Knowing Shakespeare

Senses, Embodiment and Cognition

Edited by Lowell Gallagher
and Shankar Raman

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Knowing Shakespeare

Senses, Embodiment and Cognition

Edited by

Lowell Gallagher

and

Shankar Raman

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Notes on Contributors

Patricia Cahill is Associate Professor of English at Emory University. She is the author of *Unto the Breach: Martial Formations, Historical Trauma, and the Early Modern Stage* (Oxford, 2008) and is currently writing a book on skin and tactility in Renaissance culture.

Mary Thomas Crane is the Thomas F. Rattigan Professor at Boston College. She is the author of *Framing Authority: Sayings, Self, and Society in Sixteenth-Century England* (Princeton, 1993) and *Shakespeare's Brain: Reading with Cognitive Theory* (Princeton, 2000) and of articles on early modern literature, cognition, and science.

Allison K. Deutermann is Assistant Professor of English at Baruch College, City University of New York, specializing in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century literature and culture. She is currently completing a project on hearing, theatrical reception, and genre formation in early modern England.

Lowell Gallagher is Associate Professor of English at the University of California, Los Angeles. He is the author of *Medusa's Gaze: Casuistry and Conscience in the Renaissance* (Stanford) as well as articles on articles on early modern English Catholicism, devotional figuration, and postmodern ethics, and is co-editor, with Frederick S. Roden and Patricia Juliana Smith, of *Catholic Figures, Queer Narratives* (Palgrave).

Diana E. Henderson is a Professor of Literature at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, where she also participates in the Comparative Media Studies and Women and Gender Studies Programs and is MIT's Dean for Curriculum and Faculty Support. She is the author of *Collaborations with the Past: Reshaping Shakespeare Across Time and Media* (Cornell) and *Passion Made Public: Elizabethan Lyric, Gender, Performance* (Illinois). She edited and contributed to *Alternative Shakespeares 3* (Routledge) and Blackwell's *Concise Companion to Shakespeare on Screen*. In addition to teaching and producing numerous scholarly articles, Henderson has worked as a dramaturg and public speaker for college and professional productions, and has been involved in collaborations with the Royal Shakespeare Company and the Actors Shakespeare Project.

Howard Marchitello is Associate Professor and Chair, Department of English, Rutgers University in Camden, NJ, where he teaches courses in Shakespeare, and early modern literature and culture. He has recently completed a new book, entitled *The Machine in the Text: Literature and Science in the Age of Galileo and Shakespeare*.

Sean H. McDowell is an associate professor of English at Seattle University, where he teaches courses in Renaissance literature, creative writing, and film studies. In addition to serving as president of the Andrew Marvell Society, he is also Executive Director of the John Donne Society. His published work on seventeenth-century poets and dramatists has appeared in *John Donne Journal*, *George Herbert Journal*, *Discoveries*, *Seventeenth-Century News*, *ANQ*, *Literature Compass*, and several edited collections. Most recently, he edited a collection of essays on *The Social Character of Andrew Marvell's Imagination*, which was published as volume 35.1 of the journal, *Explorations in Renaissance Culture* (Summer 2009).

Shankar Raman is an associate professor in the Literature Faculty at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is the author of *Framing 'India': The Colonial Imaginary in Early Modern Culture* (Stanford, 2002), as well of articles on a variety of early modern English and European texts and images. His research interests include colonial and postcolonial studies, early modern science and mathematics, and literary theory.

Adam Rzepka is a Ph.D. candidate in English at the University of Chicago and a visiting scholar at the University of California, Berkeley, where he teaches in the Rhetoric and Comparative Literature Departments. His dissertation is titled 'The Production of Experience: Early Modern Theater and the Sensitive Soul'; his other research interests include early modern science, travel and utopian literature, and critical theory.

Bruce R. Smith is Dean's Professor of English and Professor of Theatre at the University of Southern California, A former president of the Shakespeare Association of America, he is the author of eight books, most recently *The Key of Green: Passion and Perception in Renaissance Culture* (2009) and *Phenomenal Shakespeare* (2010). As general editor of the *Cambridge World Shakespeare Encyclopedia*, he is overseeing a two-million-word compendium of knowledge about "Shakespeare's World" and "The World's Shakespeare" that will appear in both print and online formats.

Evelyn Tribble is Donald Collie Chair at the University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand. Her research interests center around early modern culture, distributed cognition, and historical phenomenology. Current projects include *Cognition in the Globe: Memory and Attention in Shakespeare's Theatre* and *Remembering the Word in Early Modern England: Cognitive Ecologies* (both forthcoming from Palgrave).

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L.G. and S.R.

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1

Introduction

Lowell Gallagher and Shankar Raman

> Democritus, after having stated that "in reality there is no white, or black, or bitter or sweet," added: "Poor mind, from the senses you take your arguments, and then want to defeat them? Your victory is your defeat."
>
> Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (1958: 275)

PORTIA. The crow doth sing as sweetly as the lark
When neither is attended, and I think
The nightingale, if she should sing by day
When every goose is cackling, would be thought
No better a musician than the wren.
How many things by season season'd are
To their right praise and true perfection!

The Merchant of Venice, 5.1.102–8.[1]

From the time of Democritus through Shakespeare to Arendt, the proper relationship between the senses and cognition has remained a topic of debate – and an occasion for great art. Both the laughing philosopher and Shakespeare's heroine recognize the impossibility of simply seeing things "as they are." But whereas Democritus wryly concedes the mind's pyrrhic victory in mastering the senses, Portia "seasons" that skepticism with an appreciation of their suasive power. Her nocturnal rumination eschews the pugnacity and poignancy of Democritus's metaphor, enlarging the field of maneuver. Now contingency appears not only in thought's dependence on the vagaries of sense perception, but also in our ability to profit from this mutability. After all, Portia's own "season" in Venice has shown her (and her spectators) how mistaking may produce unanticipated "perfection." She is indeed a "season'd" skeptic, not paralyzed but emboldened by the prospect of double truth in which both thought and senses trade. A wily pupil of Democritus as well as Bellario, the hybrid figure of Portia/Balthasar serves as an apt sentinel to the terrain covered in this book.

Viewing the legacy of Portia's attitude from a Whiggish – though not necessarily for that reason inaccurate – vantage point, we might say that that the radical skepticism of David Hume represents the logical endpoint of early modern discourses on the senses and cognition:

> I may venture to affirm of … mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement. Our eyes cannot turn in their sockets without varying our perceptions. Our thought is still more variable than our sight; and all our other senses and faculties contribute to this change: nor is there any single power of the soul, which remains unalterably the same.
>
> (Hume 1978: 252–3)

Hume's insistence on sense perception as the unmitigable basis for knowledge; his assertion of the vivacity of belief produced by sensory impressions as the ground for rational judgment; his defense of a probabilistic knowledge resting on inductive inferences drawn from *a posteriori* experience of the world: these distinctive features of Humean skepticism can all be traced to the re-envisioning, over the course of the long sixteenth century, of knowledge and the role of the senses in its acquisition.

For Hume, sense-perception is the *sine qua non* of the only kinds of knowledge we are likely to obtain. Not only is the body ultimately nothing more than a "bundle or collection of different perceptions," but its ostensibly higher operations – be they the passions or thoughts – are equally tied to impressions derived from sensory data.

> And were all my perceptions remov'd by death, and cou'd I neither think, nor feel, nor see, nor love, nor hate, after the dissolution of my body, I shou'd be entirely annihilated, nor do I conceive what is further requisite to make me a perfect non-entity. If any one, upon serious and unprejudic'd reflection, thinks he has a different notion of *himself*, I must confess I can reason no longer with him. All I can

> allow him is, that he may be in the right as well as I, and that we are essentially different in this particular. He may, perhaps, perceive something simple and continu'd, which he calls *himself*; tho' I am certain there is no such principle in me.
>
> (Hume 1978: 252)

This refusal to grant the existence of such totalities as a self or body which endures beneath constantly changing sense-perceptions serves as a guiding-post in reconsidering two decades of productive scholarly engagement with the topic of the body in early modern culture.

These labors have led to an ambivalent result. While confirming the body's centrality for the period – as organizing metaphor and material substrate – they have equally sparked awareness that to speak *the* body is already to simplify. Certainly, all bodies are not the same. Taking into account gender, ethnicity, sexuality, and class rightfully acknowledges the need to differentiate among societal bodies. But such distinctions still rely on a body – *any* body – as the natural and elemental unit of analysis, a post-Cartesian stance that privileges dualistic formulations opposing body to mind, soul, world, society, and so on. Granted, there is a long pre-Renaissance tradition of related dualisms, reaching back to Plato and to elements of pre-Socratic thought. But these very oppositions become blurred and challenged at the outset of the humanist project. When Leonardo da Vinci represents man as the measure of all things, it is not his physical body alone that is signified; when Pico della Mirandola describes man as a chameleon, he invokes more than the domain of instrumental rationality.

Looking back upon the early modern period from Hume's perspective allows us to reassemble the body by starting with the senses and the forms of cognition, experience, and discernment they make available. What if we treated embodiment as a constellation of different kinds of sensory and perceptual engagement with the world, rather than as a predicate or object of knowledge and power? What if we think of bodies as sites of an interrelationship among multiple discourses that run diffusely across, over, and around their contours? Pursuing such questions returns us to what a tradition of skeptical philosophy has long grappled with, but is often neglected by scholars. The shift in perspective might allow us to assign the Cartesian understanding of the body its proper place; it would also enable a suppler grasp of the diverse modes of experience and cognition than is afforded by the Cartesian legacy. Such is the impetus behind *Knowing Shakespeare*: it stages the dramas of the early modern senses, as they are disclosed to us within Shakespeare's dramatic oeuvre.

The drama of the senses

That there are indeed such dramas is amply borne out by the wide-ranging arguments developed by our contributors. They reveal in Shakespeare's plays not only deep engagement with distinctive features of early modern phenomenologies, but also tendrils of thought that make him seem our phenomenological contemporary as well. The essays gathered here suggest that Shakespearean drama is underwritten precisely by the *agon* between, on the one hand, received understandings of how the senses produce knowledge and experience, and, on the other, alternative cognitive and emotive frameworks, be these contemporaneous, historically emergent, or merely potential.

The premodern view finds telling expression in Aristotle's enigmatic concept of a "common sensation" (*koinē aisthēsis* or *sensorium commune*) through whose unifying agency the information from the external senses reached the mind.[2] As is well known, the overarching early modern category through which physical sensations were understood was that of the bodily passions, which included the emotions and the perceptions of pain and pleasure. Moreover, as Jean Starobinski reminds us, the category of the passions was internally differentiated: "For a long while, pain and pleasure were not attributed to specific sensory systems … whereas the traditional term, *internal sense* (*sensus internus*), referred to the conscious activities that the mind developed in and of itself (reason, memory and imagination) on the basis of information provided by the *external senses* (sight, hearing, taste, touch and smell)" (1989: 354). Aristotelian common sense thus mediated complex sensory perception as well as the sensation of sensing. But it informed, too, the hermeneutic aspect of sense (where "sense" denotes "meaning"). A trace of this complexity survives in the pun held by the word "sense" – as sensation, signification, and direction.

A number of our contributors unfold the implications of Shakespeare's nuanced evocation of the Aristotelian archive (which broadly includes Hellenistic and Latin developments in medical doctrine and natural philosophy). By deciphering Shakespeare's encodings of the commingled adventures of sense perception and sensory engagement, they show how the plays test the seams of Scholastic faculty psychology (McDowell, Smith); register gains and losses attending the emergence of new scientific paradigms (Crane, Raman, Marchitello); and mediate our own subjective and intersubjective ways of knowing and experiencing the world (Tribble, Cahill). While these chapters emphasize the epistemological dimensions of the senses, they also show how early modern understandings of bodily sensation opened onto the domains of affect, emotion, and social opinion (Smith, Cahill, and Henderson).

Of course, the Aristotelian is not the only relevant body of thought to leave an imprint in Shakespeare's works. Biblical tradition covered a wide range of devotional and mystical idioms that mobilized variously spiritualized senses of sensation.[3] Notably, Shakespeare's religious and poetic cultures remained conversant with Pauline, Augustinian, and Thomist intuitions of the mystical envelope surrounding and penetrating the human sensorium. Paul's vision of a world transformed by the onset of grace; Augustine's eroticized sense of the supersensuous order of creaturely affect induced by the experience of divine love; and the Thomist conception of a permeable boundary between natural and supernatural life: these legacies, though vigorously debated in Reformation and Counter-Reformation strongholds, nonetheless named important branches of the era's *lingua franca* of sensory experience.[4]

A Shakespearean touchstone appears in Bottom's report of his "most rare vision" (*A Midsummer Night's Dream* 4.1.204–5): "The eye of man hath not heard, the ear of man hath not seen, man's hand is not able to taste, his tongue to conceive, nor his heart to report what my dream was" (4.1.211–13). The comic undertow to Bottom's bottomless confusion (as he promises, the dream "hath no bottom") derives mainly from the garbled memory of Paul's messianic transfiguration of sensation's empire:

> "What no eye has seen, nor ear heard,
> Nor the human heart conceived,
> What God has prepared for those who love him" –
> these things God has revealed to us through the Spirit.
> (1 Cor 2.9–10)[5]

Bottom's inadvertent caricature sounds a dissonant echo of the Augustinian and Thomist reflexes noted above, particularly when you consider how the substance of Bottom's "dream" (the sylvan folly with Titania) combines accents of disorienting wonder and pleasure with a subnote of fear at the prospect of unsolicited congress between creaturely and divine realms.

If the joke here is on Bottom, it is not entirely so, because the comedy of Bottom's patchy literacy is "season'd" by the sheer diffusion of senses it conveys – not least the sense that the wonder of his "rare vision" expresses itself through, not despite, the garbled Pauline reference. Tellingly, the term commonly used in modern literary criticism to describe Bottom's transgressive commingling of senses – synesthesia – comes from Romantic and Symbolist poetics rather than the Renaissance rhetorical tradition.[6] But Maurice Merleau-Ponty's *Phenomenology of Perception* raises the intriguing possibility that the Romantic sublime may well owe a silent debt to Bottom's unruly imagination, a debt we continue to forget to pay:

> Synaesthetic perception is the rule, and we are unaware of it only because scientific knowledge shifts the center of gravity of experience, so that we have unlearned how to see, hear, and generally speaking, feel, in order to deduce, from our bodily organization and the world as the physicist conceives it, what we are to see, hear, and feel.
>
> (2002: 229)

That the ways we describe the world shape the ways we experience the world has become a virtual shibboleth for contemporary cultural materialist studies on the senses and the emotions. Consider the currency of the assumption that critical attention to the language of early modern physiology and theology enables an "unlearning" that yields imaginative access to how early modern subjects sensed and felt.[7] This impetus is reflected in a number of the essays collected here as well. They seek to reconstruct what the editors of *Reading the Early Modern Passions* might term the changing "cultural scripts" of early modern sensation, seeing texts less as discrete artifacts awaiting unified interpretation than as force fields or vectors of divergent mechanisms of sense production. Recovering anterior phenomenologies, Gail Paster and others have suggested, demands sustained attention to the "materiality of the passions," which is achieved in part by "literaliz[ing] those locutions that we have long presumed to be figurative" (Paster et al. 2004: 16).[8] Accordingly, textuality is itself redescribed; it turns into a mode of witnessing the sensed and felt conditions enabling changes in culture's grasp of the real.

Yet Bottom's mingle-mangle equally emphasizes the extent to which the letter itself is always already a figure or symbol. If we take him at his word, "it is past the wit of man to say what dream it was." Even as the sensory scripts of early modern experience are only disclosed to us through the letters of their texts, the experiences themselves are literally foreclosed to us – as the litany of negations in Bottom's speech suggests. The passage retrieves, if fleetingly, an essential aspect of the kinesthesia gestured at in the biblical archive: a dynamic and transitory experience that evades the senses even as it builds upon and (re)configures them. It reveals in sense perception itself a necessary relation to what lies outside or beyond the senses – be it the thing itself, the ineffability of the divine, or (as Bottom's paradox shows) the lability of the very sense of sense. His "mistake" provides a window onto Shakespeare's habitual modes of playing and working on the senses to intervene in inherited philosophical and religious understandings of the primordial communicability, as well as the received distinctions, between the sensible and the intelligible, animal and human, flesh and spirit. Our contributors make sense of this persistent dimension in Shakespeare's plays in different ways. On the one hand, this problem occasions other historical turns that detect in Shakespeare a struggle over the nature of *kinesis* or motion (Raman), or that query the very category of experience and how it is made (Rzepka, Deutermann). On the other hand, we are led through and beyond the letter of Shakespeare's texts to their performative actualizations (Cahill, Henderson). Such translations – "Bless thee, Bottom … Thou art translated" – hold out, if obliquely, the promise of realizing in our own sensory affections the imprints of senses past.

Skeptical traditions

The conjunction above of theology, Renaissance Aristotelianism, and Humean empiricism points to a context implicit throughout *Knowing Shakespeare*: the evolution of fideist skeptical thought in early modern Europe. This context furnishes, too, the motive for choosing Shakespeare as focal author. Given the institutional and cultural surroundings for most of our academic labors, the choice does not immediately require special pleading. Shakespeare's canonical position – reaffirmed with ever more generous consequence over the past few decades – has meant that our most vital critical debates are drawn almost ineluctably toward his texts, as their gravitational center. The essays collected here make a more specific case for Shakespeare's importance, by calling attention to the pervasive engagement of his plays with how the sixteenth-century revival of skepticism produced or reconstituted the senses as objects of inquiry and analysis.

To say this is to make explicit an as yet unstated assumption: that the senses have a history. In *The Political Unconscious*, Frederic Jameson clearly intended this assertion as provocative:

> The scandalous idea that the senses have a history is one of the touchstones of our own historicity; if … we still feel that the Greeks, or better still, primitive peoples were very much like ourselves, and

> in particular lived their bodies and their senses in the same way, then we surely have not made much progress in thinking historically.
>
> (1981: 229)

Today, in the wake of a number of excellent studies on the senses and on the emotions, the claim seems far less controversial. Indeed, among scholars, it may well seem more provocative to assert the converse.[9] Nevertheless, it is worth pausing here to consider briefly what it means to assert the historicity of the senses.

For it must be said that the early modern period assumed, as do the essays gathered here, that as biological organs and capacities the senses are largely universal. This assumption holds even for texts that turn a skeptical eye on biology. Sir Walter Raleigh posthumously published *The Skeptic*, for instance, first insists that the nature of things in the world must remain obscure because sensory organs vary from species to species, and from person to person:

> If then one and the very same thing to the eye seem red, to another pale, and white to another: If one and the same thing seem not hot or cold, dry or moist in the same degree to the several creatures which touch it … [then what] they are in their own nature, whether red or white, bitter or sweet, healthful or hurtful, I cannot tell. For why should I presume to proffer my conceit and imagination in affirming that a thing is thus and thus, before the conceit of other living creatures, who may well think it otherwise to them than it doth to me.
>
> (1651: 11–12)

Despite his relativism, Raleigh does not in fact challenge the assumption that the *mode* of functioning of the senses – be it across or within a species – is shared. That certain animals have sharper senses than humans supplies grounds for defending the legitimacy of what they perceive as against what we perceive, but such insight does not qualitatively distinguish between mechanisms of perception.

Michel de Montaigne seems even more extreme, since he is perfectly willing to entertain the notion that there may be more senses than the five apparent to us. “I have my doubts,” he says

> whether man is provided with all the senses of nature. I see many animals that live a complete and perfect life, some without sight, others without hearing; who knows whether we too do not still lack

> one, two, three or many senses? For if any one is lacking, our reason cannot discover its absence. It is the privilege of the senses to be the extreme limit of our perception. There is nothing beyond them that can help us discover them; no, nor can one sense discover the other.
>
> (1965: 444)

Tellingly, Montaigne does not deny that each sense has its "proper effect"; the knowledge of things continues to depend upon the "consultation and concurrence" of the senses, however many there may be (1965: 446). That humans lack, say, the faculty to perceive magnetic attraction – and must necessarily be unaware of their lack – supports a skeptical stance regarding the possibility of complete and certain knowledge; but the concession does not entail doubt as to how the senses work. All human beings are assumed to share, with a greater or lesser sensitivity, roughly the same biological apparatus, even if the precise modes of its functioning remain obscure. No doubt, biology too evolves; however, its evolutionary time-scale is of a different order not only from that of human life-cycles but from that of social cycles as well. From this vantage point, the senses cannot be said to have a history, or at least not one discernible to us as a distinctive narrative, *causa sui*.[10]

If the senses are nonetheless historical, their historicity takes shape precisely in the spacings between selves and things, expressing itself in how we understand the ostensible givenness of the shared biological inheritance mediating between us and what we sense. This interstitial lodging of the senses speaks to what Jean-Luc Nancy calls the fundamental "transimmanence" of sensory experience (1997: 55).[11] Simply put: how we explain how we think, know, and experience our world is both a historical and a historicizing question. After all, any explanation of sense-perception necessarily presupposes that we know what needs to be explained as well as what would count as an adequate explanation. Yet even a cursory comparison reveals the vast difference between, say, late medieval and early enlightenment approaches to such issues. For the scholastic tradition, to explain something meant to specify its cause: by demonstrating why that thing is the kind of thing that it is. Accounting for sense-perception required, then, specifying its constitutive material, efficient, formal, and final causes. Much of this scheme drops out in Hume, who turns causality from an explanatory category into an effect of "constant conjunction." It becomes something like an after-image resulting from the habitual association of external things and sense impressions. The contrast between these divergent explanatory models forces us to consider how we moved from querying the senses in one way to querying them in another, and whether such shifts themselves affect the ways in which we make sense of and in the world. Such shifts call for a history of the senses.

The decision to center this volume on Shakespeare reflects a belief shared by its contributors that his plays centrally engage the reimagining of the senses outlined above. The fictive worlds anatomized on the early modern stage disclose a fundamental characteristic of skeptical reasoning: the renewed attention to sense perception *as* a problem. The context that produced such figures as Montaigne, Bacon, Raleigh, Shakespeare, and Donne was, of course, an overdetermined one. Even beyond the gradual erosion of the authority of Aristotelian thought, the intellectual crisis of the Reformation brought to the fore what Richard Popkin has called the problem of the criterion for religious truth. The Lutheran attack on the Catholic Church anticipated the wave of contentious debates over the related problem of establishing the standard or guarantee for truth about nature, which came to a head in the last decades of the sixteenth century with the revival of Lucretius and Greek skepticism.[12] Correspondingly, natural philosophy examined with new urgency the question of whether human reason and sense perception could provide the criteria for certain and infallible knowledge without the aid of faith. This line of questioning led to the skeptical focus on the separation between things in the world and the perceiving or knowing subject, a gap that thinkers as diverse as Montaigne and Sir Francis Bacon argued was irreducible.

While Montaigne and Bacon develop the implications of skeptical thought in very different directions, their points of departure are similar in crucial respects. To begin with, they insist that the senses are in themselves incapable of providing access to the truth of things. In the "Apology for Raymond Sebond," Montaigne repeatedly emphasizes that the mediation of the senses is far from neutral. On the one hand, they remain the only means of access to knowledge about the world, since man "cannot escape the fact that the senses are the sovereign masters of knowledge" (1965: 447). On the other hand, the dubiety of our senses "makes everything they produce uncertain" (1965: 453–4). Montaigne's eloquent endorsement of this Pyrrhonist position is justly famous:

> there is no existence that is constant, either of our being or of that of objects. And we, and our judgment, and all mortal things go on flowing and rolling unceasingly. Thus nothing certain can be established

> about one thing by another, both the judging and the judged being in continual change and motion.
>
> (1965: 455)

Inscribing temporality into the very heart of things, Montaigne concludes that "there is no knowledge" (1965: 447). Or rather, there is no knowledge *for us*; our mental and physical resources are themselves caught up in the flux and flow of existence and are thus incapable of achieving the fixity that must characterize truth, in its transcendental cast.

The radical skepticism of the "Apology" does nonetheless have a counterpoise: an image of universally valid truth, unattainable though it may be. Truth, Montaigne avers, "must have one face, the same and universal. If man knew any rectitude and justice that had body and real existence, he would not tie it down to the customs of this country or that" (1965: 436). Thus judgments based upon "the faculty of inclining rather to one probability than to another" are compromised: "Either we can judge absolutely, or we absolutely cannot" (1965: 421). Ultimately, Montaigne attacks both reason and the senses in order to establish a dual necessity: of faith to uphold the image of a single truth inaccessible through the rational and sensory instruments we are equipped with; and of custom to provide the forms of action upon which we regularly fall back in the face of uncertainty. The willingness to let accepted practices guide everyday action provides a tempered stability, mitigating our sense of being afloat on an uncertain sea. "And since I am not capable of choosing, I accept other people's choice and stay in the position where God put me. Otherwise I could not keep myself from rolling about incessantly" (1965: 428). Faith and custom are the guardrails we hold on to.

In *The Winter's Tale* the antidote to Leontes' wild misreadings of sensory information, to say nothing of his mad logic, is found in a mode of cognition that comports with Montaigne's upholding of faith and custom (see Tribble). As commentators have noted, the concluding scenes of the play virtually stage a *paragone* among the arts, to which the play's choreography of sensory perceptions contributes.[13] The conversation among the Gentlemen in the penultimate scene is notable for its prosaic paraphrases of reconciliations and meetings that the audience will never see. The subtraction of the visual from the domain of audition is pointed up by the iterated reminder that what we have lost in not seeing exceeds the capacity of ears: "Then you have lost a sight which was to be seen, cannot be spoken of" (5.1.42–3). Or again: "I never heard of such another encounter, which lames report to follow it and undoes description to do it" (5.2.56–8). The force of seeing is instead deferred to the next scene, which discloses "a piece many years in the doing and now newly performed by that rare Italian master, Julio Romano," who "so near to Hermione hath done Hermione that they say one would speak to her and stand in hope of answer" (5.2.95–102). That the piece is a statue rather than a painting only heightens its claim to likeness, the competition between ears and eyes seemingly already decided in the latter's favour: "Every wink of an eye some new grace will be born. Our absence makes us unthrifty to our knowledge. Let us along" (5.2.110–12). Despite its "natural posture" and the muteness it produces in the viewers – "I like your silence" (5.3.21), Paulina says – the statue's "dead likeness" marks yet again the limits of the senses emphasized thus far, since it impels the desire in both Perdita and Leontes for even more intimate contact: to kiss the statue.[14]

What the theater alone can promise, so this scene would intimate, is the s(t)imulation of that constitutive and redemptive excess which marks both the condition of possibility for and the limits of what the senses perceive. Truly to read the letter of the senses, "it is required," as Paulina advises, "you do awake your faith" (5.3.94–5). In such moments, Shakespeare – like Montaigne – overleaps the skeptical abyss to which the senses have led him. Ann Hartle locates a countervailing aspect of Montaigne's *Essays* in the movement of his thought, which "first open[s] us up to the possibility of the strange and the foreign, then lead[s] us back to the familiar and let[s] us see the extraordinary in the ordinary, in the familiar and the common" (2005: 194).[15] The conclusion of *The Winter's Tale* evokes a similar dynamic. Echoing the *Essays* Shakespeare read with such care, his stage itself becomes a series of experiments in the limits and possibilities of skeptical thinking: his imagined worlds variously conceive of the difference between perception and sense "not as an opposition but as a threshold, not as a fixed barrier but as a porous membrane" (Heller-Roazen 2007: 178).[16] The theatrical provocation of the *paragone* assembled in *The Winter's Tale* depends on just such an interface. Even centuries of interpretation have scarcely dulled the impact of the play's final scene. Against an audience's rational deduction that Paulina has squirreled Hermione away for "this wide gap of time" (5.3.154), it counterposes the belief that the statue's coming to life is nonetheless a magic "lawful as eating" (5.3.111). Fickle as they are, our senses uphold both the skeptical refusal of what we see before us and the customary faith that points us beyond our own refusal.

Such a conclusion might appear far removed from the kind of inductive knowledge advocated by Bacon. However, the tendency to see Bacon as a pragmatist interested primarily in an instrumental knowledge of nature has blunted the degree to which he lays out a far-reaching theoretical programme motivated by skeptical concerns akin to those Montaigne voices.[17] Far from advocating a simple return to things in themselves, the preface to *The Great Instauration* insists that "no man can rightly and successfully investigate the nature of anything in the thing itself" (1863a: 31).[18] The weakness of the scientific practices of the day do not therefore derive primarily from the failure to address empirical phenomena or existing things. Rather, "Nobody … can be found who has made [*fecerit*] the proper [*legitimam*] pause upon the things themselves and experience" (1863b: 204).[19] The legal connotations of the adjective *legitimam* as well as the insistence that the lawful kind of pause has to be made (*fecerit*) suggest that Bacon is primarily concerned here with describing the *right way* of remaining with things or dwelling upon experience. For this reason, the Baconian *factum* is not a "mere 'datum of experience.'" As Dennis Desroches has argued, the operative sense of the word is the definition that the *OED* attributes to Bacon himself: "an action cognisable in law." Consequently, "a fact… is not just subject to, but also *determined by*, the discursive arrangements and limits according to which it may be judged, put on trial" (Desroches 2006: 94).[20]

The impossibility of unmediated access to the real leads Bacon grudgingly to acknowledge the potency of Pyrrhonist skepticism, as Montaigne had done before him. "[T]he earlier Greeks," he tells us,

> were more careful to steer a course between a boasting certainty and despairing Acatalepsy; and though more often complaining of the difficulty of enquiry and the obscurity of things, … they still pressed on … and engaged with Nature, thinking … that it is best not to argue that nothing be known, but rather to try and find out.
>
> (1994: 37)

Certainly, Bacon has no patience for those whose labors extend no further than complaining about "the subtlety of Nature, the hidden recesses of truth, the obscurity of things, the tangled skein of causes and the weakness of the human intellect" (1994: 10). Nevertheless, such complaints do express an essential aspect of nature: its hiddenness from us. But this concealment should not be treated as a boundary beyond which the understanding cannot reach; it represents instead an incitement to overgo our apparent limits, "to try and find out." And in this endeavor there is no escaping either our dependence upon the senses or their fallibility:

> The constitution of the universe in its structure is to the contemplating human intellect formed like a labyrinth, where on every side so many ambiguities of way, such deceptive things, such resemblances of signs, natures so oblique and so knotted and entangled, present themselves. And the way is always to be made under the uncertain light of sense, sometimes shining out, sometimes clouded over, through the woods of experience and particular things.[21]
>
> (1863b: 205)

The senses appear here in two guises: as the unreliable light that makes visible a convoluted world of things, and as the cognitive vision of contemplation. The distrust of empirical sight is coupled here with the operation of an intellect that paradoxically models its own contemplative action on vision, that most important of senses.[22]

But unlike Montaigne, Bacon does not take this unavoidable dependence upon the senses to be fatal, for the senses also indicate their own errors – "*Sensum enim fallunt, sed et errores suos indicant*" (1863b: 217) – and can therefore be corrected. The Baconian equivalent to Montaigne's image of a single truth is consequently a faith in knowability, rendered actual via the experiment:

> To the immediate and characteristic perceptions of sense … we do not attribute much; but by them we deduce the thing only inasmuch as the sense judges of the experiment, and the experiment judges of the thing.[23]
>
> (1863b: 218)

Things are disclosed in their essential natures not by the immediacy of sense perception but by modes of inferential and inductive reasoning that operate on sensory data produced in controlled experimental environments. The experimental conditions do not treat nature or things in themselves as the source of knowledge; instead, they disclose the assumptions underlying the appearance of things *qua* things, permitting distortions introduced by those assumptions to be corrected.[24] The experiment provides, in other words, a structure upon which the relationships between the senses and things are staged.

The platform upon which Shakespeare relied to experiment with the senses was the theater, informed by the regulative norms of genre. Whereas

Shakespeare's comedies avert the consequences of failures presented as endemic to the unregulated operation of the senses (see Henderson's reading of *Much Ado*, for instance), the tragedies do not permit the senses to recover from the scrutiny to which they are subject. *Othello* is perhaps the most obvious example, its evocation of "ocular proof" ultimately calling into doubt both ocularity and provability. And yet even in so resolutely skeptical a play we can glimpse the kinds of inferential reasoning Bacon develops to counter the constitutive infirmities of the senses.

Consider the short scene in act 1, where the council discusses the imminent threat of the Turkish fleet on the basis of letters sufficiently "disproportioned" that the Duke can find "no composition in these news / That gives them credit" (1.3.1ff). But the evidentiary discrepancy among these missives does not immediately lead to discounting them entirely, since they all appear to "confirm / A Turkish fleet, and bearing up to Cyprus" (1.3.7–8). As the Duke hesitantly puts it, "I do not so secure me in the error / But the main article I do approve / In fearful sense" (1.3.10–12). A mistrust in the senses is balanced against a trust in the "fearful sense" of what they portend.

The Duke's qualified approval is immediately undermined, however, by a messenger's report that the Turks are heading not for Cyprus but for Rhodes. This news initially pits sense data against rational cognition:

> **1 SENATOR.** This cannot be
> By no assay of reason. 'Tis a pageant
> To keep us in false gaze.
>
> (1.3.17–19)

The clash between visual evidence and reasoned assessment of what sense can be made of it leads to a suspension of belief in what can be seen. Yet the "credit" of seeing is re-established by a further report that the "Ottomites"

> … Steering with due course toward the isle of Rhodes,
> Have there injointed themselves with an after fleet
> … and now they do restem
> Their backward course, bearing with frank appearance
> Their purposes towards Cyprus.
>
> (1.3.34–9)

The Duke sums up the result: "'Tis certain then for Cyprus" (1.3.43). The scene offers *in nuce* an illustration of inferential and deductive procedures that convert unreliable sensory data into operational knowledge. While all doubt has not been banished – the exact size of the fleet is still up in the air – the sifting of sense information against contextual assumptions provided by rational thought allows a trustworthy knowing to emerge. By the end of the scene, the senses remain fallible (we still don't know the correct number), but an accommodation with sense has been reached: the senses were both right and wrong (the ships are indeed headed to Rhodes but that isn't their ultimate destination), as was the cognitive frame that made sense out of the visual data (the ultimate destination was indeed Cyprus but the fleet didn't go to Rhodes in order to keep the Venetians "in false gaze"). At moments such as these, Shakespeare nears the kind of scientific paradigm Bacon is at pains to delineate: skepticism is countered by discovering the right way to dwell upon a labyrinthine world of particulars lit only by the uncertain light of the senses.

Staging the senses

Philosophers, Diogenes Laertius claimed, "may be divided into dogmatists and skeptics."[25] Shakespeare's skepticism, we have been suggesting, attests to the spirit of Diogenes' claim, not least because the plays' skeptical undertow, instead of adhering to a specific philosophical tradition, ranges widely over different registers. If a certain nomadic Pyrrhonism traverses the plays, the currency resides in the plays' intuition of how the senses variously inform perception, convey information, and inflect ways of being in the world – or, more precisely, of being implicated in the phenomenal tissue of the world. In this regard, the Shakespearean drama of the senses discloses the intimate relation between skeptical and phenomenological habits of reasoning.

Though famously associated in philosophical modernism with Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, the so-called phenomenological reduction or *époché*, expressed in the call to return to the things themselves, is rooted in a Pyrrhonian commitment to "hold to phenomena alone" – thus Diogenes' essentially phenomenological account of the skeptic's suspension of judgment and belief in the face of immanent experience.[26] If the senses are fundamental here, however, this is so precisely because their collective agency produces tectonic shifts in the very sense of what may be said to count as fundamental. The affinity of sensory and skeptical intuitions suggests that what is fundamental is not a substrate of the phenomenal world awaiting discovery through rational means (the goal of both Cartesian and Husserlian projects), and neither is it a conjectured preserve of Being divorced from the pulse and rhythm of beings (the goal of Heidegger's ontology). Rather, it is the discovery that "the most important lesson which the reduction teaches us is the impossibility of a complete reduction" (Merleau-Ponty 2007: 61).

The assertion is Maurice Merleau-Ponty's, and it places his existential phenomenology in a trajectory of skeptical suspensions of judgment that includes Montaigne and Hume.[27] In Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of carnal being – with its radical construal of the "flesh" of the world as a network of exchanges between "the sensing and the sensed" (2007: 354) – what warrants being called fundamental is so precisely because it is "bottomless," which is to say, "it is never *with* itself" (2007: 336).

Such transitivity does not preclude rational critique or even a Baconian regulative ideal for converting perceptions into facts. But it does replace the detached, sovereign rationality of a Descartes, for example, with a different, incarnate rationality "precisely proportioned to the experiences in which it is disclosed" (2007: 67). Its attention is trained on the manner in which

> perspectives intersect, perceptions confirm each other, a sense appears. But it must not be posited apart, transformed into absolute Spirit, or into a world in the realist sense. The phenomenological world is not pure being, but the sense which shows through at the intersection of my experiences, and at the intersection of my experiences and those of others, by their engaging each other like gears.
> (2007: 67)

If scientific methodologies – like the "flat projections of a surveyor's plans" (2007: 336) – embrace apodictic evidence susceptible to taxonomic mapping, the skeptic's and phenomenologist's methods seek to describe "the topology of being," replacing notions of "concept, idea, mind, representation" with "*dimensions*, articulation, level, hinges, pivots, configuration" (1968: 224).

Without being determinative, Merleau-Ponty's schemas for this topology are genetically linked to a wide range of critical approaches to embodiment in communication theory, cognitive science, and various strains of materialist critique, including recent turns to historical phenomenology in early modern studies. Among the latter, Bruce R. Smith's pathbreaking inquiry into the soundscapes of Elizabethan England (1999) is especially relevant to the present volume. It invites us to explore the aptitude of historical phenomenology for exposing what Merleau-Ponty would call the "jointures" through which various critical methodologies may be enlisted to describe latent or hitherto undetected qualities or textures – the for us unsensed senses – of early modern experience.[28] Where Smith's argument in *The Acoustic World* asks us to "listen for multiple voices, for competing voices, even for noise" (1999: 26), the essays in *Knowing Shakespeare* push further still, by pointing up how the concert of variously described senses on Shakespeare's stage constitutes the medium of imaginary contact, exchange, and friction between his play-worlds and their critical redescriptions in Shakespeare studies.

In *The Five Senses*, Michel Serres offers an enlarged sense of *skin* to capture the word's critical purchase. He treats this porous membrane as "itself a *sensorium commune*, a sense common to all the senses, forming a link, bridge and passage between them: an ordinary, interconnecting, collective, shared plain" (2008: 70).[29] *Knowing Shakespeare* participates in the ongoing making and remaking of this plain, the zone of contact between us and all the things we mean or sense in speaking of the early modern. It seeks to give critical voice to Shakespeare's intuitive grasp of "skin's" singular ability to register the almost ineffable traces and motions of experience. Such an ecology does not presume seamlessness or totality as precondition or goal. As suggested by Tribble's account of the intersensory "abundance" of touch and its transformative consequences in *The Winter's Tale*, skin puts in play a responsive dynamism attuned to the encroachments and intermittences that soundlessly, invisibly inform the senses' habitual ways of bridging access to an experience of the world.

Analogously, if historical phenomenology mounts a de facto critique of the "objectifying imperative" (Smith 1999: 28) that continues to hold sway in textual studies (and often even when the historicizing mandate is observed), the solvency of that critique depends on yet another implication of Serres's very Shakespearean description of skin's impressionability. By virtue of what it retains – the "remnants or marks of loud, harsh energies" traversing "the invisible side of the visible" (Serres 2008: 71) – "skin" also stands for the ecological relation that obtains among the varied critical senses (i.e. methods and postulates) used to give shape to the perceived presence of the past. The turn to the senses, in other words, reminds us that "presence" is inherently a composite and roving event, whether the scene of the present is imagined in macrohistorical terms (as in "Shakespeare's England") or in recent neuroscientific debates concerning the nature of the relation between neuronal and mental activity. Commenting on the latter topic, Catherine Malabou endorses the proposition that "the formation of each identity is a kind of resilience, in other words, a kind of contradictory construction, a synthesis of memory and forgetting, of constitution and effacement of forms" (Malabou 2008: 77). To this synthesizing activity the essays in *Knowing Shakespeare* add the vectors of experience and identity mobilized by the action – the drama – of the senses.

But why would Shakespeare's theater seem the appropriate venue for disclosing the dramas of the early modern senses? As a way of justifying the choice, we could do worse than turn again to Hume, and his famous metaphor likening the mind to

> a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively make their appearance; pass, re-pass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations. There is properly no *simplicity* in it at one time, nor *identity* in different; whatever natural propension we may have to imagine that simplicity and identity.
>
> (1978: 253)

Following the associational principle so dear to Hume, a reader may be led by this comparison to Enobarbus's memorable description of Cleopatra: "Age cannot wither her, nor custom stale / Her infinite variety" (2.2.234–5). Indeed, the anticipatory echoes of Hume in Shakespeare only grow stronger if we call to mind the central importance of "custom" in Hume's philosophy for producing the regularity and predictability that his image of the mind as a perceptual flux would seem otherwise to evade and undermine.

