Acerroës' Three Short Commentaries on Aristotle's "Topics," "Rhetoric," and "Poetics"

title | : | Averroës' Three Short Commentaries On Aristotle's "Topics," "Rhetoric," and "Poetics" Studies in Islamic Philosophy and Science
author | : | Averroèes.; Butterworth, Charles E.
publisher | : | State University of New York Press
isbn10 | asin | : | 0873952081
print isbn13 | : | 9780873952088
ebook isbn13 | : | 9780585018591
language | : | English
subject |  | Aristotle.--Organon, Logic--Early works to 1800.
publication date | : | 1977
lcc | : | B749.A35B87eb
ddc | : | 160
subject | : | Aristotle.--Organon, Logic--Early works to 1800.

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STUDIES IN ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE

Published under the auspices of the Society for the Study of Islamic Philosophy and Science

EDITORIAL BOARD

George F. Hourani, State University of New York at Buffalo

Muhsin Mahdi, Harvard University

Parviz Morewedge, Baruch College of City University of New York

Nicholas Rescher, University of Pittsburgh

Ehsan Yar-Shater, Columbia University

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Averroës Three Short Commentaries on Aristotle's "Topics, Rhetoric, and "Poetics

Edited and Translated by
Charles E. Butterworth

ALBANY
STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK PRESS
1977

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UNESCO COLLECTION OF REPRESENTATIVE WORKS
ARABIC SERIES
This book has been accepted
in the Arabic Series
of the Translations Collection
of the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO)

First Edition

Published by State University of New York Press
99 Washington Avenue, Albany, New York 12246

© 1977 State University of New York

All rights reserved

Printed in the United States of America

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Averroës, 1126-1198.
Averroës' three short commentaries on Aristotle's
"Topics," "Rhetoric," and ''Poetics."

(Studies in Islamic Philosophy and Science)
Arabic and English.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. Aristoteles. Organon. 2. LogicEarly works to 1800.
I. Butterworth, Charles E.
II. Title. III. Series.
B749.A35B87 160 75-4900
ISBN 0-87395-208-1

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To My Wife

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Preface

There was a time when Dante could be certain that even an oblique reference to Averroës would be immediately understood by any of his readers. Indeed, over the course of several centuries, fierce debate raged around the philosophy of Averroës: he was either extolled as the foremost interpreter of Aristotle or vilified as the gravest menace to Christian faith. Schools devoted to the study and propagation of his commentaries on Aristotle flourished, while others zealously committed to combatting the teachings of those commentaries had equal success. Today, mention of his name evokes no passions, prompts no discussions; rather, reference to Averroës is usually met with querulous stares. Even in learned circles, little is known about the man and still less about his teachings.

The contemporary neglect of Averroës can be traced to the very reason for his celebrity during the Middle Ages: his reputation as the commentator on Aristotle. Today, few people are interested in either Aristotle or commentary. Philosophic study having been reduced to scientific method or general culture, the passion for serious discussion about perennial problems has waned. Thus knowledge of, much less interest in, the problems raised by Aristotle is slight, and desire for acquaintance with the momentous debates those problems have occasioned nil. Moreover, with the spread of the assumption that all things evolve through time, inventiveness has come to be acclaimed the mark of excellent thought and commentary condemned as imitative or servile. Consequently, Averroës has been judged as neither meriting an important place in the history of philosophy nor deserving particular study.

Even those still attracted to the philosophy of Aristotle are little inclined to study the commentaries by Averroës. They seem to consider the recovery of the Greek manuscripts as having diminished the significance of those commentaries. In their eyes, Averroës performed the

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historical function of preserving Aristotle's thought until the sources could be recovered, but his importance goes no further. As a result, Averroës has become a figure of mild curiosity, a thinker to be studied by orientalists or backward looking scholastics.

For many reasons, the contemporary neglect of Averroës is unfortunate. Like Aristotle, Averroës addressed himself to theoretical and practical questions of concern to human beings in all ages. As long as it is possible to wonder about the origin of the world or the basis of political justice, serious minds can delight in careful consideration of Aristotle's ideas and in Averroës's interpretative presentation of those ideas. To such minds his use of the commentary can be especially instructive, for the art of commenting was completely transformed in his hands. Far from a servile imitation or literal repetition, Averroës presented a unique interpretation of Aristotle's ideas under the guise of a commentary. Indeed, an attentive reading of Averroës's commentaries with the texts of Aristotle shows that arguments Aristotle had made are often omitted, notions foreign to his thought sometimes added, and on occasion arguments even invented in his name.

Hence the recovery of the Greek manuscripts does not render Averröes's commentaries obsolete. On the contrary, their recovery makes the study of those commentaries immensely more fascinating. As the thought of Aristotle is laid bare and compared with the interpretation presented by Averroës, new questions about the meaning of the interpretation, as well as about the significance of the distortion, arise. At that point the reader can begin to appreciate the special relationship between the scholarly task of uncovering the thought of someone else and the philosophic task of making that thought one's own. Once Averroës's use of the commentary acquires this kind of problematic significance, his reputation as the commentator on Aristotle can again occasion serious reflection.

The treatises presented here are especially helpful for reassessing the importance of Averroës. Nowhere has he been so audaciously liberal with the text of Aristotle as in these treatises or in the larger collection from which they are taken. That larger collection has long been presumed to represent Averroës's Short Commentary on Aristotle's Organon. It does represent that short commentary, but a short commentary which transforms the Organon by adding a non-Aristotelian treatise, as well as Aristotelian treatises not belonging to what is usually understood to be the Organon, and by changing the order of

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the treatises in the Organon. More importantly, the treatises presented herewhich are short commentaries on individual treatises of the extended Organonoffer exciting interpretations and provocative applications of Aristotle's teaching. Consideration of the logical arts appears to be little more than a veil from behind which Averroës evoked the problematic relation between philosophic thought, religious belief, and political conviction. Even the horizons of time and culture peculiar to the discussion serve only as reminders of how unlimited the discussion really is.

It is especially pleasant to be able to express my gratitude to all those who have given so generously of their time and learning and thus facilitated my work on this book, as well as to acknowledge those institutions which have provided material aid.

Without the help of Norman Golb, I would never have been able to undertake this project; he gave unstintingly of his time and learning to teach me how to decipher Judaeo-Arabic manuscripts. Lawrence Marwick and William C. Williams helped me prepare the Hebrew part of the critical apparatus. George N. Atiyeh offered valuable criticism of the Arabic text. If I have a severe but judicious Aristarchus, it must be Miriam Galston; she offered excellent criticism of the finished text and invaluable advice about how to translate technical Arabic into smooth English. Above all, the final presentation of the book owes much to the careful eye and agile mind of Muhsin Mahdi and to his sound advice at each stage of the project. I am especially grateful for the friendly help extended by each of these persons.

I would like to acknowledge the assistance of the Graduate School of the University of Maryland which awarded me a fellowship for the summer of 1970 and a grant for typing expenses. I would also like to acknowledge the assistance provided by a fellowship from the American Research Center in Egypt for the summer of 1972. Finally, I wish to thank the personnel of the Centre Universitaire International in Paris for their helpfulness.

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Contents

Introduction

1

The Text

5

The Teaching of the Text

19

Short Commentary on Aristotle's "Topics"

43

Short Commentary on Aristotle's "Rhetoric"

57

Short Commentary on Aristotle's "Poetics"

79

Notes

85

Index

135

Arabic Texts

143

Page 1

Introduction

Born in Córdoba in 1126 C.E. (520 Anno Hegirae), ¹ Abu* al-Walid* Muhammad* ibn Ahmad* Ibn Rushd, known to the West as Averroës, received a traditional education in the principal disciplines of Islamic culture: jurisprudence and theology. He also studied medicine, eloquence, poetry, literature, and philosophy. His reputation as a man of learning brought him to the attention of his sovereign, Abu* Ya`qub* Yusuf*, the ruler of the Almohad dynasty, who encouraged him to explain the difficulties in the works of Aristotle and appointed him as a judge, eventually naming him the chief justice of Seville. Except for a brief period of legal exile, Averroës occupied this post, also serving as personal physician and sometime adviser to the Almohad sovereigns, until almost the end of his life in 595/1 198. Still, his reputation among learned men of the Middle Ages was due to his skillful interpretations of pagan philosophy and defense of theoretical speculation, rather than to these practical accomplishments. Even today his theoretical accomplishments could interest thoughtful men, but most of his writings are largely inaccessible to themexisting only in medieval manuscripts or barely intelligible Latin translations.

An attempt is made here to fill that void by presenting three treatises of historical and theoretical significance to all interested in philosophic thought. None of these treatises has ever before been edited and published in Arabic or translated into a modern language.² Because the Arabic manuscripts were apparently lost at an early date, the closest replicas of the original Arabic version now available to interested scholars are two Judaeo-Arabic manuscripts. They have been used as the basis of this edition. According to the scribe of one of the manuscripts, the copy was completed in 1356 C.E. Unfortunately there is no reliable information about the date of the other manuscript: the date of 1216, written in the kind of Arabic numerals used by Westerners in recent times and in a hand other than that of the scribe, appears on

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the title page; it has no connection with any of the textual material.

The fourteenth century manuscript contains a Hebrew translation opposite the Judaeo-Arabic text. The Arabic text was first translated into Hebrew in the thirteenth century. Subsequently, it was translated into Hebrew a number of other times, and one translation was eventually published in the mid-sixteenth century. ³ Collating the Hebrew translation with the Judaeo-Arabic manuscripts proved to be of little help for establishing an accurate Arabic text.

Numerous Latin translations of Averroës's works were made in the early thirteenth century, many of which were published in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. However, the only known Latin version of the texts presented here is that of Abraham de Balmes who died in 1523 C.E. This translation, made directly from the Hebrew, was published in Venice in the sixteenth century. It has gained wide acceptance and is the principal source cited by those interested in the logical thought of Averroës. It, too, was collated with the Judaeo-Arabic versions, but was of even less help than the Hebrew translation for establishing an accurate Arabic text.

To appreciate why only two manuscripts of such an important work have survived and why those manuscripts have survived in Judaeo-Arabic rather than in Arabic, it is necessary to reflect upon the suspicion in which Averroës was placed as a result of legal exile in the later years of his life. It is also necessary to consider the significance of the purge of unorthodox opinions carried out by the Almohad dynasty shortly after his death. At that time, religious intolerance reached such intensity that books suspected of heresy were frequently burned before the public. It is probable that in this setting works attributed to a figure as controversial as Averroës readily disappeared. However, largely because of Maimonides's influence, Averroës had very early gained such fame in the Jewish community that most of his works were transliterated into Judaeo-Arabic, translated into Hebrew, and widely circulated in North Africa and even France. The collection to which the treatises presented here belong, as well as Averroës's more formal commentaries on works by Aristotle, were of special importance to those members of the Jewish community interested in peripatetic philosophy and were consequently carefully preserved. Even though Latin Aristotelian studies became more prominent than Jewish Aristotelian studies in the later Middle Ages, Jewish interest in Averroës and in Judaeo-Arabic or Hebrew versions of his works did

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not diminish. As a result, many of the medieval Judaeo-Arabic and Hebrew versions of his works are still available. ⁴

However, these considerations do not explain why the treatises presented here have been neglected since their recovery more than a century ago. One reason for that neglect appears to be their subject matter: logic. The writings of Averroës on logic were not studied very carefully by fellow Arabs nor by the Latin Aristotelians who were first attracted to his works. Similarly, even though the academic community knew about the existence of these treatises in Judaeo-Arabic manuscripts and about the existence of the Middle Commentaries on Aristotle's Organon in Arabic manuscripts during the latter part of the nineteenth century, scholars preferred to edit Hebrew translations of other works by Averroës while deploring the lack of Arabic manuscripts. It was not until the first third of the twentieth century that one of the logical works was thoroughly edited.⁵

Another reason why these treatises have been neglected is that, as commentaries, they were considered to be less original than other writings by Averroës. Throughout the nineteenth century, the image of an Averroës who was a faithful disciple of Arisotle prevailed. For a long while it was accepted without question and passed on as rigorously confirmed. Only recently has the doctrine begun to be doubted. However, while it reigned supreme, scholars expressed more interest in those works of Averroës which were obviously independent and original. Turning their attention to these works, they left the commentaries, and especially the commentaries on logic, aside.⁶

Whatever the full explanation might be, it is clear that neglect of these treatises has not resulted from an informed judgment about the quality of the arguments they set forth. Far from having thoroughly investigated these arguments, the academic community has never been very knowledgeable about the most superficial aspects of the treatises. When Munk first announced the existence of one of the Judaeo-Arabic manuscripts in 1847, he simply identified it as Averroës's Short Commentary on the Organon without any reference to its possible significance. Shortly afterward, Renan reported Munk's discovery, but paid such little attention to the content of the treatise or to its identity that he spoke of the Hebrew version of the Short Commentary on Logic (which he called Abrégé de Logique) and of the manuscript discovered by Munk (which he called Abrégé de l'Organon) without ever associating the two. More importantly, he insisted that the treatises on rhetoric and poetics

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contained in the Florence manuscript of Averroës's Middle Commentaries on Aristotle's Organon, which he had catalogued, were short commentaries. Although he recognized differences between the treatises on rhetoric and poetics in the Florence manuscript and the Latin translations of these works by Hermannus Alemannus and Abraham de Balmes, he never compared them with the manuscript discovered by Munk. ⁷

Despite Renan's acknowledgement of the manuscript's existence and Munk's subsequent reminder of its significance as the Arabic source, the German historian of logic, C. Prantl, showed no awareness, as late as 1861, that the treatise existed in any form but the old Latin version. Some years later, Steinschneider attacked Prantl for this apparent lapse of scholarship and used the occasion to announce his discovery of the other manuscript containing the Judaeo-Arabic version of this collection of treatises on the art of logic.⁸ Still, nothing prompted anyone to edit the manuscripts. They remained neglected after Father Bouyges mentioned their existence in 1922 and erroneously identified a notebook manuscript he had found in Cairo as a possible Arabic copy of the Short Commentary on Rhetoric. EvenWolfson's repeated call for a Corpus Commentariorum Averrois in Aristotelem did not lead to an edition of the treatises.⁹

Such neglect must be decried, for, in addition to the historical significance attached to these manuscripts, the treatises are important for other reasons. Above all, they command serious attention because of their daring critique of traditional Islamic thought and of the dialectical theologians who considered themselves its true defenders. Starting with the particular perspective of Islam, Averroës was able to raise the universal question of the relation between philosophy, politics, and religion. These treatises are also of special interest due to their form or literary genre. So little is yet known about the different kinds of commentaries and treatises composed by Averroës or about their functions that careful attention must be paid to examples of each. In that way it may be possible to learn what the art of commentary truly was for Averroës and how he used it to present his own, as well as Aristotle's, thought. Only then will it be possible to form correct opinions about the quality of Averroës's teaching. Finally, these treatises are important because of what they teach about the way Aristotle's logical writings were interpreted at that time.

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The Text

Before considering the teaching set forth in these treatises, it is appropriate to have an accurate idea of their character. The correct identification of the treatises is linked to the problem of determining their original titles. Moreover, because of the peculiarities present in the formal organization as well as in the substantive arguments of the treatises, serious questions have arisen about their authenticity. Finally, a description of the manuscripts and an explanation of the way they have been edited and translated, though free of controversy, are equally important preliminaries.

In the Munich catalogue, the manuscript is identified as The Short Commentary on Aristotle's Organon and on Porphyry's Introduction. ¹⁰ Since the manuscript contains no title, this is more a conjectural description of the subject matter and putative identification of the work than a title. The title given the manuscript in the Paris catalogue, on the other hand, only vaguely alludes to the subject matter and to the identification of the commentary: Summary of Logic.¹¹ In his Index Général, Professor Vajda listed the manuscript under yet another title: al-Daruri* fi* al-Mantiq* (What Is Necessary in Logic). ¹²

Professor Vajda's choice of title is in keeping with a long tradition. In his biographic sketch, Ibn Abu* Usaybi`ah* first referred to one of Averroës's works by something like this title: Kitab* al-Daruri* fi* al-Mantiq* (The Book of the Necessary in Logic). Moreover, among the books of Averroës mentioned in the Escurial manuscript 884 is a work bearing a title identical to the one given by Professor Vajda. The Latin translator Abraham de Balmes also identifed the work by a similar title: Compendium necessarium Averroys totius logicae. Steinschneider, who discovered this use of the title by de Balmes, originally questioned the ''necessarium" and the traditional title because they were reflected in the first few words of the treatise: "al-gharad* fi* hadha* al-qawl tajrid* al-aqawil* al-daruriyah* min sina`at* sina`at* al-mantiq* (the

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purpose of this treatise is to abstract the necessary speeches pertaining to each and every logical art)." However, he settled upon the traditional title in his final description of the two Judeao-Arabic manuscripts. ¹³

Steinschneider's earlier doubt about the accuracy of the traditional title was better founded than he realized. The only other Arabic reference to anything resembling the traditional title was Ibn al-Abbar's* vague allusion: "his book in Arabic, whose title was al-Daruri*." When al-Ansari* wrote a supplement to Ibn al-Abbar's* book, he made no reference to such a title and only spoke generally of Averroës's commentaries on Aristotle's philosophical and logical books. Even the noted historian, master of tradition, and theologian Shams al-Din* al-Dhahabi*, who claimed to cite the works of Averroës according to Ibn Abu* Usaybi`ah's* list, omitted the qualificative "al-Daruri*," calling the book simply Kitab* fi* al-Mantiq* (Book on Logic).¹⁴

An even more important difficulty with the traditional title is that it does not explain what kind of a treatise Averroës wrote. However, Ibn Abu* Usaybi`ah's* list does contain a long descriptive sub-title: Kitab* al-Daruri* fi* al-Mantiq*, mulhaq* bih Talkhis* Kutub Aristutalis* wa qad lakhkhasaha* Talkhisan* tamman mustawfan (The Book of the Necessary in Logic, Containing His Complete and Exhaustive Middle Commentary on Aristotle's Books).¹⁵ Although it purports to identify the kind of treatises contained in the collection, it cannot be considered accurate. In the first place, the word "talkhis*" ("middle commentary"), usually used in contradistinction to "sharh*" or "tafsir*'' ("large commentary") and "jawami`*" or "mukhtasar*" ("short commentary"), is certainly not descriptive of the treatises contained in this collection. Even if the word "talkhis*" is understood in the loosest possible sense, these treatises certainly do not provide a "complete and exhaustive" commentary on the art of logic. Averroës admitted as much in the opening words of this collection by saying that the purpose of the work was to provide an abstract or summary ("tajrid*") of what was necessary. Moreover, the manuscript copies of the Middle Commentaries on Aristotle's Organon have been found; those treatises are much more extensive commentaries on logic than what is found in this collecton. Finally, there is no evidence that Averroës used anything resembling Ibn Abu* Usaybi`ah's* title or subtitle to refer to this work, whereas he did refer to one of his works in terms similar to the title reflected in the Munich catalogue listing and in the way de Balmes used the word "compendium":

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at one point Averroës spoke of "our short commentary" (al-mukhtasar * al-saghir* alladhi* lana*) on logic..¹⁶

Consequently, the conjectural title of the Munich catalogue offers the most accurate identification of this collection of treatises. Apart from the negative reasons already considered, there are positive reasons which confirm its appropriateness. In the first place, most of the treatises comment on particular books of Aristotle's Organon. In addition, the general logical theory presented in these treatises is basically Aristotelian. Moreover, there are frequent references to Aristotle and explanations of what prompted him to write about each art. Still, there are several superficial and substantive divergences from what might be expected to be the form of a short commentary, and they might call this identification into question.

For example, Averroës introduced the work by a general statement about the reasons for studying logic without ever suggesting that the treatises to follow depended on Aristotle's logical theory. In fact, he never mentioned Aristotle's name in that general statement. Moreover, he began the treatise by commenting on Porphyry's Isagoge as though it were a necessary preface to Aristotle's Categories.¹⁷ Averroës altered the end of the treatise in a similar manner by including treatises on the arts of rhetoric and poetics. Here, too, the change was effected without elaborate explanation, the only preparation being Averroës's introductory remark that rhetoric and poetics were logical arts as much as demonstration, dialectic, and sophistics.¹⁸

Nor did Averroës respect the order of Aristotle's Organon. For one thing, he transferred the discussion of equivocal terms from the discussion of the Categorieswhere Aristotle had examined the subjectto the treatise concerned with the Isagoge, even though Porphyry never discussed that subject.¹⁹ Again, arguing that it was essential to learn how to make syllogisms after having learned how to distinguish their different classes, he placed the discussion of syllogistic topics immediately after the discussion of the syllogism and immediately before the discussion of what he considered to be the most important logical artdemonstration. In terms of the Organon Averroës thus placed that which corresponds to Books II-VII of the Topics after the Prior Analytics and before the Posterior Analytics.²⁰ He also inverted the order of the treatises on the arts of dialectic and sophistry: in this work, the treatise on sophistry follows the discussion of demonstration (i.e., the Posterior Analytics) and precedes that on

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dialectic; in Aristotle's Organon, the treatise on dialectic (i.e., the Topics) follows the Posterior Analytics and precedes On Sophistical Refutations.

Finally, there are notable discrepancies in the titles of the various treatises. With the exception of the treatises on the Categories (al-Qawl fi * al-Maqulat*), the Posterior Analytics (Kitab* al-Burhan*), and On Sophistical Refutations (Kitab* al-Sufsatah*),²¹ the traditional titles for the works of Aristotle are not used here. For example, the treatise following that on the Categories is entitled On the Rules Peculiar to Assent (al-Qawanin* allati* takhuss* al-Tasdiq*),²² rather than On Interpretation (Fi* al-`Ibarah*). Similarly, rather than a title suggestive of Prior Analytics (Kitab* al-Qiyas*), Averroës called the corresponding treatise On the Knowledge for Bringing about Assent (Fi* al-Ma`rifah al-fa`ilah* li al-Tasdiq*). When he wrote about the syllogistic topics, he called that treatise On the Rules by Which Syllogisms Are Made (Fi* al-Qawanin* allati* ta`mal biha* al-Maqayis*)²³ instead of simply Topics (Fi* al-Mawadi`*).

In addition to these superficial divergences from what might be expected to be the form of a commentary, there are substantive divergences. Averroës presented a novel classification of the different kinds of syllogisms and introduced some that were never mentioned by Aristotle. Similarly, his analysis of the matters of syllogisms was foreign to Aristotle's logical thought. In addition, he gave a disproportionate amount of attention to some subjects and completely neglected others. His discussion of the theory of the nondemonstrative syllogism set forth in the Topics, for example, was so extensive that the reader might think Aristotle had written a book solely about the dialectical syllogism. Conversely, Averroës's discussion of the art of poetics was completely free of any reference whatsoever to tragedy.

Given all of these divergences, the correctness of calling the collection a Short Commentary might be questioned. In addition to the divergences, there is the massive fact that Averroës never explicitly declared it his intention to set forth the teaching of Aristotle in this collection. It might therefore be argued that the extent to which the treatises differ from Aristotle's logical teaching will cease to be problematic once the collection is no longer thought of as a kind of commentary. Averroës's allusion to his mukhtasar* saghir* could then be understood simply as an allusion to a "short treatise," rather than as an allusion to a "short commentary" on Aristotle. However, such an argument fails to account for the numerous references to Aristotle

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throughout the text, references which always take Aristotle's correctness for grantedas though Averroës were simply explaining Aristotle's thought. That argument is likewise unable to account for the fact that each treatise ends with remarks about the kind of considerations which first prompted Aristotle to write about the particular art. Above all, that argument is unable to explain why the content of each treatise should correspond roughly to a particular Aristotelian text.

By his frequent references to Aristotle, Averroës gave the distinct impression that his exposition was based on Aristotle's treatises about the logical arts. At the same time, by means of the aforementioned superficial and substantive divergences from Aristotle's Organon, he suggested that the exposition was in no way limited to Aristotle's text. Differently stated, while generally oriented toward the logical teaching of Aristotle, these treatises of Averroës were addressed to the larger subject rather than to the particular arguments found in Aristotle's books on the logical arts. Because Averroës presented them as setting forth in summary fashion what Aristotle had fully explained and because he tried to keep the image of Aristotle foremost in the reader's mind, they ought to be considered as commentaries. The kind of freedom from Aristotle's text and attention to the general subject which is permitted by the superficial divergences has been observed to be characteristic of Averroës's procedure in the short commentaries, the middle and large being devoted to an explicit consideration of particular Aristotelian arguments. ²⁴ Consequently, the descriptive title of the Munich catalogue appears to be most accurate and most in keeping with Averroës's own allusions to the work.

There are problems of a similar sort with the titles of the treatises presented here. Despite clear parallels with Aristotle's Topics, Rhetoric and Poetics, as well as references to Aristotle's intention with respect to each work, Averroës used titles which did not suggest that these treatises were commentaries on Aristotle's works. For example, the first treatise is called The Book of Dialectic (Kitab* al-Jadal).²⁵ Similarly, the second of the treatises presented here is called The Speech about Rhetorical Arguments (al-Qawl fi* al-Aqawil* al-Khatabiyah*),²⁶ while the last of the three treatises is entitled About Poetical Speeches (Fi* al-Aqawil* al-Shi`riyah*).

The reasoning which dictated identifying the larger work as the Short Commentary on Aristotle's Organon also dictates identifying these treatises as the Short Commentary on Aristotle's Topics, the Short Commen-

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tary on Aristotle's Rhetoric, and the Short Commentary on Aristotle's Poetics. Moreover, despite his recourse to novel titles for these and others of the logical works, Averroës cited them by their traditional titles in the course of his argument. For example, he referred the reader to Kitab * al-Qiyas* (Prior Analytics), rather than to Fi* al-Ma`rifah al-fa`ilah* li al-Tasdiq* (On the Knowledge for Bringing about Assent).²⁷ Similarly, at one point he used the traditional Arabic title for the Topics, Kitab* al-Tubiqi*, rather than Kitab* al-Jadal (Book of Dialectic) or Fi* al-Qawanin* allati ta`mal biha* al-Maqayis* (On the Rules by Which Syllogisms Are Made).²⁸ It should also be noted that Averroës seemed to consider the titles Kitab* al-Jadal (Book of Dialectic) and Kitab* al-Tubiqi* (Topics) interchangeable: in his introduction to the Talkhis* Kitab* al-Tubiqi* (Middle Commentary on Aristotle's Topics), he spoke of both as equally valid titles.²⁹ Moreover, at the end of the Short Commentary on Aristotle's Rhetoric, he referred to that work as the Book of Rhetoric (Kitab* al-Khatabah*). Finally, it is clear that Averroës did not consider the treatise Fi* al-Qawanin* allati* ta`mal biha* al-Maqayis* (On the Rules by Which Syllogisms Are Made) to represent his commentary on the Topics, because he so carefully explained to the reader that he was using the topics discussed in this treatise solely to prepare the way for his teaching about demonstration and because he reminded the reader quite frequently that his use of topics here differed from the way they were used in dialectic or rhetoric. Consequently, just as there is no question that the treatises on rhetorical and poetical speeches refer to Aristotle's books on those subjects, so there can be little doubt that the treatise on dialectic refers to Aristotle's book on the art of dialecticthe Topics.

Recourse to novel titles for most of the treatises in this collection was one more way for Averroës to indicate the different character of these commentaries to the reader. In the larger commentaries, which were explicitly devoted to explaining Aristotle's arguments in an organized manner, Averroës used the traditional titles. In these Short Commentaries, where the goal was to explain the subject matter in a succinct fashion, the use of novel titles alerted the reader to a special freedom from Aristotle in the commentary. Recognition of the different titles could either spur the imaginative reader to search for other instances in which Averroës took liberties with the Aristotelian teaching or lull the indolent reader into thinking that Averroës's freedom from Aristotle was only superficial.

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Of no less importance than the proper identification of these treatises is confirmation of their authenticity. While Prantl has been the only one to argue that they might be spurious, he has advanced weighty objections worthy of serious consideration.

His suspicions were first aroused because of two innovations he found in the technical vocabulary of the treatises: he was astonished that the Latin terms definitio and demonstratio had been replaced by the terms formatio and verificatio. (Both pairs of terms were used to translate the Arabic terms tasawwur * and tasdiq*). Acknowledging the possible temerity of founding his critique on the Latin translations alone, Prantl insisted that the terminological innovation was of such magnitude that it could not possibly be due to the translator. Steinschneider agreed with Prantl's acknowledgement of temerity, blamed him for failing to note that Munk had never expressed doubts about the authenticity of the treatises, as well as for neglecting Averroës's own reference to his Short Commentary on logic, and then dismissed Prantl's objection by citing similar examples of that innovative terminology in the translated works of al-Farabi* and Avicenna.³⁰ Later, Lasinio, who agreed with Steinschneider's general condemnation of Prantl's scholarship, made the particular refutation more convincing by citing a passage in which another Latin translator used the terms formatio and verificatio or certificatio for tasawwur* and tasdiq*, while de Balmeswhose translation had first aroused Prantl's suspicionsused yet other terms.³¹

Another reason for Prantl's doubts about the authorship of these treatises was the difference he observed between Averroës's willingness to preface these treatises with a commentary on Porphyry's Isagoge and his reluctance to preface the Middle Commentaries on Aristotle's Organon with a commentary on that work. Not believing that such inconsistency could be found in the work of one man and the authenticity of the Middle Commentaries being beyond doubt, Prantl concluded that these treatises were to be rejected as spurious.³² Because he failed to understand the grounds of Averroës's reluctance, Prantl's conclusion was too hasty. Of prime importance to Averroës was the particular context of the commentary: he considered the Middle Commentaries to be, above all, commentaries "on the books of Aristotle."³³ The introductory remarks to his Middle Commentary on Aristotle's Categories limit the collection even more by defining its goal as that of commenting on Aristotle's books about logic, explaining and summarizing

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them. ³⁴ For that goal it was not necessary to comment on Porphyry.

That same emphasis on the particular context of the commentary explains Averroës's willingness to include remarks on Porphyry's Isagoge in the Short Commentaries. Averroës introduced a new ordering of the art of logic in these treatises. He first identified concept (tasawwur*) and assent (tasdiq*) as fundamental terms and then explained that instruction about each had to proceed from that which prepares the way for it (al-muwatti'* lah) and from that which brings it about (al-fa`il* lah). This meant that the art of logic fell into four parts: (i) that which prepares the way for a concept, (ii) that which brings a concept about, (iii) that which prepares the way for assent, and (iv) that which brings assent about. Averroës's discussion of words and of Porphyry's account of the predicables corresponded to the first part, while his commentary on the Categories corresponded to the second part. Had Prantl been aware of the new ordering introduced by Averroës, he would have understood what prompted him to discuss Porphyry's Isagoge in these treatises even though he was reluctant to do so in the Middle Commentaries.

Prantl had an additional reason for doubting the authenticity of these treatises. He thought that the clearest indication of their spurious character was the way they were ordered. Recalling Averroës's severe criticism of Avicenna for suggesting that the inquiry into dialectical method (that is, the Topics) precede the inquiry into demonstrative method (that is, the Posterior Analytics), Prantl pointed to the way the commentary on the Topics precedes that on the Posterior Analytics in this collection.³⁵ Still persuaded that Averroës was incapable of such inconsistency, he concluded that the treatises were spurious. Unfortunately for his argument, Prantl failed to understand Averroës's reasons for criticizing Avicenna and failed to grasp the content of the treatise which precedes the Short Commentary on the Posterior Analytics.

In criticizing Avicenna, Averroës admitted that probable premises were usually more readily at hand than certain premises, but insisted upon the necessity of understanding the conditions of certainty in order to be able to distinguish among the kinds of probable premises that were so easily found. Consequently, it was logical for the Posterior Analytics (insofar as it provided the proofs and rules by which certain premises might be obtained) to precede the Topics (insofar as it provided the proofs and rules by which probable premises might be obtained).³⁶ Averroës did not go against this reasoning by placing

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the treatise entitled On the Rules by Which Syllogisms Are Made (Fi * al-Qawanin* allati* ta`mal biha* al-Maqayis*) before the Short Commentary on Aristotle's Posterior Analytics. The former work was limited to the discussion of the topics occurring in Books II-VII of the Topics, but that discussion was designed to prepare the way to demonstration by explaining how to make demonstrative syllogisms. It was in no way concerned with dialectical reasoning.³⁷ In fact, dialectical reasoning was not considered until Averroës discussed it in the treatise presented here as the Short Commentary on Aristotle's Topics. To impress this order upon the attentive reader, Averroës opened the treatise by declaring that only because demonstrative reasoning had already been considered was it now appropriate to consider dialectical reasoning.³⁸

Prantl also failed to note the multiple indications that Averroës was trying to explain the art of logic and the order of the traditionally accepted Aristotelian books on the logical arts in an unprecedented manner. In accordance with the previously mentioned fourfold division of the art, Averroës presented his Short Commentary on Aristotle's De Interpretatione as corresponding to the third part of the art, that which prepares the way for assent. This was made clear both by the title of that commentary, On the Rules Peculiar to Assent (al-Qawanin* allati* takhuss* al-Tasdiq*), and by the opening sentences of the treatise.³⁹ The Short Commentary on Aristotle's Prior Analytics was designed to provide the rules for forming syllogisms, i.e., that by which assent is brought about, and was appropriately entitled On the Knowledge for Bringing about Assent (Fi* al-Ma`rifah al-fa`ilah* li al-Tasdiq*). However, Averroës did not consider this kind of exposition to correspond to the part of the art which really treated what brought about assent and therefore classed this treatise as a continuation of the third part of the art, explaining that his treatise On the Rules by Which Syllogisms Are Made (Fi* al-Qawanin* allati* ta`mal biha* al-Maqayis*) constituted the fourth part of the art. This meant that the Short Commentary on Aristotle's Posterior Analytics was an explanation of how one kind of assentthe most noble kind, demonstrationworked. Similarly, the treatises on sophistics, dialectic, rhetoric, and poetics were simply so many illustrations of how the other kinds of assent worked.⁴⁰ It is clear, then, that Averroës committed no logical inconsistencies by his novel ordering of Books II-VII of the Topics and certainly did nothing to call his authorship of these treatises into question. Consequently, this objection of

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Prantl's must be rejected along with his other ones and the treatises constituting the Short Commentaries on Aristotle's Organon accepted as authentic.

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Now that the treatises have been properly identified and their authenticity assured, it is appropriate to consider their formal characteristics.

The Munich manuscript contains nine treatises and comprises 86 folios. Each folio measures 21.5 cm. in height and 14.5 cm. in width, with the writing occupying 15 cm. of the height and 8 cm. of the width. Although not completely uniform, the folios usually contain 24 lines of script.

