by woods, valleys, hills, straits, rivers, and in all places to lay traps for {the enemy}, so that he can neither march, nor fight, nor camp without danger. . . .

CHAPTER 14

Wherein it is shown how the victory is to be used, and the conquest maintained, once the enemy is vanquished.

[p. 200] {V}ictory is not the be-all and end-all [*All consists not of victory*], but those deserve {most} commendation, who can use a victory to their purpose, and maintain that which they win. . . .

Either the enemy's army is altogether vanquished and dispersed; or else some good part has withdrawn intact . . . {L}et us now consider the course the general must take. If the enemy is not vanquished, but some part of his army remains sound, or at least unbroken, then the general is to follow him, and urge him while the terror of the recent fright is still in his mind. . . .

[p. 201] But some may say that it is not good to drive the enemy to utter despair, for that forces men to take risks, and to try all means of escape. . . .Themistocles said that a bridge of gold was to be made for an enemy that flees, so that he might depart quietly.[52] {This applies to} an enemy who flees without intending to return, and [p. 202] who cannot be broken without great danger. But if they intend to return, no danger is to be refused, nor labour shunned, so that he may be broken, if this is not difficult. For he who cannot resist when whole, cannot resist when broken. . . .Yet in pursuing the enemy, I would not stop him so that he cannot flee, nor would I fight with desperate men, but I would force them to accept to live with hunger and disease, and so coerce their armies to depart. . . .

But if the enemy's forces are utterly dispersed, and dare not confront us in the field, then the next task is to besiege their main cities, and that immediately, while the pain [*smart*] of their wounds is still fresh. . . .The terror of a victorious army is great, and sufficient to make any town yield. . . .There is no town that dares to hold out without hope of help [*succour*].

But some may say that it is a hard task to take well-fortified towns that are defended and have stores of victuals. I grant that this is the case if armies that besiege them are such as ours, and are similarly supplied, and the towns have hope of relief. Otherwise, as Scipio said, it is a matter more of time, [p. 203] than labor.[53] For when the country is spoiled, no towns can hold out for long. . . .

A victorious army not only takes whatever town it besieges, but also seizes the whole country. . . .

But what can delays, lack of supply and division not work in such cases! First, therefore, the army that is victorious ought not to allow the enemy to concentrate, but to scatter his forces. Secondly, it ought

to besiege the main city, and to seize the country . . . , not allowing the enemy any place to rest.[54] . . . Thirdly, the general's care ought to be about how to take the enemies' subjects away from them, and to deprive them of the aid of their confederates, a matter that is not difficult, if he proceeds wisely in war, and justly after the victory. For as good success procures friends for the conqueror, similarly everyone abandons and condemns the vanquished. . . .

[p. 204] {A}fter the victory, the general is to negotiate [*practice*] with the friends and confederates of the vanquished, and with good conditions to unite them unto himself. . . . To keep our conquest, there are two principal means which are necessary; force and justice. For neither can those who are rebellious, and desirous of change [*innovation*], be repressed without force, nor can the peaceful be defended, or contented without justice. "The rule [*empire*]", says Camillus, "which the subjects willingly embrace and gladly continue is the most firm and durable."[55] And it is hard to keep discontented men in subjection [p. 205] for long by force. "A subdued country is kept by the same means that subdued it; that is by fortitude, industry, and justice," says Sallust.[56] The uses of force are diverse: first, to repel the enemy if he comes again, and to keep him down so that he does not look up. . . .

[p. 207] For the rest, if the governors of newly conquered countries should be careful and watchful, and trust no man without reason, and use equality in taxation, and enact good justice against thieves [*ravevours*], bribe-takers, and rebels, they need not fear rebellion; if they do not, all force that may be used will not serve to keep {the people} in subjection for long. . . . For no people can like a government for long, when their property is spoiled and they are vexed, injured, . . . pillaged, and tyrannised.

CHAPTER 18 [p. 273]

The use of the navy, and many points to be considered by those who command at sea.

Those nations and cities that have the command of the sea, even if they are foiled on land, they can never be thoroughly vanquished, before they are beaten from the sea. This matter {is made} apparent by many examples. . . . In contrast, however strong a nation is on land, it cannot sustain itself for long, nor continue in its reputation without sufficient power at sea. . . .

[p. 274] The use of the navy is great in peace, greater in wars. With its use, traffic and intercourse between friends is maintained, supplies going to the enemy are stopped; our victuals, arms, munitions, and other necessities are supplied; the enemy's coast is spoiled and our own defended; the coastal towns of the enemy's country that border the sea

are brought to great extremes, while our own are maintained. Without a navy the trade of merchandise cannot be maintained, nor the sea towns of the enemy besieged, nor their country spoiled; nor can we understand the enemy's [p. 275] movements [*proceedings*], nor help, or well defend our friends, or ourselves. . . .

[p. 278] To come all of a sudden, the best course is, as soon as we spot [*decrie*] land, and see where we are, to stay until the fall of night [*the shutting of the evening*], and then to make towards a haven or harbour. If the weather is fair, then there is no danger. . . . The more speed [*expedition*] that is used in landing, the better it is executed; and the longer it is delayed, the more time the enemy has to resist, or rather to run away, taking his goods with him. If we mean to do such a thing, our force must be the greater. . . .

So that we may be quicker, it would be good to resolve and give direction before we depart from our country, as to who should land first, and what every man should do immediately upon landing. Once landed, we are to proceed in order, according to the practice of war, sending our scouts [*espials*] before us, and placing guards in convenient places, to defend those who are ranging about in search of spoils. . . .

[p. 279] Those who do not provide also for their men to retire safely, and be shipped in {good} order, so they may go forth in {good} order, seldom escape danger or loss. Therefore, if there is a defence to be made at the landing, certain banks and trenches must be constructed [*cast*], so that our men may safely retire into them, and from them quietly, and without tumult, take shipping, repelling those who come to charge them. . . . If the enemy can either burn our ships or boats, or if there is no correspondence between those at land and those at sea, they both incur manifest danger, and therefore we are to choose a safe place of landing, and to keep a diligent and strong guard. . . .

[p. 284] Those who are afraid to venture their ships of war [p. 285] . . . may also be afraid to venture in defence of their country. For without venturing, not only of {ship-} timber, but also of men's lives, which (even if some in our time do not value thousands of men the same as the price of one rotten ship) are far more precious, our country cannot be defended, nor the prince served. Let these men therefore keep their decayed wits and joints warm, and do not let them tell us what is impossible, ridiculous, or indeed very dangerous. For the way to hazard our ships is not {by risking enemies} boarding {them}, but by saving money, when they are not properly equipped [*furnished*] to fight, and so must fall into the enemy's hands if they are ever taken at disadvantage, for example if their masts break, their sails tear or burn, or their tackle is cut. . . .

Let us therefore ensure that we need not fear any such danger, and so that we might not only overcome the enemy by fleeing, but also by fighting. . . . Our soldiers and mariners would do so now, if men's hands were

not bound, and their hearts broken, whereas men should try to encourage them, and make them keen [*whet them*] to go forward.

In fighting at sea the admiral who has his ships well trimmed, and all things ready, must also have further care that his company may have the advantage of the wind, and keep good order in the sailing of ships, so that one does not go before another, and that he ranges his navy with supplies, and finally that he provides whatever else is necessary or requisite for obtaining victory. . . .

[p. 286] The array and good order of the navy brings with it this advantage, that one ship is not easily surrounded [*environed*] by others, and further, one ship is always ready to aid [*succour*] another. . . .{A}s in fighting on land, also at sea a particular order is to be kept among the ships sailing to fight. The most common array is that the front of the battle is divided into three parts, into the "right corner" or wing, into the "mid-battle," and into the "left corner." In each case, other ships are to be designated not only to aid those who fight, but also to fight with those who try to attack the navy from behind.

The manner of a sea fight is the same with the whole navy, as when single ships fight . . . First they assail their enemy with their large shot, which would be done only when the ships come nearby; then they attack him with small shot. Those who feel stronger lay hold upon their enemy's ship and force themselves to enter it. . . .

CHAPTER 19 [p. 288]

Wherein special matters concerning peace treaties, truces, and confederacies, and likewise concerning the privileges of ambassadors and messengers, who ordinarily are the mediators of peace treaties, truces, and such like treaties.

Although the joy and triumph of victory is exceedingly great, yet I do not count him as wise who refuses a reasonable peace with equitable conditions when things hang in the balance, in the dubious hope of victory. "All that we take in hand is subject to chance," and "success of battle is common to both parties."[57]

Wherefore, seeing that peace is the end of wars, and seeing that we do not take arms in hand to do wrong, but to recover or obtain what is rightfully ours, let no man refuse reason who may have {peace}. But because many who seem to offer peace have nothing but wars in their hearts, let us . . . declare also how we may assure ourselves that we will not be cheated [*abused*] by deceptive [*coloured*] treaties, or unequal conditions, or bad assurances of peace, which are more dangerous than any war. . . . [p. 289] Therefore in making peace treaties we must first ensure that we do not

slacken our preparations of war, nor defer to take any advantage that his offered. . . . For peace is not obtained with talk or petition, unless we also prepare our forces.

Secondly . . . do not trust the enemy. None gets abused more easily, than those who have little credit. We must therefore not let the enemy see our weakness, or anything that might be prejudicial to us, nor commit ourselves into our enemies' hands either during the treaty, or after the conclusion of peace. . . .

[p. 290] Thirdly, great care must be taken that we yield no advantage to the enemy. The first injury that we receive at the enemies' hands is nothing but a step to the next, as has been shown, and he who from the top of the stairs takes one step shall sooner be thrust down to the bottom than recover the top again. He who once begins to fall is easily overthrown. . . .

Fourth, the time to negotiate peace treaties is to be considered: it is when both parties have tasted from the cup of calamities that war brings with it, and yet neither is overthrown or thoroughly vanquished. . . .

Further we are to look that the conditions of peace are reasonable. If we quarrel [*contend*] about borders [*limits*], towns, or countries, it is no honor to lose our right. If we have had wrong done unto us, it is no reason that we should rest without satisfaction. But because conditions are many according to the causes of war, the times, and persons that contend, and many other circumstances, one should refer [p. 291] to the judgement of those who are employed in such affairs, whose chief ends should be the majesty of God, the honor of the prince, the safety and profit of the country.

But most special care is to be had that the conditions are applied [*performed*]. Without this the treaty is nothing but a vain show of fair words. . . . The contempt for religion and true honor, and greedy desire for gain, have brought contempt not only for promises but also for oaths. Some have no regard for hostages, or pledges, so they may take a good advantage. . . .

The ordinary means to assure the conditions agreed upon in a peace treaty are many, first word or promise, then writing and seal, thirdly pledges of towns, which the Protestants of France have found to be the best assurance,[58] and we have chosen for the assurance of the contract between us and the Low Countries. . . . Fourthly, {the taking of} hostages . . . is an old practice . . . I see no other assurance of peace than either to treat the enemy in such a way that cannot hurt you, even if he wants to, or else to have arms in hand, that he can never break {his word} without loss or disadvantage. To avoid quarrels, and to take away all just causes of arguments [*brable*], it would be good if the conditions were conceived in good terms and were set down in writing, confirmed with the seals of the prince or states whom it concerns. . . .

[p. 292] Further, if any doubt should arise, power should be given to some prince commended by his honor, and power to compel the obstinate [*froward*] to obey, both to interpret words, and also to see the agreement implemented [*performed*].

Lastly, as by conditions we agree [*covenant*] what should be done; so likewise, in case of contravention, penalties should be set down. However penalties are set down, wise princes not only forecast how to cause the enemy to perform conditions, but also how, in case he should break his promises, he can be forced.

The same considerations that are used in peace treaties also have their place in treaties concerning truces and confederacies. For truces are nothing but a ceasing of hostilities for a time, the causes of war still undecided, whereas peace is, or ought to be, a final conclusion. But peace is made sometimes where there is no confederacy. For this is among associates and friends, and may be made between enemies.

The conditions of peace and confederacies are divers according to the condition and state of the parties that are made friends. . . .

[p. 294] Those who are either equal or inferior to each other in force sometimes join in a defensive league, or sometimes in an offensive league against those who are enemies to either, either with all their forces, or with some specified numbers of soldiers. These are either paid by those who send them, or those who use them.

Some nations yield themselves into the protection of others by treaty out of fear of their enemies. . . . In this case, as the receiver binds himself to defend those who give themselves into his arms, so they either bind themselves to pay money, or to serve him, or to surrender to him certain towns. No man is bound to refuse the protection of others, unless it is specially agreed. Nor is it a dishonor to protect those who are wrongfully oppressed, as it is much more dishonorable to abandon those whom they have undertaken to defend. . . .

[p. 295] . . . Not only do princes and free states make covenants with each other, but also subjects with their princes, and princes with their subjects . . . If in these they demand no more than that which the laws of nations require anyway, it is tolerable. But if the subjects prescribe laws to their sovereign princes, and bind them to inconveniences, it smacks [*savours*] of force rather than loyalty. And that princes' commands should be obeyed against reason proceeds from tyranny. Neither can any assurance be made of such agreements.

That covenants of peace and association may be well-conceived and made, princes and others are to consider diligently unto whom they commit the management of such affairs, and to furnish them with good instructions. And those are likewise to have regard that they do not surpass their commission and instructions. Without commission no man, under the decree of those who rule as sovereign, is to make peace or {form an} alliance [*league*]. . . .

CHAPTER 21 [p. 298]

Wherein it is declared that, to encourage the frontline men to behave valiantly, nothing is more effective than reward, nor, for the maintenance of military discipline, anything more required than severe punishment.

…{A}fter victory is obtained or troubles ended, those who have served valiantly are to be rewarded. While wars in our times admit no such order, and being ended, are the beginning of beggary and calamity for many [p. 299] poor soldiers, yet may I not omit this argument, though interrupted and broken by men who are ignorant of wars and all good order. There is nothing more effective to move men to risk their lives in the service of their country, than reward….

[p. 301] Yet this does not hold {true} everywhere: in some states there is neither reward, nor scarce praise for service. Honor is given for wealth, kindred, favor, and if anyone is rewarded, it is those who do not deserve anything….

As valiant deeds are to be rewarded, so are treachery, cowardice, and [p. 302] disobedience severely to be punished….For if the prince's commandment can be ignored without danger; and ambition and covetousness of individuals cause public matters to be neglected…; if public treasure is abused for private purposes, and that which should be used to pay soldiers and other necessary expenses of the common wealth is lent to usury, or spent on purchases; if the officers who are to provide supplies, arms and munitions,…may make…gain, and accountants give in false reckonings, and captains and officers report false force strengths, and {officers do not honor}…their…superiors…, not only the sinews of the military, but also of the state will be easily dissolved….

CHAPTER 21 PART 3 [p. 316]

Containing laws concerning the duties of captains and soldiers more specifically. [p. 318]

20. No soldier or any other shall fraudulently or by theft take anything from anyone's person, or their lodging, house, or cabin upon pain of death.
21. When any company of soldiers shall be billeted in any village, or pass through it, or be put up on any dwelling house, or anything else belonging to our friends, they shall not hurt, nor injure the people, nor their goods on pain of death, or other grievous punishment according to the quality of the offence.
22. No man shall burn any corn or hay, or forage, or destroy any provisions, or houses, barns or mills, or other buildings that may serve the uses of the army on pain of death.

23. All murders, perjuries, forgeries, rapes of women or maidens, fraternisation [*cousinages*], or other disorders, whereby the army may receive disgrace, or hurt, although not comprised in these laws, shall be punished by such penalties as the civil laws, or else the common laws of England order in such cases.…

Annotations to the previous laws.

[p. 327] Re. 22. Many things may be found in the enemy's country that would benefit the army, if they could be saved from wanton despoiling by the soldiers. So that soldiers do not fall into needless want because of their own fault, let this law be diligently executed among others.

Re. 23. Such offences, that are punished by civil laws at home, ought to be punished abroad. Yet the judges and officers that deal with such offences must proceed with great discretion. For small matters in times of peace, such as the neglect of the watch, and disobedience against officers, are severely punished in time of wars. By contrast great matters in times of peace are for obvious reasons neglected in wars.…

CHAPTER 21 PART 8 [p. 336]

Comprising orders concerning booty, spoils, and prisoners taken in wars.

1. After the enemy is driven out of the field, or the fortress or town being besieged is entered, no man shall leave his position, or ensign run to gain spoils before their licence, or a sign given upon pain of death.…

3. All spoils taken from the enemy belong to the prince, or State, who pays the army. And therefore whatever a soldier takes or finds, being above ten shillings in value, is to be brought to the general, or his deputy upon pain of imprisonment, and loss double the value of the thing concealed. By this means the general may reward the most valiant and forward soldiers, and have means to pay his soldiers' wages.

4. Every man shall have the liberty to ransom his prisoners taken in wars at his own pleasure.…{I}f the prisoner is a prince or a great man, the general is to have the prisoner to make whatever value he can of him for the benefit of his prince and country: allowing the taker either the value of the prisoner or an honourable reward.

Annotations to the previous laws.

…[p. 338] Re. 4. It is inhumane and harsh to massacre those who surrender [*yield themselves*], and throw down their weapons, confessing themselves to be vanquished, and flying to our mercy.…But if it is inhumane to kill those who surrender, it is far more so to kill those in cold blood that one has promised to save.…Therefore let prisoners be saved, if they can be, and let them be ransomed.…[p. 342]

To God, who is the Lord of Hosts, praise, honor & glory for ever and ever.

CHAPTER 5

Don Bernardino de Mendoza (1595)

Don Bernardino de Mendoza, born around 1540, was of the highest nobility: the Mendozas could trace their ancestry back to 12th-century Spain. His parents were Alfonso/Alonso, the third Count of Coruña, Vizconde de Torija, and Juana, daughter of Juan Jiménez de Cisneros, older brother of the cardinal de Cisneros. Even though there has been some confusion about Don Bernardino de Mendoza's genealogy in later times, in his own lifetime nobody doubted that he was of a family and standing making him worthy of highest office as a trusted diplomat and soldier. Nevertheless, Don Bernardino may have been the tenth of 18 or 19 children,[1] and thus a younger son and not the heir to the family's estate. He thus had to earn his living and so was sent to study in Alcalá; at the age of 16 or 17 in 1557, he obtained a diploma in arts and philosophy. Besides Spanish, he read Latin, Greek, French, English, and Italian. He was elected a member of the Colegio Major de San Ildefonso. From 1560 on, he was in royal services, and was initially given military, rather than diplomatic, tasks. He fought in the Spanish expeditions of Oran in 1563, Peñón in 1564, and Malta in 1565; he accompanied the Duke of Alba to Italy in 1567 to levy troops for the campaign in Flanders, where Alba was in charge of the counterinsurgency operations against the uprising of the Calvinist Dutch nobility against the rule of King Philip II of Spain, of which Mendoza thus was to obtain first-hand experiences. Mendoza clearly did not approve of Alba's harsh rule, as can be seen in his views on how to handle rebels or insurgents. He later wrote insightful commentaries on the wars in the Low Countries.[2]

In 1576 Mendoza was made a knight of the Order of St. James,[3] and about that time also became a diplomat. He was sent to the Vatican (where Pope

Pius V reigned) and then to England in 1578. There, he conspired actively to get Queen Elizabeth off and place Mary Queen of Scots onto the throne; as a result, he was forced to leave the Court of St. James in 1584. Philip II sent him instead to King Henry of Navarre, to persuade the king to join Spain in a war against Henry III of France. Mendoza was subsequently accredited to the French court under the same Henry III as ambassador, where he stayed until 1591 and continued his conspiratorial support for Mary Stuart until her execution in 1587. His intrigues were more successful in the formation of the Catholic League, led by the Duke of Guise, Mary Stuart's cousin. When in 1589 Guise was murdered in Blois, Mendoza probably saved the life of the Duke of Mayenne, who was threatened with a revenge killing; even so, Mayenne later became one of Mendoza's antagonists. Mendoza continued to plot with the League in Blois, then returned to Paris where he recognized the Union government as the only legitimate government. Nevertheless, Mendoza represented a king who stood for Catholicism, and had claims to the French throne, which gave Mendoza much leverage with the Catholic League. The moderates opposed him. But after Henry IV converted to Catholicism in 1593, Mendoza negotiated with him, offering reconciliation with Philip II of Spain and marriage to a Spanish princess. The latter negotiations came to naught. With Henry IV's entry into Paris, Mendoza's mission ended, and he returned to Madrid in 1591, already affected by problems with his eyesight.[4]

At some stage, Mendoza had married Doña Leonor María de la Vega, a lady of good standing. They had a single child, Sancha, who married Don Francisco Centurión, fourth son of the Marquess of Estepa.[5] After his return to Madrid, Mendoza lectured on fortifications at the Academy of Mathematics in Madrid, alongside Cristobál de Rojas (1555–1614), probably around 1595;[6] it may have been that he needed the money. Mendoza became blind in his old age; he died around 1604 while he was living, in relative poverty, in lodgings belonging to the Monastery of St. Bernard in Madrid.[7]

Mendoza published the *Theory and Practice of War* in 1594, dedicated to the crown prince Philip (the future Philip III) of Spain. Despite Mendoza's classical education, the book's style is even less digestible than that of Fourquevaux,[8] for Mendoza tried to apply Latin models for paragraph-length sentences to a modern vulgate, with the effect that the grammar sometimes escaped his control. The book has no chapter divisions, but rather pointers to the contents written along the margins, which are turned into section headings here. Apart from the passages included in this chapter, the book contains sections on the dangers of starting a war if one has insufficient money to pay the troops throughout it; on diplomats' need for military experience; on the virtues needed in a good general or captain, officers, and soldiers; on camps and fortifications; on sieges; on the best configuration for ground forces in battle and on the march; and on naval warfare (with a particular focus on sieges of ports).

Mendoza's work appeared during a wave of publications that owed their popularity to the Spanish-Dutch-English-French wars. The most remarkable features of the contents of Mendoza's work are its pronounced preference for defensive wars, and its insistence on leniency when dealing with insurgencies, such as that against Spanish rule during the time of Mendoza's writing in the Netherlands. Mendoza's arguments have been shown to resemble those of Justus Lipsius in the fifth book of his *Politicorum sive civilis doctrina,* which Mendoza later translated into Castilian.[9] Mendoza's views also scan with those of Luis Valle de la Cerda, who had written along similar lines in 1583.[10] Other—in part original—themes found in Mendoza's book are his emphasis on God's role in war; his praise for the regnal or feudal spirit in which vassals are obliged to sacrifice service and their own goods and persons for the king's cause, in return for protection of honor; by contrast, his amoral view that desire for conquest is a natural human craving and acceptable in a king; his preference for native soldiers balanced with role specialization among different national groups of soldiers, which he shared with Machiavelli and Sutcliffe**;** his recognition that one needs a superiority of forces over those of the enemy in order to attack him, compared with smaller numbers if one only wishes to defend oneself; his belief that aggression is more dangerous than defense; his conviction that alliances are to be kept (*pacta sunt servanda*); his view that a prince has the obligation to come to the aid of oppressed populations; and his support for the benefits of neutrality and balance-of-power politics. He is unusual in his times in dismissing some of the wisdom of the Ancients, and in emphasizing the changes brought on by new military technology, especially gunpowder.

The contemporary translation of 1597 by Sir Edward Hoby (1560–1617) is used in large measure as a starting point for the translation that follows. Hoby may well have come across Mendoza in the Low Countries, where Hoby clearly gained some of his own military experience and probably learned his Spanish.

* * *

Don Bernardino de Mendoza: *Theórica y prática de guerra* (Madrid: Pedro Madigal, 1595; repr., Madrid: Ministerio de Defensa, 1998).

Theorique and practise of warre, trans. Sir Edwarde Hoby (Middelburg: Richard Schilders, 1597), to which the pagination refers.

Dedicated to Don Philip, Prince of Castile.

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF WAR [p. 3]

{On good counsellors and good advice}

Your Highness is . . . to give hearing, void of passion, to your clerical and military counsellors. If they say that for the defence of your kingdoms,

great esteem and reputation, it is necessary to take up arms, you will owe it only your own opinion, stemming from the ardor of {your} age [*hervor de la edad*][11] and greatness of mind. For although God gives this unto kings the day he sends them into the world…, their education alone cannot be sufficient to enlarge their minds [p. 4], when it comes to embracing some glorious enterprise or other confidently, notwithstanding that it can carry multitudes of dangers with it.

How much more you will be beaten, if you know this and act to the contrary

If Your Highness is fully assured by the theologians that your demand is just, according to the laws of God and man, and that it is wise to maintain it by arms and with a strong hand, then…you might hope for God's assistance and victory. Under any other conditions, you must expect evil. If God {on occasion} has given victory to those that have fought unjustly, it has been because of God's secret judgements: as far as men's reason can conceive, God may try to use them like a whip to chasten those who forget to serve and glorify him in return for benefits they have received. {In doing so He} bestows the light of faith, knowledge of God's invincible truth, and promise of the greatness of the rewards which might be expected to come forth from his powerful and bountiful hand, to all those that keep his commandments…How much more then should these commandments be observed in war, being a flash of lightning of our Lord's wrath.

Obligations kings enter into

The burden that a king takes upon himself cannot be expressed, if he assumes it for any other motive or end than the pure honor and glory of God, defence of his kingdoms, and the protection of the holy Catholic faith. {By doing so, kings} fulfil the obligation that God has laid upon them, that the souls of those should not be lost of whom He has made {kings} the captains on earth and administrators of his justice. This is not enough, however, to let kings know when a war shall end, even if they were quite sure of its causes, and even if they have achieved all they can desire in the world….

Two manners of war [p. 5]

If your Highness is resolved to take up arms to wage war on land or at sea, it must be by offensive or defensive force. For these are the two aims that war can have {lit: targets that the warrior's eye must aim for},…The first thing Your Highness is to look to do, is to command your councillors and officers of your Ministry of Estates [*Haciendas*] { = Finance Ministry}

that they advise of its state, what ready money you have, and the intervals [*plazos*] at which your taxes are to be paid, so you know it is possible {to make war}…and how you may use them: you concede to the merchants the means to increase prices without causing grief to your subjects. Thus {your} lands will be able with their substance, and with their wealth, to do greater service to their prince than in normal times. For which Your Highness is to give thanks to our Lord,…as your kingdoms and states are so fruitful, and powerful, that you do not have to fear other kings' actions, given the barrenness and poverty of their lands…

Of all the means and expedients which princes have to provide themselves with money, I find none more effective, or mild, than to have…{a culture} where the vassals can be persuaded to spend their wealth in service of their prince, purely for honor and [p. 6] reputation, and not for their own profit. For men will pluck out their own bowels to attain {honor}, and will not undertake an adventure, unless they see a present gain before their eyes. Honor stirs them up to a kind of envy, and competition among them against one another who wish to attain it…{T}he care which men take in acquiring wealth is no less than their efforts to spend it as soon as it has been acquired. In this context one might {revive} the old custom…that subjects…should be persuaded to employ the substance of their wealth for the greatest service of the prince, and for the benefit of the public welfare of the realm. Similarly those that have the means should find armour, men, and horses, and practise using them, from which they would develop a greater interest of conservation of the state, than out of rich furniture and other possessions.

A prince's greatness is to have their subjects ready and equipped for wars

Some hold the opinion that it may be inconvenient for the princes to keep their vassals prepared for war. I, however, answer that if they are loyal, it is of much more greatness and power for princes to command such subjects. For other princes and potentates stand in fear of such quality.…

[p. 8] The Ancients were wont to say, "{M}oney is the sinews of war," which continual experience proves.…

General considerations on declaring war [p. 9]

If Your Highness wants to conquer a kingdom, state, country, or part of any of these, this is the most carefree sort of war for princes, being {undertaken} voluntarily and not forced by having to defend. [p. 10] It gives time to make preparations, and {one can choose to undertake the campaign} in the best season. The desire of conquest is held to be a natural matter in all sorts of men, and more so in kings. A prince undertaking it is worthy of commendation.…{I}f he does not undertake such enterprises, he can be

excused for many reasons. If a conquest is undertaken without convenient force to perform it, the people will blame him. If he commits sundry errors as well, and he is counselled to do so under the pretence of making him more powerful, this procures his ruin. The prince is to be suspicious of that counsel, when the conquest is not proportional to the size of his forces. Even if these are great, and if the season and time may seem convenient for the enterprise, is it…better to declare war on another king, or to stay until he moves first? Comparing the enemy's forces with his own, he should consider whether it would be better to have many join in league with him in making war, or to undertake it alone….

{Good government preparations for war} [p. 18]

When Your Highness has followed all the principles, stocking provisions and preparing levies of men, and you are in such a good state of preparation that the enemy has no time to increase his forces, it is fit to tell Your Highness' vassals of the enterprise you mean to execute…[p. 19], especially if it is against infidels, barbarians, or enemy peoples or nations of a sort that Your Highness' vassals abhor. Thus they will be burning {with enthusiasm}, and greet the day that a declaration of war is published with great content and rejoicing. Thus two things are gained: first, they are encouraged to perform extraordinary service for Your Highness hoping for the profit and success that will ensue from it. Secondly, most princes and potentates perceive the affection which Your Highness' vassals have for you, and the approval [*aplauso*] with which they perform the service. Notwithstanding that it is done with excessive expense of Your Highness' income [*renta*], they will be willing to supply part thereof by diminution of their own income.

Defensive war

When another prince attacks the kingdoms and states of Your Highness, the war is defensive. Give heed to the cause of the war. Is it to compensate [*recobrar*] for any lost right, injury, or grievance, which he believes to have received? Or is it for the common enmity's sake, which the infidels and barbarians hold against all Christian princes? These are all for the destruction of a kingdom which are called extrinsic, or outward. Intrinsic reasons {i.e. for insurgencies or civil war}…could arise in some of Your Highness' states by the fault of a governor…

[p. 20] Defence may take three forms:

1. moving out to meet the enemy outside the kingdom,
2. or awaiting him at the borders of the kingdom, covering the frontiers in whichever way the conditions and narrowness of the roads and difficulty of passing the rivers will allow.

3. The third may be done in two ways, equipping one or two frontiers or more with a good supply of soldiers and munitions when they can be well-fortified, having the rest of the army stationed within one's lands, to be ready any time. The other, if the frontiers are weak, with villages and open fields around, is to choose a {fortified} site to station your army from which it can reinforce the frontiers wherever you fear the enemy, seeking to attack the enemy . . .

Considerations regarding the first manner of defence

In going forth to seek out the enemy, a greater courage and gallantry [*gallardía*] may be noted in him who acts, than in him who waits, and that ordinarily the success of war favors the invaders more than the defenders. One must consider, however, that to attack requires more forces than to be attacked, or at least, they ought to be considered equal. . . . Many believe that soldiers fight with greater courage outside their own country than within it, because they do not have the hope of any place to escape to, they can only trust in their own hands. They also say that the good father of the family takes less care to rid the house of those who behave badly within, than to prevent them [p. 21] from entering in the first place. Nor would it be a wise politician who only chastens thieves within the commonwealth, but {he would be wise} who governs in such a matter that thieves will not come in. Similarly, a wise prince has never given occasion to the enemy to set foot on his land, if he had any means to hinder it, or convenient forces to break him before his entry.

Reasons for not fighting outside one's own country

By contrast, it is thought to be dangerous to go to seek out the enemy, except if one has a secure refuge to retreat to, or another army on the confines and frontiers with which you are prepared to fight a second time. In doing otherwise, it would endanger the whole State in one battle, especially when one does not go forth with superior, or at least equal, forces. In this context one has to consider whether the captain in charge of the expeditionary force is valorous and experienced, and whether the soldiers . . . are well trained and love the commanding captain. If that is not the case, they will not perform in a worthy manner, nor will the captain, if he does not hold the confidence . . . of his soldiers, whatever else he does . . . Also, the Prince himself should remain at the frontier with the second army, that is with a body of people ready to relieve {the expeditionary force}, if it should have to fall back, and to gather up the remains of {the expeditionary force}, if there have been losses, {so as} to turn it around and face the enemy again, . . .

Considerations regarding the second manner of defence

In the second manner of defence one should consider whether to defend the passages and entries {to one's country} can be done with few people, relying on the strength of the {fortified} site, or {whether this can be done only} with so many [p. 22] that this uses up the larger part of the army. If the army is divided, and if then the first part of the army {that is defending the passages} is defeated because it is so small, and the passage is lost, then it is impossible to fight with the second {if that is also small}. It will then take a long time to come to the help of frontiers or towns that are attacked by the enemy, if he is master of the field. If the enemy chooses to attack the remaining part of the army…, the only option for it is to stay close to some town or fortified place to defend it, awaiting help if there is any hope of it, if the space {of the town or fortress} allows it, and to stock up victuals. Otherwise {our army} will find itself in a difficult situation.

Considerations regarding the third manner of defence

The third manner is safest…Rarely is a kingdom or state attacked that controls entry points that are naturally difficult to force. Nevertheless, {the enemy} will always seek to get intelligence about them, in the hope of {taking them} through some cunning stratagem. And if {the country} is to be invaded from the sea, {the enemy} will always seek a port or landing place where the artillery of the castles and platforms may not reach the shipping while the men are going ashore.…

Considerations for making war to assist an allied prince—a prince is bound to keep his word [p. 25]

Your Highness may levy men in assistance of some prince, with whom you are allied. By reason of such an alliance as you hold with him, which ought to be honoured in all points, Your Highness and all princes are engaged to keep their faith and word, and contracts are built on this trust, for two considerations: first, that by the law of nature, contracts are to be kept; and secondly, a prince is to keep his faith and word, for it ought to stand as a pledge and inviolable guarantee, towards subjects as well as towards all other manner of persons, keeping in mind what God signified by the mouth of the psalmist, saying: "and the words that proceed from my mouth I will not make void."[12] Nothing remains to be considered except whether the number of men is specified in the agreement, or whether they should be from among the old soldiers and ordinary garrisons of Your Highness, or of men who are to be newly levied by experienced captains.