But Shakespeare was not (always) Hume. As the opening essays of *Knowing Shakespeare* establish, his theater discloses to us what we – post-Humeans – are no longer accustomed to: the sensory experience of a world understood through the fading paradigms of early modern faculty psychology. For the infinite variety of the world – beggaring, like Cleopatra, all description – had also to be managed, ordered, and brought under control, and "custom" was not the only possible means to that end. Faculty psychology proposed a different model: a regulated chain of interactions linking sensations received from without to the so-called internal senses of common sense, imagination, memory (to follow a typical division adopted by the Aristotelian–Galenic tradition). Reading the Scottish tragedy against this backdrop, Sean McDowell's "Macbeth and the Perils of Conjecture" shows how the play externalizes for its audience the internal struggle within Macbeth, a disturbance in the mechanism of conjecture that arises precisely from a "disordering in the relations between one of the internal senses (imagination) and the rational powers (reasoning, understanding, and will)." For Macbeth, conjecture dissolves into sensory solipsism, turning the willful man into a will-less machine and short-circuiting the ethically decisive gap between his immediate registering of sensory impressions and the actions that attend them: "The very firstlings of my heart shall be / The firstlings of my hand" (3.4.163–4). The play attests to the high cost of the slippage from sensitive perception to senseless action.

The persistence of a distinctively early modern phenomenology in the Aristotelian–Galenic tradition is likewise central to Bruce Smith's "Eying and Wording in *Cymbeline*." The modern binary representation of sensory perceptions distorts, Smith argues, an earlier tripartite scheme in which "feeling" intervened between "seeing and naming." In its characteristically meta-theatrical way, *Cymbeline* not only restores the interpretative necessity of "feeling," but conveys what it *feels* like to inhabit a phenomenological paradigm for which feeling was a central cognitive category. The play's repeated separation of the cognitive modes of the visual and the verbal reveals an investment in making listeners and spectators experience the third term that mediates between sight and language: namely, feeling. In this sense, the astonishing recognition scene (5.6) offers its theatrical publics the satisfaction of closure, but only after they have felt "the incongruity [between vision and words] to the absolute limit of possibility." Their pleasure comes from being "touched" by sound and sight.

As Evelyn Tribble's and Patricia Cahill's contributions to this volume make evident, the attention to touch within faculty psychology yields manifold critical consequences, beyond the specific impulse to rehistoricize the Shakespearean stage and the theatrical experiences it offered. The ambiguous place of touch in early modern accounts of the sensorium opens up connections to late twentieth-century developments in phenomenology, notably Maurice Merleau-Ponty's and Jacques Lacan's. As has often been noted, touch was seen as distinctive among the senses. Primary and indispensable, it was for this very reason persistently associated with the bestial in man. Moreover, it was regularly distinguished by two features: first, its organ (the skin) was not localizable to a part of the body, but was rather co-extensive with the body's surface; second, it was seen as fundamentally and inescapably reciprocal in that it involved a double sensation, of touching and being touched.

These complex characteristics make the sensory modalities of touching particularly suitable to represent and produce the intersubjective horizons of early modern selves. Showing the deep resonances between early modern theories of apperception and Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of embodiment, Tribble's reading of *The Winter's Tale* reveals how touch – and, as for Smith, the relationship between touch and sight – posits a model of intersubjectivity and intercorporeality that does not devolve either into identity or into a stable opposition of subject to object. The play's final scene, notably, goes beyond the zero-sum games of self *or* other, original *or* copy, body *or* spirit, insisting instead upon the reciprocity of touch and sight. If the scene begins with an objectified statue that opposes the viewing subject, it ultimately suspends the kind of cognitive mastery associated with visual distance through an intercorporeal diffusion of touching and being touched. Such resolution, however, does not spring from ahistorical speculation or anachronistic bias. As Tribble shows, the conception of touch and its functions in *The Winter's Tale* issues from a profusion of available repertoires of embodiment, including the ceremony of hand-fasting in early modern marriage, religious discourses of idolatry, and still-vital Ovidian literary traditions. As Paster suggests, following Merleau-Ponty, the matter and texture of phenomenological experience can never be properly grasped apart from "the social field's governing beliefs about how the world is constituted" (2004: 8).

In many respects, Cahill's "Falling into Extremity" offers the dialectical inverse of the argument sketched above. If the early modern understanding of the reciprocity of touch can be said to anticipate Merleau-Ponty's ethics of intersubjectivity, such doubleness is equally fitted to convey the vulnerability of the body. In Cahill's argument, touch becomes traumatic. The fugitive phenomenality of touch, as depicted in Christopher Marlowe's "Hero and Leander" and Shakespeare's *King Lear*, engages the problem of representing traumatic experiences that each text "seems unable to know fully and yet unable to avoid" – the single event of the lovers' impending doom in Marlowe's poem and the layered multiplicity of catastrophic events in Shakespeare's play. These evocations of tactility emblematically reproduce the peculiar narrative logic of trauma by indicating how traumatic meanings are held in suspense, deferred, and are only completed retroactively when we re-encounter them in an altered form. Like Tribble, Cahill turns to the distinctive features of early modern discourses on tactility to show how their specific differences paradoxically reveal connections with modern phenomenological paradigms – here, psychoanalytic models of trauma – that mediate our own ways of knowing and experiencing the world. To turn back is also to look forward.

Cognitive reconfigurations

The first four chapters of *Knowing Shakespeare* suggest that Shakespeare's theater may be viewed productively through the lens of Hume's metaphor likening the perceiving mind to a theater. The metaphor's aptness itself derives from a self-reflexiveness peculiar to the Shakespearean stage: its material aptitude for disclosing the perceptions, sensations, impressions and experiences of early modern minds and bodies, and for uncovering the ways in which these anticipate contemporary understandings of how we know and experience our own realities. Nevertheless, as Hume knows, the metaphor has its limits:

> The comparison of the theater must not mislead us. They are the successive perceptions only, that constitute the mind; nor have we the most distant notion of the place where these scenes are represented, or of the materials of which it is composed.
>
> (1978: 253)

Hume's mind is a theater without a stage: the mind *is* simply the successive perceptions that constitute it. There may exist, for all he knows, a site upon which the perceptions are "represented" but there can be no knowledge of such a site – and thus no basis for positing its existence. But what would Shakespeare's theater be without its wooden O?

Perhaps the cipher itself may provide a clue. From the "crooked figure" of the "unworthy scaffold" in *Henry V*'s Prologue, to the "airy nothing" that the poet's pen gives "local habitation and name" (*Midsummer Night's Dream* 5.1.15–17), to the "nothing" that Leontes imagines Bohemia to be (*The Winter's Tale* 1.2.294), Shakespeare's stage persistently engages in its own dismantling. Indeed, that the nothingness of the early modern stage can be so richly productive of sensible and sensuous realities is one of the central – and enabling – paradoxes of Shakespeare's writing for the stage. As we have observed earlier, *A Midsummer Night's Dream* vividly and comically registers this fecundity as a bottomless confusion of the senses. Though certainly no forerunner of Hume's, Bottom's wild thought-experiment nonetheless aptly conveys the radical contingency underlying the constitution of bodies and their appropriate modes of relation. It asks us to imagine a new and hitherto unthought of body, one whose eyes hear, whose ear sees, whose hand tastes.

In such moments, Shakespeare's theater of the mind expresses its own enmeshment in the momentous cultural shift whereby the mind's capacity is taken apart and reconstituted on a different sensory basis. These cognitive transformations form the subject of the chapters by Mary Crane, Shankar Raman, and Howard Marchitello. Crane's "Roman World, Egyptian Earth" reconsiders the binary division that structures Shakespeare's *Antony and Cleopatra* as a cognitive opposition "based in Shakespeare's imaginative engagement with changing theories of the relationship between human sense perception and scientific truth." The Egyptian understanding of "earth," she argues, stands opposed to the Roman "world," and the difference encodes a historical shift from a once-dominant Aristotelian system of elements (central to which was the sensory immersion of self in its material environment) to a proto-scientific and proto-colonial perspective that separates the subject from the natural world, privileging vision as means of both access and control. Aristotelian theories of matter, Crane shows, inflect the play's recurring descriptions of Egypt (and, famously, Cleopatra's language: "I am fire and air, my other elements / I give to baser life"). Underpinning that archive is a basic trust in the reliability of sensory data so that one could "read back" from sensory perceptions to construct an appropriate theory of matter (and sense of the cosmos) aligned with everyday perception.

The resurgence of atomist natural philosophy (spearheaded in England by Thomas Harriot) yielded a different picture. Stressing the gap between observation and theory, atomism separated the "tangible surfaces of the world from their invisible material underpinnings." Rational intervention from without was thereby deemed essential: the proper categorization and naming of surfaces had to be carefully allied with the visual observation of phenomena. The consequent separation of the rational subject from the world is expressed by the language of Shakespeare's Romans, whose fantasies are structured in terms of an absolute imperviousness to the environments in which they live, an imperviousness that in turn allows them to conceive of the world as shaped primarily by human agency. For Crane, the play's ambivalence with regard to the victory of the (Roman) world over the (Egyptian) earth expresses not just a hankering after a lost heroic past but, even more fundamentally, "a nostalgia for a passing theory of the material world … which rendered subject and world deeply interconnected and saturated with meaning."

No volume on the senses and cognition in Shakespeare can afford to miss the rendezvous with *Hamlet*, the playwright's extended meditation on the intersections of epistemology and ontology, knowing and being. Reading *Hamlet* against this cognitive background, the chapters by Raman and Marchitello examine complementary aspects of the transition to scientific modernity. Raman's "Hamlet in Motion" focuses on a broad historical shift in the discourses of the passions or the affects. Early modern treatises on the passions had inherited from antiquity the problem of how to connect internal corporeal events to their external bodily manifestations. This division was reproduced in the Galenic medical tradition's semiotics of the body, which distinguished between a perceptible corporeal change and a hidden one: between, say, the pulse another person can feel and the invisible beating of the heart and arteries. Crucially, what appeared to be a binary opposition between sign and hidden cause was controlled and overcome by a third term: movement. Sign and cause were thus two parts of a single encompassing process. However, as Rüdiger Campe has argued, the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries bore witness to a gradual reduction in the importance of movement, and a concomitant alteration and sharpening of the divide between sign and its internal cause or excitation (Campe 1990: 119–37). Thinkers such as Descartes and Mersenne would not deny that there were movements of the heart, but they refused to grant metaphors of movement any explanatory power. These became mere metaphors, useful only to describe a process, not to account for it.

Hamlet dwells, as Raman puts it, "in the shadow of this lost movement." Through its insistent references to ears and hearing, the play reintroduces the missing terms whose absence virtually drives Hamlet mad: moving, acting, becoming. The play's focus on the ear expresses the precarious idea of movement, whose loss will end up opposing an active and motive soul to a merely mechanical body. In so doing, the ear reveals a different mode of knowing, one tied not to the substantive or to knowledge as a possessed state, but to the verb and the processes through which knowledge is activated.

While Raman locates the sensory crises of *Hamlet* in the breakdown of inherited models of representation, Howard Marchitello's "Artifactual Knowledge in *Hamlet*" explores how the epistemological crises staged by the play also point forward to the so-called scientific revolution of the seventeenth century. He begins by relocating the play's epistemological crises in the "collapse of the perceptual body"; that is, in the play's depiction of the manifest inability of senses to provide the kinds of certainty (the "true avouch," in Horatio's words) that would stabilize knowledge and existence. Against this backdrop, however, the play fitfully enacts "a recuperation … that depends for its success upon a profound recasting of knowledge: no longer understood as the accumulation of meaning that arises naturally from primary perception, this reconstituted knowledge emerges, if at all, rather as the artifact of a deliberate and artificial construction." Concomitantly, the very status of experience is recast, since experience furnished by the senses (despite their intrinsic unreliability) remains the only basis for both knowledge and action. Drawing on recent work in science studies, Marchitello's chapter argues that scientific experiment in the seventeenth century was understood as an "artifactual" knowledge to be achieved through "the controlled production of artificial experience." Such attempts to secure a new way of knowing are epitomized by Hamlet's turn to theater in *The Mousetrap*. Through the play within the play the prince develops a prototype of "that particular practice which would eventually become the very hallmark of science: the experiment."

Theatrical experiences

The concluding chapters in this volume turn a distancing eye upon early modern discourses of the senses, reconsidering the limits of sensory knowledge and experience. In so doing, they shift attention from the representation and deployment of senses within Shakespeare's plays to sensory experiences occasioned by the play as performative event. Indeed, Adam Rzepka's "Rich Eyes and Poor Hands" tackles head-on the very category of "experience" by asking a deceptively simple question: "To what do we appeal when we appeal to experience?" The word itself is usually treated as self-explanatory, despite its palpable ambiguities. Seeking to recover the word's critical potential, Rzepka suggests that contemporary criticism implicitly (and sometimes explicitly) relies on the assumed security of a "contract between historian and historical agent to share experience across time"; experience becomes a way of guaranteeing a bridge between past and present, "an agreement to meet in a comfortable, autonomous space for the re-enactment of the past." But equally pervasive in critical metaphors is the link between "the figure of experience and the figure of the theater" (signaled, for instance, in R. G. Collingwood's use of such terms as "revival" and "re-enactment," or more recently in Bruce Smith's contrast between "immersive experience" and "detached spectatorship"). Historicizing this connection within the context of early modern Protestant and Puritan discourse, Rzepka shows that the religious and the secular spaces of Renaissance literature shared a belief that experience "is not simply had or gained, but *made*." If, as Marchitello argues, *Hamlet* prefigures the soon-to-be dominant form of experience that is the scientific experiment, Rzepka's argument reads Shakespeare's plays as experimenting more generally with the embodied proximities and forms of specular distance that "make" experience, highlighting in the process the early modern theater's role as a radically innovative media technology.

The historical making of experience is followed into the Restoration by Allison Kay Deutermann's reconstruction of the theatrical experiences of one intrepid theater-goer, Samuel Pepys. She takes Pepys's repeated visits to watch Restoration reworkings of *The Tempest* as the occasion to ask what it means to be invited to participate. Shakespeare's play is itself preoccupied with sounds and with hearing, expressing a deep-rooted cultural interest in audition that crucially shapes not only the thinking about the human body and the production of identity but the formation and reception of dramatic genres as well. While often seen as involuntary and corporeally affective, hearing could also be voluntary, communicative of aesthetic discernment. These competing models of hearing became increasing bifurcated in the early modern theater, where each was increasingly associated with a specific dramatic genre. *The Tempest*'s conjoining of revenge tragedy and comedy marks its generic hybridity, but this trait also describes how the play blends competing models of audition to introduce the possibility of a newly collaborative, cooperative theater-going practice. Restoration adaptations of Shakespeare's play by John Dryden, William Davenant, and Thomas Shadwell made this possibility real. In Deutermann's view, Pepys's enthusiastic participation in these theatrical events catalyzes the production of his bodily dispositions. Drawing on seventeenth-century anatomical theory, contests over theatrical audition, and moral philosophy, "Listening to *The Tempest*" locates in changing modes of late seventeenth-century theatrical experience the processes through which someone like Pepys would create a coherent sense of himself as a social and embodied subject.

The final contributor to this volume, Diana Henderson, approaches the complex and mediated making of sensory experience from the perspective afforded by the problematic convergence of the senses in *Much Ado about Nothing*. The crucial role of the interpreter in making sense out of sensory uncertainty has long been recognized as a central principle of Shakespeare's play, but Henderson's reading suggests that that principle has not yet found its proper (and properly paradoxical) place and person: Hero. Against the grain of a critical tradition that has tended to efface this character, "Another Hero?" seeks to recover her force in the play – but to do so means overturning both early modern and contemporary sensory landscapes that share complexly gendered dichotomies such as speech/silence, seeing/hearing, active/passive. Shakespeare's synesthesia, through which "watching and hearing, like seeing and speaking, become enmeshed if not confused," ultimately directs us away "from the world of empirical proof to an almost completely semiotic and symbolic register, in which sound and sense, name and fame, nothing and knowing coalesce." George Steiner has suggested that language gestures beyond itself through the entry into silence, where the "word borders not on radiance or music, but on night." Building on this idea, Henderson shows how the play uses Hero – the figure that represents nothingness, absence, and silence – to enter into the abyss of sensory uncertainty. But rather than dwelling there, its "dark speaking" moves outward again toward a transcendence that awaits its own (always only potential) realization: in performance. Comparing television and film visualizations of *Much Ado* across a twenty-year span, Henderson shows how fitfully the intertextual, symbolic, and gendered dimensions of the play's social world – and of Hero's place in that world – have been addressed. If the play suggests that perception potentially opens on to a domain beyond the empirical realities disclosed by the senses, the history of performance reveals both "the opportunities taken – and missed – to see Hero anew."

Henderson's attention to linguistic instability and to the limits of what can be said reminds us that Shakespeare is also Montaigne's contemporary in his distinctive awareness of the prison-house of language. "I can see why," Montaigne says,

> the Pyrrhonians cannot express their general conception in any manner of speaking; for they would need a new language. Ours is wholly formed of affirmative propositions, which to them are utterly repugnant; so that when they say "I doubt," immediately you have them by the throat to make them admit that at least they know and are sure of this fact, that they doubt. Thus they have been constrained to take refuge in this comparison from medicine, without which their attitude would be inexplicable: when they declare "I do not know" or "I doubt," they say that this proposition carries itself away with the rest, no more nor less than rhubarb, which expels evil humours and carries itself off with them.
>
> (1965: 392–3)

Turning language against itself to create a linguistic and existential uncertainty in which one lingers, refusing the comfort of clarity and certainty of affirmation – these are traits that characterize both Shakespeare and Montaigne.

Such an attitude would not always be held in high regard. Samuel Johnson's withering view of Shakespeare's alleged linguistic promiscuity – "a quibble was to him the fatal *Cleopatra* for which he lost the world, and was content to lose it" – has long stood as a paradigmatic form of literary misrecognition (1965: 274). But to construe, as Dr Johnson does, the penchant for punning word-play as a trait both superfluous and defective is to disown the symptomatic potency of the quibble (and by extension the materiality of language) in Shakespeare's linguistic habits and dramaturgical signature.[30] To put the matter in terms that point up the presiding topic of this volume, Dr Johnson's *bon mot* is instructive precisely for what it forecloses: the range of Shakespeare's investments in staging and sounding the sense(s) of sense. The "world" that Dr Johnson's Shakespeare was content to lose for the sake of a quibble was not one that the playwright would have recognized, and not simply because of the temporal distance and historical drift separating the two. In ways both idiosyncratic yet representative of his era, Shakespeare's understanding of the roles of the senses does not imagine a world set against or apart from language, at least not in the manner that Dr Johnson's critique understands. For the mobility of his language is fundamental to the ways in which Shakespeare's plays participate simultaneously in a number of different ways – from Montaigne to Hume and beyond – of reimagining the senses.

At the same time, Shakespeare's turn to the transcendent, to a "beyond" of the senses and of language, would have been foreign to Hume. Indeed, the sanguinity with which Hume viewed the prospect of his own demise is singularly absent from the tradition to which he was heir. Visiting the "lean" and "ghastly" philosopher on his death bed in July 1776, James Boswell could not contain his "strong curiosity to be satisfied if he [Hume] persisted in disbelieving in a future state even when he had death before his eyes" (1970: 11). Hume answered that "it was possible that a piece of coal put on the fire would not burn; but he added that it was a most unreasonable fancy that we should exist forever" (1970: 11). Upon further prodding, the philosopher insisted that the "thought of his annihilation never gave him any unease … no more than the thought that he had not been" (1970: 12). Famously, this steadfast denial of a world and an existence beyond the senses radically unsettled Boswell, who testifies to feeling

> a degree of horror, mixed with a sort of wild, strange, hurrying recollection of my excellent mother's pious instructions, of Dr Johnson's noble lessons, and of my religious sentiments and affections during the course of my life. I was like a man in sudden danger eagerly seeking his defensive arms.
>
> (1970: 12)

As we have seen, custom functions for Montaigne as a bulwark against the potentially disabling implications of skepticism. It should not surprise us that the very knowledge of the instability of identity and existence lends Montaigne a paradoxical kind of stability: "And now from the knowledge of this mobility of mine I have accidentally engendered in myself a certain constancy of opinions, and have scarcely altered my natural and original ones" (1965: 428). With Hume, however, custom takes on a fundamentally epistemological role, since our knowledge of the things populating the world – including forms of selfhood – has to be built upon its regularities. But custom is itself a product of the repeated actions of the senses: our structures of belief, emotion, and knowledge all rest on the sedimentation of sensory impressions of the world outside us. We do not need anything beyond these to be who we are.

Boswell's horror at such a view suggests that even among his contemporaries Hume's conviction was provocative. Certainly, the thought that there may be nothing other than what the senses offer us, nothing outside the worlds and selves that sensory experience makes, unsettled Shakespeare as well, despite the unflinching gaze with which he contemplated the possibility in his great tragedies. But analytical knowledge and the allure of knowledge possessed in certainty do not constitute the limits of Shakespeare's vision. In his plays he, unlike Hume, remained attuned to a sense beyond the senses. Bottom is, after all, the spokesman for the "not": not-hearing, not-seeing, not-tasting, not-conceiving, not-reporting. In the end, such a vision must be sung: "I will get Peter Quince to write a ballet [ballad] of this dream … and I will sing it in the latter end of a play" (4.1.214–17). Only a final translation into the realms of the aesthetic and the avowedly conjectural, at the very edge of the known, can hope to communicate what eludes even the senses, however reconfigured.

2

Macbeth and the Perils of Conjecture

Sean H. McDowell

> Now entertain conjecture of a time
> When creeping murmur and the pouring dark
> Fills the wide vessel of the universe.
> From camp to camp, through the foul womb of night,
> The hum of either army stilly sounds,
> That the fix'd sentinels almost receive
> The secret whispers of each others' watch.
>
> *Henry V*, Act 4, Chorus 1–7[1]

Thus the Chorus in *Henry V* enjoins audience members to use their imaginations to overcome the daylight pouring into the roofless Globe Theatre and establish in their minds the "creeping murmur and pouring dark" of the eve of Agincourt. The *OED* uses the first three of the lines cited above as an example of sense 3 of "conjecture," the "supposing or putting of an imaginary case" or a "supposition," definitions the editors declare to be "*Obs. rare*." For early moderns, however, the process of conjecturing was neither as stable nor as harmless as this definition implies. The Latin root of the word – *conjectura* – means a "throwing or casting together, a conclusion derived from comparison of facts, an inference … guess, etc." In other words, to conjecture was to attempt to make sense of the jumble of information (facts, sensations, perceptions, beliefs, affections, etc.) within and flooding into the early modern soul-body. Against the safety or assurance implicit in sense 3, "conjecture" in early modern England also suggested divination and "prognostication" (sense 1), the "formation" of unproven opinions (sense 4a), genuine "puzzlement" (sense 4b), and even an "evil surmise or suspicion" (5b). To conjecture, the *OED* would have us believe, was to take interpretative risks.

It should not be surprising, then, that in *Macbeth* (1606), one of Shakespeare's bloodiest tragedies, conjecturing becomes Shakespeare's vehicle for communicating the fault lines in early modern sensation. Every stage of Macbeth's progression from "worthy thane" to malicious tyrant depends on his (and others') flawed conjectures. What does it mean to conjecture in *Macbeth*, a play centrally concerned with epistemology and the imagination? A close examination of the play in the context of the early modern faculty psychology within which Shakespeare and his contemporaries operated reveals that misprisions result not simply from a confounding of the outward senses through external means, but from a disorder in the relations between one of the inward senses (imagination) and the rational powers (understanding and will). This disorder facilitates Macbeth's downfall, and although it occurs *within* Macbeth and is therefore an internal struggle, Shakespeare goes to great lengths to render it accessible to his audience. His specificity of language and his foregrounding of the apparent mechanisms of perception allow us to reconstruct how early modern audiences would have construed the interior processes responsible for Macbeth's conjectures. Our awareness of these interior processes sheds new light, in turn, on critical discussions that have extolled Macbeth's imagination as the inspiration for his poetic expression. Viewed alongside early modern discourses on the passions, Macbeth's exalted imagination can be identified equally as the instigator of his peril.

"What bloody man is that?": 1.2.1

At the start of *Macbeth* – or indeed, of any play, Shakespearean or otherwise – the playwright must communicate the world of the play to audience members, who make inferences about characters and their situations, thereby accepting the dramatic illusion. Interestingly, Duncan's first words in the play – "What bloody man is that?" (line 1) – not only emphasize the bloodiness of medieval Scottish conflict but also highlight the significance of perception and inference: like the audience, Duncan, too, must figure out what the "bleeding Captain"[2] portends. He concludes (because of the wounds) that the soldier seems fit to communicate news from the battle between his own forces and those of the rebels and invaders ("He can report, / As seemeth by his plight, of the revolt / The newest state," lines 1–3). Malcolm, who stands beside or near his father, recognizes the captain as the same person who "fought / Gainst my captivity" (lines 4–5), and so from the beginning, father, son, and all others present are disposed to look favorably on the captain and on the veracity of his report.

From the standpoint of early modern psychology, their decision to accept the captain's report at face value results from a commonly accepted process of sensation involving both external and internal "senses." First, the "bloody man's" appearance stimulates the ocular nerves of those who see him. According to Renaissance psychologists, sight was the highest and most influential of the senses. Robert Burton, for example, in *The Anatomy of Melancholy* (1628) calls it the "most precious" sense and the "best" because it "sees the whole body at once" and because "by it we learn, and discern all things" (2001: 157). Discernment, however, involves more than a simple traffic between the eyes and the mind. In faculty psychology, no cognitive or emotional process is simple. The image of the captain passes from the eyes to the inward senses, or "wits," before traveling to the higher faculties. As Nicholas Coeffeteau explains,

> *As soone as the* Exterior sences, *busied about the* Obiects *which are proper for them, haue gathered the formes of things which come from without, they carry them to the* common sence, *the which receiues them, iudgeth of them, and distinguisheth them; and then to preserue them in the absence of their objects, presents them to the* Imagination, *which hauing gathered them together, to the end she may represent them whensoeuer need shall require, she deliuers them to the custody of the* Memory; *from whence retiring them when occasion requires, she propounds them vnto the* Appetite, *vnder the apparance of things that are pleasing or troublesom, that is to say, vnder the forme of* Good *and* Euill; *and at the same instant the same* formes *enlightened with the* Light *of the* vnderstanding, *and purged from the* sensible *and singular conditions, which they retaine in* Imagination, *and instead of that which they represented of particular things, representing them generall, they become capable to be imbraced by the* vnderstanding ....
>
> (Coeffeteau 1621: 26–7)

While the concupiscible and irascible appetites busily respond to the image, imagination also conveys it to the higher rational powers (understanding and will).[3] There, in the rational soul, the understanding (sometimes called "judgment") measures it against universal principles and reports to the will, which mobilizes the other forces of the soul-body into some form of action or response, if indeed action is required.[4] Early modern psychologists thought the proper functioning of these faculties (and the processes of sensation and conjecture they enact) was reinforced by strong moral education, beneficial habits, healthy organs, and the absence of "*bad inclination*" in the will. According to Coeffeteau, a person deficient in education or in health, or prone to inordinate desires, often "*ouerthrows and peruerts this order*" of faculties, so that

> reason *cannot enioy her* power, & *subiect the* Sensuall Appetite *vnto her; but contrariwise* [the person] *abandons himselfe in prey vnto this disordered* Appetite, *and suffers himselfe to bee transported by his furious* motions [passions]. *So as suddenly when as fantasie offers to the* Appetite, *the* formes *which she receiues from the* Sences, *vnder the shew of* Good *or* Euill; *he without stay to have them iudged by the discourse of* vnderstanding, *and chosen by the* will, *commands of himselfe the mouing* power, & *makes it to act according to his pleasure. And herein consistes the disorder which the* passions *cause in the life of man, which diuert him many times from the lawes of* Reason.
>
> (1621: 29–30)

Quoting this passage, H. James Jensen explains that the "passions, when aroused, distemper the body, causing it to lose its harmony or temper – hence our phrase 'losing one's temper'" (1976: 12). The behavior of those who suffer this loss of harmony becomes erratic or chaotic, truly irrational, a pattern we see repeated throughout Shakespeare's tragedies and indeed throughout early modern English literature, from many of the knights of *The Faerie Queene* to the fallen angels and humans of *Paradise Lost*.

The Scottish nobles listening to the captain exhibit balanced tempers and react in consonance with Coeffeteau's account of normal, undistorted sensation. Duncan, who does not recognize the captain, thinks he can act as a mere conveyer of news. Malcolm, however, remembers him (i.e. his memory informs common sense and the imagination of the previous encounter) and imparts his recognition to the rest of the royal party, who then take this new piece of information (which guarantees the captain's trustworthiness) as evidence of integrity.

Of course, the process described somewhat laboriously above is assumed to occur in seconds – indeed, within the space between Duncan's initial question and Malcolm's observation.[5] I pause to describe it in such detail not to render Renaissance theories of sensation absurdly mechanical, but to emphasize the fact that for early moderns the related processes of sensation and conjecturing depended on a chain of interactions among the faculties comprising the mind, and that accurate perceptions and sound conjectures required a proper ordering of these interactions. In early modern England, as Michael C. Schoenfeldt has argued, it is "the disordered, undisciplined self, subject to a variety of internal and external forces, that is the site of subjugation, and the subject of horror" (1999: 12). The resulting concern for control is true not only of the digestive processes Schoenfeldt analyzes but also of cognition. The length of the chain of intermediaries between the physical world and the rational faculties accounts for the fragility of perception within the Renaissance sensorium. Under ideal conditions, the external senses serve the internal senses, which in turn serve the rational powers and carry out instructions from above. But if any one faculty – and especially the imagination – usurps the power of any of the others, or exerts undue influence, the ensuing psychological disorder corrupts the mind's decision-making abilities, with negative consequences. Shakespearean drama, especially *Macbeth*, may be said to thrive on eruptions of such disorder, and the resultant cognitive breakdown in Macbeth, dramatized with a high degree of precision, causes the thoughts and actions responsible for his tragic decline.

Before we experience the manifestation of disorder in the "brave" thane of Glamis, however, act 1, scene 2 offers us another example of conjecturing through the captain's characterization of Macbeth in battle:

> The mercilous Macdonald –
> Worthy to be a rebel, for to that
> The multiplying villainies of nature
> Do swarm upon him – from the Western Isles
> Of kerns and galloglasses is supplied,
> And fortune on his damnèd quarry smiling
> Showed like a rebel's whore. But all's too weak,
> For brave Macbeth – well he deserves that name! –
> Disdaining fortune, with his brandished steel
> Which smoked with bloody execution,
> Like valour's minion
> Carved out his passage till he faced the slave,
> Which ne'er shook hands nor bade farewell to him
> Till he unseamed him from the nave to th' chops,
> And fixed his head upon our battlements.
>
> (1.2.9–23)

Harry Berger, Jr contends that the captain's language in this description of Macdonald's death is "insistently self-preferring, that it compels the king's attention, indeed respect, as much for the quality of its narrative as for its substance" (1980: 6). This language also compels Duncan's conjectures and begins to construct the contrast we will see between the "good" characters' version of Macbeth and his true unstable nature. Gratified by what he hears, Duncan responds, "O valiant cousin, worthy gentleman!" (1.2.24). Later, referring to the recently executed thane of Cawdor, Duncan remarks, "There's no art / To find the mind's construction in the face" (1.4.11–12). As a presumably wise king, he realizes the danger of misleading appearances. Indeed, Duncan here voices a suspicion regarding the semiotics of physiognomy to which Shakespeare consistently returns in his plays, and which modern interpreters note as an implicit critique of the Renaissance theory of the face – or the body more generally – as window to the soul. As Michael Torrey explains, *Richard III*, for instance, depends on the inherent ambivalence of physiognomy, in that Richard masterfully exploits the significations of his deformed body to further his malevolent ends. "The audience is never uncertain about what Richard is and represents," Torrey writes,

> but the audience does see that some characters are uncertain about him, that his appearance fails to signify as consistently for these characters as it does for them. Watching such characters be deceived, the audience sees physiognomy fail, and in seeing it fail, the audience is consequently encouraged to ask whether physical appearances reveal anything at all.
>
> (2000: 148–9)

The failure of interpreting physiognomy can seem almost comical in *Richard III*, a phenomenon exploited by Laurence Olivier in his 1955 film production, in which Richard, moving from room to room, shows the audience how easily the false appearances he constructs deceive the other characters. At the beginning of *Macbeth*, however, Shakespeare does not so much exploit the unreliability of bodily significations as he delves into the *process* of their interpretation. It is enough for him simply to have Duncan articulate as a general principle the lack of a definitive art of mind-reading through the face. Despite his general suspicions about the unreliability of perception, Duncan quickly attributes the best of motives to Macbeth when he hears the captain's account of Macbeth's bloody rampage across the battlefield. Indeed, the play so far confirms his trust in "valour's minion," who bravely defends the monarchy from invaders and traitors. Prior to the battle, we are led to believe, Macbeth never acted disloyally to Duncan and never wanted in courage when dealing with Duncan's enemies.

By contrast, one of my students in a recent undergraduate course likened the persona described in this passage to Arnold Schwarzenegger's "Terminator" in the 1984 film of that name; she questioned whether Macbeth's violence here might foreshadow his future murderous acts. To what extent, she wondered, are the seeds of Macbeth's later bloodlust sown here, even in the captain's admiring report? Anyone familiar with the film can see what she means: Macbeth charges single-mindedly and "with bloody execution" through the fray until he reaches his target, whom he cleaves and decapitates. Later in the play, he assassinates presumed threats with a similar single-mindedness. Indeed, it is tempting to attribute to Duncan a certain naïveté in his disregard of the potential for Macbeth's betrayal. Yet to assume that the extremity of Macbeth's violence on the battlefield should trigger suspicion in Duncan, or in any of the captain's auditors, would be to ignore the utter normalcy of violence in this world. To the captain and the others, as Berger explains, Macbeth's "ferocity is the mark of manliness and value, and it is warranted by the vicious weakness that makes Macdonald 'worthy to be a rebel'" (1980: 8). Additionally, and perhaps more importantly, such an assumption would obscure the psychological implications of the scene. Duncan's joyful reaction to the report suggests, in context, that his faculties are *balanced*. At this point in the play, none of the "good" characters has reason to experience the kind of paranoia that later haunts Macbeth; they feel no strong negative passions, like hate or terror; and their imaginations do not plague them with the damaging suspicions (i.e. conjectures as "evil surmises") that would inspire such negative passions. They cannot imagine Macbeth acting dishonorably because their imaginations observe the dictates of reason. They conjecture rightly.

Further confirmation of the proper use of conjecture comes later in the scene, after the revelation of Macbeth's heroism. When Ross enters to report the Scottish victory, Lennox exclaims, "What haste looks through his eyes! So should he look / That seems to speak things strange" (1.2.46–7). Lennox draws the audience's attention both to Ross's hurried appearance and to the "strange" tidings it signifies. His conjecture proves accurate – Ross brings wondrous tidings of the Scottish victory – once again demonstrating that one can discern a person's inward disposition through an acute reading of bodily disposition, provided the observer himself or herself maintains the proper internal hierarchy of the powers of reason over the inward wits of the sensible soul. A balanced mind allows for a balanced perception of the world, as well as for balanced conjectures about that world.

By offering three instances of characters conjecturing, act 1.2 reinforces the idea that the world of the play requires constant, vigilant interpretation, ideally by characters whose faculties operate as God intended them to. While Duncan's trust of Macbeth eventually proves deadly for him, thereby disproving his conjectures about the strength of Macbeth's loyalty, the scene nonetheless depicts the normative operation of conjecture even as it suggests its implicit dangers. As we quickly discover in Macbeth's first contact with the witches, however, Macbeth's own internal faculties fail to operate in as balanced a fashion as Duncan's, Malcolm's, or Lennox's.

"Stay, you imperfect speakers, tell me more": 1.3.68

The following scene counterpoints act 1, scene 2 by foregrounding Macbeth's psychological *im*balance. Just as the aforementioned characters were confronted with figures they had to interpret (the bloody captain and Ross's face), so, too, must Macbeth and Banquo conjecture about the status and meaning of the three witches and their eerily suggestive pronouncements. Their reactions to these "withered" women differ. Moments after their appearance, Macbeth enjoins them to speak ("Speak, if you can. What are you?": 1.3.45) and the command empowers them to provide additional sensory information for the faculties of his soul to interpret. But are they able to supply what Macbeth seeks – collaboration in conjecturing rightly, based on Macbeth's experiences and inclinations?

Immediately upon hearing the witches prophesize that he will become both thane of Cawdor and king of Scotland, Macbeth "starts," indicating that their words have had a strong physiological effect on him. "Good sir," Banquo asks, "why do you start and seem to fear / Things that do sound so fair?" (1.2.49–50). A few lines later, Banquo reports that the witches' "present grace and great prediction" have caused his companion to become "rapt withal" (53–5). Macbeth's momentary speechlessness calls to mind the disjunction Bruce Smith elsewhere in this volume finds between the visual and the verbal in early modern sensation: while eying the witches in the aftermath of their words, Macbeth loses his own considerable powers of speech, a loss which would have sounded a warning to members of Shakespeare's original audiences.

Banquo's own reaction to the witches is less passionate. "As a realist whose imagination, unlike Macbeth's, has yet no seed of treason or evil," Richard J. Jaarsma writes, Banquo "is able to challenge the Witches in good conscience" (1967: 89).[6] While Banquo, after his initial shock at their appearance, seems at ease with the witches in his discourse with them (he will neither “beg nor fear” their “favours nor [their] hate”: 1.3.58–9), one has the impression that they have made public some of Macbeth’s secret fantasies about greater glory, which accounts for some, but not all, of Macbeth’s disquiet. Banquo also may have aspired to greater social heights, but if so, never as strongly as Macbeth. Already, within a few lines, the minds and motivations of both characters appear very different.

Students of the tragedy have long noted that ambition is Macbeth’s Achilles’ heel.[7] Indeed, A. C. Bradley has identified ambition as the master passion differentiating *Macbeth* from Shakespeare’s other tragedies. Bradley contends that Macbeth must have been ambitious “by temper” and that the defeat of Macbeth’s “better feelings” “in the struggle with ambition leaves him utterly wretched, and would have kept him so, however complete had been his outward success and security” (1992: 308). But if we treat Macbeth’s ambition as a kind of genetic trait or inherent component of his character, we lose sight of the fact that for early moderns, strong passions functioned both as transformers of reality, inflecting the sense of events, and as essential tools for personal agency. While capable of transforming a personality through the force of interior turbulence, they also were susceptible to the regulatory commands of the higher faculties. As Burton explains, when people succumb to ambition, or any other strong passion – pride, envy, anger, fear, jealousy, anxiety, shame, avarice, despair, and the like – “they are torn in pieces, as Acteon was with his dogs, and crucify their own souls” (2001: 258–9). Even so, everyone need not succumb:

> Some few discreet men there are, that can govern themselves, and curb these inordinate affections, by religion, philosophy, and such divine precepts, of meekness, patience, and the like; but most part, for want of government, out of indiscretion, ignorance, they suffer themselves wholly to be led by sense, and are so far from repressing rebellious inclinations, that they give all encouragement unto them, leaving the reins, and using all provocations to further them: bad by nature, worse by art, discipline, custom, education, and a perverse will of their own, they follow on, wheresoever their unbridled affections will transport them, and do more out of custom, self-will, than out of reason.
>
> (2001: 258)

If a strong passion (e.g. ambition) always asserted itself with the force of a genetic trait, the afflicted person would be unable to “govern” himself or herself through "religion, philosophy," or any other means. This is the flaw in humoral readings of Shakespeare's plays that treat the four humors as master-narratives to which all major facets of a personality must conform. A body of conduct literature would have little purpose if the prevailing belief in Renaissance England affirmed a strictly deterministic psychology based on the humors alone. In the words of Robert L. Reid, "humors form a somatic theater for the rational soul, which may actively govern humoral flux, passively submit to its urgings, or slyly counterfeit other tempers, effecting subtle paradox in the body–soul relation" (1996–7: 471). Moreover, just as the humors are more flexible than we normally suppose, so, too, are the primary passions, which "ultimately join" the humors "in a stately dance" of behavior (1996–7: 472).

Macbeth's fault is more than a superabundance of ambition; he also suffers from strong anger (as described on the battlefield), excessive guilt (especially after the murders of Duncan and Banquo), excessive fear (or paranoia, as we would call it today), and despair. In other words, he is plagued by a *complex* of passions. The high degree of lability in early modern phenomenology has only begun to be registered by scholarship on the Renaissance. As the editors of a recent groundbreaking collection of essays on the topic note, "Early modern subjects experienced strong passions as self-alteration: being moved measurably 'besides' oneself, as experts such as Levinus Lemnius describe it in *The Secret Miracles of Nature* (1658)" (Paster et al. 2004: 16).[8] In *Humoring the Body*, Gail Kern Paster contends that the mutability of personality was thought to result in part from the connectedness of the early modern body to the physical world: "It is not surprising," she writes, "that the humoral body should be characterized not only by its physical openness but also by its emotional instability and volatility, by an internal microclimate knowable, like climates in the outer world, more for changeability than for stasis" (2004: 19). Macbeth presents us with a highly changeable internal microclimate, susceptible to external influences as well as internal imbalances. His condition resembles that of the psychologically imbalanced soul described by Thomas Wright in *The Passions of the Minde in Generall*:

> Sometimes you shall haue a number of greedy Passions like so many young Crowes half starued gaping and crying for food, euery one more earnest than another to be satisfied; to content them all is impossible, to content none is intollerable, to prosecute one and abandon the rest, is to carry so many hungry vipers gnawing upon the heart-strings of the soule.
>
> (1971: 73)

While a host of strong passions was thought to cause rebellion within, in theory at least a person could keep the passions in check by enlisting the resources of a discerning judgment and a strong will. In the properly adjusted soul, the will withstands the onslaught of passions and reins the imagination to ensure the conveyance of accurate information from the outward senses and the rest of the inward ones. It keeps the internal landscape quiet enough so that the voice of understanding, the faculty widely thought to be in the closest harmony with divine precepts, can be heard.[9] But not so in Macbeth's case: the voice of understanding hardly registers in the critical moments before he settles on a course of action. Instead, its influence is strictly reactive: it provides the impetus for Macbeth's guilt and the ensuing "murder" of sleep. Within the first fifty lines of his entrance to the play, Macbeth shows he lacks control of his imagination, the one inward faculty responsible for connecting the senses, the passions, and the higher faculties. No other faculty can keep Macbeth's imagination in check.