All of the treatises but one are complete, and all are in the proper order. The introductory statement explaining the purpose of the collection (fol. 1a-b) is followed by the commentary on the Isagoge of Porphyry (fols. lb-6b). After these are the commentaries on the Categories (fols. 6b-10b), On Interpretation (fols. 10b-16b), and Prior Analytics (fols. 16b-30a). Then the commentary on Books II-VII of the Topics (fols. 30a-41b) follows. The commentary on the Posteroir Analytics (fols. 41b-63a) and that on On Sophisticat Refutations (fols. 63a-72a) come next. They are followed by the commentaries presented here: Topics (fols. 72a-77a), Rhetoric (fols. 77b-86a), and Poetics (fols. 86a-b). Unfortunately, most of folio 86b is missing, but its content can be reconstructed from the Paris manuscript, as well as from the Hebrew and Latin translations.

Some damage has occurred to the manuscript, but it is still quite legible. The first line of the first folio has been somewhat obliterated. In addition, the upper corners of many folios, from folio 63 to the end of the manuscript, have fallen off; as a consequence, portions of the first few lines are sometimes missing. These page corners must have fallen off fairly recently, for Lasinio's copy of the Short Commentary on Aristotle's Poetics from the Munich manuscript contains readings which can no longer be found due to those missing corners. Many wormholes may also be found from folio 77 to the end of the volume. These holes are sometimes so large that entire words are missing.

The manuscript has been bound, and the flyleaves of the binding indicate the different stages of recognition of its contents. Thus, on what might be considered to be the title page, the work was first

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identified as having been written by Averroës, but his name has been crossed out and Avicenna's name written in with both Hebrew and Latin characters. On the same page, the manuscript was identified as lib. Medicamenta" or Sefer Refuot," with an explanation in Hebrew and German that the text is in Arabic with Hebrew characters. The date of 1216 also occurs on this page, written in what seems to be the same handwriting as the Latin and German notations. The other flyleaves contain pencil and pen notes from Steinschneider, dated 1864.

The script, a very old Spanish rabbinical script, is large and clear. Although the script is sometimes almost undecipherable, care has been taken to place points, when needed, over the Hebrew letters used to transliterate two Arabic letters. There is no indication of the name of the scribe. Many corrections of an extensive nature are to be found on the margins and above the lines. They are all written in a hand different from that of the scribe.

The Paris manuscript contains the same nine treatises as the Munich manuscript and comprises 103 folios, on 96 of which are contained the treatises presented in the Munich manuscript. Each folio measures 31 cm. in height and 20 cm. in width, with the writing occupying 17.5 cm of the height and 13 cm. of the width. With few exceptions, each folio contains 25 lines of script.

Although all of the treatises are properly ordered and the manuscript complete, the first folio of the Judaeo-Arabic version is missing. The commentary on the Isagoge of Porphyry is contained on the first five extant folios. It is followed by the commentaries on the Categories (fols. 6-11), On Interpretation (fols. 11-17), and Prior Analytics (fols. 17-33). After these is the commentary on Books II-VII of the Topics (fols. 33-46). Then there are the commentaries on the Posterior Analytics (fols. 46-69) and on On Sophistical Refutation (fols. 69-79). These are followed by the commentaries presented here: Topics (fols. 79-85), Rhetoric (fols. 85-95), and Poetics (fols. 95-96). Two short treatises by al-Farabi * are separated from the rest of the collection by a blank folio; both treatises are in Judaeo-Arabic alone: "The Speech about the Conditions of Demonstration" (fols. 98a-100a) and "Sections Which Are Necessary in the Art of Logic" (fols. 100b-103b).⁴¹

Unlike that of the Munich manuscript, the script of the Paris manuscript is rabbinic duktus tending toward cursive. However, it is much smaller and not as clear as the other. Moreover, no care has been taken

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to place distinguishing points over the Hebrew letters used to transliterate two Arabic letters. The script is so small that the Paris manuscript is only nine folios longer than the Munich manuscript even though it contains both the Judaeo-Arabic and Hebrew versions of the work. The Hebrew translation is placed opposite the Judaeo-Arabic text, and each page of each version begins and ends with approximately the same words.

The Paris manuscript is in remarkably good condition. Except for the missing page of the Judaeo-Arabic text, no damage has occurred to the manuscript. Each of the section titles is set off by flower-like encirclements in red ink. There are some marginal corrections, many in a hand different from that of the scribe. In a colophon, the scribe identified himself as Ezra ben Rabbi Shlomo ben Gratnia of Saragossa. ⁴²

Microfilm copies and full-size photographic prints of the manuscripts were used for most of the editing, but both manuscripts have also been examined directly at various stages of the project. For purposes of editing, the Judaeo-Arabic manuscripts were considered to be of equal value. Both are deficient due to lacunae; transposition of phrases, words, or letters; and simple grammatical mistakes. Despite evidence of a later attempt to correct the Munich manuscript (e.g., marginal additions and corrections in a different handwriting), many errors still remain.⁴³ Those lacunae which have not yet been corrected appear to be simple errors of copying: the scribe often dropped several words which occurred between two identical words on different lines. Such errors make it impossible to depend on the Munich manuscript to the exclusion of the Paris manuscript. The Paris manuscript is faulty in these ways and in other ways. It suffers from numerous lacunae not encountered in the Munich manuscript.⁴⁴ The missing passages often refer to technical terms or key verbs for which the scribe usually left blank places, as though he had the intention of filling them in later.

In both manuscripts, fine points of Arabic orthography are missed. This appears to be a consequence of the limitations of Judaeo-Arabic. Generally the orthographic difficulties pose no major problem in discerning the sense of the argument.

When all of the evidence is considered, it appears that the Paris and the Munich manuscripts are independent of each other. In addition to the many instances of simple scribal errors which are not

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significant, there are numerous instances of errors where each manuscript differs from what might be considered to be the correct reading. Moreover, some passages missing from the Paris manuscript were also originally missing from the Munich manuscript; these were often corrected in the margin, and the corrections must have been inspired by readings from a manuscript other than either the Paris or Munich manuscript. ⁴⁵ Although such an observation suggests that the manuscripts may still be faulty in ways not yet noticed, it only makes careful study of the texts all the more necessary to those interested in Averroës's teaching.

Another problem arises from the fact that many of the lacunae encountered in the Judaeo-Arabic version Of the Paris manuscript do not occur in the Hebrew version. Of the two explanations which may be offered, only one is tenable: to assume that the Judaeo-Arabic version is a poor translation of the Hebrew translation is to reason falsely, for it is unlikely that a scribe could translate from the Hebrew in a manner so faithful to the Arabic style of Averroës. It therefore appears that the Hebrew translation was originally made from a better version of the Arabic text than that which the Judaeo-Arabic version represents. Since the Munich manuscript fills most of the lacunae of the Paris Judaeo-Arabic manuscript, it may very likely be based on, or have been corrected on the basis of, a text closer to the one used by the Hebrew translator.

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In the translation, every attempt has been made to combine readable and intelligible English with fidelity to the original Arabic. For two reasons, it has not always been possible to achieve that goal. In the first place, the technical character of these treatises at times made a certain kind of stiffness unavoidable. Averroës was clearly addressing himself to an audience familiar with the general features of logic and thus did not hesitate to use specialized terminology or to speak in the arid style so appropriate to discourse about logic. Secondly, some awkwardness in style has resulted because insofar as has been consonant with intelligent speech, the same word has been translated in the same way whenever it occurs. Here the idea was that a careful reading of any text will at some point oblige the reader to note the occurence and the recurrence of certain words. If words have been translated differently to suit the taste of the translator, that path is

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closed to the reader. In sum, while every effort was made to arrive at a faithful and readable translation, the path facilitating instruction was chosen when there was no way to avoid choosing between literal ineloquence and eloquent looseness.

Numerous notes accompany the translation. Their purpose is to help the reader understand the text. For that reason, the notes explain technical terms or give more precise information about references Averroës has made to different authors, books, and opinions. Similarly, the dates of authors and of their writings, as well as page references to their writings, have been included in the notes. When appropriate, references to Aristotle have also been included so that a comparison between Aristotle's definitions and Averroës's explanations may be made. There are no marginal references to the books of Aristotle commented upon in these treatises because Averroës did not follow these works in any orderly manner; as has already been explained, he completely restructured them.

Each treatise or commentary has been divided into paragraphs and into sections to permit the reader to follow Averroës's thought more easily. One rule has been paramount in this task of editing: the stages of the argument must be clearly set forth. Although paragraph division as understood today was not used by Arabic writers in Averroës's time, certain conventions did prevail for denoting the change of thought now expressed in the form of paragraphs. In addition, thick pen strokes were used to indicate the change in argument corresponding to the contemporary division of a treatise into sections. Both of these conventions have been respected in the translation as well as in the edition.

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The Teaching of the Text

Averroës's Short Commentaries on Aristotle's Topics, Rhetoric, and Poetics are part of a larger work, the collection of Short Commentaries on Aristotle's Organon. Yet they differ from the other treatises of the collection in important respects. The other treatises explain the concepts leading up to the kind of reasoning which is based on apodeictic premises and results in apodeictic conclusionsthe demonstrative syllogismand explain how it is used. These three treatises, however, are concerned with arts which use mere similitudes of apodeictic premises and demonstrative reasoning. Moreover, while the other treatises are recommended because they teach how to reason correctly, these three treatises are presented as providing ways of imitating or abridging correct reasoning in order to influence other human beings in any number of situations, but especially with regard to political decisions and religious beliefs.

These three treatises even stand apart physically from the other treatises of the collection. Although neither the Rhetoric nor the Poetics was traditionally viewed as belonging to the Organon, Averroës included the Short Commentary on Aristotle's Rhetoric and the Short Commentary on Aristotle's Poetics as the last two treatises in this collection of short commentaries on the Organon. He also reversed the positions of the Short Commentary on Aristotle's Topics and the Short Commentary on Aristotle's On Sophistical Refutations with respect to their order in the traditional view of the Organon. As a result, the Short Commentary on Aristotle's Topics, the Short Commentary on Aristotle's Rhetoric, and the Short Commentary on Aristotle's Poetics are the last three treatises in the collection. So that the significance of this extensive reworking of the Organon not escape attention, Averroës offered another indication of the separate status of these treatises. As justification for having reversed the order of the Short Commentary on Aristotle's Topics and the Short Commentary on Aristotle's On Sophistical Refutations, he limited the art of sophistry

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to deception about demonstrative arguments. Entirely without parallel in Aristotle's work, that limitation served to explain why the treatise about sophistical arguments followed the treatise about demonstrative arguments in this collection. Averroës then linked the art of dialectic to the art of rhetoric by extolling its usefulness for bringing about persuasion and linked the art of poetics to the art of rhetoric on the grounds that it could persuade people by means of imaginative representations. ⁴⁶ All of these observations suggest that while the larger collection does constitute a whole and must be studied as such in order to grasp the full teaching, it can also be divided into two major parts and that either one of these parts can be studied separately with profit.

The reason for studying these treatises, rather than those belonging to the other division, is to acquire an understanding of the relation between politics, religion, and philosophy in the thought of Averroës. Intelligent awareness of such topics is important because of the constant influence they exert over thought and action. Learned as well as unlearned human beings are continuously seeking better ways to live with one another as fellow citizens, as members of different nations, or simply as associates. Similarly, decisions about work, play, and family life are tied to opinions about one's place in the universe and about the kind of life proper to man. Whether those opinions are based upon precepts deriving from a particular revelation or are the result of some kind of independent thought, they play an important role in daily life and demand the careful attention of reflective individuals.

Averroës is an important source of instruction about these topics, because the problem of their relationship occupied so much of his practical and intellectual activity. Exceptionally well informed about the sources and interpretations of the revealed religion which dominated his own community, he applied its precepts to particular matters in his capacity as a supreme judge and speculated about broader aspects of the religion in the political realm whenever he acted as adviser to his Almohad sovereigns. He becomes especially important to us because he did not restrict himself to the notions prevalent in that community. To the contrary, he found rare philosophical insight in the thought of Aristotlea member of a community not affected by revealed religionand tried to persuade his learned fellow Muslims of Aristotle's merit by writing explanatory commentaries on Aristotle's thought. On a few occasions, he even directed

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the argument to the larger public in order to defend philosophic activity against attacks by zealous advocates of religious orthodoxy and in order to explain the theoretical limitations of religious speculation, as well as the political significance of religion. ⁴⁷

Among all of his writings, the Short Commentaries on Aristotle's Topics, Rhetoric, and Poetics are the best sources for acquiring an understanding of the relation Averroës thought existed between politics, religion, and philosophy. In the first place, his thought about this problem was based on specific ideas about the logical character of different kinds of speech, their proximity to certain knowledge, and the investigative or practical purposes to which each might be put. While these ideas are presupposed in his other works, including his larger commentaries on the logical arts, they are explained in these treatises. Secondly, these treatises contain the fullest statement of the grounds for Averroës's abiding disagreement with those who considered themselves the defenders of the faith. In Averroës's view, these dialectical theologians and masters of religious tradition were responsible for confusing the common people by using extraordinarily complex arguments to speak about simple principles of faith and guilty of attacking philosophy under the pretext of saving the faith they had garbled. Awareness of the reasons for his disagreement with them is important, because it is the background against which he expressed his ideas concerning the relation between political life and religious belief, as well as between religious belief and philosophic investigation.

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However, the substantive teaching of these three treatises is not immediately evident. It is so intimately related to the technical exposition of the different logical arts that the treatises first appear to be purely technical. Even though it is at once obvious that the technical exposition was designed to correct prevalent misconceptions about each one of the arts, the deeper significance of that correction must be ferreted out. For example, another consequence of incorporating rhetoric and poetics into logic is that it allowed Averroës to stress the importance of each art for inquiry and instruction, as well as to allude to the way each art shared in the attributes of logic. He thus countered the prevailing tendency to restrict rhetoric and poetics to eloquence and to examine each solely in terms of style. Then, by reminding the reader that rhetorical proofs were quite far removed

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from certainty and that imaginative representations were frequently based on the merest similitudes of the real thing, Averroës easily prodded him into thinking about the status of our knowledge with regard to the generally accepted political and religious uses of each art. ⁴⁸ In this way he brought an apparently abstract, timeless discussion to bear on concrete, actual issues. The advantage of his procedure was that it never obliged him to quit the cloak of scientific detachment.

Nonetheless, to appreciate the cleverness of this procedure, its diaphanous quality must be recognized. Averroës tried to facilitate that recognition by the judicious use of subtle allusions. The first occurs at the very beginning of the larger treatise. There he justified his summary account of the logical arts on the grounds that it provided what was needed if one were to learn the essentials of the arts which had already been perfected in his time. This justification was closely related to the goal of the treatise: to enable the interested person to acquire the concepts by which these already perfected arts could be learned. Realization of that goal necessitated understanding how concept and assent were used in each one of the logical arts, these being identified as demonstration, dialectic, sophistry, rhetoric, and poetics.⁴⁹ Although it was never given, the obvious reason for such a goal had to be that knowledge of the essentials of those other, already perfected, arts was somehow important.

In the introduction, the only example of already perfected arts cited by Averroës was medicine. However, in the course of the exposition, he referred less explicitly to other artse.g., dialectical theology, traditional theology, and traditional jurisprudence. Even though he explicitly cited the art of medicine in the introduction, he made no attempt to correct it in the course of the larger exposition. Conversely, in the course of the larger exposition he did try to correct those other arts which he had not previously cited in an explicit manner. From this perspective, it appears that the ultimate goal of the treatise was to enable the reader to become competent in logic and especially competent in assessing the different ranks of the classes of concept and assent used in the already perfected arts, not so much in order to learn the essentials of those arts as in order to learn how to evaluate them critically. The identification of that ultimate goal cannot, therefore, be separated from the identification of the already perfected arts. Once both identifications are made, the practical, reformative character of the logical exposition becomes evident.

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Another particularly significant hint that these abstract summaries of the logical arts contain a broader teaching occurs at the very end of the whole collection. There, Averroës did not hesitate to place the different logical arts in a definite hierarchy. Whereas the particular skill to be acquired from poetics was explicitly judged to be nonessential for man's peculiar perfection, the proper understanding of logicthat is, knowledge of the ranks of the classes of concept and assentwas explicitly judged to be propaedeutic to the attainment of ultimate human perfection. Ultimate human perfection, moreover, was clearly stated to depend on man's acquiring true theory. The reason for that distinction derives from a prior judgment about the superiority of theoretical knowledge to practical action, and the implication of the distinction is that the things the art of poetics allows one to make and do are inferior to the things the larger art of logic allows one to understand. ⁵⁰ What is striking about the distinction is that Averroës eschewed the easy subordination of poetics to the larger art of logic on the basis of part to whole, treating them instead as though in competition for supreme recognition. That is, in fact, faithful to the claims of the poetical art's protagonists, and Averroës bore witness to those claims before subordinating poetics to logic in such a definitive manner.

That Averroës concluded the treatise by insisting upon the essential hierarchy is significant because of its easily discernible implications. In the first place, it suggests that the art of logic as a whole is not relative, but is guided by reference to a definite standard. Secondly, it shows that the different logical arts do not have equal claims to priority and that their claims are to be judged in terms of their facilitating the attainment of ultimate human perfection. The basic idea is that if man's perfection consists in theoretical understanding, then his actions or practice should be ordered so as to allow the best development of his theoretical nature. Logic is important because the characteristics of theoretical knowledge are explained in it, and theoretical knowledge is differentiated from other kinds of knowledge. Moreover, it is the only art which shows how to acquire theoretical knowledge.

It was necessary for Averroës to state the merits of logic so clearly, because its use was condemned by some people with extensive influence. Usually, those who argued against logic criticized its foreign origin or claimed that other arts could provide theoretical knowledge in a more direct manner. The general tone of the larger treatise does away with the first kind of argument: logic is treated as an art which

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belongs to the Islamic world as much as to any other world. Those arts alluded to in the beginning statement of the purpose of logic, the arts whose critical evaluation logic will facilitate, are among the ones thought to have greater merit than logic for attaining theoretical knowledge. It is for this reason that their critical evaluation is of such importance.

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Although prepared by the earlier investigation, the critical evaluation is carried out in these three treatises by means of a very selective presentation of each logical art. Thus, in setting forth his account of dialectic, rhetoric, and poetics, Averroës stressed the technical aspects relating to the first two arts. A very extensive explanation of the way arguments are made in each art, of the way they are employed, and of the value of those arguments took the place of an explicit discussion about how these arts might actually be used, that is, to what substantive use they might be put. As a result, essential features of both arts were neglected. For example, in the Short Commentary on Aristotle's Topics, there is an account of the quality of dialectical premises, of the extent of belief dialectical argument provides, and of the proximity of dialectic to demonstration, but there is no mention whatever of its possible use for inquiring into the theoretical arts or into the same subjects as metaphysicsuses clearly indicated in other commentaries. ⁵¹ Similarly, in the Short Commentary on Aristotle's Rhetoric, the standard uses to which rhetoric may be putdeliberation, defense and accusation, praise and blameare passed over in silence until the very end of the treatise; even then, they are mentioned only incidentally. The Short Commentary on Aristotle's Poetics is presented in a different manner, however. Very little is said about the technical parts of the poetical art, and relatively much is said about the uses to which it may be put. To perceive the details of this selectiveness more clearly and to grasp its significance, it is necessary to look at the summary of each art.

When speaking about the art of dialectic, Averroës emphasized that it should not be confused with demonstration despite the appearance of certainty which its arguments provide. The crucial difference between the two arts is that dialectical premises may be false, whereas demonstrative premises are always certain and true. Consequently, not truth as with demonstrationbut renown is the basic consideration in

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choosing a dialectical premise. The premises used in dialectical syllogisms differ from those used in demonstrative syllogisms for yet another reason: although universal predicates, they do not encompass all of the universal predicates used in demonstration. Nor are the premises of dialectical syllogisms all that prevent it from being identical to demonstration: in addition, the induction used in dialectic has a very limited use in demonstration. Finally, dialectic differs from demonstration because the classes of syllogism to which it has access are far more numerous than those open to the art of demonstration. ⁵² Obviously, one should not confuse the art of dialectic with that of demonstration. Still, the whole presentation appears very arid, and one cannot help but wonder why Averroës would. have been content to insist upon all these technical considerations in order to make such a minor point.

The answer is relatively simple: the tedious technical discussion is a screen for a more important substantive argument. The long discussion of induction, for example, prepared the grounds for Averroës's criticism of the dialectical theologians. This becomes apparent once the particular induction repeatedly cited by Averroës is carefully considered: it is the one used to prove that all bodies are created because most of those to be seen around us are created. The conclusion of that induction was itself the major premise for the familiar syllogism about the world being created because it is a body. Although he never explicitly refuted either argument, Averroës showed that the use of inductions to arrive at premises of syllogisms was highly questionable logical practice. At the most, inductions could be helpful for affirming something that was already generally acknowledged, but never for discovering what was unknown. His teaching therefore restricted induction to a very limited role in dialectical argument. The implication was that those who used induction extensively and placed no restrictions on its useas the dialectical theologians did, for examplereally knew nothing about the art they claimed to practice.

The best way of indicating this appreciation of their worth was to destroy the grounds of their arguments and to establish the correct basis of the art. That is why Averroës tried to identify the kind of assent dialectic provides, show what the true dialectical argument is and how it is constructed, explain the limits of the premises used in those syllogisms, and relate the art of dialectic to other arts according to the quality of its arguments. Above all, that tactic allowed him to

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avoid mentioning the dialectical theologians by name, a move. that was masterfully subtle: rather than attack them openly here, he pretended to ignore them as though this were not the place to speak of them. The effect of his silence, then, was to suggest that they should not really be associated with the art of dialectic. Even though it was possible to say that they practiced an art in their theological disputations, it was clear that the art was not dialectic.

This interpretation admittedly places extensive emphasis on Averroës's silence about the dialectical theologians. Yet no other explanation can account for the strange character of this treatise, especially as compared to the Short Commentary on Aristotle's Rhetoric. If a discussion about the dialectical theologians were to occur in any treatise, it is reasonable that it occur in a treatise about dialectic the art they claimed to practice. However, Averroës relegated that discussion to his treatise on rhetoric. Even so, he did not completely exclude consideration of the dialectical theologians from this treatise for he made obvious allusions to their favorite arguments. It seems necessary, therefore, to ask about the relationship between the teaching of the treatise and the unexpectedly neglected dialectical theologians. As has already been suggested, the whole movement of the treatise toward a strict interpretation of dialectic then becomes especially significant. In addition, by insisting more upon the limitations than upon the varied uses of dialectic and more upon what it was not appropriate for than what it was appropriate for, Averroës was able to indicate his disagreements with the dialectical theologians.

For example, according to this treatise the art of dialectic would be entirely unsuited for investigation. Averroës remained silent about its investigative possibilities here. He also emphasized the technical differences between dialectic and demonstration, as though he wanted to suggest that dialectic does not have the same force or logical necessity as demonstration. Above all, he explicitly denied that training in dialectic could have any relevance for pursuit of the demonstrative arts, a denial which was simply contrary to Aristotle's view. ⁵³ Clearly, Averroës wanted to show that dialectic ought not to be used to investigate the same subjects the art of demonstration is used to investigate. However, because of the numerous references to the investigative possibilities of dialectic in Averroës's other writings, this presentation must be considered partial or restrictive. The fuller teaching is that dialectic may be used to investigate any subject investigated by the

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art of demonstration, but that the degree of certainty to be expected of dialectical investigation is inferior to what might be expected of demonstrative investigation.

By presenting this partial or restrictive teaching about dialectic, Averroës enabled the reader to call the whole activity of the dialectical theologians into question. If the art of dialectic cannot be used for most kinds of theoretical investigation, then it cannot support the complicated theological disputes characteristic of dialectical theology. Those disputes presuppose a detailed and deep metaphysical inquiry for which dialecticas presented herewould be inadequate. Consequently, either the dialectical theologians reached their conclusions by means of another art and then presented them in dialectical terms or they attributed too much certainty to their dialectical arguments. Whatever the explanation, their use of dialectic was erroneous.

Averroës could have made the same point without presenting dialectic in this partial or restrictive manner. In the Incoherence of the Incoherence, for example, he used dialectical arguments to counter al-Ghazali's * attacks against philosophy. The subject matter was such that he thus used dialectic to investigate weighty philosophical and theological issues. Yet he never lost sight of the limitations of the art and frequently apologized for the general character of his arguments, explaining that they were based on premises which presupposed a fuller examination of each issue.⁵⁴ Although it suggested the problematic character of his own replies to al-Ghazali*, this admission of the limitations of dialectical argument raised a graver problem with regard to al-Ghazali's* original criticisms: on what deeper investigation were they based? The advantage of the partial or restrictive teaching about dialectic in the Short Commentary on Aristotle's Topics, then, is that this problem was raised quickly and decisively.

Averroës attempted to restrict his presentation of the art of dialectic in another way. At the very end of the treatise, when enumerating the reasons which prompted Aristotle to write about the art, he described dialectic as an art limited to contentious argument between questioner and answerer and even suggested that Aristotle's major purpose in writing about dialectic was to provide each contender with the tools that would help defeat the opponent. The explanation was that once Aristotle had noted that most well-known premisesthe basic elements of dialectical argumentare in opposition and may thus be used to prove or disprove the same proposition, he then

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recognized how useful the art of dialectic was for training in contentious speech. Again, even though Averroës obviously recognized the need to indicate the partial character of his presentation and thus admitted that dialectic had uses other than contentious argument, he immediately reinforced his partial interpretation by dismissing those other uses as irrelevant for the purposes of this treatise and did so without even listing them. As presented here, the contentious art of dialectic is more like the art of fencing: it is good for contending with someone else, but it should be directed by another art.

This partial or restrictive insistence on the contentious character of the art served two purposes. First of all, it drew attention to the question of the audience whom the dialectical theologians usually addressed. If dialectic is really suited for contentious argument between men of equal capacity, it can have little effect when it is employed by the learned to communicate with the usually uneducated mass of people. It appears that the dialectical theologians were trying to use dialectic for the wrong purpose; the art of rhetoric is much better suited for instructing the general public. Secondly, this partial account of the art provides a very accurate idea of the original duty of the dialectical theologians: contending with each other or with the misdirected in defense of the faith. ⁵⁵ They seem to have neglected their original duty, which was more consonant with the art of dialectic, to attempt activities for which dialectic is very poorly suited.

These thoughts, prompted by an attentive reading of the treatise, show that in order to uncover Averroës's teaching it is as important to ask about what is implied as to ask about what is said. Because the omissions are as significant as the declarations, the only way to explain the whole treatise adequately is to ask about what is missing. A simple account of the technical description of dialectic would not be sufficient, because that description is at such variance with Averroës's other explanations of the art. Moreover, an account of the technical characteristics of dialectic would neglect the allusions to a broader issue. The interpretation set forth here not only explains all the parts of the treatise, it also provides a means of relating this treatise to the other treatises as part of one teaching.

The striking difference between the Short Commentary on Aristotle's Topics and the Short Commentary on Aristotle's Rhetoric is the emphasis on the dialectical theologians in the latter. Abu* al-Ma`ali* and al-Ghazali* are named a number of times, and there are passing references to the

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dialectical theologians as a group. In addition, several arguments of Abu * al-Ma`ali* and al-Ghazali* are cited in order to illustrate different features of rhetorical discourse.⁵⁶ However, very few of the references are favorable. In almost every instance, Averroës cited the argument of the dialectical theologians as a negative example and then went on to suggest the correct rhetorical argument.⁵⁷.

It was appropriate to criticize the arguments used by the dialectical theologians according to the standards for rhetorical discourse because the dialectical theologians were so ignorant about the technical characteristics of dialectic that they sought to use it when they should have used rhetoric. Rhetoric is the proper art for instructing the general public or addressing it about any matter. That is why Averroës referred to it as ''this art of public speaking" in the opening lines of the Short Commentary on Aristotle's Rhetoric and arranged the discussion of rhetoric in the treatise according to the persuasiveness of different subjects. For the same reason, when he set down instructions for constructing rhetorical arguments he emphasized what would have greatest persuasive effect on the audience.⁵⁸ In fact, the whole treatise is organized so as to show why rhetoric is more suited for public discourse than dialectic. The basic reason is one that was alluded to in the Short Commentary on Aristotle's Topics: rhetoric permits the speaker to pass over difficult matters or even to be deceptive regarding them, whereas such practices cannot be admitted in dialectical argument.⁵⁹

One reason the dialectical theologians might have been so confused about the technical characteristics of dialectic that they would try to use it when rhetoric would have been a better tool is that, superficially, the two arts are quite similar. They both have the same general purpose of bringing about assent. They are also similar in that each art is dependent on a kind of common opinion known as supposition. Averroës did not hesitate to point out these similarities nor to direct the reader's attention to them by talking about rhetorical arguments as though they were special examples of dialectical arguments. The enthymeme was said to correspond to the syllogism and the example to the induction. He even analyzed the forms of the enthymeme according to the categories normally used to discuss dialectical syllogisms and, in the discussion of the material aspects of the enthymeme, implied that parallels with the syllogism could be drawn .60

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Nonetheless, the similarities between dialectic and rhetoric are only superficial. When the two arts are more closely considered, it becomes readily apparent that they are not identical. For example, even though both arts are used to bring about assent, syllogisms and inductions are used to accomplish this task in dialectic while persuasive things are used in rhetoricthat is, even though enthymemes and examples are used, persuasive devices having nothing to do with syllogistic argument may just as easily be used. Then again, while both arts are dependent upon supposition, the particular type of supposition used in rhetoric is of a lower order than that used in dialectic. A corollary of that difference is that rhetorical arguments induce people to belief for reasons which usually do not withstand deeper scrutiny and thus occupy a lower rank with regard to certainty than dialectical arguments. ⁶¹ Even the emphasis on the dialectical syllogism served to distinguish the two arts. By constantly drawing attention to the dialectical syllogism, Averroës was able to contrast it with the rhetorical argument par excellence, the enthymeme, and to show in what ways they differed.⁶²

The superficial parallelism that Averroës drew between the two arts served a dual purpose. In the first place, his explanations that the differences between the two arts were greater than their similarities permitted him to show why rhetoric was better suited for the purposes of dialectical theology than the art of dialectic. At one point, using rhetoric to explain rhetoric, Averroës could even call upon the famous al-Ghazali* for testimony that people with different intellectual capacities needed to be addressed in different ways.⁶³ Unfortunately, neither al-Ghazali* nor the other dialectical theologians had thought about applying such a principle to their own popular writings. As has been previously noted, however, Averroës had thought about it; most of his criticism of the dialectical theologians and their arguments was directed to that issue. It was in order to show why these arguments could not be used to persuade people, not in order to harm religion, that he pointed out the weaknesses of their theological arguments.

The use of the superficial parallelism also permitted Averroës to make an important substantive argument. When discussing the different uses of enthymemes and examples, as well as their similarities to the dialectical syllogisms and inductions, Averroës twice referred to Abu* al-Ma`ali* in order to show how an inadequate grasp of rhetoric led to deeper errors about important theoretical subjects.⁶⁴ Because

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he did not understand how to use a disjunctive conditional syllogism, Abu * al-Ma'a1i* mistakenly believed that he had refuted the idea that the world might have come into being through the uniting of various elements. This mistaken belief not only meant that he failed to refute that idea, it was also a reason for him to abandon further inquiry into the problem. His erroneous belief that it was possible to acquire universal certainty by means of the example led to even more alarming consequences: according to Averroës, to attribute such power to the example would reduce scientific investigation to child's play and render any kind of instruction useless. Thus, in addition to confusing the usually uneducated mass of people by addressing them with complicated arguments, the dialectical theologians led themselves into error by failing to comprehend the deeper significance of their own arguments. Another reason for showing the inadequacies in their arguments, then, was to show why those arguments needed to be examined more carefully and why the possibility for deeper philosophical inquiry needed to be kept open. In both instances, the arguments of the dialectical theologians were refuted in order to suggest how they could be improved.

However, the dialectical theologians were not the only ones to have insufficient knowledge about the characteristics of the logical arts. While they used something like rhetorical arguments without being fully aware of what they were doing, practitioners of other arts used different kinds of rhetorical devices without having an adequate understanding of the limitations of such devices. The last third of the treatise on rhetoric is devoted to a discussion of the persuasive things external to the art of rhetoric, things which are explicitly assigned a lower rank of logical value and rhetorical merit than the enthymeme or example.⁶⁵ Central to that discussion was a consideration of how the arguments proper to the traditionalist schools of theology and jurisprudencetestimony, recorded traditions, consensus, and challengingmight be used. The traditionalist theologians and jurists had failed to understand the rhetorical origins of these devices and consequently relied upon them too heavily. As a result, conflict and strife arose concerning things allegedly proven by these devices. To remedy that situation Averroës tried to show the precise limitations of these devices and to clarify their very restricted persuasive qualities.⁶⁶

He identified testimony as being a report about something or a series of reportsi.e., a traditionabout something and said that testimony

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was about things either perceived by the senses or apprehended by the intellect. Although testimony could be concerned with what we ourselves have perceived or intellectually apprehended, it is unusual to report such matters to ourselves. For that reason, Averroës directed his remarks to an explanation of the extent of belief which ought to be accorded what others claim to have perceived or to have intellectually apprehended. ⁶⁷ His argument was that unless we ourselves have perceived what has been reported or are able to form an imaginative representation of it, reporting can lead to essential certainty only if it can be proven by a syllogism.⁶⁸ Although he did not go into extensive detail about these conditions, it is not difficult to think of situations in which they might be applied. What, for example, would be a convincing imaginative representation of divine revelation to a particular individual? Or how could a syllogism about the event be constructed? The problem becomes more difficult when the reports concern sense-perceptible matters which have never been perceived; for instance, a secret and solitary voyage by an easily recognizable and famous figure.

Averroës also tried to explain the kinds of problems which arise with regard to what has been intellectually apprehended. Testimony about this sort of thing can be of value only to those unable to apprehend it, e.g., the usually uneducated mass of people.⁶⁹ Still, for testimony to be effective in this instance, something more is needed. The audience must have some notion of the significance of what is being reported, and that can be acquired only by careful explanation. For example, it is not enough to report that a particular individual received a special revelation from a divine agent. In addition, an effort must be made to explain what revelation is, how it can be transmitted, and what that means for the people exposed to the revelation.

His basic argument was that, whether the matter reported about had been intellectually apprehended or perceived by the senses, recourse to reports could not replace intellectual understanding. Reports are nothing more than persuasive devices and are subject to the same kinds of limitations as other rhetorical devices. For this reason he criticized those who sought to derive certainty from reports by enumerating conditions with which to judge the quality of different reports.⁷⁰ Averroës's goal was to underline the suppositional character of reports so that those who used them could begin to think about the problems of communicating the meaning of these reports to others.

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Throughout the discussion he tried to insist that testimony or reporting was only of persuasive value; the fuller context of the report had to be understood and explained before it could have any wider value.