Considerations concerning going to war as a protector

Your Highness may in a similar way employ your forces for the [p. 26] conservation of any prince or commonwealth [*república*] under your protection. Being somebody's protector does not include any subjection of the other party, nor does it give the protector any right to command; {rather} it only accords a certain honor to the protector, and the reverence which those who put themselves under his protection owe unto him. This in no way diminishes any authority of their sovereign, and does not yield to the protector power to rule them. From this it can be deduced that the prince who puts himself under protection has less authority than him who yields tribute, for in paying tribute the latter {has discharged his debt and otherwise} rests free and exempt, while he who is under protection always needs to be defended. This obliges {the protégé} to take greater care of his own security than that of the protector, because {the protégé} is weaker than him. It is a dangerous matter to submit oneself to a protector, except if, in the absence of {a protector}, one would be forced to fall into one's enemy's hands. In turn, a protector must hold some interest in defending those who put themselves under his protection. He does so for the conservation of his own State, because any other sort of protection will be of little duration. Many times the consequence is that somebody has sought the protection of one sovereign, while renouncing his {status as a} vassal to somebody else…In this situation the protector is doubly obliged to support the protégé, especially if his own person, honor and possessions are involved in the quarrel.[13] All civil lawyers agree, however, that a prince cannot reasonably take into his protection any vassal against the latter's own lord, except if he has just reason to quarrel with this lord. Therefore it requires a good consideration to be made before taking somebody into one's protection, as it might bring inconveniences.…

Considerations for making war in defence of the oppressed [p. 27]

Your Highness may in a similar way take up arms to assist some prince, with whom you are not allied, nor hold in your protection, moved to do so only through the injustice which is done to him.…{H}e who assails the other prince without reason must not become more powerful, or be a neighbour to Your Highness' states. Nevertheless, one must consider and respect the quality of the prince to be defend relative to him who {attacks}, and whether either has more need of cavalry or infantry, munitions or artillery. If you aid him with men, they must be well-paid and disciplined, so they may serve as a salve to his sores, and not fester with insolence and grievances which they commit under the pretence of necessity. For the latter would cause them no less hate among the country's people where they make war, than those bear towards their proclaimed enemies.

Considerations about arming oneself while remaining neutral

It is no less fit that Your Highness should arm yourself to be prepared to defend your vassals, if there is war between two princes whose kingdoms and states border on Your Highness'. As a result of the suspicion aroused in you by seeing the two {princes} arm, show yourself to be neutral and well-furnished with forces. It is no less convenient to prevent an injury, than, having received it, to have to avenge yourself. To perform this without engaging yourself in their wars, giving assistance to neither, allows you to hold sure ground. For if you do {give assistance to either}, the loss will be general, and the fruit of the victory is only his who maintains the quarrel, and you are forced to proclaim enmity to such [p. 28] a prince that never offended you. If you are neutral, there are always occasions to broker a peace between them, gaining the honour and thanks of each, besides preserving your own State while the two others ruin each other. For in the view of good judges, the greatness of a prince lies in the destruction of his neighbors, and in his strength being greater than the weakness of the other, and the security of kings and republics is founded on the balance of forces against one another.

Some think it good to pretend to be neutral, while secretly kindling the fire of a war, instead of quenching it, as the means to preserve their state. To encourage the other two princes to fight each other can hardly remain a secret, and once having become known, in the end the two others, having grown tired of fighting each other, will agree to use their forces against the third. Thus it is safest to remain neutral, and to remain in that state {of neutrality}, without meddling in any way with the war of one's neighbors.

Considerations with regard to insurgencies [rebellions by one's own vassals]

Occasions may also arise where Your Highness needs to raise soldiers and take up arms . . . to chastise some sedition or rebellion of your subjects, which must be done without delay. There are many reasons: not the least of these is that a prince, who allows insurrections of communities, cities, or provinces, gives an example to others to follow this lead, when they see the prince is not armed to punish them. If he is, it is a means to draw unto their prince more readily those who have not declared themselves to be against him, seeing that he has a followership, and {seeing} that he will not allow himself to be defeated. They will be assured that he holds more certain means to provide reward for service than do the rebels. Those make larger promises of remuneration than they are able to keep, partly because the [p. 29] violence with which the insurgents are forced to proceed in the beginning of their rebellion, partly because of the changes which they must necessarily make, using much coercion [extortion] to keep them in

place. Many will soon tire of these wrongs, if they see protection from such violence [*seguridad de armas*] afforded by their prince.

While the authority of an empire and government is strengthened by the use of force, it is very dangerous to employ force against your own subjects, unless to all human reason it seems certain that you shall eventually punish them, lest you arm the lion with claws to hurt his governor, and fight at a disadvantage with a rover or pirate, who augments and reinforces himself with the damage done to us, for the benefit of his ships. These are sufficient words to move a prince not to cover his sword in the blood of his vassals, if he does not do so with much security. Instead, he should put it off with secret means of negotiation, of the sort that may be offered to reduce some of the principal heads of the insurrection, by treaties of grace and pardon. Those may move them, so that {the prince can} enjoy the benefit of time without allowing things to turn so bad that if more pressure is brought to bear on {the prince}, he would be forced to make concessions, and so find himself neither in a fit state to maintain an offensive war against {the insurgents}, nor come to a peace without great disadvantage. The wrongs received would in that case let the wounds fester through the assistance other princes give . . . the rebellion, thus weakening the prince's force, of whose greatness and power they {previously} stood in fear. A holy teacher, foreseeing how troublesome it would be to a prince, wrote: "For the most part the just king even knows how to conceal the mistakes of bad men, not by agreeing with the injustice {of their deeds}, but by awaiting corrections to be made during an appropriate time, after which he may either be able to correct their failings, or punish them."[14] This ought to be executed whether a victory is won or not, [p. 30] so that the punishment may seem to be done to give a good example, not out of revenge. The barbarians hold it to be the better part of a victory to restrain just fury and the anger of men from shedding blood among those that had previously loved each other . . . This is a passion which can hardly be cooled, except if one considers that the taste for revenge only lasts a few days, and the joy of piety is eternal. Therefore let justice be accompanied by clemency, so that it is not cruelty, and let clemency be accompanied by justice, so that it will not be held in contempt. In the insurrections of cities and provinces, or mutinies of soldiers, {the prince} is obliged to punish those who have initiated the movement . . ., and to pardon the rest, as it is not possible to punish a multitude.

Opinions about forming armies from one nation or several

I have discussed the reasons that might occasion the resort to arms on the part of Your Highness or any other prince or potentate. . . . The considerations set down are able to serve as a guide as well . . . in deciding what infantry, or cavalry, artillery, or munitions are fit to be levied for creating

an army, or fleet of ships, if the service is to be at sea. Many are of the opinion that it is better to compose an army or fleet from one nation rather than many, as the latter brings diversity of languages and customs, causing confusion on many occasions, not only in domestic arrangements, but also in fighting. From that diverse quarrels arise, which can fester to the point of resulting in the loss of one's own armies. In addition, generally among foreign troops are soldiers who only serve for the pay and pillage which can be found particularly in wars; if they lack either, [p. 31] they put aside the reputation of the prince, his well-being and greatness (owing no further fidelity to him than their service) for their own interests. Their leaders support them in this, moved by the gains they have in pay and musters, in which they are greatly interested, as they recruit such regiments and levies of men for profit rather than for any affection they have for the prince. Therefore they have often refused to fight at the time of necessity, and gone and served the other party, without qualms about having failed in their loyalty, as they have not been paid. In this way the enemy is strengthened, the other party weakened. In addition, seldom do kings and general captains understand so many languages as to be able to speak to everyone in his own language, which {if the princes could speak to the soldiers} would naturally make them affectionate, and win them to obey with more readiness, and would sooner stir them up to fight.

On the other hand, there is {historical} experience of great captains who have fought and warred for years with armies composed {of soldiers} from different nations without ever having had any mutinies or sedition among them, and gained many victories. One nation can hardly accommodate among its {own soldiers} without very extensive and continual training the diversity of weapons . . . used in armies these days.[15] In this respect and consideration, the Ancients were of the opinion that those instruments of war were for the most part so valuable that one could use them without any training. Yet some nations are seen to be more agile in the use of the arquebus, and others of the stand and strength of the pike, and can more easily endure marching {long distances} fully armed. [p. 32] Also in the cavalry, some are better equipped with a short lance and with armour, with shields . . . without any chain-mail tunics . . ., and some carrying light horse staves . . . and small shields, others with pistols, or long firearms. These differences in weapons must be considered, as must be which horses are best in combat. . . . All this confirms that it is currently very difficult to recruit an army from only one nation when it is not for the defence of that same kingdom against the invasion of foreigners . . . It also depends on whether the province is populous enough to yield as large a number of men as is necessary for the conduct of war abroad, which every day consumes men. In order to make soldiers, it is necessary to employ youths who are at least sixteen years old.

The best composition would be soldiers from only one nation

In case enough men can be drawn out of one country, and {in case} enough men among them can be trained to specialise in the use of different arms, undoubtedly an army drawn from but one entire nation is to be preferred to one drawn from diverse nations, as the former are the same in terms of customs and language.…

{How to behave having conquered enemy territory} [p. 53]

In conquests you must always take care to seize some town, assuring your footing within the province, and allowing you to have a secure place to draw together the sick and injured men, and other munitions reserves, which can hardly be done in the open field which would make necessary the use of many horses, and to find a source for help…to reinforce the army.

To these considerations may be added the reputation which is gained by the taking of a town, by weakening the enemy and his train, who look bad while we profit. All this requires that when attempting a conquest, you first seek out and are able to invest any place which may be of profit, when there is no capital town within the province, whose surrender may reasonably promise the capture of the rest. Or else you {prepare from there} to fight with the enemy's army. These details must be studied first, leaving behind other considerations.…

The prince should show himself many times to the soldiers [p. 59]

Most days that Your Honour shall camp in his lodging {on enemy territory}, you are to go out and walk so that the people may see you often. It increases the love {for you} among {your} vassals if they behold the face of the king often. It will make the soldiers lively, gallant and affectionate if they are within sight of their captain, whose person…every one admires according to the qualities of his behaviour, and more still his pomp and train. From this it comes that in seeing kings with the majesty and grandeur which they show in public and behaving according to their actions, each vassal will esteem himself moved {by the thought} that God has given him such a powerful king. Each {vassal} will promise to himself that his secret…actions will be guided with the same discretion and consideration as his public actions.…

{Behaviour in enemy territory} [p. 61]

Your Honour is not to depart from {his} lodging {in enemy territory} before you have joined together all your men, artillery, munitions, and

victuals, which are necessary for the day of battle [*jornada*]. If it is a conquest, Your Honour is to command that new forces are prepared to assist the army. After achieving good success, you may send them away if it is unnecessary to reinforce {the army}, lest otherwise you consume opportunity and time…In this way you will…ensure that no occasion will be given to other princes to invade Your Highness' states, seeing your forces routed, and disarmed, whilst the enemy remains brave and victorious. [p. 62] This would result in the loss of {your} reputation, and in the abating of the liveliness and courage of the soldiers, in the cooling of {your} friends' and confederates' faith {in you} and affection {for you}. It is mostly in this way that spoils made in wars and rents are diminished, breeding bad luck and loss of reputation.…

Considerations for a day of battle [p. 106]

The day of battle presents itself when Your Highness perceives that your army has the appetite and courage to fight, and when there are no excuses for not fighting, when there is pressing need, or good occasion calls for it.…{M}any leaders of armies seek to fight only for their own advantage. Your Highness must ensure victory, not leaving them to be carried by their own imaginations, when the foundation of their discretion and wisdom is no more than a little foolhardiness.…

When the {two} camps are equal, Your Highness must divide your squadrons into exactly as many as the enemy's, the old soldiers most experienced in war, strong men on horse as well as foot, facing the enemy. Advice {on the order of battle must} be taken according to reason, and the number of the enemy's squadrons, according to the spies, and intelligence that might be gotten from the roads and skirmishes (which are to be conducted only with this intent), so that the quality of those men which the enemy estimates highest, and relies upon for [p. 107] supply may be discovered. Thus {we need to ascertain} the confidence of his army, delivery of pay, and victuals for the maintenance the army, and the position he occupies, whether he proposes to fight there, or come forward and seek us out. Such knowledge will shed great light on the question of whether to decide on giving battle, or to defer the day of battle, and it will show when it will be most convenient to offer it.…

Why the Ancients made so much of the sun on the day of battle

The reason why men of old made such great reckoning of the wind and sun was that their battles were of long duration, and stood upon the strength of their arms. But these days, battles are short of duration, because of the violence and dexterity of cavalry, vivacity of the harquebusier, and helped by the fury of the artillery.…

[p. 108] It is impossible for a soldier to describe to Your Highness all the circumstances for a day of battle as a chess player might, even though there the possible moves {in chess} are very many. Even a {chess player} cannot answer anyone who asks him in order to learn which is the best move, other than that {the purpose is} to give the checkmate, and not being able to do that, to take another major piece, and finally to take get the better of the game. Putting the board with the chess-men set before him,…he may play many good draughts, when in the end only by putting forward one pawn he might mar all. The same applies to war, and the best will win.…This is a part which a general can hardly play out in his imagination, but only the presence of the occasion presents itself, as in many other things. I am unable to signal to Your Highness [p. 109] more than some {rules} which are common, and those which are most current.

…{T}he fury of gunpowder is to be considered to be so great these days, helped with the instruments of artillery, muskets and arquebuses, that not only has it come to break legions and phalanges before they can engage in hand to hand combat, as hand-thrown missiles did in the past, but it also throws squadrons and battalions into disarray, defeating them. The greatest part of victories is gained nowadays through…artillery or…the lively volleys of harquebusiers, disordering the squadrons of the enemy in such a way that puts them to rout, and defeats them, without ever seeing or affronting them, except very occasionally by squadrons of pikes.…

[p. 109] If necessity does not force it, one should not begin the fight by engaging all the squadrons so that they that cannot enjoy the fruits of the victory, once the victory has been obtained. For there will be a loss of many men, which obliges us to attempt battle only with a foot of lead, {after} discovering the intent of our enemy, and the force which he uses…{A} soldier should not to allow himself to become confused by success, nor to become a coward in any failure, but to increase efforts in relation to adversity.…

[p. 113] On days of battle, when there are men from many nations in the army, not wearing the same sort of clothes (as a result of being free and serving sundry princes), give orders that scarves of differing colours be worn to aid recognition…, to prevent friends from attacking one another in skirmishes. An announcement of this is to be made in public to all the squadrons, so they may be able to distinguish themselves from the enemy, and know one another.…[p. 115]

What a prince is to do after a battle won

Your Highness, having won the battle, is instantly to give thanks to our Lord for having received such a benefit, and to honour those that live that have served you in the battle with their efforts, and those that are dead with their boldness and valour. You are to bury these with all honour and solemnity, rewarding their sons and heirs with booty, according to the quality of service done, demonstrating your feeling that Your Highness

has had a loss by the death of any of the army who was a person of valour and experience; for this is one of the greatest losses that can fall to a king or prince. God has given unto these kings and princes means to be able to make men rich, and to be followed, but not to be wise and experienced in war, except if he has framed the course of his life to follow it, and had the fortune to see it in many different ways, which is of greatest advantage for a man who improves himself in his army.

After a battle had been called, the Ancients never esteemed them to be won unless the conqueror held the field for three days, by doing so showing that that the field was theirs, and that the enemy was overcome. This matter is not greatly regarded now. Today it is thought that a battle is over when all the enemy's squadrons are broken and not a single one remains intact, winning in it artillery pieces and {the enemy's} colours. When any squadron gets away in its entirety, although some artillery pieces and insignia are seized, it is called a rout, a name still used today, as well as when they kill and break any large number of men, although they carry no artillery pieces, nor many colours or standards. The artillery pieces and munitions which are won must be given to Your Highness, and the colours and standards to the general, giving ten crowns to the soldier who seized them, when he hands them over.

When the local population should be moved [p. 138]

On some occasions one should spoil and destroy the villages around the town, if the inhabitants are not well-intentioned, in order to oblige them, by loss of their houses, to flee to the frontiers of their neighbours. Thus the enemy will find himself overburdened having to supply them, their wives, and children. But when labourers and husbandmen of the [p. 138] hinterland cannot be displaced for some reason, and are supplying the towns with the fruits of their labours,… they should be kept satisfied; the soldiers, when sallying forth from the town to get booty, must not abuse them. In this way {the locals} will provide good intelligence, and pry with great care into the enemy's actions, imagining that by this, their own profit will rise.

CHAPTER 6

Paul Hay du Chastelet (1668)

Very little is known about Paul Hay, Sieur du Chastelet (1619–1682?).[1] We do know that he was baptized at Rennes in Brittany on May 30, 1619, and that he was the son of (and is often confused with) the homonymous Paul Hay, sieur du Chastelet, de Vaufleury, and other places (1592–1636). The grandfather, Daniel Hay du Chastelet, had been a judge in Laval. The family traced themselves back to a Jean Hay who lived around 1390, but the family claimed to be descended from the counts of Carlisle and of Errol in Scotland, whose ancestor, a peasant called Hay, was knighted by King Kenneth of Scotland III for organizing the defense against Danish invaders.[2]

Paul senior was married, first, to Marguerite de Renouard, who died before him, and then to Madeleine Dauquechin, who outlived him; it is not clear whose son Paul junior is because his father died so young, at the age of 43. Paul senior, the first secretary of the Académie Française and a prolific writer, was mainly a lawyer and civil servant working under Richelieu and the Duke of Montmorency. He oversaw military justice and police for the armed forces of France on campaign in Lorraine, and wrote military biographies and political tracts, among other pieces. Paul senior's brother Daniel Hay du Chastelet (1596–1671), who had taken a doctorate at the Sorbonne and had become a priest, was abbot of Chambon and doyen of the collegiate church of Saint Thugal in Laval. Daniel Hay du Chastelet was also a member of the Académie Française.

Paul junior, his nephew, was educated in his uncle's house. In 1646, in La Perrière, Paul junior married Geneviève-Élisabeth Bonneau, daughter of Jean Bonneau, knight, sieur de la Maisonneneuve, seneschal of Saumur, and of Renée Collin, a descendant of the Huguenot captain François de

la Noue, ardent supporter of King Henry IV. Uncle Daniel celebrated the wedding. After his uncle's death, Paul junior supposedly burned his uncle's mathematical and theological treatises without taking any interest in them. We have plenty of evidence, however, that Paul took a keen interest in religion. In his *Traité de la politique de France,* Paul wrote about how to combat the Huguenots, whom he wanted to suppress and drive out as the Moors had been driven from Spain. Even his *Treatise on War* has the style of a theological tract. Perhaps, therefore, Uncle Daniel had theological treatises of a Protestant nature in his possession that it was safer to burn.

Hay du Chastelet claimed in his *Treatise on War* that he had first-hand experience of warfare (see p. 106 below), but as with Sutcliffe, in which circumstances or in which capacity, we do not know. The *Treatise* draws on many classical examples that are omitted here for reasons of length. The themes include that of just war, in which Paul Hay emphasized that princes should only fight for just causes, while acknowledging that in reality, they usually fought for their own interest and for glory. In very religious passages, he underscored that every minute detail in war is in God's hand, yet the entire book is about the need to prepare well for war, and to conduct war wisely, something of a contradiction.

Like Basil Liddell Hart more famously in the early 20th century, he identified two styles of warfare: the aggressive, offensive, and impetuous style of Alexander the Great, set on conquest, and the defensive, careful approach of Fabius Cunctator. Hay much preferred that of Alexander, stating his belief that battle was almost always to be sought, and he was keen on the idea of preemptive battle.

In contrast, once a battle had been won, Hay again applied all his Christian ardor to argue that civilians must be spared in every way, and that even enemy soldiers had to be treated with utmost evenhandedness: enemy prisoners were to be fed and exchanged or even released in acts of clemency, the enemy wounded were to be looked after as well as one's own soldiers, and the enemy dead were to be buried with all Christian ceremonial. He was worried about civil war—he had lived through the Fronde in France (1648–1653)—and saw it as a social problem. He was also interested in alliance warfare, in the advantages and disadvantages of mercenaries and other foreign troops. To my knowledge, his *Treatise on War* has not been translated into any other language, although it also printed once in Amsterdam, reprinted in Paris in the same year, and again in 1757 in Paris under the promising title *Politique militaire.*

Other works he wrote include a treatise on the education of the dauphin of France (1664), a biography of Bertrand du Guescelin, one of the commanders-in-chief in the Hundred Years' War (1666), and a treatise on the politics in France (1669), for which he is supposed to have been put in the Bastille for 15 days.

Paul Hay du Chastelet is claimed by some to have died in Paris in 1670; his heart was supposedly taken back to the parish of Balazé, where it was

buried in the church. If that were so, his last book was published posthumously.[3] Nor could Paul have outlived his uncle Daniel in that case. Another, more likely, date for his death is given as 1682, which would make more sense.[4]

* * *

Paul Hay du Chastelet: *Traite de la Guerre, ou Politique militaire* (Paris, Iean Gvignard, 1668)

Dedicated to the King.[5]

CHAPTER I [p. 5]

1. What war is

As war is the most important of the professions . . . of men, they have never applied themselves with so much exaction to anything than they have to understand {war}. They have well judged that nothing is as necessary for them as the science of arms, since they have realized that by this means they repel public and private injuries, defend the law and the freedom of their fatherland, maintain discipline within states, and in stimulating virtue in their fellow citizens, they assure their felicity.

. . . {W}ar is a school where one learns a more certain philosophy than that which is taught in the philosophy schools: . . . in all Athens, which is so well known for the assemblies of philosophers, has one imagined anything comparable to this art, the first principle of which is a justified disdain for life? . . . Can one imagine purer principles, . . . {than those} that make it shameful to flee from a perilous occasion, to betray one's King, to trouble one's country, and to neglect the protection of one's family? . . . {H}eroes are most excellently precious . . .; they have even recognized this as something divine. God is armed with thunder, and in Scripture He calls himself the God of hosts, the God of victories, and the valiant God in combats.[6] Even leaving aside the truths of the Bible, the pagans . . . had their Mars, their Bellona, their Jupiter Martialis, . . . Moreover they wanted Minerva, goddess of wisdom, to be goddess of armies; the poet[7] in fact makes her the perpetual companion of his Ulysses in order to make us understand that the qualities of valour and wisdom cannot ever be separated.

2. Of the law of war [p. 7]

God calls himself the God of war, and the valiant God, because there are just wars and legitimate combats. For can He undertake anything that is unjust, or departs from the right and unchanging rule of his eternal laws? By these titles, there are three things that are taught to men. The first, that it is behoves only sovereigns, who in the world are the living

images of God, to make use of the right to take arms, and it is only allowed to the masters of the universe to interrupt order and tranquillity. Therefore the Divine Philosopher legislated that he who wages war on his private authority should be punished like a capital criminal. The second is that princes should add moderation to valour, and that they should pardon those whom they have subjected to their victorious arms; otherwise it would be pure brutality. Men have to fight for glory only; they can claim the prize, but they must banish hatred from their hearts. The third is that they must never undertake nor carry on a war which is not based on a good reason. The most just enterprises are the happiest. . . .

Based on these incontestable principles, war is truly for kings a legitimate means of acquisition, and that which they have taken by the sword is fully theirs. . . . {Yet} . . . one cannot legitimately acquire by war what falls under the law of nations, especially as division has created nations and empires. According to the same right, and in consequence, the means of war are also juridical, they mark the extent and the limits of states [*républiques*].

CHAPTER II

1. Structure of this work [p. 9]

. . . Some of the writers who have written about military art have clung too closely to the rules of the Ancients; others have only favoured modern opinions; others have lacked judgement or experience; and instead of drawing their precepts from different events which they have been able to observe in history, have delected themselves in explaining unnecessary details and trivial minutiae, or formulating maxims following their whims, or too difficult to put into practice. All these considerations encourage me to put my hand to it. Imitating the wisest man of the last century[8] in mixing the ancient art of war with the new, and in gathering the fruit of the observations which I have made in twenty years of study, together with some experiences which I have had, I undertake to give an idea of perfect war, which Hannibal and Caesar would perhaps not disdain . . . Homer has served as the guide and schoolmaster for Alexander in his conquests which have made his reputation so excellent, and it is certain that, as war contains a sublime and delicate philosophy, its precepts must be established by philosophers and people of letters.

2. Whether it is necessary to keep up preparations for war within a state. [p. 11]

War troubles men's nature-given sleep. Combat itself is . . . in some ways against natural justice and humanity. A large forest fire is less terrible

than a victorious army rushing through the countryside, filling it with tears, blood and desolation.…{W}ar is an extreme evil. Nevertheless no great empire must stay long in the idleness of peace. Peace, which is the most beautiful object of the desires of all men, the aim of their work and the most solid good which they might possess, if it is too deep-rooted, insensibly engenders vices in the states: it brings luxury, authorises voluptuousness, and causes {standing armed} forces to grow by the day and to turn on themselves, preoccupied with their {mutual} destruction. Courage and vigour decrease and are lost, and we see that through an excessively constant {period of} rest, those nations whose valour previously was loudly proclaimed throughout the earth, and who have triumphed in all parts of the world, are today its shame and is disdain. The wise Romans had reason to fear the overthrow of Carthage.[9] They saw rightly that the strength of this great city, which never ceased to make Rome jealous, also continuously incited its citizens to copy it, from which {the Romans} derived the desire for glory and the love of virtue. In their wisdom, {the Romans} rightly foresaw that when the citizens of the Republic would no longer have occasion to use their arms against foreigners, they would use them to their own ruin, and that the freedom of the Roman people would finally be oppressed.

3. Of the choice of soldiers and captains [p. 13]

{Soldiers} should always be ready to march the moment the order is given. Old troops, constantly trained, impress the enemy more than new troops. {Veterans} are proud and brave, and it is a matter of honor to them to win at all times, never to be defeated. It is dangerous to raise troops only when unforeseen circumstances dictate it. The sort of troops which are raised precipitously, whom the Romans called *subitares* and whom we call militias, never have any substantial effect. Those are not war-like people, and do not have a team spirit, and make up numbers without strength or cohesion. Captains hire them without choosing them. They are the refuse of towns, whom laziness, misery and debauchery has chased from their homes. Thus they have no stamina in combat, and one could say that they are armed hares, *galeati lepores,* they are so vulnerable to fear and predisposed to shameful flight.

…{W}e know the habit of Turkish emperors of demanding that they should be given children in tribute, and what pains they take in the education of those whom they choose to become janissaries. In this they have been so successful that until our day, one can hardly think of an occasion where the janissaries did not live up to expectations.

The young people whom one will choose to be educated for war should be put in garrisons at the age of fifteen or sixteen.…

In times of peace, once the young people will have been in garrison for some three or four years, they will be sent home and new recruits will be

put in their place; the best of them, however, will be incorporated into the regular standing forces, either cavalry, or infantry, which are needed at all times. In times of war, one will mobilise them {all}…

The question has been debated for a long time whether it is better to use subjects or foreigners. {This debate} has been resolved in favour of subjects who expose themselves to danger with greater courage and goodwill, and loving their commander as their compatriot, they risk their lives with pleasure to save his. Moreover, they fight for their own fortune, for the protection of their families, for their honour and some rest [*repos*]. When they break rank in battle and seek their salvation in flight, they will be criticised by all sides for their lack of courage, encounter cruel displeasure, recognising themselves as guilty of the loss of their friends and the ruin of their fatherland. Thus it is with greater diligence that they obey and fulfil their tasks than foreigners who, to the contrary, do not identify with the affairs of those they serve.

CHAPTER III

3. Of different sorts of war [p. 34]

There are two sorts of war. The first is domestic or civil, if one can call it thus if fellow-citizens take up arms against another. The second is when one has something to settle with a neighbouring or foreign state.

War takes place on land or at sea.

It is offensive or defensive. It concerns the countryside or the towns.

I shall write separately about these different sorts.

CHAPTER IV

1. Of offensive foreign war [p. 36]

2. What it needs to make a war just [p. 37]

One has to observe three criteria to make a war just.[10]

The first is that it must be a prince or a sovereign State that undertakes it. Private individuals have no right to resort to arms as these have the laws and the magistrates above them who enforce justice on their behalf. Monarchies and republics do not have {such superiors}, and often recognise no rules other than their interest and their glory.

The second condition [*observation*] is that the cause that has given birth to a war must concern the wellbeing and the needs of the public, and in it an entire nation has to find itself engaged. It is of extreme consequence to have a legitimate reason [*sujet*] for taking arms, and that the friends and

the enemies are equally convinced of this. This knowledge always secretly gives confidence and courage to one side, and fear and despondency to the other.

The third condition [*observation*] is the aim one has in mind in making war. This aim has to be peace, as the target to which all men aspire, following their natural inclination, where they will find the rest [*repos*] which they seek with all their travails. This is why a king who is arming publishes the reasons for going to war for the benefit of his neighbours, and why his manifestos explain these to the entire world. In making known the justice of his intentions, he draws to him the {good} wishes of good people, and at the same time brings to his side the strength and arm of God whose help is so necessary… The wars of God are always victorious…

It is thus necessary that the war be just. However just it may be, in addition it must be undertaken with all the prudence of which the human mind is capable. No monarch, however strong he may be, must despise the {armed} forces, nor even the weakness, of his enemies. There are elements of fortune in war, or better, elements of providence, which one cannot foresee. This providence, which I can call here Christian destiny, *fatum christianium,* bears effects down to the smallest exchange in combat: it rules the hand that strikes, carries the bullet that kills, and that, in short, because nothing in the universe happens without His immutable and eternal order. God presides over all the events; chance has no power, and is a chimera which the ignorance and blindness of men leads them vainly to conjure up.

3. What one has to do before starting the war [p. 39]

Although a great prince has forces that are ready and well disposed to carry out his commands, although the war he wants to undertake is based on {just} reason, it is appropriate to his greatness and dignity to try all ways of sweetness before resorting to extreme means. He has to remember, in the middle of the agitation of all his worries and muddled thoughts, that he is a human being, and that he is thus obliged to spare human blood. He has to think that those who waste their life for his quarrel do not hold it from him, and as it is not in his power to give it to them, he should exercise and use power to protect it. If the prince sees himself elevated by fortune and his authority to consider himself above ordinary men, and if he thinks he is part of the Godhead in being His living image, he has to imitate the conduct of God Himself who thunders for a long time before releasing the lighting from his hand. Thus a king, through the medium of his ambassadors, must have demanded reparation for the subjects on account of which he has reason to complain; he has to add menaces to persuasion and reason, but he needs to declare war before he commits any hostile act.…

Can a king use force against an enemy who submits and sues for peace, i.e. who is willing to accept {the King's} conditions? He who grants peace, commands, and he who accepts it, obeys.... {And yet the decision to destroy Carthage} is a stain which tarnishes forever the glory of the Roman name. Those conquerors of the world have merited praise and {victor's} crowns more through the favours which they have {bestowed upon} the nations which they have subjected than through the desolation of those over whom they have triumphed. In the former way they have shown the extent of their virtue, in the latter they have mixed it with their vanity and ostentation; in the former they have shown themselves worthy of commanding the entire universe; in the latter one sees that one had to dread [*apprehender*] them as tyrants and usurpers....

14. Battles [p. 90]

...Battles bring about the decision in war, and the past centuries have hardly given us examples that this is possible to bring about otherwise. Sieges consume too much time and make too many people perish; if a town is well defended...its allies have the time to come to its aid. But the moment that destiny has declared itself in favour of one party or another in general combat, all cede to the arms which {destiny} has favoured, nobody being ashamed to subject themselves to the commands of the happy winner.

Battles either take place by accident, when two armies encounter each other unintentionally, or else when the day has been designated for battle....The conqueror, entering the country of his enemies, has to be convinced that his principal goal is to win the general battle, for following the example of Cyrus, Alexander and Hannibal, he must always seek battle. In order to do so with advantage, he has to think about how to weaken his enemies, either by preventing their allies from joining them, or by preventing them from assembling all their troops. He must also by small meetings habituate his people to fight, as those small victories give courage to one side, timidity to the other. He will seek ways to arouse every soldier's desire to see this day come about, up to the point of making them impatient. When finally the occasion has come, having taking his resolution to the council, he has to show his joy to his army, and having shown himself to all parts of the armies, make the officers and soldiers understand that they will, by means of a single victory, harvest all the fruit of their past pains; that suddenly, their wishes for riches and rest will be fulfilled entirely; that they hold their fortune in their own hand; in short, that they will assure for themselves immortal glory, on condition that they strongly desire it. He will make them feel that he only has a part in their glory, and that he will let them have the goods and spoils of their enemies. And that for the rest, they are fighting for a just cause, and that those who oppose them are the same they have recently beaten,

and that {his soldiers} have to prevent the other side from taking away the glory which they have already won.

If by contrast in the small encounters that have preceded the main battle . . . the enemies have won, the general has to use the opposite reasoning, telling his soldiers that finally the day has come for which they have yearned so much to make up for their losses, and that if they had been beaten {before}, fortune has demonstrated that they had valiant enemies, and that their victory now would be the more illustrious and striking. And he has to {remind} his troops of the memory of the fallen . . .

15. What one has to do after having won a battle [p. 95]

If he is fully and entirely victorious in battle, a wise captain has to profit from it and to make best use of it, thus joining the honor of having well used his victory to the glory of having gained it.

The first thing the victor has to do is to give thanks to God for the favors he has received . . . Secondly, let him remember that, having defeated his enemies, there is another war to fight, in which success will be very difficult to have, as the new enemy to fight is . . . the idleness that follows pleasures. These eventually defeated the triumphant Hannibal and Alexander . . .

Thirdly, {the captain} has to preserve a generous humanity for the vanquished, to have compassion with them, to comfort them in their disgrace, and through good treatment, sweeten their rude misfortune. . . . It is a sign of the greatness of a victorious prince if he sends his emissaries to the places of asylum and retreat where his strength has led his enemies to ask them for peace, rather than to impose it. In order to strengthen the reputation of his magnanimity, he has to make it easier to fulfil the condition of the treaties, proportionately to the fact that he has won the greatest advantages. . . .

The victor, after the defeat of his enemy, will proclaim this news everywhere, increasing his advantages even further. He will examine the state of his army, and will still know all about the state of affairs of the defeated . . . In this situation he has to present himself at some great fortress which, intimidated by his arms, opens its doors to him. He must above all try to win over the last public {spoils}, meaning those belonging to the prince, as those which belong to private individuals should be untouchable for him . . ., but to the contrary, he has to be their protector and conserver. Thus he will gain the love of the people, and will accustom them gently to a new rule. . . .

16. Of the wounded, the dead and the prisoners [p. 98]

In addition to all the things I have said, the general of a victorious army, the moment that he is master of the field, has to forbid, on pain of death, the despoiling of any corpses that have remained on the battlefield, before they have been inspected. For it happens frequently that a soldier, in order

to get a nice coat, finishes off a person of importance, who had so far not been mortally wounded. Once this ban has been pronounced, he {the general} will order an inspection of all the bodies: the dead will be separated, the enemies to one side, friends to the other. If one recognises a person of importance, one will separate them from the others in order to give the body back to their friends or their servants. Once this has been done, the chaplains of the army will immediately, at that very place, pray for the rest of their souls. On the subsequent day, on the same battlefield, they will say masses and will serve with funerary pomp in military solemnity, at the end of which all corpses will be thrown into the graves that will have been prepared for this purpose, and which will have been dug as deeply as possible. In the meantime word will have been sent to the enemy to notify them of what one intended to do with the corpses, so that they can come and fetch those corpses which they want to take away. It is unbelievable what effect such acts of piety and commiseration have. The captain thus acquires the respect and affection of everybody. We shall show that we truly have humanity, if, purged of anger and resentment, we pardon those whom we see humiliated. And if their submission or their weakness takes our weapons out of our hands, we shall transform emotions of hatred and vengeance into emotions of tenderness and compassion. . . .