As with ambition, the subject of imagination also needs to be revisited within the context of early modern psychophysiology.[10] Critics long have noted the strength of imagination and his penchant for articulating poetic utterances. Bradley argues that Macbeth's imagination is one of his most admirable, if problematic traits. "Macbeth's better nature," he writes,

> – to put the matter for clearness' sake too broadly – instead of speaking to him in the overt language of moral ideas, commands, and prohibitions, incorporates itself in images which alarm and horrify. His imagination is thus the best of him, something usually deeper and higher than his conscious thoughts; and if he had obeyed it he would have been safe.
>
> (1992: 308–9)

Bradley would elevate imagination to the status of reason or understanding, thus radically departing from the psychological model informing the play. He is not alone, however, in anachronistically reassigning the values we should attach to the imagination.

Harold Bloom, aware of the weakness of Macbeth's will and horrific inclinations, also admires the strength of Macbeth's "proleptic" imagination:

> Macbeth is as much a natural poet as he is a natural killer. He cannot reason and compare, because images beyond reason and beyond

> competition overwhelm him. Shakespeare can be said to have conferred his own intellect upon Hamlet, his own capacity for more life upon Falstaff, his own wit upon Rosalind. To Macbeth, Shakespeare evidently gave over what might be called the passive element in his own imagination. We cannot judge that the author of *Macbeth* was victimized by his own imagination, but we hardly can avoid seeing Macbeth himself as the victim of a beyond that surmounts anything available to us.
>
> (1998: 533–4)

For Bloom, if imagination is not the "best of him," it is nonetheless the means by which Macbeth enjoys the status of visionary. Bloom's treatment of imagination as the transcendent faculty subsumes some of the operations of the understanding within the faculty scheme, in so far as he attributes cosmic scope to imagination's empire. In this interpretation, the world is a darker, more sublime place for Macbeth than for the rest of us, and he wanders through it more as a Blakean poet than a medieval thane – a "natural killer" but also a "natural poet," attuned to the murky cosmic powers arrayed against him. The imagination he possesses is a coded version of Shakespeare's own. Thus, the "beyond" that victimizes him is known only to him and to his sublime creator.

Conversely, Renaissance psychologists assigned the cosmic implication (construed in Christian theological terms) to the understanding. For the majority of early modern writers, the imagination fit neither Bradley's nor Bloom's description. Instead, it enabled communication among the other faculties, its image-making abilities essential for sensation and its tendency to sensationalize or to embellish on "nature," a constant threat to psychological stability. "Among the inward wits, the imagination naturally interested poets most," F. David Hoeniger remarks. "Though its image-making faculty is essential to mental powers as are the other wits, it was traditionally conceived as the wildest and most disorderly of the wits, unless controlled by the judging power" (1992: 158). Of all the inward wits, imagination was the most likely to pursue its own course through its compelling fictive constructions of experience. According to Wright, "if the imagination be very apprehensiue, it sendeth greater store of spirits to the heart, & maketh greater empression" (1971: 46). The more it engenders strong passions through its errant constructions, the more it destabilizes a person's inward disposition. Furthermore, because imagination was thought to bind the higher faculties to the external world through the senses, it could easily corrupt the will by presenting it with false information, as in the case of Macbeth's hallucinations. If we look closely at his responses to the witches' prophecies, we see that Macbeth's psychological imbalance results not only from a surfeit of passions but also from an overactive imagination in the worst possible sense.

After commenting on his companion's surprise, Banquo inquires about his own fortunes, whereupon the witches inform him of the royal destiny of his progeny. Meanwhile, Macbeth behaves as if he has not been listening. Rather than address Banquo's prophecy, he wants instead to learn more about his own:

> Stay, you imperfect speakers, tell me more.
> By Sinel's death I know I am Thane of Glamis,
> But how of Cawdor? The Thane of Cawdor lives,
> A prosperous gentleman, and to be king
> Stands not within the prospect of belief,
> No more than to be Cawdor. Say from whence
> You owe this strange intelligence, or why
> Upon this blasted heath you stop our way
> With such prophetic greeting. Speak, I charge you.
> *The Witches vanish*
>
> (1.3.68–76)

"Stay," "Say," "Speak" – Macbeth's imperatives communicate his eagerness for confirmation of predictions corroborating his own fantasies. When the witches vanish, he is left with an inescapable regret ("Would they had stayed": 1.3.80). According to Wright, an inordinate passion, such as love, anger, or ambition, engenders both a pursuit of "some thing desired" and a "certaine sense of delight"; as a consequence, it "enforce[s] the minde for fostering and continuing that pleasure, to excogitate new meanes and wayes for the performance whereof" (1971: 57). Macbeth must hear more from the witches because his ambition requires additional speculation on which to thrive, and his disordered imagination eagerly obliges. By leaving when they do, the witches prompt Macbeth's imagination to be creative in supplying the need, which it amply does.

After Ross and Angus confirm Macbeth's new title as Thane of Cawdor (1.3.102ff), Shakespeare gives Banquo and Macbeth separate speeches to expose the state of each character's inward disposition. Banquo first acknowledges how the new title might "enkindle" Macbeth "unto the crown" and then warns him to be wary of the witches' words:

> But 'tis strange,
> And oftentimes to win us to our harm

The instruments of darkness tell us truths,
Win us with honest trifles to betray's
In deepest consequence.

(1.3.120–4)

Banquo's statement reveals his awareness of the perils of conjecturing. As is well known, belief in the soul's susceptibility to influence (or possession) by evil spirits was not uncommon in early modernity. Burton's *Anatomy*, for example, devotes a lengthy digression to the "*Nature of Spirits, Bad Angels, or Devils, and how they cause Melancholy*." Banquo's phrase "win us to our harm" assumes that spirits could disrupt the chain of faculty interactions responsible for perception. To avert such disastrous fortune, both he and Macbeth must remain wary of the strangeness of recent events. While Banquo welcomes the prospect of his descendants' success, he withholds judgment and, as a result, protects the stability of his mind. In other words, his caution shows his rational soul to be in control of his lesser faculties.

The tone of Macbeth's speech, meanwhile, reveals a troubled mind, buffeted by passions:

This supernatural soliciting
Cannot be ill, cannot be good. If ill,
Why hath it given me earnest of success
Commencing in a truth? I am Thane of Cawdor.
If good, why do I yield to that suggestion
Whose horrid image doth unfix my hair
And make my seated heart knock at my ribs
Against the use of nature? Present fears
Are less than horrible imaginings.
My thought, whose murder is but fantastical,
Shakes so my single state of man that function
Is smothered in surmise, and nothing is
But what is not.

(1.3.129–41)

Macbeth's imagination conjectures about the steps he would have to take to become king. Even though he realizes his "horrid image" (his supposition of probable steps) is "[a]gainst the use of nature," he can stop neither his dark conjectures nor the horror they inspire. The severity of his panic registers in his expression, as, once again, Banquo remarks that he is "rapt." Presumably, all the characters onstage watch Macbeth for the next two asides, until finally Banquo draws him out of his reverie (1.3.147). Given the strength of his passions and his desire to feed his imagination with promises of greater glory, it is no wonder that Macbeth later agrees to commit Duncan's murder – or that he tortures himself so extensively before, during, and after the act. By act 2, his imagination has run wild. Already it has begun to stir his passions, bribe his will, and thereby enslave his soul-body to fantasies, hallucinations, and nightmares.

"Our fears in Banquo / Stick deep": 3.1.50–1

In the first act, the implicit contrast of right conjecturing (in Duncan and in Banquo) and perilous conjecturing (in Macbeth) foreshadows the trajectory Macbeth will follow through the rest of the play. We have seen that Macbeth's incorrigible imagination is part of a *system* gone awry, a soul-body characterized by an internal disorder responsible for producing more questions than answers. Just as Macbeth relies too much on his imagination, he feels too much as well, or he feels too much the wrong sorts of passions. Especially after the murder of Duncan, destructive passions – fear, doubt, rage, mistrust, etc. – exert too great an influence. These passions both inspire Macbeth's later murderous acts and contribute to the profound bouts of remorse and the "horrible imaginings" that fill his days and nights. Indeed, the subsequent murders become the results of "horrible imaginings" and the "evil surmises" they inspire.

When Macbeth decides to murder Banquo, we again become readers of his mind through Shakespeare's carefully chosen vocabulary, its terms fraught with meaning within the context of faculty psychology. In act 3, scene 1, we learn of the death of Macbeth's friendship with Banquo because of Macbeth's word choices: whereas Macbeth once trusted Banquo with the secrets of the witches, he now says in soliloquy, "Our fears in Banquo, / Stick deep, and in his royalty of nature / Reigns that which would be feared" (3.1.50–2). Even though Macbeth speaks as the royal "we" in his remark – "*Our* fears in Banquo / Stick deep" – the first person plural becomes oddly appropriate in another sense by act 3: Macbeth's internal hierarchy has become so overturned that his personality is subject to the exertions of many strong passions, each one of which abets what Macduff and others come to see as his tyrannous conduct. Presently, his "fears," not his love for Banquo, "[s]tick deep"; that is, his fears dominate his heart, the primary seat of the passions, and keep his mind in a perpetual state of unrest. To anyone familiar with early modern psychophysiological discourse, the idea that fears stick deep, that a passion can drive deeply inward, like an arrow, and remain stuck there, is less a metaphor than a direct reference to an emotional state: Macbeth's suspicions are so strong that he is incapable of purging them from his consciousness. His powerful yet unruly imagination abets his fears in obstructing the quiet, countermanding voice of understanding. The deeper these fears penetrate, the less Macbeth's soul can behave in accordance with moral virtue. Macbeth's mounting obsession with, and his paranoia about, maintaining his position accord with the psychologists' accounts of imagination's corruption of the higher faculties. The "vehemency of the imagination causeth a vehement apprehension and iudgement of the wit," Wright explains (1971: 52). And "the false representation [of sense experience] breedeth a false conceit in the minde: and by these we proue the imagination and passions to preuaile so mightily, that men, in great paine, or exceeding pleasure, can scarce speake, see, heare, or thinke of any thing, which concerneth not their passion" (1971: 52). Macbeth's friendship with Banquo cannot survive such a disposition. Nor can compassion for an innocent. Fleance, too, must die.

Macbeth's conjectures about Banquo prove spectacularly misguided and psychologically destructive. His decision to eliminate Banquo and Fleance is based on false surmise: as Banquo's soliloquy proves (3.1.1–10), Banquo shows no signs of betrayal, even though he suspects Macbeth's hand in Duncan's murder; instead, he vows to keep quiet ("But hush, no more," 3.1.10) about his own prospects. Thus, not only does Macbeth murder Banquo without sound cause, and not only does the murder fail to end the threat Banquo's descendants pose to Macbeth's line of succession, it also compromises the stability of the court and augments the instability of Macbeth's mind. "Macbeth's bloody, bold resoluteness," as Katherine Rowe notes, "isolates him from every social bond that might supply a countervailing emotion: from friends and spouse, from the community of counselors at supper, and from the army that will not fight him" (2003: 62). When Macbeth hears of Fleance's escape, he describes the "fit" that takes hold of him as a paralyzing form of enclosure, in which he is "cabined, cribbed, confined, bound in / To saucy doubts and fears" (3.4.23–4). Clearly, while assassination may have removed a distant threat to Macbeth's hypothetical dynasty, the act fails to solidify his power over himself and, in fact, produces the opposite effect. The same is true of the needless murders of Lady Macduff and her children, which serve merely to increase Macduff's rage against him, as well as alienate the other thanes.

"Strange things I have in head that will to hand": 3.4.138

Macbeth's later conjectures prove disastrous because of the "saucy doubts and fears" that motivate him increasingly to compromise his decision-making capacity. We have seen that in his earliest conjectures, his imagination already exerts too much influence. Nonetheless, his process of conjecturing can be compared to the processes of other characters, in that it involves gathering external information from the senses and reconciling it with the cogitations of the inner faculties. As the play progresses, however, Macbeth's pool of valid external information gradually narrows from including the world at large to focusing solely on the witches' prognostications. At the same time, Macbeth reasons less and instead relies primarily on his "horrible imaginings" for his decisions. His withdrawal from the non-supernatural world and from the oversight of the rational faculties begins prior to Duncan's murder in act 2, with Macbeth's hallucination of the dagger. His imagination blurs the boundary between itself and the world in producing the floating dagger, and when he observes how his "eyes are made the fools o'th' other senses / Or else worth all the rest" (2.1.44–5), he is cognizant enough to recognize metonymically that the highest of his senses, sight, is being deceived. Yet he cannot help being haunted by the vision and uncertain of its reality; this uncertainty intensifies with every act.

After the vision of the dagger translates into the actual bloody dagger, Macbeth increasingly behaves as if he is on automatic pilot. As Bloom suggests, "Between what Macbeth imagines and what he does, there is a temporal gap, in which he himself seems devoid of will" (1998: 525). This insightful remark is truer of the persona presented in the last three acts than of the one in the first two, where we see a much more premeditative Macbeth. After the murder of Duncan, Macbeth's process of conjecturing becomes more perilous and lethal than before, precisely because it is more streamlined: whereas at the outset he weighed, if improperly, the suppositions of his imagination against the perspectives of his rational faculties, now he requires only suppositions to act. Consequently, his conduct becomes simultaneously more willful, in the sense of being more aggressively assertive, and will-*less*, in the sense of being more impulsive and irrational. He announces his acquiescence to irrationality in two key passages, each in connection with the most barbaric murders in the play, the killing of Lady Macduff and her children. In the first passage, after the Macbeths have dismissed the courtiers from the banquet, Macbeth describes himself as a force of nature, supported by destiny as interpreted by the "weird sisters." "For mine own good," he declares,

> All causes shall give way. I am in blood
> Stepped in so far that, should I wade no more,
> Returning were as tedious as go o'er.
> Strange things I have in head that will to hand,
> Which must be acted ere they may be scanned.
>
> (3.4.134–9)

The blood already shed presumably justifies his abdication of future moral responsibility. Rather than weigh the motives for his actions, he will send the "[s]trange things" in his head immediately to his "hand" because these "must be acted ere they may be scanned." Elsewhere in Shakespeare's plays the sense of touch is intimately related to the acquisition of knowledge, as Patricia Cahill emphasizes later in this volume. Here, though, the express connection between imagination and the "hand" bespeaks a fundamental *mistrust* of Macbeth's powers of reason. He acknowledges that his murderous plans are "strange" and, one assumes, morally suspect; nevertheless, he wishes to act on them before he or anyone around him has time enough to reflect. His paranoia about his court now also extends to himself. If he is lost in action, then he lacks time for regret, a logical byproduct of "scan[ning]" the "strange things" in his head.

The second passage, equally revealing, occurs just after the witches deliver their three-part prophecy about Macbeth's seeming invulnerability. In an aside, Macbeth plans the destruction of the Macduff family, even though he realizes his primary target, Macduff, has already fled to England. As before, he foregrounds his willful will-lessness:

> From this moment,
> The very firstlings of my heart shall be
> The firstlings of my hand. And even now,
> To crown my thoughts with acts, be it thought and done;
> The castle of Macduff I will surprise,
> Seize upon Fife, give to th'edge o'th' sword
> His wife, his babes, and all unfortunate souls
> That trace him in his line. No boasting like a fool;
> This deed I'll do before this purpose cool.
>
> (4.1.162–70)

Even though he turns to the witches for certainty in the face of his internal tempest, he is less rational after seeing the witches than before.

Now, there are no longer "strange things" in his head requiring action; instead, he possesses only hot "purpose" in danger of cooling. The "very firstlings" of his heart – his immediate impressions and his impassioned responses to these impressions – "shall be / The firstlings" of his "hand." Now that an actual threat against his crown literally materializes in the form of an English invasion force, he wants instantaneous, fatal, and therefore final action.

Macbeth's firstlings' first approach may result in bold action, but ultimately it amounts to replacing boastful foolishness with foolish rashness. By leaving behind his understanding as part of his addiction to his horrors, Macbeth converts himself into the perfect dupe for the witches. When they deliver their prophecies to him, he interprets them in the most simplistic way possible, swallowing the first admonition – "beware Macduff" – as food for his fears,[11] while completely missing the (conjectural) qualifications built into the key exemptions: the miraculous origin of "none of woman born" and the unnatural locomotive property of "Great Birnam Wood." We should not be surprised that all three apparitions make *emotional* appeals rather than rational arguments – the first to Macbeth's fears, the second to his egotism, and the third to his desperate hope for security. While such simple emotional appeals would not have worked with the skeptical Hamlet (nor, most likely, with the majority of early modern audience members), they more than suffice with Macbeth. Regardless of whether Hecate is Shakespeare's invention or Thomas Middleton's, we cannot help but agree with her that the "sprites" she raises "draw" Macbeth "on to his confusion" (3.5.28–9). Ascendant passions might pantomime reason but cannot duplicate its effective operation. By the time his enemy arrives with the English, and one-by-one, his interpretations of the prophecies prove false, conjecture for Macbeth becoming synonymous with confusion.

One reading of one play cannot decide whether a transcendent or a materialist interpretation of Shakespeare's plays is more valid than the other. But one reading can underscore (as this one has done, I hope) the usefulness of the early modern psycho-physiological discourse for recovering the signification of references that otherwise might escape notice. How much do we lose if we ignore Shakespeare's explicitness? A post-Romantic view of the imagination balloons the character of Macbeth into a larger-than-life, visionary poet, trapped in a violent soldier's body – someone, in other words, quite different from the typical audience member, then or now. However, as numerous psychology treatises pointed out during the years when this play was originally performed, Macbeth's slippage in internal control could beset anyone, from groundlings to courtiers to anyone in between. Thus, the play functions as a moral drama as well as a political one, a cautionary tale about the negative potentials of human perception as well as a nod to James I's supposed lineage to Banquo. Indeed, the horror of *Macbeth* results from its conjectured universality: every day of life requires us to conjecture about our world, and faulty conjectures can subvert anyone's honor or reputation, or jeopardize a life or a realm. To abdicate one's decisions to the lower faculties is, as the play shows, to acquiesce in a tyranny of the willful will-lessness bound to affect others. By the same token, to ignore this abdication amounts to a misreading of one of the play's most central concerns. Shakespeare's original audiences would have realized the significance of Macbeth's interior rebellion, which is why they would have agreed with Shakespeare that it must be quashed. It is no accident that the "time is free" in Scotland (5.11.21) only after Macduff carries Macbeth's severed head onstage. As soon as Macbeth decides to make the "very firstlings" of his heart the "firstlings" of his hand, he decapitates reason from conduct and exemplifies the inordinately passionate man incapable of self-governance – the very person psychologists like Wright, Coeffeteau, and others warned readers not to become. As soon as he decides to act strictly on impulse, he changes the nature of the conjectures he *could* entertain. Macduff simply removes the head Macbeth has already ceased to care about.

3

Eyeing and Wording in *Cymbeline*

Bruce R. Smith

Seeing something and saying something about that seeing: what happens in between? Several different stories are possible. Simplest of all is the most recent story, the one that psychophysics tells. Light rays, moving at certain frequencies of billionths of a meter, are focused by the lens of the pupil on the rods, cones, and ganglia of the retina, where they are converted into electrical impulses that travel to the brain, setting off in turn other electrical impulses as the brain's nerve network crosses the visual data with speech functions to send yet more electrical impulses along the nerves to the muscles of the diaphragm, larynx, tongue, lips, and nose, which convert the electrical signals into speech.[1] Simple, really. One protagonist, three episodes, no conflicts. Gestalt psychology complicates the story by attending to the pre-verbal character of visual sensations and by questioning the adequacy of speech to specify these sensations.[2] Structuralist linguistics complicates the story still further. Every reader of this chapter knows already that the relationship between visual images and the words that name them is arbitrary, and hence conventional. Ferdinand de Saussure, according to students' reports of his *Course in General Linguistics* (1916 and later editions), liked to use two pictograms, one showing what most speakers of English would instantly call "tree," the other showing "horse." Between the thing seen and the word said, de Saussure insists, there is a gap: "The linguistic sign unites, not a thing and a name, but a concept and a sound-image. The latter is not the material sound, a purely physical thing, but the psychological imprint of the sound, the impression it makes on our senses."[3] In fine, S → s – but in terms of sense impressions that doesn't make any difference. It was left to Jacques Derrida's treatise *Of Grammatology* (1967) to take what de Saussure had recognized at the level of sound (*arbor* is *arbor* because it is not *labor*) and to extrapolate it to meaning-making in general (*arbor* is *arbor* because it is not *equus*).[4] In Derrida's scheme, the gap between S and s makes all the *différance* – and complicates still more the story of how vision becomes speech.

Compared to the stories told by psychophysics, Gestalt psychology, structuralist linguistics, and post-structuralist semiotics, the story that early modern men and women told themselves about what goes on between sensation and speech is the most complicated of it all. It has the most chapters, and it involves the entire body, not just the eyes, the brain, and the muscles used in speech. One can search out that story in philosophical writings such as Aristotle's treatise *De Anima* (*On the Soul*), in medical writings (e.g. Helkiah Crooke's *Microcosmographia*), and in ethical works such as Thomas Wright's *The Passions of the Mind in General* and Edward Reynolds's *The Passions and Faculties of the Soul of Man*. But Shakespeare's *Cymbeline*, with its persistent dislocations between visual sensation and speech, tells us not only what the early modern story of seeing and speaking *was* but how that story *touched* people, how it *felt*. As Evelyn Tribble argues in her contribution to this volume, touch can be credited with creating the illusion of intersubjectivity that theater, among all art forms, does best.

Let us begin at the end, with *Cymbeline* act 5, scene 6. At 485 lines, it ranks as the longest recognition scene in all of Shakespeare's scripts. Assuming Andrew Gurr's estimate that it takes 2.4 seconds to speak a line of pentameter verse, nearly twenty minutes would be required just to get the words out, not counting entrances, exits, silences, and segues between speaking turns.[5] Recognitions that take fifty-two lines in *Twelfth Night* take nearly ten times as long here. As well they might. In 5.6 Innogen, disguised as a man named Fidele, recognizes her husband Posthumus, whom she had thought dead, and Posthumus recognizes that Fidele, whom he took for a traitor, is really Innogen and that his friend Giacomo is really a liar, while King Cymbeline recognizes that his long-lost sons Guiderius and Arviragus have been fostered in Wales by the banished courtier Belarius, that his daughter Innogen was right to prefer Posthumus to his stepson Cloten, and that the queen, Cloten's mother, is a wicked conniver. What the onstage spectator-listeners witness during the protracted time of 5.6 is a disjunction between vision and words. Names do not match bodies; stories do not match actions. The onstage spectators *see* Posthumus strike to the ground a man he takes to be a traitor; the onstage audience *hears* a different story from Posthumus's servant Pisanio: "O my lord Posthumus, / You ne'er killed Innogen till now."[6] The effect of putting the right name to the body, the right story to the action, is to set the visible world in motion and make the onlookers dizzy:

> CYMBELINE. Does the world go round?
> POSTHUMUS. How come these staggers on me?
>
> (5.6.232–3)

In these reactions we see and hear the sort of disjunction between sensation and reason that, according to Sean McDowell in his chapter in this volume, overwhelms and ultimately destroys Macbeth. Spectator-listeners in the yard and the galleries did not, of course, experience Posthumus's vertigo first hand. Standing or sitting at a distance, they got to enjoy the congruity between vision and words that they had seen coming – but not before they had enjoyed the *in*congruity to the absolute limit of possibility. They had seen one image, one sequence of actions, even as they had heard two different stories *about* that sequence of actions.

Posthumus's violent gesture threatens to obliterate one of the competing stories, the "right" one. It is a dangerous moment in the move toward narrative closure, especially in how it recapitulates all of the play's misalignments of things heard with things seen: the courtiers' faces of sorrow even though their hearts are glad that Innogen has defied the king's wishes and married Posthumus (1.1); Posthumus's plans to take refuge in Rome with Filario, a friend of his father's "known but by letter" (1.1.100); Cloten's attempt to win Innogen's favor by substituting another man's singing voice for his own doltish looks (2.3); Pisanio's instructing the disguised Innogen to flee to Wales and to take service there as a jokester and a singer with the banished lord Belarius and the king's two lost sons (3.4); and above all Giacomo's nefarious inventory of Innogen's bedchamber when Posthumus sends him from Rome to attest to Innogen's virtue.[7] Giacomo's slanders turn Posthumus the idolator of Innogen into Posthumus the iconoclast. Faced with an incongruity between words and image, Posthumus seeks to reconcile the two, not by questioning the words, but by destroying the image: "O that I had her here to tear her limb-meal!" (2.4.147). Indeed, he does finally commit that act of violence against the image when he mistakes his wife for the British traitor just as he had mistaken her for Giacomo's whore.

No less palpable than the violence that conjoins seeing and speaking in *Cymbeline* 5.6 is the sense that seeing constitutes a way of knowing quite apart from words, whether those words be true or false. The violence of Posthumus's attack on the supposed British traitor is anticipated earlier in the scene when Innogen, still in disguise, sees her husband for the first time since he ordered her murder. The very sight of him rivets her: "I see a thing / Bitter to me as death," she tells Lucius (5.6.103–4). Everyone notices the effect. "Wherefore ey'st him so?" the king asks her. Morgan and his sons go unremarked by their erstwhile housekeeper. "He eyes us not," Morgan tells the boys (5.6.124). To eye – "to direct the eyes to, fix the eyes upon, look at or upon, behold, observe" (*OED* "eye" *v*. I.2.a) – is an outward-directed action that, in this play, carries physical power. Even as the king turns the spectacle of reconciled husband and wife, father and brothers, into words, he testifies to a power in Innogen's gaze that defies language. "See," he begins:

> Posthumus anchors upon Innogen,
> And she, like harmless lightning, throws her eye
> On him, her brothers, me, her master, hitting
> Each object with a joy. The counterchange
> Is severally in all.
>
> (5.6.393–8)

"Throw," "hit," "counterchange": these words invest Innogen's looks specifically with the power to *touch*. The "harmless lightning" that she casts about the stage recalls the more dangerous "*thunder and lightning*" (5.5.186 sd) with which Jupiter made his descent in the previous scene – effects that were likely realized with squibs or other fireworks thrown about the stage by the actor playing Jupiter.[8] In those fireworks the spectators could actually see the beams of light that Cymbeline will later attribute to Innogen.

Other details in *Cymbeline* reinforce the sense of discord between things seen and things heard. Filario, the friend of his father with whom Posthumus plans to take refuge in Rome, is "known but by letter" (1.1.100), not by appearance. Write to me at Filario's house, Posthumus tells Innogen, "and with mine eyes I'll drink the words you send" (1.1.111). Cloten, described before his first appearance as a blockish "thing" (1.1.16) highly unlikely to please a woman's eye, hires another man's voice in an attempt to sing his way into Innogen's graces (2.3). Innogen notices Pisanio's strange appearance, the difference from his words, as he leads her to Milford Haven (3.4). As Pisanio advises Innogen, by disguising herself she will be able to live near Posthumus, "so nigh, at least, / that though his actions were not visible, yet / Report should render him hourly to your ear / As truly as he moves" (3.4.149–50). Again, vision is distinguished from hearing, image from words. Innogen's assumed identity as a page, so Pisanio tells her, will consist of sound as much as sight: Innogen must be "ready in jibes, quick-answered, saucy and / As quarrelous as the weasel" (3.4.163). As Adam Rzepka observes in "Rich eyes and poor hands" later in this volume, Innogen's first impression of Milford Haven involves a contradiction between what she has heard about the wilds of Wales ("report") and the civility she sees and feels ("experience"). In the play's most blatant instance of words not matching vision, Innogen misreads Cloten's headless body for her husband's (4.2.295ff). Thus, long before 5.6 the script has set up one situation after another in which things seen are out of harmony with things heard. Nor do the complications end here. Just before this pattern reaches its climax in 5.6, the whole process is recapitulated in the curious sequence of 5.3, 5.4, and 5.5. First the spectator-listeners *see* a dumb show wherein Belarius and the two princes rescue Cymbeline; then they *hear* about it, this time as the reported story of "an ancient soldier" and two lads "with faces fit for masks, or rather fairer / Than those for preservation cased, or shame" (5.5.21–2). Not until the play's last scene are those figurative masks removed and the fair faces given their true names.

What are we to make of these extended separations of the visual from the verbal? What is it about that separation that seems to have kept Shakespeare's spectator-listeners watching and listening during the two hours' traffic of the stage – and then some? Five explanations suggest themselves. Genre theory, first of all, would find in the irony of visual appearance versus verbal reality the very thing that makes comedy comedy and tragedy tragedy. A discrepancy between image and word can be funny (comedy) or disastrous (tragedy) – or in the case of *Cymbeline* a sequential combination of the two (tragicomedy). It is tragic that Giacomo's lies should instil in Posthumus a desire to tear his wife limb from limb; it is comic that the supposed British traitor Posthumus knocks to the ground should turn out to be Innogen.

Deconstruction would find in the gap between image and word an example writ large of *the* fundamental fact about human language. The apotheosis of Jupiter in 5.6 would become, in this reading, a desperate attempt to introduce an end to the chain of signifiers in the form of a god, a metaphysical guarantor that S = s. Indeed, the very thing that secures the play's happy ending is a "tablet" (5.5.204 sd), which the ghosts in Posthumus's dream lay upon his breast. This "book" (so Posthumus calls it when he awakes at 5.5.227) or "label" (his description at 5.6.431) contains an oracular text that is fulfilled, word by word, in the rest of the play. It is a Soothsayer named Philharmonus ("love of sound") who matches Jupiter's written words to what the spectator-listeners, onstage and in the house, see around them.

In Lacanian psychoanalytical theory Jupiter's apotheosis would likewise figure as an act of wish-fulfillment, but in a rather more positive light. The many discrepancies in *Cymbeline* between vision and word would provide evidence of the existential lack that all human subjects experience through the imposition of language. Bodies onstage that do not match the words spoken about them by the other characters: what more striking instance could there be of the fundamental discrepancy in Lacanian theory between the visual image of self in the mirror, separated from the rest of the world, and the social self who is inducted, through language, into the symbolic order? The gap between those selves is experienced as lack. In a Lacanian analysis *Cymbeline*, like all works of art, would become for spectator-listeners an object of desire precisely because it seems to transcend the limitations of language and to offer a connection with the Real, the state of wholeness beyond language. Openings into the Real would be seen as occurring not only in Jupiter's apotheosis, a sudden rending asunder of the web of words that entraps the protagonists, but in acts of violence like Posthumus's physical assault on the "false" Innogen.

A reading informed by Renaissance humanism would be equally directed at the positive. The words in the tablet/book/label given to Posthumus by Jupiter would be accepted with no less fervor than they would be rejected in a deconstructionist reading. The confirmation of *opsis* (knowing-through-sight) in *logos* (knowing-through-words) would be regarded as the end toward which the entire play moves. "The vision," says Philharmonus in the play's penultimate speech, "is full accomplished" (5.6.468–71), and it is accomplished by connecting each event in 5.6 to a phrase from Jupiter's tablet/book/label. Substantiation for such a reading could be found in the proverbial sharp-sightedness of the eagle on which Jupiter makes his descent, as well as in the lucidity of his "palace crystalline" (5.5.207), with its suggestion of the "crystalline humor" that Helkiah Crooke in his medical encyclopedia *Microcosmographia* (1616, 1631) regards as "the principall and primarie Organ of Sight, placed in the verie Center of the Eye" (1633: 669–70).

None of these *logos*-driven explanations, however, can account for the limits to which the disjunction between image and word is pushed in *Cymbeline* 5.6. Why should a condition that in Lacanian theory is a source of existential pain be so protracted? Why should it take an act of violence to precipitate the happy ending? What pleasure can there be in that? There is a fifth explanation that takes into account early modern ideas about the physiology and the physics of vision. If Posthumus can so readily credit Giacomo's claim that he pressed Innogen's breast with his hands and kissed her mole with his lips, the reason may be that early modern men and women did not make such a firm distinction as we do between sight and touch. For them, to see *was* to touch. The notion that eyes send out light-rays that touch objects and then return to the viewer strikes us as so wildly improbable that we can scarcely believe John Donne is being literal when he tells his mistress, "Our eye-beames twisted, and did thred / Our eyes, upon one double string."[9] And yet that is what many people told themselves was happening when they eyed the world around them, even after Johannes Kepler demonstrated in 1604 that vision depends on rays of light, reflected off objects and refracted through the lenses of the eye, producing an inverted image on the retina.[10]

"Whether Sight be made by Emission or Reception, where the nature of the Sight is accurately explayned" is one of the questions Crooke takes up in *Microcosmographia* (1633: 666). Crooke distinguishes three explanations of how sight happens: emission of light rays by the eye (Pythagoras, Hippocrates, Plato, Democritus, among others), reception of light rays sent out by objects (Aristotle and Averroes), or a combination of the two (Galen). Despite his deference to Galen on other issues, Crooke opts in this case for the Aristotelian position, the one accepted today. At the same time, however, he cannot totally resist Galen's understanding of vision as an activation of spirits that leave the eye. Spirits in the eye are drawn to light, Crooke says, so that the presence of "lucide and white obiects" can strike the viewer blind,

> because the visiue Spirits being drawne out, and as it were intised by that which is like vnto them, doe breake forth of the Eye with so great a violence and force, that by such irruption, either the substance of the cristalline humor, or the coat thereof, or something else in the Eye (which hath many tender parts) is either broken, or at least suffers some notable alteration.
>
> (1633: 669)

In Crooke's psychophysics vision is palpably physical, an act of violence on the viewer's part, an ejaculation of the body's vital "spirits" into the ambient world.

Cymbeline shares with *Othello* a sense that the act of seeing is not so much receiving of something that comes to the viewer from without as it is casting forth something that comes from within the viewer. Waiting for Othello's arrival on Cyrpus, Montano enjoins the Venetians gathered on the shore "to throw out our eyes for brave Othello, / Even till we make the main and th'aerial blue / An indistinct regard" (*Othello* 2.1.39– 41).

Posthumus's banishment presents the reverse situation. Innogen is insistent that Pisanio "go see my lord aboard" (1.1.180). The last thing that Pisanio reports seeing was Posthumus's waving handkerchief: "Thou shouldst have made him / As little as a crow, or less," Innogen replies, "ere left / To after-eye him" (1.3.14–16). For her part, Innogen "would have broke [her] eye-strings, cracked them, but / To look upon him till the diminution / Of space had pointed him sharp as [her] needle" and then would have "turned" her eyes and wept (1.3.17–22). Breaking, cracking, following the needle to its sharp point: all these turn the act of "after-eyeing" into an act of violence that in a curious way anticipates the violence in Posthumus's own ways of seeing, his impulse to tear the absent Innogen limb from limb in 2.4 and his actual assault on her in 5.6. Eyeing is, in fact, one of Innogen's distinguishing characteristics from the very beginning of the play. It is the force that binds Innogen and Posthumus together – or at least her to him. "When shall we see again?" (1.1.125) are her parting words. "Renew me with your eyes," Posthumus writes to her when he has landed back in Wales (3.2.42–3).

What gives eyeing such power? The eyes' force is not just metaphorical but physical. Feigning graciousness, the Queen tells Innogen that she will not behave like other stepmothers, "Evil-eyed unto you" (1.1.73). The threat in that image, the power to work physical effects with one's eyes, is demonstrated in the Queen's attempt to poison Innogen, using a potion so noxious that "the seeing these effects will be / Both noisome and infectious" (1.5.25–6). Left behind, Innogen tells Posthumus she will have to endure "the hourly shot / Of angry eyes" (1.1.90–1). Hardly are those words out of her mouth before Cymbeline enters and illustrates her fears, as he orders Posthumus, "avoid hence, from my sight!" (1.1.126). In the face of Cymbeline's wrath Innogen claims to be "senseless": "A touch more rare / Subdues all pangs, all fears" (1.1.136–7). Whatever the sense here of "touch" – the tactile memory of Posthumus's embraces (*OED* "touch" *n*.I.1), the impression he has made upon her mind (III.13.b), even metal/mettle that has been tested and proved (II.5) – its use here implies that Cymbeline's angry eyes have the power to wound in just the way his fists would. This sense of sight's physically destructive potential figures also in *Othello*. Desdemona attributes physical force to Othello's eyes when she tells her husband, just before her murder, "you're fatal then / When your eyes roll so" (5.2.39–40). The loss of that power is perhaps registered in Othello's own reference in the play's last scene to his "subdued eyes" (5.2.357). Here are other instances of the power of touch to create the intersubjectivity that Evelyn Tribble finds in *The Winter's Tale* – and in terms no less physical than Leontes touching Hermione's statue.

In *Cymbeline* it is Giacomo who demonstrates most forcefully how seeing and touching are fused. The letter he delivers to Innogen from Posthumus commends the bearer's nobility and bids her "Reflect upon him accordingly" (1.6.23–4). Giacomo begins his attempted seduction of Innogen obliquely, admiring how men's eyes can discriminate between stars and grains of sand, how they can "Partition make with spectacles so precious / 'Twixt fair and foul" (1.6.38–9). When Innogen fails to catch the compliment, Giacomo offers a textbook explanation of the way vision prompts action, as he moves from eye (1.6.40) to judgment (1.6.42) to appetite (1.6.44) to will (1.6.49). The very sight of Innogen – "this object which / Takes prisoner the wild motion of mine eye, / Firing it only" (1.6.103–5) – has worked just such an effect on *his* will. Had he these lips for kissing, these hands for touching, these eyes for "by-peeping" (1.6.109), he would never turn his attentions, like Posthumus, to a Roman whore. Touching with lips and with hands is, however, firmly denied him, as Innogen rejects both the person she sees and the words she has heard: "Away, I do condemn mine ears that have / So long attended thee" (1.6.142–3).

Touching with eyes is another matter. The bedroom scene is replete with references to the sequence eye → judgment → appetite → will → physical possession. The maid to whom Innogen calls out is Helen (2.2.1), she whose face launched a thousand ships, she whose apparition Faustus foolishly reached out to touch. The tale Innogen reads is Tereus's rape of Philomel (2.2.45–6). Giacomo emerges from the trunk comparing himself to Tarquin about to wake "the chastity he wounded" (2.2.12–13). In his blazon of Innogen's beauties, Giacomo inserts between white skin and ruby lips the deed he most desires: "That I might touch, / But kiss, one kiss!" (2.2.16–17). In the event, what Giacomo touches next are his writing-tables as he notes down every detail of the scene before him. Vision is turned into words – fraudulent words that have power to work violence back in Rome. Giacomo's provocations reach their climax when the visual evidence becomes tactile, when he inventories Innogen's breast, "worthy the pressing" (2.4.135), and the mole beneath: "I kissed it, and it gave me present hunger / To feed again, though full" (2.4.137–8). It is quite specifically Giacomo's wording of the scene in his writing-tables that is overwritten by the text Jupiter leaves behind in the tablet/book/label laid on Posthumus's breast. That substitution of texts shows us what is really at issue in 5.6: putting the right words to the visual evidence.

When it comes to vision, words are, indeed, the problem. Part of what makes the extramission theory of vision so puzzling to us is the huge gap between the vocabulary we have for specifying visual experience – after all, much of our lexicon is a catalogue of objects out there in the world – and our vocabulary for specifying tactile experience. Even with vision, our vocabulary directs us to *what* we see, not *how* we see it. When it comes to sensation, the comparative poverty of our resources is pointed up in early modern treatises on perception like Thomas Wright's *The Passions of the Mind in General* (1604, 1630) and Edward Reynolds's *A Treatise of the Passions and Faculties of the Soul of Man* (written 1620s, printed editions 1640, 1647, 1650, 1651, 1656, 1658). Both of these writers begin with the Aristotelian dictum "There is nothing in the mind that was not first in the senses."[11] They may vary in their emphases and concerns (Wright warns that the passions can put "green spectacles" on the eyes of the beholder and remake the world in the image of the viewer's desire, Reynolds celebrates the alacrity and vivacity of fancy), but they are in no particular rush to get from sensations to ideas.

Crooke, Wright, and Reynolds all accept a model of perception that had its beginnings in Aristotle's treatise *De Anima*, was amalgamated with Galen's conception of the human body as a hydraulic system, informed the principles of classical rhetoric that Renaissance schoolmasters used with their students, and continued to offer theater-goers in 1610–11 (when *Cymbeline* was first performed) the readiest explanation of what was happening to them as they watched and listened. Giacomo, to judge from his speeches in 2.2, has done his epistemological homework. For Shakespeare's original spectator-listeners, as for us, perception begins as stimulation of one or more of the body's five external senses: by light rays in the case of vision and by sound waves in the case of hearing. There the differences between us and them begin. In the Aristotelian–Galenic model of perception the five external senses are imagined to have their counterparts in five internal senses. In the forepart of the brain, close to the external sense organs, is situated "common sense," which receives and fuses data from the external senses. What one sees and hears in the theater – along with what one happens to be smelling, tasting, or touching at the same moment – is fused into a single experience that comprehends both the spectacle one is seeing and the words one is hearing. Aristotle locates in common sense the perceptions of "movement, rest, number, figure, magnitude" – the so-called "common sensibles" (1984, 1: 665). The process of perception continues in the central part of the brain, where two more faculties do their work: fantasy combines sense data to produce images or *phantasmata*, while imagination holds these images as *species* (literally, "appearances" [*OED* "species" *n.* etymology]) and plays with them. Reynolds's *The Passions and Faculties of the Soul of Man* celebrates the "quicknesse and volubilitie" of imagination's workings, "those springings and glances of the heart, grounded on the sudden representation of sundry different objects" (1640: sig. D3v).