When discussing the other persuasive devices external to the art of rhetoric, Averroës reached similar conclusions. He did not consider it possible, for example, to cite consensus to prove the validity of anything. As al-Ghazali * had admitted, there was such confusion about the whole notion of consensus that agreement about the exact definition of the term was lacking:⁷¹ Averroës never questioned the principle that when the community of Muslims agreed upon something, their agreement was infallible. He simply argued that it was not possible to ascertain how that agreement might be determined and thus not possible to use it for deciding whether a person or doctrine had violated the consensus.

Even accomplishing miraculous feats in order to challenge others to belief had definite limitations according to Averroës, since the ability to perform miracles is no sign of special wisdom. At the most, Averroës conceded that such an ability ought to induce people to have a good opinion of the person who performs such feats and to be disposed to believe him. But the more important question was how to acquire some kind of knowledge that would permit a sound judgment about the teaching that this miracle-worker would then set forth. Once again Averroës was able to cite al-Ghazali* as an eminent witness who shared this point of view.⁷²

The teaching about these persuasive devices which are external to the art of rhetoric is that they cannot be used as evidence of certain knowledge, except under limited conditions. Averroës also explained that these devices may stand in need of the enthymeme to achieve even their limited effect. The significance of a report, for example, might become clear only when explained by an enthymeme. For that reason, the art of rhetoric should be organized in a way that permits the enthymemes to have their rightful precedence. By organizing the art according to such a hierarchy, another benefit is acquired: to the extent that enthymemes are like syllogisms, this organization of the art insures the possibility of acquiring certainty. When the enthymemes take precedence, it is easier to guide rhetoric by a more rigorous syllogistic art. Averroës thought that the ancients had understood the art in this way and he tried to preserve that understanding.⁷³

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However, in presenting this view of the art, Averroës restricted rhetoric in an important respect. Until the very end of the treatise, rhetoric was discussed in a context that made it seem to have use only for the popular discussion of religion or for instruction. Every effort was made to show the similarities and differences between dialectic and rhetoric. It is only in the penultimate paragraph, just before turning to a consideration of poetics, that the political uses of rhetoric are mentioned. The earlier portions of the treatise concentrated on the technical aspects of the art and stressed its superficial similarities with dialectic. The end of the treatise stresses the uses to which rhetoric can be put, and these uses turn out to be very similar to those of the art of poetics.

For the purposes of this collection of commentaries, then, rhetoric can be said to occupy a middle ground between the art of dialectic and the art of poetics. It is similar to dialectic in that its arguments can be discussed and analyzed in terms of their formal characteristics; it is similar to poetics in that it has great usefulness for political matters. By neglecting the political uses of rhetoric and concentrating on the ways rhetoric could be used in the popular discussion of religion or for instruction, Averroës was able to set forth his criticisms of dialectical theology. Since he could not remain completely silent about the political uses of rhetoric, he did the next best thing and acknowledged those uses briefly at the very end of the treatise when discussing the reasons which prompted Aristotle to study the art of rhetoric. Such a tactic allowed him to avoid explicit endorsement of Aristotle's views while suggesting at least tacit agreement with them. More importantly, that reference to Aristotle's views was sufficient to remind the thoughtful reader of what had been omitted from the preceding discussion and thus to underline the corrective teaching about the dialectical theologians.

Emphasis on the political usefulness of poetics is the dominant theme of Averroës's Short Commentary on Aristotle's Poetics. He began the treatise with a statement about the political uses to which the art of poetics might be put and later explained how recognition of these uses had prompted Aristotle to write about poetics. While the acknowledgement of Aristotle's recognition of the political uses of rhetoric was perfunctory in the Short Commentary on Aristotle's Rhetoric, the acknowledgement of his recognition of the political uses of poetics is given more attention in this treatise. Here, the acknowledgement is preceded by Averroës's own recognition of those uses, and it is complemented by the art being

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recommended to our attention because of its suitability for political uses. ⁷⁴ Essentially this treatise differs from the other two treatises in that the technical aspects of poetics are almost passed over in this treatise in order to stress the political uses of the art. In each of the other two treatises, the practical uses of dialectic or of rhetoric were almost passed over in order that the technical aspects of either of those arts might be stressed. An example of the way technical explanations are almost passed over in this treatise is the absence of a discussion about the amount of assent provided by the speeches used in poetics. In fact, the word "assent" (tasdiq*) does not even occur in the treatise. Such indifference to the technical aspects of the art is counterbalanced only by explicit admissions about the potentially deceptive quality of poetics and by attempts to explain those admissions.⁷⁵

Poetics is potentially deceptive because of the character of the speeches used in the art. The poet may strive to make these speeches rhythmical in order to move the souls of the listeners as he desires, but he gives no consideration to ordering these speeches in order to bring them closer to truth or to certainty. To the contrary, poetic speeches are explicitly said to be usually of little value for seizing the essence of anything.⁷⁶ The reason is that although they are meant to give an imaginative representation of something, the resulting imaginative representation is not designed to portray the object as it really is. Consequently, a literal interpretation of poetic speeches will quite probably lead to error. However, listeners can just as readily be deceived by poetic speeches if they make a mistake about the way in which the imaginative representation is couched: even though the listeners may know better than to take the speech literally, they could fall into error by taking the speech as a metaphor when it is really a simile or vice versa.⁷⁷

Still, all of these errors can be traced to simple confusion on the part of the listeners about the meaning of the particular poetic speeches. Closer attention to the rules of the art and to the speeches themselves would help to avoid these kinds of errors. In these cases the error can be corrected by using another kind of speech to describe the thing in question. When the sea is spoken of as being "the sweat of the earth brought together in its bladder," for example, it is readily apparent that a simple physical explanation of seawater and of the topography of the earth would dispel any tendency to literal belief in this poetic image.⁷⁸ However, there are things which cannot be

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conceived of at all or which are extremely difficult to form a concept about except by the kinds of allusions given in imaginative representations. Unfortunately, poetic speeches about these kinds of things lead to error even more frequently. ⁷⁹ Moreover, to the extent that it is impossible or extremely difficult to explain such things by any other kind of speech, there is little chance of removing the error once it occurs. Averroës gave only one example of these kinds of things: a being which is neither in the world nor outside of it, that is, God.⁸⁰ Admittedly, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to conceive of God by means of anything other than imaginative representations. Nor can it be denied that confusion, if not error, about God is widespread.

These things which are difficult or impossible to conceive of seem to differ in additional ways from the other things which are also represented by poetic speeches but are easily conceived of. Although Averroës nowhere admitted as much, clearly it is only with regard to the former kinds of things that the practical uses of poetics come into play. These uses include moving the souls of the listeners to predilection for something or to flight from it, moving them to believe or disbelieve in something, and moving them to do or not do certain kinds of actions. The art of poetics may also be used simply to move the souls of the listeners to awe or to wonder because of the delightfulness of the imaginative representation.⁸¹ While the souls of the listeners may be moved to predilection for God or to a desire to flee from Him because of the poetic speech presented to them, it is unlikely that a poetic speech about the sea would have such an effect. A poetic speech about natural phenomena would arouse such emotions only to the extent that the listeners were moved to contemplate the cause of such pleasing or terrifying things, but that too would be linked closely to the notion of God. The contrast becomes starker upon considering the usefulness of poetic speeches for inducing belief or disbelief in something. Similarly, imaginative representations about natural phenomena are not designed to move the listeners to action. At the most, poetic speeches about natural phenomena arouse feelings of awe or wonder in the souls of the listeners; such speeches instruct the listeners about the beauty or the awesomeness of the surrounding world.

When these explanations about the potential for deceptiveness in poetic speechesespecially those speeches about things which it is impossible or extremely difficult to conceive of except by poetic

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speechesare carefully considered and compared to the emphasis on the practical uses of poetics, a new significance of the treatise comes into focus. In addition to its political uses, poetics would seem to have patent religious uses. The reasoning behind this conclusion is that influencing the opinions or beliefs and the actions of others is as much a concern of religion as it is of politics. This is especially true of the kind of religion which strives to provide for the welfare of a community of believers, that is, of a religion like Islam. ⁸² Another way of stating this would be to say that politics is seen to be more than secular. By introducing the idea of speaking about God and showing how it is related to the practical uses of poetics, Averroës has suggested that political concerns are necessarily related to religious concerns.

Although it becomes most apparent in this treatise, that relationship is not introduced for the first time here. The argument of the other two treatises presupposed the interplay between religion and politics. In the treatises on dialectic and rhetoric, a major effort was made to correct the evils wreaked by the dialectical theologians and to establish principles which would prevent those evils from recurring. While the evils in question derived primarily from the realm of religious opinion or belief, they clearly had consequences in the political realm. The treatise on poetics differs from those two treatises because the interplay between religion and politics is made more apparent and because there is a very explicit emphasis on how the art can influence actions. There is, then, a movement or a shift in emphasis in these treatises, a movement from concern solely about opinions or beliefs to concern about both belief and actions. That movement is symbolic of the movement from a narrow concern with religion and politics to a more inclusive concern with both. Insofar as the treatise on poetics represents the culmination of that movement, it stands apart from the other two treatises.

A sign of the different status of the treatise on poetics is the absence of any reference to the dialectical theologians or to the problems they caused. The emphasis here is massively on what the art is for, not on ways that it might be corrected. That does not mean, however, that this treatise occupies a higher rank than the other two treatises. Indeed, the art of poetics as presented here is hardly free from major difficulties. The primary difficulty is the apparent inevitability of deception in the poetic speeches that deal with concepts like God. Implicitly, the argument is that such deceptiveness is part of poetic

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speeches qua poetic speeches, as though the art of poetics had no internal standards. Averroës brought the problem into sharper perspective by suggesting that speeches about such subjects, insofar as they were deceptive, were more characteristic of sophistry than of poetics. ⁸³

Although he did not explain what he meant by drawing the parallel with reference to these speeches, he made a similar observation about poetics in the subsequent paragraph. He noted that poetics was classed among the syllogistic arts even though the syllogism is used in it only to make poetic speeches deceptively resemble speeches of other arts.⁸⁴ The implication is that poetics can be used for willful deception. When the poet pretends to have proofs about what he says without really having them, poetics strongly resembles sophistry. In that instance his use of syllogistic arguments would not be in accord with the logical rules for their use, but would be deceptively structured in order to receive greater credibility than they might otherwise receive.

Such a possibility arises because, with poetics as with rhetoric, there is no internal control to keep it from being used for deceptive purposes.⁸⁵ With dialectic and demonstration, however, the rules of syllogistic reasoning must be followed. Any purposely deceptive use of the arguments belonging to those arts is external to the art. Because poetics is not structured in that way and can therefore be used as sophistry would be, the deceptiveness of its speechesespecially those concerning things which cannot be conceived of at all or only conceived of with difficulty by other speechesseems inevitable. By linking poetics and sophistry on this issue, Averroës suggested that he drew the same conclusion.

Yet that conclusion is not without exception. The inevitability of deception about this kind of poetic speech depends on a very basic limitation in the explanation, a limitation Averroës need not have imposed. Confusion about the subjects treated by this kind of poetic speech could be removed by metaphysical investigation. However, Averroës remained silent about that possibility. Through his silence he presented as restrictive a teaching about poetics as he did about dialectic.

In part, this restrictive teaching about poetics allowed him to criticize the way the art was being used. That he was not more explicit in his criticism can be understood by reflecting about the generally accepted view among Muslims that the Qur'an* is the best example of

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poetic excellence in Arabic. Without becoming involved in that controversy, he nevertheless managed to make certain suggestions about Our'anic * exegesis. His belief about the potential deceptiveness of poetic speeches carried the implication that it was necessary to keep imaginative representations simple and as direct as possible. In this respect, the treatise on poetics, like the treatise on dialectic and rhetoric, contributes to a solution of the fundamental practical issue. By emphasizing the dangers of poetic speech and its politico-religious uses, this treatise subtly urges great care upon those who would use such speech to communicate with most people and especially upon those who might seek to interpret such speech to the people. However such advice is never given; to the extent that it is a consequence of the argument, it is only an implicit consequence. The treatise on poetics remains at a certain level of abstraction at all times.

The restrictive teaching about poetics also allowed Averroës to put the general argument of these three treatises into the proper perspective. Because the potential deceptiveness of poetic speeches brought the art into close relationship with sophistry, Averroës insisted at the very end of the treatise that perfect skill in poetics was foreign to ultimate human perfection.⁸⁶ He explained this judgment in his summary of the whole collection of short commentaries by noting that ultimate human perfection depended on correct theoretical knowledge.⁸⁷ It was clear from the preceding exposition that poetics could not furnish such knowledge. It is equally clear from the presentation of dialectic and rhetoric that they could not furnish such knowledge either. For the attainment of ultimate human perfection or correct theoretical knowledge, another art was neededan art based on a full mastery of logic.

Such a judgment was not meant to suggest that these arts were without value. In the first place, it is reasonable that a similar conclusion be drawn at the end of a collection of short commentaries on logic. After all, the study of logic is a preliminary for the pursuit of theoretical knowledge. Even the general order of this collection suggests the primary importance attached to theoretical knowledge. The first few treatises prepared the reader for the study of demonstration, and it was presented as the pinnacle of logical thinking. Thus the first few treatises were steps up to demonstration. From that peak, the treatises on the logical arts concerned with opinion represented a kind of descent: they were based on varying degrees of opinion, while

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demonstration was based on certainty; they were used to discuss particulars while demonstration was used to discuss universals. It is also possible to discern a descending order among these treatises concerned with opinion, a movement from opinion bordering on certainty to representations bordering on error. Of the three arts, dialectic most resembles demonstration and poetics is least similar to it. By placing these treatises after the discussion about demonstration, Averroës also indicated that one can understand how to work with opinions only after adequately learning how to acquire certain knowledge.

However, Averroës never insisted here that practical life had to be guided by theoretical knowledge. To the contrary, the basic and explicit argument of these treatises is that opinion usually suffices for decent human life. The virtues, for example, are presented as moral habits based on what is generally accepted, not on what is certain. ⁸⁸ In a similar manner, the restrictive presentation of each of these three treatises served to delineate an area of action in which popular opinion is sufficient. Thus, while his silence about the theoretical uses of dialectic indicated that dialectic should not be used for philosophical pursuits, he argued for the art being used with confidence in other domains.

The goal was to show why the arts based on opinion were best suited for certain functions but also why they had to be limited in their application to those functions. In most practical situations, time restrictions and the intellectual shortcomings of other people make it difficult to attain demonstrative certainty. All that is necessary is that theoretical knowledge not be endangered by opinions used in the practical situations. Averroës attacked the dialectical theologians because they had become confused about the pursuit of theoretical knowledge and had set forth opinions which were harmful to further theoretical investigation. At the same time he attempted to indicate how common opinion should be viewed and what its limitations were. It might be said that he rehabilitated common opinion. He did so by making a strong defense of its practical merits, by proving that those who were most scornful of common opinion were actually most dependent upon it for their own reasoning, and by showing how it might be used in public speech. In that way he was able to indicate the need for eliminating the confusing and complicated speech usually used for public discourse. Similarly, his identification of the limits

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and different ranks of common opinion served to restrain those who would hastily conclude that all inquiry was relative and perhaps cause greater political harm. Moreover, by insisting that the standard against which common opinion was to be judged was its approximation to certain knowledge, Averroës kept alive the possibility of coming very close to the ideal of ultimate human perfection. His rehabilitation of common opinion in no way lowered the goal of practical life.

However, the larger problem behind all of this is that of the relationship between politics, religion, and philosophy. As these treatises have been examined, it became clear that religious belief was shaped and molded by each of the different arts. It also became evident that religious belief was prior to political action and influenced political action. Moreover, to the extent that these arts depend on correct theoretical knowledge, the way religious belief is shaped and molded depends on correct theoretical knowledge. Differently stated, sound belief depends on sound investigation. While there is a large area in which belief is sound on its own principles, that independence should not be mistaken for opposition to theoretical investigation. The mark of good belief is that it not destroy the possibility of further theoretical inquiry; the mark of good theoretical inquiry is that it protect sound belief and further its acceptance by those unable to pursue theoretical knowledge.

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Short Commentary on Aristotle's ''Topics

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Outline of Argument for the Short Commentary on Aristotle's "Topics

INVOCATION AND TITLE

A. Introduction: The purpose of this commentary is to discuss dialectical arguments and the extent of assent they provide (para. 1).

B. The extent of assent provided by dialectical arguments (paras. 2-4):

1. They provide belief approximate to certainty (para. 2).

2. However, because of the kinds of premises used in dialectical arguments, that belief only pproximates certainty (para. 3).

3. That is due to the premises of dialectical arguments often being partially false (para. 4).

C. Classes of dialectical arguments which bring about assent, according to their forms (paras. 5-12):

1. There are three different kinds of syllogisms used in dialectic (para. 5).

2. The induction (para. 6):

a. how it differs from the syllogism (paras. 7-8).

b. how the way dialectic uses induction sets it apart from rhetoric (para. 9).

c. because of the limits of the induction, it is best used for generally accepted premises (para. 10).

d. nonetheless, there are instances when it can be used in demonstration (para. 11).

3. Summary (para. 12).

D. Classes of dialectical arguments leading to assent, according to their material aspects (paras. 13-19):

1. The different classes of generally accepted premises (para. 13).

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2. These premises are universal predicates or predicables (para. 14).

3. But only five of the eight universal predicates are used in dialectic (para. 15):

a. a general definition of each of the five universal predicates (para. 16).

b. although not complete, these definitions offer a sufficient idea of the universal predicates for present purposes (para. 17).

c. because of the way dialectical syllogisms are constructed, their classes may be twice as umerous as those of demonstrative syllogisms 0(para. 18).

4. Logical arguments are still another class of argument leading to assent (para. 19).

E. Summary Statement (para. 20).

F. What prompted Aristotle to write about dialectic (para. 21).

DEDICATION

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In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate. [I beseech] your succor, O Lord! ¹

The Book of Dialectic

[Introduction]

(l) Since we have spoken about the things by means of which the certain assent¹ and the complete concept² are distinguished and subsequent to that have spoken about the things which lead to error concerning them, let us speak about dialectical and rhetorical assent and the extent each one provides. For our purposes, it is not necessary to speak about what makes these arts complete. Let us begin, then, with dialectical arguments.³

[The Extent of Assent Provided by Dialectical Arguments]

(2) We say: the extent [of assent] they provide is supposition¹ which approximates certainty. In general, supposition is believing that something exists in a particular kind of way, while it is possible for it to be different than it is believed to be. Therefore, its peculiar characteristic² is that it may be eliminated through opposition; demonstration differs in that it has the peculiar characteristic of not being eliminated through opposition. There are two divisions of supposition. With one, namely dialectical supposition, opposition to it is not noticed; if it is noticed, the supposition can only exist with difficulty. With the other, which is rhetorical, opposition to it is noticed.

(3) That this is the extent of assent this art provides is apparent from the definition of the arguments providing it, since the dialectical argument is a syllogism composed from widespread, generally accepted premises.¹ Now assent about the widespread, generally accepted premise results from the testimony of all or most people, not from the matter being like that in itselfcontrary to the way it is with demonstration. Indeed, with demonstration, we arrive at assent which is certain through our assenting to premises because to our minds they appear just as they are externally, not because they are someone else's opinion.

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(4) Since that is the case, dialectical premises are often partially false. If they are found to be entirely true, that occurs by accident, that is, because it happens that what is generally accepted is the same outside the mind as it is inside the mind. ¹ However, as we have said, we do not take it from this aspect in these syllogisms, but only from the aspect of it being generally accepted. Therefore, a syllogism of sound figure² composed from premises like these necessarily provides a probable supposition.

[Classes of Dialectical Arguments Bringing About Assent, According to Their Forms]

[The Syllogism]

(5) Since the extent of assent which this art provides has now been made clear,¹ we shall speak about the classes of arguments causing it. Accordingly, we say that the figure of syllogisms bringing about something like this supposition approximate to certainty must necessarily be sound; otherwise, they would be sophistical, contentious arguments. Therefore, the specific kinds of syllogism used here are the three specific kinds mentioned in the Prior Analytics, i.e., he categorical,² the conditional,³ and the ontradictory syllogism⁴the simple and the complex ones. Indeed, it might be possible both to establish and to refute complex problems by means of complex, dialectical syllogisms like these, since generally accepted premises leading to the thing sought are right at hand.

[The Induction]

(6) This art might use another specific kind of assent which is particular to it, namely, induction. With this specific kind of thing which causes assent, an affirmative or negative universal judgment is asserted about a universal matter because that judgment applies to most of the particulars subsumed under that universal matter. An example of that is our asserting that every body is created because we find that most bodies are of this description. That is an argument which has the force of a syllogism in the first figure,¹ since the minor term² is that universal matter, the middle³ the particulars, and the major⁴ the judgment. Nonetheless, the procedure is contrary to the way it is in the syllogism.

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(7) That is because with the syllogism we always proceed to the verification of the unknown, partial matter from the universal known to us or we proceed from the equally known to the equally unknown. However, we do not take the equally-known, universal [matter] as a major premise ¹ here due to its being equally- [known], but due to its being universalwhether that be by nature or by convention. Our proceeding to the verification of the partial matter from the universal [known] to us is like our explaining that every man is sense-perceiving because every animal is sense-perceiving. For man, which is the minor term here, falls under the major premise and is encompassed within it.² An example of our proceeding from the equally-[known] to the equally-[unknown] is our explaining that every man is a laughing being insofar as every man is a speaking being.³ For speaking is equivalent to laughing. But laughing is generally taken as being encompassed within speaking and subordinate to it, even though it might be equivalent to itsince there is no harm in doing this.⁴ For that reason we say that something like this is universal by convention.

(8) With induction, we always proceed from the particular to the universal. Therefore, if we have, for example, explained by means of the induction that every body is created because we have found some bodies to be created, it is clear that we proceed to this universal propositionwhich is that every body is createdinsofar as we have found some bodies to be created, like earth, water, air, fire, and others. Thus, the composition of the argument which has the force of the syllogism in the first figure is brought forth like this: "Fire, air, water, and earth are bodies; they are created; so body is created." Yet when the induction is used all by itself to explain an unknown problem,¹ it is not very persuasive. That is because if by means of the induction it appears that the predicate applies to the subject, then that problem was not unknown, but was a self-evident premise made apparent by the induction.

(9) Insofar as this art uses the sound syllogism for an unknown problem, it does not take what is known in itself as being a problem; rather, something like this is more appropriate to rhetorical methods. Accordingly, in this art induction tends to be used mainly for verifying the major premise.¹ But in something like this as well, induction is useless. That is because if we have already inductively examined most of the particulars falling under the major premise and not one of those

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which we have thereby inductively examined is the subject of the problem, then how did it occur to us that it was encompassed within the major premise? And in general, how did certainty that that premise is universal occur to us? If the subject of the problem was among the [particulars] which we have inductively examined, the very problem reappears as a premise made clear by induction; and the first doubt reappears. ² However, the art of dialectic does not carry the matter out in such a manner; rather, it asserts that a judgment applies to all [of something] because it applies to most of it, for it is generally accepted that the lesser follows the greater.

(10) Even if all of the particulars are exhausted, inductioninsofar as it is inductiondoes not by itself and primarily set forth the essentially necessary predicate. For it is not impossible for that universal to be a predicate of all of those particulars accidentallylike someone who holds the opinion that everything which comes into being comes into being from what already exists. Therefore, premises such as these are generally accepted. Now the induction used in demonstration is only used for guidance toward certainty, not for providing it primarily and essentially. There is a major difference between what is used for guiding [toward certainty] and what is used for providing [certainty] by itself. Therefore, with regard to the premises about which the induction provides certainty, we do not require that all of the particulars be scrutinized; rather, it is sufficient to scrutinize some.

(11) There are only two circumstances in which using induction [in demonstration] is required: (a) for that general sort of premise none of whose individual cases has happened as yet to be perceived, for example, someone who has never perceived that scammony relieves bile. In cases like this, induction is needed to reach the essential predicate. Now these are known as experiential premises, and these premises vary in the number of individual instances which need to be perceived [so that] certainty about them then results. That is different for each specific matter:¹ for some, a single individual instance need be perceivedas with many of the arithmetical premisesand with some more than one need be perceived. The other circumstance which requires using induction in demonstration occurs because (b) many people do not admit the universality of many premises but admit one of their particularslike someone who admits that knowledge of health and sickness belongs to one science, which is the science of medicine. Now if he were told that the science of opposites is one,

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he would not admit this generalization until it had been made inductively clear to him. At that time, he would reach certainty about its universality.

(12) This, then, is the form of dialectical arguments leading to assent.

[Classes of Dialectical Arguments Leading to Assent, According to Their Material Aspects]

(13) Their matters, as has been previously [explained], ¹ are the generally accepted premises. These are of [different] classes:

(a) Some are generally accepted by everybody, and this is the most noble class. It is possible for all of the different nations to meet in agreement on this one despite the variance in their sects and in their natural dispositions. An example is [the premise] that it is good to thank a benefactor or that it is necessary to respect one's parents.

(b) Some of them are generally accepted by most people, without there being any disagreement among the rest about that. An example is [the premise] that God is one.

(c) Some of them are generally accepted

(i) by learned men and wise men, or by most of them without the rest disagreeing with them, for example, [the premise] that knowledge is virtuous in itself; or

(ii) by most of them, for example, [the premise] that the heavens are spherical.

(d) Some of them are generally accepted

(i) by the practitioners of the arts, without the multitude disagreeing with them about that, for example, [the premise] in the art of medicine that scammony relieves bile and that the pulp of the colocynth relieves phlegm; or

(ii) by those renowned for skill in the arts, without the practitioners of the art disagreeing with them, for example, the argument of Hippocrates that weakness arising without any precedent cause is a warning of sickness;² or

(iii) by most of them.

(e) The likeness of what is generally accepted is also generally

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accepted; for example, if it were a generally accepted [premise] that the science of opposites is one in itself, then sense-perception of opposites would be one in itself.

(f) A thing opposed to what is generally accepted is also generally accepted. For example, if it were a generally accepted [premise] that one ought to do good to friends, then one ought to do bad to enemies.

Now the most noble of all of these is that which is attested to by everyone or by most people; anything else will become generally accepted solely because of the testimony of everyone or of most people to it. Thus the opinions of learned men become generally accepted because everyone or most people hold the opinion that their opinions ought to be accepted. The same thing holds for the opinions which are particular to the arts and for the rest.

(14) These generally accepted premises are necessarily universals, since particulars change and are not perceived by everybody in the same way. If they were, they would be taken indefinitely in these syllogisms, and there would be no concern about stating the ellipsis explicitly. That is why these syllogisms do not lie by means of the particular. ¹

(15) As has been previously [explained], there are eight classes of universals, both simple and complex; genus, species, differentia, property, accident, definition, description, and the statement which is neither definition nor description.¹ Since this is so, dialectical predicates are necessarily one of these classes. However, because species² is predicated only of an individual and a proposition whose predicate is an individual is not used in this art, it is not enumerated here as a predicate. Description³ is subsumed under property, since they have the same force. Similarly, the statement which is neither definition nor description⁴ is subsumed under accident. It turns out, then, that there are five classes of dialectical predicates: definition, genus, differentia, property and accident.⁵

(16) It is sufficient here to describe definition as a statement pointing to that meaning of a thing by means of which its basic structure and its being are explained.¹ Genus is defined here as being the predicate, from the aspect of essence, of several things which differ according to species.² Differentia is also the predicate of several things which differ according to species, [but it is predicated] from the aspect of quality.³ Property is the predicate which does not point to the essence of the thing, but applies to all of it, it alone, and always.⁴

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Accident is described here in two ways: one is that it is that which applies to the thing and is not genus, differentia, property, or definition; the second is that it is that which might apply to one specific thing and might not apply to it. It is described here in two ways because, taken together, they lead to accident being conceived of absolutely. That is because the first of the two descriptions makes specific what is not distinctive about accident, and the second what is distinctive. ⁵

(17) It is clear that the descriptions [given] here are not sufficient for each one of these to be conceived of completely, but for them to be conceived of in this way is sufficient here. That is because a perfect concept of the things from which definitions are put together is [given] in the Posterior Analytics.¹ Likewise, what is included in the definition of genus here is clearly the ultimate genus of the genera.² Likewise, it is not sufficient for the differentia to be a predicate from the aspect of quality without it applying specifically to the thing for which it is a differentia.³

(18) If the predicates pertaining to dialectical premises are one of these five classes, the types of dialectical syllogisms must correspond to what is composed from these five the way they are conceived of here. Thus,¹ they might be taken as a predicate according to the natural course and then converted, and the three terms in the syllogisms might then be related to each other either by a single one of these five relations (like definition or some other relation) or by a combination of them (like one of the terms being related as a differentia and the second as an accident or some other relation). Similarly, they might be taken in another way; that is, two of the terms might always be related to the thirdeither the major term and the middle to the minor, or the minor and the middle to the majorbut the two related terms would be related to each other only by the predicate of accident. This, too, might occur in two ways. Either the two terms might be related to the other term in a single way (like the major term and the middle being related to the minor only as definition or any other one of the five relations). That might be also be done in an opposite manner (i.e., the minor and the middle might be related to the major in this way or in any other one of the relations). The other way is for both terms to be related to the other term in two ways (like the major term being related to the minor as definition and the middle being related to the minor as differentia or some other relation). That, too,

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might be done in an opposite manner (i.e., the minor might be related to the major as definition and the middle might be related to the major as differentia or some other relation). Then if these syllogisms were enumerated in this manner, there would be twice as many types of dialectical syllogisms as demonstrative syllogisms. That is because with [dialectical syllogisms] no attention is paid to whether a predicate is made naturally or essentially. Because of their strong resemblance and closeness to the types of demonstrative syllogisms, many people suppose that several types of demonstrative syllogisms are missing in Abu * Nasr* [al-Farabi's*] book.² In truth, they are dialectical syllogisms.

(19) There is another class of arguments here which lead to assent, those known as logical arguments. This class is composed from true premises which are not essential but are more general than the genus in which they are used. So insofar as it is true, it is supposed that this class should be counted among the classes of demonstrations; while insofar as it is non-essential, it is supposed that this class is dialectical. Themistius¹ explicitly stated that this class is not dialectical. However, from the force of Abu* Nasr* [al-Farabi's] argument, it appears that it is dialectical.² Now I say unless certainty that a predicate is contained in the substance of a subject or a subject in the substance of the predicate causes assent about a given, generally accepted problem, assent is only caused by general acceptance or by induction. And what is of this sort is necessarily dialectical. But syllogisms such as these are of a higher rank than dialectical syllogisms, since they are neither false nor partial.

(20) Now we have said enough for our purposes here.

[Conclusion]

(21) When Aristotle distinguished these dialectical arguments from the demonstrative, not only with regard to the matters, but according to the [form of the] argument¹ as well, he was of the opinion that syllogisms like theseeven if they were not demonstrativehad uses for training due to their being more generally accepted. That is because, since several of the generally accepted premises are opposites, it is possible on the basis of these premises to establish and refute the very same thing. That is to say, he was of the opinion that if two

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disputants use syllogisms like these in which two opposing premises are joined to a minor premise ² in order to establish or refute something, on the condition that one wants to defend it and the other to refute it, then this will result in great training for themthe way it does with arts directed toward other ones, like the art of fencing and others. On account of this, this art is made [to be exercised by] a questioner and an answerer. The questioner's role is to get the answerer to admit what will refute his position, and the answerer's role is to refrain from admitting anything which will refute his own position. It was for this that Aristotle set forth all of the topics from which syllogisms concerning every problem are derived, whether the problem be one in which the subject is investigated absolutely or in conjunction [with something else], like seeking whether it is genus, definition, or [another] one of the five relations.³ Then Aristotle set forth, in addition, how the questioner asks questions and the answerer answers. Furthermore, he set forth particular instructions for the questioner and for the answerer. Therefore this art is defined as an aptitude (a) enabling the questioner to make a syllogism from generally accepted premises for refuting either of two extremes of the contradiction to which he gets the answerer [to admit] and (b) enabling the answerer not to admit anything to the questioner from which the contradiction of what he posits would necessarily follow. There are other uses of this art already enumerated in the Topics.⁴ However, training like this seems unnecessary for the perfection of the demonstrative arts. But if it were, without a doubt, it would be from the standpoint of the most excellent [kind of training].

The Topics is finished. Praise be to God and His Succor.

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Short Commentary on Aristotle's ''Rhetoric

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Outline of Argument for the Short Commentary on Aristotle's "Rhetoric":

INVOCATION AND TITLE

A. Introduction (paras. 1-3):

1. Purpose: Discussion of persuasive things and the amount of assent they provide (para. 1).

2.Persuasive things are divided into speeches and external things (para. 2).

3. Order of presentation: First persuasive speeches, then the other persuasive things (para. 3).

B. Persuasive Speeches (paras. 4-32):

1. The Enthymemea syllogism based on unexamined previously existing opinion (paras. 4-25).

a. The forms of syllogisms bring about conclusions by their special construction (paras. 5-15).

i. categorical syllogisms (paras. 6-7):

(a) how this works in the first figure (para. 6).

(b) how this works in the second and third figures (para. 7).

ii. conditional syllogisms are of two kinds (paras. 8-13):

(a) conjunctivehow it becomes an enthymeme (para. 8).

(i) an example of an erroneous use of this by Galen (para. 9).

(ii) how to assure the success of this kind of syllogism when the onclusion is sound (para. 10).

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(b) disjunctivehow it becomes persuasive (para. 11).

(i) an example of an erroneous use of this by Abu * al-Ma`ali* (para.

(ii) how to assure the success of this kind of syllogism when dealing with negations (para. 13).

iii the contradictory syllogism (para. 14).

iv. summary (para. 15).

b. Material aspects of the syllogisma division based on the premises of the syllogism (paras. 16-25).

i. these premises are considered from the aspect of their being generally accepted by unexamined common opinion and all into two classes (paras. 17-19):

(a) proofs are taken from sense-perceived things and have a further division into proofs proper and signs (para. 18).

(b) generally received propositionsexamples of them (para. 19).

ii. examples of different kinds of proofs (paras. 20-22):

(a)examples of proofs proper, i.e., those proofs in the first figure (para. 20).

(b) examples of signs in the second figure (para. 21).

(c) examples of signs in the third figure (para. 22).

iii. major distinction for rhetoric is the status of premises with regard to nexamined opinion, not their status as necessary or more possible (para. 23).

iv. in rhetoric, as in dialectic, the premises used may be adapted to the ends of the speaker (para. 24).

v. summary: justification of the division of premises according to the ecessary and the possible (para. 25).

2. The Example (paras. 26-32).

a. Different instances of the kinds of examples (para. 26).

b. Difference between example and induction (para. 27).

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c. Examples are based on two kinds of likeness, and these have certain restrictions (paras. 28-31):

i. with an example, it is not possible to make a particular judgment on the basis of a universal (para. 29).

ii. examples always remain close to unexamined opinion (para. 30).

iii. Failure to recognize these restrictions led Abu * al-Ma`ali* astray (para. 31).

d. Summary (para. 32).