The wounded will also be separated, and the enemies and the friends will be treated in the same way.

The general must still inform himself of the number and the rank of their prisoners, so that he finds out what their needs are, and what he can do for them, giving the order that those who have captured them apply the laws of hospitality to them, . . . so that they do not treat them badly in any way. He will find out whether there are any of his {forces} in the enemy's hands, in order to propose exchanges, soldier for soldier, and officer for officer. Then he has to see who is left after the exchange has taken place. It is good to send back people of {high social} quality on their word of honour, on orders to procure a ransom, during which time they may not carry arms, and if that time {of parole} has expired, they will without respite be obliged to go to their prisons, or else to send the amount of money to which they had agreed. As regards the poor soldiers-prisoners, one can give them the means of subsistence by making them work, and to release all those who will vow not to return for six months or a year or another agreed period to the service of the enemy. Or {one might} even enrol them {in one's own forces} if they will agree. Sometimes one can release them all, without conditions, as a great act of generosity. This sort of behavior is glorious, and gives great honor and esteem to those who practice it.

17. What is to be done if a battle is lost [p. 101]

But as {feats of} arms are changeable [*journalières*], it can happen that a general, who invades a country to conquer, finds brave and warlike

people, to the point where he is beaten, and his army defeated. He has to foresee this,…and in a timely way and secretly identify a place to which he can safely retreat. This important reason obliges him always to control the country in his rear, in order to make use of it for his needs, and assemble there all those of his {forces} who have escaped bad fortune. He must then ask his country to send him new forces, await them for as long as he can, so that he can venture again to try his luck at arms. In the meantime he will hide the extent of his loss, and must not forget to write to the neighbouring towns, which either support him, or the other side, because in matters of war, appearances and reputation are extremely {important}….

CHAPTER V: OF DEFENSIVE WAR IN THE COUNTRYSIDE [p. 107]

1. What the habitants of a country have to do when a strong enemy invades; which remedy they should bring to this evil, and which help they should seek

The true character of a conqueror is that which Hannibal had in history, who, without wasting any time, without deliberating, undertook to subject all to his will, and who, like a torrent, swept rapidly away everything that he encountered in his course. By contrast, a captain who wants to defend his country, has to pause at the conduct of Fabius Maximus, and by hesitation [*cunctation*],…which is to say, in temporising, tire his enemy, exhausting his patience, to prevent him from beginning anything or executing anything….

The first of these means…is to rally all the spirits and to bring them unanimously to agree to repel the foreigners. In order to do so, one must let them know of the injustice of the enterprise of the enemy, to make them feel the shame which they would have if they submitted without a fight, and the peril into which they would throw themselves if they let themselves be defeated by arms; to demonstrate to them the indignity of a foreign domination, the evils which they would experience at the hands of their usurpers, with their children being strangled, their daughters dishonoured, the complete loss of their fortune, the ruin of their families, a perpetual exile from their country, and finally the sorrow of seeing the desolation of their native places and their lands subjected to the avarice and the power of their enemies.

The second means is to provide important {fortified} places with men and munitions.

The third is to destroy all the bridges and guard all the fords in the rivers.

The fourth is to take out the mills, as the enemy advances, for fear that he will help himself to them for the subsistence of his army. There are even

those who destroy all the countryside, having withdrawn all their {movable} property from the countryside to the towns and to sure places…

The fifth means is to call allies and neighbours to help, to show them the interest they have to oppose the growth of the power that wants to oppress them, because they in turn will be the object to which the same ambition will attach itself.…

The sixth and last means is to be in constant negotiations with the enemy, to chase him away on a path of silver, as we say. One must make him offers, and then pretend that there are difficulties in fulfilling them.…{O}ne only does so to gain time…One must note that a prince who is defending his state must never—unless there are unavoidable reasons—listen to any proposition made by his enemies unless they are outside his frontiers.

These means can obstruct the progress of an enemy, but one must add open force, for on those occasions it is nothing to have prudence if one has no arms and if one is not trained to use them. Minerva…would be imperfect and would enjoy neither divine cult nor the worship of men, if she did not have a lance as well as her spindle.…

It is therefore necessary that the prince who defends himself should be as good a warrior [*homme de guerre*], as a politician [*homme de cabinet*].…

2. How one can ruin an army of foreigners [p. 112]

…{I}t is very expedient for the good of {the prince's} affairs that he should undertake something against his enemies, in order to give his soldiers, who are already beginning to feel defeated, greater courage. For he who is on the defensive always feels a certain something which secretly acts as a break on his vigour, while he who attacks is always audacious and enterprising.

It would therefore be good if the prince divided his forces into several flying camps { = small mobile units}.[11] For it seems to me to be imprudent to commit the fortune of a state to the event of a general battle where the outcome of the fighting is always uncertain and dangerous. These flying camps will spread all over the country, which will oblige the enemy to do the same, and will thus {be able to} do nothing much. Or else, if he keeps {his forces} together in an army corps, he will have to fear {attacks} from all sides on his artillery, his baggage, his rear-guard, if he is on the move, and at all times for his convoys and foragers. He will not be able to enlarge his quarters for fear of…being reduced, because of food shortages, to taking orders from those whom he wanted to order about. These flying camps moreover are very useful to provide assistance to {fortified} places threatened by siege, and even to prevent them from being invested.… Those flying camps almost always lend themselves to draw the enemies deeper into {our} country than they wanted to go. For little by little they will allow themselves to be guided by the desire to push forward and disperse the flying camps which they believe to be very necessary for the

success of their designs. They will be all the angrier as they will despise those little units and think victory easy to obtain.

3. What has to be done before battle [p. 114]

…{I}t happens frequently that a prince, to defend himself, is obliged to give battle. For example, he may know that another army is on the way to relieve his enemies;…he may not be able to avoid battle if it is in his interest to weaken the enemy before all these forces are assembled.…

{A} captain has to safeguard all his {fortified} places, in case combat does not turn out in his favour, just as he has to store his money and his baggage in a safe place. When his army is in battle, he has to…go through his ranks, and explain to his soldiers that they are not fighting solely for glory, nor for their own salvation, but…for the altars on which they have sacrificed, for the patron saints of their fatherland, for the ashes of their ancestors, for the houses in which they were born and raised, for their possessions, for the peace, the life, the freedom and honor of the people who are most dear to them in the world.

He has to speak to them of the injustice of their enemies, of the boldness of their undertakings, with such force that he instils them, despite themselves, with hatred and anger.

4. How to fight a foreign enemy {abroad} [p. 115]

The order of battle that a captain has to adopt in defending his country is the same that he has to use in attacking [*conquerant*]. However, he has to deprive his troops of all hope of retreat, and he must let them understand that they have to win or die, for death is a much lesser evil than would be that following defeat. He must nevertheless guard himself { = his own life}, either in order to compensate for the defeat that he might suffer, or in order better to gain advantage from it, if he wins. A beaten army will never recover if it lacks a head. If it is victorious, it will not derive an advantage from the victory, being paralysed, just like a lifeless body.

5. What to do after a lost battle

If fortune is against him, in other words if he loses the battle, he has to retreat to the principal {fortified} place he has, in order to reassure the inhabitants and to give them new hope. This is very important, for people always follow what happens in the capital, which will make the other {towns} follow like a prime mover.…There he will gather together the debris from his shipwreck and levy more men to tempt fortune a second time.…This second army being raised, he has to wage war as though there had been no previous battle, and even show himself prouder and more inflexible than before.…

6. What has to be done after a battle won [p. 117]

If the captain who defends his country is lucky enough to win the battle, he must immediately afterwards let himself be seen at the gates of the most important town that his enemies have taken, if it is not so empty of men and munitions that in insisting on besieging it, he would ruin his affairs in giving the enemy much respite to recover and gather new forces. . . .

7. On diversions

It is not only by the means I have described that one can defend oneself against usurpers. There is one other, which is by {creating} diversions, which one cannot do if one is attacked. In order to do so, one has to seek out the enemy in his own country. . . .

8. How one should follow a retreating enemy [p. 118]

If an enemy has finally had enough of his losses and has lost hope of accomplishing his aims, and sees himself forced to abandon the enterprise, and to retire to his own state, and in order to do so thinks about his retreat, . . . {o}ne has to pursue him step by step, to cause him losses all along the way, but principally to put pressure upon him and to prevent him from coming back and restarting his campaign. In order to do so, one has to ruin his equipment as much as one can, so that he does not engage in a new enterprise but thinks only about getting back to his country.

CHAPTER VI: OF OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE WAR, ON THE SIEGE OF TOWNS [p. 120]

1. On fortifications

2. How to invest a {fortified} place [p. 122]

. . . The articles of a surrender must be more favorable to the besieger than to the besieged . . . especially when the latter cannot hold out any longer, and especially when there is a breach {in the defences}, and the besiegers have lodged themselves there so that they can no longer be chased away. But one should still behave with kindness, as the laws of Christianity {and} moderation have tempered what is barbarous and cruel in war, order the victors quietly not to abuse his victory, but to drop his weapons once the enemies submit and are disarmed. . . .

16. Of towns taken by force [p. 156]

It happens often in attacks that the valor of the besieged is greater than foreseen, and that the besieged are taken by force. In that case the town falls into the most terrible unhappiness that it could foresee. Everything is then governed by the blind fury of arms, and sometimes it exceeds the powers of the chief to save the most holy things from the avarice and insolence of the soldiers who attack indifferently wherever they think they can make profit. Nevertheless, a general should prudently try to bring to bear all the authority of his character and to use all the severity of discipline. For apart from the sentiments of pity that have to move him, everything is lost…by dispensing with the laws of possession. Thus before moving to the attack, a foresightful general can impose a ban to pillage on pain of death and to make any man of his army guilty of capital crime if he is found seizing any goods in the town, if he has not been given it through distribution, or if he has not bought it from one of his fellow-soldiers, to whom it has come through the distribution. So that this decree has more effect, one has to declare all goods, movable and unmovable, belonging to the burghers and soldiers of the town, which are on the point of being seized, forfeit to the soldiers once the distribution has been made in case the town has been conquered, in order to distribute to them all these goods in good faith, and even to give them the daughters of the town in marriage, as we have seen in Homer who said that this was the practice of Greek captains. This would be a way to render all the soldiers rich, to create colonies without giving cause to complaints, and finally to merge two peoples into one….

17. Of repairing a town that has been taken [p. 198—*sic*—but 158 in order]

In whichever way a town has been taken, he who has taken it must give it a wise and valiant governor and a garrison sufficient {means} to govern it. He must however be careful not to weaken his army excessively, and he is obliged to think of all needed for war before establishing a garrison. The Romans ordered the burghers of the towns they had conquered to give them hostages, and by this means forced them to defend themselves against their former friends who were the enemies of Rome. Moreover, the conqueror has to order the repair of the fortifications that have been ruined by the siege. Above all, he has to caress the inhabitants, giving them the hope that they will be happy under the new domination, and he has to deprive them of the memory of their previous situation, and he must give them reason to think that they will be happier under {him} than they were before; that they will be ruled according to their old customs, and that their privileges will be increased, and that they will suffer no reduction of their status [*diminuition*].

CHAPTER VII [p. 160]

1. Of war at sea

Whatever knowledge we have of ancient maritime wars . . . , we can barely draw any rule from them for what we do in our own times: our usages are too different from practice in Antiquity, and the invention of artillery has made all machines used then useless. One could hardly form precepts on what our own ancestors have done, unless one drew lessons from what has been done long since the invention of cannon. Thus the maxims {of naval warfare} are quite new . . . The size of the ships, the types of weapons, the equipment and the fire ships are changing almost every year, and rarely does one use the same methods in successive battles. . . .

It is said that war at sea is an extreme expense, and one usually gains from it but very little utility. It is very awkward if you want to transport an army across the sea: it is almost beyond any state of service when it regains the land. The exhaustion which the soldiers have suffered in the ships makes them incapable of acting until the firm ground has put them back into their natural state. . . . {However,} large-scale commerce is transported by fleets and ships, and finally, a great State whose power does not extend to the sea, only has imperfect authority . . .

There is an art of deploying an armada upon the sea just as there is in the open field {with an army}: the deployment may be a crescent, which is the most common. One can divide it up into fleets, keeping people in reserve, just as ground forces. One always has to deploy them in a way that allows the ships to come to each other's aid. . . .

The fleet which is the last to remain on the battlefield is seen as victorious in battle. The prudent admiral knows how to drive the enemy's ships apart and to keep his own together, to pursue those fleeing and to prepare places of retreat and safety in case he is forced to seek them out. . . .

Fleets are excellent for staging diversions, and make enemies jealous. . . .

2. On the sieges of coastal towns [p. 163]

One often uses navies to besiege maritime {fortified} places. . . . The Ancients used their vessels {as platforms from which} to scale {walls} . . . but the {invention of} cannon has ruined all those techniques . . . Thus what a fleet normally does to undertake sieges it to stop {the flow of} victuals and help to get into besieged places, and to ruin them with cannon bombardment, if one can approach the port, that is, to which one should not expose oneself as the artillery of the place will reduce one's ships to powder. One cannot do too much with a sea army, unless fortune gives you extraordinary and unforeseen occasions, such as surprise and intelligence. . . .

CHAPTER VIII: ON CIVIL WARS [p. 165]

1. How one should prevent them

{Civil wars} are nothing but revolts { = insurgencies} and unjust disorders which are always staged against the public majesty of laws, where one finds a continuous mixture of insolence, avarice, desire, debauchery and ambition, which are the pestilences the poison of which infects all the different sorts of government.

It would be better for a politician to write about these sorts of movements than for a military philosopher. I shall nevertheless say something about them because, although the art of repressing revolts is mixed up with civilian { = political} sciences,…as these sorts of wars have to be counted among wars of sedition…Nevertheless, if we cease to look upon the causes and principles,…it is clear that civil war is truly a war.…

Captains have to fight civil wars in almost the same way as ordinary and legitimate wars.…

2. How one has to disperse them [p. 168]

The wisdom of kings in monarchies, and in republics, of the magistrates, has to foresee these dangerous movements. The secret of this lies in always remaining in charge, and never to suffer that any subject, or any town, society or community encroaches {on rights} beyond its old limits, under which pretexts whatsoever.…Public authority has to oppose incessantly…all innovations, without allowing anybody…in any way to increase his rights, immunities or privileges, or solicit the affection of the people…Above all, it is expedient to prevent anybody from enriching himself beyond measure. Through being consistently severe and exact, one will keep everybody in their place. There will be equality among subjects together with the necessary distribution of the goods of the state. Thus one will guarantee everybody against the vices of ambition, envy, avarice, injustice and debauchery. Thus all will be well, and will not engage in any business {against one another}, and will be happy, and love the government.…{T}here will not be sedition, nor unrest, nor civil wars.

If notwithstanding this it happens that somebody puts rebel troops afoot, fooling the prudence of kings and magistrates, and one needs to fight an actual disorder, one has to act according to the temperament of the people whom one rules, as well as according to the quality of the disorder. In this one has to imitate the knowledgeable physician who will be governed by the constitution of the patient and the nature of the sickness that he has to heal. The Spanish never forgive a crime of having taken up arms against the state. The French by contrast always pardon them if the culpable beg the prince for clemency. We have few examples in our own history in which a repentant rebel is executed, especially if he has

a party {of supporters} behind him. The Spanish have their reasons. But if their conduct seems appropriate to prevent revolts, they render them irremediable and take away all hope {of reconciliation} from those who are thus incapable of turning back and repenting. The French, on the other hand, have their policy of pardon, and if their principles are less useful for preventing these sorts of wars, they never fail to end them. Among us, an amnesty surely takes people back to their duties, and a man who,… has imprudently sided with the bad party, will easily find an honest expedient for withdrawing from it without putting his life and fortune in peril. In my view the French way of doing things is in this point wiser than that of the Spanish. Finally, there is a general way of breaking up alliances [*ligues*] and to shatter confederations of insurgents [*révoltés*] who have taken up arms: it is to negotiate without cease with their principals, to give them more than they could wish. In that case, {even} if the {rebel} chiefs merely listen to our proposals (as they always will), they will lose the faith of their troops and will be jealous of each other. Thus no longer able to act in concert, little by little their designs and vain aspirations will go up in smoke.

CHAPTER IX: ON DISCIPLINE [p. 172]

3. Of crimes and punishments [p. 175]

The crimes of men-of-war are impiety and blasphemy, sacrilege, rape, arson, treason, important disobedience, grumbling, insolence,… abandonment of the flag, pillage, theft (which are different crimes), duelling, murder, defection…, desertion, and going absent without leave.

All these crimes with us are capital offences: the knowledge and the judgment belong to the captains who, having organised a criminal tribunal, judge it in the council of war.…

4. Of pay [p. 176]

It is true that the horror of sufferings and the cruel image of being tormented restrains men and makes them fear bad deeds. In order to stir them to {the pursuit of} glory, one has to add extra payment for their valor, and rewards which they merit by their illustrious actions.…

7. On allies [p. 183]

There are several forms of allies. Some are honored with the title of companions at arms, as the Romans called the Italians *socios.* Others are friends who, equal in strength, come out of good will and generosity to the help of a country oppressed by the enemy, without taking any pay except from their master.…

The third form of allies are those who put themselves at the service of foreigners, after they have been granted a public permission to levy troops in a state. . . . There is a fourth sort of allies, who are those who have standing armies and engage them in the service of a prince for his payment, for a certain time; and when this time is over, they will retire. This is a normal practice in Germany and in Sweden.

A fifth form are those whom a prince employs in an enemy country, as when the Swedes or the {soldiers} of Brandenbourg enter with arms into the territories of the Emperor with whom France is at war.

The sixth sort is when a prince, by grandeur and magnanimity, supports a state weaker than his, which is a proper protectorate, as the king {of France} protects the Dutch, Denmark, some princes of Germany and of Italy.

The seventh and last sort is that of those who are continuously in the pay of a great State, as the Swiss are at the service of France, and others at the service of the Spanish.

A State must never suffer that a great prince sends them too strong a support{ing armed force}, under pretences of helping his country. {For t} he allies whom a prince in need calls to his help sometimes make him annoying propositions, and in taking advantage of the occasion, force him to accept difficult and heavy conditions. They may demand secure places { = fortifications}, they demand guarantees for the payment of money they will be due. These are not true allies, they are mercenaries, who for money shamefully traffic their blood and their lives. But because he who needs them suffers the law that necessity imposes upon him, he has to think about how to treat his false and interested friends in the best way he can. As soon as his affairs are in order again, or when peace has been made, he should prudently thank them politely and usher them out of his domain immediately.

A prince who wants to help his ally cannot always do so easily, and often there are obstacles which are almost insurmountable for him, such as distance, or the existence of a State between the two which refuses to grant passage through its territories or will not promise us the right to withdraw through it. In that case one might have to force one's way by use of arms, or by money.

One can help one's allies, by giving them professional troops [*entretenues*] to join their armies, or ones . . . to create diversions in the land of their enemies, or by allowing them to levy forces {in one's own country} at their cost, or by furnishing them munitions and victuals, or by lending them money, and even by giving it to them to pay the costs of war, or else by negotiating on their behalf and finding a settlement { = mediation}.

One needs allies who are neighbours, and ones far away, for both can be useful depending on circumstances. Alliances with monarchies are preferable to the friendship of republics as the latter act with excessive slowness, their prudence is timid, they are excessively cautious before

committing themselves, their council-meetings are never secret, there are always secret desires and interests which trouble the governments, and it is rarely the case that all those who have authority in government [*affaires*] have the same inclinations and sentiments, to the point that at every turn there are new difficulties. By contrast, in monarchies, all is decided by the behaviour and will of one single person; neither his inclinations nor his interests are ever divided, so that everything is done with greater promptness and more authority than in republics, except when a prince thinks that his advantage in protecting his allies is not sufficiently at stake to stand by his alliance treaties. Instead of acting to give more glory and greater esteem to the State, the spirit of republics and all their movements exclusively prefers the principle of utility.

Finally, when a prince calls his allies to his aid, let him pay attention that he mixes the auxiliary forces with his own without respect to their rank [*sans être convenu de leur rang*] or the place where they will fight. For otherwise competition between both sides could come about, and even an open and declared division, which . . . would be of extreme consequence. . . .

CHAPTER XI [p. 199]

1. Of Peace

. . . Peace is the final aim of taking arms . . . Thus if peace succeeds war, it seems that everything is reborn in the world: order, abundance, happiness and rest are re-established where previously one only saw confusion, misery, trouble and horror. It remains that no captain must ever, regardless of what victory he has won, refuse fair conditions to his enemies . . .

2. How one should preserve a conquered country [p. 200]

It is not enough for a king, after having made a conquest, or having imposed peace on his defeated enemies, to think of repairing the evils which war can have caused in his kingdom. He also has to turn his attentions diligently to the peoples he has conquered. For in becoming his new subjects, they have become his new children. It is thus necessary that he should make them forget the rule under which they have been born, and under which they had become accustomed to live. At the same time he has to dispel the pain of their defeat and that which they might have in obeying to the laws of the conqueror. These newly conquered peoples have to be happy about the change of masters, and they must . . . fear the return of the previous government. In order to achieve this positive result, the conqueror must govern his new subjects with all possible softness, unburden them of the normal taxes, or at least not increase them; he has

to confirm and increase the privileges of the towns, establish the sciences, arts, industry and commerce there; decorate them with public buildings and ornaments, uphold the worship of God and of religion, protect the clergy, support the old laws and magistrates, and finally maintain justice, clemency, and moderation in all ways. The conqueror can even bring his old and new subjects together through marriages and mutual alliances, and harmonise the habits and customs of both. But above all, the {new} government must not affect any changes in the country. They must not commit acts of violence or injury against any private person. Those guilty of such lawlessness must be chastised in such a form that the injury is compensated and the act of violence repaired. In order to do this, he must see to it that none of the conquered peoples should be troubled in their pleasures and in the content of their domestic lives. It is good to owe one's new subjects money and to pay them back with exact interest. To the contrary, it is dangerous for a conqueror to lend them any.

The conqueror must still defend himself against all the relations of the prince he has divested, and against all those who might have a claim against him. To that effect, one has to exile them, or by containing them, to contest the case with them, so that one can put reason against treason, in case one of them wants to undertake something {against the new prince}. It is good to disarm the citizens, giving them the hope that one will restore their arms {at some point in the future}, when one has recognised their good intentions and their loyalty.

If the obstinacy of the peoples is invincible, {however,} to the point where they cannot forget their previous state and they continually try to shake off the yoke of the victors to resume that of their former princes, one must use force and severity, using more rigorous means. {In that case} one has to disarm them, change their laws, take away from them what is most precious and holy to them, deport them and colonise them, dispossess them of their lands, marry their daughters to the soldiers of the conqueror, forbid them all commerce, take away all their artisans, destroy their public buildings, keep their hostages, impose extraordinary taxes and keep armies in their midst in order to suppress them with more authority.

CHAPTER 7

Santa Cruz de Marcenado and Zanthier (1724–30/1775)

Don Alvaro Navia-Osorio (also given as Navia Ossorio) y Vigil (1684–1732) was the son of Doña Jacinta Vigil y Bernardo de la Rua, second Marchioness of Santa Cruz de Marcenado, and her husband, Don Juan Antonio de Navia-Osorio y Argüelles. He would ultimately inherit his mother's and maternal grandfather's title as third Marquess Santa Cruz de Marcenado and Viscount of Puerto. His grandfather had become Marquess Santa Cruz de Marcenado after the title had lapsed for some time: It had been held in the 16th century by Alvaro de Bazán (1526–1588), who had been given this name as a victor of the naval battle of Lepanto (1571) against the Ottoman Fleet, which had been the turning point in Ottoman expansion in the Mediterranean. There seems to be no direct family link, however.

Don Alvaro was born on December 19, 1684, in Santa María de Vega in Asturia, Spain. He was the only son, but he had two sisters.[1] As an adolescent he received an education in grammar, rhetoric, and philosophy at the monastery Santo Domingo in Oviedo; at the age of 18, he matriculated at the University of Oviedo but left it after only a year to pursue a military career. Even before going to the university, he had become colonel of the local militia, and when the Spanish War of Succession broke out in 1701, he was mustered to defend the Bourbons. He saw his first fighting in the Kingdom of Valencia. His bravery during the unsuccessful defense of Cuidad Rodrigo (1706) against a mixed army of Britons, Dutch, and Portuguese was remarked upon; his side had more luck in the defense of Tortosa (1709), where once again he excelled. The end of the war in 1714 after the Peace of Utrecht (1713) found him in Sicily. During the war he had found time to marry, first to Francisca de

Navia Arango y Montenegro, daughter of the first Marquess of Ferrera, who was related to his family, and with whom he had a son, Don Juan Alonso, who would become the fourth marquess, and a daughter, Doña Jacinta. His wife did not live long, and he married again;[2] this second marriage produced another son, Don Sebastián, who became a teacher in Santiago, and another daughter, Doña Margarita. This may have been a morganatic marriage, or else she, too, died only few years after their marriage.

In 1715 Don Alvaro was sent to Ceuta, a Spanish-occupied territory, as inspector of the Spanish forces. The Bourbon king Philip V of Spain, who had emerged as the winner after the war over his succession, used his position in the following years to increase his country's influence and security in the western Mediterranean.[3] In 1718 Don Alvaro took command of the Spanish forces in Sardinia. About this time, he had succeeded to the title of marquess, presumably upon the death of his mother, and was inspector of the Spanish forces in both Sardinia and Sicily, and also governor of Cagliari. In 1719 he married once more, to his third and last wife, the 17-year-old María Antonia de Bellet y Valencia from Barcelona, the daughter of a lieutenant general and member of the Royal Council on War, Juan Estaban de Bellet y Sampso. With his third wife, Don Alvaro had another daughter, Doña Irene, who would become a Latin poet of some fame, and three sons, Don Victorio Amadeo, Don Alvaro, and Don Lucas, born posthumously; all three would become high-ranking officers.

Santa Cruz's career changed fundamentally when he became a diplomat. From 1722–1727, he was in Turin as Spanish ambassador to the court of Victor Amadeus II (1666–1732), who ruled Savoy and had created the Kingdom of Sardinia for himself in 1720; Turin was the capital of this kingdom. Italy was of foremost importance for Spain, along with France and Britain. In Turin, Santa Cruz's house became a cultural center, where he accumulated a remarkable library containing works of Caesar, Vegetius, Leo VI, Machiavelli, Mendoza, and many works by French and Dutch authors.[4] Here he began to write not only his *Military Reflections* but also a work on economics, and he planned an encyclopedia in Spanish, a never-completed *Diccionario universal*.[5] He was well liked by King Victor Amadeus, who became the godfather of Santa Cruz's oldest son from his third marriage, born in Turin; Santa Cruz also negotiated the king's accession to the Treaty of Hanover.[6]

The peace settlement of the Spanish War of Succession broke down in 1726; after a brief interlude of fighting between Britain and Spain, diplomatic negotiations were resumed in 1727, and Santa Cruz was dispatched to participate in these both in Soissons and Paris until 1731. His main residence was in Paris, and he seems to have commuted to the meetings in Soissons. This meant a downturn in his fortune because Paris was much more expensive than Turin: he had to cut down his household

and accumulated considerable debts as a result of his social obligations. Nevertheless, he still managed to write and publish the final volume of his *Military Reflections*.[7]

After the peace talks ended, Santa Cruz seemed to have reached the peak of his career when he was in the running to become minister of war. But the court of Philip V was plagued by factional strife, and the faction around Philip's second wife, Queen Elizabeth, born a Farnese, managed to prevent his appointment. Instead, leaving his family behind in Paris, he was once again sent to Ceuta, this time with the charge to reconquer Oran, which had been captured by Ottoman forces in 1708 while Spain was distracted by its War of Succession.[8] Moreover, the western Mediterranean and the waters to the west were made unsafe for trade by pirates operating from Tangier.[9] Oran was ruled by Mustafa Buk Ağa, whom the Spaniards called *Bigotillos* (big moustache), with the help of two Spanish Christian renegades, Riperdá and Ali Den. In the summer of 1732, Santa Cruz succeeded in recapturing Oran, which had been deserted by its population. *Bigotillos* and the renegades did not give up; they plagued the Spanish garrison in Oran with attacks on their logistics with surrounding castles, and even threatened Ceuta. On November 21, 1732, Santa Cruz made the cardinal mistake of venturing forth from the security of the walled town of Oran, and fighting the superior Turkish and Arab forces. The latter, numbering about 50,000, led the Spaniards into an ambush, and although the majority of the Spaniards escaped, Santa Cruz, hit by bullets in the thigh and then mortally in the chest, was pulled down from his horse and was massacred. His body was mutilated, he was beheaded, and his head was exhibited in Argel as a trophy.[10] It seems that no remains had been found to be buried by the time his widow had a monument erected to him in 1747.

But Santa Cruz de Marcenado was a celebrated hero for Spain because Oran remained a Spanish possession until the end of the 18th century, when an earthquake destroyed the town. Poets wrote elegies on his death.[11] Santa Cruz de Marcenado became in Spain what Clausewitz would become in Germany, with the bi- and tri-centennials of his birth duly commemorated, and with streets, schools, and a prize for military achievements named after him.

Santa Cruz's international activities after 1722 helped make him and his works famous abroad during the 18th century.[12] His *Military Reflections* were translated into French in 1735–1738 and reprinted in the Hague in 1739 and 1771.[13] A comprehensive German translation was published in Vienna in 1753.[14] An Italian translation appeared in the 1750s.[15] Until this day, however, there has been no translation into English, and one can confidently say that his ideas did not influence English-speaking writers.

The *Military Reflections* follow the pattern of military handbooks since Vegetius. The subjects discussed are the skills necessary for the general: when to choose war and when to choose peace, alliances, preparations

for war, the beginning of war, camps, marches, spies, insurgencies (rebellions) and how to deal with them—where his views echo those of Mendoza—offensive wars and how to hold on to conquered territories, when to give battle, preparations for battle and the results for both sides, developments in battle, outcome of battle for either side, behavior after a battle won, siege warfare and attacks on fortified places, surprise, ambushes, defensive war, when to avoid battle, how to deal with defeat, and retreat.

Santa Cruz de Marcenado's multivolume work on war is now all but forgotten, certainly because of its cumbersome format. Santa Cruz's education had conditioned him to use the approach of theological and legal scholars. In his *Military Reflections,* he discussed each issue by listing extensive evidence for each claim, drawing on examples given by classical authors, the Hebrew Bible, and more recent historical examples, as well as on the works of other authors on war. While examples from other texts are cited with scholarly care, more recent historical examples are sometimes presented in a surprisingly chatty, anecdotal way. The abridged, one-volume German edition of 1775 by Friedrich Wilhelm von Zanthier is by far the most readable because Zanthier dropped all the examples.

FRIEDRICH WILHELM VON ZANTHIER

Friedrich Wilhelm von Zanthier, who must be seen as the co-author of the abridged version of *Military Reflections,* was a lieutenant-major (Kapitän-Leutnant) in the army of the State of Schaumburg-Lippe in Bückeburg. According to his anonymous posthumous editor, who describes himself as a friend and companion of his youth, Zanthier was born in 1741 in Meissen in the Kingdom of Saxony, where his father was a major in the Niesemeusel Regiment, which later became the Prinz Maximilian Regiment. His mother's maiden name was von Anger. The father participated in the battle of Kesseldorf and was wounded, after which he was always of delicate health, and died in 1758. Friedrich Wilhelm had several brothers, and their economic circumstances became precarious, allowing only Friedrich Wilhelm and one other brother to attend the Collegium Carolinum, a grammar school, in Brunswick when their father died. From there, Friedrich Wilhelm went to the University of Leipzig.

But the Seven Years' War was under way, and in 1760 he dropped out of the university and joined an Austrian regiment (Austria and Saxony were allies). He participated in the battle of Torgau (1760) and became a second lieutenant. In 1761 his regiment was put under Daun, and Zanthier was then ordered to defend the fortress of Schwednitz with his regiment. Toward the end of the siege, he was shot in the left eye and was still sick when he was delivered into Prussian hands as prisoner of war. He was released in 1763. In 1764 he quit the Habsburg service and joined the Royal

Danish armed forces, where he was employed as first lieutenant under General von Arnstedt. Zanthier later left the Danes and for a while lived as a private citizen in Brunswick. In 1770 he joined the Portuguese armed forces, which had prepared for a war with Spain, under Field Marshall Count von der Lippe-Bueckeburg. Zanthier seems to have lived in Porto for some time; most likely he was given little to do except use his access a good library, for this seems to have been the time when he wrote most of his books. He left Porto for Germany again in 1778 to fight for Saxony, but he returned to Portugal in 1779 where he did not find a good reception. He became lieutenant colonel and commander of the regiment of Almeyda. He died of a fever on August 23, 1783.[16]

In addition to his abridged version of Santa Cruz's work, Zanthier published a book on the art of war, illustrated with examples from the Seven Years' War;[17] an archive-based book on the campaigns of Turenne;[18] three translations into German from the Portuguese of plays for the stage;[19] and an instruction manual on "detachments" published posthumously.[20]

Zanthier's excerpts take enormous liberties with Santa Cruz's work: as the reader will see from the footnotes, Zanthier did not even follow the sequel of Santa Cruz's books and chapters. Nevertheless, the ideas are recognizably Santa Cruz's.

* * *

Don Alvaro de Navia-Osorio y Vigil, Vizconde de Puerto, Marqués de Santa Cruz de Marcenado: *Reflexiones Militares*. Twenty-one books variously bound (Turin: Juan Francisco Mairesse, 1724–1727 and Paris: Simon Langlois, 1730).

In the edition of Friedrich Wilhelm von Zanthier: *Freyer Auszug aus des Herrn Marquis de Santa Cruz de Marzenado, Gedanken von Kriegs- und Staatsgeschäften, nebst einem Versuch über die Kunst den Krieg zu studieren.* (Göttingen und Gotha: 1775). Pagination in subscript refers to Zanthier's text, footnotes give references to Santa Cruz's *Reflexiones Militares,* abridged version ed. by Joaquin de la Llave and Javier de Salas (1885, reprinted Madrid: Ministry of Defense, 2004).