Note that it is the heart, not the mind, that is doing the springing and the glancing. What comes next in the early modern story of perception is described by Thomas Wright in *The Passions of the Mind*. Once common sense, fancy, and imagination have done their work, "presently the purer spirits, flocke from the brayne, by certaine secret channels to the heart, where they pitch at the dore, signifying what an obiect was presented, conuenient or disconuenient for it. The heart immediately bendeth, either to prosecute it, or to eschew it: and the better to effect that affection, draweth other humours to helpe him." So "pure spirits" induce pleasure, "melancholy blood" pain and sadness, "blood and choler" ire (1604: sig. D7). The coursing of the humors through the body is experienced by the perceiver as a rush of passion. Crooke describes the movement of the vaporous "pure spirits" or *spiritus* as "vnseene, but not vnfelt; for the force and incursion thereof is not without a kind of violence." Its movement, Crooke implies, can feel like ejaculation: "so the seede although it be thicke and viscid, yet passeth thorough vessels which haue no manifest cauities; the reason is because it is full and as it were houen with spirits" (1633: 173–5).

Judgment, and the putting of experience into words, happen only *after* this whole-body experience in which visual sensations become multisensory species, then the *phantasmata* of fantasy and the springings of imagination, then aerated spirits, then passions. Only *then* do the original visual sensations become words. As with de Saussure's and Derrida's stories, it is precisely here that major conflict occurs. In the early modern version of the story the antagonists are Passion and Reason. Reason ought to direct the passions, Wright says, but the passions have a friendlier working relationship with the senses. Indeed, the passions can prevent reason from knowing the truth about objects that the body, through the senses, sees, hears, touches, tastes, and smells (sig. E2). Although seductive sounds can rouse the passions, Wright persistently associates vision with the passions and hearing with reason. Words make the difference. Wise men can be instructed by what a good preacher or orator says, but "common people or men not of deepe iudgement" need something to see:

> the reaso[n] is, because we have two senses of discipline especially, the eies & the eares: reason entreth the eares; the passion wherewith the orator is affected passeth by the eies, for in his face we discouer it, & in other gestures: … those passions we see, nature

> imprinteth the[m] deeper in our hearts, & for most part they seeme so evident, as they admit no tergiuersation: wherfore the euidence & certainty of the passion, perswadeth much more effectually the co[m]mon people, than a suspected reason.
>
> (Sigs M7v–M8)

The conflict between Reason and Passion is concluded in an act of will on the perceiver's part. He *does* something, good or ill, about what he has come to know. Hence the acts of violence and embracement in *Cymbeline*. In the final chapter of the story, memory, at the rear of the brain, stores sense data, *phantasmata*, and the perceiver's passionate reaction for use in processing future sense experiences. Remembered words always carry a bodily trace of passion. Rhetoric is the art of writing that trace – on the stage platform, in the eyes, on the air, in the ears, in the brain, in the heart, in the chamber of memory at the rear of the brain. The logical turn at the end of the story is managed in emblem books by Latin mottoes above the woodcut picture and by narrative verses beneath; in stage plays, by recognition scenes like *Cymbeline* 5.6.

In their concern with the means of sensation, not the end of intellection, Crooke, Wright, and Reynolds contrast sharply with Descartes, for whom clarity and distinctness are the very criteria for proper objects of knowledge. In *Principles of Philosophy* (published in Latin in 1644) Descartes gives these terms precise definition:

> A perception which can serve as the basis for a certain and indubitable judgement needs to be not merely clear but also distinct. I call a perception "clear" when it is present and accessible to the attentive mind. … I call a perception "distinct" if, as well as being clear, it is so sharply separated from all other perceptions that it contains within itself only what is clear.
>
> (1988: 174–5)

Clarity and distinctness, needless to say, are primarily qualities of visual perception – and visual perception of a certain kind, at that. In his *Optics* Descartes follows Kepler in treating vision as a strictly geometrical affair of lines and angles. An illustration that Descartes inserts more than once in his works shows a blind man feeling his way ahead with sticks held in either hand.[12] Vision, Descartes assumes, is like that: it measures the distance between the body of the beholder and objects in the physical world.

Compare that conception with Paolo Lomazzo's treatment of vision in *Tratatto dell'arte de la pittura* (1584), translated by Richard Haydocke as *A Tracte Containing the Artes of curious Paintinge Caruinge, & Buildinge* (1598). When we train our eyes on something, Lomazzo says, spirit-infused rays of light "issue out in great abundance and very forcibly."[13] These beams are not material but spiritual – and operate with a quickness and freedom the body that sends them does not enjoy: "Now the soule separated seeth not the species of the obiect, neither worketh any such effects as it doth being ioyned with the body, whence these effectes proceede, but it performeth them by it selfe, and that far more easily because it is free, and being free becomes most quicke and light," like wind and thunder, "the matter wherof is a very swift spirit" (RR1). Not being bodies themselves, visual spirits can "comprehend" objects in ways the embodied viewer cannot (RR1). First of all, two bodies cannot occupy the same place at the same time, whereas, by definition, "whatsoeuer can containe another thing in it selfe is a spirit, and is able to comprehend both heauen & earth" (RR1). The notion of containment leaves no doubt that, for Lomazzo, the word "comprehend" carries the literal force of *com* (with) + *prehendere* (to seize).

What is more, visual spirits can, according to Lomazzo, comprehend incorporeal things as well as physical objects: "Now one spirite may see and iudge of another spirite, because it, not being possessed of any bodily thing, seeth all corporal thinges, insomuch as it passeth forth through the bodily instrumentes" (RR1). The marginal note that Haydocke inserts at this point in his translation serves as a reminder that a line of words can go only so far in comprehending actions that are faster than words and need not follow linear syntax: "*In this place*," declares Haydocke, "*I find my Auctor so obscure, that I thinke the coppy much corrupted*" (RR1). For Descartes (and perhaps for Haydocke) vision remains a species of touch only in a metaphorical sense: vision is *like* the blind man with his sticks. For Lomazzo, the tactile qualities of vision are actual. Spirit-infused beams of light leave the eye and enjoy free play in the world, going places that the body cannot go, moving at the speed of wind and thunder. The result is a way of knowing the world that words can never do more than approximate. According to Joseph Roach, such eyeing was part of an early modern actor's stock-in-trade: "his motions could transform the air through which he moved, animating it in waves of force rippling outward from a center in his soul. His passions, irradiating the bodies of spectators through their eyes and ears, could literally transfer the contents of his heart to theirs, altering their moral natures."[14] If vision for Descartes is a blind man gauging distances with sticks, vision for Lomazzo is Ariel whirling about the world at the speed of wind.

It is telling to compare our own ideas about perception with the concatenation of events outlined by Aristotle, Galen, Crooke, Wright, Reynolds – and Giacomo in the bedroom scene. Theories of perception since Descartes equip us to talk only about the movement from eye to judgment, a process we understand to be a matter of electrical impulses transmitted along nerve tissues, not the whole-body experience of spirited fluids that Wright describes. Where we distinguish a two-part process, seeing → naming, early modern writers would distinguish a three-part process, seeing → *feeling* → naming. Shankar Raman in "Hamlet in Motion" locates this shift in the seventeenth century, when a ternary model of soul (internal affect → movement → external sign) was simplified into a binary model (active soul | mechanical body). Taken together, the testimonials from Crooke, Wright, and Reynolds suggest what eyeing felt like to early modern men and women, at least to early modern men and women who tried to put the experience into words. Common to all these accounts are force, violence, lightness, quickness, touch. Jupiter's fireworks in 5.5 illustrate the very qualities that Wright, Crooke, and Lomazzo, in their different ways, describe. These qualities of seeing call into question the efficacy of words. Language is deliberate in pace and linear in direction; vision is quick and multidirectional.

Early modern understandings of vision suggest that the real issue in the final scene of *Cymbeline* may not be appearance versus reality, as modern criticism would have it, but seeing versus speaking. Violence attends the divergence of these two distinct ways of apprehending the world, just as pleasure attends their convergence. The words that finally make sense – *unified* sense – of the violent scenes betray the deferred quality of trauma that Patricia Cahill investigates in her chapter "Falling into Extremity" elsewhere in this volume. Trauma can be comprehended only when encountered retroactively, in an altered form. In the case of *Cymbeline*, that altered form is aural and verbal as opposed to visual and tactile. The passionate interplay between visual experience and words in *Cymbeline* dramatizes not just the story of *Cymbeline, King of Britain*, with its violent discords and final philharmonics between doers and deeds on the one hand and names and narratives on the other, but the story that Shakespeare's customers told themselves about what was happening whenever they saw, heard, and remembered a play. In his description of the workings of the mind Hume stresses the diverse and discontinuous qualities of sensations in time. About the *place* of sensations Hume remains mystified. As a place of knowing, theater provides a physical and psychological space that is aurally resonant and visually dense. Within that space, recognition scenes like *Cymbeline* 5.6 shape up as points of convergence. What is being recognized is not just personal identities but the evanescent relationship between sensations and words.

4

"O, she's warm": Touch in *The Winter's Tale*

Evelyn Tribble

The Winter's Tale is rife with allusions to the eye, including the reference to Mamillius's "welkin eye" (1.2.135), the spider in the cup presented "to his eye" (2.1.43), and the "sight" of Paulina's "poor image" (5.3.57) at the play's end. The final scene has often been associated with idolatry, a sin of looking (O'Connell 2000; O'Conner 2003; Jensen 2004). However, this privileging of the visual in the play itself – and in the critical commentary upon it – has led to a neglect of other sensory modalities, and especially of the complex relationship between vision and touch that the play explores. Touch has long held an ambiguous place in the sensorium; Aristotle conceived of it as the "sense of all senses," primary and indispensable (1995: 413b). Unlike the other senses, the organ of touch (skin) is extensive rather than locatable, standing precariously "betwixt us and our dissolution," as the passage from Helkiah Crooke quoted by Patricia Cahill elsewhere in this volume reminds us. Moreover, touch is always dependent upon proximity (Harvey 2003: 3). Yet the primacy of touch also leaves it vulnerable to associations with the bestial and the erotic, and it was often classified as the lowest of the senses, at least in Western Europe (Harvey 2003: 1; Howes 2003: 12–13). Carla Mazzio suggests that in the Renaissance "touch was either neglected or conspicuously disruptive" (2005: 92). Elizabeth D. Harvey deftly summarizes the double nature of touch in the early modern period: "Although touch is usually associated with the surface of the body, it becomes a metaphor for conveyance into the interior of the subject, particularly the capacity to arouse emotion. ... Touch evokes at once agency and receptivity, authority and reciprocity, pleasure and pain, sensual indulgence and epistemological certainty" (2003: 2).

The contradictory associations of touch Harvey describes are explored throughout *The Winter's Tale*. This chapter examines its twinned discourses of sight and touch, arguing that until the final scene sight is objectified and associated with alienation, narcissism, and terror. In contrast, the depicted mutuality of touch, motility, and sight at the end offers a provisional exploration of an embodied and intersubjective reading of human relationships in the play, even as these are cannily mediated by meta-theatrical reflections on the layering of actor's and character's body. Maurice Merleau-Ponty's discussions of embodiment provide a helpful point of departure for my argument. Examining the initial rupture of *The Winter's Tale* from the phenomenological perspective of Merleau-Ponty rather than that of Jacques Lacan or Sigmund Freud helps us to understand not just the initial rupture, but also the provisional and partial healing of that rift represented at the play's conclusion.

For Lacan, *méconnaissance* or misrecognition is the inevitable and expected outcome of the psychic economy of lack, whereas for Merleau-Ponty it is a pathological result of the denial of one's own embodiment and the consequent objectification of the other. As Vivian Sobchack suggests, "Merleau-Ponty's system accounts for *subjectivity as intersubjectivity*, whereas Lacan's schema accounts for *subjectivity as objectified*" and mortgaged to "the negative nature of self-identity and a dysfunctional experience of the Other founded in *méconnaissance*" (Sobchack, 1992: 123, original emphasis). Both models are predicated upon alienation, but only Merleau-Ponty's proffers the possibility of moving through that alienation to intersubjectivity. He describes a (possible) dynamic rather than a state. Helen A. Fielding's assessment clarifies the stakes of the distinction:

> Whereas Lacan sees the original schism or alienation in our relations with others first generated by the mirror stage as impossible to overcome, Merleau-Ponty, while agreeing that the body is never fully united with the "ghostlike" image that the subject sees in the mirror or projects as her seen self, does not intuit this alienation to be insurmountable [Merleau-Ponty 1964: 168]. Once the other's gaze has fixed the subject as an object, robbed her of being, and she in turn has posited the other as object, this alienation can only be overcome but it can be overcome through establishing relations with the other [Merleau-Ponty 1962: 357].
>
> (Fielding 1999: 195)

One particularly suggestive element in Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology is its account of the body's status as simultaneously subject and object, which he explores through the trope of one hand touching the other. The two hands "are never simultaneously in the relationship of touched and touching to each other," but represent "double sensations" (2003: 106), each moving between subject and object in an ambiguous dynamic of embodiment. In his posthumously published incomplete work *The Visible and the Invisible* (1968), Merleau-Ponty turns again to this trope as a means of challenging the "delimitation of the senses" that posits a "crude" divide between vision and touch (1968: 133). "The look," he says, "envelops, palpates, espouses the visible things" (1968: 133). The example of one hand touching another while touching an object provides a visceral model of *chiasm*, the "crisscrossing within it of the touching and the tangible" (1968: 133). Because "every experience of the visible has always been given to me within the context of the movements of the look," it follows that "the visible spectacle belongs to the touch neither more nor less than do the 'tactile qualities'" (1968: 133). Merleau-Ponty's argument thus requires a new, enlarged, perception of tactility's scope:

> We must habituate ourselves to think that every visible is cut out in the tangible. … Since the same body sees and touches, visible and tangible belong to the same world. … There is double and crossed situating of the visible in the tangible and of the tangible in the visible; the two maps are complete, and yet they do not merge into one. The two parts are total parts and yet are not superposable.
>
> (1968: 134)

This intuition of a chiastic crossing, which posits a model of intersubjectivity that does not devolve into identity, has powerful implications for exploring the range of substitutions and displacements in *The Winter's Tale*, as they are figured through acts of touch spectated, imagined, or embodied.

Merleau-Ponty's work has often been charged with sentimentality or with false universalism, beginning with Lacan's series of lectures "Of the Gaze as *Object Petit a*," and including Shannon Sullivan's critique of the anonymous body (2001). But it has also been vigorously defended by, among others, Silvia Stoller and Gail Weiss,[1] who recognize that its emphasis upon embodiment has the potential to generate a historically situated and theoretically informed model of subjectivity. As Gail Kern Paster suggests in her discussion of "historical phenomenology," Merleau-Ponty's argument that "psychology is always brought face-to-face with the problem of the constitution of the world" implies that "the nature of an individual subject's phenomenological experience can never be understood properly apart from … that social field's governing beliefs about how the world is constituted" (Paster 2004: 8).[2] In the particular case of vision, Merleau-Ponty's understanding of the intertwining of touch and vision offers an alternative to Lacan's ocularcentric model, while also reminding us of the historical situatedness of vision and touch in the early modern period.[3] As Bruce Smith argues elsewhere in this volume, theories of extramission collapse the touch–vision binary so characteristic of ocularcentric thought. In *The Winter's Tale*, the "social field" includes historically situated conceptions of touch derived in part from representational conventions of both body and spirit on the stage; theories of sight and touch; the significance of hand-fasting in early modern marriage; religious discourses (including those of idolatry) that address touch; as well as lore derived from classical traditions, especially Ovidian.

Objectified sight: 1.2

A number of critics ascribe Leontes' sudden conviction that his wife is "slippery" (1.2.270) to her prolix and persuasive speech.[4] As Lynn Enterline suggests, Leontes "turn[s] a rhetorical anxiety – why do her words achieve the desired effect where mine do not? – into a sexual one, minimizing his wife's superior rhetorical skill by interpreting it narrowly as the consequence of her erotic power" (1997: 18). But the crisis is also generated by an embedded stage direction that Hermione and Polixenes join hands. This action takes place in the wake of a series of passages concerned with mirroring and substitution. In a classic Lacanian reading of this moment, Janet Adelman suggests that Leontes' "jealousy erupts in response to the renewed separation from a mirroring childhood twin and the multiple displacements and vulnerabilities signaled by Hermione's pregnant body" (1992: 222). As is well known, Polixenes describes his boyhood with Leontes as a utopian pastoral uncontaminated by women:

> We were as twinned lambs that did frisk i'th'sun,
> And bleat the one at th' other; what we changed
> Was innocence for innocence – we knew not
> The doctrine of ill-doing, nor dreamed
> That any did.
>
> (1.2.66–70)

In this economy "genital sexuality … marks the moment of separation and contamination by women" (Adelman 1992: 223), a moment that Leontes recalls by emphasizing Hermione's niggardliness: "Three crabbed months had sour'd themselves to death, / Ere I could make thee open thy white hand, / And clap thyself my love" (1.2.102–4). The memory of the closed, unyielding hand finally opening to "clap" another hand cues Hermione's rhetorical balancing of past and present, husband and friend:

> Why, lo you now; I have spoke to th'purpose twice.
> The one, for ever earned a royal husband,
> Th'other, for some while a friend.
>
> (1.2.105–7)

The spoken rhetorical balance is accompanied by an equivalent gesture. Hermione yokes together, here, two acts of speaking "to the purpose," the one when she accepted Leontes' proposal, the other when she convinced Polixenes to stay. As the first involved a giving of the hand, so should the second. The balancing act – literally, on the one hand, so on the other – establishes an equivalence between Polixenes and Leontes, an easy substitution of one for the other. Moreover, this act of touch has a particular cultural resonance, since it re-presents the ritual act of hand-fasting, the touch between man and woman legally affirming their marriage. Like all repetitions in this play, however, it is a repetition with a difference. The body that serves as the literal intermediary between the two men, yoking friend and husband together, is a pregnant body.

Leontes' comment is an act of repossession, drawing the audience's attention to him and framing the actions of Polixenes and Hermione as a spectacle he observes across empty space. Towards the end of the scene the dynamic reverses itself, as if in a cinematic cut, so that Polixenes and Hermione provide the frame for seeing Leontes' "unsettled" physiological reactions, the sight of the touching hands producing the sort of vertiginous response that Cahill identifies as characteristic of traumatic touch:

> Too hot, too hot!
> To mingle friendship far, is mingling bloods.
> I have *tremor cordis* on me; my heart dances,
> But not for joy, not joy. This entertainment
> May a free face put on, derive a liberty
> From heartiness, from bounty, fertile bosom,
> And well become the agent. 'T may, I grant.
> But to be paddling palms, and pinching fingers,

As now they are, and making practised smiles
As in a looking-glass; and then to sigh, as 'twere
The mort o'th'deer – O, that is entertainment
My bosom likes not, nor my brows.

(1.2.108–18)

Touch is here contaminated by the eyes, signaling the false "ocular proof" that seemingly allows sudden epistemological certainty. Sight objectifies and "others" the touch, which devolves into disgust at the "paddling palms" and "pinching fingers." Disgust, an emotion that occurs in different forms very widely across cultures (Miller 2005: 338–42), draws a line between the "me" and the "not-me." As the etymology of the word suggests, disgust is often associated with gustatory aversions, of the kind Leontes invokes when he imagines retching at the sight of the spider in the cup.

"I have drunk, and seen the spider" (2.1.45). Leontes' disgust discloses the sudden onset of jealousy. In "The Child's Relation with Others," Merleau-Ponty takes up the phenomenon of jealousy, arguing that "all jealousy, even in the adult, represents a non-differentiation between oneself and the other, a positive inexistence of the individual that gets confused with the contrast that exists between others and himself" (1964: 143). The jealous person "likes to make himself suffer. He multiplies his investigations, he seeks information, he forms hypotheses that are always designed to stimulate his anguish" (1964: 143). While the "confusion between self and other" so characteristic of jealousy originates in the visual experience of "a kind of schism between the immediate *me* and the me that can be seen in the mirror" (1964: 143, 138), for Merleau-Ponty the experience need not, indeed ought not, end there. Jealousy represents a pathological disruption of what Merleau-Ponty views as the normative situation, in which the "introceptive self" is able to "guess at" the psyche of the other through the experience of being-in-the-world (1964: 115).

Leontes' pathology is recognizable both in the fantasy of oneness alluded to earlier (particularly the Lacanian model) and in his desire to seek his image in his son – thus he tries, unsuccessfully, to create a "mirroring twin" (Adelman 1992: 263) in Mamillius, searching for the face which is "a copy out of mine," save for the "smutch'd" nose (1.2.121–2). This scene, then, represents both vision and touch as fundamentally alienating, sending Leontes into a solipsistic abyss, a desperate narcissism that demands the destruction of the other. Famously, Othello represents the same abyss by othering himself in the final scene of the play, simultaneously immolating Venetian and Turk. But in revising the wholly tragic trajectory of jealousy in *Othello*, *The Winter's Tale* offers a more supple account of vision and touch that cannot be fully accounted for through the Lacanian paradigm.

Disembodied touch: 5.1

An act of touch induces Leontes' madness, and another seemingly ends it, but between these events lie three acts and sixteen years. However, if we directly parallel the early scenes with the final one, we miss the crucial importance of act 5, scene 1 in establishing the dynamics that sustain awareness of Hermione's spectral presence. Leontes' evocation of Hermione's ghost – reminiscent of Antigonus's narration in act 3 and uncannily paired with Paulina's conjuring of Antigonus's ghost and the prospect of her own ghostly return (5.1.40–4, 63–6) – is part of a pattern of interest in *disembodiment* that links the acts of touch and sight at the beginning and at the end. 5.1 is a neglected scene, both in criticism and in production, yet it is crucial to grasping the transformed economies of touch and vision in the final scene.[5] Here Shakespeare offers the first view of Leontes since the events of 3.2 and the reported deaths of Hermione and Mamillius.

The recurring invocations of spectral presences in the scene (Hermione's, Antigonus's, even Paulina's) effectively block the economy of substitution and forgetting that Claudius in *Hamlet* describes as "remembrance of ourselves" (1.2.7). The scene begins, we should note, with a contest over memory: male courtiers urge Leontes to accept a public, statist view of memory, prompted by the need to consider "the remembrance of his most sovereign name" (5.1.25–6). In this economy, Hermione can be forgotten through the self-serving piety of "rejoic[ing] the former queen is well" and "bless[ing] the bed of majesty again / With a sweet fellow to't" (5.1.30, 33–4). But standing in the way of this economy of substitution is Paulina, who enforces memory through painful yet strategic evocations of the past, as evidenced by her description of Hermione as "she you killed." These reminders are not limited to Hermione herself: as Paulina moves to block an economy of substitution, she momentarily evokes the ghost of her dead husband. To find the heir, she claims, "is all as monstrous to our human reason / As my Antigonus to break his grave / And come again to me" (5.1.41–3).

Why remind us of Antigonus – more specifically, why evoke the spirit of Antigonus – at this point? This reminder of the forgotten dead husband establishes a parallel between Paulina and Leontes in the shared loss of a spouse, even as the scene continues to mark them as antagonists. The suggestion that Antigonus may "break his grave" links this moment to his last appearance in the play (3.3), in which he reports his dream of Hermione and the apparent grave-breaking of Hermione herself. There Antigonus tells the babe:

> I have heard, but not believed, the spirits o'th' dead
> May walk again. If such thing be, thy mother
> Appeared to me last night; for ne'er was dream
> So like a waking.
>
> (3.3.15–18)

As David Thatcher argues, this is a particularly odd account because it consistently confuses the categories of ghost visitation and dream vision. Antigonus is unsure whether he was awake or asleep, and he describes a classic stage-spirit: dressed in white robes, weeping, until finally "with shrieks / She melted into air" (3.3.35–6). The entire report is notably hedged with disclaimers and qualifiers: the description of the dream begins tenuously – "I hath heard, but not believed" (15); "if such thing be" (16) – and ends with a note of conviction: "Dreams are toys, / yet for this once, yea superstitiously, / I will be squared by this" (3.3.38–40). Antigonus's poorly reasoned interpretation of the dream (Thatcher 1993: 137) only reinforces the unsettled character of the entire account. These ambiguities are generated by the absence of the body of the actor playing Hermione; using report rather than bodily presentation facilitates the confounding of dream vision with ghost visitation. As Thatcher observes, "Because Hermione is not dead, and therefore cannot be represented on stage as a ghost, her 'ghost' has to appear, in a dream, the major dramatic purpose of which is, palpably, to reinforce the notion in the mind of the audience that she is dead" (1993: 136).

In 5.1, the specter of Antigonus raises the specter of Hermione, which in turn sparks another account of her lack of embodiment, another ghost *manqué*, the invocation of Antigonus priming Leontes for the parallel invocation of his own dead spouse:

> LEONTES. Good Paulina,
> Who hast the memory of Hermione,
> I know, in honour, O, that ever I
> Had squared me to thy counsel! Then, even now,
> I might have looked upon my Queen's full eyes,
> Have taken treasure from her lips –
> PAULINA. And left them

More rich for what they yielded.
LEONTES. Thou speaks't truth.

(5.1.50–55)

In his fantasy, Leontes imagines looking at Hermione, and, more importantly, kissing her. But while he figures the act of kissing as *taking* "treasure from her lips," Paulina's completion of the line – "and left them / More rich for what they yielded" – emphasizes the reciprocal nature of touch, an economy in which taking leads not to contraction but to abundance, an intersubjective, chiastic dynamic that challenges the zero-sum model invoked by Cleomenes when he argues that Leontes has "done enough," in fact "paid down / More penitence than have done trespass" (5.1.1–2).

Before this fantasy of reciprocal and abundant touch can be fulfilled, though, another, darker, vision of the disembodied Hermione is conjured. Vowing to take no wife, Leontes declares:

One worse,
And better used, would make her sainted spirit
Again possess her corpse, and on this stage,
Where we offenders now appear, soul-vexed
And begin, "Why to me?"
PAULINA. Had she such power,
She had just cause.
LEONTES. She had, and would incense me
To murder her I married.
PAULINA. I should so.

(5.1.56–62)

The meta-theatrical reference to the "stage" places this fantasy within the revenge play genre; remembering Hermione here becomes dependent upon scripting an alternative play, in which the accusatory ghost demands the blood of the second wife. This passage reminds us that the play could take another turn, that we could see before us the animate corpse or spirit of Hermione. In its absence, Paulina substitutes herself in the role and ventriloquizes her accusations.

As with Antigonus's description of the visitation, this account calls attention to the *lack* of a body that otherwise might appear, as murder victims so often do upon the Shakespearean stage.

PAULINA. Were I the ghost that walked, I'd bid you mark
Her eye, and tell me for what dull part in't

> You chose her; then I'd shriek, that even your ears
> Should rift to hear me, and the words that followed
> Should be, "Remember mine."
> **LEONTES.** Stars, stars,
> And all eyes else, dead coals – fear thou no wife;
> I'll have no wife, Paulina.
>
> (5.1.63–8)

Why mediate the promise not to remarry through this lurid fantasy? One answer may be that such vividness serves to enforce memory, since virtually every memory treatise of the time, taking cues from the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, recommends concocting unusual images that will "stick" in the memory: images will be remembered if they are "striking," "of exceptional beauty or singular ugliness," "or if we somehow disfigure them, as by introducing one stained with blood or soiled with mud or smeared with red paint" (1954: 221 [III.xxii]). Murdered characters in Shakespeare's plays, however, normally have a very direct system of enforcing memory: dead characters who wish to remind the living of their presence simply appear to them. Richard III's victims appear to him *seriatim*; Old Hamlet appears to his son, Caesar to Brutus, and Banquo to Macbeth. The appearance of the spirit is one of the most powerful mnemonic mechanisms in the drama, but it is unavailable to this scene, as to 3.2, because Hermione is alive. Unable to embody her "ghost," the characters on stage conjure it in a disturbing and vivid set of images that bring Hermione to mind, though not to stage.

Visible touch and tactile visibility: 5.3

In the final scene, following the infamous "gentlemen" scene (5.2) that thwarts audience expectation by hashing over the reunion verbally rather than presenting it theatrically, these imagined memory images of Hermione are reconfigured and embodied. As Leonard Barkan has noted, Shakespeare creates a final scene that is as improbable in its naturalistic as in its supernaturalistic rationale (1981: 640–1). Against all probabilities and with willful disregard for dramatic verisimilitude, Hermione's hand is extended once again to touch, if after sixteen years rather than three crabbed months.

In a play that establishes a pattern of repetition folded with difference, the final scene of *The Winter's Tale* layers a restaging of the initial act of touch with the dark fantasy of 5.1. In so doing, the play re-examines the relationship of vision and touch, mapping a way out of the deep misogyny triggered by the initial sight of the touching hands. Nearly one hundred lines separate the initial sight of the "statue" from the embrace of Leontes and Hermione. This scene is among the most charged in Shakespeare's *oeuvre*, as the characters attempt to make sense of the sight before them. A great deal of the scene's tension derives from the thwarted desire to touch that the "statue" induces in the spectator. The final section of this chapter explores the complex etiology of this desire, deriving as it does from the conventions of representation of corporeality on the stage, the play's prolonged and deliberate flirtation with idolatry, and the reworking of the Ovidian Pygmalion myth.

The act of touch has a particularly complex signification on the Shakespearean stage and should be seen in the context of other recognition scenes in which a character, presumed dead, is found to be alive and re-enters the world through an act of touch. In *The Tempest*, a play that persistently confounds the relationship between the corporeal and the spiritual, Prospero must reassure Miranda that Ferdinand is no spirit: "it eats and sleeps, and hath such senses / As we have, such" (1.2.416–17). Alonso's senses are so "jostled" by his confusing experiences that he fears that the sight of Ferdinand is merely "a vision of the island" (5.1.178). Touching Ferdinand in the act of the paternal blessing is to confirm his reality. Prospero himself must convince the shipwrecked courtiers that he is no "enchanted trifle" by exercising the power of touch:

> For more assurance that a living prince
> Does now speak to thee, I embrace thy body;
> And to thee and thy company I bid
> A hearty welcome.
>
> (5.1.110–14)

Once Alonso feels that "thy pulse / Beats as of flesh and blood," he can credit Prospero's physical embodiment.

In *Twelfth Night,* Viola and Sebastian each confront the fear that the other is a spirit:

> VIOLA. Such a Sebastian was my brother, too.
> So went he suited to his watery tomb.
> If spirits can assume both form and suit
> You come to fright us.
> SEBASTIAN. A spirit I am indeed

> But am in that dimension grossly clad
> Which from the womb I did participate.
>
> (5.1.226–31)

Although Sebastian offers to touch her – "my tears let fall upon your cheek" (5.1. 233) – Viola famously forbids his touch: "Do not embrace me till each circumstance / Of place, time, fortune do cohere and jump / that I am Viola" (5.1.244–6). Cynthia Lewis argues convincingly that Shakespeare here appropriates the "*noli me tangere*" tradition, in which Christ forbids Mary Magdalen to touch him. This passage was often discussed in conjunction with the story of Doubting Thomas, which, as Ellen Spolsky shows, represented for Protestants a crisis of knowing signified by the vexed relationships among sight, touch, and religious faith. Epistemological uncertainty may be resolved by the act of touch, which perhaps explains its persistence in the case of *Hamlet*, as noted by Howard Marchitello. By definition, an apparition or ghost cannot be touched; this impossibility places the burden of proof or credibility on other senses and calls attention to the vexed relationship between sight (alone) and knowledge.

Lear stages such a scene, one with intriguing similarities to the recognition scene in *The Winter's Tale*. In scene 21 of the Quarto and 4.6 of the Folio, Lear and Cordelia are reunited, as he is awakened from his sleep. Lear first (mis)recognizes Cordelia as a "soul in bliss," compared to himself, whom he describes as "bound / Upon a wheel of fire, that mine own tears / Do scald like molten lead" (4.6.38–40). To Cordelia's question – "do you know me?" – he first answers: "You are a spirit, I know." The sight of his own hands and the pain of the pin fail to convince him of his and Cordelia's corporeality: "I will not swear these are my hands. Let's see: / I feel this pin prick. Would I were assured / Of my condition" (4.6.48–50). Only the act of touching another confirms to Lear that Cordelia, not a spirit, is before him:

> LEAR. Do not laugh at me
> For as I am a man, I think this lady
> To be my child Cordelia.
> CORDELIA. And so I am, I am.
> LEAR. Be your tears wet? Yes faith. I pray, weep not.
>
> (4.6.61–4)

The question – "be your tears wet?" – can only be answered through the act of touch, through Lear reaching out, touching Cordelia's cheek, and seeing and feeling the tears' wetness on his hand. These acts of touch exemplify Merleau-Ponty's intersubjective model: touch is an action of touching and being touched. As Susan Stewart suggests, "Of all the senses, touch is most linked to emotion and feeling … . [W]e do not see our eyes when we see or hear our ears when we hear, but tactile perception involves perception of our own bodily state as we take in what is outside that state. The pressure involved in touch is a pressure on ourselves as well as on objects" (2002: 162). The encounter in *Lear* is the more significant for revising the persistent correlation between tears and feared and maligned femininity. When Lear takes on his own hands the "women's weapons, water-drops" (2.2.443), the act fuses "intransitive and transitive states" of touch (Stewart 2002: 163). In these scenes, corporeality is performed by enacting (or forestalling) the act of touch, expressing a complex dynamic that first potentially empties the body of corporeality and then reinvests it. While touching or embracing is common on the stage, these scenes are at pains to call attention to the act, often through a prolonged pause in the action, as characters are asked to consider the implications of touch and its relationship to embodiment. Touch framed in this sense is a means of performing – indeed, italicizing – corporeality.

In the last scene of *The Winter's Tale*, these associations intertwine with another dynamic of substitution that had great cultural resonance in this period: idolatry.[6] Perdita's reference to superstition makes this context explicit:

> And give me leave,
> And do not say 'tis superstition, that
> I kneel and then implore her blessing.
>
> (5.3.42–3)

Kneeling before a statue and imploring it as though it were a living object seems to be the very definition of idolatry. Reformers stressed the deadness of the image in their polemic against the unlawful use of images in church (Aston 1988: 115), a position that also asserted the folly of substituting the likeness for the object itself. Lifelike images were particularly suspect, as the *Homily on Idolatry* makes clear in its condemnation of painted statues, which are seen as most liable to stir inappropriate desire and to transfer affections to the dead: "The painting of the picture and Image with diuers colours, entiseth the ignorant so, that he honoureth and loueth the picture of a dead Image that hath no soule" (1987: 10).[7] Perdita's address of the "statue" as "Lady," her reference to kneeling, and the invocation to "[g]ive me that hand of yours to kiss" stage a potentially transgressive act of touch that is forestalled by Paulina: "O, patience – / The Statue is but newly fixed; the colour's / Not dry" (5.3.47–9). The desired act of touch here – the kissing of the hand – repeats and alters the hand-clasping scene of the first act, while Paulina's thwarting of Perdita's desire for touch calls attention to touch's transitive status: the colour that is not yet "fixed" threatens to leave its mark on the body of the toucher.

As Bruce Young points out, the passage evokes a further matrix of association: the rite of parental blessing, in which the child kneels to receive parental blessing every morning and upon taking leave. Taken in this context, Perdita's request has quite another meaning, fully revealed when Hermione fulfills her part in the rite and asks the gods to "pour your graces / Upon my daughter's head!" (5.3.123–4). If idolatry is defined as improper worship of a substitute object – the dead matter of the image – in the place of the living spirit, kneeling before Hermione is not idolatry, for the "statue" embodies a nexus of chiastic crossings through which attributes of both statue and parent, sacred and domestic space, are conjured.

The second forestalled act of touch is Leontes' attempted kiss: "Let no man mock me, / For I will kiss her"(5.3.79–80). Again Paulina invokes the supposed transitional state of the newly "painted" statue: "the ruddiness upon her lip is wet; / You'll mar it if you kiss it, stain your own / With oily painting"(5.3.81–3). This image emphasizes the reciprocal nature of touch, in the form of the mark left by the subject/object on the lips of the toucher. The negative cast of the image – the object kissed will be marred, the kisser stained – repeats and recasts the fantasy of abundant touch in 5.1, where Leontes imagines taking "treasure from her lips." Yet this very desire simultaneously invokes the vengeful spirit raised in that scene, for, as Kenneth Gross brilliantly suggests, the "ruddy lips" that threaten to "stain" Leontes' own recall the poisoned paintings of Jacobean revenge tragedy (2001: 103). These two moments of forestalled touch, then, represent a nuanced layering of revenge fantasy, fear of disembodied touch, the thwarted fantasy of reciprocal touch that animates 5.1, and the initial reaction of disgust that propels the tragedy.

The final repetition with a difference in this scene is Paulina's direction to Leontes to "present" his hand. The moment of animation, and the reactions of the spectators to it, are available only through Paulina's words and the prescriptive embedded stage directions they contain. The physical reactions engendered by the moment are made apparent through such lines as "Start not" and "Do not shun her." Paulina's direction to

Leontes explicitly restages the opening of Hermione's "white hand" to her wooer: "Nay, present your hand. / When she was young you wooed her; now, in age / Is she become the suitor?" (107–9). It is the moment of touch that confirms not just that she is not a statue, but that she is both corporeal and living, not a reanimated spirit usurping her corpse:

> O, she's warm!
> If this be magic, let it be an art
> Lawfull as eating.
>
> (5.3.110–11)

Susan Stewart remarks astutely that the "ontology" of the Pygmalion legends "may lie in the irreducible fact that only material substances can satisfy our needs for food and drink – only material substances can be the source for our own animation" (1999: 33). Only touch can convince Leontes that she is alive: "O, she's warm!" Only when the touch passes between them in the final scene can that gesture in turn enliven him. Both eating and touching are modes of taking in, and Leontes invokes both when he recognizes Hermione as living flesh; here the reference to eating recalls and refigures the trope of looking-as-ingestion that drives Leontes' earlier metaphor of the spider in the cup.

Camillo and Polixenes provide further crucial embedded stage directions when they describe the action: "She embraces him" (111); "She hangs about his neck" (112). Both remarks point to Hermione's own agency in touching Leontes. The stress on her movements – *she* embraces him – marks a significant revision of the Pygmalion story that underlies the scene. That legend figures the female body as turning from ivory to flesh under the touch of the male creator; his kiss enlivens her, generating her blush. In Golding's translation the passage reads thus:

> As soone as he came home, streyght way Pygmalion did repayre
> Unto the Image of his wench, and leaning on the bed,
> Did kisse hir. In her body streyght a warmenesse seemd too spred.
> He put his mouth againe to hers, and on her brest did lay
> His hand. The Iuory wexed soft: and putting quyght away
> All hardnesse, yeelded vnderneathe his fingars, as wee see
> A peece of wax made soft ageinst the Sunne, or drawen too bee
> In diuers shapes by chaufing it betweene ones handes, and so
> To serue to vses. He amazde stood wauering too and fro
> Tweene ioy, and feare too bee beeguyld, ageine he burnt in loue,
> Ageine with feeling he began his wisshed hope too proue.

> He felt it verrye flesh in deede. By laying on his thumb,
> He felt her pulses beating. Then he stood no longer dumb
> But thanked Venus with his hart. and at the length he layd
> His mouth to hers who was as then become a perfect mayd.
> Shee felt the kisse, and blusht therat: and lifting fearefully
> Hir eyelidds vp, hir Louer and the light at once did spye.
>
> (Lines 304–30)

Enterline points to the dynamics underpinning this passage: "But remember – as Ovid's poem certainly asks us to remember when it draws attention to Pygmalion's misogyny – that no one asks his statue if she wants to be 'touched' this way" (2003: 249). In Golding's translation, the male hand is alone active when it molds the female body: "The Iuory wexed soft: and putting quyght away / All hardness, yielded vnderneathe his fingars." If we think again of Merleau-Ponty's insistence of the reversibility of touch – that my pressure on an object is also a pressure on the subject – we can see the significance of the revision of this passage. Pygmalion's touch is a pressure on the other and reversibility is occluded. In contrast, Hermione "woos" Leontes and embraces him, staging a touch that, however ambiguous, nevertheless depends on her own agency. His stoniness, as well as hers, is melted by the act of touch.

Yet this moment is also fraught with ambiguities and gaps, most crucially manifest through Hermione's failure to speak to Leontes. Undermining the impression that she has come to redeem Leontes, Hermione addresses herself entirely to her daughter, and asks her the very questions that remain unanswered within the fiction of the play. We might parse these ambiguities through a return to Merleau-Ponty's discussion of the impossibility of exact superposition, since even within our own bodies "reversibility [is] always imminent and never realized in fact" (1968: 147). He elaborates: the "impotency to superpose exactly upon one another the touching of the things by my right hand and the touching of this same right hand by my left hand, or to superpose, in the exploratory movements of the hand, the tactile experience of a point and that of the 'same' point a moment later …[:] this is not a failure" (1968: 148). Such "impotency" is the inevitable condition of embodiment. Similarly, *The Winter's Tale* stages the chiastic dynamic of touch repeatedly, but never exactly. On this score, the persistent refusal of moments of concretized identity in the play can be read not as failures but as means of drawing attention to the chiastic crossing of identities across an improvised series of substitutions, including the substitution of one character for another (Camillo for Autolyclus, Perdita for Hermione, Florizel for Mamillius) over the "wide gap of time" that both bridges and separates the two parts of the play. This drama of substitution is marked by performing a temporal difference between the two sections, most notably encapsulated in the (real) wrinkles that distinguish Hermione's "statue" from the techniques of reproduction that inform sculptural and painterly mimesis. In theatrical representation such substitutions are always mediated, of course, by a fundamental chiastic crossing of the body of the actor and that of the character.[8] The intermittent phenomenality of this relation becomes representable through what Joseph Roach calls "surrogation," the complex dynamic of "memory, performance, and substitution" (1996: 3) that informs a culture's attempts to reproduce itself. The persistent metatheatricality of *The Winter's Tale* exposes the gaps and fissures in that dynamic, to such an extent that the drama could be said to track the pulse of intermittent vanishings and arrivals. When Leontes concludes the play by reference to the "part / performed in this wide gap of kind" (5.3.153–4), he offers another layer of substitution: that of the actor's body, which embodies someone else, ghost-like, and is at the same time touched by the other roles it has played.