C. Persuasive Things Not Occurring by Speeches (paras. 33-44).

1. General enumeration of the 11 persuasive things not occurring by speeches (para. 33).

2. Some of these need a further explanation (para. 34).

a. Testimony (paras. 35-40):

i. testimony is a kind of report (para. 35).

ii. the groups of theologians differ according to their opinions about its sufficiency for intellectually perceived matters (para. 36).

iii. testimonies about sense-perceived matters are strengthened when a large number of people report having seen the matters (para. 37).

(a) certainty can be attained about such matters (para. 38).

(b) such reports can even bring about certainty concerning matters that have not been perceived. (para. 39).

iv. there is no stipulated number of reporters necessary for certainty to be brought about (para. 40).

b. Recorded Traditions: Their strength in persuasion comes from people being brought p according to their dictates (para. 41).

c. Consensus: Although it has a religious basis, it is not yet clear how inviolable it is (para. 42).

d. Challenging: It is most useful with those who claim to be able to work miracles (para. 43).

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3. Summary: Although all of these have persuasive value, enthymemes are more noble (para. 44).

D. Conclusion (paras. 45-46).

1. Aristotle wrote about these things when he saw their value for public discourse about political matters (para. 45).

2. The purpose of this treatise has now been fulfilled (para. 46).

Dedication

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In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate, [I beseech] your succor our Lord! ¹

The Speech About Rhetorical Arguments¹

[Introduction]

(1) Since we have finished speaking about dialectical syllogisms and the extent of assent they provide, let us speak about persuasive things and the extent of assent they too provide. It is apparent that persuasion is a kind of probable supposition¹ which the soul trusts, despite its awareness of an opposing consideration. In what preceded, we already defined supposition.²

(2) From scrutiny and inductive investigation,¹ it appears that the things effecting persuasion can first be divided into two classes: one of them consists in arguments, and the second is external things² which are not argumentslike oaths, testimonies, and other things we will enumerate. Similarly, from scrutiny it also appears that the arguments used in public speaking³ fall into two classes: example and proof. (In this art, the latter is called enthymeme.) That is because when someone advises⁴ someone else to take a certain kind of medicine he says to him: "Use it because so-and-so used it, and it helped him." He thus persuades him by citing an example. Or he says to him: "You have a disease like this or like that." It is like that with every single thing concerning which people converse with one another.

(3) Since it has become apparent that this sort of speaking uses these two classes of arguments, we will speak about them first. Then, after that, we will go on to speak about the other persuasive things, for the former are more worthy of being considered persuasive than the latter and are prior by nature.

[The Enthymeme]

(4) We say: the enthymeme is a syllogism leading to a conclusion which corresponds to unexamined opinion previous1y existing among

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all or most people. Unexamined previously existing opinion is opinion which strikes a man as a probable supposition and which he trusts as soon as it occurs to him, even before he has examined it. Syllogisms become conclusive according to unexamined previously existing opinion either because of their forms or because of their matters. ¹ This happens because of their forms when they are conclusive according to unexamined opinion. It happens because of their matters when their premises are true, once again according to unexamined opinion.

[Forms of Syllogisms]

(5) The forms of syllogisms become conclusive according to unexamined opinion by not being strict with regard to them and by omitting from them the thing which causes the conclusion to follow necessarily, the way the multitude is usually content [to do] when speaking to one another. Therefore, we ought to consider this notion in connection with each specific kind of syllogism we have enumerated;¹, by such an enumeration, we will arrive at the types of all the persuasive syllogisms with respect to their forms.

(6) Thus we say: from what has preceded it is clear that the universal premise¹ is what causes the conclusion to follow necessarily in the first figure² and that the conjunction³ is caused by the minor premise⁴ being affirmative. Since this is the case, if the major premise⁵ is omitted or taken indefinitely the first figure will be persuasive. However, to omit itas those engaged in demonstration dois more persuasive, because omitting it may lead people to fancy: (a) that it was omitted because there was no point of contention about it and (b) that it is extremely clear. Similarly, in some instances the first figure may become persuasive by omitting the minor premise or by taking it negatively.⁶

(7) Since it is not clear at the outset which premise brings about the conclusion¹ nor which causes the conjunction in the second² and the third³ figures, but it may be the minor premise or the major premise, there would be no harm in explicitly stating both premises in these two [figures]. But, when this is done and neither one has been omitted, both of them ought to be taken indefinitely; otherwise, no point of contention would remain in these two [figures] at all. Moreover, among the kinds of inconclusive combinations are those that are thought to be conclusive according to unexamined opinion without

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really being so. Now these kinds of arguments are still persuasive because of their forms. An example of this is the combination of two affirmative [premises] in the second figure. Similarly, the conclusive types [of syllogisms] which are in the third figure are of this kind when their conclusions are taken in a universal manner. ⁴ However, in spite of this, one ought not to state the ellipsis in them explicitly but ought to take them indefinitely so that the point of contention in them might be more obscure.

(8) Conditional Syllogisms are disjunctiveas previously statedand conjunctive. The conjunctive syllogism is made an enthymeme by leaving a point of contention in it also. It has already been explained in the Prior Analytics¹ that the conjunctive syllogism becomes conclusive when the consequence is valid and when the selected term² becomes evident by means of a categorical syllogism.³ If the selected term is self-evident, the consequence must necessarily be explained. It was also explained there that the selected term and the conclusion cannot be just any chance conditional or conditioned term.⁴ Since this is the case, this kind of syllogism is only made into an enthymeme by placing some of these restrictions upon it. However, it becomes persuasive primarily by the omission of the selected term. It may become persuasive regardless of which termthat is, the conditional or the conditioned term--or which of their contraries is brought forth as a conclusion. In spite of this, however, when there is an invalid conclusion, the selected term leading to it usually should not be stated explicitly for fear the opponent might notice itlike the man who selects the conditioned term itself and brings forth the conditional term as a conclusion or who selects the contrary of the conditional term and brings forth the contrary of the conditioned term as a conclusion.⁵ Still, one might explicitly state the selected term in something like this, and the argument will be persuasive; e.g., the argument of one of the ancients: "If being is created, it has a beginning; but it is not created, thus it does not have a beginning."

(9) Galen¹ and many anatomists use this kind of syllogism to deduce the unknown causes of animal actions. For example, he says: "When the reflexive nerve is eliminated, the voice is eliminated; thus, when the reflexive nerve exists, the voice exists."² But it does not necessarily follow as stated: for when animals are eliminated, man is eliminated; yet, from the existence of animals, the existence of man does not necessarily follow.³

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(10) In the instance when the conclusion [brought forth] is valid (for example, when it is the very opposite of the conditioned term or of the conditional term), one must not state the selected term explicitly. Otherwise, unless the conjunction is omitted and is not stated explicitly, no point of contention will remain in the argument.

(11) The disjunctive syllogism becomes persuasive when more than two opposing considerations exist and they are not all carefully examined or when all of the selected terms are not carefully examined. This syllogism does not become persuasive when the selected term is omitted; rather, when that is done, it remains in the very form in which one seeks to clarify one of the two antitheses into which the problem is divided. ¹

(12) The argument of Abu* al-Ma`ali* [al-Juwayni*],¹ in his book called The Spiritual Directive² when he wanted to refute [the notion of] creation from the elements, is an example of that in which all of the opposing considerations are not carefully examined. For he said: ''If a created thing were to have been brought into existence from the four elements, then that could not help but be (a) by means of some bodies intermixing with others until the mass came together in one place or (b) by each one of them independently and separately arising in the composition; and both of these classes [i.e., alternatives] are absurd. Thus, that there should be one being created from more than one element is absurd."³ Now one thing which ought to have been set down in opposition in the syllogism has been eliminated from this argument, namely, that an existent thing may come into existence in the manner of a mixture, as is seen with oxymel⁴ and with other artificial things.

(13) The type [of disjunctive syllogism] in which one begins with a negation and arrives at a negation only becomes persuasive when the selected term is omitted and the conclusion is stated explicitly. Indeed, when the selected term and the conclusion are both omitted, the hearer does not know which thing you intend to conclude. Here, it is not possible for the explicitly stated selected term to be any chance thing nor for it to be according to unexamined opinion; rather, it is always the assertion¹ which is selected and the negation which is brought forth as a conclusion. However, when that is done, no subject of persuasion remains in it.

(14) The Contradictory Syllogism. ¹ If we wish the contradictory syllogism to be persuasive, the doubt-provoking subject and the

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consequent absurdity ought to be stated explicitly, while suppressing the premise from which the absurdity necessarily follows. Still, it might be explicitly stated when the consequence is not apparent. This would be like our argument: "If every man is not sentient, then every animal is not sentient; for every man is an animal." ² This consequence is in the third figure.

(15) These are the classes of enthymemes according to their forms. They correspond absolutely to the classes of syllogisms.

[Material Aspects of Syllogisms]

(16) With respect to their matters, syllogisms should be divided into classes in the same way premises themselves are divided, especially the major premise, since it is the one which brings about the conclusion. With the minor premise, however, it is possible to pay no attention whatever to whether it is persuasive, generally accepted, or anything else.

(17) Thus we say that the premises used in this class of arguments, especially the major premise, are taken here insofar as they are generally accepted according to unexamined common opinion. In what preceded, we have defined what unexamined opinion is¹ and that dialectical premises are used only insofar as they are truly generally accepted.² Now just as generally accepted things may accidentally be true and may not, similarly, premises which are based on unexamined opinion may accidentally happen to be generally accepted or true and may not. However, in general, they are taken here insofar as they are generally accepted according to unexamined opinion, just as dialectical premises are taken solely insofar as they are truly generally accepted. What is generally accepted according to unexamined previously existing opinion is divided into (a) generally received propositions and these are premises which are taken universally according to unexamined previously existing opinionand into (b) sense perceptible things which are taken as proofs of other things, also according to unexamined opinion.

(18) Among these proofs are (a) those that are taken as proofs of the existence of a thing without restriction¹like our taking the empty vessel as proof of the existence of voidand (b) those that are taken as proofs of the existence of a predicate for a subject. When the latter are more universal than the subject and more particular than, or similar

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to, the predicate, they belong in the first figure; these were specifically assigned the name "proof" by the ancients. ² If they are more universal than the two extreme terms, they belong in the second figure. If they are more particular than both [of the extreme terms], they belong in the third [figure]. These latter two were specifically assigned the name "sign" by the ancients.³ The proofs which are taken up here may be matters which are subsequent to the thing provede.g., its consequencesand they may be prior [to it]e.g., its causes.

(19) Now each of the two classes of premisesthe generally received propositions and the proofsmay occur in matters which are necessary, possible for the most part, and equally possible. An example of the generally received propositions occurring in the necessary matter is: "everything which is done has a doer." An example of those occurring in the matter which is possible for the most part is: "any sick person who obeys his passions and does not heed the saying of the doctors will not be cured." An example of those occurring in the equally possible is: "whatever is more agreeable and easier is preferable." However, in itself, this could be used to allege that the matter is not preferable.

(20) Proofs. The one in the necessary matter in the first figure which is what is specifically assigned the name "proof," is like our argument: "The brightness of the moon increases bit by bit, so it is spherical." What occurs in the matter which is possible for the most part is like our argument: "So-and-so is gathering men, preparing arms, and fortifying his towns. There is no enemy near him. He is, therefore, resolved upon revolting against authority." This was known among the ancients as ''specious proof." Those occuring in the matter which is equally possible are like our argument: "So-and-so did not budge from his position, and all of his companions retreated so that he was felled. He is, therefore, courageous." However, in itself this may also be used as proof of the cowardice which prevents a man from fleeing. This proof, too, the ancients identified as "doubtful proof."¹

(21) Signs. The ones occurring in the necessary matter in the second figure are like our argument: "The nerve grows out of the brain because it is implanted in it." What occurs in the matter which is possible for the most part is like our argument: "So-and-so showed the enemy the vulnerability of the town because he climbed up on the wall

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and watched for the enemy, and the one who points out the vulnerability [of the town's walls] does that." Those occurring in the matter which is equally possible have the same force as the proofs which occur in this matter, since the universals in it have the same force as particulars and particulars may be converted and brought back to the first figure. So if they were taken universally, their falsity would be as great as the falsity of particulars. For this reason, the ancients rejected the type of signs which occur in this matter.

(22) Proofs which are in the third figure. ¹ The ones in the necessary matter are like our argument: "Time is the celestial sphere, because all things are in time and all things are in the celestial sphere." Those occurring in the matter [which is possible for the] most part are like our argument: "Wise men are virtuous, because Socrates was a virtuous wise man." The reason for rejecting those occurring in the matter which is equally possible [in the third figure] is the very same reason for rejecting those in the second figure.

(23) You ought to be apprised that this divisioni.e., the division into the necessary and the possibleis not essential to the premises of enthymemes inasmuch as they are premises of enthymemes. That is because the premises of enthymemes are taken insofar as they are generally received according to unexamined opinionas we have said¹or insofar as they are signs and proofs according to unexamined opinion, not insofar as they occur in a necessary or possible matter. For it is with regard to demonstrative syllogisms that premises are taken according to this description; i.e., they are the ones which take premises insofar as they are necessary or possible for the most part. Those which are equally possible are thought to be more characteristic of these arguments, since the demonstrative art does not employ them. But this arti.e., the art of rhetorics-does not employ them from the standpoint of their being equally possible either; for if it were to employ them from this standpoint, one thing would not be more likely to follow from them than would its opposite. Rather, they are used insofar as one of them preponderates, even if slightly, according to unexamined opinion, either at a certain moment or in a certain condition. Some people who were ignorant of this idea, denied that this art could employ a proof occurring in the matter which is equally possible, for they claimed that no persuasion is brought about by that which is equally possible.

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(24) As has been said, this art does not have a particular subject, just as the art of dialectic does not have a particular subject. For the premises employed in these two arts are not grasped in the mind in the same way as they exist outside the mind. Rather, a predicate is always asserted to apply to a subject because of what is generally accepted, either according to unexamined opinion or according to the truth, not because it is of the nature of the predicate to apply to the subject or of the nature of the subject that the predicate should apply to it. Nor does this art only take premises insofar as they are widespread according to unexamined opinion, without qualifying them with regard to mode of existence. Rather, it may take the necessary as though it were possible according to unexamined opinion and, similarly, the possible as though it were necessary. As for taking the necessary as though it were possible, that is like someone who fancies that the heavens could possibly exist in another form and that it is possible for everything to be created out of any chanced-upon thing. As for imagining that something is impossible when it is possible, there are many things whose existence is not difficult when the beliefs of the multitude about them are considered. However, the kind of assent to which we have inclined since youth is that all things are possibleto the extent that the argument of anyone who says this thereby loses its necessary character. For instance, in Plato's confutation of Protagoras, when Protagoras said: "there is nothing that is perceived," Plato replied: "there, now, is something that is perceived"meaning this assertion Protagoras had made. ¹

(25) Now we have finished what we were about. So let us go back to where we were and say that it appears likely that what compelled the ancients to divide the premises of enthymemes in accordance with their matters is that premises which are widespread according to unexamined opinion are invested with weakness and strength in accordance with each particular matter. For that reason, premises according to unexamined opinion are more persuasive when they happen to occur in the matter which is possible for the most part than when they occur in the equally possible. Now it has become clear from this argument how many classes of enthymeme there are from the standpoint of form and matter.

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[The Example]

(26) We ought to speak about the example. There are [different] classes of the example. (a) With one, it is decided whether a predicate applies to a subject or does not apply to it because of that predicate applying to the likeness of that subject or because of it not applying, when it is better known whether the predicate applies to the likeness or not; like our argument that the heavens are created because the wall is created. (b) With another, we decide whether a predicate applies to a subject or does not apply to it because the likeness of that predicate applies to that subject or does not apply to it, when it is better known whether that likeness applies to the subject or does not apply; for example, our deciding that the heavens are changeable because of the fact that they move. (c) With yet another, we decide whether a predicate applies to a subject or does not apply to it because the likeness of that predicate applies to the likeness of that subject or does not apply to it, when it is better known that the likeness of the predicate applies to the likeness of that subject or when it is better known that it does not apply; for example, "honey dilutes because sugar dissolves."

(27) The judgment may be universal, while the likeness is particular, e.g., our argument: "Pleasures are bad because wine is bad." Now the difference between this and induction is that in induction we confirm the universal by the particular, whereas here we confirm one thing by another insofar as it is a likenessnot insofar as one of them is particular and the other universal.

(28) Likeness. There are two classes: either a likeness in a common matter or a likeness by analogy. An example of the likeness in a common matter is what preceded. An example of the likeness by analogy is our argument: "The king in the city is like the deity in the world, and just as the deity is one, so too ought the king to be."

(29) In general, regardless of the example, judgment about a particular based on a universal does not occur in it, because neither one of the two similar things is more general than the other. Nor do they exist as similars in this respect. It is clear from what preceded in the Prior Analytics ¹ that the apodeictically conclusive speech is the one in which the particular is explained by the universal. Since that is the case, no other argument follows apodeictically from the example, nor is it essentially conclusive. An example of that is our deciding

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that the heavens are created due to their similarity to created bodies with respect to extension, alteration, connectedness, and other things. For the heavens in this argument are the minor term in the syllogism, since they are the subject of the problem; ² being created is the major term, since it is the predicate of the problem; and the middle term is extension and alteration. Now when we compose the syllogism, we speak in this manner: "The heavens have extension, and what has extension is created, thus the heavens are created."

(30) However, it is not sufficient that our saying "what has extension is created," be taken indefinitely, if we want "the heavens" to be encompassed apodeictically under it; rather, we should even take it universally, i.e., ''every extended thing is created." Now if this universal had resulted from our scrutiny of some extended things in the way particular premises result, then to state it explicitly by an example would be superfluousunless it were taken as a means of instruction and guidance for bringing about certainty concerning the universal. But if our having perceived some of the extended things as created did not lead us to universal certainty and this premise remained indefinite for us, nothing would result necessarily from our perceiving itexcept according to unexamined opinion. From this it appears: (a) that with regard to these kinds of premises, certainty about the universal is not attained by sense perception but by another power, since by sense perception only individual instances of a limited number are discerned and (b) that the ranks of supposition¹ are in accordance with their nearness and their distance from this universal decision. In general, supposition is a universal judgment based on sense perception alone.

(31) Because one of the later dialectical theologians¹and he is the one called Abu* al-Ma`ali* [al-Juwayni*]was not aware of this, he said: "The example provides certainty as a means of guidance, not only as a way toward the syllogism and scrutiny."² However, since he did not speak of the syllogism of a valid figure, it would follow for him that all of the sciences are preexistent. Thus, nothing would be known by means of the syllogism, so that it could happen, for example, that a man who has not theoretically investigated anything at all relating to geometry would be able to read the Book of the al-Magest³ and that the origin of the world would be self-evident.

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(32) The rank of the example with regard to assent has now been explained. In this art it corresponds to the induction in dialectic, just as the enthymeme here corresponds to the syllogism in dialectic.

[Persuasive Things Which Do Not Occur by Arguments]

(33) After this, we ought to proceed to speak about the persuasive things which do not occur by arguments and about the extent of assent they provide. All together, there are thirteen kinds of persuasive things: ¹

[1]. Among them is [proclaiming] the virtue of the speaker and the defect of his opponent, for it is clear that by this a man acquires a good reputation and acceptance of what he is saying.

[2]. Among them is bringing the listeners around to assent by means of the passions; for example, strengthening the passions in the soul of the listener so that he must assent because of fanaticism, mercy, fear, or anger. Now it is evident that this also inclines a man to assent.

[3]. Among them is what inclines the listeners by means of moral speeches; this is done, just as Galen used to do, by making them imagine that the chaste, the people of preeminent character, and those who are neither sullied by corrupt thought nor false [in their thoughts] accept their speech.

[4]. Among them is extolling and belittling the matter which is spoken about, for when the speech is extolled, the soul is more inclined to it. On the contrary, when it is deprecated, the soul avoids it; and no inclination for it takes place.

[5]. Among them is consensus.

[6]. Among them are testimonies.

[7]. Among them is awakening a desire for, or apprehension about, something.

[8]. Among them is challenging and betting.

[9]. Among them are oaths.

[10]. Among them is for the quality of the speech, the voice, and the inflection to be in such a condition that they cause the existence of the matter whose affirmation is desired to be imagined; for example,

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someone whose face has already become pale and whose voice has already risen recounting a fearful matter.

[11]. Among them is distorting speeches and dropping much from them and putting them into a form in which their repulsiveness appears and opposition to them is simplified; now these enter more into sophistry than they do into rhetoric.

These, then, are all of the external persuasive things.

(34) With many of these, it is immediately evident that they only provide persuasion; with others, that may be somewhat obscure. We will speak about the latter.

[Testimony]

(35) Testimony holds the most powerful rank. In general, testimony is a certain kind of report. Those who bring the report can either be one or more than one. When they are more than one, they may either be a group which it is possible to enumerate or they may be a group which it is not possible to enumerate. Things reported are either perceived by the senses

or intellectually apprehended. Those who report things perceived by the senses are either those who have perceived these things themselves or those who report them from others like, fewer, or more numerous than themselves. Now things perceived by the senses which are reported either concern past matters that we have not perceived or matters occurring in the present but absent from us. ¹

(36) Reports about those things we have perceived by the senses are of no use or benefit. It seems this is likewise the case concerning intellectually apprehended things for those practitioners of arts whose habit it is to deduce such intellectually apprehended things in their art. For the multitude, however, testimony about them may possibly bring about persuasion. For this reason, you will find that the sect among the people of our religious community known as the dialectical theologians does not limit itself only to the testimony of the Legislator [Muhammad*] concerning knowledge of the origin of the world, the existence of the Creator, and other things; rather, concerning knowledge of that, it also employs syllogisms. Now the sect known as the Hashawiyah*¹ rejects that.

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(37) Assent to testimonies and reports of sense-perceived matters which have not been witnessed is strengthened and weakened in accordance with the number of the reporters and other considerations relating to them. Thus, the most powerful assent resulting from reports is what a group which cannot be enumerated reports it has perceived or what a group reports on the authority of another group which cannot be enumerated but which has perceived it. Now it [powerful assent about the report] is like that, however much the group increases in size, to whatever extent it reaches, if in the beginning, the middle, and the end it remains the same in that determining their number is either impossible or difficult. This class of reports is the one that is called continuous tradition. ¹

(38) Certainty with regard to diverse matterslike the sending of the Prophet, the existence of Mecca and Medina, and other things may result from this. But we should theoretically investigate the manner in which this results, for there are some things that produce assent essentially and some accidentally. Now it is clear that assent about the existence of sense-perceived matters results, primarily and essentially, through sensation. Thus, whoever loses some kind of sense, loses some kind of sense perception. Nor does [assent to] the existence of sense-perceived things result essentially only through sensation; indeed, it may also result through an imaginative representation of them according to their essence.¹ Then, too, certainty about the essential existence of sense-perceived things may result through the syllogism; an example of that is: "This wall is built; thus, it has a builder." However, the essential form of the particular builder does not result through it.

(39) Certainty may be obtained about the existence of sense-perceived matters which have never been perceived and whose existence we have no way of apprehending by means of a syllogism, but very seldomjust as we very seldom manage to conceive of them according to their essence.¹ However, even if individual instances of such matters cannot be distinguished by sensation, there is no doubt but what their names or what indicates them can be distinguished by it. Now for the greater number of people, assent to something like this comes about by means of the continuous tradition and exhaustive reports.² However, it is clear that this is an accidental effect, because that about them which brings about assent rarely follows from what

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is presumed ³ to be its cause, namely, the reportsjust as effects⁴ rarely follow from their accidental causes.⁵

(40) In this science, it is not necessary to dwell upon the cause for this accidental certainty resulting nor upon how it results; for it has already been spoken about in Sense and Sensible Objects.¹ When some people became aware of this, they wanted to set down as conditions for reports a specific number from which certainty would result essentially. When this did not succeed for them, they said: "In itself it results, even if it does not happen for us." Now this is a clear falsification, for if there were some essential number which would lead to certainty, continuous accounts with respect to the number of reporters would not vary, and it would be possible to perceive and to grasp this number. But the many and the few are closely related. Thus, when some of them wanted to set down conditions with regard to the continuous tradition which would lead to certainty and they did not succeed at it, they said; "One of its conditions is that it lead to certainty." Since that is the case, there is no condition at all which could be set down and no means by which certainty could result essentially. Now this art employs the reports and the testimonies in the manner in which they are taken for the most part, which is according to supposition. For it is very seldom concerned with something which no art employs at all.

[Recorded Traditions]

(41) The situation with regard to quoting recorded traditions is also clear; however, whatever assent to them results because of being brought up with them or because of habit is very powerful. Thus, you see many who are brought up according to the ignorant ways of life believing fables from which we are not able to turn them away.

[Consensus]

(42) The foundation for the persuasiveness of consensuswhich is the mutual understanding of the people of the religious community and their agreement about something pertaining to the religious communityis the Divine Law's testimony to them about their infallibility.¹ When a group of people became aware of this they said: "He who departs from consensus is not an infidel." Abu* Hamid* [al-Ghazali*]

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explicitly ² stated this idea about consensus in the first part of his book called The Distinction Between Islam and Atheism.³ He said: "What consensus is has not yet been agreed upon."⁴

[Challenging]

(45) A challenge may be made by means of different things. However, the most persuasive of challenges is the one that is made by means of the completely unprecedented miracle, i.e., by the performance of something considered impossible by mankind. But it is obvious, even if the feat is extremely marvelous, that it provides nothing more than good opinion¹ about the one who performs the feat or nothing more than trust in him and in his excellence when the feat is divine. Now Abu* Hamid* [al-Ghazali*] has explicitly stated this in his book called The Balance.² He said: "Faith in the Messengers [i.e., the Prophets] by the way of the miracle, as the dialectical theologians have described it, is the popular way; and the way of the select few is other than this."³

(44) These external matters which we have enumerated are the ones from which it is supposed that certainty will result. The persuasiveness of the others is self-evident. Now the enthymemes are more noble and take precedence over these, because they may be used to establish those which are neither clearly existent nor clearly persuasive. For example, when the moral excellence of the speaker is neither evident nor generally accepted, they are used to make it evident. Similarly, when someone supposes that he who claims to be a miracle-worker is not a miracle-worker, they are used to make it clear to him that he is a miracle-worker. The same holds with testimonies, traditions, and other things when the opponent contests them. All of these persuasive thingswhether they be arguments or external mattersmay be used in all of the reflective arts in the way that those ancients who preceded used to use them, because they supposed that they were ways to certainty.

[Conclusion]

(45) When Aristotle became aware of the rank of these [arguments and external things] with regard to assent, he saw that these things which bring about assent were valuable because the multitude used

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them with one another for particular voluntary things which judges decide are good or bad. Among the voluntary things which judges decide are good or bad, some are to be found in a man himself and in the present time; these are virtues and vices. Some are to be found in the present time in another person; that is injustice and justice. Some will occur to him in the future; these are useful and harmful matters. Now speech addressed to others about the first kind of things is called contradictory [epideictic]; ¹ when it is about the second kind of things, it is called forensic;² and when it is about the third kind of things, it is called deliberative.³ Moreover, to the extent that man is a social being and a citizen, he necessarily uses rhetorical arguments about these three categories of things. [Once he recognized all of this,] Aristotle began⁴ to set forth rules and things which would enable a man to persuade about each and every one of these things in the best possible manner with regard to that thing. Therefore, this art is defined as being the means by which man is able to effect persuasion about each and every one of the particular matters and to do so in the most complete and most artful manner possible with regard to each thing.

(46) Now we have said enough for our purposes.

All of the Rhetoric is completed. Praise be to God the Exalted.

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Short Commentary on Aristotle's "Poetics"

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Outline of Argument for the Short Commentary on Aristotle's "Poetics":

INVOCATION AND TITLE.

A. The character of poetical speeches (para. 1).

B. Problems arising from the way poetical speeches are understood (para. 2).

C. The syllogistic limits on the art of poetry (para. 3).

D. Why Aristotle wrote about poetical speeches (para. 4).

E. The ultimate purpose of the collection of Short Commentaries on the logical arts (para. 5).

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In the name of God the Merciful, the Compassionate. ¹

About Poetical Speeches¹

(1) Poetical speeches are rhythmically balanced speeches. With them, one strives for an imaginary representation or exemplification of something in speech so as to move the soul to flee from the thing, or to long for it, or simply to wonder because of the delightfulness which issues from the imaginary representation. They are set down in a rhythmically balanced way, because they thereby become more complete in imaginary representativeness. Now just as the sense-perceptible matters which many of the artslike the art of decoration and otherscause to be imagined are not really sense-perceptible matters, likewise, speeches which cause something to be imagined are not speeches which make its essence understood.

(2) There are two classes of representations: either (a) the class in which one thing is likened to another by one of the particles of simile¹ or (b) a representation taken as though it was the very thing being represented, and that is by means of substitution² and metaphor, like our saying: "He is the sea in whatever way you approach him."³ Some of these representations are closely similar and others are far-fetched. Now it is evident that this art does not take the representations of something as though they were the thing itself. But many people might err about that and thus take the representation of something as though it were the thing itself; for example, the speech of Empedocles about the water of the sea being the sweat of the earth brought together in its bladder.⁴ Now one errs with regard to these representations when they are set down as a substitution and no particle of simile is offered. For the most part these representations cause error concerning the things which can be conceived of only by their representations or which can be conceived of only with difficulty; thus, there is much error about the latter, as with someone who is not able to conceive of a being which is neither inside the world nor outside it. But the most suitable place for this kind of error is the book On Sophistry.

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(3) Even though this art is syllogistic, the syllogism is not actually used in it, nor is there any kind of syllogism peculiar to it; rather, when a syllogistic argument is actually used in it, it is in the manner of deceit and in order to make it similar to another art.

(4) Aristotle came to the opinion that this art was highly useful, because by means of it the souls of the multitude could be moved to believe in or not believe in a certain thing and towards doing or abandoning a certain thing. For that reason, he enumerated the matters which enable a man to devise an imaginative representation for any particular thing he wishes and to do so in the most complete manner possible for that thing. Thus, the art of poetics is that which enables a man to devise an imaginative representation of each particular thing in the most complete manner possible for it. However, these are perfections external to the primary human perfection.

(5) In sum, anyone who has understood what we have written in these treatises ¹ and had no knowledge about all this by nature is now able to discern the rank of every argument he hears with respect to assent or concept. This rank [of understanding] is part of what is noble because man is prepared for ultimate perfection through it. For if man's perfection comes about by his attaining true theory and if he becomes prepared to accept it by this amount [of logical study], then by this amount [of logical study] he attains the rank which prepares him for ultimate perfection.

God is the One who gives success to what is correct.¹

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Notes

1. Henceforth, the dates of the Anno Hegirae will be given first and separated from the corresponding date of the Common Era by a slash (/) mark; for example, the above date would read 520/1126.

2. In the nineteenth century, the Italian orientalist Fausto Lasinio transliterated the Judaeo-Arabic manuscripts of Averroës's Short Commentary on Aristotle's Poetics into Arabic and published the trans-literation. Lasinio used a copy of the Munich manuscript (cf. infra, n. 10) sent to him by the well-known German orientalist, Moritz Steinschneider, to the point where the Munich manuscript broke off; then he used a copy of the Paris manuscript (cf. infra, n. 11) sent to him by Moise Schwab of the Paris Bibliothèque Nationale. Because he did not have a full copy of the Paris manuscript, Lasinio had no way to control the Munich manuscript readings. This transliteration appeared as an appendix to his edition of Averroës's Middle Commentary on Aristotle's Poetics; cf. Fausto Lasinio, ''II Commento Medio di Averroe alla Poetica di Aristotele" in Annali delle Università Toscane XIII (1873), Parte Prima, pp. xvii-xviii, Appendix A.

More attention has been paid to the Middle Commentary on Aristotle's Poetics. Lasinio's edition was based on a single Arabic manuscript (Florence Laurenziano Manuscript CLXXX, 54). Once he became aware of the existence of a second manuscript (University of Leiden 2073), Lasinio printed the variants and suggested better textual readings; cf. ibid., pp. 1-45 (Arabic) and "Studi sopra Averroe, VI" in Giornale della Società Asiatica Italiana XI (1897-1898), pp.141-152 and XII (1899), pp. 197-206. 'Abd al-Rahman * Badawi* reprinted Lasinio's 1873 edition of the Middle Commentary; cf, Talkhis*. Kitab* Aristutalis* fi* al-Shi'r in Aristutalis*: Fann al-Shi`r (Cairo: Maktabat al-Nahdah* al-Misriyah*, 1953), pp. 199-250. Apparently, Badawi* knew nothing about Lasinio's later publication of the variants. More recently Salim* Salim* has published a new edition of the same commentary using all the available manuscripts; cf. Talkhis* Kitab* Aristutalis* fi* al-Shi`r (Cairo: Dar* al-Tahrir*, 1971). It is not believed that Averroés wrote a Large Commentary on the Poetics.

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There are no Arabic editions of the Middle Commentary on Aristotle's Topics by Averroës, even though it is known to be extant in the Florence and Leiden manuscripts. It is not believed that Averroës ever wrote a Large Commentary on the Topics.

Lasinio also published an early edition of part of Averroës's Middle Commentary on Aristotle's Rhetoric. His edition, based on both the Florence and Leiden manuscripts, stopped shortly before the end of the first maqalah * of Averroës's commentary; cf. Fausto Lasinio, "II Commento Medio di Averroe alla Retorica di Aristotele" in Pubblicazioni del R. Instituto di Studi Superiori Pratici e di Perfezionamento in Firenze, Sezione di Filosofia e Filologia, Accademia Orientale, I (1878), pp. 1-96 (Arabic). 'Abd al-Rahman* Badawi* was the first to edit the whole book; cf. Talkhis* al-Khatabah* (Cairo: Maktabat al-Nahdah* al-Misriyah*, 1960). Salim* Sa1im* has also edited the work; cf. Talkhis* al-Khatabah* (Cairo: Dar* al-Tahrir*, 1967). It is not believed that Averroës wrote a Large Commentary on the Rhetoric.

3. The French orientalist and historian Ernest Renan identified Jacob ben Abba-Maria ben Anatoli as the first to translate this collection of treatises on the art of logic into Hebrew. Although Renan did not state the precise date that Anatoli completed the translation, the context suggests it was completed between 1230-1232. Renan also cited a translation of the collection made by Rabbi Jacob ben Makhir ben Tibbon of Montpelierknown among the Christians of his time as Profatius Judaeusand claimed it was completed in 1298. Cf. Renan, Averroès et l'Averroisme ((Paris: Michel Lévy Frères 1866), 3rd. edition, pp. 188-189.