OFFENSIVE WARS[21] [p. 60]

Chapter 3: Behaviour towards conquered territories that you intend to annex[22]

§1. Some annexations of territories could lead to the conqueror's ruin, if he tries to defend them. For they might either require depopulating his own state by creating colonial settlements {of one's own population in this conquered territory}, or draw him into endless wars. Nevertheless,

it can be of decisive advantage to snatch them from the defeated {enemy} because with them he will lose some of his power to harm us. Soon after the annexation, one either has to seek to break these provinces into many small domains…Or else one gives their populations freedom and creates a republic. Or one surrenders the territory to a prince who has some well-founded claims to it, but is not powerful enough to become a future threat to the donor. At any rate, the new state must be very closely tied to one's own, and one seeks to secure all advantages which it can give, without incurring the dangers and disadvantages [p. 61] which stem from renouncing dominion over it. But if one decides to keep the conquered land as one's own, above all one has to win the hearts of the subjects, so that one is not quasi in a state of war even in times of peace, and has to take precautions which will both exhaust them and one's other provinces.

§2. Before an army enters a territory which it intends to defend even in times of peace, it must proclaim everywhere that the inhabitants and their belongings will be granted security if they stay indoors during the campaign. Safeguards will be given free of charge. Victuals will be paid for and fields and plantations have to be spared both when {soldiers} are in camps and on the move. The army'a baggage train has to be guarded with greatest diligence, marches through the country have to be accelerated and camps should not be set up unless absolutely necessary. If, in spite of that, the citizens leave the province, safety measures have to be doubled, so that the refugees will not suddenly lose their property (goods, land). Parties of soldiers have to be sent out to intercept the refugees and bring them back without maltreating them. The houses and goods of the returnees have to be restored to them. One has to repeat all the {previously made} declarations, to encourage other inhabitants to come back in turn.…{E}missaries should be selected among the most reputable men of the country in order to bring back {other} refugees.

After a short period of time, amnesties for all former offences should be announced. Prisoners have to be removed, as well as everything that would foster a hostile spirit in the inhabitants.

[p. 62] If the inhabitants of the country remain calmly indoors or return to their dwellings, one has to take care to improve their condition as much as possible, compared with their previous state. The nobility has to be granted whatever is possible, the poor should be protected from the rich. Agriculture, commerce and crafts have to be stimulated, inhabitants have to be convinced of the clemency, magnanimity and power of their new prince. One seeks to induce them to do things which will make them enemies of the previous {ruler}. No monuments or trophies are to humiliate the defeated, the religion of the country will enjoy its previous freedoms undiminished, laws and customs will not be changed unless they interfere with security. If one is forced to introduce new laws, one has to find a convincing excuse which will make changes bearable for the people. For example, one declares an existent law to be obsolete, and allows changes to it to be developed by the

locals, and so on. Harmful privileges can only be eliminated gradually, and with appropriate caution.

Taxes will be reduced or asked for in part as voluntary donation, and collected with the lightest touch possible. The tax collectors have strict orders to harm no one, and if possible to accept grain instead of money etc. They and all other civil servants of the province have to reject any gifts under no matter what pretence they are given.

§3. Newly conquered provinces demand an increased force size. If these additional soldiers have to be levied exclusively in the {conqueror's} hereditary lands, these will quickly be exhausted, as Spain knows from sad [p. 63] experience. One therefore has to recruit troops within the newly conquered territories, and rotate the regiments, in order to ensure the loyalty of the country and of the troops. Officer ranks have to be staffed partly with young noblemen and partly with wealthy citizens from good families. Sergeants, constables, adjutants and majors have to be taken from the old regiments. If any local officers have previously served in the army, one has to promote them to their advantage within the new regiments. These officers have to be chosen partly from families whose loyalty is assured, and partly from among those whose loyalty is the most suspect, to use them as hostages when the regiments are switched around and sent to remote provinces. These changes of cantonment are of keen importance to the army, as well as for the people. It makes the former more war-like through accustoming them to marches and exhaustion. Among the people it creates greater unity, it makes them more used to customs and traditions {from different parts of the realm}, leads to integration through marriage, trade and friendship. But one has to control this procedure carefully, so that hatred and acrimony are not engendered through these changes, because these cannot easily be eradicated. Furthermore these changes have to be undertaken during the most suitable seasons, depending on the climate of each country.

Chapter 4: The crucial advantages of superior naval power: Spain's navy[23] [p. 64]

§1. If one has superiority at sea, it is simple to cut off the enemies' mainland from his islands and it should be done without opposition. In that case one's own harbours are unconquerable, as they are all free. One ruins the enemy's commerce and strengthens one's own. Merchants will pay high prices to be escorted by warships, which will increase the revenues of the state. All nations are quick to conclude commercial treaties, if one requires them. The remotest people are not too remote to become allies or enemies. {The aggressor} can disembark his troops wherever {he chooses} to attack {fortified} places and raid areas. So how is it possible to occupy {i.e., defend} coastlines which are several hundred hours {miles} long, or to pre-empt a fast fleet by marching one's army there? To answer this, one

has to read the history of Spain's War of Succession. The English had just a few troops within their country, although they had to fear uproars if the Pretender had successfully landed [p. 65] in their kingdom. Instead, they relied on their fleet.[24] …

Big fleets have crucial advantages; they have to be superior to the enemy in times of war, but otherwise they are expensive and of little use. In the end { = after a long period of peace} they no longer venture out into the open sea, and one has to dismantle them … {F}leets have to {be big enough to} counterbalance the enemy's, or else one does not need them at all and can content oneself with galleys, which are readily available at all times. With these, one can secure not only one's coasts but also … one's islands … In windless nights, they can row right in between the fleets of the enemy to supply sea fortifications and coastlines in an appropriate way. If one possesses both warships and galleys, the latter can, during windless weather, tow damaged ships out of the battle, and help the remainder [p. 66] to get into position. If the hostile fleet withdraws, {the galleys} advance during windless weathers to approach its rearguard, and open fire. The warships then have to turn, and lose time, while the pursuing fleet approaches. At landings, or from besieged fortresses and ports, a galley can move in closer to the coast than warships can, guard the landing with flank fire, or rake the besieging {ships} with fire. If one wants to supply fortresses with ammunition or troops, the galley serves both in the absence of wind or if there is wind, while the warship does not. …

[p. 76] §3. If a power plans to become a naval power, the others who have already attained this status will try to choke it while it is young … There are three ways to prevent this. First, through diplomatic negotiations which have to be drawn out as long as it is possible, while arming all the more intensively.

The second is not to expose the new naval power to a major battle too early, not to berth in a port where it could be hit by hostile fireships, to reward local seamen well when they patrol the enemy coasts and bring secure and speedy messages when {the enemy} squadrons leave their harbours, to concentrate one's own forces in secret, to assault weak hostile squadrons that have become detached from the other {ships}. If the enemy embarks with a large navy this year, one should not spend more on one's own navy than is absolutely necessary. One should then leave the big ships in some safe port, well maintained, and only fit out a few frigates to keep officers and men trained, and to mar hostile operations. In order to be successful in small operations [*Streifereien*], one has to win the loyalty of the sailors of the feluccas and other light vessels belonging to neutral nations, in order to find out from them when enemy merchantmen leave the harbour, whether they have military cover, when the coastal people are at sea and when they anchor, etc. One has to assure the loyalty of {such} sailors, in order to be able to tell them [p. 77] when they can meet ours {ships} at this or that position. Signals have to be arranged

through which our ships can identify these vessels before allowing them alongside, so that they are not mistaken for pirates.

The third and best of all means {to prevent this} is an alliance with another sea power, in order, so to speak, to learn to walk by holding its hand, and to gain advantages in sailing and fighting. One pushes all one's strength to the extreme in order to increase one's own power during the alliance{'s duration} as best as one can, to be able to act alone after it {has expired}….

DEFENSIVE WARS[25] [p. 104]

Chapter 1: Defence at Sea against an enemy who must approach from the seaside[26]

§1. If the enemy who is about to attack has to transport his troops by sea, the first question of the defender is whether he should face the enemy at sea or await him on solid ground. One chooses the former or the latter strategy, depending whether the enemy is superior in one or the other, depending on whether victory on land or at sea is more decisive for us or the enemy, depending on whether one has more resources available here or there, in order to rectify the situation in case of defeat. The weakest strategy to be chosen is to divide one's forces so as to be weak in both, unable to venture forth into the open sea, then to be beaten on land. If the reason for this weakness lies within the state's pre-existing institutions, and if it is impossible to equal the enemy in both, one has to strengthen one through the other. The difficulties of doing so are not great, because ammunition, food and money serve both on land and at sea, and the sailor can become a good soldier and the soldier can also easily learn to operate the sails and the riggings…The Greeks as well as the Romans served on land and at sea, why should it prove impossible [p. 105] for us? Why should a soldier not be able to become a sailor, or a sailor not be able to learn the duties of a soldier? The advantages of mixing both sets of skills would be great, and would prove beneficial especially during landings in remote countries.

§2. If one decided to meet the enemy at see, one has to look out for advantages derived from the dispersion of the hostile fleet while it is still being equipped…

§3. If one is superior to the enemy at sea, one should advance with one's superior fleet even to the harbour where the enemy's ships are assembling, even if they have already come together. If one awaits him at the coast or on the open seas, it is easy for {some enemy ships} to sneak through, disembark troops on the coast and return. The longer the threatened coastline, the more places there are where the enemy can disembark, the bigger the danger {for us}.

If the enemy has prepared his troop transport at more than one port, and if then some of his ships are forced to pass through straits before meeting

the other squadrons, [p. 107] one has to ambush them and beat them in detail.…[p. 108]

§4. If the enemy is a master at sea, and if there are only a few ports on the coastline he menaces, but these are vital for the enemy's disembarkation, one has to fortify the promontory or the surrounding coast, or one has to spoil the ports themselves, and muddy water supplies leading into them. If time or money or people are lacking to do so, one has to sink ships filled with heavy stones at the entrance to the harbour.…[p. 109]

Well-appointed fortifications are…the safest means against all landings.…[p. 110]

Chapter 2: Magazines for defence; the use of fortresses; when to reinforce an army with garrisons, and in which cases the garrisons with the army.[27]

[p. 111] §3. Who is so weak in his defence, that he might not even have hope to find a fortunate opportunity to attack, but could assume that time will be of benefit to him; who even with his whole army and garrisons drawn from all his fortresses cannot dare to face the enemy; who can rely on strength of his fortresses rather than on the doubtful outcome of a battle, and has equipped these fortresses with everything that a persistent defence requires, he should follow the laws of war in distributing his army and strengthen every endangered fortification. But the remainder of the infantry and the cavalry must resist on open ground to stop the enemy's convoys and his foragers, make forays into enemy territory, make sieges difficult and drawn out for him. If, however, the strategy is to move from defence to attack as soon as possible and to use every opportunity to strike with advantage, one has to increase the numbers of the army with the men from all those fortresses which offer reasonable hope to be held [p. 112] even after a battle lost, and where there is no reason to fear an attack or an insurgency.…

Chapter 3: How to retain or disperse the enemy through shortage of food. How to protect the country from hostile attacks[28] [p. 116]

[p. 117] §2. There are provinces, even entire countries, which even large armies could not invade either because the scarcity of food and water or the climatic conditions would waste them. There are others which are secured against all attacks by the number and strength of their fortifications, but not from raids conducted by individual parties, which are all the more dangerous if committed by barbaric tribes. The best way to protect oneself from raids of this kind is to surround one's country with a chain of towers within visual distance of each other, constructed upon heights or any other natural advantages that the terrain offers…

Chapter 4: About cases in which a battle has to be avoided and how to avoid it[29] [p. 120]

§1. Avoiding a battle means to assume a posture which makes it impossible for the enemy to attack us, or where he can only do so with perilous boldness. The cases where one is forced to avoid battle are the following:

1. If our forces are not accustomed to war, or if they are not suitable for fighting a battle, or if they are discouraged by defeats or other circumstances.
2. If one is weaker than the enemy, and if one is in an area where the superiority of numbers weighs heavily.
3. If the sort of fighting one would engage in is inappropriate for one's own troops, and our strength would be useless in those circumstances.
4. If one can benefit by the passing of time.
5. If one expects substantial reinforcements, which are able to alter the outcome of the war, because the enemy has nothing to offset them. [p. 121]
6. If the enemy will waste away, due to diseases, desertion and the lack of money, food and forage.
7. If one knows that {the enemy} will soon be forced to weaken himself by dispatching detachments, or that he will lose an ally who will recall his troops.
8. If one is able to attain one's object without a battle, just through marches, diversions, capture of magazines, limitations of {the enemy's} forage and so on.
9. If the time to fight is not ripe. This means, if the enemy, through marches and movements, has to be drawn to the place where one wants to defeat him, or if one's . . . army or the fortifications inside one's country still have to be prepared to take advantage of our victory, once attained.
10. If victory in a battle will lead the enemy to make great plans, but not us, so that we have more to lose than to win. Such cases are:
    a. If the enemy's fortifications are in a good defensive condition, but ours are not.
    b. If everything is open to him after winning a {major} battle, while he pays dearly with blood if he makes small steps only, in skirmishes.
    c. If our retreat is extremely dangerous and the enemy's easy, so that the outcome of the battle could only be to or disadvantage. [p. 122]
    d. If, through losing the battle, we also lose the resources we need to keep us going, but the enemy is not losing his.
    e. If the loss of a battle denies us from taking a secure winter quarters in a rich province, which without {the battle} would have been ours to take, when the victory only gains us a province which is of little use to us.
    f. If a defeat will increase the number of hostile allies, or decrease the number of ours, or ours remain loyal to us {only} as long as we are not defeated, while some would then not dare rise up against us.

§2. These are the cases in which one should avoid battles. Add to them orders from the court which often forbid giving battle for reasons

of politics, even if there are grounds for expecting victory. How, then, can we save ourselves from an enemy who is eager to engage us in a battle, precisely because we are so eager to avoid it? Defence is always more difficult then the attack, because the defender has to protect himself against everything, even from the unexpected. Meanwhile the attacker exploits time and opportunity for his purposes, and can wait for them to become decisive. Here, then, are ways which may now and then help: in order to avoid battle, one chooses positions and camps which are naturally strong and cannot easily be taken. If nature is not favourable in all points, one takes recourse in entrenchments . . . [p. 123] One seeks to distance oneself from the enemy . . . One is vigilant even in marching . . .

The cases, in which an inferior force could dare to attack a stronger one, are:

1. If one has to put everything on one card. [p. 124]
2. If one meets the enemy in a country where the superiority of numbers is unimportant.
3. If it is possible, by forming an oblique battle formation, to bring more troops to bear on the point of attack than the enemy {has}, regardless of the enemy's overall superiority.
4. If it is possible to attack the enemy at night, and if he has deployed his troops badly in the position which he does not know well enough.
5. If it is possible to attack the enemy in dispersed cantonments, or while he is marching, and if the party attacked by us cannot be backed by others.

PREVENTING INSURGENCIES[30]

Chapter 1: About the means to forestall insurgencies[31]

§1. A State rarely rises up without the fault of its governors. So before learning to fight insurgencies, one has to learn the means to forestall them. A part of the {answer how to} can be found in the chapter above where I talked about the art of governing conquered countries, the rest follows here.

If new proposals are put to the prince which promise great benefits [p. 125], he must take care that they are not achieved through . . . the ruin of his people. Ministers often do not pay heed to this. One has to preserve for the whole State, and each individual citizen, the unhampered enjoyment of their commodities, laws, freedoms and the religion. Customs, traditions and clothes remain unchanged. If it is required to make new laws, or make any changes to existing ones, it has to be done in a way that is popular with the people, or is at least bearable for them, and made at a favourable moment.

False charges swell the ranks of the malcontents. Often a man becomes a rebel, just because one has falsely suspected him, leading him to believe that he is doomed. One must thus never suspect anybody, unless one is certain that the crime has been committed, and the culprit is in our power.

No warning should be dismissed, but one should never take steps against the life, the honour or the assets of the accused, as long as there are still doubts {about his guilt}. If culprits are punished by one's own authority, judgement or tribunal, even tyrants will face justice because the people will rise against them. If the enemies recognize that one is credulous, they will use this to raise suspicions against the most honest men. Accusations without signature are rarely true. False denouncers must, without mercy, face the same punishment which they had intended to bring upon the innocent.

One must not give too much power to the troops. If they use force, and the population is angry with them, one must reprimand the troops with a public show of displeasure. One must even replace the governors [p. 126] if they abuse their position, and show the people that one has done so out of a sense of justice, not of fear [of the people], lest the people become the tyrant of their master…

One must protect the poor from the rich, without diminishing the well-founded rights of the rich, and seek to win back their loyalty by other means. One has to settle every strife and conflict and eradicate it. Only among the rebels should one cause discord, while one should suppress it among one's subjects.

One must not interfere with the religion of the country, nor introduce new liberties, without having considered with great diligence what the positive and negative effects of such measures would be, especially when the clergy are powerful and control the thinking of the people.

One must not tolerate the idle and vagabonds: they are the first to support insurgent leaders. If prisons are full one has to secure them and ensure that they are in fortified places, lest the first thing an insurgent people will do is to storm them and open them. If there are malcontents among the nobility, one has to plan ahead to prevent them from increasing their power, so that they do not obtain claims through marriage which cannot be satisfied. No province must rise too much above others due to its privileges. No province should smart so badly from the loss of all its privileges that any form of change seems desirable to it. If one has subjected provinces, which enjoy such proud privileges, one must abolish them, if this can be done with a good conscience, [p. 127] but only at an auspicious moment.

Public entertainment keeps the people busy and suppresses the spirit of revolt. The rich nobility becomes poorer due to it, and arts and manufacture flourish. There are times when the prince has to encourage the nobility through his own example, especially when he has reasons to

fear them. But one has to take care lest these events become riotous gatherings, or lest a powerful and rich traitor wins the heart of the people.

Inflation and food scarcity are the most terrible sources of insurgencies, especially if the people believe that these are due to taxes, usury, or neglect on the part of the government. At times, cereals are expensive, even in times of plenty, if the owner of big farms and the tenants ask a certain price, or if corn mongers, who buy it off them, come to similar agreements. To prevent this one has to fix a cheap price for cereals, force all owners within the country without exemption to open their granaries and sell the cereals for the determined price. To contain the harm caused by corn usury, the granaries of all peasants have to be inspected repeatedly, and to ensure that none of them sell what they need for sowing or baking bread. To support the poor in the towns, no corn mongers should be allowed to buy at the marketplace before a certain hour, so that the poor can make their purchases before that.

The prize which is set for the cereals should correspond to the yield of the harvest, the price of other groceries, [p. 128] the value of the money and the other goods. If {the price} is set too low, peasants will desert the plough.

Weights and measures have to be sacred within the entire country. The falsification of goods has to be punished severely: no surcharge must be imposed on fruit and essentials groceries. If scarcity is caused by foreign trade, one must never suppress this, as it stimulates agriculture and therefore the entire country, but one must impose limitations, so that enough {cereals} remain in the country to bake bread and to sow for at least one year, if possible two. The rest is to be exported for the highest prize to be had. But one must be careful and inspect the granaries periodically, for much fraud is practised, and without such precautions, more would be exported than permitted.

Imports of crops are undependable and weaken the purchasing country, which in a manner of speaking subordinates itself to the exporting country. If the transport takes place by land, it is very costly, if by sea, it is exposed to many hazards and the cereals often go off. One should therefore only choose the latter on occasion, [p. 129] and even then favour the commerce with one's own provinces even if these are subject to more difficulties.

If the country is under-populated, one must in part ensure that the existing population flourishes, which at all times makes for the best subjects, and in part try to attract foreigners into the country and grant them and their children great liberties, which however should not be harmful to the old inhabitants. If there is not a lack of people but of workers, one has to force the people to work, punish the idle and vagabonds, and encourage the industrious with honours and rewards.

If prices rise due to overpopulation, one should move some to provinces which are under-populated. The prince should, if at all possible, raise orphans, foundlings and poor children at his expense, because

such investments create good citizens and mothers, and the most loyal soldiers.

Chapter 2: Advance signs of insurgencies; monitoring early warnings[32] [p. 130]

§1. If towns and provinces beg to be relieved of garrisons even though the troops are well disciplined and the garrisons are thus beneficial to them; if the people hold frequent secret gatherings; if diatribes and denunciations against the prince and his administration are circulated frequently; if one frequently hears of prophecies about future misfortunes of the prince and state; if spiritual leaders whose loyalty is suspect perform miracles; if the nobles of the country behave unusually in trying to gain the goodwill of the people; and if the envoys of the {foreign} princes who might hope to gain from an insurgency attempt to make contacts with locals, all these are signs that fire is smouldering under the ashes, especially when a combination of such things occurs.

The insurrection is close at hand, when the citizens stop respecting authority and complying with orders . . . {For example} when suspects stop coming to places where they are under the control of the prince, even if they are invited for good reason [p. 131], but make various subterfuges; if peasants suddenly stay away from fortresses and barracks and neither buy nor sell anything; if they even desert their homes; if one finds caches of ammunition, victuals and weapons in unusual places.

All of these are signs of an approaching insurrection, but they do not allow us to identify the rebels nor do they present us with any evidence. These must be sought, but without making new enemies through unfounded accusations, as noted above. One needs a trusted friend who will approach the person one suspects, gain his trust little by little, and entice him to disclose his plans for revenge etc. by {seemingly} talking about his own discontentment. If the suspect is in intimate contact with a lady, one has to find a young, devious man of handsome appearance, who will win her heart and secrets. Suspects should be asked for their advice regarding an undertaking which one does seriously contemplate but which, if it were executed, would disturb or consolidate the peace of the country. Maybe the traitor gives the wrong advice, which covertly aims at your downfall. Maybe the suspects will then change their behavior one way or the other. Either would throw light on the matter; moreover, it will blind the enemies about your real intentions . . . Above all, one surveys every step of the ambassadors of {foreign} princes who are likely to have a hand in furthering unrest, because the insurrection would give them advantages. One's own ambassadors at {the foreign princes'} courts must be ultra-vigilant . . . The further one is away from the danger, the less cautious one is, and often secrets are discovered hundreds of miles away which one would not have discovered at the place itself. . . .

[p. 132] §2. As soon as one has found out the initiators of the insurgency, one has to take care either to win them over or to make them incapable of causing any harm. Information about their characters and the context determine this choice. Doing them favours is the safest way if the malcontents are of noble spirit and are discontented for good reason, which proves them to be honest people. If one is unable to punish a delinquent, favours are a safe means to win time and assuage him. One must be careful enough in choosing them, so that they do not enhance the traitor's power. The best is to appoint him to a sparkling position, which does not confer authority despite its outward prestige, but which removes him from any position where he can do harm. One needs trusted friends who will dissuade each rebel leader from his plans through the most apt inducement. One has to dissimulate the fact [p. 133] that one has uncovered their intentions. But if there is no hope for such conciliation, and if one has enough power, one should not hesitate for a moment to arrest all the ringleaders in one fell swoop without letting even one escape. For what can a blind mob do without its leaders? The trick is to succeed in catching all of them.…

Chapter 4: What to do once an insurgency is under way to end it[33]

[p. 137] §1. As soon as an uprising [*tumulto*] has occurred within a city or a province, the priority has to be to give one's attention to neighbouring provinces, lest the insurrection should spread, as it may well have been planned in more than one town. One has to impose oneself on the most important towns and passes, disrupting the communication between the suspects, if possible, without causing suspicion. One razes all fortifications which one has not yet destroyed and which can pose a threat to one's side. One tries to seize at least some of the initiators of the insurrection and to punish them harshly, but promises mercy and forgiveness to the remaining ones if they calmly return to their homes within a certain time limit. If the conditions allow no dissimulation, one has to take hostage anybody suspected of being an agitator at a predetermined day and hour, in all suspect places within one's control, then conveying them to secure fortresses, where they will be detained with due respect paid to their social standing. One gives them the choice of life or death, reward or punishment, depending on whether they will contribute to bringing about peace or furthering unrest.

[p. 138] Within the area of the insurgency there must still be at least a few loyal vassals with high social standing and fortune. Let them hide their sentiments and try to win the love or the respect of the insurgents, if possible even trying to become their leaders. These might then put to the rebels all the arguments which, although true and well-founded, would not impress these at all if they were made by the government. They should vividly point out the dangers and the few benefits which victory

would bring to the rebels, the self-interest and infidelity of their leaders and the foreign powers that support the unrest. They should separate the aristocracy from the people, and the people from the aristocracy. They should create mutual distrust among the rebels themselves. If the rebels entrust them with a military command in the war, they should lead all the troops under their charge into a trap, where nothing but surrender will save them They should mediate between both sides, whichever way fortune turns.

§2. If one takes up arms to quell an uprising, one must vigorously pursue one's advantage and seek a swift decision. Every day that is wasted will spread the insurrection further and offer new advantages to the enemy. But if one is too weak to act vigorously, one has to win time through negotiations, so that the rebels remain inactive if possible. Meanwhile, one must spread more and more rumours, and make use of all possible deception, to disguise one's own weakness and the strength of the rebels. Once one has gathered one's forces, and no hope for conciliation is left, one must seek battles and large-scale engagements, and avoid small ones. Soon the rebels will lack experienced officers, soon their officers will fight amongst themselves. {In the insurgents' camp}, discipline, weapons and drill are lacking, [p. 139] {their} courage and their hope for reconciliation will wane, where despair has not become a weapon in itself. One will be able to overcome them easily if only one confronts them head-on, but if one turns one's back on them, they will be more terrifying than an army, because they know every path and bridge and even every ambush.

One has to send small, dispersed units of troops against them, supporting these units in turn with whole corps, threaten their rears and flanks, even if only with a handful of men, use cavalry for this purpose, use shock tactics and bayonets, but never engage in long exchanges of fire. That is the only true method to drive them away like sheep….

If one is victorious in combat, one hast to spare the blood of the vanquished. They may be rebels now, but may soon become most loyal subjects. [p. 140] Only those who make a show of obstinacy should be punished severely, but not if the desperation is so great that making a bloody example of them will not deter but make {them crave} revenge. The more aristocrats that were engaged in the insurrection, the less beneficial strict and gruesome punishment will be. But if only the rabble was rioting, violence often helps more than kindliness.

§3. The most dangerous war with rebels is one in which they disperse into several units, and geography is to their advantage. In that case, if one keeps one's own forces in one big unit, one cannot do anything against them, and it becomes difficult to get food or other resources. If by contrast one disperses {one's forces}, the rebels will concentrate {theirs} and attack {our units} separately before they can get help from the others. No matter what one does, one always succumbs, unless one draws one's officers and soldiers from the area itself, or wins the support of the inhabitants.

But even then the affair will be drawn out, and rarely will there be a means other than starvation to capture the rebel leader. If one knows where he is hiding, one must turn on him with all one's forces…and ensure that he does not escape. One must not accept any advice which might save him, one must have permission to look for him everywhere, whoever finds him must receive a great reward; whoever hides him should be sent to the gallows…

[p. 141] §4. If none of these measures succeed in quelling the insurgency, hunger will be the safest resort. One gives out orders which render the rebels helpless, cuts them off from towns and country…The troops will be deployed correspondingly, and officers will strictly enforce the following orders:

1. No one is allowed to leave his district or town in which he lives without a passport. These passports will be issued by the administration of the town, and they contain the name and description of the person who carries it as well as the destination of his journey, his travel route, and an expiry date. The administration of every town through which the traveller passes has to sign the passport, so one can see what is true and what is false.
2. Whoever has no passport will be arrested as soon as he sets foot in the next town. No landlord is allowed to accommodate or host a stranger who is not in the possession of a passport and has to report such strangers to the authorities without delay.
3. No one is allowed to sell guns, ammunition or flints if the buyer cannot present a written permission issued by a specially-appointed officer. The permission will specify the numbers and weight {of weapons and ammunition}.
4. No one, with whatever excuse, is allowed to supply the rebels with money, food, horses, [p. 142] clothes or harnesses. No one is allowed to provide them with information, no one should have anything to do with them, even if they are brothers or sons.
5. If rebels enter the territory of a town, the inhabitants shall inform the nearest forces without delay, ring the alarum bells, light beacons at determined hills, and warn the whole neighbourhood.
6. If officers of the army or the militia are located within a town outside which rebel forces appear, all inhabitants have to obey the orders of the officers, if the officers order them to support them in fighting against the rebels. One should also come to the defence of adjacent towns. If one is not powerful enough to defend the town itself, one has to withdraw from it to occupy heights and passes through which the rebels have to pass on their retreat. Without such a {commanding} officer, the inhabitants are forbidden to go forth to fight, but within their town itself they can counter the enemy's violence with force.
7. Inhabitants have to surrender all their guns to the headquarters. One chooses the best place of the entire town as headquarters: the castle, a good defendable house, a church, a courtyard surrounded by thick walls, and so on. The inhabitants will daily provide one guard, to patrol this post. Sentinels will be deployed around the settlement, and by day on the watchtower. If the

settlement is big, the officers will ensure that its most defensible part of it will be barricaded.

8. All secret meetings will be forbidden. Any inhabitant who knows about them and conceals them will be punished as much as the guilty. [p. 143]
9. The inhabitants of a town must be personally liable for any theft or murder carried out on their territory, as it is assumed that they are friends of the rebels. If they are loyal, one has to give orders that the neighbouring settlements are held responsible…
10. Every town is liable for the life, the freedom and the possessions of officers and civilian personnel who fall into the hands of the rebels due to neglect or malice of the inhabitants.

If all these measures are not enough to prevent the rebels from appearing on the battlefield, because they find the resources to continue the war in unfortified settlements, one must order the inhabitants of these places to evacuate them, taking along their goods and chattels and to take refuge in safe cities where they will be provided for. Above all one must remove all craftsmen who serve the rebels, whether by their own free will or because they are forced to do so, e.g., gun makers, saddlers, blacksmiths and such. One must spoil the mills, tear down the ovens etc. If one can wait that long, one should do so just after the harvest, so that the inhabitants can take their crops with them. Troops will be ordered to protect the inhabitants and to enforce the execution of this order. To protect one's own cities from want, one needs to keep the roads safe, deploy posts alongside them, cut down the forests on both sides [of the roads] up to the range of gunshot, guard all nearby houses, walls, buildings etc., assure the loyalty of the inhabitants, [p. 144] or tear them down. If even this will not bring the rebels to lay down their arms because their friends and relatives support them, one has to arrest the richest and noblest of them all at once, and tell them that they will not get away until specific rebel leaders under their orders surrender. If this happens within a fixed time, all charges will be forgotten. But if that time has passed, these hostages will be held accountable for all damage done by their relatives from this point onwards.

§{5}. As soon as one begins to get the upper hand over the rebels, and suspects that they have become tired of this war, one must again assure them of the mercy of the prince and publicly announce a general pardon. This general pardon must not impose excessively harsh conditions, yet it must not be too conciliatory in granting liberties offering opportunities for new insurrections. The amnesty concerns only men who bear arms, but not women or children, who would otherwise come on their own in order to enjoy the goods of their husbands and fathers, while these continue the war.

The most noble among the rebels must if possible be excluded from the amnesty so that his example will deter; at the very least one must try to remove him from the country, otherwise there will be no reliable calm.

One absolutely avoids any treaties that confer equality to the rebel and his prince. One deprives the country of the privileges which uphold the spirit of the insurrection. If one takes away even more, one must only do so [p. 145] in order to return these {goods and privileges} very soon. One suppresses the belligerent spirit by founding manufactures and {furthering} commerce, through sciences, new schools and universities, and especially by the removal of arms, a ban on all war-like exercises in the countryside, within the cities, and so on.

If one is forced to punish, it has to happen through the sentence of public tribunals, and the crime has to be clear. If one confiscates goods, they must become the reward of subjects who had remained loyal. If one takes away liberties and rights which are not harmful to the state, one must award them to others. One does not investigate things on which one could turn a blind eye: one forgives from the bottom of the heart without any grudge or revenge. One rekindles the courage of the people, and seeks their heart and love.

Chapter 5: About mutinies[34]

Mutinies originate either from a want of money and bread, or from hatred against their officers, or from quarrels with the citizens or among themselves, if the different regiments or ethnic contingents [*naciones*] quarrel because of this or that matter. . . . [p. 362]

OF BATTLES[35]

Chapter 5: About what to do after a victory in battle[36]

§1. It is assumed here that all measures were taken in advance to provide for the army if it moves forward to exploit its victory. The first question is then whether it is more advisable to pursue the enemy's army, or to turn on his provinces, fortresses and magazines, or whether it is possible to do both at the same time. The position of the enemy's army, as well as ours, the nature of the terrain, and the measures that one could take in advance . . . together decide the answer. But one should neither do too much, nor to little, in order not to miss out on certain opportunities which will not recur; one must not prepare the ground for future defeats and the loss of the fruits of victory by undertaking reckless moves.

§2. The enemy's army, closely pursued by us, is either composed and brave, or discouraged, weak and scattered; it is either in retreat or in flight. If the defeated enemy has composure and courage, then the night after the victory is the time [p. 363] most to be feared, because the victor is careless and often in disarray. Even greater is the danger if a

corps of hostile troops which did not suffer in battle remains in vicinity. In that case one has to be extremely vigilant, remain on the battlefield in complete battle formation, keep discipline, successively send out reconnaissance units [*partidas*] as far as possible. One must especially avoid leaving the unbeaten enemy corps out of one's sight, back up all units of special forces which it might attack, guard all roads which lead from the enemy towards us, and arrange to get news of it quickly if he advances, so that he cannot sneak up on us anywhere. Finally one has to inform the troops that the desperate enemy might attack at night, lest they think that they are . . . betrayed if it happens.

Perhaps the enemy has not fled but merely retreated and taken position near the battlefield where one does not want to attack him for a second time. In that case one must ponder his situation, the amount of forage and other resources which are available to him, and from this work out whether he can hold for long in his encampment. If he cannot, one has to try to gain information about the time of his departure through scouts and frequent raiding parties. One must . . . be prepared at all times to set out in pursuit of the enemy. [p. 367]

§4. After the battle, the commanding general has to make arrangements to reward the bravery of the troops and officers. One arranges for the dead to be buried, and honours all liturgical customs. One takes care of the wounded with paternal consideration. The commanding general must visit the field hospital himself, hand out money, talk to the wounded officers and soldiers, investigate . . . most honestly and humanely how the men are treated, and whether no care is omitted. Prisoners will be treated with human kindness. One cares for the women and children of the fallen soldiers, and moves camp soon so that no diseases will break out. One sends the trophies, a report about the battle, and a casualty list to the court. One shall not praise according to rank and descent, but according to merit. One rebukes with circumspection. . . . [p. 368]

§6. The biggest gain of victory is a glorious, beneficial peace. The most opportune moment to bring it about is immediately after a battle won, [p. 369] but one should not be boisterous and impose excessively tough conditions, which the enemy either rejects, or else, if he accepts them, breaks at the first opportunity. During the negotiations one should not sleep or rest, because nothing accelerates the negotiations within the cabinet more than military movements.