5

Falling into Extremity

Patricia Cahill

There is no such thing as "the sense of touch"; there are only senses of touch. As philosopher Mark Paterson argues, touch must involve much more than tactility or the receptivity of skin surfaces to pain, pressure, and temperature: it must also embrace proprioceptive matters such as one's awareness of balance and of bodily movements through space (2007: 3–5). Touch in this more capacious register may be described as "haptic," a word defined through its Greek etymology as meaning "able to come into contact with" (Bruno 2002: 6). To engage notions of the early modern haptic may appear anachronistic, for the word entered the English language only in the late nineteenth century as part of a specialized psychological and linguistic lexicon – the wider currency it has recently achieved in aesthetics, film theory, and architecture has to do with the modern science of haptics, which focuses on simulating touch and touch-based interfaces in virtual worlds. It is nevertheless true that early modern culture, no less than our own, recognized the entanglement of tactile and proprioceptive knowledge.

I want to elucidate the remarkably haptic underpinnings of two Renaissance texts that, despite their obvious differences in genre and subject matter, foreground encounters with psychic and corporeal extremity – Marlowe's *Hero and Leander* and Shakespeare's *King Lear*. Marlowe's poem, first printed posthumously in 1598, lingers over tactile sensations as it revisits the ancient tale of a swimmer who drowns beneath the waves of the Hellespont; *Lear* (circa 1605–6) not only evokes the exposure of Lear to a "contentious storm / [That] Invades [him] to the skin" (3.4.7–8) but also dramatizes a series of perilous falls including the one that signifies his death. My goal in exploring the haptic modalities of these texts is not simply to connect past understandings of the senses with those of the present. I seek also to show that by engaging with the multiple senses of touch, these texts allow us to make sense of early modern traumatic representation – that is, they help us recover how texts might register an event that, in the words of trauma theorist Cathy Caruth, "is not assimilated or experienced fully at the time, but only belatedly, in its repeated *possession* of the one who experiences it" (1995: 4).

Like Heather Ann Hirschfeld and Thomas Page Anderson, who have (separately) considered early modern traumatic representation and discerned "belated" or latent narrative structures in texts ranging from *Hamlet* to Marvell's lyric verse, this chapter considers how Marlowe's poem and Shakespeare's play render trauma's distinctive temporality of haunting returns.[1] While Hirschfeld and Anderson have focused on specific political, social and religious changes as contexts for extremity, I explore in contrast the *sensory* framework of traumatic representation. Given the critical tendency to focus on the ocular regimes of these two works,[2] I am especially concerned to point out the significance of touch to their narrative structures. My aim is to show how these works repeatedly turn to the haptic as they perform – rather than merely recount – a traumatic impact that, as Caruth suggests, can be grasped only afterwards and in part through the unfolding of a subsequent event. While my readings demonstrate that the early modern performance of trauma does not *require* a stage, they nonetheless uncover the representational possibilities that the early modern theater held out. Accordingly, in examining the Shakespearean tragedy that A. C. Bradley notoriously described as "imperfectly dramatic" because "something in its very essence … is at war with the senses" (1904: 247), I argue that the early modern staging of traumatic touch forced playgoers to confront, in unexpected ways, the limitations of their own sensing bodies.

That touch and trauma are closely linked in early modern texts is hardly surprising. As Elizabeth Harvey has recently observed, touch is inextricably bound up with the psyche: it is, she notes, the faculty that constitutes "the interface of the psychic and the corporeal" (2003: 15). This sensory interface, however, is complicated, not least because trauma has typically been theorized less as a present affect than as an absence; it is understood to represent a confrontation with a radical *not knowing* of its event. Its impact might thus be defined in part as a kind of failure of the senses, for the senses – both in the early modern period and in the present moment – are (among other things) epistemological instruments by which one "knows" or apprehends the world. Significantly, too, in contemporary theory, the apprehension of trauma is typically connected with vision rather than touch. Thus while

Freud – who defined trauma as a penetration or "breach" of the "protective shield" of an organism by "excessive stimuli" – relies on a language of tactility (1953: 29), more recent accounts of trauma tend to foreground the sense of sight. For example, Caruth writes that "To be traumatized is precisely to be possessed by an image or event" (1995: 4–5); Robert Jay Lifton defines traumatic recollection as an "indelible image" (1983: 172); and E. Ann Kaplan remarks upon "trauma's peculiar visuality" (2005: 13). Certainly, as Deborah Willis (2002) has suggested in her reading of gruesome spectacle in *Titus Andronicus*, some Renaissance texts foreground this visual dimension. Nevertheless, I would argue that the traumatic address of many early modern works does not rely solely upon a "modern" grammar of ocularity – upon trauma's visible repetition in the form of possessing images, be they flashbacks, nightmares, or hallucinations. Instead, early modern traumatic representation engages the many senses of touch, not least because – as Bruce Smith's contribution to this volume argues – vision itself was widely understood as a version of touch. Indeed, early modern texts often represent trauma through an *excess* of touch: one that verges, strangely enough, on the failure of touch and, with that, on an encounter with vertigo.

Tellingly, texts of the period describe vertigo – a word derived from the Latin *vertere* meaning "to turn" – in terms of motion: it is most commonly imagined as a loss of a stabilizing touch.[3] Even though "vertigo" appears not to have entered the English language until 1528 when Thomas Paynell, translating a Latin guide to health, defined it as a "heed ache … whiche maketh a man to wene that the worlde turneth" (C3v), descriptions of a condition in which one loses touch with a domain of stable objects and falls into an unsafe world of haptic confusion go back to antiquity. Lucretius, for example, pointed to the giddy perceptions of children who have spun around in circles before coming abruptly to a stop: "the room seems to children to be turning around and the columns revolving when they themselves have ceased to turn, so much so that they can hardly believe that the building is not threatening to fall in upon them" (quoted in Wade and Tatler 2005: 81–2). So, too, early modern dramas conjure up a realm that will not stay still. Sometimes the gesture is explicit: Ben Jonson has Volpone propose to Celia that they will drink a concoction of gold and amber "until [his] roof whirl round / With the vertigo" (3.7.217–18). Sometimes it is implicit: recall the lines from *Cymbeline* quoted above by Bruce Smith, where the incongruity between what characters hear and see as the play concludes is registered through Cymbeline's incredulous question – "Does the world go round?" – and

Posthumus's wonder at the "staggers" with which he is afflicted (5.232–3). As Posthumus's reference to an equine illness characterized by an unsteady gait suggests, the stage routinely proposed that vertigo was haptic in nature, a matter of movement. Indeed, in the anonymous comedy *The knave in graine, new vampt,* (first performed 1625), a doctor insists that "Vertiga" must be distinguished from "a meere setled frenzy" because the former is marked by the sensation of "whirling" (F4r).

This associative register recalls humoral conceptions of the condition. In his writings on vertigo Galen insists it stems from *haptic* as well as visual phenomena: "frequent turning movements," the "unequal, tumultuous and disorderly flow of humors and pneuma," and even the sight of phenomena in motion (quoted in Siegel 1970: 138–9). Galen's crucial point seems to be that this condition first manifests itself through unruly motions in the head. Echoing this humoral account of spinning heads and a falling body, many early modern texts link vertigo with the failures of proprioception: a giddy head, a failing grasp, a tottering body. Thus, in an English translation of the works of the seventeenth-century French physician Lazare Riviere, the "Giddiness, called Vertigo" is defined as "a false Imagination, in which all objects, and the head itself seem to turn round, so as the Patient often falls to the ground, unless he lay hold on some stay at hand" (1657: 35). Even more striking is the haptic language in John Fletcher and William Rowley's comedy *The maide in the mill* (first performed 1623), which features a French tailor named Vertigo who not only incites dizziness in others but is himself a microcosm of a whirling world: consequently, characters are instructed to "hold your heads, and wonder" at this figure about whom it is said "The Revolutions of all shapes and habits / Run madding through his brains" (Bbbbv).

From the vantage point of the present it may seem odd to propose that traumatic representation once relied upon renderings of bodies subject to a disturbed haptic realm. Yet, as is clear from recent scholarship on touch and the agency of the hand in early modern culture, touch was regarded as a *primary* way of knowing the world.[4] Early modern writers often echo Aristotle's observation that touch is essential to life (Harvey 2003: 4–5). Moreover, early modern writers share an Aristotelian understanding that touch can be dangerous: for Aristotle, in fact, while excess in the other senses may cause harm, only an "excess of intensity of tangible qualities can be fatal" (1941: 603). Indeed, touch may be key to early modern renderings of traumatic experience because, for many writers, no other sense was understood to be as elemental.

The possibility of "possession" by excessively intense touch is writ large in anatomist Helkiah Crooke's *Microcosmographia* (1615). Contesting the judgments of ancient authorities, Crooke insists that the sense of touch is properly understood as diffuse and that the stomach and the genitals are instruments only of a "peculiar and particular touch" (1615: 85).[5] For Crooke, the primary organ and instrument of touch is the skin.[6] Skin perceives insides and outsides: it "is apprehensive of those qualities which strike or move the tactive sense, and is thereopon esteemed the judge and discerner of outward touching" (1615: 87). Crooke's account also offers a stunning image of the haptic:

> The world is a Sea, the accidents and divers ocurrents in it are waves, wherin this small Bark is tossed and beaten up and downe, and there is betwixt us and our dissolution, not an inch boord, but a tender skinne, which the slenderest violence [of] even the cold air is able to slice through.
>
> (1615: 60)

Crooke evokes not only a cutaneous surface that is so "tender" or (hyper)sensitive that it might be "slice[d] through" by mere air, but also the vertiginous sensation of being completely ungrounded – of being "tossed and beaten up and downe" by the waves. This representation of worldly disasters imagines a body that seems to be both especially receptive to touch as well as at risk of being altogether ungrounded or out of touch, exposed on every surface to the force of trauma's "slenderest violence." And it is to this haptic nightmare – a fantasy in which one must negotiate the pressures of the tangible as well as the absence of the anchoring faculty associated with the hands and feet – that early modern texts persistently return as they register psychic extremity.

Crooke's account of ungroundedness and of "tender skin" as that which stands "betwixt us and our dissolution," resonates powerfully with both Marlowe's epyillion and *Lear*. I do not mean merely to suggest that these texts are acutely attentive to the perils of tactility, whether that preoccupation takes the form of the amorous embraces depicted in Marlowe's verse or of the tortured touch on view in *Lear*.[7] Rather, what interests me is the way Crooke's nightmare of vertiginous movement permeates the narrative infrastructures of both the Marlovian and Shakespearean texts. Both texts register trauma through specific haptic performances – namely, through their renderings of ungroundedness and falling bodies.[8]

Love deepely grounded

By any measure, the tale of doomed lovers that Marlowe revisits in *Hero and Leander* – a tale that had been the subject of a poem by the ancient Greek poet Musaeus as well as of two letters in Ovid's *Heroides* – might be classified as a narrative of psychic extremity. In Musaeus's telling, Leander falls in love at first sight and begs Hero to meet secretly with him; indeed, much of the first half of the poem is devoted to a description of Leander's nightly swim across the strait to his beloved, who lights a lamp to guide him to her tower. In the poem's second half, however, the deadly falls come into view. Musaeus narrates how Leander is "beaten and hurled along" by the ferocious winds of a treacherous winter storm before meeting his death by drowning, whereupon Hero, after discovering her lover's body cast ashore at the base of her tower, falls to her death alongside him: "Tearing away her embroidered robe from round her breasts, / And sweeping headlong down she fell from the lofty tower" (l. 341). Although the epistolary form of the *Heroides* entails an elliptical treatment of the narrative, the letters Ovid attributes to Hero and Leander repeatedly foreshadow the falls that constitute the myth's tragic ending. Both letters, for example, allude to the mythic figure Alycone, who threw herself into the sea upon learning of her husband's death by drowning during a storm. In fact, virtually every line of the Ovidian text conveys a sense of their impending doom.

At the outset, Marlowe's poem gestures toward the tragic narrative at the center of these prior Hero and Leander texts. Its opening lines describe the Hellespont as "guilty of true-love's blood" and identify Leander as the figure "Whose tragedy divine Musaeus sung." But, famously, Marlowe does not conclude, as Musaeus does, with the lovers' death, nor does he follow Ovid in giving voice to the lovers' terrified contemplation of the possibility of such an ending. In place of Museaus's final vision of the unclothed Hero who "lay in death beside her dead husband" (1975: 342), he has the newly devirginized Hero accidentally falling out of bed in an effort to escape Leander's embrace. Where one might expect to find anguish and grief, the poem offers the rather more perplexing image of Hero exposed "all naked to [Leander's] sight" (1987: 808).

In commenting upon the deviation, some critics have suggested that *Hero and Leander* represents a mere fragment rather than a complete poem. Proponents of this view cite the Latin phrase "*Desunt Nonnulla,*" typically translated as "something is lacking," that was appended – presumably by the printer – to the final lines of the poem's first edition.[9] But what has been imagined as the poem's "lack" – its omission of

Leander's descent under the waves and Hero's fall down from the tower – might rather be productively understood as constituting its deferral of trauma's arrival: a deferral paradoxically ensuring that trauma returns to the narrative symptomatically in other guises. Rather than diagnose aesthetic deficiencies or attempt to get at Marlowe's "real" intentions, in other words, we might instead attend to the poem's extraordinary rendering of traumatic experience as that which can neither be grasped nor avoided. In particular, we might note that the poem's exploration of what it means to be "possessed" by touch conveys its ongoing symbolic effort to assimilate the falling bodies at the heart of the Hero and Leander myth. Consequently, the poem's figuration of touch as a disordering force may be read as part of the process that Dominick LaCapra describes as "working through" through trauma: it remembers, repeats, and re-enacts the traumatic falls that it otherwise fails to narrate (2001: 43–85).

Tellingly, *Hero and Leander*'s language of touch is bound up with dizzying movements as well as with the pleasures of the erotic. Thus the speaker's opening description of Leander asserts a past intimacy with Leander's skin:

> Even as delicious meat is to the tast,
> So was his necke in touching, and surpast
> The white of *Pelops* shoulder, I could tell ye,
> How smooth his brest was, & how white his bellie,
> And whose immortal fingars did imprint,
> That heavenly path, with many a curious dint,
> That runs along his backe, but my rude pen,
> Can hardly blazon foorth the loves of men
> Much lesse of powerfull gods. let it suffise,
> That my slacke muse, sings of *Leanders* eyes …
>
> (63–72)

As the speaker exults in the erotic pleasures of tactility, the poem might be imagined as conjuring up stability rather than vertigo, for the lines produce a body defined by its deliciously smooth *surface*, imagined here in sculptural terms as even better than ivory, the material from which Pelops's shoulder was said to be fashioned. Yet this stability falters. After describing Leander's neck, shoulder, breast, belly, and back, the speaker halts abruptly – and perhaps bawdily – to invoke his "rude pen" and "slacke muse." He takes a sudden and somewhat puzzling turn away from tactility, his tribute to the feel of Leander's skin, to celebrate instead the appearance of Leander's face – his "eyes," "orient cheeks," and "lippes." Underlining the peculiarity of the speaker's rejection of tactility, the poem hints at the limitations of vision as a way of encountering Leander: it must "suffice," a locution that gestures toward the epistemological superiority of the abandoned sense.

To understand this abrupt shift in the rhetoric of sensory apprehension, we might note that the speaker's account of Leander does not enforce a separation between the speaker and the beloved as it names his parts, in contrast to the conventional blazon. Rather, as the speaker turns to touch, we may be reminded of how touch, as Evelyn Tribble points out in her contribution to this volume, reckons profoundly with intersubjectivity. Accordingly, this blazon emphasizes the speaker's proximity to Leander by suggesting the reciprocities of tactual perception. The speaker's lines coyly call attention to "immortal fingers" that have touched Leander's back and "imprint[ed] / That heavenly path, with many a curious dint," indicating the transitive nature of the sense of touch – that is, how in touching one feels the presence and pressure of another as well as oneself. Moreover, as the speaker dwells on the feel of Leander's skin, he hints at a range of alternative narratives of erotic impression, for even as he describes a "heavenly path" that has been "imprinted" on Leander's back, he himself traces a more wayward course over the surfaces of Leander's body.[10]

One may be tempted to read the speaker's sudden turn from tactility to visuality as signifying erotic frustration. But insofar as the lines express unalloyed delight in Leander's body – indeed, they may playfully imply that readers ought to pick up their own pens (as it were) and take up the slack – the speaker's coming to a standstill might rather be understood as a signifying gap in the text, one bound up with the disorientations of *jouissance* rather than with amorous disappointment. In any case, as the speaker goes on to offer what Gregory W. Bredbeck has described as an inventory of homoerotic love scenes, we might say that rather than "fixing" Leander in the poem's putatively dominant narrative, the language of tactility arrests that narrative as it bespeaks the speaker's own "fall" into desire. It is no accident that the poem's initial usage of the first person pronoun happens here, precisely as the speaker considers Leander's skin. It is as though poetic narrative as such has been waylaid by the force of the tactile.

What is most striking about the speaker's sensory rhetoric in this passage is how it exemplifies the poem's general tendency to figure touch as a radically disorienting force. Just as the poem here links the speaker's tactile memory of Leander's skin with the sudden inability to continue movement on a (narrative) path, so it will subsequently conjure up scenes of hyperbolically haptic desire: of Narcissus "that leapt into the water for a kis / Of his owne shadow" (74–5); of the "rudest paisant melt[ing]" at the "presence" of Leander (79); and of the "barbarous *Thratian* soldier moov'd with nought" who "was moov'd with him, and for his favour sought" (81–2). Significantly, such scenes suggest that to be in the throes of desire is to lose one's self-possession as a desiring subject. In calling upon this expansive sense of touch, the verse does not only veer abruptly from one mythic scene to another and unexpectedly admit the speaker's entrance under the sign of "I"; it also seems to solicit the desire – and, more pointedly, the disorientation – of its readers.

The poem's means of hearkening "back" to the two traumatic falls registered in Musaeus's text are subtle and wide-ranging. For example, in the speaker's description of the lovers' first conversation, Hero's synaesthetic description of the location employs a rhetoric of amorous touch. Far from her tower, she says, is a "sea" that "playing on yellow sand, / Sends foorth a ratling murmure to the land, / Whose sound allures the golden Morpheus, / In silence of the night to visite" (347–50). The sea's tactile "play" is something of a come-on, insofar as the speaker suggests that it immediately yields the parapraxis by which she invites Leander, Morpheus-like, to visit her in her tower:

> Comt thither; As she spake this, her toong tript,
> For unawares (*Come thither*) from her slipt....
>
> (357–9)

Strikingly, Hero's invitation is here imagined in terms of an accidental *fall* – "her toong tript," so that the invitation "from her slipt." Through the episode, the speaker's account of pleasurable tactility is conflated with an evocation of erratic motions, the fits and starts of a body in which "sodainly her former colour chang'd, / And here and there her eies through anger rang'd" (359–60).

In short, the speaker's playful performance of vertiginous touch in these passages suggests an effort to master a trauma that remains radically unknowable. At least twice, the poem comically evokes its engagement with the literal ungraspability that defines traumatic experience when it describes how, in separate incidents, the lovers collapse, upon encountering the force of desire. Thus the lovers' first meeting culminates not with Hero's invitation but with her subsequent swooning: "By this, sad *Hero*, with love unacquainted, / Viewing Leander's face, fell downe and fainted" (485–6). Similarly, Leander's chance meeting with

Neptune, who initially mistakes him for Ganymede, is presented as an encounter with the excesses of a liquid and very nearly death-dealing touch: Leander's body is "seaz'd" (642); "puld … to the bottome" of the sea where "Sweet singing Meremaids" cavort with their lovers (644; 646); and then cast upwards as Neptune, realizing his error and perceiving that Leander "under water … was almost dead," abruptly "heaved [Leander] up" (646). As the poem details these narratives about amorous touch leading to death-like collapse, it also, of course, negotiates the "real" ending of the tale. As such, these accounts suggest the two-part structure of trauma: in evoking the way the lovers fall to the ground or are pulled to the bottom of the sea, the poem, as it were, performs the "real" ending of the tale. The two scenes of death, although omitted from the poem, seemingly cannot be avoided.

The poem's insistent and belated "return" to scenes of falling and fainting bodies is especially vivid in its rendering of the lovers' first meeting in Venus's temple. The encounter, like the lovers' first meeting in *Romeo and Juliet*, happens through the meeting of their hands:

> He toucht her hand, in touching it she trembled,
> *Love deepely grounded, hardly is dissembled*.
> These lovers parled by the touch of hands,
> True love is mute, and oft amazed stands.
>
> (183–6)

While the speaker here evokes touch's reciprocity as deeper and truer than speech, the pronoun reversals in the first line emphasize that touch has the capacity to implode boundaries between seemingly distinct persons. The description of love's bedazzlement – it "oft amazed stands" – recalls the erotic force of the speaker's own earlier coming to a standstill in the course of his blazon of Leander.

However conventional, such rhetoric of desire underscores the poem's striking intuition of touch as that which disorients, rather than anchors, lovers in the world. Indeed, in this context, the aphorism about love "deepely grounded" must be read as deeply ironic, for the "groundedness" of these lovers is asserted precisely as the poem sets them in a domain marked by extraordinary instability. The lines that describe the lovers' initial meeting in Venus's temple may seem to represent one of most carefully choreographed moments of the poem – they are, after all, filled with prepositional phrasings such as "On this feast day" (131), "o'rehead" (137), "underneath this radiant floure" (145), and "in the midst" (157) that appear to fix the lovers' encounter securely in space and time. But a closer look reveals that virtually nothing is fixed in the ostensibly stabilizing narrative, since nearly every detail of the extravagant setting – from its image of "light headed *Bacchus*" hanging by one hand from the bejeweled ceiling to its image of the gods dallying, bellowing, tumbling, and heaving a net underneath a "Christall shining" glass pavement (139, 141) – seems to invite sensations of vertigo. If the passage describing the lovers' touching palms hints at the capacity of touch to erode boundaries between subjects, the set-piece of Venus's temple seems to go one step further, identifying the touch of desire with the swirling sensation of chaos and self-loss. As in the earlier passages, the poem performs here the disorientations of desire. Equating desire with errant motion and self-dissolution, the poem's haptic language represents desiring subjects as figures who are utterly lost to themselves and whose erratic movements often seem to have little to do with intended pleasures or erotic volition.

The poem's writing of erotic touch in terms of erratic movement, on the one hand, and of being "frozen" into deathlike stillness, on the other, is linked to its famously wayward narrative. That is, the poem also performs the force of traumatic touch through what Marion Campbell has termed its "cumulative" rather than "progressive" aesthetic form: veering digressions are punctuated by freeze-frame spectacles that together subvert any sense of progress in the plot (265). Why is this poem so marked by stops and starts? Why does it catapult from one image of vertiginous motion to another, from that of Hero fainting in the temple to that of Leander's descent with Neptune to the ocean floor to that of the "creatures wanting sence" who "Mov'd by Loves force, unto ech other lep" (540, 542)? In its figuration of disorienting touch and its narrative errancy, *Hero and Leander* might be read as reckoning with the extremity of events it does not explicitly encounter. This sense of a missed confrontation with extremity grows increasingly powerful as the poem nears its end, where the haptic rhetoric that permeates the speaker's account of Hero and Leander's rapturous sexual union disturbingly alludes to Musaeus's last image of Hero's trembling body plunging to the ground. Thus the speaker describes how, in their lovemaking, Hero "trembling strove" with Leander as a "bird, which in our hands we wring, / Foorthe plungeth, and oft flutters with her wing" (775, 773–4). Even more strikingly, the poem's startling conclusion – where, "as [Hero's] naked feet were whipping out" of the bed in an attempt to escape Leander, "He on the suddaine cling'd her so about, / That Meremaid-like unto the floor she slid" (797–9) – might be read, paradoxically enough, both as an attempt to master the trauma of Hero's fatal fall and as an expression of the literal force of its impact.

While these lines conjure up Hero's falling body in all its vulnerability, they also carry echoes of Neptune's mermaid-filled empire, the place to which Leander will descend in his death.

Indeed, the poem's closing lines imagine a further descent still in store for Hero as they conflate her with a feminized figure – namely, "ougly night" – who, having been "mockt" by the "flaring beamess" of a masculinized daybreak, is "o'recome with anguish, shame, and rage" only to be "Dang'd downe to hell" (816–18). Marlowe's writing of this infernal descent encrypts an Ovidian narrative about Helle, the figure for whom the infamous strait was named and whose tragic fate mirrors that of the doomed lovers. As recounted in the *Heroides*, Helle and her brother fled from a wicked stepmother and were carried through the air by a ram whose golden fleece would later be celebrated in myth. Ovid's Helle succumbs to vertigo while being carried through the air: falling, like Hero, to her death, she drowns, like Leander, in the Hellespont. Significantly, this myth is twice alluded to elsewhere in Marlowe's poem, first at the start of the poem when the speaker compares Leander's hair to the golden fleece (58), and later – and more pointedly – when Neptune accompanies his promise to protect Leander from the waves with the gift of a bracelet once worn by Helle (663–4). As these allusions to Helle's vertigo suggest, Marlowe's verse narrative is "possessed" by an event that at first glance it would seem to forget: the disavowed image, of a traumatic fall into ungroundedness.

The very brim of the cliff

King Lear also writes trauma through a narrative of falling bodies. Consider the closing scene, which opens with the captured Cordelia telling Lear, that she is "cast down" (5.3.5) and Lear delighting in the possibility that he has "caught" her, thereby rescuing her from this dangerous descent (5.3.21). Cordelia's metaphor is literalized and displaced as the scene continues and audiences witness a cascade of falling bodies. Thus the play shows the fatal collapse of both Edmund who "fall[s]" in a duel (s.d. after 5.3.148) and Regan who has been poisoned by Goneril and must be conveyed offstage. And it also evokes the faltering body of the grief-stricken Kent, whom Edgar reports he has left "tranced" (5.3.217) or in "an unconscious or insensible condition; a swoon, a faint" (*OED* "trance"). Falling is central as well to the play's final moments, when it becomes clear that even space and time are imagined as subject to grievous touch: Albany responds to the sight of the King carrying Cordelia's body with the command, or plea, that the world itself "Fall and cease" (5.3.263), and, in the play's final lines, Edgar asserts the need to "obey" the "weight of this sad time" (5.3.322), an injunction that implicitly fashions the play's survivors as over-burdened figures on the brink of physical collapse.

The play's most compelling engagement with falling and with the figure of the overburdened body is its representation in this scene of Lear's physical collapse on the stage in close proximity to that of Cordelia. The harrowing sequence of actions includes the distraught Lear assuring his presumably dead daughter that he "killed the slave that was a-hanging" her (5.3.23); asking someone to undo a button (a request that may evoke a tightness at either his or her neck or a stripping of the body for burial); commanding all to "look on her" (5.3.308); and then dropping to the ground with a suddenness marked by Edgar's cry of surprise ("He faints!": 5.3.310). But even as this sequence brings together Lear's reference to the offstage fall of his daughter in a hangman's noose with the spectacle of his own onstage "faint[ing]" and final collapse, the play does not simply narrate a past loss. Rather, I would argue that the play in effect re-enacts for spectators the trauma of the interrupted offstage hanging and reperforms the event, whose unfinished temporal status is signaled by the confused verb tenses in Lear's address to his daughter.

In offering a display of the two dying bodies, Shakespeare's play offers spectators a clear vision of the kind of tragic ending that *Hero and Leander* evokes only obliquely. What needs emphasizing, however, is that, despite the fact that *Lear* displays its dying bodies as it nears its inescapably bleak ending, it shares with Marlowe's poem a deep engagement with the deferred narrative structure of trauma. Perhaps nowhere in the play are these traumatic underpinnings more clearly performed than they are in act 4, when spectators encounter the blind and suicidal Gloucester being led to Dover by the disguised Edgar. It is a scene that famously incites bewilderment in its viewers. Dr. Johnson, for instance, recounts Addison's observation that "he who can read it without being giddy has a very good head, or a very bad one" (1908: 158). Just as a narrative of vertiginous touch sustains *Hero and Leander*'s endless deferral of the "real" ending of the traumatic narrative, so too the dizzying scene of Gloucester's stage-managed fall helps to suspend – and thereby revivify – the traumatic falls that will be enacted in the last scene of *Lear*. As the play shows Edgar telling Gloucester, who has asked to be led to the edge or "very brim" of a "cliff, whose high and bending head / Looks fearfully in the confined deep" (4.2.73–5), that he is now "within a foot / Of th'extreme verge" (4.6.26), it literalizes its dread of reaching its own traumatic ending, an ending anticipated in the play's earliest moments with Lear's desire to "Unburthened crawl toward death" (1.1.39).[11]

If this description of the infantile posture Lear will later adopt offers an early intimation of how the play links haptic matters with mortality, it may also remind us that the play draws playgoers into a virtually infantilized position insofar as they, much like the blind Gloucester, cannot with certainty decipher the physical movements of bodies on the stage. The Dover cliffs scene opens by presenting us with a figure whose blindness signals a much more profound sensory confusion. As is evident from its opening lines, the play holds out the possibility that Gloucester can be fooled not only about what he hears but also about the very movements of his body in space:

> GLOUCESTER. When shall we come to the top of that same hill?
> EDGAR. You do climb up it now. Look how we labour.
>
> (4.6.1–2)

Like Gloucester, audiences, too, are in the dark about these haptic matters and remain that way for much of the scene, for, as many scholars have noted, even the question of what happens onstage immediately after Gloucester lets go of Edgar's hand and says farewell at the imaginary cliff is not obvious.[12] According to the *Norton Shakespeare*, Gloucester "falls forward and swoons" (sd after 4.5.41), but other editors, as R. A. Foakes observes in his Arden edition, expand the Quarto's notation "He falls" – to suggest *how* Gloucester's fall is to be staged:

> Editors since Capell have often expanded the SD to "Gloucester throws himself forward and falls", and this is a common way of playing it, though sometimes he is made to jump, and in Peter Brook's 1962 production he fainted as he fell, giving point to the enormous risk Edgar is aware he is taking, that his father may really die. An older stage tradition established by Edmund Kean had Edgar move forward and "catch Gloucester as he prepared to fall".
>
> (note to 4.6.41)

Rather than intervene in the critical debate about the "proper" staging of Gloucester's fall – a debate that, as Foakes goes on to suggest, hinges on the unanswerable question of when spectators come to understand that the cliff is merely a linguistic construction – I want to address an elementary aspect of this scene that seems thus far to have escaped critical comment. No matter what one believes about the audience's cognizance of Edgar's ruse, one has to reckon with the fact that, unless one follows the stage tradition originating with Edmund Kean and arguably not supported by the text, Gloucester does in fact fall in this scene.[13] Such reckoning should not be construed as a requirement to embrace an empiricism that runs counter to the perspectival illusions conjured up by Edgar.[14] On the contrary, rather than suggest the solidity of an empirical world, the play's staging of Gloucester's collapsing body bears witness to the uncanniness of this vertiginous scene – that is, to the way in which Gloucester's falling body will come to resonate well beyond the moment of its falling.

Like Marlowe's rendering of Hero's fall out of bed, Shakespeare's rendering of Gloucester's fall at Dover has been read as a moment in which the text seems perplexingly to turn away from tragedy. Insofar as the "cliff" from which Gloucester falls is a fiction created by Edgar, it is often said that when Gloucester falls, the play veers toward the domain of slapstick or farce. The notion that this scene departs from a prior narrative is well worth exploring further because it clearly acknowledges what those critics who see this scene as seamlessly woven into what has come before and what comes afterward would seem to overlook: the affective resonance of Gloucester's actual fall in the space of the theater. The play seems to demand here that audience members feel or imagine shock at the moment the actor's body hits the stage. This jolt – which may have elicited from early modern playgoers anything from a laugh to a gasp of horror – does interrupt the narrative thrust of the scene. When the actor's body strikes the surface of the stage, the audience is in effect transported to an eerie space: one both is, and is not, in the world of theatrical illusion. In this sense, the jolt signifies precisely that one is in the domain of trauma, since – as one is likely to realize only afterward – one cannot fully apprehend what one witnesses at the moment one witnesses it. However one stages Gloucester's fall, the play's traumatic structure is such that the meaning of this fall – literally, its impact – cannot be confined to the moment of falling. Instead, Gloucester's fall continues to unfold as this event "bleeds" into the scenes that follow, including those in which we become aware of the deaths of Cordelia and Lear.[15] Accordingly, the latent trauma of this scene emerges only retroactively, as one re-encounters it in the sequence of falls with which the play concludes.

It is telling that Gloucester's suicide attempt betrays a desire to escape the world of touch. Before the fall, Gloucester asks, or orders, Edgar to "let go" of his hand (4.6.27); after the fall, the failed suicide is registered by the language of haptic sensation:

> EDGAR. Give me your arm.
> Up – so. How is't? Feel you your legs? You stand.
> GLOUCESTER. Too well. Too well.
>
> (4.6.64–6)

In depicting Edgar's clasping of Gloucester's arm, the play would seem to be powerfully countering Edgar's earlier contrast between vertiginous sight and the superior anchoring capacities of the tactile body. In fact, even as the play stages what, following Evelyn Tribble, we might think of as a performance of corporeality, it insistently suggests that the tactile body and the sense of touch remain at best a burden or "affliction" for Gloucester.[16] In this regard it is striking that even as the play represents the would-be suicide affirming a wish to die, it suggests, paradoxically enough, that Gloucester falls because he has been *moved* to fall:

> This world I do renounce, and in your sights,
> Shake patiently my great affliction off.
> If I could bear it longer, and not fall
> To quarrel with your great opposeless wills,
> My snuff and loathed part of nature should
> Burn itself out.
>
> (4.6.37–9)

Clearly, Gloucester speaks here as if he is choosing to renounce the world, but his very language indicates that he has no choice about this death. As the line endings emphasize, what he literally says is that if he "could … not fall," he would not fall off the cliff. Even in staging the attempt to die, in other words, *Lear* suggests that there is no escape from the pressures of the haptic.

At the heart of the vertiginous scene at Dover is a narrative about the trauma of being subject to the many senses of touch. Here the drama of touch not only entails a falling body – that is, a body whose movements literally foreshadow Lear's fatal collapse – but also a body in flight, the ghostly counterpart of Cordelia's hanging body and the signifier of a desired escape from the haptic realm. This language of flight is crucial to the oft-quoted lines in which Edgar evokes for his father a dizzying view down from the putative cliff as well as the sensation of vertigo that supposedly accompanies his gaze:

> Come on, sir; here's the place. Stand still. How fearful
> And dizzy 'tis, to cast one's eyes so low!
> The crows and choughs that wing the midway air
> Show scarce so gross as beetles. Halfway down
> Hangs one that gathers sampire, dreadful trade!
> … I'll look no more,

Lest my brain turn, and the deficient sight
Topple down headlong.

(4.6.11–15, 22–4)

From the vantage point afforded by Marlowe's text, this perspectival vision engages a familiar rhetoric of vertigo in which standing still is punctuated by turning and falling. Moreover, Edgar's speech gives voice to the disquieting notion of a human body that is vulnerable not only to what it sees, but also *in its very matter* insofar as it is this matter that renders it unable either to stand still or, like the crows and choughs, to "wing the midway air."[17] Underlying this passage, in short, is a suggestion – not unlike Crooke's – that the world of touch is an inescapably terrifying domain for the tactile body, a "great affliction" that cannot be "shake[n] … off" as Gloucester so affectingly desires.

Edgar's words to Gloucester moments after his supposed fall from the cliff are similarly striking, not simply because they so stunningly continue the illusion that Gloucester has fallen from a cliff, but also because they return to the fantasy of human flight and the notion of bodily substance as a marker of one's vulnerability:

Hadst thou been aught but gossamer, feathers, air,
So many fathom down precipitating,
Thou'dst shivered like an egg; but thou dost breathe;
Hast heavy substance; bleed'st not; speak'st; art sound.
Ten masts at each make not the altitude
Which thou hast perpendicularly fell.
Thy life's a miracle.

(4.6.49–55)

Edgar begins by suggesting that Gloucester's insubstantiality has provided him with protection. Like the flimsy substances of gossamer, feathers, and air, Gloucester's body has survived the violence of a headlong or "precipitating" fall; lacking solidity, it has not shattered, or "shivered like an egg." Significantly, the floating and insubstantial body Edgar here attributes to Gloucester is also imagined as an exquisitely sensitive body, not least because gossamer evokes the image of spiders' webs – that is, the "fine filmy substance, consisting of cobwebs, spun by small spiders, which is seen floating in the air in calm weather" (*OED*, "gossamer") – a common emblem of tactility in early modern iconography.[18] Indeed, one might say that Edgar here departs from his prior account of the trials of tactility to imagine instead a body that is the *opposite* of that conjured up in Crooke's far less wondrous vision: one whose sensitivity to touch, as though by miracle, does not come at the price of an extreme vulnerability.

By the fourth line of this speech, Edgar dispenses with the gorgeous fantasy of invulnerable and floating beings, acknowledging explicitly that Gloucester's body is, in fact, a thing of "heavy substance." As the haptic pun in this phrase suggests, Edgar would seem to imply that the "substance" that Gloucester possesses is signified not merely by the weight of his body but by the fact that this substance – embodiment itself – is oppressively "heavy" – it "weighs or presses hardly or sorely on the senses or feelings" (*OED*, "heavy"). If one looks again at the lines in which Edgar stakes a claim for Gloucester's near-weightlessness, it becomes clear that the play cannot sustain, even momentarily, its fantasy of corporeal invulnerability. Even Edgar's claim that Gloucester's body has *not* "shivered like an egg" is belied by the way it so powerfully evokes the physical sufferings of the play's old men: thus the egg reference recalls both the corporeality of Lear, whose crown, as the fool has earlier suggested, has been cut into two halves like an egg, and that of Gloucester, to whose wounded eye sockets a servant earlier sought to apply egg whites.

Still more powerfully, Edgar's speech also transports playgoers ahead in time to the moment in the play's final scene in which Lear, seeking to discover life in the dead body of his daughter, equates the movement of an insubstantial thing with vitality itself: "This feather stirs; she lives!" (5.3.264). Lear's reference is to the heartbreaking test he has devised to establish whether Cordelia is alive – to test whether she has enough breath to *move* something so light.[19] The scene's conflation of breath and tactility may also remind us that, as Didier Anzieu has observed, breath may be conceived of as precisely the force that gives the body volume, that makes it tangible.[20] Given all the critical attention to Edgar's ocular pyrotechnics elsewhere in the scene, it is easy to forget the crucial fact that the scene at Dover, like the play's last scene, is very much about the ways in which bodies *feel* things, including – and, perhaps, above all – their own weight. Accordingly, what is most noteworthy about Edgar's speech after his father's failed suicide is that while it evokes a desire for weightlessness – and thus for immunity from a world in which one is subject to the senses of touch – it also returns one to what the play represents as an unavoidable encounter with the anguish of haptic sensation.

By way of conclusion, I turn to a seemingly minor moment in *King Lear*. The opening scene offers a metaphor of traumatic touch that is at the same time a metaphor for the bewildering temporality characteristic of both Marlowe's poem and Shakespeare's play. The passage shows Kent unsuccessfully attempting to dissuade Lear from following through on his impetuous renunciation of Cordelia:

> **KENT.** Royal Lear,
> Whom I have ever honoured as my king,
> Loved as my father, as my master followed,
> As my great patron thought on in my prayers –
> **KING LEAR.** The bow is bent and drawn, make from the shaft.
> **KENT.** Let it fall rather, though the fork invade
> The region of my heart: be Kent unmannerly,
> When Lear is mad. What wilt thou do, old man?
>
> (1.1.139–46)

The exchange introduces a peculiarly resonant figure for traumatic experience in that it conjures up not only the specter of a literal wound but also a temporal structure that is strangely "frozen," like that of Marlowe's poem. While it may seem as though the play's evocation of the readied weapon gestures toward an already begun and soon-to-be-completed action, spectators are in fact left with a compelling image of a movement suspended in (or, perhaps, out of) time; immediately after Lear's pronouncement that the bow is at the ready and Kent's subsequent declaration that Lear should "let [the shaft] fall," the play abandons the image of an arrow in flight. Offering this enigmatic image of an arrow that seems always already to have left its point of origin and yet may never quite arrive at its destination, the play casts the arrow's flight as an unfinished event, one whose completion is figured both as a "fall" and as a death-dealing wound. This image of an arrow hovering in the air remains eerily "current" throughout act 4 until it comes home, as it were, in the final scene: one in which the deadly fall of two bodies – that is, the hanging of Cordelia's body and the collapse of Lear's – unequivocally conveys the impact of trauma's arrival.