Some years later, Steinschneider challenged Renan's identification of Anatoli as a translator of this collection, asserting that Anatoli had translated nothing more than the Middle Commentaries on Aristotle's Organon in 1232. He also contended that the first translation of this collection was Rabbi Jacob's and that it was completed in 1289, not 1298. (This date corresponds to the one given in the Paris catalogue: Kislew 5050; cf. Manuscrits Orientaux: Catalogue des Manuscrits Hébreux et Samaritains de la Bibliothèque Impériale [Paris: Imprimerie Impériale, 1866], p. 160). Steinschneider also noted that Samuel ben Yehuda of Marseilles expressed displeasure with Rabbi Jacob's translation (which is, incidentally, the translation published at Riva di Trento in 1559 as Kizzur* mi-kol Meleket Higayyon, that is, Summary of the Whole Art of Logic) and did a translation of his own in 1329 or 1330. Cf. M. Stein-schneider, Alfarabi in Mémoires de l'Académie Impériale des Sciences de St. Petersbourg, VIIe série, XIII (1869), no. 4, p. 147 and Die hebräische Ubersetzungen* des Mittelalters (Berlin: Jtzkowski, 1893), p. 54, n. 55.

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(The dates 1189 and 5 Kislew 50 in the latter work are obvious misprints and should read 1289 and 5 Kislew 5050 respectively).

4. Cf. Renan, op. cit., pp. 29-42, 79-84, and 173-199. Consider as well the remarks of the noted French orientalist, S. Munk, in the article "Ibn Roschd" in Dictionnaire des Sciences Philosophiques (Paris: L. Hachette et Cie., 1847), Vol. III, pp. 163-164 and in Mélanqes de Philosophic Juive et Arabe (Paris: A. Franck, 1857), pp. 422-429 and 439-440. Léon Gauthier also discussed this problem in his study of Averroës; cf, Léon Gauthier, Ibn Rochd (Averroôs) (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1948), pp. 9-11.

5. Father Maurice Bouyges edited the Middle Commentary on Aristotle's Categories in 1932; cf. Averroès Talkhiç Kitab al-Maqoulat (Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1932). In the introduction to this edition, he noted that the work had been neglected in the West and among the Arabs; only Jewish Aristotelians seemed to have had any concern or knowledge about it (pp. v-vi). Cf. also R. de Vaux, "La Premiere Entree d'Averroès chez les Latins" in Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques XXII (1933), p. 193.

Renan first described the Florence Laurenziano Manuscript CLXXX, 54 to the learned community in a letter from Rome dated 27 February, 1850; cf. "Lettre à Reinaud" in Journal Asiatique XV (1850), Série IV, pp. 390-391. By 1874, Lasinio was aware of the existence of the University of Leiden Manuscript 2073; cf. "Studi sopra Averroe, V" in Annuari della Società Italiana per gli Studi Orientali II (1874), pp. 234-267. For the Judaeo-Arabic manuscripts, cf. infra, p. 4, n. 7.

6. Although still under the influence of the older opinion to some extent, Gauthier noticed a tendency toward independence in Averroës's thought; cf. op. cit., pp. 15 with 257-258 and 278-281. Like Gauthier, Alonso could not deny that Averroës explicitly differed with Aristotle on certain issues; however, he could not completely relinquish the notion that the commentaries were less original than the other works; cf. P. Manuel Alonso, Teología de Averroes (Madrid: Maestre, 1947), pp. 26, 36-41 with pp. 33, 89, and 99.

In recent years, there have been more careful arguments about the way in which Averroës is to be considered a disciple of Aristotle. Cf. Michel Allard, "Le Rationalisme d'Averroës d'après une Étude sur la Création" in Bulletin d'Études Orientales XIV (1952), pp. 21, 23, 25, and 53-55; G.F. Hourani, Averroes on the Harmony of Religion and Philosophy (London: Luzac and Co., 1961), p. 25; H. Blumberg, Averrois Cordubensis Compendia Librorum Aristotelis qui Parva Naturalia vocantur (Cambridge: The Mediaeval Academy of America, 1954), p. xi, and Averroes Epitome of Parva Naturalia (Cambridge: The Mediaeval Academy of

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America, 1961), pp. xiii-xiv; Herbert A. Davidson, Averroes Middle Commentary on Porphyry's Isagoge and on Aristotle's Categoriae (Cambridge: The Mediaeval Academy of America, 1969), pp. xiii-xiv, xv, and xix. While the argument that Averroës differed from Aristotle only because he did not understand the text still attracts some attention (cf. Francis Lehner, "An Evaluation of Averroes' Paraphrase on Aristotle's Poetics" in The Thomist XXX [1966], pp. 38-65 and "The Lambda-Ennea Case" in The Thomist XXXII [1968], pp. 387-423), there is a new willingness to consider Averroës capable of intentionally differing from Aristotle (cf. Helmut Gätje, "Averroës als Aristoteleskommentator'' in Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft CXIV [1964], pp. 59-65).

7. Cf. Munk, article "Ibn Roschd," op. cit., pp. 161-162, 164. As part of his general presentation of Averroës, Renan sought to explain the difference between the Great Commentary (Grand Commentaire), Middle Commentary (Commentaire Moyen), and Short Commentary (Analyse, Paraphrase, or Abrégé). However, he mistakenly identified the Commentary on the Rhetoric and the Commentary on the Poetics contained in the Florence Laurenziano Manuscript CLXXX, 54 as "les paraphrases sur la Rhétorique et la Poétique." That is, according to his own terminology, as "Short Commentaries." This is one of the two manuscripts used by Badawi * and Salim* in their editions, and it fits Renan's own definition of a middle commentary perfectly. Cf. Renan, op. cit., p. 68 with p. 53, and pp. 58-61 with pp. 82-83.

8. Cf. Renan, op. cit., p. 83 (the first edition of this work was published in 1852); Munk, Mélanges, op. cit., p. 140, n. 1; and C. Prantl, Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande (Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1861), Vol. II, p. 374 ff. Prantl's error is all the more surprising as he cited both Munk and Renan. Cf. also Steinschneider, Alfarabi, op. cit., pp. 148-149.

In an earlier publication, Steinschneider had hinted at his discovery. Among fragments of Munich Codex Hebraicus 356, he had found a loose folio which he recognized as belonging to a commentary on the Poetics; it was a misplaced folio, number 86, of the Munich Judaeo-Arabic manuscript. Cf. "Über die Mondstationen (Naxatra), und das Buch Arcandum" in Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft XVIII (1864), p. 169, n. 65. Only after additional searching was he able to bring all the material together; cf. Hebräische Bibliographie, "Briefkasten," VIII (1865), p. 32 and "Hebriäische Handschriften in München über arabische Philosophie" in Serapeum IX (1867), p. 138.

9. cf. Bouyges, "Notes sur les Philosophes Arabes Connus des Latins du Moyen Age" in Mélanges de l'Université Saint-Joseph (Beyrouth) VIII

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(1922), p. 10. The Cairo publication which Father Bouyges cited bears no resemblance to the Short Commentary on Aristotle's Rhetoric presented below, but is simply a haphazard copy of different paragraphs occurring in the first maqalah * of Averroës's Middle Commentary on Aristotle's Rhetoric. Apparently, these paragraphs were taken from Lasinio's early partial edition of that middle commentary; cf. Lasinio, "Il Commento Medio di Averroe alla Retorica di Aristotele," op. cit. In short, the Cairo publication cited by Father Bouyges is of no value for the serious study of Averroës's rhetorical thought.

Cf. also Harry A. Wolfson, "Plan for the Publication of a Corpus Commentariorum Averrois in Aristotelem" in Speculum VI (1931), pp. 412-427 and "Revised Plan for the Publication of a Corpus Commentariorum Averrois in Aristotelem" in Speculum XXXVIII (1963), pp. 88-104. The extent to which the existence of the Judaeo-Årabic manuscripts has been neglected in the academic community is amply illustrated by the fact that, as late as 1943, Wolfson appeared to have no knowledge of either manuscript and restricted himself to the Riva di Trento Hebrew translation and the Venice 1574 Latin translation for speculations about the Arabic equivalents of certain Hebrew words appearing in the text; cf. Harry A. Wolfson, "The Terms tasawwur* and tasdiq* in Arabic Philosophy and their Greek, Latin, and Hebrew Equivalents" in The Moslem World XXXIII (1943), p. 114, n. 9 and p. 115, notes 20, 23, and 25. Similarly, as late as 1969, a scholar publishing a logical work as part of the Corpus Commentariorum Averrois in Aristotelem project was unaware of the Munich Judaeo-Arabic manuscript; cf. Averroes Middle Commentary on Porphyry's Isagoge and on Aristotle's Categoriae, op. cit., p. xii, n. 8.

10. Cf. Verzeichnis der orientalischen Handschriften der K. Hof- und Staatsbibliothek in München (Munich, 1875), Vol. I, pars quarta, p. 162: Die Epitome des Organon yon Aristoteles mit der Einleitung des Porphyrius, Arabisch yon Averroes. The manuscript is identified in the catalogue by the number 964, but it carries the number 650a in the Munich Codex Arabicus and is also identified by the number 309 in the Munich Codex Hebraicus.

11. Cf. Manuscrits Orientaux: Catalogue des Manuscrits Hébreux et Samaritains de la Bibliothèque Impériale, op. cit. p. 182: "Résurné de la Logique, par Averroès en arabe et en caractères hébreux." It is not clear whether "la Logique" refers simply to the art or alludes to "la Logique d'Aristote." The manuscript is classified as number 1008 in the Hebrew collection and carries the additional classification of "SI 835 [7A] [FALSAFA].'' This is the same manuscript that formerly carried the index number 303.

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12. Cf. Georges Vajda, Index Général des Manuscrits Arabes Musulmans de la Bibliothèque Nationale de Paris (Paris: Centre Nationale de Recherches Scientifiques, 1953), pp. v and 320.

13. Renan published the biography by Ibn Abu * Usaybi`ah* in the second and third editions of his study; cf. op. cit., pp. 448-456, and especially p. 454. Born in 600/1203 in Damascus, Ibn Abu* Usaybi`ah* was a renowned physician who composed a book of biographies about famous physicians and professors of medicine: `Uyun* al-Anba'* fi* Tabaqat* al-Atibba*. The selection published by Renan is taken from that book. Ibn Abu* Usaybi`ah* died in Sarkhad*, near Damascus, in 668/1270.

Renan also published a copy of the Escurial manuscript 884, folio 82; cf. ibid., p. 462.

Cf., as well, Steinschneider, "Une Dédicace d'Abraham de Balmes au Cardinal Dom. Grimani" in Revue des Études Juives V (1882), pp. 115-117. This use of the title occurs in Vatican manuscript 3897, which contains a translation by de Balmes of Ibn Bajjah's Risalat* al-Wada`*. Cf. also Steinschneider, Die hebraische* Übersetzungen, op. cit., p. 54, n. 54.

14. Ibn al-Abbar*, an historian and master of tradition, was born in Valencia in 595/1199 and died in Tunis in 658/1260. He wrote Kitab* al-Takmilah li Kitab* al-Silah*, a supplement to the biographical dictionary, Kitab* al-Silah* fi* Ta'rikh* A'immah al-Andalus (Biographical Dictionary about the Leading Men of Andalusia), of the master of tradition from Córdoba, Ibn Bashkuwa1* (494/1101578/1183). Renan reprinted the portion of Ibn al-Abbar's* book relating to Averroës; cf. op. cit., pp. 435-437, esp. p. 436. Although al-Ansari's* dates are not known, he obviously lived after Ibn al-Abbar*, for Renan presented the selection from his book as a supplement to the books of Ibn Bashkuwal* and Ibn al-Abbar*; cf. op. cit., pp. 437-447, esp. p. 444.

Shams al-Din* Muhammad* ibn Ahmad* ibn 'Uthman* al-Dhahabi* was born in Damascus in 673/1274 and died there in 748/1348 after travel and residence in many other cultural centers of the Muslim world. Although the list of works given by al-Dhahabi* is not as exhaustive as Ibn Abu* Usaybi`ah's*, it does follow that list quite faithfully, except in this instance. Cf. Renan, op. cit., pp. 456-460, esp. p. 457.

15. There are some technical problems with Ibn Abu* Usaybi`ah's* subtitle. First, the text reads "Kitab* Aristutalis* (Aristotle's Book)," not "Kutub Aristutalis* (Aristotle's Books)" as given here; the plural object "ha*'' of the verb "lakhkhas*" dictates the correction. Secondly, the text continues after "mustawfan" with the words "Talkhis* al-Ilahiyat* li

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Niqulawus * (Middle Commentary on Nicolas' Metaphysics''). These words are presented as belonging to the Kitab* al-Daruri* fi* al-Mantiq* subtitle, but that makes no sense. Consequently, it was decided to read them as a title of another work by Averroës of which nothing is known. H. Jahier and A. Noureddine also understood these words as a separate title in their edition and translation of the text: Ibn Abi* Uçaibi`a: `Uyun* al-Anba'* fi* T`abaqat al-At`ibba'*, Sources d`Informations sur les Classes des Médecins, XIIIe Chapitre: Méins de l' Occident Musulman (Alger: Librairie Ferraris, 1958), pp. 136-137.

16. The Middle Commentaries on Aristotle's Organon are contained in the previously mentioned Florence Laurenziano Manuscript CLXXX, 54 and the University of Leiden Manuscript 2073. There is no other reference to a talkhis* on logic in Ibn Abu* Usaybi`ah's* list, which suggests possible confusion on his part about the logical treatise he was listing. However, the Escurial manuscript refers to this collection and also to a Talkhis* Kitab* Aristu* fi* al-Mantiq* (Middle Commentary on Aristotle's Book about Logic or Middle Commentary on Aristotle's Organon); that title corresponds perfectly to the work contained in the Florence and Leiden manuscripts.

Cf. also Averroës Rasa'il* Ibn Rushd (Hyderabad: Matba'ah* Da'irat* al-Ma`arif* al-`Uthmaniyah*, 1947), pp. 2-3. In this context, Averroës was contrasting his mukhtasar* saghir* on logic to books on logic written by al-Farabi*. Cf., as well, Averroes: Compendio de Metafásica, ed. and trans. by Carlos Quirós Rodriguez (Madrid: Maestre, 1919), p. xxxiii, as cited by Alonso in Teología de Averroes, op. cit., pp. 55-56.

17. Porphyry was born in Tyre in 232 C.E. and died in Rome in 305 C.E. A zealous student of Plotinus, he had the reputation of being a Neo-Platonist. Porphyry's treatise was translated into Arabic very early and quickly gained wide acceptance. It was considered a good introduction to logic by al-Farabi* and by the time of Averroës was the customary preface to discussions on logic. Cf. Averroes Middle Commentary on Porphyry' s Isagoge and on Aristotle's Categoriae, op. cit., p. 6: "The intention of the present work is to explain the contents of Porphyry's introduction to the science of logic. [I am undertaking this commentary] because it has become customary for the logical corpus to open with the Isagoge."

Cf. also Prantl, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 626-631; J. Langhade and M. Grignaschi, Al-Farabi*: Deux Ouvrages Inédits sur la Rhétorique (Beirut: Dar el-Machreq, 1971), pp. 130-131, n. 4; and Ibrahim Madkour, L`Organon d`Aristote dans le Monde Arabe (Paris: Vrin, 1969), 2nd. ed., pp. 9-11, and 70-75.

18. Apparently, the inclusion of rhetoric and poetics among the

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logical arts can be traced back to two representatives of the Alexandrian school, Olympiodorus and Elias; cf. Richard Walzer, "Zur Traditionsgeschichte der Aristotelischen Poetik" in Richard Walzer, Greek into Arabic, Essays on Islamic Philosophy (Oxford: Bruno Cassirer, 1962), pp. 129-136, esp. pp. 133-135; originally published in Studi Italiani di Filologia Glassica, N.S., Vol. XI (1954), pp. 5-14. Although al-Farabi * and Averroës followed the idea of including rhetoric and poetics among the logical arts, neither accepted it without preliminary consideration; cf. al-Farabi* Ihsa'* al-`Ulum*, ed. `Uthman* Amin* (Cairo: Dar* al-Fikr al-`Arabi*, 1949), pp. 63-74 and Averroés Talkhis*. al-Khatabah*, ed. `Abd al-Rahman* Badawi*, op. cit., 4, 9-10, 11-13, 18, and 248-249.

19. Cf. the Munich Judaeo-Arabic manuscript (hereafter referred to as M.), folios lb line 24-3b line 2 and also the Paris Judaeo-Arabic manuscript (hereafter referred to as P.), folios 2a line 2-3a line 15. (Henceforth, references to folio and line will be cited without explaining that the first number refers to folio and the second to line; thus, the above references would read M.lb24-3b2 and P. 2a2-3a15). Cf. also Aristotle Categories la 1-15.

20. In the introduction to his Middle Commentary on Aristotle's Topics, Averroës said: "This art has three parts. The first part sets forth the speeches from which dialectical conversation is composedi.e., its parts, and the parts of its parts on to its simplest components. This part is found in the first treatise on Aristotle's book.

"The second part sets forth the topics from which syllogisms are drawnsyllogisms for affirming something or denying it with respect to every kind of problem occurring in this art. This is in the next six treatises of Aristotle's book.

"The third part sets forth how the questioner ought to question and the answerer answer. It also sets forth how many kinds of questions and answers there are. This is in the eighth treatise of Aristotle's book." Cf. Florence Laurenziano Manuscript CLXXX, 54, folio 88a, as cited by Fausto Lasinio in "Studi sopra Averroe, II" in Annuari della Società Italiana per gli Studi Orientali I (1873), pp. 140-142.

21. The title On Sophistical Refutations or, more literally, On Sophistry exists only in M.; P. has no title.

22. This is the title in M. In P., the title Treatise on Assent (al-Qawl fi* al-Tasdiq*) is followed by the subtitle Treatise on the Knowledge Preparing the Way to Assent (al-Qawl fi* al-Ma`rifah al-muwatti'ah* li al-Tasdiq*).

23. As part of the title in P., the words "and they are called Topics" (wa hiy al-musammat* Mawadi`*) are added. Although these words occur in M. as well, they are not placed in the title.

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24. Cf. references to Alonso, Blumberg, and Davidson in n. 6, supra. Cf. also Gauther, op. cit., p. 16. To date, insufficient attention has been given to the substantive divergences from Aristotle's text in all of the different kinds of commentaries by Averroës.

25. Although Aristotle wrote no book on dialectic as such, in this treatise Averroës discussed the theory of the nondemonstrative syllogism set forth in Book I of the Topics as though it had been a book on dialectic. He also emphasized the general rules for dialectical argument given in Book VIII of the Topics, the discussion of topics per se having been put into closer relation with the discussion of the demonstrative syllogism. As has been observed (cf. supra, n. 20), Averroës considered the Topics to be comprised of three distinct sections: Book I, Books II-VII, and Book VIII. A further indication of the extent to which he thought of these sections as distinct is that in his Middle Commentary on Aristotle's Topics he cited the date on which the second section was completed, something usually done only upon the completion of a whole work; cf. Florence Laurenziano Manuscript CLXXX, 54, folio 116a, as cited by Lasinio in "II Commento Medio di Averroe alla Poetica di Aristotele," op. cit., preface I, pp. xii-xiii, n. 2.

26. This title occurs only in M. and in the Hebrew translation of the Paris manuscript. In the Judaeo-Arabic version of the Paris manuscript, there is a blank space where the title ought to appear. However, that space is too small for the Munich title.

27. Cf. Fi * al-Qawanin* allati* ta`mal biha* al-Maqayis*, M. 38b19, P. 43a 11. Cf. also infra, Short Commentary on Aristotle's Topics, para. 5, and infra, Short Commentary on Aristotle's Rhetoric, end. All of these references can only be to Averroës's own Short Commentary on Aristotle's Prior Analytics, for they refer to issues not occurring in Aristotle's text.

28. Cf. Fi* al-Qawanin* allati* ta`mal biha* al-Maqayis*, M. 41a3, P. 45a21.

29. Cf. Florence Laurenziano Manuscript CLXXX, 54, folio 88a, as cited by Fausto Lasinio in "Studi sopra Averroe, II," op. cit., p. 140: "Among the multitude the term dialectic (al-jadal) signifies conversation between two people, each one of whom seeks victory over his fellow by any kind of speech whatever. That is why Aristotle assigned the term this meaning; it is the one which is closest in sense to what the multitude means and is the meaning we have defined. This book may also be called Topics (Tubiqi*). What topics (mawadi`*) are will be set forth later."

30. Cf. Prantl, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 374, notes 289-290 and pp. 385-386, n. 346; also Steinschneider, Alfarabi, op. cit., pp. 146-148 with p. 5, n. 7 and pp. 38-39.

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While Prantl's particular arguments against the possibility of the collection being written' by Averroës do merit serious attention, his general view of Averroës's writings on the Organon was badly confused. He was correct in stating that the medieval scholastic tradition spoke of three kinds of commentaries by Averröes on the Posterior Analytics: a short commentary, a middle commentary, and a long commentary. Similarly, he was correct in reporting that the scholastics thought Averroës had written two kinds of commentaries on the other books of the Organon: short commentaries and middle commentaries. However, in his discussion of Averroës's logical theory, he tried to correct the division set forth by the scholastics and their identification of the different commentaries. He thereby betrayed his own confusion about these works. For example, never citing the short commentaries, he identified the Middle Commentary on Aristotle's Categories as a short commentary. He further argued that the Middle Commentary on Aristotle's Posterior Analytics was a mixture between a short commentary and a middle commentary. Consequently, he tried to show that the Epitome in Libros Logicae Aristotelis, i.e., the Short Commentaries on Aristotle's Organon was still another kind of commentary, one which had to be rejected as spurious despite its acceptance by the scholastics. Cf. ibid., pp. 374, 377-378, and 384-385. Gauthier demonstrated a similar kind of confusion about the differences between short commentaries and middle commentaries; cf. Ibn Rochd, op. cit., pp. 12-14, 16, and 52, n. 1.

31. Cf. Lasinio, "Il Commento Medio di Averroe alia Poetica di Aristotele," op. cit., preface I, pp. xvi-xvii. In a different context, Horten cited additional inconsistencies in the philosophical terminology of the Latin translations; cf. Die Metaphysik des Averroes, trans. Max Horten (Halle: Max Niemayer, 1912), pp. ix-xi. A major reason for this inconsistency in the Latin translations seems to be the heavy reliance of the translators upon Muslim or Jewish interpreters due to their own insufficient grasp of Arabic. Cf. R. de Vaux, "La Premiere Entree d'Averroès chez les Latins," op. cit., pp. 197, n. 2 and 199, notes 1-2; also Harry A. Wolfson, "The Twice-Revealed Averroes'' in Speculum XXXVI (1961), pp. 373-392.

32. Cf. Prantl, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 376, n. 294. Steinschneider sought to refute this objection by asserting that Averroës often altered in a subsequent work what he had set down in an earlier one. Consequently, inconsistencies in doctrine could be no proof of the spurious character of a work. In these terms, Steinschneider's argument is overstated and raises as many problems as it attempts to solve. Cf. Steinschneider, Alfarabi, op. cit., pp. 149-150.

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33. Cf. Averroes Middle Commentary on Porplyry's Isagoge and on Aristotle's Categoriae, op. cit., p. 27: "This completes the subject matter of the Isagoge. I was led to comment upon it by friends in Murcia, men who are keen and eager for theoretical knowledge, may God show them mercy, and were it not for them, I would not have taken the trouble, for two reasons. One is that I do not consider the Isagoge necessary for beginning the art of logic, since its contents cannot belong to what is common to the entire art, as some imagine; for if what has been stated here in connection with the definitions of the predicables is demonstrable, it belongs to the Posterior Analytics, while if it is generally accepted opinion, it belongs to the Topics. In fact, Porphyry made these statements not as definitions, but rather as explanations of the meanings of the terms in question [so that they might be understood] whenever Aristotle uses them in his book. From this point of view, the Isagoge is not a part of logic. Alfarabi, however, implies that it is a part of logic. This is one thing that would have dissuaded me from commenting upon the book as part of my commentary on the books of Aristotle, and the second is that what this man says in the Isagoge is self-explanatory. Nevertheless, I wished to oblige the aforementioned scholars and assist them in everything that they, from their desire and love of science, considered to be to their benefit, and thus I was led to comment and dilate upon this book. In the few remarks I have made, I have alluded to most [of the things that should be discussed]. At some points there is room for speculation, but this is not the place for it." Cf. also ibid., pp. xiii-xv, xvii-xviii, and xix-xx.

34. Averroüs explained: "The purpose of this treatise is to present a Middle Commentary on the ideas contained in Aristotle's books on the art of logic, summarizing them according to our ability, as we have customarily done with his other books. We shall begin with the first of his books about this art, that is, the book about the Categories." Cf. Averroès Talkhiç Kitab al-Maqoulat, ed. Bouyges, op. cit., p. 3.

It is possible that Averroës composed his Middle Commentary on Porphyry's Isagoge after the other Middle Commentaries, for the only mention of the Arabic text of this commentary was the description of the Florence Laurenziano manuscript CLXXX, 54 by J.B. Raimundus in about 1610. That description is not entirely trustworthy, however; cf. Lasinio, "II Commento Medio di Averroe alla Poetica di Aristotele," op. cit., preface I, pp. viii-x.

35. Cf. Prantl, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 390-392, n. 372 with pp. 384-385, n. 334 and pp. 360-361, n. 230. Cf. also supra, p. 7 · For Averroës's criticism of Avicenna, cf. Magna Commentaria Posteriorum Resolutionarum in Aristotelis Omnia quae extant Opera... Averrois Gordubensis in ea... Omnes...

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Commentarii (Venice: apud Junctas, 1562), Vol. I, pars secunda, p. 7a: "Circa quod iam erravit Avicenna errore manifesto, cum putaret, praeponi Topicam arti Demonstrativae..." (trans. Abraham de Balmes); or "Et idea Manifeste erravit Avicenna circa hoc, cum existimet, dialecticam facultatem, seu topicam, debere precedere artem Demonstrativam..." (trans. Jacob Mantinus); cf. also 6a.

36. Cf. Averroës Magna Commentaria Posteriorum Resolutionarum, op. cit., pp. 7b-8b.

37. Cf. On the Rules by Which Syllogisms Are Made (Fi * al-Qawanin* allati* ta`mal biha* al-Maqayis*), M 30a19-31a8, P 33a22-34a21. Steinschneider was so convinced Averroës had not spoken about dialectical reasoning in this section of the collection that he denied it should even be entitled Topics, reserving that title for the first treatise presented here; cf. Alfarabi, op. cit., p. 148.

For some reason, none of the Latin editions presented the treatise on dialectic (Short Commentary on Aristotle's Topics) as a separate treatise. Instead, it was incorporated into the Epitome in Libros Elenchorum as chapter V and given the title De Rationibus probabilibus et liti-giosis. Cf. Aristotelis Omnia quae extant Opera... Averrois Cordubensis in ea Omnes... Commentarii, op. cit., Vol. I, pars prima, p. 72b; Vol. I, pars tertia, p. 72b; and Vol. II, p. 189b (in this volume, it is not set off as a separate chapter, and the title is in the margin). Cf. also Aristotelis Omnia quae extant Opera... Averrois Cordubensis in ea Omnes... Commentarii (Venice: apud Junctas, 1552), Vol. I, p. 357 (here it is not set off as a separate chapter). Cf. also Aristotelis Omnia quae extant Opera... Averrois Cordubensis in ea Omnes... Commentarii (Venice: apud Cominum de Tridino, 1560), Vol. I, p. 332b.

Similarly, there is confusion in these editions about the order of the treatises belonging to the collection. Despite Averroës's statement that his treatise On the Rules by Which Syllogisms Are Made (Fi* al-Qawanin* allati* ta`mal biha* al-Maqayis*) should precede the Short Commentary on Aristotle's Posterior Analytics, it is placed after the Short Commentary on Aristotle's Posterior Analytics in the Junctas 1562 edition. Moreover, only the Junctas 1552 edition presents the collection as a whole. The Junctas 1562 edition presents the Short Commentary on Aristotle's Rhetoric and the Short Commentary on Aristotle's Poetics in a separate volume, while the Tridino 1560 edition presents the Short Commentary on Aristotle's Posterior Analytics in a separate volume and the Short Commentary on Aristotle's Rhetoric and the Short Commentary on Aristotle's Poetics in yet another volume.

38. Cf. infra, Short Commentary on Aristotle's Topics, para. 1.

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39. "There are two kinds of assent. One kind is for verifying the problem and dividing it into one of the two parts of the contradiction so that what is true is contained within one of them. The second kind is for verifying the composite argument bringing about assent; it is called syllogism. We shall begin with the first kind, since it is the one which ought first to be verified with regard to the problem, as it constitutes the knowledge preparing the way to assent." As has already been noted (supra, n. 22), the subtitle in the Paris Judaeo-Arabic manuscript is even more explicit: Treatise on the Knowledge Preparing the Way to Assent (al-Qawl fi * al-Ma`rifah al-muwatti`ah* li al-Tasdiq*). Cf. M. 10b19-1la2, P. 1la10-15.

40. Cf. On the Rules by Which Syllogisms Are Made, M. 30a19-30b3, P. 33a20-25: "We say: since the rules given in this art are of two types (a type which brings about and a type which makes known) and since the discussion which preceded has been about the things by which the species and classes of syllogisms are made known, we now ought to speak about the rules enabling us to make syllogisms." Cf. also M. 30b3-31a8, P. 33a25-34a18, and M. la4-8 (the corresponding folio in P. is missing).

41. The "Sections Which Are Necessary in the Art of Logic" were mentioned by Munk (Mélanges, op. cit., pp. 351-352, n. I) and Stein-schneider (Alfarabi, op. cit., pp. 15-16), but Professor H. Blumberg was the first to discuss them in any detail. Cf. "Alfarabi's Five Chapters on Logic" in Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research VI (1934-1935), pp. 115-121. Although Blumberg promised a subsequent edition of the treatise, it never appeared. Only twenty years later when Professor D.M. Dunlop discovered the manuscript, apparently without ever having heard of Blumberg's article, were the "Sections'' edited. Dunlop viewed the Paris manuscript as an inferior source and preferred to depend on the Istanbul Hamidiye Manuscript 182, folios 3a-5b. The treatise was edited and translated by Dunlop as "al-Farabi's* Introductory Sections on Logic" in The Islamic Ouarterly II (1955), pp. 264-282. Professor Mubahat Türker edited the treatise again, using additional manuscripts, and translated it into Turkish; cf. "Farabi'nin* bazi Mantik* Eseleri" in Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih-Cografya* Fakültesi Dergisi XVI (1958), pp. 165-181, 195-213.

Professor Türker has also edited "The Speech about the Conditions of Demonstration"; cf. "Farabi'nin* Sera`it* ul-yakini*" in Arastirma* I (1963); Felsefe Arastirmalari* Enstitüsü, Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih-Cografya* Fakültesi Dergisi, pp. 173 ff.

42. This is the same scribe who made the copy of Kitab* al-Hiss* wa al-Mahsus* found in Modena (Bibliotèca Estensis Manuscript 13, I.D.

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10); he claimed to have finished copying it in 1356 C.E., the same year he finished copying this manuscript. Cf. Die Epitome der Parva Naturalia des Averroes, ed. Helmut Gätje (Weisbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1961), pp. x-xi.

Some question about the identity of the Hebrew translator has arisen, because neither the colophon nor any other passage of the text provides specific evidence about his identity. In an extremely ambiguous footnote, Renan attributed the translation of the Paris manuscript to Jacob ben Abba-Maria ben Anatoli (cf. Renan, op. cit., p. 188, n. 2). Munk later resorted to an equally ambiguous footnote in order to attribute the translation to Samuel ben Yehuda of Marseilles, but never explained why he disagreed with Renan (cf. Mélanges, op. cit., p. 489, n. 3). Yet another candidate was suggested by Zotenberg, the compiler of the Paris catalogue. He identified Rabbi Jacob ben Makhir of Montpelier as the translator because of the closeness between the translation of the Paris manuscript and another translation of this work definitely attributed to Rabbi Jacob (cf. Manuscrits Orientaux, op. cit., pp. 160, Ms. no. 917; 167-168, Ms. no. 956; and 182). Steinschneider and Lasinio accepted the identification of the Paris catalogue and rejected Renan's and Munk's conjectures without explaining the reasons for their decision (cf. Alfarabi, op. cit., p. 147; Die hebräische Übersetzungen, op. cit., pp. 54-56; and "II Commento Medio di Averroe all Poetica di Aristotele," op. cit., preface I, p. xvii). Father Bouyges did not reconsider the problem; like Steinschneider and Lasinio, he accepted the judgment of the Paris catalogue without question (cf. "Notes sur les Philosophes Arabes Connus des Latins du Moyen Age," op. cit., p. 9).

Had Lasinio paid more attention to his own edition of the Short Commentary on Aristotle's Poetics, he might have come to a different conclusion: in the printed version of the Hebrew translation (which is definitely Rabbi Jacob's translation), there is a passage missing that is present in the Paris manuscript translation; and there is a passage in the printed translation that does not occur in the Paris manuscript translation. The problem is that the Paris manuscript is no more similar to the translation known to be by Rabbi Jacob than it is to another translation executed by Samuel. Zotenberg was clearly correct in his judgment that Samuel's translation differs little from Rabbi Jacob's, despite Samuel's allegation that he decided to do his own translation in order to correct the errors in Rabbi Jacob's version. However, the differences between these two identified translations are other than the differences between either one of them and the translation of the Paris manuscript.

43. For example, cf. infra, Short Commentary on Aristotle's Topics, para.

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3, n. 3; Short Commentary on Aristotle's Rhetoric, para. 4, n. 12; and Short Commentary on Aristotle's Poetics, para. 2, n. 9.

44. For example, cf. infra, Short Commentary on Aristotle's Topics, para. 1, n. 3; Short Commentary on Aristotle's Rhetoric, para. 1, n. 4; and Short Commentary on Aristotle's Poetics, para. 2, n. 18.

45. Cf. infra, Short Commentary on Aristotle's Topics, para. 8, notes 5-6 and para. 16, note 3; also Short Commentary on Aristotle's Rhetoric, para. 23, note 4. Examples of passages where each manuscript differs from the best reading are: infra, Short Commentary on Aristotle's Topics, para. 9, n. 20; Short Commentary on Aristotle's Rhetoric, para. 2, n. 3; and Short Commentary on Aristotle's Poetics, para. 2, n. 10.

46. Cf. infra, Short Commentary on Aristotle's Topics, para. 1: "Since we have spoken about the things by means of which the certain assent and the complete concept are distinguished and subsequent to that have spoken about the things which lead to error concerning them, let us speak about dialectical and rhetorical assent and the extent each one provides." Cf. also, infra, Short Commentary on Aristotle's Rhetoric, para. 1. Although the art of poetics does not use syllogistic arguments, it persuades by means of imaginative representation; cf. infra, Short Commentary on Aristotle's Poetics, paras. 1 and 3.