If thereupon the government gives leave to the foreigners to depart, one has to ensure that it happens in a way which satisfies them. If {the government} intends to build down the numbers of the indigenous troops excessively, the commanding general has to make use of all his prestige to prevent this. To support his request, he must find ways and means to assure that the army will benefit the State even in times of peace, without being too much of a burden. Improvement of roads, new fortresses, maintenance of old canals, and the construction of new palaces and public

buildings are continuous tasks to occupy the army and preserve it at low costs. The Officers should not experience ingratitude. Some…should be posted among the regiments, according to the length of their service, with full pay. Others…should be given permission to return to their homes with half pay, until they are needed again. That would preserve the military spirit among the nation, and benefit the army even in times of peace.

Chapter 6: About what has to be done after a defeat in battle[37] [p. 370]

§1. One has to save the army, and forestall the enemy's plans: this is the sad business of a general who has lost a battle. Only little can be said about it, making it even harder to perform.

As soon as fortune favors the enemy in battle, the commanding general and all other generals, brigadiers, and heads of regiments must do all to ensure that the retreat will not turn into a flight. Skill and experience teach us to know when the critical moment has come when the battle is lost.…The best is to stage a last courageous attack with those troops which are not yet in disarray, to give those that have already dispersed time to regroup, or to fall back to an advantageous position which will cover the ensuing retreat.

But if the retreat turns into a flight, one must dispatch experienced officers which are known and loved throughout the army in full gallop, so that they can position themselves alongside the roads in order to gather the soldiers in flight, [p. 371] either to guide them back to the battle or at least to persuade them to go to the position to which one wants to retreat. If there is a ford, a bridge or a narrow pass alongside the way, behind which one can take a position without the fear of being surrounded or cut off, the officers will take position here to intercept the enemy in his pursuit. If one neglects to send these officers after the dispersing troops, one may not be able to reassemble them within several months, as the majority of them will be cut down or desert to the enemy.

If the army is broken up to find itself in several different places and forced to retreat in single corps, every general must keep the assembly point of the retreat a secret. He must announce everywhere that his corps is the vanguard of the entire army, so that the inhabitants of the country cannot take action against the stragglers, the hostile general cannot obtain information about the strength of one's column through deserters or spies, nor {figure out} how many troops to dispatch whereto in order to cut them off or defeat them. Often one is forced in such sad cases to end the enemy's pursuit by ravaging the country.…

[p. 372] §3. If loss and defeat are so big as to allow the enemy to pursue even greater goals, one has to investigate all these possible moves,…so as to prevent the enemy from the most decisive ones. [p. 373] If…the enemy is able to undertake a siege of a fortress the defence of which is

important for us to gain time to reinforce our army, one must give the fortress a strong garrison and everything that is necessary for a determined defence. . . . Most importantly, one has to pre-empt the enemy, here as well as at the magazines, so that he does not reach them before us, and make use of the weakness and confusion of the inhabitants and the garrison.

It is conceivable that the victorious army has become too weak, through its losses in battle, to undertake a siege. The siege might be impossible due to other causes, e.g., due to lack of heavy artillery or the season. The victory in battle may not have provided the army with any advantage other than to have thwarted the enemy, obtained mastery over a flat land or the acquisition of better winter cantonments. In all these cases, a defeated army has to remove itself from the victorious army and position itself close to populous towns, where it can recover, find food and replace the lost baggage and artillery.

In order to revive the courage of the army, one must instigate small encounters if one has good hope of their outcome. One should not, however, face the enemy with one's full army before one's troops have regained the stomach for it.

CHAPTER 8

Count de Guibert (1772)

Roger Callois claims that the work of Guibert "by far surpasses that of Clausewitz in terms of lucidness. It foresees, and indeed prescribes . . . what would happen: the transformation of war under the influence of democratic institutions."[1] Indeed, Guibert should be recognized as the father of modern political science, government and strategic studies, as will become apparent from the excerpts in this chapter.

The French general Jean-Bénôit[2] Count de Guibert (1715–1786) and his wife Suzanne Thérèse de Rivail had four children who survived to adulthood, of whom only the oldest was a boy. The Guiberts were of relatively recent nobility: a none-too-distant ancestor had been a cobbler. But the general was himself son of a royal counselor and local administrator at the *cour des aides* at Montauban, and of a noblewoman.[3]

As first names were rarely used at the time, there is some debate about this only son's name, who is variously referred to as Jacques-Antoine Hippolyte,[4] presumed born in 1743, or as François Apolline,[5] born in 1744; if these were indeed two children, and not a confusion, one presumably died in early infancy. In the *Annals* of the Académie Française, our Guibert is remembered as Hippolyte.[6] His friends addressed him as "Guibert" or "*mon ami*" in their letters, so these give us no further clue as to his first name. Both sets of names, and a variation on the first (Hypolyte Jacob), are used in various documents referring to him.[7] On the other hand, his only child, a girl, was called Apolline-Charlotte-Adelaïde, which could indicate that her father was called Apolline.

Young Guibert, as I shall call him, was only 12 or 13 years old when he joined the armed forces, under his father's and the Marshal de Broglie's

patronage. The young boy witnessed the Seven Years' War, fighting against the Prussians under Frederick II, and rising to the rank of captain, while his father became a brigadier and later a major general. Father and son took part in several battles, including Frederick II of Prussia's famous victories at Rossbach and Minden. Guibert's father was taken prisoner at the former and used his forced sojourn in Prussia to study Frederick II's military. Upon his release, the father resumed his position under Marshal de Broglie, and young Guibert seems to have been with him. Young as he was, Guibert the son distinguished himself at the battle of Fillingshausen on July 15, 1761.[8] Young Guibert became a great admirer of Frederick the Great and his style of warfare. And yet he recognized its shortcomings, and dreamt of even more intensive, comprehensive, and decisive campaigns.

Guibert the son wrote down these thoughts on the subject of the art of war and society toward the end of several years of independent study in his early twenties, first at the family home in Fonneuve, north of Montauban, and then in Paris, where he had followed his father, now employed at the Ministry of War. The book he called *General Essay on Tactics,* but it contained far more than what we would think of as tactics today. The Age of Enlightenment saw attempts to rationalize everything—including warfare. While other authors of this age were especially fascinated by the mathematical order that could be brought to the art of warfare, Guibert in his *General Essay* took a different approach. Reflecting on the perfect State, the perfect polity, its perfect domestic order, and its perfect external behavior, he made an impassioned plea for a citizen army, that is, a militia, to replace any paid professional armed forces. The advantages he saw were manifold: The cost would be so much lower for the State if each male citizen was charged with defending his polity, while still remaining a citizen pursuing his normal job in civilian life. If attacked, however, such a citizen army would fight with vigor unmatched by mercenary armies that were not defending their own land, family, or prosperity. Citizen soldiers would be defending their own cause, not that of a feeble government or a dynasty. Accordingly, such an army would pose no threat to its neighbors, for it would only fight if attacked. But if the citizen army was attacked, it would respond in a completely different manner from the armies of the day: nothing would be able to stop such an armed nation before it had completely subdued all its neighbors.

If left to its own devices, then, this perfect State in which citizens defended only the commonwealth, would never become aggressive; rather, it would benefit from trade with other countries, and would become an example to all other nations, which would be inclined to follow it in the pursuit of general, mutual prosperity and peace. Kant, so famous for his "democratic peace," in fact only wrote down his ideas on the subject over two decades later.[9] Either Kant had read Guibert, or else their ideas were engendered separately by the reading of Montesquieu, Voltaire, and others.

Guibert changed his views about crucial aspects of war over time. Just as Clausewitz's after him, Guibert's *volteface* would concern intensive, large-scale, major war on the one hand and limited war on the other. Guibert, however, saw this distinction a good half century before Clausewitz had his revelation. Guibert only knew the more limited form of war, but imagined a more intensive, large-scale, and above all, decisive, form—a quarter century before the French Revolution invented the *levée en masse.* For this reason, the historian Guigliemo Ferrero has called Guibert "the spiritual father of the military reforms of the {French} Revolution,"[10] and others have called him its "prophet."[11]

Guibert certainly contributed decisively to the mind-set that created French Revolutionary and Napoleonic warfare: his *General Essay* created quite a stir when it was first published anonymously in London in 1772, and the demand was such that it was reprinted several times. In the year after its first publication, critiques began to appear.[12] In turn, in 1779, Guibert published a refutation of the main points of criticism leveled against the *General Essay,* called *Defense of the Modern System of War or Refutation of the System Proposed by Mr. M. de D.,*[13] the latter referring to one of his critics, François-Jean de Mesnil-Durand.

In the years between the completion of his *General Essay* in 1769 and its publication in 1772, Guibert had gained more military experience in Corsica; thereafter, he traveled to watch military exercises of the armed forces of Frederick II of Prussia and of Maria Theresa and Emperor Joseph II of Austria. He had lively contacts with many intellectuals of his age, from Voltaire[14] to d'Alembert, editor of the great *Encyclopedia.* Well placed with his father rising to the rank of lieutenant general and becoming governor of the Invalides in Paris in 1782, Guibert worked as a defense official under successive ministers of war and finance, from 1775 to 1788. Guibert was charged with devising reforms of the French military apparatus, from recruitment to financing, which informed his later publications.[15] He was appointed principal rapporteur of the War Council, rising to the rank of a brigadier.[16] When the French Revolution broke out, however, the revolutionary Military Committee that succeeded the War Council abolished practically all the changes Guibert had designed.[17] When his career as an official ended, Guibert unsuccessfully tried to have himself elected to the General Estates (Parliament) in March 1789. Guibert withdrew to his estate and wrote his last work with a specific focus on civil-military relations. Called *On the Public Force in All Its Dimensions,* it had only recently gone to press when Guibert died from an illness in May 1790 at age 46 or 47. Had he lived, the prophet of French Revolutionary warfare might well have ended on the guillotine: Guibert had competitors and enemies, and in his latest work showed that his Revolutionary ardour had diminished somewhat—after all, he favored a constitutional monarchy, not a full republic.[18]

On the Public Force—addressing the means by which the State uses force in the public interest—is perhaps as important as his *General Essay.* In

On the Public Force, Guibert no longer described the limitations on war under the Ancien Régime as decadent, but as positive. While earlier he had been the advocate of a citizen army (militia), he now praised professional armies. He seems to have taken in some of the criticism leveled against his *General Essay,* such as the warnings by General de Warney about a militia.[19] Guibert added further considerations of his own: Were not the soldier and the civilian citizen two opposites? In *On Public Force,* he postulated that professional soldiers should be denied the citizen rights of voting for a parliament or standing for elections, and a militia should not have the right to bear arms in peace time.

The following excerpts are from the *General Essay on Tactics* and from *On the Public Force.* For the first, the translation by Lieutenant Douglas is used extensively; the second has been translated for this book.[20] The majority of the excerpt from the *General Essay* is the prologue; what is omitted are long discourses on the European political situation in Guibert's times, and the main body of the book, concerning infantry, cavalry, and light forces' tactics, and a treatise on the artillery. The pagination of both excerpts refers to the 1977 French edition by Jean-Paul Charnay.

* * *

Anon. [Jacques Antoine Hippolyte Comte de Guibert]: *Essai général de Tactique* (London: chez les libraires associés, 1772), repr. in Comte de Guibert: *Stratégiques*, with an introduction by Jean-Paul Charnay (Paris: Herne, 1977); trans. Lieutenant Douglas: *A General Essay onTactics* (Whitehall: J. Millar: 1781).

TO MY COUNTRY [p. 132]

To dedicate my work to my country is at once consecrating it to the King, who is its father; to ministers, its administrators; to all ranks of the State, its members; to the people, its children. May the day be near . . . when national praise will be justly proclaimed by the perfect union of all who compose the State! May the ruler and his subjects, the high and low degrees of the community, with one accord, feel themselves honoured with the title of citizens; unite, and support each other by his example! This confederation of hearts, and all power, would complete my wish for its prosperity and happiness. . . . It is unjust to accuse philosophy of reducing patriotism. On the contrary, {philosophy} ennobles it, and stops it from degenerating into pride. Enlightened by {philosophy}, the citizen without fanaticism is a friend to his nation, and he harbours no hate or contempt for the rest of mankind. He yearns for the prosperity of his country and he would not want his happiness to be founded on the slavery and misfortunes of the neighbouring States. He loves all mankind as his equals, and if he inclines to favour his countrymen, by a sentiment of partiality, it is that which one

brother has for another. It is that sort of patriotism that inspires my heart! I can then be useful to my fellow citizens, and not displeasing to strangers. I can write for my country, and be read by the rest of Europe. . . .

PRELIMINARY DISCOURSE [p. 134]

Part I.

A Review of modern Politics; their Parallel with those of the Ancients; their Defects; the Obstacles which they occasion to the Grandeur and Riches of a State.

If we understand by Politics, the art of negotiating, or rather of intrigue; of fomenting revolutions in secret; of binding or breaking, the obscurity of cabinets, treaties of alliance, of peace, of marriage {alliances}, or of commerce; in that respect we are, without doubt, superior to the Ancients, we have much more finesse and understanding than they. But if Politics be that sublime and vast science of governing a State internally and externally, of directing its private interests towards the general welfare; of rendering the subject happy, and of attaching him to its mode of government, then {it is} . . . unknown to our modern administrators . . .

I am not a blind admirer of the Ancients, . . . {but} I admire the Roman polity in its successful days . . . {W}hat a striking contrast do the Politics of Europe present to a philosophical mind, predisposed to contemplate them: tyrannical, ignorant, or weak administrations! . . .

[p. 137] The impossibility of any kingdom extending its domains by conquest is not due entirely to the vigilance it exacts over the conduct of its neighbours, or to the intercourse and correspondence of courts, or to the balance of power established throughout Europe. Rather, it is due to their {equality} in customs and constitutions that all of them are contained in their reciprocal spheres, by the weakness . . . of their governments.

Today the States have neither treasure, nor a population surplus. Their expenditure in peace is already beyond their income. Still, they wage war against each other. One goes to war with armies which one can neither {afford to} recruit, nor pay. Victor or vanquished, both are almost equally exhausted {at the end of a war}. The mass of the national debt increases. Credit decreases. Money is lacking. The fleets do not find sailors, armies lack soldiers. The ministers, on one side and on the other, feel that it is time to negotiate. Peace is concluded. Some colonies or provinces change hands. Often the source of the quarrels has not dried up, and each side sits on the rubble, busy paying his debts and keeping his armies on alert {in preparation for the next campaign}.

Imagine, that a people will arise in Europe, with genius, with power, and a happy form of government, that combines the virtues of austerity and a national militia with a fixed plan for expansion, that it does not lose sight of

this system, that, knowing how to make war at little expense and to live off its victories, it would not be forced to put down its arms for reasons of economy. One would see that people subjugate its neighbors, and overthrow our weak constitutions, just as the fierce north wind bends the slender reeds....

[p. 138] Such a people will never spring up, because in Europe there is no nation new and powerful. All are ... corrupted and resemble each other. They have all of them forms of government that are inimical to every sentiment of virtue and patriotism. When corruption has made such progress ... it is then next to impossible to hope for regeneration; for the place from whence it would come would be the very focus of that evil....

If Europe no longer fears ... blood and ignorance; if the vices, which undermine all governments, seem to create a kind of balance between them, her countries, ... weak and corrupted as they are, do not enjoy greater tranquillity. For such are their miserable ... Politics, that they are continually divided by fallacious interests of trade or ambition. Despite treaties which pacify them, there remain ever amongst them some seeds of altercation, which, after a certain periodical truce, cause them to rise again in arms against each other.... [p. 139] The fancies and ingenuity of ministers, the vain and silly etiquette, the petty intrigues {of} our negotiations, will soon provide them with a pretext. In short, such is the kind of war adopted by all nations, which consumes their forces, and never puts an end to their quarrel. Conqueror or conquered each in peace returns to his former boundaries. Thus war, hardly fearful to governments, is more frequent. They are frightened champions, covered with wounds, and always in arms, they exhaust their strength in watching each other's motions, now and then attacking ..., rendering battles ineffectual, like themselves; they lie down when they bleed, and agree on a truce to wash the blood from their wounds.

Amongst these people, whose weakness eternizes their disputes, there might be more decisive wars which would shake empires.... The different forms of government are the reason why it unfolds more slowly in some and more rapidly with others. The evil becomes more or less dangerous depending on the qualities of those men who govern. In one place, wholesome institutions, an enlightened sovereign, a vigorous minister, is as a dyke or impediment against bribery and corruption; it winds up the springs of government, and obliges the State, at the summit of the wheel, to turn back once more. Consequently government, sovereign, minister, all weak and corrupt, will all slacken, and the State, with a speed multiplied by its weight, will descend rapidly to its ruin....

[p. 144] ... By Politics I mean the art of governing a State in such a manner that the subjects may be happy, the State powerful, and respected by its neighbours; when considered in that extensive point of light it becomes the most interesting science; from thence Politics is naturally divided into two parts, *domestic* and *foreign* Politics.

The first is the foundation of the second. All that belongs to the happiness and strength of a people falls under the first {category}: laws,

manners, customs, preconceived opinions, national spirit, justice, police, population, agriculture, trade, revenues of the nation, expenses of government, duties, application of their produce: they must view all these with genius and reflection: Domestic Politics must rise above these to perceive those general interrelations and influences between them. Domestic Politics must then look closely at them to observe them in every detail, while not allowing itself to be preoccupied with one at the expense of the rest. For in Politics, that which makes one branch flourish early, perhaps too early, very often drains a neighbouring one of its saps, or even another branch at a greater distance. In short, Domestic Politics must direct from above all the elements of the administration; and to effect that, it must create one system of directives with its eyes continually fixed upon it to determine the operations required, and to see whether the result of those operations concurs with the execution of the general plan.

While Domestic Politics thus prepares and perfects every means internally, Foreign Politics examines what weight and consideration the result of those means can give to a State externally . . . {Foreign Politics} must be acquainted with every kind of relation influencing its own country with the interests of others. It must distinguish illusive and supposed interests from those that are real and permanent, those alliances which are ephemeral and ineffectual, from those useful and solid bonds that the topography of countries dictates, or the respective advantage of their contractors. {Foreign Politics} must afterwards calculate what military force a State requires to make its neighbours respect it, to give weight to its negotiations. {Foreign Politics} should structure their military force in relation to the spirit and power of the country, in such a way that it is not too great for its means, or else it would exhaust the State, and give it a factitious and ruinous power. {Foreign Politics} should instil into the armed forces the best understanding, the greatest valour, the most consummate discipline, because then they can be less numerous, and with this reduction of numbers less burdensome to the subjects. . . . I hear Domestic Politics . . . thus speaking to Foreign Politics; "I now put into your hand a flourishing, happy, and powerful country; its lands fertile; its income exceeding by far its exigencies; its population [p. 145] numerous and thriving; the laws revered; the manners pure; the vices ashamed to show themselves; virtue prevalent, and only waiting to be employed. Finish this great work I have begun, make that State respected externally, which I make happy and prosperous internally; give a just value to that spirit of patriotism . . ., the germ of whose warlike virtues I have planted in every heart! Raise generous defenders so that those rich harvests that they produce, as far as not absorbed by my taxes, may not be devoured by foreign armies. Call all foreigners into our ports, open the doors for trade, make alliances valuable, make {our State} renowned for its arms and not its ambition."

Domestic Politics having thus prepared a State, with what ease can Foreign Politics form the system to defend its own interests externally, by the

raising of a respectable military power! How easy it is to have invincible armies, in a State where its subjects are citizens, where they cherish and revere the government, where they are fond of glory, where they are not intimidated at the idea of toiling for the general good! How a nation, once powerful by her interior resources, would be respected externally! How her negotiations, by diminishing their complicated nature, would acquire weight! How her mode of concluding them might become free and open! It is the folly of all our governments to practise in their negotiations so much obliqueness and little faith. It is that which foments disorder in a State, which reciprocally endeavours to corrupt the members of the administration. It is that which makes the nations watchful of one another, vying amongst themselves, bargaining for and purchasing peace, mutually creating troubles and distress. It is that which creates base and dangerous rivals of every kind; that perpetual encroachment of the trade of one nation on the trade of another; those laws of prohibition, those privileges which exclude the foreigner; those treaties which favor one country to the disadvantage of the other; those chimerical calculations of the balance of exports and imports; vile and complicated methods which never did, even by those who employed them with the greatest skill…, add the least to the increase of government. In a word, it is the folly of our governments that make us jealous of the prosperity of other nations, desirous either to weaken or corrupt them. {It is} policies like these which they employ that make themselves impotent, and corrupt their own subjects; Politics quite opposite to those of a good government, who, without seeking to act contrary to the prosperity and strength of its neighbors endeavors to rise above them, by its vigour and her virtues.

In like manner it is the weakness of our governments, which renders our military constitutions so imperfect and so ruinous. Not being able to compose our armies with citizens, men who have a zeal for service, and are soldiers not merely for the sake of gain, weak governments make them numerous and burdensome. Not knowing how to reward them with honor, weak governments pay them with money alone. Not being able to rely on the courage and fidelity of the subject, because he is disaffected…, they employ [p. 146] foreign auxiliary forces.…{Weak governments} extinguish every military virtue in a State, not…suffering it to develop amongst the troops, fearful, lest from thence it should spread amongst the civilians, and arm that power…against the abuses which oppress it.…

This {Political} Science, considered from the point of view I have presented, has not been treated in any kind of work whatsoever. It is no principal object of any man's education, and is not even the subject of curious{ity-driven} research of any individual. Therefore those whom fortune has placed at the head of administrations are not qualified to be statesmen. They have more or less studied a few aspects of administration; those of more consequence are entirely unknown to them. Their orders are issued forth as chance directs, and according to long-established routine. The study which they have made of a few branches of administration

{ignores} the rest; for this reason, those they are well acquainted with, appear in their ideas the only ones that are important, the only ones that are permitted. They simply occupy themselves with those alone, excluding those they have no abilities or perseverance to grasp; and of course the latter is then necessarily abandoned to a subaltern. It may be conceived as impossible that the mind of one man is capable of embracing every part of so extensive a science. . . .

[p. 147] Note that when Politics becomes more perfect, its difficulty is greatly diminished: the imperfection of a science almost always adds to its difficulty. The obscurity of ignorance, the sophisms of prejudice throw their thick veil over its principles. By making it complicated, they multiply its difficulties. They think therefore by that means to make amends for its insufficiencies. The basis of all their operations being faulty, erroneous consequences increase every day as they jar against each other. Soon there springs up a theory, a thousand times more interwoven and more perplexing, than the linking of those truths would be which are regularly adopted by science. It is more especially in Politics, where the consequences of every deviation are so rapid and fatal. When that science shall be redressed and remodelled; when, like justice and virtue, it fixes its principles on a sure and immutable foundation, it will become simple, and enlighten that nation which is under its influence. It will cast off all those insignificant methods of detail, those supplements, those palliatives, whose imbecility has overcharged and corrupted every part of the administration. In proportion as a State is well constituted, as it acquires more real power, it will be more easily governed. States that are weak, and whose constitutions are defective, are always victims of trifling incidents, and every reverse of fortune. They are fearful of the most trivial internal agitation, and the rumour of every external attack. Goaded by the Politics of their neighbours, they are almost always obliged to act in a contrary sense to their true interests: . . . they preserve a precarious and languishing existence. They are like {ships,} weak structures, trusted to the uncertainty of the wide bottom of the sea. Constantly obliged to . . . manoeuvre, hold a course quite opposite to their line of direction, avoiding every vessel they meet . . . endeavouring to get onto their course again. A menacing cloud alarms them, a breaking wave may bury them in its devouring gulf, a rock dashes them to pieces.

It would not be thus with a State really powerful and well constituted, . . . because it is proper to distinguish that power which arises from the happy proportion and constitution of its parts, from that appearance of power which is founded on too great an extent of possessions, on the vain parade of momentary triumph; on the superior abilities of one great man, or, in a word, on all which is liable to be shaken and of no duration. Such a State might be governed without difficulty, [p. 148] its Foreign Politics might be stable and uniform. It would fear nothing from the threats or preparations of its neighbours; it would enter into no proceedings against them. Externally, it would acquire respect, by its formidable power and

moderation; an active loyal soldiery would be vigilant on its frontiers. Internally, a numerous and virtuous people would be prosperous. Of what signification would be the machinations and intrigues of other powers, the tempers of their rulers, or the destructive wars which harass and tear them to pieces? Such a State would not be jealous of their great riches, envious of their conquests or anxious in disturbing them in their remote settlements. For a State grown weak and impotent by {over-}extending itself, its distant colonies, though they furnish a supply of luxury to trade, entertain and encourage vice in the capital, that if happier than their mother country, they might draw all the nutritious quality from her breast; sooner or later {the colonies} fortify against, and detach themselves from the…metropolis that wishes to subjugate them excessively. {Therefore, the perfect State would} not encroach upon the commerce {of the colonies}. {The perfect State} needs no complicated regulations, no troublesome treaties, no fictitious or pretended calculations of the balance of power. It foresees that its opulence will attract its foreign exchanges; that, provided the openings are made smooth and practicable, they necessarily will come in of their own accord. At the entry of its seaports, before the barriers of its frontiers, these words would be inscribed as the motto of its trade: *Liberty, Safety, Protection.*

These open portals are only shut against luxury and vice; those fatal poisons introduce themselves by stealth. No contraband trade is ever carried on, but where there are ready purchasers, or where the objects are prohibited by the tyrannical measures of government, or the avaricious extortions of the exchequer, or when that government, weak and of no consequence, loudly proclaims its prohibition yet tolerates or favours it in secret. Domestic Politics will be vigilant, firm and resolved; public opinion will proscribe luxury and vice. The harmony, or unanimous contentedness of the nation, will consider them as the only scourge of its happiness and prosperity.

This State will seldom want to negotiate {over differences} with its neighbours. The interest and connexion of other nations will be of relative indifference to it. It will have learnt the secret of rendering its prosperity independent. Perhaps it might not need to employ ambassadors at foreign courts. But instead of them, it would send talented men to visit other States, not to learn from the observations they have made the wretched art of harming and destroying their neighbours, nor to sketch their sea coasts and fortified towns, nor to spy and make remarks on their motions, the secret transactions of their cabinets, or to bribe and corrupt the members of their government; but, openly and without disguise study the people, their arts and sciences, their manners, their defects, the good and the evil, afterwards to give everywhere an advantageous idea of the nation, to show themselves modest, instructed, virtuous, as the industrious bees carry the sweet extract of mellifluous flowers to their own hive, so they afterwards shall convey to their country the produce of that knowledge which they have gleaned for the public good. In return, {this State} should

welcome strangers, and receive them without jealousy and without distrust: it should not fear their visits to its seaport towns, its fortifications, its troops. It is only the effects of [p. 149] weakness, or ambition, which hide these things from public inspection. Without mistrust or ostentation, a powerful and well-constituted government displays its means, its domestic force; its roads, its towns, its cultivated countries, its people, so it permits them to be seen, certain that a public display of its resources will make its friendship fought for and the power of its arms respected.

The State I am speaking of will have its possessions so close to each other,[21] so well proportioned to the means of its defence that it will never have to fear the hostile design of its neighbors. In such a State the centre cannot be distinguished from the extremities; all parts will equally flourish. . . . Each will have between them a communication so easy, an equality so great in its interests, that most of its strength would be assembled in the endangered area. Its soldiery would be hardy, brave, superior to its neighbours, its citizens happy and interested in the defence of their prosperity: would you come and attack such men with mercenaries, with bodies of troops constituted as they are nowadays all over Europe?

If . . . in spite of its moderation, {this model State} is offended in its subjects, in its territories, in its honor, then it is fit time to commence hostilities. But when it has resolved {to do so, it} must engage with all its effort of combined power; it must engage with a firm and determined resolution not to admit of a cease-fire before it has received a reparation proportional to the offence. Its mode of war would not be like that which is adopted nowadays by other States. It would not conquer merely for the sake of dominion. It would enter on {temporary military} expeditions, rather than establishing settlements. Terrible in its anger, it would carry fire and sword against its enemy. It will intimidate, by its vengeance, every nation which may be desirous of troubling its tranquility, and not call those reprisals barbarous, in violation of those pretended laws in war, which are founded on the law of nature. Let an enemy come and insult these happy and pacific people, they will rise justly incensed, and quit their tranquil habitation. Should they be driven to extremes, they will spill the last drop of their blood to obtain satisfaction; they will be avenged, they will ensure to themselves, by the fire, the splendour of their vengeance, a future and lasting peace [*repos*]. This justice, temperate, attentive to the prevention of crimes, once an offence is committed, knows to be inexorable in its revenge, when it has overtaken the culprit, lets the sword fall on his neck, and by a well-timed example, prevents all those setting out on a path of wickedness from the temptation of becoming criminals.

This State, vigilant in reprehending injuries, would not be allied to any nation for political reasons, but it would entertain friendly commerce with all. It would always be presenting them with fresh assurances of peace. If possible, it would endeavour to be the mediator of their differences, but not because of its own interests, not with a design to profit by its mediation,

not on account of the chimerical calculations of the balance of power. I have already described how indifferent it would be to all the intrigues [*combinaisons*] of modern Politics. Peace being a well-known good,…{this perfect State} will offer itself as arbitrator. For war disrupts the happy communications which should exist between the people; and in this respect, in like manner as the shocks of [p. 150] earthquakes are felt beyond their limits, so {war} is injurious to contiguous States. {Our State} will say to its neighbours, "O people! O my brothers! Why do you tear yourselves to pieces? What false imaginary Politics has thus deceived you, and made you go astray? Nations were never created to be enemies to each other. They are branches of the same family. Come then, and profit from studying my prosperity. Come and gather knowledge, acquaint yourselves with my mode of government, bring me yours in return. I do not fear that my neighbors become happy and powerful. The more they are so, the more they will be fond of peace, knowing that a universal peace is produced by public happiness."

Part II. [p. 152]

A Review of the Art of War, since the beginning of the World. The present Situation of that Science in Europe. A comparison with what it formerly has been. The necessary relation of military establishments with political Constitutions. The defects of all our modern governments in this respect.

It is melancholy to think that the first art which man invented was that of destroying his fellow-creature; and…that ever since the beginning of ages, more schemes have been put into practice to the disadvantage of the human species than to render it happy. The various passions of man originating with the world, engendered war. Thence arose the desire to vanquish and massacre with more success, what we in short call Military Art. Initially…it was simply man against man, the art in taking advantage of each other's manual strength and activity. {Initially} humans were confined to wrestling, boxing, of the use of a few unwieldy weapons. When societies were created…in combination, men's power and means grew, as {societies} assembled a greater number of men. {The Art of War} was then as it is today amongst the Asiatics, an undigested, unformed, collection of knowledge, which scarce merits to be called science. When ambitious people rose in the world, however, {this Art}, improved by them, became the instrument of their glory. Under their government {this Art} determined the destiny of a people; it either ruined or supported empires; finally, it was preferred to other arts and sciences by every country, but by degrees, as each {country} grew, so {the Art} became neglected.

Let us trace Military Art through all its revolutions; we shall discover it successively running over various parts of the globe, giving {others} in

turn glory and superiority over that people by whom it was {originally} cultivated, shunning rich and educated nations. As the soul possessed a greater portion of energy and courage amongst those who were rustic and poor, it therefore took up its residence amongst them. . . .

[p. 155] The discovery of gunpowder added nothing to the perfection of Military Art. . . . Fire-arms apparently retarded the progress of Tactics . . .

{The reformers of the 17th century} cited the Ancients on every occasion, never perceiving the two-thousand-year gap between us and them, and what necessity there was to have other principles, on account of arms, constitution, and more especially the mentality [*ames*] being no longer what they had been before. . . .

[p. 159] . . . Military Art today, compared to what it was in former ages, in the most enlightened times of Antiquity, has become more extensive and complex {on account of larger armies, the mathematics of artillery and fortifications, logistics . . .}.

[p. 160] Even if somebody . . . had embraced the whole extent of the military system of the Ancients, and done well in commanding fifteen or twenty thousand Greeks or Romans, that person . . . would not in our era be in the least degree qualified for the study which this modern military system requires. He would find his capacity absorbed by the perplexing variety of details, his eyes blinded by the sheer size, his senses stupefied by the numbers. He would have to regulate the movements of a hundred thousand men, assure their subsistence, all the obstacles produced by poor constitutions, . . .

Modern Military Science {*sic!*} in becoming more perfect would approach true principles, and could become both simpler and more difficult. . . . [p. 161] But to finish the comparison of Military Art amongst the Ancients, . . . there are important points fundamental to Military Art, . . . in regard to which both the Greeks and Romans were greatly superior to us. One was the means by which their governments formed good citizens, soldiers, and generals. Another was the quality of their militia, the vigour of their discipline, the martial education of their youth, the kind of reward and punishment employed; . . . another was the important link between their military and political constitutions.

This seems without interest to our modern governments. Not one has calculated the number and constitution of its troops relative to the population of its territories, the system of its polities, the national genius of the subject. In none of them [p. 162] is the profession of a soldier respected . . ., does its youth receive a military education, do laws inspire courage, foes to effeminacy; is the nation prepared, by its customs and its preferences, to form a vigorous and well-disciplined soldiery. Even in a military State, called thus because its ruler is both warlike and skilful and because it has expanded through military power . . ., even in such a State, which can only preserve its conquest by that power, the troops are not

of more vigorous constitution elsewhere. They are not citizens, they are nothing more than in other countries, a muster of unreliable mercenaries, errant vagabonds, strangers, who by infidelity or necessity have been forced to take refuge under their colours, and where they are detained by the effect of a rigid discipline; a discipline, steady and active in some respects, relaxed and inadequate in others.... [p. 164] If, while the rest of the sciences are becoming ever more perfect, war remains in its infancy, this must be attributed to the fault of governments, who do not accord it sufficient importance, who do not include it in public education, who do not strive to direct towards that profession men of genius and application, who suffer them to fancy that more glory and advantage is to be found in frivolous and less useful sciences, who render the career of the military a hated and ungrateful one, where talents are pushed forward by intrigue, and rewards distributed according to the superiority of fortune and interest.

In short, if a people goes soft, becomes corrupted, despising the profession of a soldier, forgetting all the necessary labour attached to him; if a nation is abased to this shameful degree, if "Fatherland" [*Patrie*] becomes a meaningless word; if her defenders are but contemptible, wretched and badly constituted mercenaries, indifferent to the success or reverse of war (it is by this defect of manners and constitution, that all the military power of the Ancients has decayed, and by which circumstance all our modern military establishments are ruined) it is still the mistake of government. For a solid good government consists in being vigilant over the manners, the opinions, the prejudices, the bravery of the people. With virtue, good example, a proper sense of honor, and a just distribution of punishment, this government would prevail over luxury, abuses, [p. 165] vices, passions, and the most inveterate corruption.... {L}et it show the people {the dangers}, let it assume their leadership and guide them. {The people} would be all the readier to follow it with submissiveness and gratitude, as in being better instructed, they would understand better the good which is prepared for them, the danger from which they been saved, and the prosperity towards which they are conducted....