Insisting that Marlowe's *Hero and Leander* must be understood as an unfinished work, C. S. Lewis famously opined that "A story cannot properly end with the two chief characters dancing on the edge of the cliff: it must go on to tell us how by some miracle, they were preserved, or how, far more probably, they fell over" (1954: 240). Clearly, Marlowe's poem and Shakespeare's play do not, as Lewis would have it, imagine falling as a "proper" ending. Instead, as they offer narratives of continual falling, they both "preserve" their traumatic endings and signal their failure to reach closure. As Shakespeare's play and Marlowe's poem differently attempt to come to terms with extremity, they turn repeatedly to faltering, fainting, and collapsing bodies – in short, to a rhetoric suggesting that to be subject to a tactile body is to be breathtakingly susceptible to affliction. At the same time, these texts give shape to a powerful, albeit fleeting, fantasy of escape from the tactile body and, more crucially, from the fall into extremity that possession of this body seems to portend – nowhere so poignantly perhaps as when Gloucester, upon his revival after his fall, turns to Edgar and asks, "But have I fallen or no?" (4.6.56). Early modern traumatic representation, so Gloucester's words may remind audiences, entails that which is literally incomprehensible: it cannot be grasped and taken in hand. If we were to attend more closely to the haptic structures of other early modern texts, we might well discover that other texts also write extremity by, as it were, "dancing on the edge of the cliff." Ultimately, then, to attend to the way these two works explore the enigmas of erratic movement and heavy substance, is to recognize that we have yet fully to explore how early modern culture understood the experience of being gripped by trauma's vertiginous touch.

6

Roman World, Egyptian Earth: Cognitive Difference and Empire in Shakespeare's *Antony and Cleopatra*[1]

Mary Thomas Crane

Critics over the years have found many ways to read the binary division of Shakespeare's *Antony and Cleopatra* between the poles of Rome and Egypt.[2] Recently, postcolonial theory has informed readings that emphasize the "Otherness" of Egypt: as John Gillies has argued, the "'orientalism' of Cleopatra's court – with its luxury, decadence, splendour, sensuality, appetite, effeminacy, and eunuchs – seems a systematic inversion of the legendary Roman values of temperance, manliness, courage, and *pietas*."[3] However, as these critics usually acknowledge, the contrast between the two blurs upon closer inspection, since, as Gillies again puts it, "only from the vantage point of Egypt does Rome seem Roman."[4]

I want to approach the differences between Rome and Egypt in Shakespeare's play as, in large part, cognitive differences, based in Shakespeare's imaginative engagement with changing theories of the relationship between human sense perception and scientific truth. By this I mean that Rome and Egypt seem to be the sites of very different perceptual styles, which are in turn based upon very different beliefs about the nature of the material world. The cognitive orientations of Rome and Egypt have different epistemological underpinnings, and also very different political implications. Romans in the play name their environment the "world," and perceive and understand it primarily in visual terms. Their "world" is composed largely of hard, opaque, human-fashioned materials and its surface is divided into almost obsessively named – and conquered – cities and nations. Caesar refers to the reaction of the "round world" to Antony's death (5.1.15) and a temporarily Romanized Antony warns Octavia that "the world and my great office will sometimes / Divide me from your bosom" (2.3.1–2).[5] Egyptians, on the other hand, inhabit the "earth," in which they imagine themselves to be immersed, and which they perceive and understand through all the senses. The "earth" is yielding, encompassing, generative, and resistant to human division and mastery: a defeated Antony asks that Caesar let him "breathe between the heavens and earth / A private man in Athens" (3.11.14–15), and after Antony's death, Cleopatra cries "the crown o'th'earth doth melt" (4.16.65).[6]

As William Cunningham points out in his *Cosmographicall Glasse* (1559), early modern English used "worlde" to denote the object of cosmography, study of the earth and the heavens. "Th'earth," by contrast, was for Cunningham the object of geography, which studied "Hylles, Montayns, Seas, fluddes, and such other notable thinges, as are in it conteined."[7] Egyptian understanding of their relation to the earth is partly based on the Aristotelian system of elements and humors that was, by 1606, at the beginning of the end of its dominance. Romans, however, seem to have left behind that system and its porous interrelationships between subject and nature, replacing it with a subjectivity separated from and overlooking the natural world and imagining itself as able to control it. These differing systems of thought and perception result in very different versions of nation and empire. The Roman "world" seems to be reaching toward something like what Shankar Raman has termed "colonialist space," and toward the rational subject who can exploit it.[8] Egyptian earthiness suggests both the intractability and inscrutability of nature in the face of the human will to power.

The attractiveness of Egypt and unattractiveness of Rome have troubled many critics, and Shakespeare's relatively positive representation of Egypt has sometimes been read as nostalgia for a heroic past. It can also be read, I think, as nostalgia for a passing theory of the material world: the pre-seventeenth-century cosmos of elements and humors that rendered subject and world deeply interconnected and saturated with meaning.[9] Gillies has argued that this very saturation of meaning – "a rich geographic tradition which is clearly already moralized, already inherently 'poetic' in the sense of being alive with human and dramaturgical meaning" – shapes Shakespeare's representation of marginal, outlandish, barbarous, and exotic non-European cultures, in need of control by the rational and self-controlled West.[10] Raman, on the other hand, links protocolonialist representations of India and the East in Shakespeare's time with developments in geometry and cartography that led to "a changed understanding of space" and "a Western man, adequate to that space."[11] Certainly, both the beliefs and prejudices inherited from classical antiquity and the technologies produced by the "new science" contributed to the ideologies that justified the colonial domination of India, Africa, and the Americas by European cultures. However, the most interesting question raised by Shakespeare's *Antony and Cleopatra* is less *which* of these two modes of thought is the most implicated in colonialism, than *how* each belief system works as a mode of inhabiting the world. Although Egypt in the play is certainly marked by orientalizing stereotypes, I want to argue here that it also represents a mode of thought that Shakespeare associated with sixteenth-century England, and that is experientially resistant both to a will to colonize others, and, finally, to being colonized itself.

Although the imperial Roman paradigm wins out in the historical narrative traced by the play, the Egyptian mode proves itself to be difficult to fix, pin down, or grasp. Its intangibility, imagistic richness, and extravagance ally it with both the poetic and the theatrical – that is, with literature as opposed to "science" in its modern sense. The play thus traces the nascent split between C. P. Snow's "two cultures," although it may also suggest that the Egyptian relation to the natural world involves a kind of knowledge different from, but not necessarily inferior to, the scopic economy of the new science.[12]

Some readers may object that Shakespeare was not a scientific thinker, and that 1606–7, the probable date of *Anthony and Cleopatra*, was too early for the influence of Boylesian atomism and Cartesian dualism to have made itself felt. Unlike John Donne, who refers explicitly to the disorientation caused by changing theories of the universe and of matter, Shakespeare engages with the new science only implicitly.[13] However, my argument here is based on a different set of assumptions regarding the nature of scientific knowledge and its relation to literary texts. As contemporary cognitive scientists have suggested, most people hold intuitive beliefs about the nature of the universe that are based on common, everyday experience of the material world and that can contradict the tenets of contemporary organized science.[14] Although there is debate about the extent to which these intuitive beliefs represent universals as opposed to culturally constructed knowledge, several writers have noted that intuitive physics corresponds in multiple ways with Aristotelian science.[15] Indeed, it seems likely that the corpus of Aristotelian science and its medieval elaborations were, essentially, systematizations of intuitive science. In this case, a critical implication of the shift to the "new science" of the seventeenth century would be the beginnings of a disjunction between intuitive science and official scientific theory, a disjunction that has only increased over time.

My assertion about Shakespeare's engagement with this shift is that he and other writers in the period were aware of scientific theories that seemed to be moving away from ordinary experience of material existence. The atomic theory espoused by Thomas Hariot and his circle provides one example of a disjunction between theory about nature and experience of it; speculative writings about changes in states of matter, contemporary with Shakespeare, also began to question the validity of Aristotelian science.[16] I am not arguing that Shakespeare anticipated Descartes as a scientific theorist, but only that he was generally aware that new explanations of the nature of the world were being formulated that questioned his intuitive sense of the ways things worked, an intuitive sense that had been reinforced and legitimated by Aristotelian science.

"Earth" in *Antony and Cleopatra* is both another name for the "world," and the name of one of the constitutive elements of Aristotelian science: earth, water, air, and fire. Antony's early declaration of love for Cleopatra clearly articulates the difference between imperial world and material earth; "Let Rome in Tiber melt, and the wide arch / Of the rang'd Empire fall! Here is my space, / Kingdoms are clay; our dungy earth alike / Feeds beast as man" (1.1.33–6). The Roman world is an orderly, impermeable, manmade "arch." The Egyptian "earth" is "dungy" "clay" – elemental, life-giving, and allied with another element, water. In general, characters associated with Egypt perceive the world as composed of the four elements. Gillies notes the prevalence of water imagery in the play, but the other elements are present as well. The soldiers who believe they hear Hercules abandoning Antony perceive mysterious "music i'th' air" or "under the earth" (4.3.13). While the Romans refer to battles waged on "sea" or "land" rather than water and earth, Antony reveals his mixed allegiance when he notes that the Roman "preparation is to-day by sea, / We please them not by land," while he and his Egyptian allies "would they'ld fight i'th' fire, or i'th' air" (4.11.1–3). Cleopatra heralds her coming death when she proclaims "I am fire and air, my other elements / I give to baser life" (5.2.289–90).

Before the beginnings of modern chemistry in the mid-seventeenth century, most educated Europeans believed in some version of the Aristotelian theory that all matter was composed of the four elements. This theory of matter had the advantage of positing that the "qualia" of the material substances – their perceptible qualities such as dryness, wetness, density, and solidity – were direct manifestations of their essential nature.[17] "Earth" was dry and cold, for instance, and the properties of elemental earth were dryness and coldness. In this sense, Aristotelian science read back from sense perceptions to construct a theory of matter that accorded with what could be directly perceived, and it entailed the belief that human senses provided reliable information about the true nature of the universe. The theory thus corresponds at many points with modern intuitive science because it codifies and provides explanations for basic everyday experience of the world. In addition, Aristotelian science posited a close connection between the elements constructing the macrocosm and the humors that constructed the human microcosm, such that earth and its inhabitants were made of the same interchangeable stuff. In attempting to account for changes in non-living elements, Aristotle drew an analogy from the operations of the human body (digestion, concoction, and so on) to understand the operations (melting, evaporation, ripening, decay) of non-human matter. In this universe, people and the earth were inextricably intertwined.[18]

Nevertheless, the assumption that unaided human perception provided an accurate view of the very nature of matter remained a signal disadvantage of the Aristotelian theory of matter as well, because, as we now know, the atomic and molecular structures that determine its properties are not directly visible. Moreover, the theory had difficulty in accounting for change: changes in states of matter, for instance, since the transformation of water from liquid to solid or gas involved transformation of its qualities and therefore, potentially, of its essential nature. Early theorists like Galileo and Hariot in the late sixteenth century anticipated the work of seventeenth-century chemists like Robert Boyle and began to replace the Aristotelian theory of matter with the atomic theory that still holds true today, albeit in a different form. Atomic theory better accounts for changes in states of matter, explained by changes in the distance between the tiny particles, or their interactions with each other, but it introduces a gap between observation and theory: the tiny, invisible particles that atomic theorists assumed could not be directly seen or perceived in any way. As Christopher Meinel has argued, "there was no experimental proof possible" for an atomic theory of matter until the nineteenth century and, as Thomas Kuhn suggests, "Boyle's constructive attempt to replace existing theories of the elements by a conceptual scheme derived from the prevalent metaphysical atomism of the seventeenth century was a failure."[19] Bruno Latour has emphasized the "work of *retrofitting* that situates a more recent event" – such as experimental evidence for the existence of atoms – "as what 'lies beneath' an older one" (the speculative atomism of the seventeenth century). Latour's insight reminds us that in 1607, the "new" science might seem to be separating the tangible surfaces of the world from their invisible material underpinnings, even though experimental evidence later caught up with theory and provided retroactive underpinnings for it.[20] The end of belief in the Aristotelian elements meant the end of a system in which human sensory experience of the world was thought to give unmediated access to truth about it, and, indeed, in which humans and the world were interconnected in complex ways. Instead, the new science fostered a system in which visual observation, categorization, and naming of the surfaces of matter placed rational man above, apart from, and (in theory) able to control the world.

Shakespeare's *Antony and Cleopatra* reflects this shift when it depicts Egyptians as porously interconnected with their elemental earth, and Romans dominating a hard-surfaced, impervious world. The Egyptian worldview seems to reflect what Mary Floyd Wilson has termed "geo-humoralism," the pervasive early modern belief that climate and other environmental factors shaped the bodily complexion of humors and, therefore, shaped racial character.[21] The point that I want to emphasize here is not that Egyptians seem stereotypically "warm-blooded" and self-indulgent, while Romans are cold, austere, and self-controlled, but instead that Egyptians in the play reflect an earlier view that environment shapes subjects while the Romans look forward to a Cartesian mind–body split, in which self-contained individuals are separate from and gain mastery over their environment. As Floyd-Wilson argues, the development in the seventeenth century of a new ethnography based on a "disavowal of both environmental and somatic influences on the mind" allows for "the formation of the autonomous – and white – subject," and further, that "the construction of bounded selves goes hand in hand with the construction of racial boundaries."[22]

Thus, the Egyptians in the play imagine themselves as being fed by their "dungy earth" – in Cleopatra's words, "the dung, / the beggar's nurse and Caesar's" (5.2.7–8). Cleopatra imagines herself as the embodiment of Egypt because she has been shaped by its environment: she is the "serpent of old Nile," fed with the serpent's "delicious poison," who has become "with Phoebus amorous pinches black" (1.5.25). Cleopatra imagines the triumph that Caesar plans for her in Rome in terms that emphasize the interrelation of body and environment: the Roman citizens have "thick breaths, rank of gross diet" in which Cleopatra will be "enclouded / And forced to drink their vapour" (5.2.207–8).

By contrast, Romans imagine themselves as impervious to environmental influence. They tend to conceive of the world as hard and solid, and themselves as statues or buildings. Philo calls Antony "the triple pillar of the world" (1.1.12). A messenger describes Octavia to Cleopatra as "a statue" (3.3.21). Caesar speaks of the "three-nooked world" (4.6.5), as if the human demarcation of Europe, Africa, and Asia determined its shape, and Menas calls the triumvirs "world-sharers" (2.7.70), as if they possessed, and shared, the world. As a solid object (rather than fungible "dung" or "clay"), the Roman world is imagined as being broken in half by political division: Octavia believes that war between Antony and Caesar would be "as if the world should cleave" (3.4.31) and Caesar says (depending on which text you use) that either the "round world" (*Riverside*) or the "rived world" (*Oxford*) should be altered by Antony's death. In the Roman world, human relationships are imagined as "cement" holding parts of the world together, as when Pompey notes that Antony and Caesar will "square" between themselves when "fear of us / May cement their divisions" (2.1.45, 480). Similarly, Caesar imagines Antony's marriage to Octavia as a "hoop should hold us staunch from edge to edge / O'th world" (2.2.120–1).

Caesar's long, strange speech at 1.4.55–71, describing the trials that the formerly heroic Antony had been able to survive, offers a weird fantasy that idealizes a complete imperviousness to the environment. Antony "didst drink the stale of horses," "brows'd" tree bark, and "didst eat strange flesh / Which some did die to look on," but suffered no bodily effects: "thy cheek / So much as lank'd not." Janet Adelman reads this speech as manifesting a "contest between Caesar and Cleopatra, Rome and Egypt" that "is in part a contest between male scarcity and female bounty as the defining site of Antony's masculinity."[23] Adelman is certainly correct that both Rome and Egypt are strongly marked by gender difference. I would simply shift her emphasis to note that women's bodies, as Gail Paster has shown, were seen in this period as more open to environmental influence, more porous, leaky, and impressionable than male bodies, and therefore that the gendering of Rome and Egypt in the play can be seen as complementary to the different relation to the material world associated with each.[24]

The Egyptian earth is controlled not by its human inhabitants, but by cycles of natural change and transformation extending from birth through death. The flooding of the Nile, and the fertility that it engenders, is the central Egyptian trope:

> The higher Nilus swells,
> The more it promises; as it ebbs, the seedsman
> Upon the slime and ooze scatters his grain,
> And shortly comes to harvest.
>
> (2.7.20–3)

This fertility is imagined in elemental terms, as the water of the Nile combines with earth to form "ooze," in which the sun engenders life: "By the fire / That quickens Nilus' slime" (1.3.68). "Ooze," "fire," and "slime" conjure up the feel of these materials, suggesting sensory immersion in the elements rather than visual mastery of them. The interaction of these elements can even spontaneously generate life, as was widely believed until well into the seventeenth century: "Your serpent of Egypt is bred now of your mud by the operation of your sun. So is your crocodile" (2.7.26–7). Antony reiterates this belief that a "courser's hair" could be transformed into a snake which "hath yet but life / And not a serpent's poison" (1.2.176). Cleopatra imagines that a kind of reverse generation is also possible, when she exclaims "Melt Egypt into Nile! and kindly creatures / Turn all into serpents" (2.5.78–9). And, although she can at one point imagine her death as a transformation into immaterial "fire, and air," she can also imagine it as a return to the ooze of the Nile:

> Rather a ditch in Egypt
> Be gentle grave unto me! Rather on Nilus' mud
> Lay me stark-nak'd, and let the water-flies
> Blow me into abhorring!
>
> (5.2.57–60)

In Egypt, characters feel themselves to be part of the processes of nature, upon which they depend, and which they can't control.[25]

Refusing such dependence, Romans view the world as changed only as a result of human agency. They don't seem to perceive, or imagine themselves part of, the natural cycles that so shape Egypt. Romans rely on visual observation of a world that they almost obsessively divide into geographic entities, which they name, and control by naming: "Labienus – / This is stiff news – Hath with his Parthian force / Extended Asia; from Euphrates / His conquering banner shook, from Syria / To Lydia and Ionia" (1.2.88–92). In *Space, Geography, and Politics in the Early Roman Empire*, Claude Nicolet describes how "in order to set boundaries to their empire and to claim to have reached those that were marked out, the Romans needed a certain perception of geographical space, of its dimensions, and of the area they occupied."[26] He charts the means through which Romans established this perception of space, some of which have remarkable resonance with Shakespeare's play. In the *Res Gestae* of Augustus, for instance, lists of geographical names ("over fifty-five geographical names divided into four large categories") play a role in helping Romans imagine the world as a space that they could control.[27] Similarly, he notes the "ever-more-frequent appearance of the globe on Roman coins from about 76 B.C. or 75 B.C.," a representation that made the "world," or "orbis terrarium" visible as an artifact.[28] Shankar Raman has linked this moment of imperial Roman domination of space with an "analogous" early modern moment of "the material domination and symbolic appropriation of space" when "staging a geometrized and neutralized space … helped conceal the colonial practices out of which they emerged and to which they contributed."[29]

The separate, solid, manmade, nameable world in Shakespeare's play thus reflects spatial strategies necessary for imperial domination. When Caesar wishes to portray Antony and Cleopatra as a threat to Roman imperium, he describes them engaged in a scene of imperial naming: "Unto her [Cleopatra] / He gave the stablishment of Egypt, made her / Of lower Syria, Cyprus, Lydia, / Absolute queen;" "Great Media, Parthia, and Armenia / He gave to Alexander; to Ptolomy he assign'd / Syria, Cilicia, and Phoenicia" (3.6.8–11, 14–16). Caesar imagines the scene as ornamented with orientalizing trappings: "I' th' market-place, on a tribunal silver'd"; "in chairs of gold," "She / In th' abiliments of the goddess Isis / That day appear'd" (3.6.3, 4, 17–18). Although he attributes these gestures of empire to Antony and Cleopatra, we never see them engage in anything like the scene he imagines, and it seems possible that he fabricates or exaggerates it in order to justify waging war against Antony. It is significant that Caesar translates the earthy imagery of Egypt into hard, though exotic, surfaces – a silver tribunal and a golden chair – as if he cannot imagine Egypt on its own terms.

Egyptian earth, though, seems less suited for conquest – that is, either to conquer or to be conquered. Shaped by their environment, mired in the ooze of the Nile, seemingly inseparable from the earth that gives birth to them and receives their dead bodies, Shakespeare's Egyptian subjects lack the objectified concepts of space and geography that lead to *imperium*. In the scenes where battles between Antony's Egyptian forces and Caesar's attacking troops are discussed and described, Cleopatra's influence is repeatedly associated with a refusal to occupy and defend hard ground, the space on dry land upon which the Roman world is based.[30] Instead, she insists on fighting at sea, and her sudden retreat is associated with the yielding elements of water and air; "the breeze upon her, like a cow in June – / Hoists sails and flies"; "Our fortune on the sea is out of breath" (3.10.14–15, 24). Antony's reaction to this first loss at sea takes the form of a sense that the land has rejected him: "the land bids me tread no more upon't … I am so lated in the world" (3.11.1, 3).

After Cleopatra's second retreat at sea, Antony imagines the world, and ultimately himself, as made of the yielding and indistinct elements or water and air that make up clouds and mist:

> Sometime we see a cloud that's dragonish,
> A vapor sometime like a bear or lion,
> A tower'd citadel, a pendant rock,
> A forked mountain, or blue promontory
> With trees upon't that nod unto the world
> And mock our eyes with air.
>
> (3.14.2–7)

These seemingly solid and visible shapes are as insubstantial as his political power and control of Egypt have become: "even with a thought / The rack dislimns, and makes it indistinct / As water is in water … now thy captain is / Even such a body" (3.14.11–13).[31]

While the Egyptian forces are unable to achieve mastery, visual or otherwise, over the solid world, we must also nonetheless wonder whether Caesar really is able to conquer Egypt in any meaningful sense. Gil Harris is among critics who cite Enobarbus's famous description of Cleopatra to argue that although "Cleopatra's power appears to be predicated on the visibility of her eroticized body to her subjects, who abandon all activity to gaze on her," Enobarbus never actually describes *her*: "For her own person, / It beggar'd all description."[32] Harris cites the "synaesthesic" nature of the description of her surroundings, but it may be more accurate to say that it simply focuses on senses other than sight: "so perfumed that / The winds were lovesick with them"; "the tune of flutes"; "whose wind did seem / To glow the delicate cheeks which they did cool"; "flower soft hands"; "strange invisible perfume" (2.2.193, 195, 203–4, 210, 212). Cleopatra's Egyptian power manifests itself as a spectacle that cannot be fully seen, and that therefore cannot be captured by sight, the Roman vehicle of mastery and empire.

Enobarbus's speech thus eschews the Egyptians' earthy landscape of mud, slime, and ooze, replacing it with an ethereal fantasy that is equally ungraspable. His is a vision of fire and air rather than earth and water, a "vision" that is not quite seeable, since Cleopatra is insistently likened not to concrete objects but to her differences from them. She "o'erpictures" a portrait of Venus, and her accoutrements are difficult to attach definitively to a solid surface: what exactly is made of "cloth of gold of tissue"? To what is the "silken tackle" attached? How does the tackle "swell"? The culmination of this vision is, appropriately, the threat of “vacancy” or vacuum, not any concrete presence.[33] If Egypt can’t be clearly seen or firmly touched, it seems difficult to know or conquer it with any certainty.

Cleopatra temporarily adopts Roman language when she falsely assures Caesar that “all the world; ’tis yours, and we, / Your scutcheons and signs of conquest, shall / Hang in what place you please” (5.2.134–6), but her suicide, in fact, prevents him from leading her in triumph through Rome as a sign of his conquest. Although his final speech attempts to monumentalize Antony and Cleopatra in Roman terms – “no grave upon the earth shall clip in it / A pair so famous,” and “our army shall / In solemn show attend this funeral” (5.2.359–60, 363–4) – many readers have felt that his final gesture is inadequate as a final word and agree with Cleopatra’s conclusion that “’Tis paltry to be Caesar.”[34] Thus, although Caesar does materially conquer Egypt, it is not clear that he has gained any purchase on its way of life. As Ania Loomba has argued, “Cleopatra’s final performance, which certainly exposes her own vulnerability, not only cheats Caesar but denies any final and authoritative textual closure” (130). Indeed, although Egypt was annexed into the Roman empire after the battle of Actium in 31 BC, Alexandria remained a center of learning to rival Rome, and never really adopted Roman customs. Under the emperor Constantine, the center of the Roman Empire was moved east, to Byzantium, and Alexandria remained an important center of learning after the Byzantine empire replaced the Roman.

Although I have been arguing that Egypt, as depicted in the play, represents something other than (or in addition to) an orientalizing stereotype, it is important to note that the Egyptian worldview is also flawed. As Gil Harris, for one, has argued, Cleopatra can sometimes seem curiously disembodied despite the insistent corporeality of her language, since “reminders of her physicality are supplemented by a counter-narrative in which her very vividness is shown to be the effect of a Roman desire for her presence, prompted by the gaps and absences that repeatedly afflict the play’s attempts to represent her.”[35] It is as if the play can’t quite believe in the elemental Egyptian earth and transcendent fire and air, and at least entertains the idea that they are a powerful fantasy. Thus, Enobarbus’s description of Cleopatra seems like a fantastic dream, and the clearest articulation of the central Egyptian trope of spontaneous generation comes from the drunken Lepidus, who desires to believe in an exotic Egypt that he has never seen.

If spontaneous generation is the central trope of Egyptian earthiness, then Egypt is linked to the complex and problematic history of this concept, which raises some of the central issues of the play. Aristotle offers different accounts of spontaneous generation, reflecting the problems that it entailed for his theories of causation and matter. From the very beginning, the process of spontaneous generation raised questions about the very nature of the material world. Was matter wholly natural, or was it infused with some sort of divine spirit? Could life itself be explained in wholly material terms, or did it require a divine spark? In *The History of Animals*, Aristotle describes spontaneous generation as a wholly material process but gives no explanation of how it works:

> So with animals, some spring from parent animals according to their kind, whilst others grow spontaneously and not from kindred stock; and of these instances of spontaneous generation some come from putrefying earth or vegetable matter, as is the case with a number of insects, while others are spontaneously generated in the inside of animals out of the secretions of their several organs.[36]

In *The Generation of Animals*, book 3, chapter 11, however, he was forced to consider how life could be spontaneously generated from non-living elements, concluding that a life spark or "pneuma" must permeate matter and can cause life under the right circumstances:

> Animals and plants come into being in earth and in liquid because there is water in earth, and air in water, and in all air is vital heat so that in a sense all things are full of soul. Therefore living things form quickly whenever this air and vital heat are enclosed in anything. When they are so enclosed, the corporeal liquids being heated, there arises as it were a frothy bubble. Whether what is forming is to be more or less honourable in kind depends on the embracing of the psychical principle; this again depends on the medium in which the generation takes place and the material which is included.[37]

Doubts about the truth of spontaneous generation surfaced early in antiquity – Theophrastus questioned it, as did Lucretius – but skepticism coexisted with acceptance of it as a fact well into the seventeenth century. In the early seventeenth century, the Paracelsan alchemist and physician J. B. van Helmont "believed that frogs, slugs, and leeches were spontaneously generated," and provided directions for the generation of mice: "if a dirty shirt is stuffed into the mouth of a vessel containing wheat, within a few days, say 21, the ferment produced by the shirt, modified by the smell of the grain, transforms the wheat itself, encased in its husk, into mice."[38] William Harvey also accepted spontaneous generation as a fact, and only with Francisco Redi's experiments in the 1660s was it demonstrated that maggots did not appear spontaneously in rotten meat.[39] The history of the theory of spontaneous generation thus reflects the epistemological shift enabled by increasing skepticism about intuitive science that I have been emphasizing here. Aristotelian science took visual evidence that lower forms of life seemed to appear without visible cause in various media to mean that they must be spontaneously generated, since human sense perception should be able to detect the material causes of these life forms if they, indeed, existed.

Scientific experiment in the seventeenth century was able to establish that visible life forms (such as maggots) were caused by eggs deposited in rotten meat by flies, but it took until the nineteenth century for Pasteur to prove that microbes, invisible to the naked eye, were not spontaneously generated. Latour suggests how difficult it was for Pasteur to eradicate "the well-known universal phenomenon of spontaneous generation," which could only be done through "a gradual and punctilious *extension* of laboratory practice to each site and each claim" of its defenders.[40] With each stage and through great effort, experimentation and technology move scientific theory farther from the purview of ordinary human perception; with each stage, too, matter loses its animate spark and living things are more strictly separated from non-living things.

Shakespeare's play insists on Egyptian belief in spontaneous generation as a central feature of their relation to the earth. Only the credulous and drunken Lepidus among the Romans seems to entertain the theory, however. An earth with the capacity to generate life is seen, in the play, as nearing the end of its tenure, to be paved over by Romans who free themselves from enmeshment with the elements by constructing and colonizing an inert and non-living world. Although not yet the mechanistic universe that would become dominant by the end of the seventeenth century, the Romans in the play do imagine an artificial world. The play does not attempt to judge which worldview is scientifically correct. It simply marks the passing of one into the other, and registers the perceptual experience of each.

Although Rome (and science) triumphs in the temporal space of the play, the copiously productive Egyptian earth provides a more fertile source for Shakespeare's poetic imagination, with its proliferation of metaphors and analogies, than the spare and plain Roman style. In constructing Rome and Egypt as a perceptual dichotomy, the play may mark an originary site of the disciplinary division into the two cultures of literature and science that has so deeply structured modernity. The nostalgia that seems to attend the final scenes of the play may, in fact, reflect the passing of a worldview that lent itself more readily to the Shakespearean imagination in all its abundance and ambivalence. The play seems to acknowledge the greater efficiency of the Roman mode, and its greater potential for domination of the world and its inhabitants, even as it acknowledges what the theater will lose as a result.

7

Hamlet in Motion

Shankar Raman

The uncertain senses

Maynard Mack was perhaps the earliest to recognize that the question with which *Hamlet* begins – "Who's there?" (1.1.1) – is emblematic of its world: the pervasive darkness, the uncertainty of identity, the jumpiness of the sentries, the confusion in their roles, all presage a mismatch between the order of existence and the order of knowledge.[1] These epistemological quandaries are borne in no small measure by the tension between seeing and hearing. Vision and audition are out of joint, unable mutually to confirm the knowledge each singly provides.[2] Rather than being unified in the act of perception and knowledge, the relationship among the senses has become disjunctive. Since sight is disabled, identity must be confirmed by voice: Barnardo's "Long live the king!" (1.1.3) functions as a shibboleth to allay Francisco's anxieties at not being able to see whether the person arriving upon the scene is the person he was awaiting.[3] But trust in what one hears also remains elusive: "the sensible and true avouch / of … eyes" (1.1.60) still seems essential to overcome resistance to whatever enters through the ears. Only after the ghost has been seen does the story once dismissed as fantasy now seize body and mind ("How now, Horatio? You tremble and look pale": 1.1.56), so that by the scene's end Horatio is increasingly willing to give credence to the power of the cock's crowing even though he has never witnessed it before: "So have I heard and do in part believe it" (1.1.170).

The very setting of *Hamlet*'s opening scenes reveals how steeped the play is in early modern discourses of the senses. The stage direction in Folio and Second Quarto – "Enter two Centinels" – along with the positioning of the sentries upon the battlements of the castle, appears almost designed to recall metaphors ubiquitous in contemporary accounts justifying the anatomical positioning of the eyes, as in these lines from Helkiah Crooke's *Microcosmographia*:

> [The eyes] are situated in the head as in the highest and best defensed place of the body, immediately under the forehead as Scoutwatches: for as watchmen are placed in high standings and turrets that they may farther off discern whether any enemies be approaching or lie in ambush, so the eyes are set aloft to foresee and give warning of any danger that may be toward us.[4]
>
> (1616: 536)

Crooke often returns to the same image, linking the eyes' production of knowledge with their minatory function: an earlier description calls them "spies or sentinels, day and night to keep watch for us, and being beside given us, that we should take view of those infinite distances and glorious bodies in them" (1616: 5). Such metaphors were widespread and their use varied.[5]

The military imagery of fortification and defense extends to the ears as well – despite the persistent gap throughout the play between sight and sound, vision and hearing. Horatio has been summoned to "watch the minutes of this night" to "approve [the] eyes" that have twice seen "this dreaded sight," as well as to "speak to it" and to "charge" it to speak (1.1.23ff). But the guards hope also that Horatio's confirmatory vision will alter his own auditory resistance, so that his "ears / That are so fortified against our story" (1.1.35) will finally be forced to open their porches and thus allow "belief to take hold of him" (1.1.27). Here, too, anatomical and affective treatises provide the blueprint (as Deutermann's contribution to this volume further shows). The militarized metaphor of the ear as "assail[ed]" (1.1.34) by sound and speech is developed at some length by Richard Braithwaite (1620: 6), and Crooke's description of the architecture of the "outward ear" likewise emphasizes its defensive functions (1616: 574).

The pervasive sense in *Hamlet*'s early scenes of a sensory and a political kingdom under imminent threat develops in relation to an (absent) ideal: that of a properly ordered body, mind, and state.[6] Not surprisingly perhaps, the paradigm of a controlled, hierarchical ordering of senses and passions is strongly espoused by Claudius when he admonishes Hamlet for falling away from what is assumed to be norm and normal:

> … But to persever
> In obstinate condolement is a course

> Of impious stubbornness, 'tis unmanly grief,
> It shows a will most incorrect to heaven,
> A heart unfortified, a mind impatient,
> An understanding simple and unschool'd;
> For what we know must be, and is as common
> As any the most vulgar thing to sense –
> Why should we in our peevish opposition
> Take it to heart?
>
> (1.2.92–101)

That Claudius's key terms are inherited from early modern discussions of the affects becomes evident when we juxtapose to his rebuke Edward Reynoldes's description of the soul's dependence "in her operations" upon the body:

> For whereas the principal parts of man's soul are either of Reason and Discourse, proceeding from his Understanding; or of Action and Morality, from his Will; both these in the present condition of man's estate, have their dependence on the Organs and faculties of the Body, which in the one precede, in the other follow: to the one, they are as Porters, to let in and convey; to the other as Messengers, to perform and execute: to the one, the whole body is an eye, through which it seeth; to the other a hand, by which it worketh.
>
> (1640: 3–4)

As Claudius sees it, the failure of Hamlet's will leads the prince to the inappropriate action of "obstinate condolement"; this failure betrays in turn a fault of reason, "an understanding simple and unschool'd." Reynoldes's description allows us to trace these perturbations affecting the soul to their sensory preconditions: if corporeal faculties and organs are like "an eye" to the understanding, Hamlet's constrained vision – which "ever with … vailed lids / Seek[s] for [his] father in the dust" (1.2.70–1) – distorts his rational grasp of the world he inhabits. Claudius's correlation between an "unfortified" heart and a mind "impatient" is equally typical of the genre upon which his admonition draws. According to Thomas Wright's well known *The Passions of the Mind in General*, for example, just as the sensitive apprehension of externals has its seat in the brain or mind, so too is there a part of the body – the heart – wherein "peculiarly the passions of the mind are effected" (1604: 114).[7] The punning adjacency of "common" and "sense" further underscores Claudius's reliance on a normative model of the passions. Nicolas Coeffeteau's preface to *A Table of Human Passions*, for example, places common sense first among the three "Interiors powers capable of knowledge … for that it is as it were the Center, to which do flow the forms which are sent unto it from the other senses: so as from the Eyes it receives the forms of Colours which they have seen [; f]rom the Hearing the forms of sounds which have touched the Ear," and so with the remaining organs of sensation.[8]

But in Hamlet's world, the proper correlation between sensation and affection is conspicuous only in its absence. As has often been noted, Hamlet refuses to acknowledge, let alone ratify, the terms of Claudius's rebuke. Pointedly ignoring the king's desire that the prince remain "in the cheer and comfort of our eye" (1.2.116), he accedes instead to the Queen's prayers that he not depart for Wittenberg. The famous soliloquy that follows Claudius's enforced acceptance of this "loving and … fair reply" (1.2.121) expresses the putatively lost ideal as the yearning for a vanished Eden, now replaced by the "unweeded garden" (1.2.135) of the present. (A similar ideal, Marchitello's chapter in this volume argues, inhabits the Ghost's subsequent horror at the "vile and loathsome" transformation of what was once his "smooth body" (1.5.72–3).) The expected relationship of denotation connecting external "forms, moods, shapes" to whatever lies "within" has been snapped for Hamlet. This disruption of the relationship between an (unspecified) interiority and a (suspect) outward manifestation does not merely assert the latter's falsity – even if this possibility is evoked by Hamlet's assertion that these are "actions that a man might play" (1.2.84) – but points to an internal state that exceeds what can be made visible to others, even when deception is not at issue: "'Tis not *alone* my inky cloak … / That can denote me truly" (1.2.77ff). As Grace Tiffany suggests, taken as a whole Hamlet's words may well mark the limits of what *any* outward "show" or display can achieve – it is less that his inner state is not representable than "that it cannot be represented visually" (2003: 314).[9]

While scholars have justifiably taken Hamlet's insistence that he has "that within what passeth show" as a clue to the nature of early modern subjectivity,[10] I am concerned instead with how *Hamlet* draws our attention to the cognitive processes that connect (or not) internal states to sensation, affection, and action.[11] As I hope to show, the disruption evident throughout *Hamlet* of what sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England took to be the normative relationships among the sensory faculties – and, consequently, between the senses and the affects – expresses a far-reaching transformation of the Aristotelian category fundamental to sensory and affective discourses in the period: motion or movement (*kinesis*).

This transformation involved the erosion of traditional models to understand the dynamics of cognition, a consequence of which was a radically circumscribed role for movement in explaining how the senses and the passions operated. Hamlet dwells in the shadow of this lost movement.

Impassioned movements

Despite recent critical interest in the historicity of the emotions, the significance of the word's etymological origin in movement and the complexity of motion itself have been insufficiently registered in readings of *Hamlet* – or, for that matter, of early modern discourses on the senses and the passions.[12] Indeed, while early moderns often used "passion" and "affection" interchangeably, the use of "emotion" as a rough synonym for these terms involves forgetting the very motion it contains. Heading the significations that the *OED* declares obsolete is "[a] moving out, migration, transference from one place to another" – whereas the earliest instance of emotion being used figuratively to denote an "agitation, disturbance of mind, feeling, passion" dates to 1660.[13] No doubt, our neglect of the motile implications revealed by the word's history results in large measure from the revolution in mechanics spurred by Copernicus and Galileo, and culminating in Newton. This epistemic change has led to our thinking about motion primarily in terms of local movement – that is, as change of place – thereby rendering less apparent a more capacious earlier concept (whose traces the etymology of emotion preserves). Aristotle's use of *kinesis* or *metabole*, however, treats it as virtually identical with nature itself. As the *Physics* puts it,

> Nature has been defined as "a principle of motion and change," and it is the subject of our inquiry. We must therefore see that we understand the meaning of "motion"; for if it were unknown, the meaning of "nature" too would be unknown.[14]

Likewise, for the Scholastics, *motus localis* was no more than one specific mode of a generalized concept that conceived movement, following Aristotle's lead, "as the transition from potentiality to actuality or vice versa, … [and therefore occurring] in every formal category in which the distinction between actual and potential being can be made" (Maier 1982: 22). The four such categories were substance, quantity, quality, and place. Hence, motion comprised the creation and dissolution of substances (*generatio* and *corruptio*); the quantitative increase and decrease in material (*augmentatio* and *diminutio*) or in volume (*rarefactio* and *condensatio*); the qualitative alteration in substances, including the increase and decrease in intensity of a characteristic (*intensio* and *remissio*); and, finally, change of place (*motus localis*). Generally speaking, the Scholastics eliminated the first of these in their discussions of motion because they added another requirement, itself drawn from Aristotle: that the transition between actuality and potentiality be a successive rather than an abrupt one. Insofar as generation and corruption were seen as instantaneous mutations rather than successive movements, they no longer counted as motion. But quantitative, qualitative, and spatial change remained bound together as different formal instantiations of movement understood as "the acquisition or loss, in successive stages of a categorical attribute, a so-called 'perfection'" (Aristotle 1980: 23).

For early modern anatomists and philosophers alike, the Aristotelian claim that motion or change was the single, underlying principle of nature as such remained central to their accounts of the senses and the passions. As Paster notes, "to report on an emotion – whether subjectively as experienced or objectively as observed – was, among other things, to describe an event occurring in nature and thus understandable in natural terms" (2004: 27). Just as the physical senses registered the form and pressure of the world through change in their substance, so too was movement and alteration constitutive of how the passions operated.[15] Thus Coeffeteau draws on standard Aristotelian models when he describes the relationship between the "Sensitive" and the "Reasonable" soul in terms of an ideal hierarchy of movements: first, from the outside to the inside (namely, from sensory information about the external world to the internal tribunal of reason), and then back out again, to externalize as action the judgments of reason. Mediating this double movement are the interior and appetitive powers of the Sensitive soul, whose interventions ought ideally to be governed by Reason, except for the unfortunate fact that man "oftentimes … overthrows and perverts this order, either by bad education, or by custom, or by the organs being unsound, or that his will hath bad inclination" (1621: n.p.). Coeffeteau's definition of passion builds upon this basic dynamic: a passion is "a *motion* of the sensitive appetite, caused by the apprehension or imagination of good or evil, the which is followed by a change or alteration in the body, contrary to the laws of nature" (1621: 2). The soul "excites" such alterations by virtue of possessing "a moving power commanding over the body," which "changeth his natural disposition, and by her agitation pulls him from his rest, wherein he was before she troubled him" (1621: 12).