The interpretation expressed here develops some ideas first expressed in an article entitled "Averroës: Politics and Opinion," American Political Science Review LXVI (1972), pp. 894-901.

47. The works in question are the Kitab * Fasl* al-Maqal* wa Taqrir* ma* bayn al-Shari`ah wa al-Hikmah* min al-Ittisal* (Book of the Decisive Treatise and Stipulation of the Relationship between Divine Law and Philosophy), ed. by George F. Hourani (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1959); the Kitab* al-Kashf `an Manahij* al-Adillah fi* `Aqa'id* al-Millah (The Book of Uncovering the Clear Paths of the Signs about the Beliefs of the Religious Community), ed. by Mahmud* Kassem (Cairo: Maktabat al-Anglu* al-Misriyah*, 1963); and the Tahafut* al-Tahafut* (The Incoherence of the Incoherence), ed. by Father Bouyges (Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1930).

48. Cf. infra, Short Commentary on Aristotle's Rhetoric, paras. 38-40; and Short Commentary on Aristotle's Poetics, paras. 1-2.

49. Cf. General Introduction, M. la4-11: "The purpose of this treatise is to abstract the necessary speeches pertaining to each and every logical art by explaining the ranks of the kinds of concept and assent used in each and every one of the five artsi.e., the demonstrative, the dialectical, the sophistical, the rhetorical, and the poetical. The reason is that this extent of this art is what is most necessary for learning the arts which have already been perfected. And in this time

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of ours most of the arts, like medicine and others, are like this [i.e., perfected]." The corresponding folio in P. is missing.

50. Cf. infra, Short Commentary on Aristotle's Poetics, paras. 4-5. The prior judgment was made in the Short Commentary on Aristotle's Posterior Analytics where it was explained that man's ultimate perfection consisted in having certainty about the most remote causes of the beings and that philosophy provided such knowledge. It was also explained that a further development of the issue belonged in another work. Cf. M. 57a 17-19, P. 63a 2-4. The same sort of judgment applies to rhetoric, for the final definitions of rhetoric and of poetics are nearly identical; cf. infra, Short Commentary on Aristotle's Rhetoric, para. 45. Poetics, however, can only be spoken of in terms of what it allows one to make and do, because Averroës denied that it had any contribution to make towards understanding; cf. infra, Short Commentary on Aristotle's Poetics, paras. 1-2.

51. Cf. infra, Short Commentary on Aristotle's Topics, para. 21. Cf. also Averroës Short Commentary on Aristotle's Posterior Analytics, M. 56b 22-57a24, P. 62a 15-63a6; Averroès Talkhis * Kitab* ma* ba`d al-Tabi`ah* ed. by `Uthman* Amin* (Cairo: Mustafa* al-Babi* al-Halabi*, 1958), pp. 1:10-2:8, 5:12-6:14; and Aristotle Posterior Analytics 77a29-35, 86a22-30.

52. Cf. infra, Short Commentary on Aristotle's Topics, paras. 1-4, 6, 8-11, 15-19.

53. Cf. ibid., para. 21 and n. 3.

54. Cf. The Incoherence of the Incoherence, op. cit., pp. 207-209, 356-358, 427-430, 514-515, 527-528. Concerning al-Ghazali*, cf. infra, Short Gommentary on Aristotle's Rhetoric, para. 42, n. 2.

55. Cf. al-Farabi* Ihsa'* al-`Uium*, op. cit., chapter 5, pp. 107-108: "The art of dialectical theology is a skill enabling a man to use arguments for defending the established opinions and actions declared by the Lawgiver and for refuting anything which contradicts them. This art [like jurisprudence] is divided into two parts: one concerning opinions and one concerning actions. It is unlike jurisprudence in that the jurist takes the opinions and actions declared by the Lawgiver as indisputable and considers them as principles from which he deduces their consequences, while the dialectical theologian defends the things used by the jurist as principles without deducing other things from them. If it happens that one man has a facility for both tasks, then he is a jurist and a dialectical theologiana dialectical theologian insofar as he defends these [principles] and a jurist insofar as he deduces [other things] from them." The same role is assigned the dialectical

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theologians by Louis Gardet in his article "Quelques Réflexions sur la Place du 'Ilm al-Kalam * dans les 'Sciences Religieuses' Musulmanes" in Arabic and Islamic Studies in Honor of Hamilton A.R. Gibb, ed. by. G Makdisi (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1965), pp. 258-259, 262-267.

56. Cf. infra, Short Commentary on Aristotle's Rhetoric, paras. 12, 31, 36, 42, and 43. Concerning Abu* al-Ma`ali*, cf. ibid., para. 12, n. 1.

57. Ibid., paras. 12, 29-30, 31, 36, and 44. For a fuller discussion of this issue, cf. "Rhetoric and Islamic Political Philosophy" in International Journal of Middle East Studies III (1972), pp. 187-198.

58. Cf. infra, Short Commentary on Aristotle's Rhetoric, paras. 2, 3, 6, 8, 12, 13 (with paras. 7 and 10), 18-19, and 33.

59. Cf. infra, Short Commentary on Aristotle's Topics, para. 9; also On the Rules by Which Syllogisms Are Made, M. 37a2437b10, P. 41a20 42a2, where rhetoric is substituted for sophistry as though they were identical. Cf. also infra, Short Commentary on Aristotle's Rhetoric, para. 17.

60. Ibid., paras. 4-5, 6-7, 8-13, 14, 15, 16-22, 23-24, and 26-32.

61. Ibid., paras. 1-5, 12, 29 and 31.

62. Ibid., paras. 5, 15-17, and 23-24.

63. Ibid., para. 43.

64. Ibid., paras. 12 and 31.

65. Ibid., paras. 33-44.

66. Ibid., para. 34.

67. Ibid., paras. 35-36.

68. Ibid., paras 38-39 and cf. infra, Short Commentary on Aristotle's Topics, para. 11.

69. Cf. infra, Short Commentary on Aristotle's Rhetoric, para. 36.

70. Ibid., paras. 37 and 40.

71. Ibid., para. 42.

72. Ibid., para. 43.

73. Ibid., para. 44

74. Cf. infra, Short Commentary on Aristotle's Poetics, paras. 1 and 4.

75. Ibid., paras. 1-3.

76. Ibid., para. 1.

77. Ibid., para. 2.

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78. Ibid.

79. Ibid. "For the most part these representations cause error concerning the things which can be conceived of only by their representations or which can be conceived of only with difficulty; thus, there is much error about the latter..."

80. Ibid.

81. Ibid., paras. 1 and 4.

82. Cf. al-Farabi * Kitab* al-Millah [Book of Religion], ed. by M. Mahdi (Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1972), para. 1. "Religion is the opinions and actions which the first ruler prescribes to the collectivity. They are determined and restricted by qualifications as he seeks to obtain a specific goal with respect to the people or by means of them, through their practicing these opinions and actions... the craft of the virtuous first ruler is kingly and linked with revelation from God. Indeed, he determines the actions and the opinions which are in the virtuous religion by means of revelation..."

83. Cf. infra, Short Commentary on Aristotle's Poetics, para. 2.

84. Ibid., para. 3.

85. Cf. Averroës Talkhis* al-Khatabah*, Badawi* edition, op. cit., pp. 13-14.

86. Cf. infra, Short Commentary on Aristotle's Poetics, para. 4.

87. Ibid., para. 5.

88. Cf. infra, Short Commentary on Aristotle's Topics, para. 13.

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Notes to the Translation of the Short Commentary on Aristotle's Topics

Invocation.

1. The clause "[I beseech] your succor, O Lord" was omitted from the Paris manuscript. In its place is the clause: "I have recourse to Him, and in Him I place my trust".

Paragraph (l).

1. The word translated here as "assent" (tasdiq *) is one of two key terms for Averroës, the other being "concept"; cf. below, n. 2. At the very beginning of the collection of these Short Commentaries, Averroës explained that his whole analysis centered around these two terms since all the problems considered in the rational arts may be explained by means of them. ''Assent is the firm assertion or denial of something, and it comes about in two ways: (a) either absolutely, like our saying 'does vacuum exist?' or (b) with qualification, like our saying 'is the world created?' Now this sort of seeking is always asked about by the particle 'does' [or 'is' (hal)]." Cf. M. lb3-5; there is no corresponding folio in the Paris manuscript, as has been noted in the Introduction. Cf. also Harry A. Wolfson, "The Terms tasawwur* and tasdiq* in Arabic Philosophy and their Greek, Latin, and Hebrew Equivalents," op. cit., pp. 114-128.

2. Concept" (tasawwur*) is "the understanding of something in accordance with what gives an analogy of its essence or with what is supposed to give an analogy of its essence, and it is asked about for the most part and primarilyby the particle 'what'; like our saying 'what is nature?' and 'what is the soul?'" Cf. M. la23-1b2.

Because the word "form" (surah*) is derived from the same root, the term "concept" is used in a very strict sense; i.e., the mental image of the form of something.

3. The word translated here and in what follows as "arguments" could literally be translated as "speeches" (aqawil*). Because the word means "arguments" in this context, because "speeches" are used as arguments in the art of dialectic, and because both here and in the following Short Commentary on Aristotle's Rhetoric the word is used to refer to those aspects of speech which produce assent rather than to the whole speech, this translation has been adopted.

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Paragraph (2).

1. The arabic word zann * is translated here as "supposition." It is usually used to denote the thought someone holds about that in which he believes. For instance, al-Farabi* defined zann* as: "believing that a thing is such or not such." He also explained: "Supposition and certainty have in common that both are opinion. Opinion (ra'y) is to believe that a thing is such or not such. It is like their genus, and they are like the two species." Of. al-Farabi* Kitab* al-Khatabah*, edited and translated by J. Langhade, in Langhade and Grignaschi, Al-Farabi*: Deux Ouvrages Inédits sur la Rhétorique, op. cit., p. 31, lines 6-8; p. 33, lines 8-9.

Avicenna also defines supposition as a kind of opinion: "True supposition is an opinion about something being so, while it is possible for it not to be so." Cf. A.-M. Goichon, Lexique de la Langue Philosophique d' Ibn Sina (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1938), para. 405.

Although some similarly does exist between zann* and ra`y, there is a difference. These authors have tried to distinguish between the two words and apparently considered it possible for opinion, but not supposition, to reach the level of certainty.

2. The word translated here as "peculiar characteristic" is really the word for "property" (khassah*); cf. infra, paras. 15 and 16, as well as para. 17, note 3.

Paragraph (3).

1. According to Aristotle, "a premise is an affirmative or negative statement about some subject... [and] a syllogistic premise will be simply the affirmation or negation of some predicate of some subject... while the dialectical premise will be, for the interrogator, an answer to the question which of two contradictory statements is to be accepted, and for the one making the syllogism, an assumption of what is apparently true and generally accepted..." Gf. Prior Analytics 24a17-24b12; also Topics 104a2-37. Averroës said that the premise is the smallest statement which admits of truth or falsehood. "It is composed of a predicate and a subject, and insofar as it is a part of a syllogism, it is called a premise." Cf. Short Commentary on Aristotle's Prior Analytics M. 17a6-7; P. 18a8-9. A syllogism results from the combination of two or more premises.

Paragraph (4).

1. Or "The same outside the soul as it is inside the soul" (kharij* al-nafs 'ala* ma* huw `alaih fi* al-nafs).

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2. Aristotle classified syllogisms as belonging to three different "figures" in accordance with the different manner in which the middle term (cf. infra, para. 6, note 3) might be arranged. This classification also served to distinguish the character of the different kinds of syllogisms; i.e., a syllogism occurring in the first figure was said to be perfect because "it requires nothing, apart from what is comprised in it, to make the necessary conclusion apparent," whereas a syllogism occurring in either one of the other two figures was imperfect because it "requires one or more propositions which, although they necessarily follow from the terms which have been laid down, are not comprised in the premises," and for this reason, such a syllogism was said to be merely valid. The superiority of the syllogisms occurring in the first figure is also apparent from Aristotle's contention that "it is possible to reduce all syllogisms to the universal syllogisms in the first figure'' and that "all imperfect syllogisms are completed by means of the first figure." It is in this latter way that the syllogisms of the second and third figures ultimately become valid. Cf. Prior Analytics 24b23-27, 29b24-25, and 40b15-16. In the Short Commentary on Aristotle's Prior Analytics, Averroës followed Aristotle's schema and, after distinguishing the different kinds of premises and terms, explained that any problem which occurred to mind could be classified in one of three ways according to the different manner in which its subject and predicate might be related to the major term (cf. infra, para. 6, n. 4). By explaining the possible relations of the subject and predicate to the major term and the effects of each relation on the other two terms, Averroës was able to offer a plausible argument that there was no reason to adopt the fourth figure which Galen (cf. infra, Short Commentary on Aristotle's Rhetoric, para. 9, n. 1) had tried to impose upon Aristotle's classification. Cf. M. 17b16-18a2 and 19a3-24a8; P. 19a5-10 and 20a 14-26a6. For examples of syllogisms occuring in each of the three figures, cf. infra, para. 6, n. 2.

Paragraph (5).

1. Cf. supra, para. 2: "We say: the extent [of assent] they provide is supposition which approximates certainty." The meaning of this statement was explained in paras. 2-4.

2. All of the syllogisms which are divided into figures fall under the grouping "categorical syllogism" according to Averroës. Cf. Short Commentary on Aristotle's Prior Analytics M. 24a6-8, P. 26a5-6. Such a distinction does not occur in Aristotle's Prior Analytics because Aristotle insisted that all syllogisms are brought about by means of one of the three figures. Cf. Prior Analytics 40b22-23 and 41b1-5. Because

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Aristotle made this statement subsequent to the long discussion of syllogisms based on modal attributions (ibid., 29b2940b16), he apparently did not intend to place them in a different class from the syllogisms which conclude immediately in one of the three figures (ibid., 25b26-29b28).

3. Although Aristotle did not treat the conditional syllogism as a separate kind of syllogism, Averroës thought that arguments ex hypothesi (cf. Prior Analytics 40b17-41b7, 45b15-20, 50a16-50b4) should be understood as conditional syllogisms. In the Short Commentary on Aristotle's Prior Analytics, he explained that "the conditional syllogism is usually composed of two premises, a major and a minor. The major is composed of two categorical premises to which is attached a conditional particle (harf * al-sharitah*). The minor is a part of this major and is that which is selected from one of the two categorical premises from which the major is composed." Cf. M. 24a8-27b6; P. 26a7-30a8. Conditional syllogisms are further divided into conjunctive and disjunctive (cf. infra, Short Commentary on Aristotle's Rhetoric, para. 8). One example of the conjunctive conditional syllogisms given by Averroës is: "If this entity is a human being, then he is an animal; but he is a human being, so he is necessarily an animal."

It appears that Averroës followed a well-established tradition by dividing the syllogisms into classes other than the three figures mentioned by Aristotle. Both Avicenna and al-Farabi* made the same kind of distinction. For Avicenna, cf. al-Najah* (Cairo: Matba`at* al-Sa`adah*, 1938), pp. 32-52 and al-Shifa'*: Talkhis* Kitab* al-Qiyas* (Cairo: Wizarat* al-Thaqafah*, 1964), pp. 231-426. For al-Farabi*, cf. Kitab* al-Qiyas*, Hamidiye Manuscript no. 812 (Istanbul), folios 28b-42b. The tradition that all three followed seems to have had its origins in the theory of the hypothetical and disjunctive conclusions first presented by Theophrastus (371-288 B.C.E.) and later developed by Porphyry, both of whom were well-known to Arab thinkers. Cf. Prantl, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 294-295, 374-393, and 470-482; Vol. II, pp. 301-302, 309-311, 357-359, 368-370, and 379-384. Cf. also J. Tricot, Traité de Logique Formelle (Paris: Vrin, 1930), pp. 227-235.

4. Averroës defined the contradictory syllogism in the following manner: "The contradictory syllogism is composed from the categorical and the conditional [syllogisms]. It is used in this way: when we wish to explain the truth of a certain proposition, we take its opposite and we join to it a true premise whose truth is not doubted. From them one of the conclusive constructions is constructed, according to any of the categorical figures chanced upon. If a clear falsehood results, we know that the falsehood does not derive from the way the syllogism

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is constructedsince it is a conclusive constructionnor from the true premise; so all that is left is that it is derived from the opposite of the common premise, and if its opposite is false, then it is true." Cf. Short Commentary on Aristotle's Prior Analytics M. 27b6-28a 23; P. 30a 8-31a8. This classification seems to be based on Aristotle's discussion of a particular kind of argument ex hypothesi, the reductio ad impossible; cf. Prior Analytics 45a23-45b15, 50a28-39, and 62b30-63b20.

Paragraph (6).

1. The first figure, according to Aristotle, is the one in which the perfect syllogism occurs. A syllogism is perfect when its terms, i.e., the subject and predicate of the premises, are so arranged that "the last is wholly encompassed within the middle, and the middle is wholly encompassed within or excluded from the first." When he said that "one term is wholly encompassed within another," Aristotle meant that the latter may be "predicated of all of the former." Cf. Prior Analytics 24b27-31, 25b26-32. Averroës explained that the first figure occurs when the middle term is the subject of the major premise and the predicate of the minor premise. Cf. Short Commentary on Aristotle's Prior Analytics M. 17b18-23; P. 19a6-9.

Since a syllogism in the first figure is perfect, i.e., so formed that the necessary conclusion is readily apparent, it is very convincing; consequently, its force is very strong. The example given here is developed more fully in para. 8, infra.

2. Every syllogism has at least two premises and three terms. When a syllogism has more than two premises and three terms, there is always one term more than the number of premises. With respect to the first figure, Aristotle identified the minor term as "that which is subsumed under the middle term." By saying this, Aristotle meant that it is wholly encompassed within the middle term, i.e., that the middle term can be predicated of all of the minor term or that the middle term is more comprehensive than the minor term. In the second figure, as well as in the third figure, the minor term is most distant from the middle term. Cf. Prior Analytics 42a32-42b27, 24b28-30, 25b26-35, 26a23, 26b38, 28a14. Averroës expressed the idea somewhat differently: according to him, the minor term is the subject of the proposition resulting from the syllogism. Cf. Short Commentary on Aristotle's Prior Analytics M. 17b12-13; P. 19a3-4.

An example of a syllogism occurring in the first figure would be: "Every body is composed; every composed thing is created; thus, every body is created." In this example the terms are "body," "composed," and ''created," and the minor term is "body." An example of a

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syllogism occurring in the second figure would be: "Every body is composed; no eternal entity is composed; thus, no body is eternal." In this example, the terms are "body," "eternal," and "composed," with "body'' again being the minor term. Finally, an example of a syllogism occurring in the third figure would be: "Every theoretical science is learned [i.e., acquired by learning]; every theoretical science is a virtue; thus some virtues are learned [i.e., acquired by learning]." In this example, the terms are "theoretical science," "learned," and "virtue," with "virtue" being the minor term. Cf. Averroës, ibid., M. 1968, 21b23-22a2, 23a20-22; P. 21a5-6, 23a17-18, 25a9-10.

3. In the syllogisms occurring in the first figure, Aristotle identified the middle term as that term "which both is encompassed within another and encompasses another." In the syllogisms occurring in the second figure, the middle term is that term "which is predicated of both subjects." Finally, in the syllogisms occurring in the third figure, the middle term is that term "of which both predications are made." As a consequence, it literally occupies a middle position only in the syllogisms of the first figure. Cf. Prior Analytics 25b35-37, 26b36, 28a12-13. According to Averroës, the middle term is the part of the syllogism which is common to both of the other terms. Cf. Short Commentary on Aristotle's Prior Analytics M. 17b 13; P. 19a4.

Taking the syllogism cited in the preceding note as an example of those syllogisms occurring in the first figure, "composed" is the middle term. With regard to the syllogism cited as an example of those syllogisms occurring in the second figure, "composed" is once again the middle term. In the syllogism cited as an example of those which occur in the third figure, "theoretical science" is the middle term.

4. With respect to the syllogisms occurring in the first figure, Aristotle identified the major term as "that within which the middle is encompassed." In syllogisms occurring in the second figure, the major term is "that which comes next to the middle." In syllogisms occurring in the third figure, he stated that the major term actually occupies the middle, but it is difficult to understand what he meant by such a definition. Cf. Prior Analytics 26a22, 26b38, 28a13-14. According to Averroës, the major term is the predicate of the proposition resulting from the syllogism. Cf. Short Commentary on Aristotle's Prior Analytics M. 17b13; P. 19a4.

Taking the syllogism cited in note 3 as an example of those syllogisms occurring in the first figure, the major term would be "created." In the syllogism cited as an example of those syllogisms occurring in the second figure, "eternal" would be the major term. With regard to the syllogism cited as an example of those syllogisms occurring in the third figure, "learned" would be the major term.

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Paragraph (7).

1. Although Aristotle discussed the major premise in the Prior Analytics, he does not appear to have presented a detailed explanation of what it is anywhere in that book. Apparently, the student of logic was expected to deduce the definition by reference to the previously presented analysis of the syllogisms. Accordingly, the major premise of the syllogism cited as an example of those occurring in the first figure would be the premise which has the middle term as its subject and the major term as its predicate, i.e., "every composed thing is created." For the syllogism which was cited as an example of those occurring in the second figure, the major premise would be the one having the major term as its subject and the middle term as its predicate, i.e., "no eternal entity is composed." Finally, the major term of the syllogism cited as indicative of those syllogisms occurring in the third figure would have the middle term as its subject and the major term as its predicate, i.e., ''every theoretical science is learned [i.e., acquired by learning]." Cf. supra, para. 3, n. 1, para. 6, n. 2, and infra, para. 21, n. 1.

Averroës defined the major premise as "the premise whose predicate is the major term," a definition which can be valid only for the major premise of syllogisms occurring in the first and third figures. When he presented the example of the syllogism occurring in the second figure, he identified its major premise as being universal and negative, i.e., "no eternal entity is composed." However, when he presented the example of the syllogism occurring in the third figure, he explained that its minor premise could be converted to a particular and thus placed into the third type (mode) of syllogisms occurring in the first figure; by process of elimination, that means that the major premise of this syllogism must be "every theoretical science is learned [i.e., acquired by learning]." Cf. Short Commentary on Aristotle's Prior Analytics M. 17b16-17, 21b22-23, and 23a22-23 with 20a3-7; P. 19a5-6, 23a16, and 25a9-10 with 21a16-19.

2. Part of the syllogism, namely the minor premise, is left unstated. The complete syllogism would be: "Every man is an animal; every animal is sense-perceiving; thus, every man is sense-perceiving." The minor premise is "every man is an animal," and the major premise is "every animal is sense-perceiving." When the syllogism is fully stated, it is the kind of syllogism that would belong to the first figure.

3. The word translated here as "speaking being" (natiq *) is equivocal. It could be translated "rational being" with equal accuracy, because the verb root (ntq*) is as rich in meaning as the Greek word logos; in fact, one form of the verb root is the Arabic word for logic (mantiq*).

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Here "speaking being" appeared to be more analogous to the idea of "laughing being" than "rational being.''

Here, too, the syllogism is incomplete. However, this syllogism is incomplete only because the major premise is not stated in the beginning. The complete syllogism would be: "Every man is a speaking being; speaking is the same thing as laughing; thus every man is a laughing being." Given the qualifications established by Averroës, this syllogism could also be classified as falling within the first figure.

4. For a different perspective, cf. "Al-Farabi's * Introductory Risalah* on Logic," ed. by D.M. Dunlop in The Islamic Quarterly III (1957), p. 229, lines 2-9. Actually, a better syllogism can be constructed if "laughing" is taken as encompassed within "speaking" :"All laughing is speaking; every man is a speaking being; thus every man is a laughing being." This syllogism would be classified as falling within the second figure.

Paragraph (8).

1. The argument of the rest of the paragraph, as well as that of the following paragraph, will be much more easily understood once it is noted that the word "problem" (matlub*) is used here in the sense of the proposition which is the conclusion of some kind of syllogistic reasoning and that as a proposition it has a subject and predicate.

Paragraph (9).

1. In effect, with some more elaboration, the example of induction discussed in paras. 6 and 8 could be used to verify the major premise of the syllogism presented as an example of syllogisms occurring in the first figure, namely, "every composed thing is created" (cf. para. 6, n. 2). By reflecting on the difficulty of verifying that premise by induction, the reader will readily grasp the argument developed here and in the next two paragraphs by Averroës.

2. That is, the doubt raised in the last sentence of the preceding paragraph.

Paragraph (11).

1. The word translated here as "matter" (maddah*) is to be understood in both a material and a qualitative sense. It refers to the materials which constitute the syllogismi.e., to the premises and to their qualityi.e., whether they are "necessary," "possible for the most part," or "equally possible."

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Paragraph (13).

1. Cf. supra, para. 3: "... the dialectical argument is a syllogism composed from widespread, generally accepted premises."

2. In the Aphorisms, Hippocrates said: "spontaneous weariness indicates disease." Cf. Hippocrates Aphorisms, Section II, no. 5, in Hippocrates, trans. by W. H. S. Jones (London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1931), Vol. IV, p. 109. Hippocrates lived from 460-370 B. C. E.

Paragraph (14).

1. Cf. supra, paras. 3-4 and infra, Short Commentary on Aristotle's Rhetoric, para. 21. Although dialectical syllogisms may be partially false, that is not because the premises used in them are based on particulars. Rather, it is because the premises used in them are based on what is generally accepted and thus might not correspond to what is really true.

Paragraph (15).

1. The discussion of the universal predicates was part of Averroës's Short Commentary on Porphyry's Isagoge; cf. ibid., M. 4a15-6b4; P. 4a10-6a17. As has already been explained, this commentary served as a general introduction to the rest of the Short Commentaries on the logical arts.

Actually, Porphyry only discussed five universal predicates in the Isagoge: genus, species, differentia, property, and accident. In the Short Commentary on Porphyry's Isagoge, Averroës introduced the other three universal predicates (definition, description, and the statement which is neither definition nor description) as representative of the two types of meanings composed from those five original universal predicates; cf. ibid., M. 6a7-6b3; P. 6a5-17. His explanation of the three additional universal predicates illustrated how the meaning which each of these could provide was identical to the meaning that could be provided by different combinations of two of the original five universal predicates. Cf. also "Al-Farabi's * Introductory Risalah* on Logic," op. cit., pp. 228-229.

Incidentally, it ought to be noted that when the word "predicate" occurs in the text with reference to one of these five or eight universal predicates, the reader might understand it as "predicable." However, since Averroës did not consider the distinction sufficiently important to warrant a change in terminology, it did not seem appropriate to correct his style.

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2. According to Averroës, species (naw`) and genus (jins) are conceived of by analogy to each other, genus applying to what is more general and species to what is more particular. "When there is more than one universal distinguishing what a certain individual is and some are more general than others, then the more general is genus and the more particular is species" (cf. ibid., M. 4a16-19; P. 4a12-13). "For example, body, the self-nourishing, animal, and man are all universals distinguishing what an individual man, who is pointed out, is. Now some of these [universals] are more general than others. There is nothing more general than the universal, 'body,' and nothing more particular than the particular, 'man'" (ibid., M. 4a22-4b3; P. 4a 15-17).

3. Description (rasm), according to Averroës, is "a conditionally composed composite argument which illustrates the meaning alluded to, [but] not according to everything that is analogous to its essence. For the most part it is put together: (a) from genus and property, like our saying that man is an animal who educates his children in thought and deliberation; or (b) from genus and accident, like our saying that man is a writing animal" (ibid., M. 6a13-19; P. 6a10-12).

4. According to Averroës, "The statement which is neither definition nor description is put together: (a) from species and accident, like our saying about Zayd that he is a white man; or (b) from accidents, like our saying about him that he is an excellent scribe. Now this is peculiar to the concept (tasawwur *) as employed in rhetoric" (ibid., M. 6a19-22; P. 6a12-14).

5. In the Topics, Aristotle only discussed four universal predicates: definition, property, genus, and accident; cf. Topics 101b13-25, 101b35-102b26, and 103b20-21.

Paragraph (16).

1. Cf. Aristotle Topics 10lb21, 101b35-102a16.

2. Cf. Aristotle Topics 102a30-102b3.

3. Cf. Aristotle Topics 101b17-18: "Since the differentia is of the same nature as the genus, it ought to be classed under it."

4. Cf. Aristotle Topics 101b19-22, 102a17-30.

5. Cf. Aristotle Topics 102b3-25.

Paragraph (17)

1. In the Posterior Analytics, Aristotle discussed the definition at great length in order to distinguish it from the thesis (cf. 72a 20-25)

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and from the hypothesis (cf. 76b35-77a4), as well as to explain its relation to demonstration (cf. 89b23-100b17). In the course of explaining the relation of the definition to demonstration, Aristotle implicitly touched on matters pertaining to the other universal predicates; cf. ibid., 91b27-33, 96b15-97b8 with 73a35-74b12; 99b9-14 with 73a7-8; and 96b35-100bl; (cf. also Topics 102b26-103a5 for the explanation of why all of the universal predicates are implicit in any discussion of definition). Averroës also stressed the importance of the definition in his Short Gommentary on Aristotle's Posterior Analytics. However, he was much. more explicit about the relation of the other universal predicates to the definition and structured his discussion in terms of the different relation each had to the definition. Cf. ibid., M. 42a14-42b15, P. 47a9-22; M. 42b22-52a14 (especially 46a16-23 and 46b6-20), P. 48a2-57a21 (especially 51a19-22 and 52a2-9); and M. 52a15-56a27, P. 57a22-62a5.

2. At the end of the Posterior Analytics, Aristotle spoke of the ultimate genus of the genera as though it were a category; he developed this statement more thoroughly in the Metaphysics. Cf. Posterior Analytics 100a14-100b4; Metaphysics 1014a26-1014b15; and Hugh Tredennick's translation of the Posterior Analytics (London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1960), note e, p. 259. Although Averroës extensively developed the implications of the end of the Posterior Analytics in his short commentary on that work, I can find no discussion of this particular point.

3. The reasoning here would seem to be that the differentia risks looking too much like the genus, if it does not apply specifically to that which it differentiates; cf. Aristotle Posterior Analytics 91b27-33 and 96b15-97b8 with 73a35-74a4 and 100a14-100b4; also Metaphysics 1014b5-15.

Paragraph (18).

1. In the Arabic text, this is the beginning of a long conditional sentence. Literally, the sentence begins "that is because if..." and the apodosis is not reached until the words "then if these syllogisms were enumerated in this manner..."

2. When he commented on Aristotle's Posterior Analytics, al-Farabi *explained that there were really only three classes of demonstrative syllogisms: the demonstration that a thing is, i.e., the demonstration of its existence; the demonstration of why a thing is, i.e., the demonstration of its cause; and the demonstration that encompasses both of these. Although each of these classes could be subdivided into various types of demonstrative syllogisms, depending on the way the universal

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predicates or predicables were used with them, al-Farabi * explicitly declared that many of the syllogisms resulting from such uses of the universal predicates were not demonstrative. Cf. Kitab* al-Burhan*, Hamidiye Manuscript, op. cit., folios 62b23-63a9 and 63a10-68b17; cf. also Prantl, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 318-325.

Paragraph (19).

1. Themistius was born in Paphlagonia, a province of the eastern Roman Empire in Asia Minor near the Black Sea (roughly the area between Ankara and Sinop of modern Turkey), circa 317 C.E. and died in Constantinople circa 388 C.E. He first gained recognition for his numerous commentaries on Aristotle's logical, physical, and philosophical writings. Although his interests turned more to practical matters later in life and he was raised to the post of prefect of Constantinople in 384 C.E. by the Roman Emperor Theodosius I, he did not abandon his philosophic activity. Unfortunately, few of his writings have survived until this day, and thus far nothing is known of the Arabic translations of his works to which Averroës might have had access.

It is said that Gerard of Cremona translated Themistius's Commentary on Aristotle's Posterior Analytics from Arabic into Latin some time in the latter half of the twelfth century, but no copy of that translation remains. Cf. Pauly-Wissowa Real-Encyclopaedie (Stuttgart: J.B. Metzlersche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1934), Vol. VA, cols. 1642-1680.

For an indication of the notion to which Averroës referred, cf. Themistius Analyticorum Posteriorum Paraphrasis, I. vi, xxiv, and xxvii. Prantl, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 639-640 and 720-724, also gives adequate citations for identifying the idea.

2. Although Themistius is never mentioned by name in al-Farabi's* Commentary on Aristotle's Topics, there are at least three passages in which an argument is made that could have prompted such a statement by Averroës; cf. Hamidiye Ms., op. cit., folios 90a2-4, 10-17; 91a22-91b16; and 104a15-105a12.

Paragraph (21).

1. Literally, "according to the argument." However, according to para. 12, supra, the discussion in paras. 5-11 was about the form of dia-lectical arguments. The discussion in paras. 13-19 was limited to the matters of dialectical arguments.

2. Cf. supra, para. 3, n. 1, para. 6, n. 2, and para. 7, n. 1. Aristotle was as laconic about the minor premise as he was about the major

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premise. However, if the syllogism cited as an example of those occurring in the first figure is considered ("every body is composed; every composed thing is created; thus, every body is created"), the minor premise would be the premise which has the minor term as its subject and the middle term as its predicate, i.e., "every body is composed." For the syllogism which was cited as an example of those occurring in the second figure (''every body is composed; no eternal entity is composed; thus, no body is eternal"), the minor premise would be the premise which has the minor term as its subject and the middle term as its predicate, i.e., "every body is composed." Finally, for the syllogism which was cited as an example of those occurring in the third figure ("every theoretical science is learned [i.e., acquired by learning]; every theoretical science is a virtue; thus, some virtues are learned [i.e., acquired by learning]"), the minor premise would be the premise having the middle term as its subject and the minor term as its predicate, i.e., "every theoretical science is a virtue."

Averroës defined the minor premise as "the one whose subject is the minor term," a definition which can be valid only for the minor premise of syllogisms occurring in the first and second figures. For example, when he presented the example of the syllogism occurring in the second figure, he identified its minor premise as being universal and affirmative, i.e., "every body is composed." However, when Averroës presented the example of the syllogism occurring in the third figure, he explained that its minor premise could be converted to a particular and thus placed into the third type (mode) of syllogisms occurring in the first figure. If the example that Averroës gave of such a syllogism is considered, it becomes apparent that the minor premise of the previously cited syllogism would be "every theoretical science is a virtue." That this is an accurate interpretation of Averroës's explanation can be shown by converting this premise into a particular so as to make a syllogism representative of those occurring in the third type (mode) of syllogisms of the first figure, according to the necessary component. The new syllogism would be: "Some virtues are theoretical sciences; every theoretical science is learned [i.e., acquired by learning]; thus, some virtues are learned [i.e., acquired by learning]." Cf. Short Commentary on Aristotle's Prior Analytics M. 17b15-16, 21b23, and 23a22-23 with 20a3-6; P. 19a5, 23a17, and 25a9-10 with 21a16-19.