{T}he military success of a country depends, more than is imagined, on its system of Politics...

GENERAL ESSAY ON TACTICS

Section II. [p. 182]

Definition of the Tactics, their Division; their present State.

...{T}he Greeks were {perhaps} the first people who encoded the art of constituting troops into principles and dogmas,...{as} the name of that

science originates from a Greek word.... {Undeniably} the arms and precepts of France have set the tone for almost a century now, when almost all the technical terms of war are culled from our language....

In the eyes of most military persons, Tactics appear to be only a branch of war: to mine they are the foundation of that science, since they teach how to constitute troops, appoint, put in motion, and afterwards to fight them; they are the resource both of great and small armies, since they alone can make up for deficiencies of numbers, and govern [p. 183] multitudes. They finally comprise the experience of men, armies, terrain, and circumstances; because it is the united knowledge of Tactics, which should determine their movements. Tactics ought to be divided in two parts; the one elementary and limited, the other composite and sublime.

The first contains all detail of formation, instruction and exercise of a battalion, squadron, or regiment. On this subject, we have so many rules pronounced by sovereigns, subaltern systems, and a great diversity of opinions. It is this which at present agitates our spirits, and will continue to do so...for all trifling details come within the scope of every man's genius because national inconstancy...changes principle according to fashion, and because innovations have become the surest means of acquiring reputation and fortune.

The second part is, properly speaking, the *science of the generals.*[22] It contains every great occurrence of war, such as the movements of armies, orders of marches, and of battles; it rests its whole force on that alone, and includes both the science of the choice of positions, and the knowledge of the country, because both share the aim of determining better how to deploy the troops. It covers the science of fortification; since its works should be always constructed for the service of troops...It has a connection with artillery, whose manoeuvres...must be concerted with the movement and position of armies, for the artillery is only a support for them. This part is of itself everything, since it contains the art of conveying action to troops, and because all other parts are only secondary. Without the assistance of {the science of the general}, he would have no object to decide upon, or only to produce embarrassment....

Section III. [p. 185]

Influence which the Genius, Government and Arms of a Nation, has over Tactics.

Formerly every nation had its arms, Tactics, and particular constitution, because the people, more separated from each other, had a genius, government, and customs peculiar to themselves. This difference of arms and genius must of course account for the variations in the ordinances of every country....

[p. 186]…Now that all the peoples of Europe are, so to speak, mixed… because of the similarity of the principles of their governments, customs, politics, travels, arts and sciences; those national prejudices which used to separate them no longer exist. Thus characteristic impressions have been wiped out…, those traits, in which national genius lies, which are as much the result of customs and government, as of physical disposition and climate….

[p. 187]…Today indeed all the nations of Europe model themselves on one another. But it is in the constitutions and military methods that this similarity is most general, and more conspicuous. All military manners in this part of the world have the same arms and the same ordinance, except for the Turks, who by their opinions and religion are separated from us. It may be because {the nations of Europe} have the same level of understanding and knowledge {of the art of war}, that they have found the superiority of fire arms over the missile weapons of the Ancients, and so copied from each other. Or else it may be because they are become effeminate, inactive, unskilled and inexpert in the exercises of the body, that they have unanimously given the preference to weapons, which require less courage, force, and skill in its execution. Or it may be, as noted before, that their ordinance is determined by the existing weapons troops are armed with anyway, so that all military ordinances are the same.

Today all the troops of Europe have, with small differences, the same constitutions, which is to say…constitutions…which are based neither on honor nor on patriotism. All armies are composed of the most infamous and wretched part of the populace, strangers, vagabonds, the outcasts of nations, who, for the slight motive of interest or discontent, are ready to desert their banners. These are the armies…raised by government, but not those of a nation. The only exceptions are the Swedish troops, and the militias of Switzerland and England. Though it boasts of being a free republic, {England} has been frequently seen to make use of its troops against its own peoples' liberty and rights, owing to the court, which disposes of every post and reward.

…{T}he Ancients' method of making war was much better adapted for making nations brave and warlike. At that time conquered enemies experienced the greatest misery. They were frequently slain, or else dragged to linger out their lives in the most debasing slavery. The idea of full barbarous treatment impressing their minds with the greatest dread must necessarily have induced them to improve their discipline, through all kind of military exercise. War in such a case would naturally be rendered the first and most useful profession. Today, all of Europe is civilized. Wars have become less barbarous and cruel. Outside combat, blood is no longer shed. Towns are no longer destroyed. The countryside is no longer ravaged. The vanquished people are only asked to pay some form of tribute, often less exacting than the taxes that they pay to their sovereign. [p. 188] Spared by their conqueror, their fate does not become worse {after a defeat}. All the

States of Europe govern themselves, more or less, according to the same laws and according to the same principles. As a result, necessarily, the nations take less interest in wars. The quarrel, whatever it is, isn't theirs. They regard it simply as that of the government. Therefore, the support for this quarrel is left to mercenaries, and the military is regarded as a cumbersome group of people and cannot count itself among the other groups within society. As a result, patriotism is extinct, and bravery is weakening as if by an epidemic. Half the inhabitants of Europe are artisans, who are for the most part unmarried, who therefore have no tie to fix them to that ground on which they gain their existence, hence this dangerous maxim: *Ubi bene, ibi patria.*[23] "The Plague is in Provence; I care not"; say these cosmopolites, "I'll go and live in Normandy." "War is at this time threatening Flanders, I abandon this frontier to those who are willing to defend them and I go in search of peace to some more distant country. I carry with me a trade, my fortune, and excellence; every soil produces nurture for man, and the same sun shines throughout the universe."

. . . {T}he fate of countries now depends on despicable and ill-constituted mercenary troops, who are not excited to bravery by any glorious motive whatsoever, gaining nothing by conquest, nor losing anything by defeat. Since these defects do so recently exist, and cannot possibly be remedied but by the entire changing of our form of governments, let us then seek, [p. 189] in the light of our experience and knowledge, all the remedies for this evil, and let us endeavour to replace the decline of our constitution and bravery, by the perfection of {the} Art {of War}.

* * *

Jacques-Antoine Hippolyte de Guibert: *De la Force publique*[24] *considérée par tous ses rapports* (Paris: Didot l'aîné, 1790), rept. in Comte de Guibert: *Stratégiques*, with an introduction by Jean-Paul Charnay (Paris: Herne, 1977), pp. 567–638.

CHAPTER 1

On Public Force in general. The division of Public Force into two forces, one for external use, one for domestic use [p. 572]

A nation's public force has the aim to contribute to general security, on the one hand against internal disorder, on the other hand against external enemies. . . . [p. 573]

Here are the tasks of a public force for external use: to maintain a rank, rights, national dignity among the strongly armed great powers, to preserve the frontiers and coasts or an immense development and far-flung colonies, to maintain political relations, even if we would imagine them in future purged of all spirit of intrigue and ambition.

Here are the considerations that must…influence a public force for domestic use: to contain in the necessary order and harmony all the parties of a great country and a vast administration; to ensure observation of all laws, to guarantee all property and to protect all individual liberties; to strengthen a nascent constitution and to defend it in the long term against prejudices, resentment and perhaps even against {hostile} campaigns.

CHAPTER 2

On the external use of force

A regular and permanent army is needed against foreign enemies, which may, if necessary, be deployed beyond frontiers.…[p. 574] At present, hostilities between great peoples can take place at all four corners of the earth over trade and colonies…

{I}t takes young, robust men to devote themselves to such a duty and to all the opportunities it may offer; men who could and would let their homes out of their sight. It takes men free of other functions or pressing and urgent obligations towards society. It takes men who bind themselves to the duty they embrace from beginning to end, in a voluntary contract of at least a few years.

For this army to have all the qualities which can ensure its successes and compensate its costs, it has to be rigorously disciplined, trained and capable, as foreign armies possess these advantages, and those must be offset. A good army is valuable in yet another way; the better it is, the smaller it may be in number, and the lesser burden it is to the nation. For training and discipline to be in force in the army, they have to become the army's principal activity, its habit and its glory.

But principles fundamental for discipline, and convictions that make up the military spirit, are necessarily and by nature opposed to all principles of good citizenship. Soldiers must have a thirst for war, and citizens a love of peace. Equality and freedom are the citizen's rights. Subordination and passive obedience are the soldier's duties. Soldiers cannot have the same tribunals, the same sentences nor the same role models [*objets d'émulation*] as citizens. Soldiers must have *esprit de corps* and professional spirit. Citizens must only have a public and national spirit.

In the present state of Europe and the Art of War, to desire a citizen army thus means intending to bring together heterogeneous principles and elements. It means attempting to create something which does not exist in any modern nation, something the Ancients, who were most sensitive to liberty, have never undertaken. Once citizens were enrolled, enlisted, or even temporarily conscripted, their status and citizens' rights were suspended. They passed under the yoke of military discipline; and what a discipline, compared with ours! Its wonders and rigors astonish our weak imaginations.

It is perhaps more feasible to turn citizens into soldiers, in other words to momentarily bring citizens closer to soldiers' duties. This will be developed as we discuss force used internally.…[p. 589]

CHAPTER 5

On the domestic use of force in general

The abovementioned is devoted exclusively to the nation's security. The following will almost entirely be dedicated to its freedom. We will see that it is not the part that occupied me the least.

Oh! How can one not take a great interest in the consolidation and perpetuity of this liberty which is so miraculous, so new and still so fragile! But, by defending it against its enemies, let us also protect it from the unwise exaggerations of its friends. Let us prevent it from becoming costly to the people. There is no lasting order of things other than that founded on love. Do not give its last chance to despotism, that of our excesses and mistakes. It is important that we distinguish between the passing and illegitimate precautions which may be justified by the crisis of a revolution, and the wise and eternal principles which should form the basis for a constitution. The time for conquest is over. This is to establish ourselves as free and generous men in what we have conquered.

Nature seems to have protected some fortunate lands and to have arranged them for freedom. There have been peoples who have long been attuned to the ideas of order and justice. [p. 590] In these countries, among these peoples, legislators have had to do almost nothing to ensure freedom. There, it has prospered, living like a native plant. Here, it remains for now just a feeling,…something exotic. Teaching it will be difficult for a long time. Here, we must fight everything, the extent, location and variety of the country, the habits, prejudices, customs, laws and men. Virtually nothing of what I am about to say is applicable to other free peoples on the planet. Tranquillity and order complement liberty there. In France, it takes far-reaching and flexible arrangements to reconcile them.

The first purpose of domestic public force must be the safeguarding of public liberty. The second must be the protection of laws, under which citizens live, own property, work and enjoy life.

These two roles need to be considered separately as they require significant differences in the constitution and in their use of the public force. They are however inseparable in their outcomes. Although I have named them first and second,…they are on the same level. Peace [*tranquilité*] without liberty will merely reflect the calm that can reign over a slaves' workshop. Nor can freedom exist without peace, as excessive caution and repeated eruptions would make it infeasible.

The domestic public force must, in a country such as France, be independent of the external force, or rather, exist independently of it.

The reason behind this is that, on the one hand, a standing and fearsome army such as the one France must keep against foreign enemies, could become dangerous for public liberty, if all the forces of the nation did not exist to stop and counterbalance it.

On the other hand, when the army is used against the enemy, either on the borders or beyond them, the rule within {the State} must remain protected. Otherwise, disorders would multiply and great troubles could arise. Moreover, taxes become more burdensome in wartime and, consequently, their collection becomes more difficult and needs to be guaranteed.

A domestic public force must be created by the constitution and constitute a part of it. But how complicated it is to establish and assemble the principles, elements and laws of this internal public force! How difficult it is to set up these connections between the external and internal public forces! How much thinking is needed to determine correctly the use of this force and its relations with both constitutional powers!

The domestic public force must guarantee public liberty. [p. 591] But, at the same time, it should not restrict or oppress individual freedoms.

However if it is founded on false or exaggerated principles, either in its set-up or in its use, it may repress individual freedoms. These could be oppressed if citizens are required to pay for a service, duties or taxes. They could be oppressed by putting opportunities or means of harassment and injustice into the hands of such primitive and secondary authorities as would have the right to use them. Then citizens could . . . themselves be the instruments of their oppression. This would then be, if I may say so, the tyranny of freedom. I do not know if there is anything on earth more unbearable than wrongs and abuses which deceive hope and spring from where we expected the primordial good.

There are connections, either inevitable, or necessary, between the external public force and that of the interior. It is nevertheless to be feared that, if their union becomes too common and too intimate, the army's discipline will ceaselessly be damaged by this combination!

If there is no union between them, it is also to be feared that there will be rivalry, jealousies, seeds of discord and unrest, and in the middle of all of this, conflicts or suspension of action in both divisions of the public force!

The internal public force must have connections of either dependency, or responsibility, or of correspondence with the two powers as well as with the bureaucracy. It must be linked to the judiciary for the protection of justice and the implementation of its decrees. How important it is to establish and limit all of these relationships! How easily could they, otherwise, produce the anarchy of confusion or of stagnation.

I understand the importance and difficulty of what I set out to deal with. That alone does not guarantee success. But it animates courage and stimulates the mind.

CHAPTER 6

Domestic force in relation to public freedom. Need for a national militia

Public freedom is the good and the happiness of all. Thus all citizens are both interested in and obliged to guarantee and defend it. That is what must constitute the domestic force.

[p. 592] The only dangerous enemies which public liberty can have is the throne and the army. This danger must be foreseen but not exaggerated. Exaggerated fears will lead to burdensome safeguards that destroy all the accessories of liberty.... The nation needs a public force which can counterbalance any alliance of the king and the army against liberty. For this purpose, we must establish a permanent national militia, capable of acting locally, capable of integrating, if needs be, an organisation which will enable it to take general action. But... this national militia must not be armed constantly as though public freedom were threatened all the time.... It has to be constituted so that (1) it is the least burdensome possible for the nation, (2) so that it does not harm the army; (3) so that it does not become a means or subject of disorder and trouble.

CHAPTER 7

The national militia must be the least possible burden for the nation [p. 593]

Within the kingdom, the national militia must be universal { = there must be universal military service}. Every citizen in or out of work who lives in a municipality must take part in it... Boys under 16 and men above the age of 50 should be exempt. All members of the administration and judiciary system, all {clergymen} and all members of the active armed forces should also be exempt....

On their colours should be written: *for freedom, for the law and the fatherland*.... [p. 594]

The national militia must only have as its objective the protection of the constitution and the guaranteeing of the public freedom on which it is based. It cannot and must not, given its composition, be employed against external enemies.... It must not be used by the police for the protection of the laws.... The national militia must only act in support of that other type of force if the latter is insufficient, or in exceptional cases.... {It} must be a force of inertia and resistance....

[p. 595] {T}he force of national militias lies in the love inspired in it for its country's constitution and for freedom. May the legislators of our Revolution think about that seriously... Otherwise the discontented

national militia will one day support the malcontents. An armed people that loses faith in its liberty or the phantom that it has been given in its stead will seek a new master. . . .

CHAPTER 10

The question of the right to bear arms [p. 597]

. . . {T}hrough the creation of a public force, have all citizens individually renounced the right to use force individually? . . . [p. 598] If everybody is armed, there is no public force, or at least that public force is always too small. {F}or the . . . portion of the public force . . . will always be inferior in numbers to insurgencies . . .

Soldiers and officers only bear arms when they are on active service. . . . The national militias will have . . . their arms stored in the principal church of the municipality, and the bearing of a sword will only be permitted to any member . . . when they are on active duty [*sous les armes*]. In the towns, no citizens is allowed to have a gun at home . . .

CHAPTER 11

Who should have power over the national militia [p. 599]

As the national militia has as its aim the guarantee of the constitution, it cannot be in the hands of the executive power, the necessary tendency of which is to increase its influence and consequently the diminution of public freedom. The legislative power {by contrast} is the protector of this freedom, and is thus the one who should control the national militia. . . .

CHAPTERS 12–14 {ON POLICE FORCES} [p. 600–604]

CHAPTER 18

Continuation of the examination of the relationship between external and domestic Public Force [p. 611]

[p. 612] Let us now consider how to make national militias work in corps, either in order to wage war alongside the army, or to simply employ them to defend the borders, by forcing them to this service {instead of staying at home}. It would be as if removing people from their homes, their interests, their families, and training them as slaves for a job they

are not intended to do, and that most would not, could not and would not know how to do.

When it is a question of only defending his fields, his house, his family, every man becomes a soldier or, at least, fights. Any man can, animated by these great concerns, kill or be killed. But in a vast empire, will you persuade all of the people that all of the empire's provinces must be loved equally by them? Will you deploy the people of [p. 613] the South of France to defend Flanders or Alsace, or the people of these provinces to protect the coasts of the Mediterranean or Gascony? Assuming that you arranged for everyone only to defend the border closest to them, will it then be necessary, when war takes place at sea, that the entire burden be borne by the coastal . . . provinces, or when it is on the Rhine, for it to be defended by the sole provinces that border {it}?

How many more objections I could make! How could you make good use of troops that would be made up, formed and ordered in such way? You will perhaps obtain acts of courage. But what discipline, what constancy to expect from them? What an example would this be for your regular troops! War, real and major war, such as the one fought by the disciplined and capable armies, does not consist of small expediencies [*coups de main*] and temporary efforts . . . Battles, and more difficult still, wars, have to be won. . . .

{However, i}f you involve national militias in the war, in other words, the lowest strata [*le fond*] of the nation, then the nature of war will change. War will be fought at a greater cost, as national militias will have to be paid when made to leave their homes. Soldiers of this kind, men still used to the ease of city life and domesticity, will certainly be more burdensome to support than soldiers from your camps and garrisons. Hence one needs to increase taxes. Hence war will increasingly burden the people.

This will however not be the greatest change. A more fateful one will fall upon the nations. By involving themselves directly in the war, the war will directly envelop them with all its horrors. Today, they merely perceive it through the increase in subsidiary taxes. Even those who are defeated, even those whose country becomes the battlefield, do not experience disastrous calamities. Blood is only shed within the armies; generosity and humanity will stop the blows as soon as one is victorious. Life will always be respected and even . . . prisoners . . . are exchanged or returned for small ransoms. The land is never torched or ravaged. People plough and sow among the {military} camps. A professional army takes pride in the discipline to conserve all that is not consumed by necessity.

But when nations themselves will take part in war, everything will change. As the inhabitants of a country become soldiers, they will be treated as enemies. The fear of having them as opponents, the worry of leaving them behind will lead {the enemy} to destroy them. At the very

least attempts will be made to contain them and to intimidate them by destruction and grief. Remember the barbarity of the ancient wars in history, [p. 614] those wars where fanaticism and partisan spirit armed the people. This is what you will bring back.

Ah! What a good invention this fine art was, this beautiful system of modern warfare which only required a certain amount of forces to eliminate feuds between nations, and which left all the rest in peace, in which discipline replaced quantity, science made the weight tip towards [*balançait*] successes, and ceaselessly imposed ideas of order and preservation on the cruel needs that war entailed.

CHAPTER 9

August Rühle von Lilienstern (1816)

Johann Jacob Otto August Rühle von Lilienstern, known as August, was born in Berlin on April 16, 1780.[1] His father, Jacob Friedlieb Rühle von Lilienstern (1749–1817), hailed from Frankfurt on Main and was a Prussian lieutenant; his mother was Christiane Sophie Katharina widowed Quidmann, née von Cronenfels (1751–1817), from Pommerania. His father later owned the manor of Königsberg near Prignitz in Brandenburg, where August spent his childhood. In 1793, at the age of 13, he was sent to the cadet corps in Berlin, and toward the end of 1795, he became an ensign with the Regiment "Garde" in Potsdam. August did not take to the military lifestyle and hated the chief of the regiment, General von Rüchel. He did, however, enjoy the social life of Potsdam. General von Geusau spotted his talent for drawing and put that to good use with the royal maps. Meanwhile, Colonel Scharnhorst's Academy for Officers opened in Berlin in 1801, and August was sent there together with Carl von Clausewitz; at the school, Rühle ranked just after Clausewitz in special mentions from Scharnhorst for excelling in talent, knowledge, and assiduousness. The curriculum included mathematics, natural sciences, philosophy, politics, and music, as well as military sciences. One of the teachers there was Christian Karl August Ludwig von Massenbach, later general, who became Rühle's patron, and who later assured Rühle's admission as *adjoint* to the newly formed general quarter master's staff on March 30, 1804. Under Massenbach's command, at the headquarters of Prince Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen, Rühle participated in the Franco–Prussian War of 1806 until Prussia's capitulation at Prenzlau.

Rühle spent 1807 in Dresden, reading and writing an eye-witness report of the campaign of September–October 1806.[2] On the basis of this book,

Duke Charles Augustus of Saxe-Weimar hired Rühle to become the tutor of his second son, Prince Bernhard, with the rank of major and privy counselor [*Kammerherr*]. Rühle accepted, as the alternative for him seemed, at the time, to go to East India because he had been dismissed from the Prussian Army in September 1807. Rühle did not make a great job of his new position: Bernard lived a fairly unrestrained life as a young officer in the Saxon army stationed in Dresden while Rühle dedicated his time to his research and writing, and especially from 1808 to 1810 to the editorship of the journal *Pallas,* a *Journal on the Art of Statecraft and War.* Rühle had an animated social life of his own: in Dresden he met his future wife, Henriette von Schwedhof, née Franckenberg-Ludwigsdorff (1789–1847), daughter of a general. Henriette had a daughter, Jenny, from her first marriage, whom Rühle adopted. Among Rühle's intellectual contacts and friends of this time were Adam Müller, Ernst von Pfuel, and the poet Heinrich von Kleist. When Prince Bernard was sent off with the Saxon forces to fight alongside Napoleon's armies in the campaign against Austria, Rühle accompanied him and kept the war diary. Both Prince Bernard and Rühle were assigned to the forces of General Bernardotte, the future King of Sweden. Rühle published another eye-witness report on his military experiences of 1809.[3]

Toward the end of 1811, Rühle was dismissed from the Weimar court; at that time, he tried his hand at agriculture, using up his small fortune. In 1813 he therefore volunteered to join the Prussian army, this time to fight against the French, alongside whom he had fought in 1809, and he was given the rank of major in Blücher's general staff. While he had some active experience in this campaign, he was preoccupied with his *Military Cathechism*[4] as he worked in close proximity with Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Müffling, and others. But Rühle contracted a throat disease and had to take leave. Sick and grumpy, Rühle poured all his wrath into *An Apology of War,* a polemical publication in both senses of the word. It was first printed in 1813 in the first two issues of a periodical called the *German Museum,* edited by his friends Mueller and Schlegel, under the title "Apology for War, especially against Kant." It was republished on its own in 1814 under the title *On War,* from where Clausewitz presumably got the idea for his own book's title. In his *On War,* Rühle wrote this: "War is the means of settling through chance and the use of force the quarrels of the peoples. Or: it is the pursuit of peace or of a legal agreement by States with violent means." He conceded that some, like Kant in his treatise on eternal peace, saw war as "the interruption of peace, the cancer gnawing on the happiness and welfare of States and mankind." Rühle attacked this last interpretation with reference to Fichte's ultranationalist speeches of 1813, addressed to "the German nation." Rühle condemned those who put peace above all else as committing the "error, not to proclaim the indispensability of war, and its inner moral nobility and worthiness." He denounced this error as arising from a selfish and small spirit "that has

never arisen above one's own kitchen cupboard, one's own granary and one's own skin, to something higher and more divine."[5] These were the same overemotional sentiments of moral outrage at the Prussian capitulation to the French with which Clausewitz wrote his *Confession Memorandum* of 1812, and with which he laid down his Prussian commission and joined the Russian forces that were still holding out against Napoleon. Such sentiments were widespread even among Prussia's greatest minds, otherwise people of reason and wit, such as Rühle's friend Heinrich von Kleist, who, moved by similar feelings in 1808, had written a patriotically arousing apotheosis of unconditional military obedience, the *Prince of Homburg.* It is hard not to think of this when reading about fortune smiling upon youthful impetuosity in the excerpts in this chapter (see p. 186 below).

Rühle reappeared in September 1813 in Blücher's headquarters in Lauban, where Rühle's time as a military diplomat began: he managed to coordinate the Allies' operations, shuttling between Bülow, Bubna, and Tauentzien despite their diverse interests, to the point where Tsar Alexander hugged Rühle fondly in the presence of Frederick William III and congratulated the Prussian king on having such a talented officer. Rühle thus played a possibly crucial role in having the Allied efforts converge in the battle of Leipzig. The battle coincided with the end of Rühle's fighting career as his throat troubles returned. He was promoted to lieutenant colonel in December 1813, and was charged by the Prussian king with military procurement and recruitment as General Commissioner for Arming the German Lands, working from Frankfurt am Main. Given the diversity of the German states, his activities were of varying success. Rühle was then charged with reorganizing the armed forces, and he was present at the Congress of Vienna. After 1815, as a colonel, he was seconded to Aachen to the forces of General von Dobschütz to organize a militia there. At the end of the year, Rühle returned to Berlin to perform various duties, including those of chief of the Section for War History of the newly formed Great General Staff; from 1821 he served as its chief under Lieutenant General von Müffling. Beginning in 1816, he edited the *Military Weekly.* In 1817–1818 he published his *Handbook for Officers* in two volumes. The *Handbook* includes a few verbatim passages from his *Apology of War,* but by now his analytical skills had gotten the better of his emotions.

Rühle published many other works in the following years. He became a lieutenant general in 1835, and in 1837 became Clausewitz's second successor as director of the General War School (which later became the War Academy). In 1844 he became inspector general for military education and director of the officers' exams board, where he was not very successful. He was a member of many commissions on education, military justice, the development of the railway system, and so on. In 1839 he received an honorary doctorate from the University of Kiel. Rühle died at age 67 on July 1, 1847, in Salzburg; he had gone there on the way back from

Bad Gastein, where he had hoped to find relief from his recurrent throat ailments. His wife died only five months later.

Besides the usual chapters on infantry, cavalry, artillery, camps, fortifications, marches, and other such topics that are omitted here, Rühle's *Handbook* contain several ideas that Clausewitz later made famous. One is that of war as a duel.[6] Related to this concept is the idea of war as a dynamic interaction between two parties, neither presenting constant forces, but both varying their behaviors in constant reaction to the other, both parties seeking to harm each other. The two parties in warfare are thus mutually dependent, mutually influencing variables. This fact alone indicates that warfare is impossible to study satisfactorily through any reductionist, one-independent and one-dependent variable interpretation.

Rühle added reflections on the purpose of war, which in their complexity go far beyond Clausewitz's simple idea that one's aim in war is to impose one's will upon the enemy. Perhaps Rühle's greatest insight, remarkable even today, is that military victory is by no means the one and only political aim of all warfare. In contrast, many writers of the 19th century, starting with Rühle's and Clausewitz's contemporary, General Konstantin von Lossau, argued that politics ceases when war begins[7] so that military victory would be the only aim. Although Clausewitz copped out by claiming that such considerations would exceed the limits of his work, Rühle examined closely the political and other aims that might be pursued by war, and he rediscovered what Christine de Pisan had already known: war is the recourse of States to settle disputes in the absence of a legally binding and satisfactory nonviolent settlement to the quarrel. In this context, Rühle was perhaps the first to articulate that world opinion—the international community—is something of a judge of States' actions, and even the greatest military victory might be disadvantageous if it mobilizes international opinion against the State, with the consequences this had for a Napoleon in Rühle's day, or for Hitler over a century later.

Rühle also very interestingly explored Small Wars, not from the point of view of the counterinsurgent or even the partisan leader, as all authors before him had done, but in a larger context and from the point of view of the benefiting side. He explored coercion—usually thought to be a mid-20th-century discovery—and presented an anatomy of courage and morale that would be sought in vain in other writings before Charles Ardant du Picq. Rühle explored the implications of gaining or sacrificing time and space, and the trade-off it might imply, particularly in the context of windows of opportunity, long before such a term was coined. He understood how socially or artificially constructed views of a phenomenon hamper its full understanding. In short, his work, completely forgotten and entirely eclipsed by that of his contemporary Clausewitz, richly merits being rediscovered and given as much attention as *On War.*

{Otto August} R{ühle} v{on} L{ilienstern}: *Handbuch für den Offizier zur Belehrung im Frieden und zum Gebrauch im Felde* (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1817) vol. 1.

ON ENGAGEMENTS [*VOM GEFECHT*]. [p. 1]

I. On the general conditions of Engagements

1. War is fighting. From the point of view of a subaltern officer, it appears as a succession of battles, or if you wish, as one big battle with repeated pauses and manifold interruptions, which serve to prepare the real engagement of the parties to the fighting or to let them rest, or in some other ways to contribute indirectly. The decision affecting the purpose of war through the direct use of weapons…is thus not merely one {among several} essential points of all warfare, but {*the* essential one}. {T}here is hardly a mission during the war that is not linked to a real engagement, or where one does not {at least} have to be prepared for the possibility of being drawn into a battle. Of all things a soldier [*Krieger*] needs to know, the most necessary are {to have} a notion of the general conditions of engagements, and training for the handling of weapons in earnest. For the officer especially, it is the basic pre-condition for the ability to execute his missions appropriately for their intended ends.
2. What is important about any conscious action is (1) its aim; (2) the means available to achieve one's aim; (3) an understanding of the exterior circumstances which are independent from us and which will affect the applied means positively or negatively, thus influencing the way in which the means are used. [p. 2]…
3. Both warring parties generally strive unfalteringly…to prevail over one another and to bring about a glorious conclusion to the war. Nevertheless, in the individual parts of a war, especially in the enterprises of small units, victory is not always the immediate aim of an engagement [*Gefecht*], but many other intentions and purposes might be pursued.…
4. Leaving aside its special purpose, an engagement [*Gefecht*] is conditioned above all by the way in which the fighters are armed and equipped.…[p. 3]
5. An engagement…presupposes the existence and interaction of two inimical parties. Not only do we seek to bring about a decision favourable to us, through our best knowledge and skills, but the adversary has the same intention. Some circumstances favour him, others us. We must never assume an adversary who is inactive or in every aspect inferior to us, even if he is in some. To the contrary, one must always be prepared for the enemy to act with all {possible} measures, knowledge and circumspection. The course and success of an engagement thus depends as much on the types of troops [*Truppengattung*] and way of fighting of the adversary, on his strengths and configuration, as on ours. The less this is the case, and the less the enemy understands how to pursue his advantage, the better for us. The enemy does not merely have an effect on us, but in the same way, our actions and omissions condition his.[8] Anything that benefits the enemy and favours his intentions, increases his forces for attack and his ability to resist, is a disadvantage to us, but the converse is also true.[9]

6. Nevertheless, for victory to be possible, and to defeat the enemy, there has to be a preponderance of forces and advantages on our side. This preponderance will only in few cases be achievable merely through greater numbers; many other variables [*Umstände*] contribute in different ways to make the sum of all circumstances more favourable in the final result for us or for the enemy, and thus there area many ways and means to balance the disadvantage of smaller numbers. If the resultant of all variables and circumstances were the same on both sides, the two parties would be in equilibrium, neither would reach its purpose. Thus each will strive somehow to achieve preponderance for his own side.

   Often, however, one must content oneself [p. 4] with bringing about equilibrium. Often an engagement has to be brought about under unfavourable circumstances, and in such a case the decision is at times made by luck. This may also be the outcome if it turns out that we have made false assumptions, and that the resultant of the mutual relations was by no means as unfavourable as we deduced rationally from the information available to us. In general, we are trying here only to draw attention to the mutually influencing variables [*Wechselverhältnis*] of friend and foe.
7. In a third way, the engagement is conditioned by the {variable which is the} nature of the surface of the earth, inevitably the theatre of all engagements on land.…

* * *

{Otto August} R{ühle} v{on} L{ilienstern}: *Handbuch für den Offizier zur Belehrung im Frieden und zum Gebrauch im Felde* (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1818) vol. 2

ON SMALL WAR [p. 1]

I. General Reflections on Small War

In the first volume of this handbook we have got to know war as an engagement multiplied in time and space and indeed in all directions and relations. We have therefore…called war a battle writ large, and battle a war on a smaller scale.…How then should one think about Small War? How is Major War [*grosser Krieg*] different from Small War? And is there a view of war, other than that it is a multitude of simultaneous or successive battles…?

Both Major War and Small War, in as far as both are to be seen as different sorts of war, must be aggregates of several individual engagements, separated by intervals. Moreover, war *as such* consists of both sorts of war taken together, or jointly. The events that take place in the course of a campaign thus belong partly to the realm of Small War, partly to that of Major War. Next we have to examine according to which principles of classification…these must be categorised. [p. 2] From the strongly divergent definitions which certain otherwise very respectable authors have furnished of Small War, one may conclude that this is a tricky business, and

that several serious views can be defended. Given the words "small" and "major" [*gross*], one can to some extent surmise that the degree of importance is a distinguishing feature; in the domain of Small Wars, one will encounter operations of smaller scale and employment of resources, while the deployment of the armed forces as a whole, and the decisive strikes, would be sought in the domain of Major War. And yet one will note soon that the number of combatants and the duration of the fighting as such cannot be the only distinction between war and engagement, nor between Small and Major War … Indeed, in certain circumstances Small War could reach such a scope that several thousands {of combatants}, indeed, the larger part of the existing and assembled forces, might have to be used for its purpose. Some authors have described Small War as essentially the operations of light forces, yet light forces are being used in our current style of warfare just as frequently in Major War. And there is no reason why one should not give the so-called heavy {regular} forces, appropriately trained, such missions, which one would count as Small Wars. Nor should one imagine Small War as merely the sum of the individual engagements, without coherence, without essential influence on the larger operations. Small War often consists mainly of actions and enterprises without much of an engagement, yet the very existence of the army and the success of the larger operation may depend directly upon them. Small War in turn can only achieve something of consequence if its individual events bear a useful relation to each other and to the larger enterprise.

[p. 3] The reason for this and other inadequate definitions … lies in the inappropriate use of language … but also in the fact that history, even that of the most recent wars, only furnishes examples of a limited application and use of Small Wars. Indeed, the practice of this extremely important aspect of the art of war has not yet achieved any degree of perfection. The responsibility for this in turn can be found partly in the political circumstances, {partly} in the character of the leaders at the highest level, and {partly in} the particular ways of war generated by both sides unconsciously. For if a people does not naturally have a particular … way of war, acquired through long practice … it will sooner or later adopt the habits and ways of war of its neighbours, not even always copying what is best, but imitating and taking on also what is imperfect. In part, the responsibility {for the poor understanding of Small Wars} lies with prevalent prejudices, in unclear views of the value and advantage of Small War, and the use of light troops. … {B}ecause in the wars observed by us, there have been in the main few {elements of} Small War, … [p. 4] Small Wars are belittled. {Our officers} only want to carry out big strikes, accumulating superior weapons. They are afraid of partitioning their forces into too many small units, of wasting them prematurely in individual engagements, of becoming trapped in a fruitless prolongation of the war, and so on. Whoever subscribes to this view, or to this prejudice as we have called it, shows that he has only recognised one side of this form of warfare. He seems to forget

that bottom line, it amounts to the same whether one is annihilated in bits, little by little, or in one fell swoop, but that it is unconditionally dangerous, to put all . . . on one card in the game against an adversary superior in physical force and talent. . . .