Most early modern treatises shared the belief that the passions were movements or motions, and, further, that this essential trait allied them more closely to the senses than to reason and the dictates of the rational soul.[16] Such an affinity is evident in J. F. Senault's description of the passions as "motions or agitations" arising from the rational soul's attempts to exercise its powers. Nonetheless, these effects, he continues,

> forbear not to pretend to some sort of liberty [from the rational soul]; they are rather her citizens than her slaves, and she is rather their judge than their sovereign. These passions arising from the senses side always with them; whenever Imagination presents them to the understanding, he pleads in their behalf, by means of so good an Advocate they corrupt their Master and win all their causes.
>
> (1649: 15–16)

Nor ought we to wonder, Coeffeteau informs us, that "the irregularity of the change, which these passions breed," is grounded upon "the disorder which the sensitive appetite (stirred up by the sensible objects) casts into the heart," since the ability to move or alter the body signals the "sympathy which is found in those powers, which are governed by the same soul which employs them" (1621: 20). In other words, because the sensitive soul's "moving power" governs the movements of both inward and outward senses, these are necessarily like one another. Even if the passions are themselves perturbations from an ideal or normative condition of rest, their normal operation requires external changes to be correlated with internal ones through a movement that encompasses them both.

Rüdiger Campe's monumental study on the rhetoric of the affects amply demonstrates that movement was central in such treatises because it seemed to offer a solution to a problem bequeathed by antiquity: how to connect a half-visible externality with a half-hidden corporeal event.[17] Building upon this distinction of outside and inside, the mid sixteenth-century Italian humanist Mario Nizolio, for instance, differentiated between a conceptual definition – or the "name" – of anger (the demand to punish someone who has unjustifiably injured one) and a definition of essence (anger as the heating up of the blood around the heart).[18] The perceptible external changes signifying anger were thereby related to hidden corporeal ones as effects to causes. This division was reproduced in the Galenic medical tradition as a semiotics of the body via the distinction between a corporeal change perceptible through the senses and a hidden one: between, say, the pulse we can feel and the invisible beating of the heart and the arteries. Thus, Hamlet seeks to convince Gertrude of his sanity by insisting that his "pulse as yours doth temperately keep time / And makes as healthful music" (3.4.142–3). Sensory affection in all its senses marked a connection and division between a physical or mental change that could be sensed and another hidden beneath the sensible surface. But while the classical tradition had focused on enumerating and organizing the affects, its early modern inheritors reached behind the older foundational oppositions (love/hate, hope/despair, and so on) in an attempt to link the complex range of situations in which one feels a particular passion to patterns of behaviour, on the one hand, and to corporeal processes, on the other. In other words, a bridge had to be built between an external event (be this a noise hitting the ear or an angry blush) and an internal one (the sound we hear and attach to a representation or the corporeal process of becoming angry). In short, what appears in early modern accounts as a binary opposition between a sign and its hidden cause or between the name and the essence of an affect was controlled and overcome by a third term: movement. Sign and cause were understood as linked parts of a single encompassing process through which the potentially deep divide between visible name and invisible essence could be overcome.

Classical discussions of affect had resorted to metaphors to capture the mediating term of movement, the dynamic exciting of the passion, and these metaphors now took on explanatory value in connecting the visible and invisible aspects of sensory and affective processes. The Aristotelian Daniele Barboro, for instance, characterizes anger through an etymological metaphor: "and because he who is angry seems directly to go out of himself (*extra se ire*), one speaks therefore of anger (*ira*)." A metaphorical description of the external event of anger as "being outside oneself" allows the name of the affect – that is, the word *ira* – to be linked to the verb, *ire*, to go.[19] The sixteenth century would develop complex physiological elaborations of such metaphors. Philip Melanchthon, for instance, describes the inner corporeal process of anger in terms of the heart sending out blood as its soldiers in order to exact revenge, whereas calming down is expressed as the soldiers' returning to the barracks of the heart. To paraphrase Campe, this account compares the topology and personnel of the corporeal inside (heart and blood) with the topology and personnel of the army (soldiers and barracks). The verbal action of movement (sending out and returning) provides the third term integrating the heart's inner action with the outer action of seeking revenge for an unjustified injury.[20] The longevity of military metaphors of this ilk is borne out by Gertrude's alarm-filled reaction to Hamlet's "distemper" at being unexpectedly visited by the Ghost:

> Forth at your eyes your spirits wildly peep,
> And, as sleeping soldiers in th'alarm,
> Your bedded hair, like life in excrements,
> Start up and stand on end.
>
> (3.4.119–22)

While the image of spirits "wildly peep[ing]" out of Hamlet's eyes describes the actual process thought to occur within Hamlet's body, the metaphor likening his once "bedded hair" starting and standing on end to the rudely awakened soldiers emphasizes – especially through its verbs – the overarching movement which connects changing internal, psychic states to their external manifestations.[21]

This nexus of movement, change, and action is central to what is perhaps the most discussed speech in the play. As so many have already done, let us, too, descend into the vortex of Hamlet's mind to revisit his starkly posed alternative: "To be or not be" (3.1.58).[22] To what extent is this question equivalent to the one into which he immediately translates it: "Whether it is nobler in the mind to suffer / The slings and arrows of outrageous fortune, / Or to take arms against a sea of troubles, / And by opposing end them?" (3.1.57–60). The "senselessness" of these lines has often been remarked upon: how does the primordial question of being versus non-being get tangled up with whether it is nobler to suffer or to take arms? But perhaps the difficulty of making sense of what Hamlet says resides less in what he says than in how he poses the problem: the "or" shared by the two questions signals the pressure to choose between states presented as mutually exclusive. But the ostensibly Parmenedian opposition between being and non-being seems unstable, even forced, from the very outset, for the choice literally concerns not two nominal states (being and not-being) but rather two infinitives (to be or not to be) whose grammatical form works against the very distinction between noun and verb. What Hamlet offers are verbal statives that straddle the ontic and the ontological.

This slight but significant reorienting of an otherwise traditional philosophical problem marks a tendency endemic to this soliloquy, which is characterized both by a metonymic displacement of questions and by sudden reversals that affect the terms of those questions. In moving from the initial question to the second, for example, Hamlet also reverses the usual associations evoked by being and not-being. The passivity of suffering belongs to temporal existence, whereas active opposition attaches itself to suicide: ending "them" does not vanquish the troubles themselves but ends them for *him* in so far as he ends himself.[23] What seems an attack outwards thus folds in upon itself, changing direction and valence. The swerve allows Hamlet to translate the problem yet again, turning negation into position: "to die, to sleep" (3.1.64). But the metonymic extension will not let Hamlet go. Representing death as a sleeping without end undoes the punctual moment at which one simply ceases to be. In effect, temporality and change enter death as well. In the infinitives, state turns into the process, noun into verb, and the resulting elongation opens up the possibility of an endless dreaming in time.

Jenkins's edition notes that the ideas put into motion by the speech "for all their brilliant use … are for the most part traditional" (1982: 489). The broad outlines of the argument were familiar from Augustine's *De Libro Arbitrio*, while the likening of death to sleep was a Renaissance commonplace, to be found in such works as Girolamo Cardano's *De Consolatione* and Montaigne's "Of Physiognomy." Hamlet's vision of sleep as "a consummation / Devoutly to be wish'd" (3.1.63–4) directly echoes the language that Montaigne ascribes to Socrates, speaking before the judges who had condemned him: "Death may per adventure be a thing indifferent, happily a thing desirable.… If it be a consummation of one's being, it is also an amendment and entrance into a long and quiet night. We find nothing so sweet in life, as a quiet rest and gentle sleep, and without dreams" (1603: 627). And even the image of taking arms against sea can, according to Jenkins, be traced back to Aristotle's *Eudemian Ethics*: "A man … is not brave … if, knowing the magnitude of danger, he faces it through passion – as the Celts take up their arms to go meet the waves."[24]

Indeed, this link with Aristotle's discussion of virtues and passion opens another, less noticed set of precedents: those furnished by contemporary anatomical and medical treatises dealing with the senses. For Hamlet's weighing the costs of acting or not acting also revives what Crooke (citing Averroes's commentary on the *de Anima*) calls the "first and chief consideration of sense":

> Whether it be to be accounted amongst the active or passive virtues or faculties of the soul, that is, whether it be accomplished by action or passion, for he which is ignorant of this can never attain to the perfect knowledge of the manner of sensation.
>
> (1616: 653)

We need to remember, of course, that suffering and passion are linguistically linked; "to suffer" was a standard early modern translation of the Latin *pati*, from whose past participial stem such words as passion and passive derived. Thus, the contrasting term to action in the early modern period was properly passion or suffering, as Hamlet's opposition between the action of taking arms and the passion of suffering makes evident.[25]

If Hamlet nonetheless finds it difficult to draw a bright line demarcating action from passion, this difficulty was not his alone. On the one hand, for Crooke, sensation involves the reception of the species or forms of external objects, and "and so it is a passion, for in that respect it suffers of the object. And of this did Aristotle understand that where he saith, that *to perceive is a kind of passion or suffering*" (1616: 658). On the other hand, sensation requires

> discerning and knowing … the object by the species received unto the Sense, and so it is an action, for so the faculty doth work upon the species, and so sight doth see, and hearing hear, and so of the rest; and so is Aristotle to be understood, when he saith that the senses be active.
> (1616: 658)

Building upon this duality, Crooke proceeds to echo the very logic whereby Hamlet translates his initial question ("to be or not to be") into its amplified form. Defending the claim that action is "requisite unto sense," he argues that were sensation to "be made without acting," it would follow that the vegetative faculty "should be more noble than the sensative, because that to *do* is more noble than to *suffer*, but no man doubts that faculties of the vegetative soul are active, wherefore lest we should fall into an absurdity unheard of and monstrous, we must grant that the faculties of the sensative soul are also active" (1616: 657). As Crooke's language suggests, the peculiarity of Hamlet's moving from "to be or not to be" to whether it is "nobler in the mind" to act or to suffer can be traced in part to the Aristotelian tradition underpinning contemporaneous accounts of sense and affect, wherein the nobility of the mind was seen as closely bound to its ability to act (since even that part of the soul most affiliated with body in its nutritive capacities was understood as possessing action). Given the dual nature of sense perception, Crooke predictably resolves the impasse by arguing that "when as the whole Sensation that is the perfect act of Sense is understood," it is both action and passion, a doing and a suffering: "for first, unto the perfection of sensation, there is need of passion or an alteration of the organ, from whence afterward follows the action of the faculty" (1616: 658).

But if the seeming opposites of action and passion can thus be conjoined in sensation, this is because they are both, first and foremost, motions or movements. Just as perception requires passion, that is, a change in the perceiving organ, it also requires the *act* of perceiving since sensation is necessarily "an operation of life and therefore proceedeth from an internal and active original of motion, for life is *an internal motion, performed by that which liveth*" (1616: 658). The distinction between action and passion is consequently logical or categorial rather than absolute, and it depends on how one views the motion in question:

> in my opinion the Logicians … have more truly said, that Active motion is that which preceedeth from the agent for the effecting of something; and Passive that which is received of the patient to make alteration in it: wherefore both action and passion being indeed one motion, as it cometh from the agent is an Action, and [as] it is received of [the] patient is a Passion.
>
> (1616: 653)

The centrality of motion in this account suggests another route into Hamlet's soliloquy, one that focuses more on its "how" than its "what," on its process rather than its substance. For subsisting under the shifty oppositions that Hamlet constructs is the flow of his speech, constantly moving from referent to referent. The impossibility of holding on to the states denoted by the nouns; the persistent interference of verbs; and the repeated sliding from one opposition to another: these enact Hamlet's difficulty in specifying the border that he needs to cross, between action and passion, between one state and another, between noun and verb. His language repeatedly exceeds fixed propositional limits – either A or B – to express instead a movement in the form of a becoming that he cannot fully either articulate or achieve.

In the dizzying movements of this soliloquy we glimpse the underlying problem of which Hamlet's restlessness turns out to be a symptom: the temporal problem of becoming as such. To put it another way, the sense of the soliloquy lies in the direction of its unfolding: it aims at the more profound and more paradoxical dualism of alteration, of transformation, that echoes in the noise of the sea whose "currents turn awry," threatening to wash Hamlet away. In *The Logic of Sense*, Gilles Deleuze argues that the paradox of pure becoming entails the simultaneous affirmation of two temporal senses or directions: "Insofar as it eludes the present, becoming does not tolerate the distinction of before and after, or of past and future. It pertains to the essence of becoming to move and pull in both directions" (1990: 1). The specific mode of becoming that Hamlet needs is precisely what he will claim is lost: "the name of action." At issue here, as so often in the play, is the (in)ability to act in time. However, the contortions of the speech reach less towards either the conditions or after-effects of action – that is, to the states before and after an act – than towards the movement that constitutes acting itself, to the crossing of that "bourn" between states whereby one becomes other than one was.[26]

For the consequence of becoming is, Deleuze further argues, an undoing of states, and in particular of identity and the proper name: these are guaranteed by *savoir*, knowledge as possession and permanence, fixed or measurable qualities embodied "in general names designating pauses and rests, in substantives and adjectives" (1990: 3). By contrast, verbs, the carriers of becoming, undo the proper sense, render things bidirectional and paradoxical, thereby sweeping away identity and name. To be swept away is what Hamlet tells us he desires: "Haste me to know't, that [I] with wings as swift / As meditation or the thoughts of love / May sweep to my revenge" (1.5.30–2). If the missing "I" in the Folio and First Quarto texts expresses, as Stephen Greenblatt has suggested, a subject-less process – namely, Hamlet's desire to lose himself to the movement of revenge – how to produce that movement still remains a mystery.[27] "Know[ing]" the undefined "it" turns out to be both a spur that "hastes" one to act and a barrier that prevents acting, a situation whose consequence the soliloquy draws: "thus conscience does make cowards of us all" (3.1.83).

If the absence of the movement that constitutes action names Hamlet's problem, it comes as no surprise, then, that it is an actor who has forced the problem – along with the pertinence of dreaming – into Hamlet's view:

> Is it not monstrous that this player here,
> But in a fiction, in a dream of passion,
> Could force his soul so to his own conceit
> That from her working all his visage wanned,
> A broken voice, and his whole function suiting
> With forms to his conceit? And all for nothing!
> For Hecuba!
> What's Hecuba to him, or he to Hecuba,
> That he should weep for her? What would he do,
> Had he the motive and the cue for passion
> That I have?
>
> (2.2.544–56)

For Hamlet, the player's transformation is "monstrous" in the root sense of the Latin *monstrare*: namely, to show or to express. His response to the player's performance anticipates the "to be or not to be" speech in the very next scene at least in part because the player brings Hamlet visage to visage with his own failure to transform himself in the way the player so successfully has. Hamlet is thus a bad actor. Etymology once again indicates to us *what* the player demonstrates to Hamlet. Motive – from the past participial stem of the Latin *movere* or to move – is what Hamlet has, but precisely as a substantive: that is, as a cause, state or quality capable of inciting motion. What he lacks, however, is the dynamic "force" of the verb, the moving that will sweep him away.

The absence of this force reappears in Shakespeare's remarkable neologism, "unpregnant," which conjoins the usual sense of the word (from the Latin *prœgnant*) to the old French *preignant* (meaning forcible, lively, or pressing): "Unpregnant of [his] cause," Hamlet "can say nothing" (2.2.563–4).[28] Since saying nothing hardly seems to characterize Hamlet particularly well, his berating himself thus suggests that at issue is instead a particular kind of saying: being able to say something for and out of himself. If in the play's opening act, the Ghost's words were necessary to give voice to Hamlet's "prophetic soul," here the player's saying (and, indeed, the player's saying through the figure of Hecuba) provides the means for Hamlet to say that he can say nothing. The ultimate instance of such ventriloquizing would of course be the play within the play, where Hamlet's words must be spoken for him by someone else. By such indirections must he find directions out. Yet, as the player clearly shows Hamlet, acting does not require truly having something of one's *own* to say – "And all for nothing!"; it does not demand anything deeper than the process of moving itself. The "working" of the soul, the "suiting" of "his whole function," suffices. Despite having the requisite "motive and cue," despite being "prompted" to his revenge by "heaven and hell," acting nonetheless eludes Hamlet: he is unable to become what he needs and desires to become. It is thus the "how" shown in the actor's craft, connecting verbal image ("conceit") to corporeal transformation ("Tears in his eyes, distraction in's aspect, / A broken voice"), that constitutes the missing term here, and resurfaces in the later "to be or not to be" speech as a crossing of the boundary between opposed alternatives. The "how" indicates the dimension of becoming – of moving, of acting – that emerges in the fissures of these speeches, in their dynamic transitions from one topos to the next.[29]

Hamlet's dismissing the player's "a dream of passion" as a fiction – in comparison to his deeply felt "motive and cue for passion" – reveals the extent to which his own contorted formulations respond to a broader historical shift in the discourses of the senses and the affects. As Campe shows, the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries saw a gradual reduction in the importance of movement, and a concomitant alteration and sharpening of the divide between the name or sign of an affect and its internal cause or excitation. It is less that such thinkers as Descartes and Mersenne would deny that there are movements of the heart than that they refused to grant the traditional metaphors of movement any explanatory power. These become mere metaphors, useful only to describe a process, not to account for it. Thus, for the French royal physician La Chambre, what was once a ternary structure becomes a binary one: the soul wants to reach or flee from an object, so she triggers the corresponding corporeal movement. It was precisely the idea of correspondence that earlier thinkers had tried to explain through metaphors of movement.[30] But for La Chambre such correspondence is simply a given: any particular movement associated with an affect is merely a specific instance of a general theory that distinguishes the motive soul from a purely mechanical body. The soul thus constitutes the totality of the inner principle of the body's movement.

As a consequence, the boundary between inner and outer shifts as well: invisible physiological changes in the body's interior now belong to same order as the perceptible outer signs of passion, and both are categorically divided from the workings of a soul that directly triggers them.[31] With Locke and Hume, even the corporeal metaphors disappear. Hume's account of the passions, for instance, distinguishes between the original "impressions of sensation" and "reflective impressions" of passion and emotion that "proceed from some of these original ones." But Hume is completely unconcerned either with the corporeal processes that produce the former or with those that connect the sensations to the passions. Sensations arise directly from "the constitution of the body, from the animal spirits, or from the application of objects to the external organs," but the examination of these "natural and physical causes" would, he says, "lead me too far from my subject into the science of anatomy and natural philosophy" (1978: 275–6). As for the connection between sensations and passions, Hume attributes their relation simply to a correlation between the sensation produced by an external object and the sensation of pain or pleasure that constitutes for him "the very being and essence" of passion itself: "Thus pride is a pleasant sensation, and humility a painful; and upon the removal of the pleasure and pain, there is in reality no pride or humility" (1978: 286). There is no explanation deemed necessary beyond the conjunction itself.

Hamlet struggles in the zone between conflicting paradigms. On the one hand, in describing the player's performance, he seems to evoke a binary model that opposes and connects two different orders of events: "from" the soul's inner "working" the body is directly and visibly transformed; the visage wans, the eyes fill with tears, the voice breaks. On the other, Hamlet's amazement reveals that bridging the divide between soul and body remains a crucial and unresolved issue. He can only replicate as it were the binary structure; he posits an anterior "conceit" – in effect, a metaphoric identification of player and role – that "forces" the actor's soul. Likewise, Hamlet's charge of empty artifice (the "fiction" or "dream" of passion) itself cuts against the clear opposition of inner and outer, soul and body, since it subordinates the soul to an external (verbal) image forcibly impressed upon it. The difficulty here of accounting for what moves the soul and transforms the body anticipates the paradoxes of becoming, which Hamlet's later "to be or not to be" speech will manifest through the movement and direction of his speaking. The inability to find the metaphor that can "hold" the distinction between "to be" and "not to be" results there in a metonymic sliding, a renewed displacement from one metaphor to another – until Hamlet encounters something new: the fear of the unknown in dreams, "the dread of something after death" (3.1.78) Through this shift, the initial ontological question finds an answer (of a sort) by being transposed onto an epistemological one: would we not "rather bear the ills we have / Than fly to others we know not of?" (3.1.81–2). The difficulty of choosing between "to be" and "not to be" is thereby reconfigured as the choice between knowing and not knowing.

Between eyes and ears

In the space of this choice the contrast between the eye and the ear unfolds. I suggest that the play's focus on the ear be read as a complex response to the larger shift outlined above in how the passions were characterized – broadly speaking, the shift from a ternary system to a binary one. Against this background, *Hamlet*'s ear expresses precisely the idea of movement, whose loss marks a historical transition that will end up by opposing an active and motive soul to a merely mechanical body. But in so doing, the ear also reveals a different mode of knowing, one tied not to the substantive or to knowledge as a possessed state, but to the verb and to the processes through which knowledge is activated.

Hamlet soon takes a page from the player's book when he insists that Gertrude "Look here upon this picture, and on this, / The counterfeit presentment of two brothers" (3.4.53–4). His violent assault on Gertrude's sight – "Have you eyes? … Ha? Have you eyes?" (3.4.65ff) – seems to have the desired effect, "turning" Gertrude's "eyes into [her] very soul," where she "see[s] such black and grained spots / As will not leave their tinct" (3.4.89–91). Transforming the Queen's soul into a book in which she can read her truth underscores the extent to which the eye in *Hamlet* generally reigns over the domain of cognition and the law. Seeing is closely affiliated with knowledge as a state that the rational subject legitimately possesses. The fixing of knowledge depends, of course, on all the senses working in tandem:

> Sense sure you have,
> Else could you not have motion; but sure that sense
> Is apoplex'd …
> Eyes without feeling, feeling without sight,
> Ears without hands or eyes, smelling sans all,
> Or but a sickly part of one true sense
> Could not so mope.
>
> (3.4.71ff)

But for the disconnection among the individual senses to become legible, to acquire knowledge of how far judgment has been betrayed by the body, it is necessary to see. *Hamlet*'s eye is the eye of science, in the root sense of the term. From the play's very opening scene, the obsessive focus on the accuracy and reliability of vision establishes the eye's cognitive importance. It bears the primary burden of recognizing the unexpected nocturnal visitor. The viewings never come singly, but always in pairs ("has this thing appeared again?," "this dreaded sight twice seen of us," "what we two nights have seen"), emphasizing the fact that the confirmation provided by vision alone holds out the promise of a verified – and only therefore true and present – cognition. Hence, too, the association between seeing and law: "he may approve our eyes," "the sensible and true avouch of mine own eyes," "this present object made probation." No surprise, then, that in the closet scene Hamlet presents his mother the "counterfeit presentments" in order to make her recognize her own lapsed judgment – "what judgment / Would step from this to this?" (3.4.70–1) – and the fall of her reason to the sway of will ("reason panders will": 3.4.88).[32]

But in relying thus on images and eyes, Hamlet has perhaps not learned quite enough; he is perhaps still too enamored of "show[ing] virtue her own feature, scorn her own image" (3.2.22–3). Perhaps he simply hasn't *listened* hard enough. For it is through the ear that the play reintroduces the missing terms whose absence virtually drives Hamlet mad: moving, acting, becoming. Even as Gertrude acknowledges that Hamlet has made her re-envision her soul, his "turning" her eyes inward seems prompted less by the images she has been shown than by what she has heard him say: "O Hamlet, speak no more" (3.4.88). The phrase echoes: "O, speak to me no more," Gertrude implores again, "these words like daggers enter in my ears" (3.4.94–5), recalling Hamlet's earlier resolution that he must "speak daggers to her, but use none" (3.3.387). And the Ghost himself soon urges Hamlet to "step between" Gertrude and "her fighting soul" by "speak[ing] to her" (3.4.115). There is enough evidence in *Hamlet* to indicate that the ear and hearing are linked to a different kind of knowledge, the knowing that sweeps one away and "binds" one to action. This dimension is intimated, too, early in the play, in the Ghost's first meeting with Hamlet:

> GHOST. Pity me not, but lend thy serious hearing
> To what I shall unfold.
> HAMLET. Speak, I am bound to hear.
> GHOST. So art thou to revenge, when thou shalt hear.
>
> (1.5.5–8)

As the one traveler who has returned from the bourn of the undiscovered country reminds Hamlet, there are tales not meant for the time-bound, the living: "But this eternal blazon must not be / To ears of flesh and blood." Nevertheless, acting in this world of time demands that those ears must "List, list, O list!" (1.5.21–3).

This association of ears with the transformation of the self, with moving the self to action, draws upon the ostensible closeness of the ears to understanding in contemporary discourses of the passions. According to Braithwaite, the ear "is the organ of the understanding, by it we conceive, by the memory we conserve, and by our judgement wee resolve; as mainie rivers have their confluence by small streames, so knowledge her essence by the accent of the eare" (1620: 4). Helkiah Crooke cites Aristotle's authority in claiming that the outward ears are the "sensum disciplinae" because they were "created for the understanding of Arts and Science: for Speech because it is audible, becometh the Cause of that we learne thereby." His subsequent paean to the hearing is worth citing at length. "[N]o Voyce, no not a River of Eloquence is able to extoll [the ear] with due prayses, if we doe but contemplate the cunning, skill and diligence, which Nature hath used in the Fabricke of this Organ, and more accurately intend how many winding Convolutions, Burrowes, Holes, Shels, Dennes, and darke Caves like Labyrinths she hath prepared and furnished therein." The ear's physical complexity matches its crucial function as "the doore of the mind" whereby we enter into knowledge: "a living and audible voyce doth better instruct then the silent reading of Bookes, and … things heard make a deeper impression in the Mind than those which be only read" (1616: n.p.).

In *Hamlet*, the emphasis falls on the dynamic quality of hearing, and on the ears as the boundary which the voice – that is, air or pneuma, soul – must cross in order to motivate action or engender belief. Hence, the double sense of the ear. First, as I have already noted, it is the organ that protects the self, preventing intrusion from without:

> a discreet eare seasons the understanding, marshals the rest of the senses wandring, renewes the minde, preparing her to all difficulties, cheeres the affections, fortifying them against all oppositions, those be the best Forts, and impregnablest, whose seats, most opposed to danger, stand in resistance against all hostile incursions.
>
> (Braithwaite 1620: 6)

In this vein, Hamlet dismisses Horatio's self-deprecation by insisting that he not "do my ear that violence / To make it truster of your own report / Against yourself" (1.2.170–1). But the ear's defensive function equally evokes its status as a passage way laying the self open to the world (for good or ill), opening the possibility of changing, becoming other. The most striking illustration of such a transformation is offered in the account of Claudius's murder of King Hamlet: he pours the "juice of cursed hebenon" in "the porches of [the king's] ears," both killing the king and "rankly abus[ing]" the "whole ear of Denmark" with a "forged process" of this death (1.5.63ff). Indeed, the Ghost's description of the murder is striking in shifting the story's focus from the actual murder to the body's interior and exterior transformation as a result of its invasion through the ears. He emphasizes the working of the poison that "swift as quicksilver … courses through / The natural gates and alleys of the body," correlating this inner assault to an outer transformation: "and a most instant tetter barked about, / Most lazar-like, with vile and loathsome crust, / All my smooth body" (1.5.66ff).

Such examples showing the *kinesis* that the ears and hearing make possible can easily be multiplied.[33] Consider, for example, Polonius's fear that Ophelia's honor may sustain a grievous loss were she "with too credent ear" to "list [Hamlet's] songs" (1.3.30). The contrast between ear and eye is intimated in Polonius's use of visual metaphors to communicate the power of aurality:

> Do not believe his vows; for they are brokers
> Not of that dye which their investments show,
> But mere implorators of unholy suits,
> Breathing like sanctified and pious bawds
> The better to beguile.
>
> (1.3.127–31)

The ear takes on the role here of a deceptive mediator, both exploiting and bridging the structural gap between a visible exterior (the clothed vows) and the invisible intention of seduction. And, of course, the contrastive cognitive functions of these organs is most pointedly established in the doubled rendition of the *Mousetrap*, first as dumb show, and then as proper theater, combining sound with sight. Thus, Claudius rises only after Hamlet interrupts the play to narrate what will transpire. And the visual confirmation provided by Horatio's perceiving the King's response – "I did very well note him" (3.2.284) – is explicitly linked by Hamlet to the effect of the aural: "Didst perceive? … Upon the talk of poisoning?" (3.2.281ff). If vision offers the knowledge of truth as something fixed and stable, its precondition is knowledge as movement, as a process of change that perturbs the ostensible stability of the eye's domain. It is this movement that Hamlet repeatedly fails to produce within himself.

But not entirely, for the first death we witness in the play results from a surprisingly decisive movement: a rapier's thrust through the arras to skewer Polonius. Soon hereafter, Hamlet interprets the Ghost's appearance as a reproach to the "tardy" son, who, "laps'd in time and passion, lets go by / The important acting" of his father's "dread command" (3.4.106ff). Yet, in recalling what he suffers and what he has made his mother suffer, Hamlet forgets the "rash and bloody deed" (3.4.27) he has just committed, one triggered, notably, by hearing the rat behind the tapestry. It is worth remarking here that Hamlet carries out his action without prior knowledge of whom he is killing, even if he does have his suspicions as to the spy's identity. As Fisher puts it, "The very essence of rashness lies in the suddenness that does not wait for knowledge" (1991: 56). The instantaneity of the movement is such that it does not allow Hamlet to lapse himself in time: the moment arrives, the action is taken, the moment is past. In the disappearance of any mediation between cause and effect, between sensation and a correlative action, movement is reduced to what it will become for Hamlet's heirs: a local motion (or, in

Hamlet's case, a loco-motion) that is purely mechanical in nature. There is no room here for the early modern passions: Hamlet's action has no emotional consequences for him – as is made evident by the insult-laden brevity of his valediction for Polonius, squeezed in between his passionate responses to his mother's alleged crimes. To cite Fisher again, "Emptied out from among the categories of action, the passions are noticed where they once occurred, but now in their absence" (1991: 77). For Hamlet to become the son he thinks he wants to be, he must become, as he presciently realizes, a machine.

But such moments are more the exception than the norm for most of the play. For even at the moment of his own death, Hamlet continues to struggle with the early modern senses, trying to hold on to the world they once disclosed. Between the iterations of his paradoxical "I am dead" – and its impossible coupling of the beyond and the here and now, of eternity and time – return also the conflicted senses:

> I am dead, Horatio. Wretched Queen, adieu!
> You that look pale and tremble at this chance,
> That are but mutes or audience at this chance,
> Had I but time – as this fell sergeant Death
> Is strict in his arrest – O, I could tell you –
> But let it be. Horatio, I am dead.
>
> (5.2.312–17)

Mediating between the speaking voice and the "arrest" of death, being and non-being, are the listeners, the dumbstruck "audience," hanging on to hear a story that will not come. Though, perhaps, of course, it already has – for those who have had the ears to hear it. But let it be, as Hamlet says, and having over-extended the patience of your eyes (and ears), I can do no more than concur.

8

Artifactual Knowledge in *Hamlet*

Howard Marchitello

The opening scene of *Hamlet* stages two spectacular and related moments. The first is the anticipated but nevertheless startling appearance of some "thing" – "this dreaded sight," "this apparition," this "figure like the King" – that we will learn to call the Ghost of Old Hamlet. Next is the sudden conversion of the skeptic: "How now, Horatio? You tremble and look pale. / Is not this something more than fantasy?" Instantly converted, Horatio replies, "Before my God, I might not this believe / Without the sensible and true avouch / Of mine own eyes."[1] The conjoined effect of these two moments is double-edged; even as his response highlights the fundamentally important issue of the relation between seeing and knowing that lies at the play's heart, Horatio's words serve to obscure precisely those complexities that obtain between the senses and knowledge that the rest of the play will investigate with concentration and rigor.

For Horatio, the very act of seeing this "illusion" serves definitively to establish the veracity of Marcellus's report. Knowing arises naturally from the body's senses: once one sees a ghost, there simply are no complexities surrounding the relationship between sight and knowledge. Horatio's newfound certitude is underwritten by standard late medieval and early modern models of sense perception. While acknowledging the senses' potential unreliability, these models nevertheless upheld the body's viability as a means to knowledge: the senses provide, after their particular fashions – immediately, for taste and touch, remotely for sight, hearing, smell – stimuli or what we might now call information or data to the Imagination or Fancy, which then "processes" this input by virtue of an appeal to the instrument of judgment, the Understanding.[2] The following passage from Samson

Lennard's 1607 translation of Pierre Charron's *Of Wisdome Three Books* (1594) is especially relevant to this chapter:

> The imagination first gathereth the kinds and figures of things both present, by service of the five senses, and absent by the benefit of the common sense: afterwards it presenteth them, if it will, to the understanding, which considereth of them, examineth, ruminateth, and judgeth; afterwards it puts them to the safe custodie of the memorie, as a Scrivener to his booke, to the end he may againe, if need shall require, draw them forth (which men commonly call *Reminiscentia*, Remembrance) or else, if it will, it commits them to the memorie before it presents them to the understanding: for to recollect, represent to the understanding, commit unto memorie, and to draw them foorth againe, are all works of the imagination.
>
> (1607: 50)

We will return later to the scrivener in the figure of Hamlet and his tables (1.5), but for the moment it is important to stress what this passage (and the many others of its kind) argues: that knowledge is possible only by virtue of the perceptual body. We should underscore, too, the historical specificity – and hence the provisional nature – of this settlement: as Bruce Smith reminds us, it would not be until after Descartes in the 1630s and 1640s that we would become convinced that we could "think without [our] bodies" (2004: 149).[3] But even if we had not yet become convinced, there were suspicions, for the idea of the instrumental role of the body in producing knowledge was by no means wholly settled in the late sixteenth century. Michel de Montaigne's 1580 *Apologie de Raimond Sebond* explicitly engages the problems of perception and the nature of experience and knowledge. Montaigne's radical skepticism is in fact predicated upon his understanding of the eminent *fallibility* of the senses: physically unreliable, subject to deceptions and illusions, hopelessly subjective and therefore non-confirmable and non-verifiable, the human senses constitute something of an epistemological dead-end:

> Our imagination does not apply itself to foreign objects, but is formed through the mediation of the senses; and the senses do not understand a foreign object, but only their own passions; and thus what we imagine and what appears to us are not from the object, but only from the passions and suffering of the senses, which passion and which object are different things; thus he who judges by

> appearances judges something other than the object. And if you say that the passions of the senses convey to the soul, by resemblance, the quality of the foreign objects, how can the soul and the understanding assure themselves of this resemblance, since they have in themselves no commerce with the foreign objects?
>
> (2003: 161)

Hamlet is important to this discussion of the senses in early modern culture in part because it marks a crossroads, a moment of the jarring coincidence of two radically opposed epistemologies distinguished above all by the different ways in which the body's role is understood. On the one hand, thinking happens only through the body and its properly functioning perceptions. On the other hand, Shakespeare's era witnessed an increasingly serious skepticism over their viability as mechanisms to secure knowledge. Indeed, to return briefly to the play's opening scene, there is something unsettling and disturbing in this staging of the skeptic's conversion and its aftermath. Arguments such as Montaigne's suggest that Horatio's absolute confidence in his new knowledge may be in fact less durable than it appears since it depends wholly upon the testimony provided by sight: he can only establish the "truth" of the apparition through the "true" testimony of his senses. This is not to suggest that Horatio does not *believe* what he sees – especially since for him the truth of this experience is registered somatically, his body (pale and trembling) obligingly manifesting the authenticating markers of this truth. But it is to call into question the reliability of an epistemology such as Horatio's founded on an uncritical acceptance or understanding of the relation between the senses and knowledge.

For Horatio – as for fifteenth- and sixteenth-century practitioners of natural history, on the one hand, and theorists of the natural (whether humoral or mechanical) body, on the other – seeing is believing precisely because seeing constitutes bodily the means of knowing. But throughout *Hamlet* the perceptual body that would serve as both grounds and means for knowledge fails to function in a known and reliable fashion. Ultimately, the perceptual body – that chain of associated apparatuses that begins with the senses and culminates in judgment – is characterized less by a functional reliability (the appearance of an accustomed automaticity of stimulus and response) than by an utter vulnerability, even to the point of collapse. In other words, *Hamlet* asks the urgent question: if thinking happens through the body, what happens to thought when the body fails? Where Montaigne's

Apologie offers his conclusions about the uselessness of the body as a viable means to access knowledge (holding out faith as the only hope), *Hamlet* stages precisely the struggle of a figure, Hamlet himself, in the very midst of his attempts to resist such conclusions even though these seem borne out by virtually the rest of his entire world.

Hamlet depicts – and Hamlet inhabits – a strange and unsettling world in which knowledge and experience are figured as impossible because the perceptual body that would serve as their condition of existence simply does not exist.[4] The epistemological crisis the play stages arises from the realization that while thinking cannot happen without the body, it cannot happen with it either. In response, Hamlet – unevenly, to be sure, and only by fits and starts – attempts to enact a recuperation of knowledge that depends for its success upon profoundly recasting knowledge: no longer understood as the accumulation of meaning that arises naturally from primary perception, this reconstituted knowledge emerges, if at all, instead as the artifact of a deliberately artificial construction.[5]

Hamlet aims to recuperate both knowledge and action by means of a strategic new consolidation of experience derived from sense perception but realized by *re*-deploying the senses within a sustaining network of practices and techniques that collectively serve to render experience artificial and evidential.[6] This artificial and evidential experience will in turn enable the production of an artifactual knowledge capable of leading to action. In short, Hamlet's attempts to secure a way to knowing – figured most powerfully in his turn to theater via *The Mousetrap* – can be understood as versions of that particular practice that would eventually become the very hallmark of science: the experiment. For the ambition of the scientific experiment is an artifactual knowledge achieved through the controlled production of artificial experience, as can be seen in such landmark scientific texts of the period as William Gilbert's *De Magnete* (1600), Galileo's *Sidereus Nuncius* (1610), for example, and William Harvey's *De Motu Cordis* (1628), companion pieces, as it were, to Shakespeare's play.[7]

In contrast to Horatio – the natural historian for whom seeing is sufficient for believing – Hamlet represents the experimental philosopher for whom seeing is more an occasion for inquiry than an act self-identical with believing. This contrast also describes the differences between the simple empiricists (as seen, for example, in the model of natural historians and sixteenth-century antiquarians) and the experimentalists – figured perhaps most famously by the middle of the seventeenth century in Robert Boyle and Robert Hooke.[8] At the heart of this difference lies the distinction between knowledge construed as merely found, collected, and displayed and knowledge understood as constructed and therefore artifactual. This essential difference is expressed by the radical distinction between the cabinet of curiosities, the (mere) repository of things, and Boyle's air-pump and Hooke's microscope, machines dedicated to producing knowledge.

Hamlet recognizes the radical assault upon the perceptual body that will tend toward its annihilation, even if he cannot understand it: "What piece of work is a man, how noble in reason, how infinite in faculties, in form and moving how express and admirable, in action how like an angel, in apprehension how like a god: the beauty of the world, the paragon of animals – and yet, to me, what is this quintessence of dust?" (2.2.303–8). At the same time, however, Hamlet will resist this slide toward an inevitable meaninglessness that threatens to prevail once the perceptual body can no longer serve as the means to knowledge, or to action. In what follows, I trace the play's double engagement in the destruction of the perceptual body by acts of violence visited directly upon the organs of sense and perception, and the concomitant resistance to its disappearance.

This resistance itself takes the form of two complementary movements identifiable by their opposite (though non-oppositional) trajectories. The first is in the direction of "inwardness," the reactive and defensive retreat toward a projected interiority (or subjectivity) that has been the subject of well known discussions in recent criticism of early modern literature and culture.[9] The second tends toward what can be called "outwardness": the focused attention that emanates outward from the introjected self toward the material world as the object of organized and sustained epistemological inquiry. Understood as *intellectual* as well as "psychological" trajectories, inwardness and outwardness can be said to construct different kinds of experience and therefore provide different avenues for resecuring knowledge. Taken together, they represent yet another important contrast in play during the early modern period: between experimentalists such as Boyle and Hooke, who seek to construct knowledge through apparatuses specifically designed to extend the perceptual body, and anti-experimentalist rationalists such as Descartes and Hobbes, for whom thinking without the body obviates the need to recuperate the perceptual body.[10]

I want to stress that these trajectories do not delimit separate cultural domains.[11] On the contrary, they cut across culture in general and are therefore as present in the early modern laboratory (as it will come to be called) as they are in other sites where knowledge is under construction: the library, the study, Gresham College, the printing house, and eventually the Royal Society. They are equally present in many other cultural practices in the period, in chorographical and cartographical research, for example, in navigational practices (and thereby in early modern global trade), and also upon the early modern stage. To put it another way, these trajectories are best understood as cultural forces at play across the range of cultural sites and practices long before they become the increasingly exclusive properties of those practices and techniques eventually organized (or, disciplined) under the rubric of "science." For his part, Hamlet's hopeful bid for the restoration of sense and the perceptual body takes the form of a fantasy of what I will call the *automatic body* dedicated to the production of artificial experience and artifactual knowledge.