3. Because the problem is composed of a subject and a predicate, to solve a problem requires identifying the correct predicate for a given subject. The other idea is that some problems are pursued for their own sake, while others are pursued because they are related to another, more interesting, problem. Cf. Aristotle Topics 104b1-12 and 101b11-103a5.

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4. In the Topics, Aristotle explained that in addition to mental training, the art of dialectic was useful for engaging in conversations, pursuing the philosophic sciences, and discovering the ultimate bases of each science. His reasoning was that the art of dialectic "is useful for conversations, because, having enumerated the opinions of the majority, we shall be dealing with people on the basis of their own opinions, not of those of others, changing the course of any argument which they appear to us to be using wrongly." Similarly, Aristotle deemed it useful for the philosophic sciences "because if we are able to raise difficulties on both sides, we shall more easily discern both truth and falsehood on every point." The art of dialectic was considered to be useful for discovering the ultimate bases or grounds of each science because of the impossibility of discussing those bases or grounds from the perspective of ''the principles peculiar to the science in question, since the principles are primary in relation to everything else." The art of dialectic would permit one "to deal with them through the generally accepted opinions on each point." Cf. Topics 101a25-101b2.

Because Averroës's Middle Commentary on Aristotle's Topics was not completed until 1168 C.E., whereas this Short Commentary on Aristotle's Topics is thought to have been completed prior to 1159 C.E. (cf. Alonso, op. cit., pp. 55-61 and 77-78), Averroës was clearly not referring to anything he had said in another commentary. What is significant, however, is his silence about the possible use of dialectic for conversations, as well as for the philosophical sciences, and above all his explicit denial of what Aristotle considered to be the fourth use of the art of dialectic, namely, its use with the ultimate bases of each science. Given al-Farabi's * emphasis on the uses that the art of dialectic had for both philosophy and demonstration (cf. Commentary on Aristotle's Topics, Hamidiye Ms., op. cit., folios 88b19-22, 89a26-100a18) and given the emphasis that Averroës placed on the close relationship between dialectic and philosophy earlier in this collection of commentaries and in other writings, such a posture is most striking.

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Notes to the Translation of the Short Commentary on Aristotle's Rhetoric

Invocation

1. The clause "[I beseech] your succor, our Lord" was omitted in the Paris manuscript. Instead, i t reads: "And in Him I place my trust; there is no Lord other than He."

Title

1. Cf. supra, Short Commentary on Aristotle's Topics, para. 1, n. 3.

Paragraph (1)

1. Cf. ibid., para. 2, n. 1. Cf. also Aristotle Posterior Analytics 88b30-89b9.

2. Cf. supra, Short Commentary on Aristotle's Topics, para. 2: "In general, supposition is believing that something exists in a particular kind of way, while it is possible for it to be different than it is believed to be." Cf. also n. 1 of the same paragraph.

Paragraph (2)

1. The word translated here as "inductive investigation" is the term normally translated as "induction" (istiqra' *).

2. Literally, "things from outside." These are the things Aristotle called "non-technical" or "inartificial'' (atechnoi); cf. Rhetoric I. ii. 1355b36-38, and I. xv. 1375a22-1377b12.

3. In Arabic the two words translated here as "public speaking" (al-mukhatabah* al-jumhuriyah*because jumhur means multitude or the many, i.e., the demos. As will be made clear in the sequel, speaking in public usually means speaking to the large body of citizens; therefore, arguments used in such speech must not be too complicated.

4. Aristotle divided rhetoric into three general classes: deliberative, forensic, and epideictic. The use of deliberative rhetoric entails advising others, especially the ruler. Cf. Rhetoric I. iii-iv. 1358a 35-1360b3. Cf. also infra, para. 45, n. 3. With regard to the second example, cf. Aristotle Metaphysics 981a6-13.

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Paragraph (4)

1. Cf. supra, Short Commentary On Aristotle's Topics, para. 11. n. 1 and cf. also infra, paras. 16-25.

Paragraph (5)

1. Cf. supra, Short Commentary on Aristotle's Topics, para. 5 and notes -4.

Paragraph (6)

1. According to Aristotle, at least one of the premises must be universal for a syllogism to be possible. In syllogisms of the first figure, the major premise must be universaleither affirmative or negative. He defined a universal premise as "a statment which applies to all, or to none, of the subject." Cf. Prior Analytics 24a17, 26a16-20, 41a6-41b35. In the Short Commentary on Aristotle's Prior Analytics, Averroës explained that to say that something is universal means that it "exists as a predicate, either possibly or necessarily, for everything characteristic of its subject." Cf. M. 18b6-19a6; P. 20a3-16.

2. Cf. supra, Short Commentary on Aristotle's Topics, para. 6, n. 1.

3. In order to relate the two extreme terms of a syllogism, it is necessary to have a middle term. This is what is meant here by the conjunction. According to Aristotle: "We must take some middle term relating to both, which will link the predications together, if there is to be a syllogism proving the relation of one term to the other." Cf. Prior Analytics 40b37-41a12. Averroës explained that "if there is no conjunction at all between the two premises, then these two do not bring about any conjunction between the predicate and the subject of the problem and thus there is no syllogism at all." Cf. Short Commentary on Aristotle's Prior Analytics M. 17b2-5; P. 18a19-23. A little later, i.e., in the same passage cited in note I of this paragraph, he explained the need to have a universal major premise and an affirmative minor premise in order to effect the conjunction in a syllogism of the first figure. Cf. also Aristotle Prior Analytics 26a16-19, 26a37-26b25.

4. Cf. supra, Short Commentary on Aristotle's Topics, para. 21, n. 1.

5. Cf. ibid., para. 6, n. 4.

6. The statement would not be accurate if the minor premise were also particular. Cf. Prior Analytics 26a3-26b30.

Paragraph (7)

1. Literally, "the controlling premise with regard to the conclusion" (al-muqaddamah al-malikah * fi* al-intaj*), but it is obvious that Averroës

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meant the premise which brings about the conclusion. This is usually the major premise; cf. infra, para. 16 "al-muqaddamah... al-malikah * li al-intaj*."

2. For Aristotle, the second figure occurs "when the same term applies to all of one subject and to none of the other, or to all or none of both," cf. Prior Analytics 26b34-36. Aristotle also said that in this figure the middle term is the one that is predicated of both subjects; cf. ibid., 26b37. Averroës made this latter statement the basis of his definition of the second figure, saying that it is the one in which the middle term is the predicate of the major and the minor extremes. Cf. Short Commentary on Aristotle's Prior Analytics M. 17b23-18al; P. 19a9. Cf. also ibid., M. 21b21-23a11; P. 23a15-25a3.

3. Aristotle explained that the third figure is the one in which "one of the terms applies to all and the other to none of the same subject, or both terms apply to all or none of it"; cf. Prior Analytics 28a10-12. In this figure the middle term is "that of which both the predications are made"; cf. ibid., 28a13. Averroës expressed this last idea in a slightly different way by saying that the third figure is the one in which the middle term "is a subject for the two extremes." Cf. Short Commentary on Aristotle's Prior Analytics M. 18al-2; P. 19a9-10. Cf. also ibid. M. 23a11-24a8; 25a4-26a6. The conclusion of the third figure is not usually stated as a universal.

4. Cf. Aristotle Prior Analytics 27b10-39, 29a15-17.

Paragraph (8)

1. Cf. supra, Short Commentary on Aristotle's Topics, 5, n. 3. The explanation alluded to here occurs within Averroës's exposition of all of the different kinds of conjunctive syllogisms. Cf. Short Commentary on Aristotle's Prior Analytics M. 24a21-26b11, especially 25a11-15; P. 26a15-29a8, especially 27a15-18.

2. Cf. supra, Short Commentary on Aristotle's Topics, para. 5, n. 3. The selected term is the one which is selected as affirmative or negative and from which the affirmation or the negation of the term conditioned by it follows. Cf. Goichon, op. cit., paras. 73, 76, 574, 586, and 611.

3. Cf. supra, Short Commentary on Aristotle's Topics, para. 5, n. 2.

4. According to Averroës, "the first part of the conditional syllogism, which is the cause of something resulting, is called the conditional term (al-muqaddim); the second part, which brings about the result, is called the conditioned term (al-taliy*)." Cf. Short Commentary on Aristotle's Prior Analytics M. 24a17 and margin; P. 26a12-13. The first, or conditional, term of a conditional syllogism would be "if the sun has risen,

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it is daylight." The second, or conditioned, term is what restricts the conditional term and affirms or denies one part of it, e.g., "but the sun has risen." The conclusion of the syllogism is: "therefore, it is daylight." Cf. also Goichon, op. cit., para. 573. Averroës sometimes used muqaddim to speak of the first half of the condition ("if the sun has risen''), while using the talin * to speak of the second half ("it is daylight").

5. Averroës was apparently thinking of the following kind of inaccurate conclusion: "Man exists because animals exist." The first, or conditional, term of this syllogism is: "if man exists." If the second, or conditioned, term ("then animals exist") is selected and the conditional term brought forth as a conclusion, the syllogism is not accurate, e.g., "but animals exist, therefore, man exists." The reason the syllogism must be inaccurate is that the conditioned term has a wider scope than the conditional term. Similarly, if the opposite of the conditional term is selected and the opposite of the conditioned term brought forth as a conclusion, the resulting syllogism is not accurate, e.g., "but man does not exist; therefore, animals do not exist." The inaccuracy of this syllogism is due to the same reason as in the first example: the conditioned term has a wider scope than the conditional term. The same problem occurs in a slightly different manner in the next paragraph.

Paragraph (9)

1. Galen (129-199) was born in Pergamum (now Bergama in western Turkey) and died in Rome. He has long been considered one of the greatest medical writers of Greek antiquity and was reputed among the Arabs as an anatomist, physiologist, practicing physician, and philosopher.

2. Cf. Oeuvres Anatomiques Physiologiques et Médicales de Galien, trans. by Ch. Daremberg (Paris: J.-B. Baillière, 1854-1856), Vol. I, pp. 498-508; Vol. II, pp. 167-171. Although it is not possible to find the direct quotation, many of Galen's remarks and proofs are similar to the way in which Averroës characterized him here.

3. Averroës refuted this very example on logical grounds, without naming Galen, in his explanation of the conjunctive syllogism. Cf. Short Commentary on Aristotle's Prior Analytics M. 24b7-17; P. 26a22-27a4.

Paragraph (11)

1. According to Averroës: "The disjunctive syllogism is the one to which particles of disjunction, like 'or' and 'either,' are attached."

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He also explained that it is composed of opposing considerations and stated: "It is peculiar to the disjunctive syllogism that the conditional term in it is not a conditional term by nature and that the conditioned term is not a conditioned term by nature; rather, it may be possible for the conditional term to convert to a conditioned term and for the conditioned term to convert to a conditional term." Cf. ibid., M. 24a19-20, 26b11-2766; P. 26a14-15, 29a9-30a8. Thus, the disjunctive syllogism has an either/or quality. "Either this number is even, or it is odd." If the selected term "but it is not even'' were omitted, the statement of the conclusion "thus, it is odd" would only raise the problem of how that conclusion might be proven.

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1. Abu * al-Ma`ali* `Abd al-Malik ibn `Abd Allah ibn Yusuf* al-Juwayni*, known as Imam* al-Haramayn*, was born in Bushtanikan*, a village near Nishapur, Iran in 419/1028 and died in the same village in 478/1085. During his lifetime, he taught in Baghdad, Mecca, and Medina. He was especially noted for his work in dialectical theology and for having been the teacher of al-Ghazali* (cf. infra, para. 42, n. 1), but he spent much time as well in the study of Islamic jurisprudence.

2. This book, Kitab* al-Irshad* ila* Qawati`* al-Adillah fi* Usul* al-I`tiqad*, has been edited and partially translated by J.-D. Luciani (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1938).

3. Cf. ibid., Chapter XIX, Section XVII, pp. 215-216 of the translation and pp. 133-135 of the Arabic text. Although Averroës did not quote Abu* al-Ma`ali* literally, he expressed the core of this author's thought very accurately. The divergence from literal quotation permitted Averroës to summarize Abu* al-Ma`ali's* argument.

4. Oxymel (Arabic: sakanjabin*) is a mixture of honey and vinegar. The Arabic word is derived from the two Persian words which describe the elements of the compound: sukar (honey, sugar) and jabin* (vinegar).

Averroës was apparently referring to the fact that if these two liquids are cooked long enough, they will form a hard, chewy substance; thus, a new kind of existence arises from the mixture of the two ingredients.

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1. Literally, "affirmative statement" (al-mujab*).

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1. Cf. supra, Short Commentary on Aristotle's Topics, para. 5, n. 4.

2. This syllogism could be reordered so that it would be suitable for classification with syllogisms of the first figure: "Every man is an animal; every animal is sentient; thus, every man is sentient." However, if it were presented in that manner, it would no longer be a contradictory syllogism.

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1. Cf. supra, para. 4. Note, however, that the earlier definition was actually the definition of "unexamined previously existing opinion." Averroës apparently considered the terms "unexamined opinion" (badi' * al-ra'y), ''unexamined common opinion" (badi'* al-ra'y al-mushtarak), and "unexamined previously existing opinion" (badi'* al-ra'y al-sabiq*) to be equivalent in meaning. Cf. infra, para. 23.

2. Cf. supra Short Commentary on Aristotle's Topics, paras. 3-4, 13-17, and 21.

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1. Literally, "absolutely" (`ala* al-itlaq*).

2. This will be discussed more fully in para. 20, infra. It should be noted, however, that what is identified here as "proof" is the middle term of a syllogism occurring in the first figure; cf. supra, Short Commentary on Aristotle's Topics, para. 6, and Aristotle Prior Analytics 70a11-23. The way in which Averroës has used the term "proof" both here and in para. 20, below, indicates that he was thinking of the term Aristotle called tekmerion, not pistis; cf. Rhetoric I. ii. 14-17, 1357a23-1357b10, II. xx. 1393a20-1394a14, II. xxii. 1395b 27-1397a6; Prior Analytics 70b1-6.

3. This will be discussed more fully in paras. 21-22, infra. It should be noted, however, that what is identified here as "sign" is the middle term of a syllogism occurring in the second or third figure; cf. supra, Short Commentary on Aristotle's Topics, para. 6, n. 3. Cf. also Prior Analytics 70a4-29. The way Averroës has used the term "sign" here corresponds to Aristotle's use of the term semeion; cf. Rhetoric I. ii. 18, 1357b12-28.

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1. To the best of my knowledge Aristotle never used the terms "specious proof" or "doubtful proof" in a technical sense. Averroës

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may have been alluding, however, to some of the examples of fallacious signs cited by Aristotle in the Rhetoric; cf. II. xxiv. 5-11, 1401b7-1402a30.

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1. In order to remain consistent with his previous terminology, Averroës ought to have spoken here of "signs in the third figure." Cf. supra, para. 18 and note the order of paras. 20-21. Nonetheless, the different terminology used here does not appear to suggest any significant change in the argument.

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1. Cf. supra, para. 17: "Thus we say that the premises used in this class of arguments, especially the major premise, are taken here insofar as they are generally accepted according to unexamined common opinion... What is generally accepted according to unexamined previously existing opinion is divided into (a) generally received propositions... and into (b) sense perceptible things..."

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1. Averroës used this example in his Short Commentary on Aristotle's Prior Analytics, but he did not mention Protagoras by name. Cf. ibid., M. 26a14-15; P. 28a22.

The confutation of Protagoras to which Averroës alluded is not as stark as the example suggests. There is an exchange in the Protagoras where Socrates said something similar to what is reported here (cf. 331c-e), but the reference is much more suggestive of the way in which the doctrine of Protagoras is refuted in the Theaetetus. In the course of a discussion with Theodorus (a friend of Protagoras) and Theaetetus (a student of Theodorus), Socrates set out to examine the doctrine of Protagoras that "man is the measure of all things." The relativism to which the doctrine leads was clearly identified and harshly denounced, as were the doctrines which may have given rise to it. Even though Protagoras was dead when the conversation took place, Socrates resurrected him, so to speak, by addressing questions to Theodorus as though he were Protagorasquestions to which Theodorus replied without insisting on his own identity. Some of these exchanges come very close to the example given here. Cf. Theaetetus 167c, 169d-172c, 182c-183b, as well as the exchanges between Socrates and Theaetetus at 151e-154b, 157d-158a, 159c-160e, 164b-d, 165e-168c, 186e-187a. Cf. also Aristotle Metaphysics 999b1-15, 1007b18-

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1011b23, and 1062b13-1063b18; Averroës Tafsir * ma* ba`d al-Tabi`ah*, ed. M. Bouyges (Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1967),238:17-241:13 and 382:10-454:11 (esp. 383:4-14 and 423:1-427:15); and Alfarabi's Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, trans. Muhsin Mahdi (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), p. 54.

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1. Cf. Aristotle Prior Analytics 25b31-26a2, 26b22-33, 29b29-30a14, 32a7-14. Cf. also, Averroës Short Commentary on Aristotle's Prior Analytics, M. 18b6-19a7, 20b13-21b20; P. 20a3-16, 22a11-23a15.

2. Cf. supra, Short Commentary on Aristotle's Topics, para. 8, n. 1 and para. 6, notes 2, 4.

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1. The notion that supposition (zann*) is a species of opinion (ra'y) is evident here. Cf. supra, para. 1, notes 1 and 3. The term "ranks of supposition" refers to the different degrees of conviction an individual might have about the correctness of his supposition. Concerning the limits of sense perception for certainty about universal matters, cf. Aristotle Posterior Analytics 87b28-88a18, 99b15-100b17; Metaphysics 1009b13-17; and Averroës Tafsir* ma* ba`d al-Tabi`ah*, op. cit., 417:14-418:9.

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1. Although the term "dialectical theologian" (mutakallim) originally referred to any Muslim theologian, it later came to have a more specific connotation. Both the term for theology ('ilm al-kalam*) and that for theologian were used to refer to scholastic theology with an atomistic basis, taking its roots from Democritus and Epicurus. It is to this distinction that Averroës was obviously alluding when he said that those authors who wrote about physics in verse could more properly be called dialectical theologians than poets. Just prior to this observation, Averroës had mentioned the name of Empedocles. Cf. Averroës Talkhis* Kitab* Aristutalis* fi* al-Shi`r, Badawi* edition, op. cit., 204:1-10 and Aristotle Poetics 1447b9-23.

2. Partially because of textual difficulties, it is not easy to seize the precise nature of Averroës's criticism. All texts but one read: "The example only provides certainty as a means of guidance and scrutiny." Unfortunately, it has not been possible to locate anything resembling this statement in the few works of Abu* al-Ma`ali* that are now available.

Averroës's criticism of Abu* al-Ma`ali* seems to be based on the argument of the preceding paragraph about the inadequacy of the

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example for acquiring certainty about a universal (cf. also supra, paras. 27 and 29). Because Abu * al-Ma`ali* only partially understood the limits of the example, he failed to account for the role of the syllogism in instruction and in scientific investigation. Averroës had already demonstrated the inadequacy of the induction for scientific investigation (cf. supra, Short Commentary on Aristotle's Topics, paras. 6-11, esp. para. 10) and carefully prepared the way for the role of the syllogism in that task (cf. Short Commentary on Aristotle's Posterior Analytics, end). The larger problem here is how to get at the fundamental principles of each science: since it is not possible to do that by means of the principles peculiar to the science, one must have recourse to reasoning based on probable opinionthe dialectical syllogism; but Abu* al-Ma`ali's* statement has the consequence of eliminating that tool, since neither induction nor example can provide the needed premises. As Averroës pointed out here, that consequence is disastrous for learningunless it is presupposed that the sciences already exist and one has only to select premises as one wishes. Abu* al-Ma`ali's* other major error was forgetting that examples are based on sense perceptions and could not therefore be used to reason about a science whose subject is free from matter, a science like geometry. Cf. also Aristotle Prior Analytics 68b30-37, 69a12-18; and Topics 101a33-101b3.

3. The reference is to the Almagest of Ptolemy. Ptolemy, or Claudius Ptolemaeus, was an astronomer, geographer, and mathematician who lived during the 2nd century C.E. He was born in Greece but passed most of his life in Alexandria, and it was there that he composed his encyclopedic work on astronomy called The Mathematical Collection. This work was translated into Arabic in the 9th century C.E. and came to be known as the Almagest or "the Great." It was widely read and commented on by Arab thinkers.

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1. Averroës apparently considered the enthymeme and the example to be the first and second kinds of persuasive things. Since these have already been discussed, the other eleven are presented here. Cf. al-Farabi* Kitab* al-Khatabah*, op. cit., 69:7-81:11 for a similar enumeration.

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1. If Abu* al-Ma`ali* can be trusted in such matters, Averroës has faithfully presented the traditional view concerning the report. Cf. Kitab* al-Irshad*, op. cit., pp. 345-351 of the translation and pp. 231-236 of the Arabic text.

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1. The term is usually used to designate the more literal traditionalists, i.e., those scholars who specialized in gathering, perfecting, passing on, and studying the deeds and sayings traditionally attributed to the prophet Muhammad *. They influenced Islamic jurisprudence as much as they did Islamic theology. Averroës singled them out for criticism in some of his other writings because of the confusion to which their literalness sometimes led the people in matters of faith; cf. Fasl* al-Maqal*, op. cit., 7:17-8:5 and Kashf, op. cit., 133:4-19 (pagination of Müller edition: 27-28), 134:4-135:8 (Müller pagination: 28-29).

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1. Abu* al-Ma`ali* explained the continuous tradition in much the same way, but he also indicated that the reason for considering the number of people an essential element in making this kind of report more believable is that if it can be believed that these people knew what they were talking about, their number makes it unlikely that they have contrived a false tale. Because those making the report are presumed to have had no previous contact and to be ignorant of what others have reported about the particular event, the agreement of many people about something makes the truth of what they say more likely. Cf. Kitab* al-Irshad*, op. cit., pp. 346-350 of the translation and pp. 232-235 of the Arabic text; cf. also Muhammad* A`la* ibn `Ali* al-Tahanawi*, Kitab* Kashshaf* Istilahat* al-Funun* (A Dictionary of the Technical Terms Used in the Sciences of the Musalmans), ed. M. Wajih*, `Abd al-Haqq*, and Gh. Qadir* (2 vols.; Calcutta: W.N. Lees Press, 1862), Vol. II, pp. 1471-1473.

Throughout this section Averroës has used the term "report" as a general instance of the more specific term "tradition" (hadith*). The tradition was generally considered to be second in authority to the Our'an* and was divided into two basic classes: the hadith* nabawi* and the hadith* qudsi*. The former is either an account of something the prophet Muhammad* said or did, or it affirms his tacit approval of something said or done in his presence. The latter is an account that expresses God's words, that is, not God's exact words, but words expressive of the meaning of His exact words. The continuous tradition would be one kind of hadith* nabawi*. Neither of these classes of traditions is considered to fulfill the conditions permitting it to be accepted as revelation. Nonetheless, well-attested traditions should be accepted as explanations of ambiguous matters.

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Paragrah (38)

1. Literally, "as they are" (`ala * ma* hiy `alaih).

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1. Cf. supra, para. 38, n. 1.

2. Exhaustive reports are considered to be a little less compelling than the continuous tradition and a little more compelling than generally accepted reports (mashhurat*). Cf. al-Tahanawi*, Kitab* Kashshaf* Istilahat* al-Funun*, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 748-749.

3. Literally, "supposed" from "zann*," ''supposition." Cf. supra, Short Commentary on Aristotle's Topics, para. 2, n. 1.

4. Literally, "caused things" (al-musabbabat*).

5. Cf. Aristotle Metaphysics 1025a14-34, 1026a33-1027b16, 1064b 15-1065b4; Averroës Tafsir* ma* ba`d al-Tabi`ah*, op. cit., 693:7-696:10 and 716:10-736:8, esp. 719:15-18, 720:17-721:13, 725:14-17, 726:10-728:16, 734:1-4, and 736:5-8.

Cf. also Maimonides Maqalah* fi* Sina`at* al-Mantiq*, ed. by Mubahat Türker, "Musa* ibn-i Meymun'un* al-Makala fi* Sina`at* al-Mantik*," in Ankara Üniversitesi Dilve Tarih-Cografya* Fakültesi Dergisi, XVIII (1960). p. 55, lines 14-16: "In general, all of the natural things that usually exist are essential; whenever they rarely exist, they are said to be accidentallike someone who digs a foundation and finds money. In general, all chance matters, whether they are things not intended by man or not intended by nonman, are said to be accidental whenever they occur."

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1. According to the strictest teaching of the Metaphysics, there can be no accidental certainty (cf. supra, para. 39, n. 5). Nor did Aristotle ever speak of accidental certainty in Sense and Sensible Objects. To the contrary, he attacked his predecessors and contemporaries in that work for having confused accidental and essential causes; certainty could be attained only about essential causes (cf. Sense and Sensible Objects 437a18-438b16, 441a4-442b27, and 445a16-445b3).

The real issue, then, must be belief which is so strong as to be like certainty and which is due to accidental causes: how does it come about? There is a discussion of accidental causes in On Prophecy in Sleep (462b27-464b19), and it results in casting extensive doubt on the phenomenon of prophecy. Aristotle thought dreams were more

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often to be explained as coincidences than as signs or as causes of something. Since Averroës considered the treatise On Prophecy in Sleep to be part of the book Kitab * al-Hiss* wa al-Mahsus* (Sense and Sensible Objects), he may have been referring to that argument. When he later commented on that collection, he paid careful attention to the question of prophecy in dreams, denying that there was any basic mystery about it. He attributed the phenomenon to the kind of knowledge of causes that arises from a highly developed imaginative faculty. Cf. Averroës Talkhis* Kitab* al-Hiss* wa al-Mahsus* li Aristu* in Aristutalis* fi* al-Nafs, ed. by `Abd al-Rahman* Badawi* (Cairo: Maktabat al-Nahdah* al-Misriyah*, 1954), pp. 224-226.

If Alonso and Gätje are correct in their dating, the commentary on Sense and Sensible Objects was written eleven years after these commentaries (554/1159 versus 565/1170). Consequently, Averroës's reference here would be to Aristotle's work, not his own. Alonso, Gätje, and Wolfson also argue that despite the title of Talkhis* (Middle Commentary), Averroës's book on Sense and Sensible Objects is a Short Commentary (Jawami'*). Cf. Alonso, op. cit., pp. 55-82 and the corroborations from the secondary literature cited by him; Gätje, Die Epitome der Parva Naturalia des Averroes, op. cit., p. v, n. 2 and pp. x-xi, and Wolfson, "Revised Plan for the Publication of a Corpus Commentariorum Averrois in Aristotelem," op. cit., pp. 90-94.

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1. According to different traditions, the Prophet claimed that God would never let the nation of Islam agree about something that could lead them astray. It is in this sense that the Muslims are infallible. However, there is a problem about how to treat a member of the community who disagrees with the consensus which the others have supposedly reached. The problem arises from the difficulties of exactly identifying the consensus of the community on any given issue, particularly on theoretical issues. Averroës discussed this problem more fully in the Decisive Treatise; cf op. cit., 8:15-10:18.

One tradition quotes the Prophet as saying: "Verily, God would not let my nation agree about an error." Another tradition reports a variant of that statement: "Verily, my nation would not agree about an error." In a different tradition, he is reported to have commanded Muslims: "Do not come to agreement about an error." Yet another version quotes the Prophet as praying: "Do not let them agree about an error." Cf. A.J. Wensinck et al., Concordance et Indices de la Tradition Musulmane (7 Vols.; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1936-1969), Vol. I, pp. 97, 364, and 366; Vol. III, p. 517.

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2. Abu * Hamid* Muhammad* ibn Muhammad* al-Tusi* al-Ghazali* (450/1058-505/1111) was born at Tus*, a small town in Khurasan* near the modern city of Meshed, Iran, and, after living in many other parts of the Middle East, returned there at the end of his life. He was a student of Abu* al-Ma`ali* for many years and taught theology in Baghdad and later in Nishapur. The best source for a biographical and intellectual account of al-Ghazali* is his own al-Munqidh Min al-Dalal*, a book which is translated into English as The Deliverance from Error. Of al-Ghazali's* intellectual activities, the most important are his attacks on philosophy and his attempt to reform or renew religious belief and pratice. The attack on philosophy was brilliantly answered by Averroës: to al-Ghazali's* Tahafut* al-Falasifah* (The Incoherence of the Philosophers), Averroës replied with the Tahafut* al-Tahafut* (Incoherence of the Incoherence).

3. This work was written between 493/1099 and 499/1106 and provided a defense of al-Ghazali's* views. He examined the question of interpretation and the extent to which tradition and consensus could be used as a basis for knowledge about religious matters. The central theme in the book is indicated in the title: he wished to determine how atheism could be clearly defined.

The difficulties of identifying the precise date when the book was finished are presented by Father Bouyges. He did think, however, that the book was written after The Balance (cf. infra, para. 43, n. 2) and before the Deliverance from Error; cf. Maurice Bouyges, Essai de Chronologie des Oeuvres de al-Ghazali, edited by Michel Allard (Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1959), pp. 50-51, 57-58, 70-71 and 4-6.

4. The quote is not exact, but Averroës caught the spirit of al-Ghazali's* thought. According to al-Ghazali*, one is not called a heretic for holding different opinions about the "branches" or side issues of Islam, except under special circumstances. The only clear case for deciding that someone is a heretic is his denial of the three roots of Islam, i.e., belief in Allah, his Messenger, and the Last Daybeliefs that Averroës accepted as crucial in the Decisive Treatise, cf. op. cit., 14:13-15:8.

All other questions lead to the charge of heresy only under certain conditions, such as denying the religion passed on by Muhammad* or harming the belief of the common people. Consensus is a very obscure matter that al-Ghazali* preferred to leave for skilled jurists to settle; he even argued that the palpable error of Abu* Bakr al-Farisi* about consensus did not warrant the charge of heresy. Cf. Faysal* al-Tafriqah in al-Qusur* al-`Awali* Min Rasa'il* al-Imam* al-Ghazali* (Cairo: Maktabat

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al-Jundi *, no date), pp. 165:14-17; 166:5, 14-17; 166:18-167:6; 169:16-170:11.

The Munich manuscript has a sentence explaining this citation, but it has been bracketed as though if were not part of the text: "That is because the dialectical theologians disagree about the conditions to be set down about consensus." (Reading "ijma'*" [consensus] for "iqna'*" [persuasion]).

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1. The text reads husn* al-zann*, i.e., literally, "good supposition."

2. This book was written between 493/1099 and 499/1106 but. at any rate, prior to The Distinction between Islam and Atheism; cf. supra, para. 42, note 2 and cf. also M. Bouyges, op. cit., pp. 50-58, 70-71, and 4-6. The Balance is the last of five treatises written by al-Ghazali* against esoteric doctrines.

3. There is no remark in the book which corresponds to this quotation. Moreover, in this treatise, al-Ghazali* never used the term al-jumhur* to refer to the common people; instead he used the term al-`awam*.

Averroës nevertheless summarized the main idea of the latter part of the book, for al-Ghazali* did make a distinction between the way the learned grasped religious notions and the way the common people did. The only mention of "miracle" occurred in a context which would make Averroës's statement appear to be a fair abridgementbut an abridgement, nevertheless. Cf. al-Qistas* al-Mustaqim* in al-Qusur* al-`Awali*, op. cit., pp. 70:9-71:2. Cf. also pp. 59:1-60:9, 68:6-7, 69:11-15. Note the long digression on pp. 68:7-69:11 in which al-Ghazali* examined the question of the extent to which dialectic was of any scientific value.

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1. Epideictic rhetoric is concerned with praise or blame, is usually addressed to mere spectators, and has honor or disgrace as its end. Cf. Aristotle Rhetoric I. iii. 3-5. 1358b4-20 and I. ix. 1366a22-1368b1; cf. also Averroës Talkhis* al-Khatabah*, Badawi* edition, op. cit., pp. 28-31, 71-82.

2. Forensic rhetoric is concerned with accusation or defense, is usually addressed to those who judge things that have taken place, and has justice or injustice as its end. Cf. Aristotle Rhetoric I. iii. 3-5. 1358b4-20 and I. x-xv. 1368b2-1377b10; cf. also Averroës Talkhis* al-Khatabah*, Badawi* edition, op. cit., pp. 28-31, 83-130.

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3. Deliberative rhetoric is concerned with exhorting or dissuading, is usually addressed to judges of things to come (like rulers), and has expediency or harm as its end. Cf. Aristotle Rhetoric I. iii. 3-5. 135864-20 and I. iv-viii. 1359a25-1366a21; cf. also Averroës, Talkhis * al-Khatabah*, Badawi* edition, op. cit., pp. 28-31, 32-71.

4. In the Arabic text, this is the apodosis of the sentence beginning with the words: "When Aristotle became aware..."

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Notes to the Translation of the Short Commentary on Aristotle's Poetics

Invocation

1. In addition to this phrase, the Munich manuscript has the following phrase: "Praise be to God, Lord of both worlds." However, the Paris manuscript has the phrase, "I have recourse to Him and place my trust in Him," in addition to the phrase translated in the text.

Title

1. Although the word aqawil * has often been translated as "arguments" (cf. supra, Short Commentary on Aristotle's Topics, para. 1, n. 3), it seemed more appropriate to translate it as "speeches" in this context.

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1. In the Middle Commentary on Aristotle's Poetics, Averroës gave examples of the particles of simile; cf. Talkhis* Kitab* Aristutalis* fi* al-Shi`r, Badawi* edition, op. cit., pp. 201-202.

2. Substitution (tabdil*) is an Arabic grammatical and poetical term. When an author places a word or letter in place of another he is said to employ "substitution." Examples of substitution are:"the habits of the gentlemen and the gentlemen of habits"; "... the first house set down for mankind was at Bekkah," Qur'an* III. 97, where Bekkah is used in place of Mekkah; "... Oh, God, make me wealthy through need of You, but do not improverish me through belief in sufficient wealth to do without You." Cf. al-Tahanawi*, Kitab* Kashshaf* Istilahat* al-Funun*, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 145-146; Vol. II, pp. 978-989, 1171-1172. Note also the discussion of substitution in Averroës's Middle Commentary on Aristotle's Rhetoric, Badawi edition, op. cit., pp. 204-209. Cf. also Abu* 'Abd Allah Muhammad* al-Khuwarizmi*, Kitab* Mafatih* al-`Ulum*, ed. G. Van Vloten (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1895), p. 73.

In the Middle Commentary on Aristotle's Poetics (op. cit., p. 202), Averroës gave two examples of substitution, one a clause from a Qur'anic* verse and the other the verse of poetry quoted in the next sentence of this text (cf. note 3, infra). The citation from the Qur'an*, occurring in surah XXXIII, verse 6 ("... his wives are their mothers..."),

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is part of a proof of how close the Prophet is to the believersso close that his wives could be their mothers.