What may also have contributed to giving Small War so little acceptance . . . is the fact that in some respects it is more difficult to wage than Major War, as it requires many actions and habits of war, a multitude of educated and adept officers, an organisation of the armed forces fit for this form of conduct of war, and an exceptional degree of physical, intellectual and moral education of the troops used in it.

[p. 8] Every war and every {military} operation is based on a Wherefore? and Why?, a purpose and a cause, which will give a specific character and a definite direction to each of its actions.

The individual operations have military purposes, the war as a whole always has a final political purpose, i.e. the war is engaged and carried out in order to achieve the political purposes which the State power has decided upon, according to its internal and external national conditions. The operations only serve to make possible the final purpose of the war. Whatever is achieved in these individual operations is not the ultimate purpose in itself, but only a means or a step towards the final purpose, a condition for the possibility of attaining this final purpose. If the success of these operations does not lead to the realisation of the political purposes, if indeed they clash with them, or do not further their attainment, they are pointless, however brilliant and exemplary their achievement may {otherwise} have been. . . .

[p. 9] Some say that the aim of war is victory. Others say it is peace. Even others say it is the defence . . . or the conquest of large pieces of land. In some cases any of these definitions may be right. In general, however, one is as unsatisfactory as the other, for otherwise each of these {three definitions} would have to state the same. Victory, however, is not always the necessary condition of conquest or of peace, and peace is not always the necessary result of victory and conquest.

{Added here is this footnote:}

Each war has an outstanding or a main purpose, which, however, according to the opinion of some, is not always peace. Peace can be seen merely as the end-state of war. The obstacle which in war obstructs the attainment of the main purpose is the enemy, and it has to be cleared out of the way. In the best case this may lead to victory, but for this reason alone, victory is not the main purpose of the war, but only a subordinate purpose within war. If somebody concludes a peace without attaining the main purpose—that which was supposed to be attained by the war—he can be called the defeated party, however many battles he may have won, even if he has won all of them. {End of footnote}

To the contrary, victory and conquest are often causes of the continuation, the renewal and the multiplication of war. Often, peace comes

because none of the warring parties was able to defeat the other, and often war is not made in order to establish peace. It will be necessary for the understanding of the following to examine these misunderstandings more closely.

Above all we will have to come to agree on a meaning of "peace." It is not without importance whether one sees in this word merely {an armistice}, or whether one understands by this term the lasting friendly mutual understanding of States. {According to the former definition}, the end of fighting and the commencement of peace is identical. In as much as the striving of States as that of individual humans in general aims at an existence which [p. 10] favours the calm enjoyment of possessions and the uninterrupted development of a lawful free activity, without interference by an alien force, and in as much as war, rich in sacrifices and strife, disrupts this comfortable existence in a burdensome and disagreeable way, it is intelligible that a State will only decide upon war in order to deflect a greater evil, or in order to create a lasting and complete state of peace. Given this understanding, the State cannot win anything through war except for its glorious completion. The faster and the more cheaply this aim is reached, the more desirable it is. Generally one can conclude from this that one only wages war for {the sake of} peace, and that one should only wage war, in order afterwards to build it the more firmly and intensively on the lawful understanding between States.

But in our experience and with individual real wars it does not always work like that. There are…political contexts…in which a warring State only concludes peace for the sake of the next war, in which it regards peace as a convenient and irreplaceable period of calm, in order to continue the struggle that has been decided upon the more forcefully and completely thereafter. There are other contexts…in which a State derives some substantial, or perhaps only imaginary, gains from the continuation of war. In such cases, war is by no means waged for the sake of peace, as this would be quite an undesired event, but for the sake of the hoped-for gains, to be achieved through war. Such wars include those that are waged for passion and personal interests of individual military men or officials, or of the army—in short, because of some subordinate interest, but not the general welfare of the State. The existence of standing armies in times of peace often leads to the erroneous delusion that wars are only waged because of armies, which rationally [p. 11] cannot be the case. Even with regard to glory, one fights not for the glory of the army, but for the honor of the nation.…

Also it easily happens that the victory, i.e. the overcoming and annihilation of the inimical fighting forces, is *not* the purpose of the war. Victory is often bought very expensively, or the outcome of the fight is unclear, one's own defeat more likely than that of the enemy. Or one hopes to turn him into a helpful friend, or might have reason to spare him or one's own forces out of other considerations. In short, there may be circumstances

in which a State could obtain its aims in cheaper and safer ways: the State may not need the {military} victory, its purposes are reached in other ways. Victory as such is not the purpose of the State, but is only a means that serves to reach the purpose in an appropriate way.

Often war is waged neither in order to maintain the general welfare of a State nor to fend off an actual looming danger, but about a particular object. The ownership or the use of a physical (real) or moral (ideal) good are to be defended or established. The character of the war depends on the nature of the object or good, and the relationship of the State to it. It depends on whether the object of the dispute itself can be destroyed by war, whether we own it and want to fend off a diminution of this, or whether we want to use force to acquire it, or whether we simply want to deny its ownership to the enemy, or protect it for the use of others, etc. For example, if the object of the war no longer exists, or our view of it, our interest in it has changed, as happens especially in the quarrel about [p. 12] ideal goods, the reason for war disappears, its continuation becomes objectless, its bitter pursuit at times disadvantageous, and its operations must be directed from the sole point of view of making possible a benign settlement with the enemy. Or else, if we fail to acquire, defend, protect the good by the war, all victories are pointless, the readiness of the enemy to make peace cannot help us, and the very annihilation of the enemy is no less a pointless aim.

Moreover, in view of the political links and networks which all civilised [*kultivierte*] States entertain with one another, in all wars the impression the conduct and the results of the war on public opinion and the interests of the other temporarily neutral States are almost as important, as the relationship the two warring parties have on account of the war. A temporary advantage, the early humiliation of the enemy, a conquest—however brilliant—are of little value for the State the existence of which has to be calculated and secured for hundreds of years, if there is not the hope of keeping this advantage and the conquests for a long time, or if it creates the fear of a new, greater danger. The possibility for us or for our adversaries to obtain help from the outside, to effect any political situation that is beneficial or disadvantageous for us,…has an important influence on the development of the enterprise of war…

These concerns about public opinion and the political community of States contribute significantly to making the legal basis of war so very important, {and explain} why even very powerful States try at least to package their feuds in an acceptable way, and accept limitations on their behaviour even in victory. This leads us to the consideration of another question. War is often defined as the means or the judgement by which States impose their rights [*ihre Rechte*] against one another by force. This should be so; according to moral principles, no war should ever be fought except to apply [p. 13] the idea of justice [*das Recht*] ever more perfectly in the intercourse of States. Regrettably, this justice is ambiguous, and it

is difficult to recognise on whose side it is. The world knows much unjust ownership and unjust desires which the powerful like to realise by use of force. Most wars are fought less because of justice, than because of utility or honour. While it can be the case that both parties are equal in justice or injustice, at least in cases where justice is clearly on one side, the adversary fights for an unjust cause. War is thus the judgement [*Auskunft*] of States, by which to settle their just and unjust causes, in one word: their {clashing} political aims, against each other with the use of force. It is the attainment of these political aims, which are the true final war aims, not victory, peace or conquest, if these are not perchance in line with the political intention.

In as much as the army is merely a subordinate part of the State, an organ of it for certain {tasks}, and in as much as it does not define the final purpose of the war, but they are given to it, the army is not responsible for the folly or wisdom of political decisions…The army is merely the acting organ, the executive of the higher will. The army's and its leaders' entire mental activity should aim to tailor the individual operations, to combine and execute them in a way that their success may deflect any danger from their State, or give it political advantages. It depends entirely on the particular constitution of the belligerent State and on the particular context of its time, to what degree the leading general, individuals or elements of the armed forces are consulted on political affairs, what sort of voice they have in such a consultation, which influence the opinions of the army as an important part of the male population has on public opinion and the views of the nation as a whole…[p. 14]. This is a different matter, however, which does not belong here. A man of very lowly occupation, who happens to be a favourite, friend or counsellor of the prince or the highest levels of State government, may have a most decisive beneficial or noxious influence incommensurate with the man's formal public competences. This influence might thus not be tied to the man's position, or to the sphere of his official tasks or powers.

What applies to the purpose of war also applies to the purposes of operations and of individual actions of which operations are composed. Here, too, different purposes may predominate. Behaviour which may be most appropriate from this point of view and for this operation may be entirely inappropriate for another operation. If the big and small operations which make up a particular war are to be called purposeful, they must be designed and executed to suit its final purpose. However, in the practice of war, the object is not just to overcome lifeless resistance with the means available, but one is dealing with a live adversary, who in part deliberately creates obstacles to our enterprise, in part thwarts it unconsciously due to the mere fact that he pursues his own war aims. Thus the tasks to be executed by the army or its individual units, and the purposes to be reached by means of individual operations, have to be determined according to our own aims and according to the opposing activity of the

enemy. In so far as the army or its units do not operate in one monolithic mass, but are split up into several discretely acting parts tasked to pursue a common aim, there will . . . always be three considerations which will condition the execution of an operation . . .:

- To accomplish or achieve the self-imposed purpose;
- To overcome the obstacles in the way of our undertaking;
- To harmonise our actions with the advances and retreats of those co-operating with us. . . .

[p. 15] Depending on the situation, it may suit our purpose:

1. *To bring about the physical clash of our armed forces with those of the adversary.* This would be the case if our priority is to annihilate the main obstacle {to the pursuit of} our purposes: the . . . fighting forces of the enemy; or else if the fast use of this violent means is the sole way to deflect the danger posed by the enemy, or if other reasons exist to seek a decision in this particular way.
2. It may, however, be quite inappropriate for the time being to consent to a battle or an engagement with the enemy, and all may depend conversely on *avoiding the physical exchange,* either because unequal forces and disadvantageous contexts might put us in grave danger, or because the only result would be a squandering of time and forces without bringing us closer to the main purpose, or because we can reach the same result more comfortably in another way, or because some political context prescribes this course, or because a clash with the enemy in one place or another, at a particular time does not fit into the overall military plan, etc.
3. Moreover, it may be the main purpose of the operation *to conquer particular strips of land* . . . either because they contain sources of force and help which we want to use or deny to the enemy, or because they can be used as bases, cover or defensive positions of our possessions [p. 16], our sources of power, or of our deployment and movements; or because they might in some other way benefit the enemy.
4. Or {it may be our purpose} to *defend such points or strips of land lastingly or for a particular period of time,* for similar reasons as above, or
5. *to defend certain fixed or mobile but destructible objects and possessions, especially ones needed by the army, against damage, obstruction, or pillage by the enemy.*

It is easily understood that it is generally advantageous to take the war onto enemy territory, to remove the theatre of war as much as possible from our possessions; that any reduction of the enemy's ability to fight would improve the balance of actual forces for us; that the losses in war would be less heavy and numerous, the faster the decision is brought about. Nevertheless, special purposes of operations can cause a quick decision to be avoided, the affair to be drawn out, opportunities to harm the enemy in one way or another left unexploited, territories conceded to the enemy deliberately. In other words, victory and conquest are generally desirable

events, but depending on circumstances, their unconditional pursuit can bring more damage than advantage.…

{Major War and Small War}

[p. 41]War in general {can} thus {be divided} into Major and Small War. Individual campaigns and operations are made up of, on the one hand, individual forceful and decisive events which have to be carried through, according to final political purposes, energetically, following great rules and with the concentrated effects of existing overall strength. On the other hand, many occasional, in themselves unremarkable enterprises…accompany the great events and helpfully assist their outcome.…

[p. 42] The importance of Major War is immediately intelligible. But as we have repeatedly noted, Small War, too, is important…

[p. 58] One will resort exclusively to Small War if one either does not want to or cannot bring about the quick violent decision. For the first, there may be a variety of political reasons;…{however} we can always decide to switch to Major War, in order to give forceful support here or there to Small War enterprises.

The second case in which one is forced to opt for Small War is found when one has either been taken by surprise by the outbreak of war and has not yet assembled one's forces adequately in order to face up to the enemy with success. Or else {it is found} when the assembled army has been destroyed by attrition or is broken up due to unfortunate events, or else if one is unable to meet the rapidly advancing enemy with a suitable force in a remote part of the theatre of war…; or, finally when one has forces in sufficient numbers but not sufficiently well trained for large-scale battles.[10]…Generally, in such cases, the task is "to hold out in a particular part of the theatre of war with a smaller number of irregular troops than the numbers of the enemy army has, until succour arrives from somewhere else, or until one's {own forces have} gradually assembled and got organised. During this time, one has to avoid being worn down, and try instead to do {the enemy} as much harm as possible, and to keep him tied down so that he cannot gain foot in the area in question nor is free to contribute significantly to operations elsewhere."[11]

If no help can be expected within a certain period of time, much will depend on the size of the theatre of war, on the numeric ratio of the inimical armed forces to the population, and on opportunities for us or our enemies to replenish the armed forces…In the long term, the superior forces will win, if only because the weaker party can merely stand up with such effort that {this alone} will wear it down sooner or later even without the direct action of the adversaries. Conversely…even the most splendid and well-disciplined army will begin to fester internally and deteriorate morally, if it cannot achieve significant results with its efforts and if it is not replenished with new troops. At the same time, the {irregular} adversaries

will become increasingly hardy, enterprising and warlike through their success, the growing consciousness of their own resilience and hope. Between two unequal entities of which the smaller increases its size continuously and to a more significant degree than the other, equilibrium will necessarily establish itself, and will in the end lead to a reversal of the balance.

As is widely known, actual military preponderance does not depend on the number of troops alone, but as much on their quality, on their suitable composition by different units, and on the abundance and quality of their equipment. The more effective the forces for Small War are in relation to the enemy's . . . [p. 60], the more easily they will be able to fend him off; the less they have, the more difficult the game will be for them . . .

[p. 65] {Small War type} engagements cannot suit our purposes when these are to bring about central results, or if we want to avoid all engagements with the enemy . . . or are afraid that they would draw us into more serious and inopportune fights with the enemy. But it is just these inconveniences which are so appropriate for Small War, as they provide {us with the} opportunity to become a burden to the adversary on account of them. Engagements of this sort are harmful for the party whom they prevent from doing something more important, or which experiences greater losses in human lives. Meanwhile, many bloody battles do not have a greater result than this, that both sides have killed a good portion of each other's men. Whether one gives battle every two or three months, which would cost the enemy 10,000 dead and wounded, or whether one renders one or a few hundred men incapable of fighting on a daily basis, more or less amounts to the same, with the only difference that in that {one} battle the . . . campaign might be irredeemably lost, while {Small War engagements} will not risk anything substantial. They are thus appropriate for the party that wants to hurt the enemy without risking everything, and also for him whose troops and leaders are not sufficiently practised and war-experienced to fight well in large formations, and who wants to get his men and officers used to war by and by. When confronted with an enemy whose way of war . . . is not tailored to suit this type of small skirmishes, one will be able to harm him more by resorting to them than to big battles. Imagine two armies wearing each other down in this way until the last man—would this have the same result for both parties? Oh no! Their war ends with the annihilation of their fighting forces. But the party that wanted to achieve positive aims by means of this war has sacrificed its means without realising its intentions, while the other party which merely wanted to fend off the enemy entirely realises its purpose. But the fighting will hardly continue until no-one is left. The party with the positive purpose will most likely desist from its enterprise once it has suffered such substantial losses that it becomes uncertain whether the remainder has enough force to impose itself in the midst of a hostile enemy population. This decision will be made all the sooner . . . if the daily losses cannot be replaced as fast as by the enemy, who is operating in the midst of his

sources of power and supplies. For this and other reasons, equally great human losses do not equalise the advantages of both sides, nor do they offset the disadvantages equally. This is not to mention the possibility that the death roll will now and then contain a name which is worth many others.

[p. 67] For {the side} that is from the beginning limited to Small War there is no choice at all. For it, there is no salvation in any other way; for it these engagements are its battles, as they are the only option it has available, and from which it may hope by and by to achieve advantages and equilibrium with its adversary.…

Another topic which tends to be subject to even greater misunderstanding is the gaining and loss of space and time. There is a saying that if you have gained time, you have gained everything. But what does it mean to gain time? We gain time if we can put off to a more convenient time an action the execution of which is uncomfortable for us, or perhaps impossible in present circumstances. Also, {we gain time} if we can defer a decision, which could be dangerous to us generally or in the present circumstances, at a later point, or generally in the future. The gains thus consist of the *status quo* [*Aufenthalt*]. The *status quo*, however, is only welcome for him who wishes…that something will *not* take place…, i.e. for him who has a negative intention (as is generally the case for the party that is reduced to {the sole option} of Small War), [p. 68] who tries to prevent, and where he cannot prevent entirely, at least to delay. Whosoever has a positive intention, however, or whosoever seeks specifically to reach this or that defined aim, to seize this or that object, to bring about this or that event, for him the delay is conversely disadvantageous and objectionable. This is so much more the case if perhaps, as happens so often, the utility and the feasibility of certain endeavours is limited to particular windows of opportunity [*Zeiträume*]. For him, gains lies in *acceleration,* in the prevention of immobility [*Aufenthalt*], in the grasping and seizing of the moment, in the filling of…time with successful activity. A period of time which has passed without having advanced, without having obtained results, without having improved one's situation essentially, he calls time lost. Thus time gained by one party can be time lost by the other (although not always); it depends on whose side benefits from a better situation after that time has passed. Perhaps I even gain time simply by letting my adversary lose it. Its loss is of no {negative} consequence for me because the events {that could have taken place} in this period would not have been advantageous for me, or the passage {of time} is of great value to me, as it was during that very time that I was in danger. Thus time is not an absolute value, but a relative one; i.e. it depends on the factors [*Umstände*] related to that period of time whether it becomes a means or an obstacle for my purposes, whether I can use time positively, or only negatively, by preventing the enemy from using it positively. It also depends on the way in which factors and time hang together.

Some factors [*Umstände*] are entirely time-independent, i.e. they retain the same value, the same influence; it does not matter when one wants to use them. Such permanent factors one should rather call situation [*Verhältnis*], as a factor is a variable dependent on time, or variable in nature. Such variable factors either depend on a particular time; the point when they will take place might be foreseeable, as may be their duration; their gradual or sudden appearance or disappearance may be calculable roughly or with significant precision. Or else their existence is dictated by chance, can only be registered in the present, and at times can only be fully recognised and comprehended, once past. It is a sign of genius to be able fully to recognise such sudden and unforeseen factors already when they are present. To foresee and evaluate them with certainty, without sufficient premises, merely from a gut feeling that one cannot articulate is a rare and precious gift called devination. Some accidental factors are, however, signalled by certain signs…Yet at all times, a high degree of attentiveness, discernment and good judgement are needed fully and correctly to interpret these signs, so as not to be tempted to wrong consequences. Moreover, it needs a good portion of luck, so that no unrecognisable, unknown and unforeseeable factors come on top of this, which would confuse the entire calculation…This mix of art and game of fortune which is inherent in war explains why some people without much talent can achieve so much {in war}, and why one can often succeed without much reflection and artful calculation…Whoever wants to see war only as an art (or even as a science, as a mathematical calculation), whoever does not want to do anything without good reason, or without the highest likelihood of success, rarely goes far. That is why the saying is: he who dares not, wins not; and: courageously dared is half-won. In war, one rarely has 20:20 vision, and must in most cases trust in one's good star. Thus one should respect the lucky general as much as the wise, and should not entrust anything to the wisest man if he tends to be decidedly unlucky. In criticising his acts of war, one should make more allowances for the {commander} who was unlucky because he was too enterprising, than for him who did not achieve anything, as he…did not know how to be daring. Fortuna is a woman who smiles upon all youthful {impetuosity}, and even on excessive confidence, if it goes along with force and genius; she rarely chooses her favourites from the company of fearful pedants.…

{Offensive and Defensive}

[p. 114] Let us move on to the consideration of the Offensive and the Defensive.

Already in the first volume of this *Handbook,* in the context of considering the duel, we have…drawn attention to the fact that some arms are more suitable to the offensive, some favour a defensive posture more. Almost everybody today favours the offensive. They think they have found, in

grasping and retaining it, the key to the entire art of war. Whoever counsels defensive measures is in danger of having his intentions misinterpreted. The awakening … of a general lust for fighting and of the internal yearning for positive action is certainly a cheering phenomenon, {one that is} necessary for the conduct of war, and thus to be encouraged. If the spirit of the age [*Geist der Zeit*] tends towards slovenliness and pedantically shy unwillingness to act, it may well be inescapably necessary to applaud all that is arousing, and even excessively to condemn, accuse and belittle anything that can support a slovenly attitude … [p. 115] However, where such a {passive} spirit is absent, or where there is a predisposition to study the way things actually work, in a non-partisan, scholarly [*wissenschaftlich*] manner, in order then to draw conclusions from them depending on the situation …, it would be inappropriate to misjudge the value of the defensive, and to ignore or belittle its undeniable advantages.

If we examine the accusations levelled against the defensive and the exclusive homilies for the offensive, we find that most of these are founded on untenable assumptions, partly half-truths [p. 116] and historical traditions, partly an unclear vision of war as such and of a muddled application of both these artificially constructed[12] terms. In as much as the offensive and the defensive are different forms of war, but neither form as such can be called good or bad, but can only be judged in relation to … circumstances and situations, one may suspect in advance that one will prove not to be intrinsically worthy of recommendation, the other not intrinsically of dismissal.

What people tend to criticise about the defensive can be summarised in the following statements:

1. The defensive is of no *moral* value, it has a negative influence on the spirit, it makes one despondent, indecisive, and lax.
2. The defensive is a *passive* posture, it does not lead to positive results, but by contrast wears itself down.
3. With a defensive posture, we *lose many advantages* which are rooted in the offensive, we impose on ourselves harmful restrictions, let the enemy dictate our actions or at least the tone of operations, we makes ourselves vulnerable in many ways, we save and protect nothing precisely because we only want to save and protect, etc.

Examination of the first statement

Wherever the words offensive and defensive are applied there is the open or covert assumption that the first is an idea of attack, of coercion [*Zwingen*], of inflicting pain, and the other an idea of fending off, resisting, securing. But one must differentiate between intention and purpose on the one hand, and a state of affairs and behaviour on the other. The intention of coercing somebody or of hurting him can be reconciled with defensive

behaviour, especially when the implementation of one's intention takes a long period of time, and if one looks at different sub-periods within that {campaign}. In the same way, offensive conduct can be based on the intention alone to deflect the danger posed by the enemy, and to protect oneself against his coercion and pain inflicted by him. . . .

[p. 118] The spiritual force of the human being is infinite and its possible effects exceed all calculations. And because of this, it can often counterbalance all other inequalities {between ourselves and our enemies}. Especially the morale [*Gemütsstimmung*] with which we act and with which we accomplish our actions is of greatest importance. Such morale is not an independent variable [*ursprünglich*], but is dependent on many internal and external causes. {For example} the view we have of the possibility and likelihood of the success of our enterprise lends wings to or paralyzes our zeal, our will, our spirit of enterprise, indeed all spiritual powers and physical skills. . . . One credits the offensive with inspiring the spirit with such a revivification. . . . [p. 119] {However}, courage does not just manifest itself in different ways and characters in its appearance and effects, but it can spring from contradictory causes. . . . [p. 120] With some, it results from a nervous system that is difficult to irritate, or from a lucky resilience. With others, it results from character and reflection; with some from ignorance of the danger, with others from understanding of, but disdain for, it. With some, quite different causes come together. Thus courage cannot be divided clearly into different categories, but it manifests itself into as many shades of grey as there are human beings. Nevertheless, one can often find entire nations with similar attitudes, and one could thus divide humankind into a group who tend more towards the negative, passive, or those with a more positive and active courage; those who meet danger with a quiet resilience, or with a cold, obstinate resistance, and others who are incited to a more active show of force. {One can divide them into} those for whom courage is a variable, accidental . . . appearance, and those for whom this is a lasting characteristic that spreads throughout their entire personality; those for whom it manifests itself as sudden feeling [*Affekt*] as opposed to strength of character. It is a strange phenomenon that humans, who have shown excellent courage in many situations, on other days appear almost cowardly. Some at times show a sudden transformation from decisive courage to panic. Some may not be afraid of cannon balls, but all the more afraid of ghosts, of responsibility, or daring ideas etc. The Spaniards therefore do not say of a human being that he is courageous, but "he has shown courage here or there." The more that courage is a function of sudden feelings, the less reliable it is, but then it is also easier to excite that person quickly, and in such a moment he can work wonders. The more it is a matter of character, the more stable it will be, the longer it will last, and the less likely to be upset accidentally, but it will be concomitantly more difficult to change its course . . .

[p. 122] Another factor needs to be considered. It is not always in our power to take the offensive; it is not always appropriate to all operations and all contexts. If the prejudice prevails in an army that the offensive is linked to a moral preponderance, any defensive measure on our part, any offensive measure on the part of the enemy, will…spread unrest and mistrust and doubt concerning the wisdom of the military leader, or the likelihood of a lucky end.…It is doubtless better if solders live with the conviction that each thing has its time and its use, and that one can defeat an enemy in the defensive mode as well as in the offensive, and that all depends on making the right choice in each case.…[p. 124]

Examination of the second statement

The claim that the defensive is something passive, negative, destructive rests almost entirely on misunderstandings which have their roots in old ways of fencing and waging war, in which one side would stand still while the other would move. The one left standing would thus generally deliberately forego all advantages based on movement. Having assumed a posture which would not allow movement, he would seek his salvation exclusively in the inaccessibility of his front, or protect himself with fortifications on all sides, so as to lose the freedom of escaping, if the fight were to take an unlucky ending.…Later one differentiated between a pure [*strikte*] and an active defence. A pure defence would really only take place if all actions were geared towards depriving the adversary's attack of harm and success. But it should never take place in this way, otherwise war would cease being a war (i.e. reciprocal fighting). Even then, it cannot be conceived as something entirely passive.…[p. 125] Opposition against a living, effective force cannot take place without a living expression of force.…[p. 126]

Examination of the third statement

First we have to address the question: which advantages are so exclusively linked to the offensive? We then have to show that these are compatible with the defensive, or can be counterbalanced through other advantages of the defensive.…

We know that some arms, and especially cavalry, have their main advantages and their main utility only in movement, and thus above all in the attack. Others, however, mainly artillery and pioneers, need a certain calm and steadiness for the full unfolding of their fighting forces, which cannot be reconciled with the charge. Infantry, as the most numerous and decisive mass, is useful in both forms, and can derive advantages both from immobility and from movement. Moreover, as we have discussed, both attack and defence can only be effected through living use of force and…morale…which can take many forms, and is distributed

in different ways among the mass of humans. Thus {defence} will . . . be of most value in cold, rational courage and lasting fearlessness, while {the offensive} is {appropriate} for surging passionate courage and insensate boldness. [p. 127] Let us note also that no operation in war, not even an engagement, is limited to just one point in time and one moment, but that . . . it consists of several spatial sections and periods of time, . . . offering distinct advantages, now for steadiness, now for movement . . .

A greater degree of courage is needed less for movement that is already underway . . . than for the *sudden transition* from the state of immobility to the accelerated, immediate movement to attack an enemy, which usually goes along with an active defence. . . .

Notes

FRONT MATTER

1. The Bourbons: French kings known for their military prowess; Bayard, see p. xxx.

2. Charles-Irénée Castel, Abbé de Saint-Pierre, who in 1712 published *A Project for Settling an Everlasting Peace in Europe;* English translation (London: Ferd. Burleigh, 1714).

3. Quoted in Dr. Hoefer, ed., *Nouvelle Biographie générale* Vol. 22 (Paris: Firmin Didot, 1865), col. 519.

4. For good editions of their works, see the Selected Bibliography.

CHAPTER 1

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2. Anon., *Peri Strategias* (sixth century), ed. and trans. George Dennis, *Three Byzantine Military Treatises.* (Washington, DC: Dumbarton Oaks, 1985), 20–21.

3. Leo VI the Wise, Emperor, *Taktike Theoria* (ca. 900), ed., Robert Vári, *Leonis imperatoris Tactica*, 2 vols. (Budapest: University Press, 1917); trans. George Dennis, *The Taktika of Leo* (Washington, DC: Dumbarton Oaks 2010.)

4. Robertus Valturius or Valturinus (Roberto Valturio), *Libri XII…de Re militari* (Verona: Gianni de Verona, 1472), Books 1–3.

5. Sextus Iulius Frontinus, *Stratagematon* (between 84–96 C.E.), trans. and ed., Charles E. Bennett, *Frontinus: The Stratagems and the Aqueducts of Rome* (London: William Heinemann for Loeb, 1925), e.g., 2–7.

6. Trans. from Greek into Latin by John Checo, *De bellico apparatu liber* (Bâle: Michael Isengrinium, 1554).

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10. François la Baume le Blanc Chevalier de la Vallière, *Pratique et Maximes de la Guerre* (Paris: Estienne Loyson, 1666).

11. Paul-Gédéon Joly de Maizeroy, *Institutions militaires de l'Empereur Léon le Philosophe,* 2 vols. (Paris: Claude-Antoine Jombert, 1771), 1:5–7.

12. Johann W. von Bourscheid, trans. *Kaiser Leo des Philosophen Strategie und Taktik* in 5 Bänden (Vienna: Joseph Edler von Kurzboeck, 1777–1781).

13. For the evolution of the term, see Beatrice Heuser, *The Evolution of Strategy: Thinking War from Antiquity to the Present* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), ch. 1.

14. Hermann Meynert, *Geschichte des Kriegswesens und der Heeresverfassung in Europa,* vol. 1 (Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt 1973), 291; Jan Frans Verbruggen, *The Art of Warfare in Western Europe during the Middle Ages; from the Eighth Century to 1340,* (1977; 2nd ed. Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 1997), 75; Hans Delbrück, *Geschichte der Kriegskunst*, *vol.* 3 *Das Mittelalter* (3rd ed. 1921; reprint, Hamburg: Nikol, 2003), 316–324.

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43. Vegetius, *Epitoma de re Militari*, 69f, 92, 116–119.

44. Vegetius, *Epitoma de re Militari*, 116–119.

45. Georg Heinrich von Berenhorst, *Betrachtungen über die Kriegskunst, über ihre Fortschritte, ihre Widersprüche und ihre Zuverlässigkeit* (1797; enlarged 3rd ed. Leipzig: 1827; reprint, Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1978), 18–27.

46. Vegetius, *Epitoma de re militari*, 1f.

47. Christine de Pisan, *Livre des fais d'armes,* trans. Caxton, *Boke of the fayt of armes and of Chyualrye* (London: Caxton, 1489).

48. Machiavelli, Niccolò, *Libro della Arte della Guerra* originally printed as Amadeo Niecoluci, *Arte de la Guerra* (Florence: li Heredi di Philippo di Giunta, 1521), trans. Ellis Farnworth, *The Art of War* (New York: Da Capo Press, 1965), 47, 51; Bernard Wicht, *L'Idée de milice et le Modèle suisse dans la Pensée de Machiavell* (Lausanne: l'Age de l'Homme, 1995).

49. Londoño, *El discvrso*, trans. John Thorins, *Military Discipline* (n.p.: John Wolf, 1589); Alava y Viamont, *El Perfecto Capitán;* Thomas Digges, in Thomas and Dudly Digges, *Four Paradoxes, or politique discourses Concerning Militarie Discipline* (London: H. Lownes for Clement Knight, 1604); ed. Brigadier Marquis de Puységur *Art de la Guerre, par principes et par règles, ouvrage de M. Le Maréchal [Jacques François] de Puységur* (Paris: Charles-Antoine Jombert, 1748); Joly de Maizeroy, *Traité des Stratagèmes permis a la guerre.*

50. Maurice de Saxe, *Rêveries sur l'Art de la Guerre* (written 1732; posthum. publ. in 1756), trans. Anon., *Reveries on the art of War* (Pope's Head: Sands, Donaldson, Murray, and Cochran, 1759), ix.

51. See Heuser, "The Military Revolution and the French Revolution in Warfare."

52. Baron Antoine Henri Jomini, *Traité des grandes Opérations militaires,* 4 vols., 2nd ed. (Paris: Magimel, 1811), trans. col. S. B. Holabird, *Treatise on Grand Military Operations, or a Critical and Military History of the Wars of Frederick the Great,* 2 vols. (New York: D. Van Nostrad, 1865).

53. Beatrice Heuser, "Clausewitz' Methodology and the Traditions of British Writing on War," in *The Blenheim Conference Papers, The Silent Alliance–300 Years of Anglo-German Cooperation,* ed. Major General Mungo Melvin, Occasional Paper No. 52 (UK Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, 2007), 46–58.

54. Susan Reynolds, *Kingdoms and Communities in Western Europe, 900–1300,* 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 254.

55. Cavalcanti, *La très élégante Oraison*, 120A.

56. Marie Gaille-Nikodimov, *Machiavel* (Paris: Talladier, 2005).

57. Simphorien Champier, *Les Proverbes des Princes* and Robert Balsac, *La nef des batailles*, both in *La nef des princes et des batailles* (Lyon: Guillaume Balsarin, 1502); and following Balsac, Stuart, *Traité sur l'Art de la Guerre*, 9.

58. Hugo Grotius (Hugo de Groot), *De iure pacis ac belli* (1625), trans. A. C. Campbell, *The Rights of War and Peace* (Washington, DC: M. Walter Dunne, 1901), 271.

59. See also de La Noue, *Discovrs politiqves et militaires*.

60. Williams, *Briefe discourse of Warre;* Garrard, *Arte of Warre;* Barret, *Theoricke and Practike;* Digges, *Four Paradoxes*.

61. Henry Hexham, *The Principles of the Art Militarie, Practised in the Warres of the Vnited Netherlands,* pt. 1 (London: M. P., 1637; 2nd ed. Delft: Antony van Heusden, 1642)*;* pt. 2 (Delft: Antony van Heusden, 1642).

62. Hay du Chastelet, *Traité de la Guerre, ou Politique militaire,* ch. X omitted here.

63. Clausewitz, *Vom Kriege/On War*, 141.

64. Leo VI the Wise, Emperor, *Taktike Theoria* (ca. 900), ed. Robert Vári, *Leonis imperatoris Tactica,* 2 vols. (Budapest: University Press, 1917), Preface.; Anon., *The Book of the Order of Chivalry*, 23; Bueil, *Le Jouvencel,* 15.

65. Antonio Cornazano, *De Re Militari* (Venice: Alexandro di Bindoni, 1515).

66. Cavalcanti, *La très élégante Oraison;* Girolamo Garimberto, *Il capitano generale* (2nd ed. Venice: Giordano Ziletti, 1556), 1.

67. Giovanni Battista Ciotti, *Aforismi politici e militari* (Venice: Stampati dal Ciotti, 1620).

68. Hexham, *Principles of the Art Militarie*.

69. Rohan, *Parfaict Capitaine*, 262.

70. Puységur, *Art de la Guerre*, 2.

71. Bardet de Villeneuve, *La Science militaire,* Vol. 1, *Cours de la science militaire* (The Hague: Jean van Duren, 1740).

72. Frank Tallett, *War and Society in Early-Modern Europe, 1495–1715* (London: Routledge, 1992), 42.

73. See chapter 9, and Paul-Gédéon Joly de Maizeroy, *Essais militaires, ou l'on traite des armes défensives* (Amsterdam: Gosses, 1762), passim.

74. Bülow, *Geist des neuern Kriegssystems,* 3rd. ed. (1835), xiv.

75. Joly de Maizeroy, *Essais militaires*, ii.

76. Clausewitz, *Vom Kriege/On War*, 87, 128.

77. Upton, *De Studio Militari*, ed. Barnard, 49.

78. Bülow, *Geist des neuern Kriegssystems* (1799), 211.

79. Bueil, *Le Jouvencel,* 13.

80. Champier, *Les Proverbes des Princes* in *La nef des princes et des batailles* (Lyon: Guillaume Balsarin, 1502), no pagination. This particular argument was reiterated verbatim by Diego de Alava y Viamont, *El Perfecto Capitán,* 107.

81. Champier, *Les Proverbes des Princes*.

82. For example, Machiavelli, *Arte della Guerra/Art of War*, 202.

83. Clausewitz, *Vom Kriege/On War*, 89.

84. Quoted in Barbara Donagan, "Atrocity, War Crime, and Treason in the English Civil War," *American Historical Review* 99.4 (1994): 1141f.

85. Onosander, *Strategikos* (before 57 C.E.), ed. and trans. William A. Oldfather, *Aeneas Tacticus, Asclepiodotus, Onosander* (London: William Heinemann for Loeb,

1923), 390. Oldfather translates "the heavens," on p. 391, but Onosander writes "the gods" on p. 390.

86. Porcia, *Clarissimi viri…de re militaris liber;* trans., Peter Betham, *The preceptes of Warre set forth by James the Erle of Purlilia* (London: E. Whytchurche, 1544), ch. 1, see also ch. 94.

87. Rocca, *De discorsi di gverra Libri quattro*, ch. I and XI; Arman Gontault de Biron, Mareschal [sic] de France, *Maximes et Instructions de l'Art de la Guerre* ed., Davdigvier (Paris: Toussaincts du Bray, 1611).

88. Ciotti, *Aforismi*, 1f.

89. Grotius, *De iure pacis ac belli/The Rights of War and Peace*, 267f.

90. Frederick II of Prussia, *Der Antimachiavell* (1739), in *Die Werke Friedrichs des Großen,* Vol. 7, *Antimachiavell und Testamente* ed. Gustav Berthold Volz (Berlin: Reimar Hobbing 1912), 108, 111f., 114.

91. Porcia, *De re militaris liber/Preceptes,* ch. 1.

92. Anon. [Johann Friedrich Konstantin von Lossau], *Der Krieg, Für wahre Krieger* (Leipzig: W. Engelmann, 1815), 3f.

93. Quoted in Donagan, "Atrocity…in the English Civil War," 1141f.

94. Bülow, *Geist des neuern Kriegssystems* (1799), 12.

95. Archduke Charles, *Grundsätze der höhern Kriegskunst für die Generäle der österreichischen Armee* (Vienna: Imperial and Royal Printing office, 1806), 7.

96. Lossau, *Der Krieg*, 3f.

97. Major General Johann Gottfried von Hoyer, *Handbuch für Offiziere in den angewandten Theilen der Krieges-Wissenschaften,* Vol. 4, *Von der Strategie* (Hanover: Helwigsche Hof-Buchhandlung, 1829), 3.

98. Clausewitz, *Vom Kriege/On War*, 75.

99. Stuart, *Traité sur l'Art de la Guerre*, p. 10.

100. Porcia, *De militaris re liber*, ch. 153.

101. Blaise de Monluc, *Comentaires de messire Blaise de Montluc maréchal de France, où sont descrits les combats etc. 1521–1575* (Bordeaux: Simon Millanges, 1592), *Commentaires* ed. Paul Courteault, (Bruges: Bibliothèque de la Pléiade/Gallimard, 1964), 669.

102. Bülow, *Geist des neuern Kriegssystems* (1799), 207–209, 215.

103. Psalm 20.

104. Basille, Becon, *The new pollecye of warre,* 34B.

105. Quoted by Champier, *Les gestes ensemble…Bayard*, p. 189.

106. Livy, *Ab Urbe Condita* XXII, 51.11.

107. For example, Onosander, *Strategikos* (before 57 C.E.), book XLII.

108. Upton, *De Studio Militari*, 55–57.

109. Porcia, *De re militaris liber/Preceptes,* ch. 66, see also ch. 109, 117.

110. Emerich de Vattel, *Le Droit des Gens, ou Principes de la Loi naturelle,* Livre III "De la guerre" (Leiden: la Compagnie, 1758), trans. Joseph Chitty, *The Law of Nations; or, Principles of the Law of Nature* (London: S. Sweet and Stevens, 1834), 354f.

111. For example, *The Book of the Order of Chivalry* (13th century [?]), ed. Alfred T. P. Byles (London: Kegan Paul, 2004), 38f.; Stuart, *Traité sur l'Art de la Guerre,* 8–10.

112. Champier, *Les gestes ensemble*, 160, 164–170.

113. Porcia, *De re militaris liber/Preceptes*, ch. 138, and see also ch. 128, 133, 146, 147, 182.

114. Rocca, *De discorsi di gverra Libri quattro*, 66, 165, 179.

115. Barret, *Theorike and Practike*, 11f.

116. Marquess Anibale Porroni, *Tratado universal militar moderno* (Venice: Francesco Nicolini, 1676), 417.

117. Vattel, *Le Droit des Gens/The Law of Nations*, 351f.

118. Porcia, *De re militaris liber/Preceptes*, ch. 45, 49; see also ch. 118, 155.

119. Christine de Pisan, *Livre de la Paix*.

120. Machiavelli, *The Discourses*, p. 354, emphasis added.

121. Leviticus 19:18; Matthew 5:43.

122. Grotius, *De iure pacis ac belli/The Rights of War and Peace,* passim.

123. Lloyd, General Henry Humphry Evans, *Continuation of the History of the Late War in Germany, between the King of Prussia, and the Empress of Germany and her Allies,* Part II (1781), in *War, Society and Enlightenment, The Works of General Lloyd,* ed. Patrick J. Speelman, (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2005), 453.

124. Vattel, *Le Droit des Gens/The Law of Nations,* 421f.

125. Champier, *Les Proverbes des Princes* and Balsac/Barsat, *La Nef des Batailles*.

126. Machiavelli, *I Discorsi/The Discourses*, 306–309.

127. Porcia, *De re militaris liber/Preceptes*, ch. 1, 3, 150.

128. Porcia, *De re militaris liber/Preceptes*, ch. 14, 73.

129. Archduke Charles, *Grundsätze der höhern Kriegskunst für die Generäle der österreichischen Armee* (Vienna: Imperial and Royal Printing Office, 1806), 6.

130. Alava y Viamont, *El Perfecto Capitán*, 72.

131. Porcia, *De re militaris liber/Preceptes*, ch. 11, 23, 25, 106, 198, and Peter Betham, *The preceptes of Warre set forth by James the Erle of Purlilia* (London: E. Whytchurche, 1544), dedicatory preface.

132. David Whetham, *Just Wars and Moral Victories, Surprise, Deception, and the Normative Framework of European War in the Later Middle Ages* (Leiden: Brill, 2009).

133. Robert de Balzac, *La Nef des Battailles.*

134. Robert de Balzac, *La Nef des Battailles.*

135. Machiavelli, *The Discourses*, 302.

136. Published posthumously by his son, Digges, *Four Paradoxes*, 1. Thomas Digges's work in large part plagiarises Bertrand de Loque's.

137. Machiavelli, *Discorsi/The Discourses*, 286.

138. Machiavelli, *Discorsi/The Discourses*, 259, 286, 346f, 449.

139. Porcia, *De re militari liber,* ch. 44.

140. Porcia, *De re militaris liber/Preceptes,* ch. 67, 148

141. See Beatrice Heuser, *The Evolution of Strategy, Thinking War from Antiquity to the Present.* pt. IV.

142. Bruni, "De militia," 390–397.

143. Machiavelli, *Arte Della Guerra/Art of War*, 7–43.

144. René Le Normant, *Discours pour le restablissement de la milice en France* (Rouen: Charles Osmont, 1632).

145. Père Gabriel Daniel, S. J., *Histoire de la milice française,* 2 vols. (Paris: Denis Mariette, Jean-Baptiste Despine, Jean-Baptiste Colgnard, 1721).

146. Napoléon, *Maximes* (London: Arthur L. Humphreys, 1906), 158.

147. Bülow, *Geist des neuern Kriegssystems* (1799), 214.

148. Johann Friedrich von der Decken, *Betrachtungen über das Verhältnis des Kriegsstandes zu dem Zwecke der Staaten* (Hanover: Helwig'sche Hofbuchhandlung, 1800; reprint, Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1982).

CHAPTER 2

1. M. Prevost et al., eds., *Dictionnaire de Biographie française,* Vol. 14 (Paris: Librairie Letouzey et Ané, 1979), col. 878; see also Dr. Hoefer, ed., *Nouvelle Biographie générale,* Vol. 39 (Paris: Firmin Didot, 1865), col. 421f; J. Fr. Michaud, ed., *Biographie universelle ancienne et moderne,* Vol. 14 (Paris: Madame C. Desplaces, n.d.), 557; *Biographie toulousaine,* Vol. 1 (Paris: Michaud, 1823); and François Xavier de Feller, *Biographie universelle, nouvelle édition* (Lyon: Pelagaud, 1851).
2. Gladys Dickinson, ed., *Mission de Beccarie de Pavie, Baron de Fourquevaux en Ecosse 1549* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1948).
3. Prevost et al., eds., *Dictionnaire de Biographie française,* Vol. 14, col. 879.
4. See ch. 5.
5. Prevost et al., eds., *Dictionnaire de Biographie française,* Vol. 14, col. 890.
6. By the same publisher in 1549, and again by Michel Vascosan & Galiot du Pré in 1553 and 1592.
7. Paul Iue, *The Practise of Fortification* (London: Thomas Orwin, 1589).
8. See also a facsimile reprint, edited by Gladys Dickinson (London: Athlone Press, 1954).
9. From fr.: *Arrièreban,* military unit composed of vassals owing service to a lord.
10. Quintus Sertorius, 123–72 B.C.E., Roman general in the Marsic War (90–89 B.C.E.) between Sulla and Marius.
11. Quintus Caecilius Metellus Pius, ca. 130–63 B.C.E., Roman general in the Marsic War.
12. Pierre Terrail, Chevalier de Bayard, 1473–1524, French general, great hero, and example of chivalry, who died after being wounded at Robecco.
13. Battle of Poitiers, 1356, English victory in the Hundred Years' War.
14. Quintus Fabius Maximus, ca. 280–203 B.C.E, called "Cunctator," the one who hesitates, because of his strategy in fighting the Carthaginians under Hannibal.
15. Charles VII of France, born 1403, king 1422–1461.
16. Joan of Arc, ca. 1412–1431.
17. Agesilaus II of Sparta, ruled ca. 400–360 B.C.E., described by Xenophon and Plutarch.
18. Agathocles, ruler of Syracuse from 317 B.C.E., then of all of Sicily, 304–289 B.C.E.

CHAPTER 3

1. The sources for this biography are throughout Dr. Hoefer, ed., *Nouvelle Biographie générale,* Vol. 31 (Paris: Firmin Didot, 1862), col. 632, and Justin Brun-Durand, *Dictionnaire biographique et biblio-iconigraphique de la Drôme,* Vol. 1 (Grenoble: Dauphinoise, 1900), 102–104.
2. Num. 31:1.
3. Deut. 20:1, 23:14; 2 Chron. 20:16.
4. Exod. 15:3; 2 Chron. 20:16.
5. Gen. 14:14.
6. Matt. 26:52; Luke 7:8, 3:14; Acts 10; Heb. 11:33; Rom. 13:4.
7. Exod. 20.
8. Matt. 5:39.
9. Matt. 26:53.
10. Num. 21:1, 21, 33.

11. Isa. 49:23.
12. Rom. 13:4.
13. Deut. 17:19.
14. 1 Tim. 24.
15. Alfonso V of Aragon, later also king of Naples, 1396–1458.
16. Early Christian sects that were condemned as heretics by the Church Councils and persecuted.
17. Augustine of Hippo, *Letter to Bonifatius*.
18. Agasicles or Agasicles, ruled ca. 575–550 B.C.E. The context of this reference is unclear, unless Loque means Agesilaus II of Sparta, who was praised for his wisdom by Xenophon and Plutarch.
19. Hypocrates, *Aphorismi* 6 *Aeph*.
20. Cicero, *De Officiis,* 1.35.
21. Reference unclear: probably one of the Caecilii Metelli clan, several of whose members were involved in the wars against Hannibal.
22. Exod. 21:12.
23. Plutarch, *Life of Lysander* 7.4 and *Apophthegmata Laconica* 229 B.
24. Cicero, *De Officiis,* 1.41

CHAPTER 4

1. Sidney Lee, ed., *Dictionary of National Biography,* Vol. 55 (London: Smith, Elder, 1898), 175–177; H.C.G. Matthew & Brian Harrison, eds., *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography,* Vol. 53 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 351–353.
2. His ch. 15 omitted here.
3. Lee, *Dictionary of National Biography*, Vol. 55, 176
4. She was called either Frances and predeceased her father (Matthew & Harrison, 353) or else Anne, who later married Richard Hals of Knedon (Lee, 177).
5. Seigneur [François] de la Noue, *Discours politiques et militaires,* 2nd ed. (Bâle: François Forest, 1587).
6. Count Giacomo/Jacopo di Porcia, *Clarissimi viri Jacobi Povliliavm comitis de re militaris liber* (Venice: Joannis Tacuinus di Tridino, 1530), trans. Peter Betham, *The preceptes of Warre set forth by James the Erle of Purlilia* (London: E. Whytchurche, 1544), and see pp. 68 and 84 of this chapter.
7. Hannibal, in Livy, *Ab Urbe condita* 30.44.8.
8. Flavius Vegetius, *De re militari* III, 1.
9. Sutcliffe gives "Publius," adapted from Horace, *Satires* 2.2.111.
10. Cicero, *De Officiis,* 1.36.
11. Alphonso the Wise of Spain, *De rebus Hispaniae.*
12. Valturius or Valturinus, Robertus (Roberto Valturio), *Libri XII . . . de Re militari* (Verona: Gianni de Verona, 1472).
13. Franceso Guicciardini, a Florentine, historian and papal diplomat (1483–1540).
14. Flavius Vegetius, *De Re militari.* I.1.
15. *Rom*. 13.
16. Augustinus, *Epistula ad Bonifacium* 6.
17. Abrose of Milan, *De officiis.*
18. Bernard of Clairvaux, *De laude novae militiae.*
19. Sutcliffe cites Ovid., but reference unclear.

20. Sutcliffe cites Lucan, but reference unclear.
21. Sutcliffe cites Livy, *Ab urbe condita* XXI, but reference unclear.
22. Sutcliffe cites Euripides, *Electra.*
23. Phil. Com. li.4.–Reference unclear.
24. Cicero, *Pro Milone* 30.
25. Aristotle, *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* 1425.
26. adapted from Cicero *De officiis* 1.28?
27. Sutcliffe gives Livy, *Ab urbe condita* VI and VII, but reference unclear.
28. Sutcliffe gives Sallust, *De conjuratione Catilinae,* but reference unclear.
29. *Lex cornelia apud hostes,* de captiu.
30. Augustine, *Contra Faustum Manichaeum.*
31. Cicero, *De Officiis,* 36.
32. Augustine, *Contra Faustum Manichaeum.*
33. Sancho de Londoño, *El discvrso sobre la forma de redvcir la Disciplina militar, à meyor y antigvo estado* (Brussels: 1589; reprint, Madrid: Ministry of Defence, 1992), 56f.
34. Augustinus, 22 *Contra Faustum Manichaeum* XXII. 7.
35. Cicero, *De Officiis,* 3 [1?].
36. Dionysus of Halicarnassus: *Antiquitates Romanae* I.
37. Sutcliffe gives Livy, *Ab urbe condita,* VI, but reference unclear.
38. Sutcliffe gives Publius [Horace], but without further specification.
39. Vegetius, *De Re militari,* III. 3.
40. Sutcliffe gives Tacitus [*Agricola?*] 18, without further specification.
41. Xenophon, *Cyropaedia* 1.
42. Livy, *Ab urbe contita,* XXXIV.
43. Homer, *Iliad.*
44. Sutcliffe gives Polybius, II without further specification.
45. Tacitus, *Agricola.*
46. Unlike in France during the Hundred Years' War, and during the Elizabethan campaigns in Flanders. In both cases, England took her wars abroad.
47. Sutcliffe gives [Francesco] Guicciardini, Book I, but the reference is unclear—this could refer to one of Guicciardini's histories.
48. Homer, *Iliad*.
49. Fabius Maximux (ca. 280–203 B.C.E.), Roman general, acquired his byname "Cuctator"—the one who hesitates—because of the caution he used in the wars against Hannibal.
50. Porcius Licinius, a general in the battle of the Metaurus, 207 B.C.E., see Livy, *Ab urbe condita,* XXVII. 47.
51. Hasdrubal Barca, brother of Hannibal.
52. Plutarch, *Themistocles.*
53. Livy, *Ab urbe condita,* XXVIII.
54. Echoes here of Porcia, *De militaris re liber,* ch. 100?
55. Livy, *Ab urbe condita,* IX.
56. Sallust, *Conjur. Catil.*
57. Scipio and Hannibal, both from Livy, *Ab urbe condita,* XXX.
58. In the French Wars of Religion in the 16th century, the Protestants finally managed to negotiate safe havens for themselves—towns in which they could live according to their social rules and practice their own religions freely, while both sides abstained from proselytizing in each other's towns.

CHAPTER 5

1. Federico Carlos Sainz de Robles, *Ensayo de un Diccionario de la Literatura,* Vol. 2, *Escritores españoles y hispanicoamericanos* (Madrid: Aguilar, 1973), 776f.

2. *Commentarios de lo sucedito en los Paizes Baxos, desde del anno MDLXVII hasta el de MDLXXVII* (Paris, 1591; Madrid, 1592).

3. Don Nicolas Antonius Hispalensus, *Bibliotheca Hispana Nova,* Vol. 1 (Madrid: Joachim de Ibarra, 1783), 218.

4. See also Dr. Hoefer, ed., *Nouvelle Biographie générale,* Vol. 34 (Paris: Firmin Didot, 1865), col. 957f.; J. Fr. Michaud, ed., *Biographie universelle ancienne et moderne,* Vol. 27 (Paris: Madame C. Desplaces, n.d.), 628; Lopez Piñero, Thomas F. Glinck, Victor Navarro Brotóns, and Eugenio Portela Marco, eds., *Diccionario histórico de la ciencia moderna en España,* Vol. 2 (Barcelona: Ediciones Peninsula, 1983), 53.

5. Don Martin Fernandez de Navarette, *Biblioteca marítima española,* Vol. 1 (Barcelona: Palau & Dulcet, 1995), 241–245.

6. Cristobál de Rojas, *Teoría y Pratica de Fortificación* (1598).

7. Don Nicolas Antonius Hispalensus, *Bibliotheca Hispana Nova,* Vol. 1 218.

8. See ch. 2.

9. Juan Antonio Sánchez Belén, "Teórica y Práctica de Guerra de Bernardino de Mendoza: entre la politica y la ciencia military," in Bernardino de Mendoza, *Teórica y prática de guerra* (Madrid: Ministerio de Defensa, 1998), 11.

10. Luis Valle de la Cerda, *Avisos en materia de Estado y Guerra para oprimir rebeliones o hacer paces con enemigos armados, o tratar con súbditos rebeldes* (written 1583, printed 1599); see Sánchez Belén, "Teórica y Práctica," 13, 15.

11. Mendoza was writing for the young crown prince, the future Philip III of Spain, who was 18 at the time of Mendoza's book's publication.

12. Psalm 88:35.

13. Sir Edwarde Hoby added here, "How still you conclude with your own error, acknowledging the great injustice you have done her Majesty by having nourished and given pension to so many English traitorous subjects."

14. Isidor of Seville, *Sententiae,* Book 3 ch. 5: "Plerumque Rex justus etiam malorum errores dissimulare novit, non quod iniquitati eorum consentiat, sed quod aptum tempus correctionis expectet, in quo eorum vitia emendare valeat, vel punire."

15. The context here is the role specialization of armed forces—the Welsh and English specialized in artillery (especially longbow and crossbow), the Swiss in pikemen, and so on.

CHAPTER 6

1. What we do know is found in Dr. Hoefer, ed., *Nouvelle Biographie generale,* Vol. 10 (Paris: Firmin Didot Freres, 1855), col. 71–73; and Prosper Jean Levot, *Biographie bretonne,* Vol. 1 (Vannes: Cauderan, 1852–1857), 303–305.

2. Levot, *Biographie bretonne* Vol. 1, 303.

3. *Réflexions de Du Moulin* (Cologne: 1771).

4. Dr. Hoefer, ed., *Nouvelle Biographie generale,* Vol. 10, col. 73; and Levot, *Biographie bretonne,* Vol. 1, 305.

5. Louis XIV of France.

6. Cf. Loque, p. 52 above.

7. Vergil.
8. Reference to Machiavelli?
9. The same argument is made in Count Giacomo/Jacopo di Porcia, *Clarissimi viri Jacobi Pvrliliarvm comitis de re militaris liber* (Venice: Joannis Tacuinus di Tridino, 1530), transl. by Peter Betham, *The preceptes of Warre set forth by James the Erle of Purlilia* (London: E. Whytchurche, 1544), ch. 17.
10. See above p. 16.
11. This is the term used for *camps-volans* by Paul Ive or Iue, see Ive's translation of Fourquevaux, *Instructions for the warres* (London: Thomas Man & Tobie Cooke, 1589), passim.

CHAPTER 7

1. Gonzalo Anes and A. Castrillón, "Solar y Familia del Marques de Santa Cruz de Marcenado," in Gonzalo Anes et al. *El Marques de Santa Cruz de Marcenado: 300 Años despues* (Oviedo: Instituto de Estudios Asturianos, 1985), 112–136.
2. Two different names are given for his second wife. Madariaga has Doña Isabel de la Rocha, see Juan de Madariaga, "Vida del Marqués de Santa Cruz de Marcenado," in de Madariaga, *Comentarios á la vida y escritos del General Marqués de Santa Cruz de Marcenado* (Madrid: Enrique Rubiños, 1886) while Anes and Castrillón ("Solar y Familia del Marques,") have María Teresa Roig y Magriña from Tortosa, where Santa Cruz was conducting the siege.
3. Vicente Palacio Atard, "El entoro historico de las 'Reflexiones Militares," Special Issue of *Revista de Historia Militar* for Santa Cruz's 300th birthday, Vol. 39. (1985), 71.
4. Don Joaquín de la Llave y García, "La Biblioteca del Marqués de Santa Cruz," in Administración y Redacción de la Revista Cientifico-Militar, ed., *Reflexiones Militares del Vizconde de Puerto* (Barcelona: Revista Científico-Militar, 1885), xliii–lx.
5. Don Julio Fonseca Rodríguez, "El proyecto del magno 'Diccionario universal' del Marques de Santa Cruz de Marcenado," in Anes et al., *El Marques…300 Años despues,* 95–104.
6. For Santa Cruz's time in Turin, see Madariaga, "Vida del Marqués," 120–127.
7. Madariaga, "Vida del Marqués," 128–141.
8. There is a debate what rank and mission he had; see Madariaga, "Vida del Marqués," partic. 166.
9. Madariaga, "Vida del Marqués," 144.
10. Madariaga, "Vida del Marqués," 177; Didier Ozanam, *Les Diplomates espagnols du XVIIIe Siècle* (Madrid: Case de Velázquez, 1998), 366f.; Luis Lopez Anglada, "Vida de Don Alvaro de Navia-Osorio, Marques de Santa Cruz de Marcenado y Vizconde de Puerto," in Special Issue of *Revista de Historia Militar,* 15–20; Fernando Murillo Rubiera, "Santa Cruz de Marcenado: un Militar ilustrado," in Special Issue of *Revista de Historia Militar,* 109–166.
11. José María Garate Cordoba, "Las Reflexiones militares del Marques de Santa Cruz de Marcenado," *Revue internationale d'histoire militaire* 56 (1984), 148.
12. Garate Cordoba, "Las Reflexiones militares," 128f.
13. Trans. Francis Vergy, *Reflexions militaires et politiques* (Paris: Librairie Rollin fils, 1735).
14. Trans.Bohr.

15. Trans.Mariano Frezza, *Lo Squadronista, o sía, Táctica Militare* (Naples: 1752), with another edition *Reflezzioni Militare* (1760); see Garate Cordoba, "Las Reflexiones militares," 151f.

16. Anon. Preface in Zanthier, *Versuch ueber die Lehre vcon Detaschements* (posthum. publ., Dresden: Walther'sche Hofbuchhandlung, 1783), 2–8; Georg Christoph Hamberger and Johann Georg Meusel, *Das gelehrte Deutschland*, Vol. 8, 5th ed. (Lemgo: Meyer, 1800).

17. *Versuch über die Märsche der Armeen, der Lager, Schlachten und den Operationsplan, erläutert durch die Geschichte des vorigen Krieges* (Dresden: Waltherische Hofbuchhandlung, 1778).

18. *Feldzuege des Viscompte Tuerenne, Marechal-General der Armeen des Königs von Frankreich, aus den ächtesten Urkunden* (Leipzig: bei Weidmanns Erben und Reich, 1779).

19. "Ignaz de Castro," tragedy by Antonio Verreira; "Ignaz de Castro," tragedy by Domingo dos Reis Quinta"; and also "Bristo," comedy by Antonio Verreira, translated by Zanthier in excerpts in Bertuch, ed., *Meister der Spanischen und Portugiesischen Literatur*, Vol. 3 (1782).

20. *Versuch über die Lehre von Detaschements* (Dresden: Waltherische Hofbuchhandlung, 1783).

21. Santa Cruz de Marcenado, Don Alvaro de Navia-Osorio y Vigil, Vizconde de Puerto, Marques de *Reflexiones Militares* Book IX.

22. *Reflexiones* Book IX, ch. 27.

23. *Reflexiones* Book IX, ch. 10.

24. Reference to the Jacobite Uprising of 1715, in which James Francis Edward Stuart—the "Old Pretender"—tried to claim the English and Scottish throne as James III.

25. *Reflexiones* Book XVII.

26. *Reflexiones* Book XVII, ch. 2.

27. *Reflexiones* Book XVII, ch. 3.

28. *Reflexiones* Book XVII, ch. 7.

29. *Reflexiones* Book XVIII, ch. 3.

30. *Reflexiones* Book VIII.

31. *Reflexiones* Book VIII, ch. 1.

32. *Reflexiones* Book VIII, ch. 19–26.

33. *Reflexiones* Book VIII, ch. 27–62.

34. *Reflexiones* Book VIII, ch. 63f.

35. *Reflexiones* Books X–XIII.

36. *Reflexiones* Book XIII, ch. 3–4.

37. *Reflexiones* Book XIX.

CHAPTER 8

1. Roger Callois, *Bellone ou la perte de la guerre* (Brussels: La Renaissance du Livre, 1963), 84.

2. Hoefer calls him Charles-Bénoît. See Dr. Hoefer, ed., *Nouvelle Biographie générale*, Vol. 22 (Paris: Firmin Didot, 1865), cols. 518–521.

3. This and the other personal data are taken from Hoefer, *Nouvelle Biographie*, and from the latest biography by Éthel Groffier, *Le Stratège des Lumières: Le comte de Guibert, 1743–1790* (Paris: Honoré Champion, 2005).

4. Guigliemo Ferrero, *Bonaparte en Italie, 1796–1797* (Paris: Plon, 1936), 85ff.; Groffier, *Le Stratège,* 9.

5. M. Prevost et al., eds. *Dictionnaire de Biographie française,* Vol. 17 (Paris: Librairie Letouzey et Ané, 1989), col. 48ff.

6. Prosper Vedrenne: *Les Fauteuils de l'Académie,* Vol. 2 (Paris: Blond & Barral, 1887), 88.

7. Groffier, *Le Stratège,* 23ff.

8. Prevost et al., eds., *Dictionnaire,* Vol. 17, col. 48.

9. Ferrero, *Bonaparte en Italie,* 85ff.

10. Immanuel Kant, *Zum Ewigen Frieden* (Königsberg: Friedrich Nicolovius, 1795), trans. by Anon., *Project for a Perpetual Peace* (London: Vernor and Hood, 1796). On the democratic peace debate, see Christopher Layne, "Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace," *International Security* vol. 19, no. 2 (Fall 1994), 5–49.

11. Jean Lambert Alphonse Colin, *L'Education militaire de Napoléon* (Paris, 1901), quoted in Matti Lauerma, *Jacques-Antoine-Hippolyte de Guibert (1743–1790)* (Helsinki: Suomalainen Tiedeakatemia, 1989), 25.

12. Marquis de Silva, *Remarques sur quelques articles de l'General Essay de Tactique* (Turin: frères Reycent, 1773); see also Anon. [François-Jean de Mesnil-Durand], *Fragments de Tactique ou Six Mémoires* (Paris: C. A. Jombert père, 1774), pt. 6, "Sur l'Essay général de Tactique," 188–370; Le Chevalier M*** de C***, *Grande Tactique et manœuvres de guerre, suivant les principes de sa Majesté prussienne* (Potsdam and Paris: la veuve Tilliard & fils, Merigot le jeune, Alexandre Jombert le Jeune, 1780); Le G. de W…y [General de Warnery]: *Remarques sur l'General Essay de Tactique de Guibert* (Warsaw, 1781).

13. Anon. [attributed in the catalogue of the Bibliothèque Mazarine to Chevalier d'Arçon], *Défense du Système moderne de la Guerre, ou Réfutation du Système de M. de M…D…* (Neuchâtel, 1779).

14. See the preface of this book, p. vi above, for the poem written by Voltaire about Guibert.

15. As Lauerma shows convincingly in *Jacques-Antoine-Hippolyte de Guibert,* 98, 175–211.

16. Samuel Anderson Covington, "The Comité Militaire and the Legislative Reform of the French Army, 1789–1791," Ph.D. Diss. (Little Rock: University of Arkansas, 1976), 1–17.

17. Covington, "The Comité Militaire," 18–27.

18. Jacques Antoine Hippolyte de Guibert, *Projet de Discours d'un Citoyen aux trois orders de l'Assemblee de Berry* (1789); passages are also included in Guibert's *De la Force publique.*

19. Le G. de W…y, *Remarques sur l'General Essay de Tactique de Guibert* 189–193.

20. Thanks to Sophie Lick for providing the first draft of the translation.

21. Several political entities in Europe were still composed of territories not immediately adjacent to each other, for example, the possessions of the Hohenzollerns.

22. That is, strategy, according to the Greek definition; see p. 1f above.

23. My home is where I feel well.

24. *Force publique* (public force) is a force that has legitimate and legalized use of physical force in order to serve public interests. It can refer to both police and military forces. The first use of the concept of *force publique* was in the Declaration of Human Rights, 1789.

CHAPTER 9

1. This and all following biographical information come from B. Poten, "Rühle von Lilienstern" in *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie,* ed. by the Historical Commission, Vol. 29 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1875–1912), 611–615.

2. [Otto August] R[ühle] v[on] L[ilienstern], *Bericht eines Augenzeugen von dem Feldzuge… September und Oktober 1806* (Tübingen: Cotta, 1809).

3. [Otto August] R[ühle] v[on] L[ilienstern], *Reise mit der Armee im Jahre 1809,* 3 vols. (Rudolfstadt: Hof-, Buch- und Kunsthandlung, 1810–1812).

4. [Otto August] R[ühle] v[on] L[ilienstern], *Kriegskatechismus für die Landwehr* (Breslau, 1813).

5. As quoted in Louis Sauzin, ed., *Ruehle von Lilienstern et son Apologie de la Guerre* (Paris: Nizet et Bastard, 1937) 35, 38.

6. [Otto August] R[ühle] v[on] L[ilienstern], *Handbuch für den Offizier zur Belehrung im Frieden und zum Gebrauch im Felde* (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1817), 1:114.

7. Anon. [Johann Friedrich Konstantin von Lossau], *Der Krieg: Für wahre Krieger*, (Leipzig: W. Engelmann, 1815), 7.

8. They are thus interdependent variables.

9. This spells out the theory of war as a zero-sum game.

10. Rühle here in a footnote refers to the concrete examples of the American War of Independence and the uprisings in the Vendée, Tyrol, Spain, Prussia, and Russia.

11. No source is given by Rühle for this quotation.

12. Today's linguists would say "socially constructed."

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About the Author

BEATRICE HEUSER holds a Chair in International Relations at the University of Reading. A graduate of the Universities of London (Bedford College and LSE) and the University of Oxford (D. Phil.), she holds a Higher Doctorate (*Habilitation*) from the Philipps-University of Marburg. From 1991 to 2003 she taught at the Department of War Studies, King's College, London, where she last held the Chair in International and Strategic Studies (2000–2003). In 1997–1998 she spent a sabbatical at NATO headquarters as a consultant/intern. From 2003 to 2007 she was director of research at the Military History Research Office of the *Bundeswehr.* She has also taught in France at the University of Reims and at the Graduate School of Journalism in Lille, and in Germany at the University of Potsdam and the University of the *Bundeswehr* near Munich. Her publications include *The Evolution of Strategy: Thinking War from Antiquity to the Present* (2010); *Reading Clausewitz* (2002); and several books, edited volumes, and close to 100 articles on strategy (especially nuclear strategy and culture in Britain, France, and Germany), NATO, and Cold War international relations.