It is of some interest that Averroës considered the substitution used in the art of poetics to be more noble than the simile, just as he considered the syllogism used in dialectic to be more noble than the induction and the enthymeme used in rhetoric to be more noble than the example. Cf. Middle Commentary on Aristotle's Topics, Bibliotèca Laurenziana, Florence, Codice Orientale Laurenziano, Ms. CLXXX, 54, fol. 91a14-18.

3. This verse was cited by Averroës in the Middle Commentary on Aristotle's Poetics in exactly the same manner, and the editor of that work presented the complete verse in its correct version: "He is the sea from whichever direction you approach him / for his depth is the good deed, while generosity is his coastline" (huw al-bahr * min 'ayy al-nawahi* ataytah / falujjatuh al-ma`ruf* wa al-jud* sahiluh*). According to the editor, the verse is from a poem by Abu* Tammam*, cf. Middle Commentary on Aristotle's Poetics, Badawi* edition, op. cit., p. 202 and note 2.

4. In the Middle Commentary on Aristotle's Poetics, Averroës also referred to Empedocles, identified him as a natural scientist, and explained that he was a poet only insofar as his arguments were set forth in meters. Averroës then suggested that those who made metered arguments about physical questions deserved to be called dialectical theologians more than they deserved to be called poets. Cf. supra, Short Commentary on Aristotle's Rhetoric, para. 31, note 1 and Middle Commentary on Aristotle's Poetics, Badawi* edition, op. cit., p. 204; cf. also Poetics 1447b18, 1457b24, 1461a24 for Aristotle's references to Empedocles. Empedocles (490-430 B.C.E.) thought that all the structures in the world arose from combinations of four primary substancesfire, air, water, and earthby means of two forces: love and strife. Because he held that these primary substances are never destroyed, but only undergo alterations in their mixture, he denied generation and destruction.

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1. The word translated here as "treatises" is the same word which has been translated as "speeches" and as "arguments" (aqawil*). Because each of the commentaries in this collection has been spoken of in a speech or an argument about a certain subject, Averroës could conclude by speaking of all which preceded as so many speeches or arguments, i.e., aqawil*.

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Epilogue

1. The scribe of the Hebrew translation added a colophon in which he stated: "It is finished and completed, praise be to the Lord of the world. The summary of the Art of Logic was completed, praise be to Him who dwells in a hidden, lofty place, on the third day of the month of Tishri in the year five thousand one hundred and seventeen since the period of creation. It was written for myself, as well as for anyone else who wishes [to read it]Ezra bar Shlomo (may his memory live in the world to come), ben Gratnia of Saragossa (may the name protect them)." The Latin edition adds the following: "Verily, God is on high; it is God who aids and sustains; there is none other than God; praise be to God forever. Amen."

Page 135

Index

The purpose of this index is two-fold. In the first place, it is designed to identify the proper names, titles, and technical terms which occur in these texts and the passages where they occur. Secondly, it is designed to serve as a glossary; for that reason, the Arabic equivalents of the technical terms are given. References are to the paragraphs of the texts presented here.

A. Names and Titles Cited by Averroës

A

Abu * Hamid*, see al-Ghazali*

Abu* al-Ma`ali*, see al-Juwayni*

Abu* Nasr*, see al-Farabi*

Anatomists

Rhetoric, 9

Ancients

Rhetoric, 8, 18, 20, 21, 25, 44

Aristotle

Topics, 21

Rhetoric, 45

Poetics, 4

On Sophistical Refutations

Poetics, 2

Posterior Analytics

Topics, 17

Prior Analytics

Topics, 5

Rhetoric, 8, 29

Sense and Sensible Objects

Rhetoric, 40

Topics

Topics, 21

D

Dialectical Theologians

Rhetoric, 31, 36, 43

Divine Law

Rhetoric, 42

E

Empedocles

Poetics, 2

F

al-Farabi*

Topics, 18, 19

Page 136

Galen

Rhetoric, 9, 33

al-Ghaza1i *

Rhetoric, 42, 43

The Balance

Rhetoric, 43

Distinction between Islam and Atheism

Rhetoric, 42

H

Hashawiyah*

Rhetoric, 36

Hippocrates

Topics. 13

J

al-Juwayni*

Rhetoric, 12, 31

The Spiritual Directive

Rhetoric, 12

M

al-Magest

Rhetoric, 31

Mecca

Rhetoric, 38

Medina

Rhetoric, 38

Muhammad*

Rhetoric, 36, 38

P

Plato

Rhetoric, 24

Prophet, see Muhammad*

Protagoras

Rhetoric, 24

S

Socrates

Rhetoric, 22

T

Themistius

Topics, 19

Page 137

B. Technical Terms Used by Averroës

A

Absolute (itlaq*)

Topics, 16

Rhetoric, 15

Accident (`arad*)

Topics, 4, 10, 15, 16, 18

Rhetoric, 17, 38, 39, 40

Affirmative (mujab*)

Topics, 6

Rhetoric, 6, 7, 13

Analogy (munasabah*)

Rhetoric, 28

Argument (qawl)

Topics, 1, 3, 5, 6, 8, 12, 13, 19, 21

Rhetoric, 2, 3, 7, 8, 10, 12, 14, 17, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 33, 44, 45

Art (sina`ah*)

Topics, 1, 3, 5, 9, 13, 15, 21

Rhetoric, 2, 23, 24, 32, 36, 40, 44, 45

Poetics, 1, 2, 3, 4

Assent (tasdiq*)

Topics, 1, 3, 5, 6, 12, 19

Rhetoric, 1, 24, 32, 33, 37, 38, 39, 45

Poetics, 5

C

Cause (fa`il*, sabab)

Topics, 5, 6, 19

Rhetoric, 2, 6, 7, 18, 19, 36, 39, 40

(`illah)

Topics, 13

Certainty (yaqin*)

Topics, 2, 5, 9, 10, 11, 19

Rhetoric, 30, 31, 38, 29, 40, 44

Challenge (tahaddan*)

Rhetoric, 33, 43

Class (sanf*)

Topics, 5, 13, 15, 18, 19

Rhetoric, 2, 3, 12, 15, 16, 17, 19, 25, 26, 28

Poetics, 2

Concept (tasawwur*)

Topics, 1, 16, 17, 18

Rhetoric, 39

Poetics, 2, 5

Conclusion (natijah*)

Rhetoric, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 13, 16

Conjunction (ittisal*)

Rhetoric, 6, 7, 10

Consensus (ijma`*)

Rhetoric, 33, 42

Consequence (luzum*)

Rhetoric, 8, 14

Convention (wad`*)

Topics, 7

D

Decision, see Judgment

Deduction (istinbat*)

Rhetoric, 9, 36

Page 138

Definition (hadd *)

Topics, 3, 15, 16, 17, 18, 21

Rhetoric, 17, 45

Demonstration (burhan*)

Topics, 2, 3, 10, 11, 18, 19, 21

Rhetoric, 6, 23

Description (sifah*)

Topics, 6, 15, 16, 17

Rhetoric, 23

Dialectic (jadal)

Topics, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 12, 15, 18, 19, 21

Rhetoric, 1, 17, 24, 32

Differentia (fasl*)

Topics, 15, 16, 17, 18

Divine Law (shari`ah*)

Rhetoric, 42

E

Element (istaqis*)

Rhetoric, 12

Ellipsis (idmar*)

Topics, 14

Rhetoric, 7

Enthymeme (damir*)

Rhetoric, 2, 4, 8, 15, 23, 25, 32, 44

Essence (ma* huw, dhat*)

Topics, 10, 11, 16, 18, 19

Rhetoric, 23, 29, 38, 39, 40

Example (mithal*)

Topics, 6, 7, 8, 13

Rhetoric, 2, 7, 9, 12, 19, 26, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 38, 44

F

Figure (shakl)

Topics, 4, 5, 6, 8

Rhetoric, 6, 14, 18, 20, 21, 22, 31

Form (surah*)

Topics, 12

Rhetoric, 4, 5, 7, 11, 15, 25, 33, 38

G

Generally accepted (mashhur*)

Topics, 3, 4, 5, 9, 10, 13, 14, 19, 21

Rhetoric, 16, 17, 24, 44

Generally received (maqbul*)

Topics, 17

Rhetoric, 23

Genus (jins)

Topics, 15, 16, 17, 19, 21

I

Imaginative Representation

Rhetoric, 38

(takhyil*, takhayyul)

Poetics, 1, 4

Indefinite (muhmal)

Topics, 14

Rhetoric, 6, 7, 30

Induction (istiqra'*)

Topics, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 19

Rhetoric, 2, 27, 32

J

Judgment (hukm*)

Topics, 6, 9

Rhetoric, 26, 27, 29, 30

K

Knowledge (ma`rifah)

Topics, 11, 13

Rhetoric, 36

Page 139

L

Likeness (shabih *)

Topics, 13

Rhetoric, 26, 27, 28

Logic (mantiq*)

Topics, 19

M

Matter (maddah)

Topics, 11, 13

Rhetoric, 4, 16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25

Meaning (ma`nan)

Topics, 16

Medicine (tibb*)

Topics, 11, 13

i.e., Drug (dawa'*)

Rhetoric, 2

Metaphor (isti`arah*)

Poetics, 2

Multitude (jumhur*)

Topics, 13

Rhetoric, 5, 24, 36, 45

Poetics, 4

N

Nature (tab`*)

Topics, 7, 18

Rhetoric, 3

Poetics, 5

Negative (salib*)

Topics, 6

Rhetoric, 6, 13

O

Oath (yamin*)

Rhetoric, 2, 33

Opinion (ra'y)

Topics, 3, 10, 13, 21

Rhetoric, 4

Poetics, 4

Unexamined Opinion (badi'* al-ra'y)

Rhetoric, 4, 5, 7, 13, 17, 23, 24, 25, 25, 30

Unexamined Common Opinion

(badi'* al-ra'y al-mushtarak)

Rhetoric, 17

Unexamined Previously Existing

Opinion (badi'* al-ra'y al-sabiq*)

Rhetoric, 4, 17

P

Particular (juz')

Topics, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 14, 19

Rhetoric, 18, 21, 27, 29, 30

Peculiar Characteristic,

see Property

Persuasion (iqna`*)

Topics, 8

Rhetoric, 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 13, 14, 16, 23, 25, 33, 34, 36, 42, 43, 44, 45

Poetics (shi`r)

Poetics, 1, 4

Point of Contention (mawda`* `inad*)

Rhetoric, 6, 7, 8, 10

Predicate (mahmul*)

Topics, 8, 10, 11, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19

Rhetoric, 18, 24, 26, 29

Page 140

Premise (muqaddamah)

Topics, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 11, 13, 14, 18, 19, 21

Rhetoric, 4, 6, 7, 14, 16, 17, 19, 23, 24, 25, 30

Major Premise (muqaddamah kubra *)

Topics, 7, 9

Rhetoric, 6, 7, 16, 17

Minor Premise (muqaddamah sughra*)

Topics, 21

Rhetoric, 6, 7, 16

Presume, see Supposition

Probable (ghalib*)

Topics, 4

Rhetoric, 1

Problem (matlub*)

Topics, 5, 8, 9, 19, 21

Rhetoric, 11, 29

Proof (dalil*)

Rhetoric, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23

(hujjah*)

Rhetoric, 2

Doubtful Proof (mushtabah)

Rhetoric, 20

Specious Proof (ashbah)

Rhetoric, 20

Property (khassah*)

Topics, 2, 15, 16

Proposition (qadiyah*)

Topics, 8, 15

Rhetoric, 17

Q

Quality (ayy shay` huw)

Topics, 16, 17

R

Relation (nisbah)

Topics, 18, 21

Religious Community (millah)

Rhetoric, 36, 42

Report (khabar)

Rhetoric, 35, 36, 37, 39, 40

Exhaustive Report (mustafid*)

Rhetoric, 39

Representation (khayalah*)

Poetics, 2

Rhetoric (khatabah*)

Topics, 2, 9

Rhetoric, 23, 33, 45

(balaghah*)

Topics, 1

Epideictic (unafariy*)

Rhetoric, 45

Deliberative (mushawariy*)

Rhetoric, 45

Forensic (mushajariy*)

Rhetoric, 45

S

Science (`ilm)

Topics, 11, 13

Rhetoric, 31, 40

Scrutiny (tasaffuh*)

Topics, 10

Rhetoric, 2, 30

Sign (`alamah*)

Rhetoric, 18, 21, 23

Simile (tashbih*)

Poetics, 2

Page 141

Sophistry (safsatah *)

Topics, 5

Rhetoric, 23

Poetics, 2

Species, see Specific kind

Specific kind (naw`)

Topics, 5, 6, 15, 16

Rhetoric, 5, 7, 24

Poetics, 3

Speech (qawl)

Rhetoric, 29, 30, 33

Poetics, 1, 2

Subject (mawdu`*)

Topics, 8, 9, 19, 21

Rhetoric, 18, 24, 26, 29

Substance (jawhar)

Topics, 19

Substitution (tabdil*)

Poetics, 2

Supposition (zann*)

Topics, 2, 4, 5

Rhetoric, 1, 4, 30, 39, 40, 43, 44

Statement which is neither

definition nor description (rasm)

Topics, 15

Syllogism (qiyas*)

Topics, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 14, 18, 21

Rhetoric, 1, 4, 5, 9, 11, 12, 15, 16, 23, 29, 31, 32, 36, 38, 39

Poetics, 3

Categorical (hamaliy*)

Topics, 5

Rhetoric, 8

Conditional (shartiy*)

Topics, 5

Rhetoric, 8

Conjunctive (muttasil*)

Rhetoric, 8, (9, 10)

Disjunctive (munfasil*)

Rhetoric, 8, 11, (12, 13)

Contradictory (qiyas* at-khulf)

Topics, 5

Rhetoric, 14

T

Term (tarf*, hadd*)

Topics, 18

Rhetoric, 18

Conditional (muqaddim)

Rhetoric, 8

Conditioned (talin*)

Rhetoric, 8, 10

Major (tarf* a'`zam*)

Topics, 6, 18

Rhetoric, 29

Middle (tarf* awsat*)

Topics, 6, 18

Rhetoric, 29

Minor (tarf* asghar*)

Topics, 6, 7, 18

Rhetoric, 29

Selected (mustathna*)

Rhetoric, 8, 10, 11, 13

Testimony (shahadah*)

Topics, 3, 13

Rhetoric, 2, 33, 35, 36, 37, 40, 42, 44

Topic (mawda`*)

Topics, 21

Page 142

Tradition (sunnab)

Rhetoric, 44

Continuous (matawatar *)

Rhetoric, 37, 39, 40

Recorded (sunnah maktubah*)

Rhetoric, 41

Type (darb*)

Rhetoric, 7, 13

U

Universal (kull)

Topics, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 14, 15

Rhetoric, 6, 7, 17, 18, 21, 27, 29, 30

W

Widespread (dha'i'*)

Topics, 3

Rhetoric, 25

Page 143

Arabic Texts

Page 145

Page 147

Page 149

Page 151

Page 152

et haec est_8EBF1597CF101D2E

topica, altera autem est,

quod non conjectetur eius

_9BCF1597CF101D2E contradictorium

_A01D1597CF101D2E in rebus _A1E71597CF101D2E

_C2EB1597CF101D2F facientium... acquirere

Page 153

Page 154

_147221597CF101D30 et _148D81597CF101D30

Page 155

_193671597CF101D30 aqua _195201597CF101D30

_19CD11597CF101D30 terra _19E941597CF101D30

_1B82E1597CF101D30 fecerimus per _1B9E31597CF101D30

Page 156

_1FE8F1597CF101D31 fuerit _200481597CF101D31

_20D6A1597CF101D31 fit_20F291597CF101D31

perficitur _2132E1597CF101D31

_218D61597CF101D31 fit _21A951597CF101D31

_229541597CF101D31 fit _22B2F1597CF101D31

_233ED1597CF101D31 utile _235A51597CF101D31

_237751597CF101D31 perfectione

Page 157

_23C421597CF101D31 non oportet _23E0B1597CF101D31

_240001597CF101D31 oportet _241C21597CF101D31

_2525E1597CF101D31 ut _2541D1597CF101D31

_260E21597CF101D32 oportet _262A91597CF101D32

_268D61597CF101D32 sentiamus _26A991597CF101D32

_2725D1597CF101D32 indigemus _274251597CF101D32

_2763B1597CF101D32 indigebimus

_278031597CF101D32 facere _279C01597CF101D32

_27DC81597CF101D32 facere _27F8C1597CF101D32

_28F1E1597CF101D32 indiget _290D01597CF101D32

_294E31597CF101D32 diceremus _296A61597CF101D32

Page 158

commendatio studiosorum

_2B8F61597CF101D32 inquirat

_2BC771597CF101D32 illius universalitas _2BE371597CF101D32

_306DE1597CF101D32regionarum _3089D1597CF101D33

Page 159

_330241597CF101D33 amico

_3464A1597CF101D33 inimico

_348161597CF101D33 labores _349E21597CF101D33

Page 160

_368701597CF101D33 signis

_38B5E1597CF101D34 in enuntiatione _38D171597CF101D34

_3A3AC1597CF101D34 latentes_3A5711597CF101D34

Page 161

_3C5AD1597CF101D34 una _3C7621597CF101D34

_3CFC91597CF101D34 attribuitur _3D18B1597CF101D34

_4030B1597CF101D34 significato _404C01597CF101D34

_409831597CF101D34 perfectio enim _40B381597CF101D34

Page 162

_420411597CF101D35 uno _422011597CF101D35

_423E31597CF101D35 accepimus _425A11597CF101D35

_438231597CF101D35 ponamus _439E61597CF101D35

amborarum _43FD01597CF101D35

_443961597CF101D35 propositionibus _445591597CF101D35

_447351597CF101D35 illorarum

_457F51597CF101D35 termini _459B31597CF101D35

_473021597CF101D35 unius _474CF1597CF101D35

_478461597CF101D35 semper _47A071597CF101D35

Page 163

_4A08C1597CF101D36 processerimus

_4A23E1597CF101D36 proportionetur

_4A4011597CF101D36 combinationibus _4A5B31597CF101D36

_4AD841597CF101D36 alterius illorum _4AF441597CF101D36

_4B64E1597CF101D36 ponamus _4B8091597CF101D36

_4CFFE1597CF101D36 servant _4D1CA1597CF101D36

_4DFE71597CF101D36 assimilationis _4E1B21597CF101D36

Page 164

_51FBE1597CF101D36 verborum _521761597CF101D36

nos autem _527FD1597CF101D36

_530491597CF101D36 dicimus

quod _550231597CF101D37

_556D41597CF101D37 putatur in anima

x

Page 165

_574C21597CF101D37 exercitum _576821597CF101D37

_585B81597CF101D37 modum instituit _5877B1597CF101D37

_596981597CF101D37 sicut _5985C1597CF101D37

_5CFA91597CF101D37 et eveniet _5D1661597CF101D37

_5E3E11597CF101D37 dialectica _5E59A1597CF101D37

Page 166

_5F0141597CF101D38 manifestioris _5F1D11597CF101D38

_5FB5C1597CF101D38 propositionibus _5FD201597CF101D38

Page 167

Page 169

x

in librum Rhetorices _6221A1597CF101D38

Page 170

argumentatio- _64A3F1597CF101D38

_6524B1597CF101D38 nes

_66D6D1597CF101D39 nominis

_674EE1597CF101D39 concludunt _676B41597CF101D39

quando sic est, _67A141597CF101D39

_6800E1597CF101D39 concluditur sic

_681CD1597CF101D39 sed _6838E1597CF101D39

_688011597CF101D39 suam materiam _689C01597CF101D39

Page 171

_69DF71597CF101D39 exacta sunt _69FB91597CF101D39

_6A9061597CF101D39 concludunt _6AAC61597CF101D39

negligunt _6B8901597CF101D39

_6D55C1597CF101D39 aut similiter _6D71A1597CF101D3A

_6E54D1597CF101D3A observunt

_705CC1597CF101D3A rhetoricorum _7078F1597CF101D3A

Page 172

suntduae _720D41597CF101D3A

conclusiones universales

_73CC11597CF101D3A rem in conclusione

_73E901597CF101D3A signa

Page 173

_786DF1597CF101D3B coniunctio _7889F1597CF101D3B

_7A04F1597CF101D3B putet _7A2091597CF101D3B

_7CFC31597CF101D3B subtrahemus

Page 174

_8255B1597CF101E0 insinuetur

_8321B1597CF101E0 Abualmaphal _834F21597CF101E0

Page 175

_852D71597CF101E1 ostendemus _854941597CF101E1

Accipiamus itaque _85DB81597CF101E1

_8644D1597CF101E1 ambas

_895011597CF101E1 Notemus _896D01597CF101E1

_89A431597CF101E1 subtrahemus _89C041597CF101E1

Page 176

_8A4C51597CF101E2 Rhetorica _8A6871597CF101E2

_8B6851597CF101E2 omne est animal _8B8591597CF101E2

_8C3871597CF101E2 preamissa

_8C7A41597CF101E2 facta _8C96B1597CF101E2

_8DE601597CF101E3 exactis _8E01B1597CF101E3

et quae non _8ED081597CF101E3

_8F51E1597CF101E3 sint

Page 177

_922921597CF101E3 Signorum

_94DB41597CF101E3 Sicut passiones _94F711597CF101E3

Page 178

Luna auget suum lumen

paulatim secundum luna-

rem figuram ipsa itaque

_97AEF1597CF101E4 (est spherica

_97CAA1597CF101E4 Patienti sit agens _97E6A1597CF101E4

enses et _9B4E81597CF101E4

_9BD2E1597CF101E4 arma

moenia _9C7591597CF101E4

_9CE9F1597CF101E4 suae terrae

Page 179

_9DCD51597CF101E4 ut dicendo _9DE951597CF101E4

utitur _9E5911597CF101E4

_9EE0E1597CF101E4 versutia

_9EFD21597CF101E4 dicendo _9F1901597CF101E4

_9F63A1597CF101E4 percussit _9F7F71597CF101E4

_A0C831597CF101E5 exemplum _A0E451597CF101E5_A0C831597CF101E5

_A172A1597CF101E5 recessit _A18E21597CF101E5

et obviam factus est ei

ipse inimicus: significans

autem injuriam est hic

et superavit suum rivalem

_A27EE1597CF101E5 (actus

et adeo quo successit illi

_A31301597CF101E5 lassitudo

_A47531597CF101E5 primi _A49181597CF101E5

Page 180

_A4B391597CF101E5 dicere

_A53F91597CF101E5 philosophi _A55BB1597CF101E5

_A5DF31597CF101E5 studiosi _A5FB61597CF101E5

_A69681597CF101E5 philosophus _A6B261597CF101E5

_A72AD1597CF101E5 studiosus _A74711597CF101E5

_A87E71597CF101E5 sciamus _A89B51597CF101E5

sicut, exempli gratia _AA6FB1597CF101E5

Page 181

_AC2E31597CF101E6 abjecerunt_AC4A71597CF101E6

Sed utitur illis ex parte

qua cognoscitur unum

illorum medica judicii

inclinatione in initio

_B10F71597CF101E6 judicant_B12C61597CF101E6

_B14A51597CF101E6 (opinionis

Page 182

_B1F211597CF101E6 qui vero_B20EA1597CF101E6

Socrates_B59891597CF101E7

_B5EB41597CF101E7 notes divulgates _B60871597CF101E7

_B67E61597CF101E7 Scitur_B69A91597CF101E7

_B77921597CF101E7 Scitam_B79561597CF101E7

Page 183

_B89E91597CF101E7 enuntiemus_B8BB51597CF101E7

_BB9EF1597CF101E7 quod sunt_BBBB41597CF101E7

Page 184

_C10201597CF101E8 quia_C11EE1597CF101E8

_C2EC11597CF101E8 sit in altero

Page 185

_C561A1597CF101E9solidum

_C64881597CF101E9solidum

_C755B1597CF101E9solidatem_C77241597CF101E9

_C7A101597CF101E9dicenti_C7BDB1597CF101E9

equalitatem_C7DBE1597CF101E9

_C8A861597CF101E9solidum

_C96B21597CF101E9contrarietatem

_C98701597CF101E9 sit_C9A301597CF101E9

_CA3FF1597CF101EAconcludere_CA5C31597CF101EA

_CB39B1597CF101EAsolidiatas

equalitas et_CC1751597CF101EA

_CC60B1597CF101EAsolidum

_CC7C21597CF101EAcaetera

Page 186

_CDF341597CF101EA veritatis_CE1021597CF101EA

_CE3181597CF101EA soliad

_CEFBE1597CF101EAexpertae_CF1821597CF101EA

_D0BFE1597CF101EA praevii apparatus _D0DBC1597CF101EA

_D163E1597CF101EAveritatis_D17FF1597CF101EA

_D1A331597CF101EA imaginati sunt

veritatis de _D1BFD1597CF101EA

_D24341597CF101EAuniversalitate

_D41391597CF101EA advertentiae

Page 187

_D5CD71597CF101EB praevius apparatus_D5E9E1597CF101EB

_D609B1597CF101EB aliquod quod doceatur_D626B1597CF101EB

_D6A3A1597CF101EB affectum_D6BFD1597CF101EB

_D78841597CF101EBsimile et conforme_D7A4F1597CF101EB

_D8E9F1597CF101EBsimile et conforme_D90611597CF101EB

Prout possible est in veri-

ficatione audientis affec-

tus, cogens eius verifica-

_DB98E1597CF101EBtionem

Page 188

_DC56D1597CF101EB purificatio_DC72D1597CF101EB

_DD27E1597CF101ECdolore_DD43F1597CF101EC

_DDECB1597CF101ECdeclivis_DE08B1597CF101EC

_DEA2E1597CF101EC declinare faciat_DEBEC1597CF101EC

et de illis sunt_E08291597CF101EC

_E12E61597CF101EC conciones

_E14A41597CF101EC proclari intellecto_E16551597CF101EC

_E224A1597CF101ECsupplicatio_E24081597CF101EC

_E31B11597CF101EC viri nobilis educationis

_E3CF71597CF101EC fideiussio_E3EB11597CF101EC

_E40CB1597CF101EC utitur_E42881597CF101EC

_E4E8B1597CF101ECperversus_E50481597CF101EC

_E5EA31597CF101ECpignoratio

Page 189

Et de illis est_E6A641597CF101EC

_E6DF41597CF101EC detegat

solitude in eremo et tolle-

rantio laborurn et vita

_E75551597CF101ED monastica

vehemen-_EA8CA1597CF101ED

_EACC51597CF101EDpallescit et erubescit_EAE8F1597CF101ED

tiore gradu istorum, qui

_EB4D81597CF101EDest ipsa attestatio

depravatio sermonum et_EBD041597CF101ED

_EC2231597CF101ED ipsorum declinatio

Page 190

_ED12D1597CF101EDimmorandum_ED2E91597CF101ED

_EED081597CF101EDinvenimus_EEEC91597CF101ED

aut narrant illas quas

viderint, aut narrant quae

radicibus_EF4A71597CF101ED

_EF9201597CF101ED audiverint ab aliis

legis super attestione legis

secta autem, _F0B8D1597CF101EE

_F13551597CF101EEquae Deum cognoscit

Page 191

quando excedit una_F2DA71597CF101EE

in nar-_F2FD11597CF101EE

universitas aliam, et magis

ratione autem et attes

sunt adepti excellentium

_F34DE1597CF101EEtione

_F36A21597CF101EE illius, quod attingerunt

aut difficile foret_F46D41597CF101EE

_F49901597CF101EEvidemus

_F4B5B1597CF101EE illos confundere

_F4D131597CF101EEquod fortificetur_F4ED11597CF101EE

rora_F52551597CF101EE

_F5C741597CF101EEin scriptura sacra

_F63EF1597CF101EEfidei sunt quae_F65BC1597CF101EE

_F6DC61597CF101EEaliquo modo_F6F8B1597CF101EE

Moses principis_F7D631597CF101EE

prophetarum, supraipsum

_F8DA41597CF101EEsit pax

innumerabilis_F8F531597CF101EE

_F92971597CF101EESinai_F94461597CF101EE

_F98C81597CF101EFuniversitas

_F9A901597CF101EF Horeb_F9C4D1597CF101EF

Page 192

rem sen-_FACEA1597CF101EF

_FB9C41597CF101EFsatam

fabricatum_FBB871597CF101EF

_FE3EC1597CF101EFpenetret_FE5A31597CF101EF

_FEF7F1597CF101EF penetrat_FF1361597CF101EF

per imagina-_100F791597CF101EF

_1013131597CF101EF legibus

_1014D91597CF101EF tionem

_101F8B1597CF101EF historiis

Page 193

_10384F1597CF101E10veritasessentialiter_103A141597CF101E10

_103C261597CF101E10historia_103DEA1597CF101E10

_104E9A1597CF101E10 se excederunt

suam_1059F21597CF101E10

_105F421597CF101E10 res divulgate

_1061001597CF101E10causam accidentalem

Et possibile esset quod hic

mumerus esset proportio-

natus et constaret multi-

tudo veri et paucitas sunt

compositae ex combina

_108C511597CF101E10historia_108E161597CF101E10

_1091E41597CF101E10(tionibus

_10AC321597CF101E10 innituntur

_10ADFA1597CF101E10 si esset aliquis numerus

Page 194

_10B2291597CF101E10 legibus_10B3F11597CF101E10

_10B7AB1597CF101E10 Statuorum_10B9731597CF101E10

veritas quae non sint_10BC031597CF101E10

_10C1261597CF101E10necessariae

quo evenit de illis verifi-_10C8F81597CF101E11

catio, est ipsorum consue-

_10D3971597CF101E11 tus usus

_10EEC91597CF101E11 veritas essentialiter_10F0851597CF101E11

_1116AF1597CF101E11 consuetudine_11187C1597CF101E11

_111A961597CF101E11historia_111C601597CF101E11

Page 195

Abulhamadh_1140221597CF101E11

_1145841597CF101E11 autem Algazel

Convenimus etiam per-

suasioni attestionis legis,

decori, et conventioni

_11658C1597CF101E11 Mauros

virorum legalium de ali-

_1167411597CF101E11 Amazonides

_1169091597CF101E11 (qua re ipsius legis

Page 196

Abuhamadh_11EDFE1597CF101E12

_11F4F01597CF101E12 Algazel

_11F6B31597CF101E12 contentiones_11F8741597CF101E12

_11FFB81597CF101E12in differentiis verborum_1201791597CF101E12

_1203561597CF101E12 inscripta circa haec_12050D1597CF101E12

_1207161597CF101E12contentiones_1208D11597CF101E12

_120C8E1597CF101E12 simpliciter

_120E591597CF101E12de_12107D1597CF101E12

_121C7A1597CF101E12 lasso

_121E321597CF101E12 lassi

_121FEE1597CF101E12 scindente_1221A61597CF101E12

promisiones_122E591597CF101E12

_12328E1597CF101E12 loquentes

_1234581597CF101E12 legis

_1245EC1597CF101E13 agens_1247A91597CF101E13

_124F461597CF101E13 veritas_1251221597CF101E13

Rhetorica autem residui_125AFF1597CF101E13

_125CDF1597CF101E13 maxime enormis

_125EA11597CF101E13 huius est nota

_1264751597CF101E13 signa_1266681597CF101E13

Page 197

_1271F81597CF101E13 ignotis esse _1273B81597CF101E13

ignotum_1278FE1597CF101E13

_1282CE1597CF101E13 esse

usi sunt_128DE41597CF101E13

_1293261597CF101E13 prestantia _1294E81597CF101E13

_129AC51597CF101E13 loquentis_129C8A1597CF101E13

_129E811597CF101E13via_12A03A1597CF101E13

_12A9E41597CF101E13 veritatis_12ABAA1597CF101E13

_12B9C91597CF101E13 exquo_12BB901597CF101E13

_12C9DC1597CF101E13 veritate_12CBAA1597CF101E13

oppor -_12DEB21597CF101E13

_12E3B81597CF101E14 judiciis_12E5871597CF101E14

_12E92C1597CF101E14 tunitas

accidit,_12EAFA1597CF101E14

_12F3661597CF101E14disputatio de illis

Page 198

_1311E91597CF101E14 judicium_1313AB1597CF101E14

_1318161597CF101E14 judicialis_1319D81597CF101E14

_132E9D1597CF101E14 quomodo_13305D1597CF101E14

_1332981597CF101E14decernit_13345D1597CF101E14

_13432A1597CF101E14 Quod autem fiant_1344E71597CF101E14

_13521E1597CF101E14 exposuit_1353DB1597CF101E14

_1357881597CF101E14 equitas_13594D1597CF101E14

_135D141597CF101E14 tradendo_135ED11597CF101E14

et iniq_1360ED1597CF101E14uitas_1362B21597CF101E14

demonstrativa_138FD61597CF101E15

Page 199

_13A7A41597CF101E15 suam naturam _13A96E1597CF101E15

Page 201

Page 203

aut fugens enormitatem _13B5711597CF101E15

_13FA391597CF101E15v

_13FFF81597CF101E15 in maiore parte _1401B11597CF101E15

_1409EB1597CF101E16 picturae _140BAB1597CF101E16

_1424E61597CF101E16 intelligitur _1426A31597CF101E16

_1430AB1597CF101E16 rem _14326D1597CF101E16

Page 204

_1437BF1597CF101E16 erat _1439741597CF101E16

_143B781597CF101E16 sumuntur _143D331597CF101E16

duae species _143F3D1597CF101E16

_144A451597CF101E16 assimilat _144BF91597CF101E16

res alicui rei per _145D811597CF101E17

una dictionarum assimi-

_1462AA1597CF101E17 sumuntur _1464561597CF101E17

_1466561597CF101E17 lationis

aut simulacrarum sump- _147FAB1597CF101E17

_1481951597CF101E17 assimilationis _1483431597CF101E17

_14856B1597CF101E17 tuarum

_1487221597CF101E17 maior autem pars _1488E01597CF101E17

_1493331597CF101E17 essentia _1494E91597CF101E17

similitudines sit quando _1499B71597CF101E17

_149BA71597CF101E17 assimilati _149D531597CF101E17

sumutur secundum mo-

_14A4D41597CF101E17dum permutationis

terrae _14A6781597CF101E17

_14AFEF1597CF101E17 sudor est

_14B50B1597CF101E17 industriae _14B6C01597CF101E17

_14BF3C1597CF101E17 sumat _14C0F11597CF101E17

Page 205

_14D1FC1597CF101E17 valet _14D3B41597CF101E17

_14F2BB1597CF101E17 estimat _14F4851597CF101E17

concludendo autem dici- _151BA51597CF101E18

_1524C51597CF101E18 mus quod

_152EC01597CF101E18 instituat _1530831597CF101E18

_153B1E1597CF101E18 necessitatis