* * *

In *Hamlet* the organs of perception – eyes, ears, nose, mouth, and skin – are simultaneously the means through which one apprehends the material world and the loci of a profound material vulnerability. In this regard, the play participates in an early modern convention: poets (since Petrarch at least) understood the senses, especially vision, as both invasive and violent, even as other writers – from divines to physiologists to dramatists to anti-theatrical polemicists – were convinced of the power of external stimuli to overwhelm the body and with it reason and judgment. Within the English sonneteering tradition, Sir Philip Sidney's *Astrophil and Stella* offers a profusion of illustrative lines, including the following, from Sonnet 42:

> For though I never see them, but straight ways
> My life forgets to nourish languished sprites;
> Yet still on me, O eyes, dart down your rays;
> And if from majesty of sacred lights,
> Oppressing mortal sense, my death proceed,
> Wracks triumphs be, which love (high set) doth breed.
>
> (1989: 169, ll. 9–14)

Spenser's House of Alma episode (book 2, cantos 9 and 11, of *The Faerie Queene*) provides a *locus classicus* of the body under siege by sensory data. The opening stanza of canto 9 presents an allegorical précis of the human body and its faculties:

> Of all Gods works, which do this world adorne,
> There is no one more faire and excellent,

> Then is mans body both for power and forme,
> Whiles it is kept in sober gouernment;
> But none then it, more fowle and indecent,
> Distempered through misrule and passions bace:
> It growes a Monster, and incontinent
> Doth loose his dignitie and natiue grace.
> Behold, who list, both one and other in this place.[12]
>
> (1981, II, 9.1.1–9)

In the siege of the castle/body, Spenser has Maleger unleash his horde of "raskall routs" (II, 9.15.4) specifically "Against the fiue great Bulwarkes of that pile," the five senses (II, 11.7.2). Yet for all of its power (and its comprehensiveness), Spenser's depiction of the body and its senses under assault is an altogether conventional one. Temperance and the soul, together with Guyon and, especially, Arthur, must fight and defeat an enemy that lies potentially within all of us: the undisciplined and therefore corrupt (and corrupting) body transformed into a monster.[13] *Hamlet* is less conventional: it articulates the fantasy of an *invulnerable* body against which the collapse of the perceptual body is all the more striking – and all the more destabilizing. The projection of this body first appears (if only spectrally, as ghost) embedded within the play's most conspicuous instance of the coincidence of bodily perception and corporeal vulnerability: the story of Old Hamlet's ear into which is fatally poured the "juice of cursed hebenon" (1.5.62).[14] The Ghost describes this "distilment" as "leperous" (64), first because of its effects on the blood, which "with a sudden vigour it doth posset / And curd" (68–9), and then for its subsequent effects on the skin: "And a most instant tetter bark'd about, / Most lazar-like, with a vile and loathsome crust / All my smooth body" (71–3). Old Hamlet's story joins two related narratives: the play's concern with the organs of sense under siege and attack from the material world; and the image of the *smooth body* imagined as having preceded the attack, standing thereafter as the lost ideal, as that figure of the whole and solid and unblemished body/self against which Hamlet's own body/self (like Hyperion to a satyr) is "sullied."[15]

As the play demonstrates, this figure is nothing more than a fantasy, for the smooth body and its organs of sense are *naturally* under siege precisely in order ro make perception itself possible. The ears, for example, are either promiscuously open (Old Hamlet's); deliberately, though ineffectually, closed (as Barnardo characterizes Horatio's "let us once again assail your ears / That are so fortified against our story": 1.1.34–5); or simply dead (as are Claudius's – and perhaps Hamlet's, as well – at the play's end, "The ears are senseless that should give us hearing / To tell him his commandment is fulfill'd. / That Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are dead": 5.2.374–6). No matter how they are understood, the ears are invariably conceived as the site of a violence that is both perceptual and epistemological. Hamlet tells Horatio: "I would not hear your enemy say so, / Nor shall you do my ear that violence / To make it truster of your own report / Against yourself. I know you are no truant" (1.2.170–3). Gertrude begs Hamlet: "O speak to me no more. / These words like daggers enter in my ears. / No more, sweet Hamlet" (3.4.94–6). Claudius reports to Gertrude on the rumors that greet Laertes upon his return to Denmark after the death of Polonius: he "wants not buzzers to infect his ear / With pestilent speeches of his father's death, / Wherein necessity, of matter beggar'd, / Will nothing stick our person to arraign / In ear and ear" (4.5.90–4). And Hamlet's letter to Horatio announces and warns: "Let the King have the letters I have sent, and repair thou to me with as much speed as thou wouldst fly death. I have words to speak in thine ear will make thee dumb" (4.6.20–3).[16]

These instances of the coincidence of the ear and violence are informed by a belief in the immediate, involuntary nature of somatic responses to aural impressions, the model for which is established by the Ghost in its untold story of purgatorial torments:

> But that I am forbid
> To tell the secrets of my prison-house,
> I could a tale unfold whose lightest word
> Would harrow up thy soul, freeze thy young blood,
> Make thy two eyes like stars start from their spheres,
> Thy knotted and combined locks to part,
> And each particular hair to stand an end
> Like quills upon the fretful porpentine.
> But this eternal blazon must not be
> To ears of flesh and blood.
>
> (1.5.13–22)

The Ghost's harrowing account attests to the general collapse of the organs of sense – or, more abstractly, corporeal sense itself – in the play-world, and the concomitant instability of the smooth body threatens to overthrow all reason, all nature – even language itself. Here is Hamlet chastising Gertrude in her bedchamber: "Have you eyes?" he asks her not once but twice in three lines. In contrasting the portraits of her two husbands, he expresses astonishment at the abject failure of Gertrude's senses to perceive, and, since she fails to blush at her own error/transgression, the attendant failure of her body to participate in the somatic economy of signification:

> Have you eyes?
> Could you on this fair mountain leave to feed
> And batten on this moor? Ha, have you eyes?
> …
> Sense sure you have,
> Else could you not have motion; but sure that sense
> Is apoplex'd, for madness would not err
> Nor sense to ecstasy was ne'er so thrall'd
> But it reserv'd some quantity of choice
> To serve in such a difference. What devil was't
> That thus hath cozen'd you at hoodman-blind?
> Eyes without feeling, feeling without sight,
> Ears without hands or eyes, smelling sans all,
> Or but a sickly part of one true sense
> Could not so mope. O shame, where is thy blush?
>
> (3.4.65–81)

As these lines suggest, even after the traumatic and grotesque death of his father, Hamlet maintains as ideal the very notion of the smooth body that has fallen apart around him. This fantasy holds on not only to the image (or ideology) of smoothness, but also to an entirely conventional understanding of the nature and the status of the senses. Such understanding posits for the body an unmediated relation to the material world figured as the immediate connection between an event and the somatic response – the *natural* reactions of the perceptual body – to that event.[17]

Hamlet wants to uphold the notion of a guaranteed relation between event (stimulus) and bodily response (reaction). Nonetheless, the play bears the marks of an unmistakable skepticism regarding the somatic economy upon which many of its principal features are constructed, from the Ghost's non-report of its torments to Hamlet's violent repudiation of Gertrude's somatic failures ("I will speak daggers to her, but use none": 3.2.388). Given the besieged status of the senses, the information provided by them no longer serves to construct a stable basis for action in the world. This destabilization of the senses accounts for

Hamlet's nostalgia for a smooth body governed by the predictable and stable connections between stimulus and response.

Hamlet's crisis generates two complementary and simultaneously enacted narrative arcs. The first moves toward inwardness, the second toward outwardness. As intended here, outwardness should be understood as a linked move toward a world external to the (newly conceived) "inward" early modern self; it represents a deliberate engagement with the outside world through a set of early modern mechanisms and practices that were in the very process of becoming collectively consolidated under the category "science." For Hamlet, the emergence of the latter leads to the attempt to recuperate experience by recovering the functional perceptual body that his world has already disallowed. More specifically, he seeks to restore perception in the image of the smooth body and it is just this artificial – this constructed – automatic body that the play evokes in one of its most curious locutions, the "machine" which appears in Hamlet's love letter to Ophelia: "Thine evermore, most dear lady, whilst this machine is to him, Hamlet" (2.2.122–3). While this line has given readers fits, it has also seemed somehow integral to the greatness of the play, not least because of its indexical nature: it bears the traces of its original speaker having perhaps endured fits (of melancholy or of madness) and at the same moment it evokes a certain burden of greatness, whether of station, destiny, or (to invoke a concept for which Hamlet may well stand as an icon) *character* itself.[18]

But if this line truly is essential to the play, what does it mean? Virtually every editor of the play, when offering any aid at all, provides a more or less simple gloss: "machine means body." This may seem an unremarkable determination, not only because it makes perfect sense as a lover's vow – "Hamlet is Ophelia's so long as his body endures" – but also because the gloss appears to be guaranteed by the prestige of its genealogical descent from no less a figure than Descartes and the mechanical philosophy he comes to represent. Yet the substitution of "machine" for "body" strikes me as a particularly unhelpful instance of defining one unclear term (machine) with a second that is even *more* unclear and ambiguous (body). Needless to say, whole philosophies and entire religions (to say nothing of certain mystical traditions and a significant number of particular sciences) have been devoted to the discovery, or the invention, of a definition of that most elusive term. Of all Shakespeare's works, the one *least* likely to yield a robust definition of "body" is probably *Hamlet*, a play that reads very much like a sustained indictment of a body that everywhere manifests unmistakable signs of its utter vulnerability, even to the point of death and material dissolution: “To what base uses we may return, Horatio! Why, may not imagination trace the dust of Alexander till a find it stopping a bung-hole?” (5.1.196–8). By these measures, if the body is a machine, it is clearly a very poor one indeed.

But surely this cannot be the whole import of Shakespeare’s only recorded use of “machine”; “There needs no ghost,” as Horatio says, “come from the grave / To tell us this” (1.5.131–2). One way out of this difficulty is suggested by recent work in science studies – a term denoting a variety of related disciplines and practices, including the history, sociology, and philosophy of science. The interpretive havoc wrought by substituting “body” for “machine” in Hamlet’s famous line can perhaps be undone by reversing the polarity of the critical formulation. The question, as I see it, is not “What is a body?” but instead – or rather *first* – “What is a machine?” I propose to think about the machine as an amalgamation of instruments deployed as a machination, and dedicated to the production of artificial experience.[19]

If we think of Hamlet’s invocation of the machine as referring to a set of machinations and to a prosthetic system – albeit not of glass vials or mechanical devices but instead of literary and rhetorical uses of such representational systems as enclosed plays, posthumous life stories, and secret forgeries designed to produce artificial experience –what emerges is a new way to understand both the machine and the body, on the one hand, and Hamlet’s attempt to reinvent the possibility of experience and knowledge, on the other. From this perspective, Hamlet’s love letter to Ophelia (which I take to have been composed at some point after act 1) emerges as part of a larger plot or ploy to achieve Hamlet’s greater objective: not to win or maintain Ophelia’s love, but instead to satisfy the Ghost’s command to avenge Old Hamlet’s murder. If the love letter is as much machination as machine it would then be just like Hamlet’s other letters – and indeed, other writings – through the course of the play. His forged royal commission at sea, his disturbing and obscure letter to Claudius (“High and mighty, you shall know I am set naked on your kingdom”: 4.7.42–3), and his staging of “The Mousetrap” (“The play’s the thing / Wherein I’ll catch the conscience of the King”: 2.2.600–1) are equally instances of machinations that employ (like the love letter) certain strategies of ambiguity in pursuit of revenge. These machines, all textual in nature, are dedicated to the production of artificial experience and the resecuring of knowledge that experience allows.[20]

If we seriously treat machines/machinations in the terms briefly outlined here, then perhaps we can offer for consideration a modified Hamlet, a character for whom the dread command of the Ghost gives rise not to instant action, but instead to multiple, local, and *improvisational* machinations that collectively articulate a general trajectory toward a resolution – albeit one that is never clearly in sight. Against this backdrop the *automatic* body itself emerges as the principal machination within Hamlet's projected regime of problem-solving.

Upon the instant of hearing the Ghost's the report of his father's murder, Hamlet envisions instant revenge: "Haste me to know't." But the very language he uses to express immediate revenge – a response arising as if it were itself a somatic reaction to a physical stimulus too great or too demanding to suffer even the slightest mediation – betrays Hamlet's predicament: "Haste me to know't, that I with wings as swift / As meditation or the thoughts of love / May sweep to my revenge" (1.5.29–31).[21] The remainder of the play makes clear that neither meditation nor the thoughts of love are swift, and both serve to frustrate Hamlet's execution of swift revenge. Indeed, precisely the space between event (the news of Old Hamlet's murder at the hands of Claudius) and response (Hamlet's moment to kill the King) separates Hamlet from his revenge, in particular, and from action, in general. Given Hamlet's alacrity in thrusting his blade through the arras – "O what a rash and bloody deed is this!" (3.4.27) – or his swiftness in securing the execution of Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, he is clearly capable of "sweeping" to action. What intervenes, significantly, is meditation across time, so that the execution of action, as the Player King's speech makes clear, emerges not from valor or from duty, but if at all only *as a function of memory*:

> Purpose is but the slave to memory,
> Of violent birth, but poor validity,
> Which now, the fruit unripe, sticks on the tree,
> But fall unshaken when they mellow be.
>
> (3.2.183–6)

The Player King's diagnosis of the interval between passion and action stands as a cautionary tale of the dangers inherent in the very structure of early modern conceptions of the body's perceptual system, and in particular of the relationship of memory to the senses and their stimuli, on the one hand, and the mechanisms of the Understanding (sometimes, the Imagination or Fancy) in the processing of memories, on the other.

As we saw in the passage from Charron's *Of Wisdome Three Books*, the information collected by the senses would be processed immediately and then routed to "the safe custodie of memorie," or it could be stored in the memory immediately, literally to be recalled and acted upon at some later time. One significant threat, then, to "purpose" is precisely the interval of time created by the fact that the immediate inscription of stimuli as memory is recollected at some later moment, when passions may have waned. A second threat to purpose – and therefore an incentive to inaction – lies within the very nature of memory conceived as a (textual) retrieval system in which any particular piece of inscribed information already stands at one significant remove from the original event/stimulus itself. This kind of inscription is always and immediately only a *copy*, impermanent and fluid, of a lost ephemeral event. Hobbes's famous formulation of memory as "decaying sense" is an especially apt characterization of this fragility:

> And any object being removed from our eyes, though the impression it made in us remain; yet other objects more present succeeding, and working on us, the Imagination of the past is obscured, and made weak; as the voice of a man is in the noyse of the day. From when it followeth, that the longer the time is, after the sight, or Sense, of any object, the weaker is the Imagination. For the continuall change of mans body, destroyes in time the part which in sense were moved. … This *decaying sense*, when wee would express the thing it self, (I mean *fancy* it selfe,) wee call Imagination, as I said before: But when we would express the *decay*, and signifie that the Sense is fading, old, and past, it is called *Memory*.
>
> (1996: 16)

Hamlet seems aware of the textual nature of memory, as well as of the threats posed to it by time and the "decaying sense" that Hobbes sees as resulting from "the continuall change of mans body." We first glimpse this awareness – and the corresponding anxiety of a virtually inevitable forgetfulness as well as the inaction to which it leads – when Hamlet responds to the Ghost's call to remembrance:

> Remember thee?
> Ay, thou poor ghost, whiles memory holds a seat
> In this distracted globe. Remember thee?
> Yea, from the table of my memory
> I'll wipe away all trivial fond records,
> All saws of books, all forms, all pressures past
> That youth and observation copied there,
> And thy commandment all alone shall live

> Within the book and volume of my brain,
> Unmix'd with baser matter.[22]
>
> (1.5.95–104)

The "baser matter" against which Hamlet hopes to insulate the import of the Ghost's tale of murder and its call to revenge is not only the "continuall change of mans body," but also thought itself. Perhaps surprisingly, for Hamlet – known to criticism as Shakespeare's most intellectual figure – intellection comes as something of a burden.

> Thus conscience does make cowards of us all,
> And thus the native hue of resolution
> Is sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought,
> And enterprises of great pitch and moment
> With this regard their currents turn awry
> And lose the name of action.[23]
>
> (3.1.83–8)

The hoped-for antidote to the loss of action, which is built into the very structure of perception, memory, and action, is nothing less than the desire to reinvent memory itself as a physical sense, a mechanism that can be literally incorporated into the body ("incorps'd," to use one of the play's more curious figures: 4.7.86), rather than a faculty of sense that is purely intellectual in nature, separating thought from action. Hamlet's own nostalgia for the smooth body (which response follows immediately from stimulus) generates the fantasy of something that (at least theoretically) is solid in nature and guaranteed in both reliability and durability. What Hamlet imagines as sufficient to stand in for the absent smooth body of the father is the automatic body of the machine.[24] Hamlet's conception of the automatic body is enabled by means of the relocation of memory within an artificial system of stimulus and response that will be made to stand in for the lost perceptual body. This system – this *machine* – goes by the name "theater."

The Player's Hecuba speech offers Hamlet his first opportunity to witness the simulated re-emergence not of the smooth body, but of its double, its simulation:

> Is it not monstrous that this player here,
> But in a fiction, in a dream of passion,
> Could force his soul to his own conceit

> That from her working all his visage wann'd,
> Tears from his eyes, distraction in his aspect,
> A broken voice, and his whole function suiting
> With forms to his conceit? And all for nothing!
> For Hecuba!
>
> (2.2.545–52)

What so astounds Hamlet ("What's Hecuba to him, or he to her, / That he should weep for her?": 2.2.553–4) is that the Player has just demonstrated a solution both to the crisis of the fallen perceptual body and to the threats posed to purpose by the deferral that lies at the heart of memory, blocking access to action. The Player can move to action ("his whole function suiting / With forms to his conceit") precisely because he can produce passion artificially.

The Player's Hecuba speech, then, triggers a turn to theater, the very form taken by Hamlet's hopeful bid to restore the smooth body and reinvent memory by incorporating it within the newly conceived automatic body. But there is something still more particular about Hamlet's turn to theater that makes it especially astonishing.

> What would he do
> Had he the motive and the cue for passion
> That I have? He would drown the stage with tears,
> And cleave the general ear with horrid speech,
> Make mad the guilty and appal the free,
> Confound the ignorant, and amaze indeed
> The very faculties of eyes and ears.
>
> (2.2.554–60)

Hamlet's image of the utterly amazed body, its very faculties of sight and hearing wholly overcome, provides a hint (both to Hamlet and to his auditors). Hamlet's appeal to theater emerges from his knowledge of an old and trusted axiom (to which this whole speech has been tending) that theater can conjure the guilty to confess: "Hum – I have heard / That guilty creatures sitting at a play / Have, by the very cunning of the scene, / Been struck so to the soul that presently / They have proclaim'd their malefactions" (2.2.584–8). What makes this turn to theater remarkable is that Hamlet undertakes it in the spirit of what will become the very hallmark of science: the experiment.

Hamlet's turn to theater is an experiment in both a general or abstract sense, and a particular and local sense. On the one hand, *The Mousetrap* is an experiment that will test and assess the truth value of the axiom about theatrical representation and the confessions of the guilty. On the other hand, it will test Claudius by trying to cause the artificial experience of an authentic reaction – to fret Claudius (as Hamlet says after the event) with false fire:

> I'll have these players
> Play something like the murder of my father
> Before mine uncle. I'll observe his looks;
> I'll tent him to the quick. If a do blench,
> I'll know my course.
>
> (2.2.590–4)

In both of these ways *The Mousetrap* functions as experiment and as such marks one striking moment in that monumental change in the seventeenth century remarked upon by Peter Dear: "A knowledge of past events was not true knowledge; a knowledge of the current state of affairs was itself mere history." Dear continues:

> The question "Why?" in the sense of Aristotle's "Why thus and not otherwise?" – expecting the answer "because it cannot be otherwise" – haunted would-be knowers, heirs to the Western philosophical tradition. "Experience" was understood as a field from which knowledge was constructed, rather than a resource for acquiring knowledge, because "experience" was itself incapable of explaining the necessity of those things to which it afforded witness. By the end of the seventeenth century, however, a new kind of experience had become available to European philosophers: the experiment.
> (1995: 11–12)

Hamlet emerges at that moment of transition between two systems of knowledge: between knowledge understood as evident and crystallized in axioms (in *Hamlet*, the power of theater to elicit confessions), and knowledge produced artificially (in *Hamlet*, Claudius's "blench" and his cry, "Give me some light": 3.2.263); between an understanding of "how things happen" and "how something had happened" (1995: 4).

Dear describes this history in more detail:

> At the beginning of the seventeenth century, a scientific "experience" was not an "experiment" in the sense of a historically reported

> experiential event. Instead, it was a statement about the world that, although known to be true thanks to the senses, did not rest on a historically specifiable instance – it was a statement such as "Heavy bodies fall". … By the end of the seventeenth, by contrast, it had become routine, especially in English natural philosophy, to support a knowledge-claim by detailing a historical episode.[25]
>
> (1995: 14)

Claudius's revulsion at the re-enacted scene of his fratricidal murder of Old Hamlet (itself a re-enactment of the first murder – "It hath the primal eldest curse upon't": 3.3.36), is certainly a somatic response, indeed one that Hamlet will take as a marker of truth, but crucially it is a response that is *only* produced artificially. The "blench" (or flinch) Hamlet witnesses arises naturally from the artificial simulation of the king's guilt that he has been made to see: "If his occulted guilt / Do not itself unkennel in one speech, / It is a damned ghost that we have seen, / And my imaginations are as foul / As Vulcan's stithy" (3.2.80–4).[26] Claudius's guilt becomes Hamlet's knowledge because it is produced *automatically*, as a matter of course or nature, and because it was made to do so without the mediatory roles of speech ("For murder, though it have no tongue, will speak / With most miraculous organ": 2.2.589–90) and – even more importantly – without thought.[27]

In short, in the theatrical figure of the Mousetrap, *Hamlet* manifests an understanding of a feature that will come to characterize or define the modern – and the scientific – world: that meaning, like authenticity, is not a naturally occurring fact, but the artifact of a complicated set of technical operations.

9

"Rich eyes and poor hands": Theaters of Early Modern Experience

Adam Rzepka

Shakespeare's Globe Theatre, the functioning period model built by Sam Wanamaker in Bankside, London, is, according to its website, "dedicated to the experience … of Shakespeare in performance."[1] The painstaking archival and archeological work that went into the new Globe makes it clear that "experience" here is to be produced by a strictly historical technology that is then in some sense activated by the event of performance. This archival and archeological process is oriented at every point toward the strange attractor of the performance, when actors and audience enter the completed architectural machine and the transitory, emergent structure of early modern theatrical experience is generated, like a hologram, from the precisely measured timbers and thatch. Yet this theater of history is as immersive as it is specular, as much like a holodeck as like a hologram: audiences "experience the 'wooden O' either sitting in a gallery or standing informally as a groundling in the yard, just as they would have done 400 years ago."[2] The same theater-machine that processes our diverse bodies into the collective body of an audience is also a history-machine that allows us literally to take the place of an early modern audience. We attend the Globe not simply to view the past, but to inhabit an event that has returned from it. The promise of "experience" here lies in the sudden collapse of the historical distance that haunts the archive and the archeological site: Shakespearean theater re-embodies and re-enacts, conjuring a dead past into a living event.

Such an account of theatrical "experience" seems to cry out for critical demystification.[3] Readers of early modern drama and culture, however, have not fully established a position from which to level that critique, and it is not even clear that we can do without the work that "experience" continues to perform in our methodologies. Like the new Globe, we continue to use this term to gesture toward a reinhabitation and reanimation of the past; through decades of stern injunctions against transhistorical continuity, subjective autonomy, and naive psychology, we have still been able to refer without hesitation not only to early modern "theatrical experience" (Cartelli 1981), but also to "corporeal experience" (Schoenfeldt 1999: 3), "emotional experience" (Strier 1983: 175), gendered "divisions of experience" (French 1981: 21), "Puritan experience" (Watkins 1972), "lived experience among Catholics" (McClain 2004), "experience in song," "self-experience" (Paster et al. 2004: 17), "subjective experience" (Mazzio and Trevor 2000: 3), and many other variations spread over a wide array of approaches to early modern culture. It seems proper that R. G. Collingwood's guiding question in *The Idea of History* (1946) – "Of what can there be historical knowledge?" – should remain urgently alive today. Yet it is surprising that we still produce, in the casual introductions, unpoliced sentences, and framing statements that form the marginal apparatus of rigorous scholarship, echoes of his answer: "In the first place, this must be experience" (1946: 302).[4]

Collingwood's method is as strangely theatrical in its details as it is outmoded in its premises: historical experience must be mentally "revived" or "re-enacted," and, Collingwood writes, "the historian's mind must be such as to offer a home for that revival" (1946: 304). As methodological groundwork, this will seem virtually unrecognizable today. To what extent, though, are we still asked to enter something like Collingwood's theater of historical experience when, for example, Michael Schoenfeldt, in *Bodies and Selves in Early Modern England*, suggests that early modern humoral theories "describe not so much the actual workings of the body as the experience of the body" (1999: 3–4)? When the editors of *Reading the Early Modern Passions* argue, in their introduction, that "The way we describe the workings of our bodies and minds … may shape and color our emotional experiences"? (Paster et al. 2004: 16). Or when Bruce R. Smith, in *The Acoustic World of Early Modern England*, invites us to abandon "*ontology*, which assumes a detached, objective spectator who can see the whole, and consider early modern subjects from the point of view of *phenomenology*, which assumes a subject who is immersed in the experience she is trying to describe" (1999: 10).

Schoenfeldt's and Smith's emphasis on the phenomenal has more recently been taken up as a formal methodology that is sometimes referred to as "historical phenomenology." The editors of *Reading the Early Modern Passions*, for example, note that many of the contributors to the volume

> take a phenomenological approach to exploring how pre-Cartesian psychophysiology may have affected early modern self-experience. By putting pressure on the fact that the period's most categorically "scientific" discourses on the passions are in themselves not only socially invested representations but also cultural scripts, [they] imply that the very language of physiology … helps *determine phenomenology*. The way we describe the workings of our bodies and minds … may shape and color our emotional experiences.[5]
>
> (Paster et al. 2004: 16, my emphasis)

The field to be partially determined by historical discourse here cannot be "phenomenology" as such; the term, in any case, is mistakenly used in place of something like "the phenomenological." Such a formula would be a methodological contradiction in terms, or at least a very different project in intellectual history. A less troublesome signifier steps in directly afterwards, however, to stand in the place where the philosophical baggage of "phenomenology" feels unwieldy: "experiences." As the critical taboos established by deconstruction, identity critique, and new historicism steadily multiplied the distance between critic and historical subject in the late twentieth century, "experience" continued quietly to mark the stations of the retreat and to keep in reserve an otherwise unconfessed sense of our immediate proximity to history. Now, in this new turn away from the long turn against that sense of proximity, "experience" is quietly marking the stations of a return, underwriting projects for its own mediation while continuing to derive its infrastructural force from a richly suggestive non-specificity.

To what do we appeal, then, when we appeal to historical "experience"? What is at stake in the rhetorical shift from history as discourse to history "as it was lived" – or as we imaginatively relive it? In this chapter, I develop an approach to these questions by attending to the ways in which "experience" was put to use in early modern English discourse. These uses are manifold and dispersed, and even my brief tour of them will dash laterally through Protestant theology, technical manuals, literature, and drama. What "experience" flags across this field, however, is consistent in one respect: within any given discursive formation – whether current literary criticism, Protestant diaries, sixteenth-century bee-keeping advice, or Shakespearean drama – "experience" marks a struggle to ground knowledge in the non-discursive. Tracking this paradoxical struggle across early modern culture will ultimately bring us back to my opening questions about the medium of theater and the ambivalent investments of contemporary scholarship.

A survey of Shakespeare's uses of "experience" demonstrates the dynamic variety of the term's tropological modes in early modern discourse, but also suggests a rough spectrum onto which those modes can be mapped. The most apparently straightforward sense of "experience" in Shakespeare is that of a somber wisdom that accrues over the course of a long life and manifests in old age – a sense that bears little resemblance to the immersive phenomenality that the Globe's website and the critics cited above seem to have in mind. In the final scene of *Titus Andronicus*, for example, a Roman lord's white hairs function as "frosty signs" whose signifying force is as sober and settled as the capacity for judgment that they signify: they are "grave witnesses of true experience" (5.3.77–6).[6] Experience appears in a similar vein in *All's Well that Ends Well*, when Helena offers to cure the ailing King with a remedy bequeathed to her by her father as "the dearest issue … of his old experience" (2.1.107–8). In these instances, "old experience" works to guarantee knowledge by appealing to the length of time over which that knowledge has been aggregated and distilled.

This guarantee comes, however, with two closely related costs: a deep sadness, and a rift between knowledge and speech. The Roman lord cites his "true experience" as a reason for the company to "attend my words," but those words are subsequently broken off by his grief over the play's tragic events. "Floods of tears," he says, "will drown my oratory / And break my utterance" in the middle of his speech, and he is forced to yield the floor to Lucius, "Rome's young captain" (5.3.90–4). Helena's father, who is still being mourned at the play's opening ("how sad a passage 'tis," laments her new guardian), has given her the remedy on his "bed of death"; the cure both fends off mortality and serves as a *memento mori* (1.1.18, 2.1.105). The directions for the medicine are written down on a "receipt," but we are never told what it consists of (2.1.113); Helena's father's prescriptions are, in any case, "notes whose faculties inclusive were / More than they were in note," so that we would not know the mechanism of the cure even if we were allowed to read the instructions for mixing and administering it (1.3.222–3). A hermetic "triple eye, / Safer than [Helena's] own two," its accomplished formulation and absolutely reliable effects remain obscure to language and even to plain sight (2.1.109–10). As "old experience" or "long experience," this kind of perspicacious but melancholy and untranslatable wisdom marks one end of the modal spectrum of early modern usages. This is the version of experience that the ruminative, depressive Jaques has so much trouble summarizing for Rosalind in *As You Like It*: "I have gained my experience," he concludes, after a fruitless attempt to articulate the precise character of the melancholy state to which his wandering life has brought him. "And your experience makes you sad," Rosalind replies.

Shakespeare deploys "experience" just as often, however, in ways that attend to the turbulent *process* that ultimately results in old, sad experience. That process is frequently figured in economic terms: Antony is said to have "pawn[ed his] experience to present pleasure" in *Antony and Cleopatra* (1.4.32), for instance, and experience is twice imagined as something "purchased" – with the "penny of observation" in *Love's Labours Lost* (3.1.25) and at "an infinite rate" in *The Merry Wives of Windsor* (2.2.195–6). The emphasis here is on the transactional costs by which knowledge is gained or lost, shifting us away from the completed manifestation of experience at the end of life and toward a series of gambles taken in the midst of living. In this mode, experience has to be actively gained ("by industry achieved," as Antonio puts it in *The Two Gentlemen of Verona*) before it can be "perfected by the swift course of time" (1.3.22–3). Crucially, however, neither the metaphorical capital laid out for experience nor the industrious seeking of it can be directed toward any known, nameable end; what is bought or sought is a personally hazardous encounter with the *unknown*, an encounter for which knowledge received at second hand cannot substitute. Experience in Shakespeare is almost never to be gained simply from reading, then, but it is often to be gained from travel. In referring to experience gained "by industry," Antonio is acceding to a plea to send his son to "travel" and "let him spend his time no more at home" (1.3.14–16). Petruchio echoes this sentiment in *The Taming of the Shrew* when he explains his reasons for traveling to Padua: he has been blown there by "Such wind as scatters young men through the world / To seek their fortunes further than at home, / Where small experience grows" (1.2.49–51). The contrast between the dormant, infertile certainties of home and the buffeting winds of travel suggests that the sober reliability of "old" or "long" experience can only emerge from a process that is inversely risky and improvisational. As we shall see, it is in this latter context that "experience" and "experiment" function as partial synonyms in the early modern period; experience in process is constituted by a series of *tests* that employ particular armatures of cultural practice (travel, for instance) in order to posit zones of eventuation at or beyond the limits of established knowledge.

The sense of experience as an experimental troubling of received wisdom finds its most literal Shakespearean expression in the fourth act of *Cymbeline*. Imogen, lost in the wilds of Wales and taken in by the residents of a cave, is struck by the hospitality she receives in such a "savage hold":

> These are kind creatures. Gods, what lies I have heard!
> Our courtiers say all's savage but at court.
> Experience, O, thou disprov'st report!
>
> (4.2.3-12–4)

The unmediated revelation that "Experience" seems to level against "report" here turns out to be intricately problematic, since everyone in the cave, including Imogen, is in disguise. Nonetheless, this is the closest Shakespeare brings us to "experience" in the event of its acquisition, rather than as an impending series of tests or a melancholy retrospection on a long life. As a moment of both powerful recognition and powerful confusion, Imogen's encounter suggests a third distinct use of "experience," one that grapples with an affectively intensified, unfolding present whose translation into knowledge is acutely in question. I will return to Imogen's revelatory "Experience" and, at the opposite end of the experiential spectrum, Jaques and Rosalind's exchange concerning "sad" experience, later in this chapter, where my concern will be the close weave between these figures of experience and the figure of the theater. First, however, I want to locate the modes of experience I have outlined in Shakespeare's work in early modern culture more generally, beginning with their manifestations in emerging religious discourse.

The enormous body of work on the English Reformation and the rise of Puritanism (Patrick Collinson's "perfect Protestantism") has shown a special interest in "experience" as a term that seems to provide an unlikely continuity to the Protestant tradition from its foundations through the eighteenth century and beyond. The doctrine of "justification by faith alone," which formed the fundamental principle of Reformation thought, refigured faith as ultimately unfigured, a "life-transforming force," in Bernard Reardon's terms (1981: 55), without which both words and works are ultimately insufficient. It is not simply the institution of the church and the textual apparatus of scripture that are made secondary to this understanding of faith, but also any final conceptualization or textualization of faith itself. Luther repeatedly attempts to correct the notion that "faith" refers to what he calls the "human fabrication" of "belief"; faith is neither a theological concept nor even, Luther says, a "quality latent in the soul," but something antecedent to intellectual apprehension (1961: 18). In making this correction, he turns to a more specialized term that is more resistant to misinterpretation because it is more resistant to interpretation as such: the *fide* in *justificatio sola fide* refers not to belief but to "experience" (*experientia* in Luther's Latin, *Erfahrung* in his German). This translation of "faith" into "experience" and the distinction between "experience" and "belief" become increasingly important themes as Protestant movements expand and diversify in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, so that Luther's admonition is still clearly legible in Vavasor Powell's 1652 definition of experience as "the spirituall and powerful enjoyment of What is believed" (Epistle). This approach to faith claims that religious language and practice – indeed, faith itself – must flow from an event that is transitory and ultimately immutable.

The Protestant location of conversion experience in "the depths of the heart," however, also becomes the occasion for the opening of experience into time and into language (Luther 1961: 23). For the most part, historians and literary critics alike have emphasized the "inwardness" suggested by the Protestant emphasis on the heart; as an integral part of the grammar of experience, references to the heart seem to put, in Richard Strier's words, "an extraordinarily strong stress on individual inner experience" (1983: 143). What the Protestant tradition tends to emphasize, though, is not so much the silent inwardness and privacy of the heart as the radical *transformations* it undergoes when it receives divine grace. The language that describes the heart in which grace "takes root" proliferates in the gap between Word and experience, elaborating the poetics of interiority in vivid and challenging ways. This is particularly clear in the work of the lineage of English divines whom Norman Pettit, in *The Heart Prepared*, calls the "Preparationists." Late sixteenth-century preachers like Richard Greenham and Richard Rogers explored possibilities for readying oneself for the conversion experience, emphasizing not only its mute centrality but also the steps leading up to it. Images of the "preparation of the heart" develop the activity and the temporality of Luther's sense of faith as "a living, busy, active, mighty thing" (1961: 20). Crucially, for the Preparationists it is not only the Holy Spirit that plays an active role in experience, but the regenerate as well. Greenham warns that "Before we can enter the covenant, we must labor to circumsize the foreskins of our hearts" (1612: 706). In a gentler vein, Richard Sibbes imagines the heart as a scented garden, planted by Christ and graciously hosted by the larger self: "Therefore," he advises, "keep the soul open for entertainment of the Holy Ghost" (1862: 75). If the heart is, as Pettit reminds us, "the biblical metonym for the inner man" (1966: 1), then its role is not only to mark the immutability of inwardness but also to figure inwardness as the immutable first term in a rapidly proliferating series of poetic images that figure the approach to and aftermath of the experience of grace. Experience functions here as the event that opens the heart to the imagination, and therefore as the force that orients and drives the production of metaphor.

Early modern Protestant writers also worry consistently, however, that the immediacy of experience and the sensational urgency of the imaginative production that circulates around it have a tendency to fade, leaving the regenerate alienated from the promise of salvation. Diarists like Samuel Bolton kept accounts recording not only "all the *experiences* of Gods shining … the light of his countenance upon him," but also "his *withdrawings* and hiding his face" (Calamy 1655: 25). Outside the experiential event, time can come to feel deserted, empty, and fraught with the danger of forgetting – haunted, in Owen Watkins's words, by a "deadness and flatness" (1972: 20). The meaning of "experience" splinters dramatically in this context, designating both a revelatory intensity and the pain of its absence: "The 'sense of Heav'ns desertion' was a familiar experience," writes Richard Strier, reading Herbert (and quoting Milton); in this respect, "Faith both produces and is contradicted by experience" (1983: 219). Watkins quotes from Jane Turner's autobiography, in which she finds, "from *sad experience*, that … [she is] prone to forget the particulars" of the mercies she has received (1972: 18, my emphasis). "Experience" in this sense connotes neither an unmediated event nor the lively temporality of the images to which it gives rise, but instead the long, modulated time of a life – as Strier puts it, "the whole pattern" of experience (1983: 243). Comprehension of this pattern is only made possible by establishing a removed, "unifying perspective" in which the subject is no longer "at the mercy of … phenomenological absoluteness" (Strier 1983: 243, 251). Reading Rogers's confessional diary, Watkins discovers such a device in Rogers's ambition "to view his whole life in a more balanced perspective" (1972: 19). The result is a retrospective experience that is neither an ecstatic communion nor an unbearable absence, but instead a form of removed *spectatorship* before the accumulated events of one's own life.

The three elements of Protestant "experience" outlined here – moments of revelatory immediacy, the "preparation" of enabling conditions for these moments, and their eventual assimilation in a distanced retrospection – roughly correspond to the modes found in Shakespeare, where "experience" can refer to a transitory, extra-discursive encounter, to the conditions in which such encounters are sought, or to the completed aggregation of those encounters in "old experience." Important aspects of this tripartite distribution of tropes can also be found in deployments of "experience" in a range of early modern polemical and technical texts, which frequently appeal to the authority of "experience" alongside the more traditional authority of philosophical reasoning or received wisdom. Stephen Gosson's well-known 1579 screed against popular entertainments, *The school of abuse*, offers a typical instance in announcing that its arguments will be drawn from "prophane [i.e. secular] writers, naturall reason, and common experience" (p. 1).

The proliferation of claims to a distinctly experiential production of knowledge in the late sixteenth century is particularly striking, however, in instructional writing: handbooks, guidebooks, and manuals on subjects as diverse as horseback riding, healing springs, swimming, bee-keeping, husbandry, mechanical invention, navigation, marriage, and witchcraft include distinct but overlapping versions of it. Thus, we can be sure that the "bathes of Bathes" are "wonderfull and most excellent, agaynst very many sicknesses" because this has been "approued by authoritie, confirmed by reason, and dayly tryed by experience" (Jones 1572: 1); we can trust John Davis's account of a "universally navigable" world of interconnected oceans (including a "passage by the Norwest") because it has been "proved not onely by aucthoritie of writers, but also by late experience of travellers and reasons of substantiall probabilitie" (Davis 1595: 1, 6). In some manuals, the triad of textual, rational, and experiential authority is fractured by the elevation of experience above the others. When Edmund Southerne, for example, in his 1593 *Treatise concerning the right vse and ordering of bees*, sets out "to publish this mine own experience" (A2), the undertaking is explicitly *opposed* both to natural philosophy and to the citational strategies of what Foucault calls *commentaire* (1966: 92): Southerne acknowledges that

> many wise men haue uery learnedly written of the nature of bees, and *Virgil* in his *Bucholicks* hath giuen as reasonable directions, as any ever before him or since, and yet neither he nor they, no more then they did imagine by naturall reason, as within these foureteene yeares I have fully prooued.
>
> (Epistle)

Southerne explicitly (if deferentially) rejects the reasoning of Virgil for its insufficient method, and at the same time implicitly refuses a second method: that of producing knowledge by linking together authoritative citations. Unlike "commentary," which is enabled by the fact that it "makes no distinction between the thing represented and the words representing it," this treatise grounds its authority in large part *on* that distinction (Foucault 1970: 79).[7]

Yet Southerne's appeal to experience, like the appeals in other manuals and handbooks, is more than a claim simply to have been *present* at his hives without the interference of received advice or abstract reasoning; it is also a claim to a proactive engagement. When Southerne argues that bees "are for want of due experience greatly neglected," he means that he has discovered through trial and (painful) error methods of preventing stings ("To the Reader"). Many religious and secular uses of "experience" from the fourteenth century through much of the seventeenth preserve this primary sense of the Latin *experientia* – to test, to make trial of, to *experiment*, often with risk or hazard.[8] This was almost invariably the case when the term was used as a verb, as it is in Thomas Elyot's 1541 medical handbook, *The Castel of Helthe*: "In extreme necessitie," Elyot advises, "it were better to *experience some remedy*, than to do nothynge" (III.vi.62b; my emphasis). Peter Dear, in *Discipline and Experience*, has traced the seventeenth-century transition from an Aristotelian conception of "experience" as common knowledge about nature to a "modern experimental science" in which a controlled and personally witnessed experiment could function as "a warrant for the truth of a universal knowledge-claim" (1995: 6). Sixteenth-century handbooks like Southerne's and Elyot's suggest, however, that a sense of the experimental was often deeply imbricated in earlier uses of "experience."[9] Southerne cites his "own experience" as an challenge to both common and authoritative wisdom, and he makes clear that this experience involved a kind of testing that exceeded what Dear, describing the Aristotelian tradition, calls "observational perceptions of nature's ordinary course" (1995: 6). If "modern experiments" departed from classical "experience" in part because they "by design subverted nature" rather than passively observing its customs, then projects like Southerne's occupied at least a transitional place between the two (Dear 1995: 6).[10]

The sense that experience grounds an empirical, wholly natural knowledge free from the artificial influences of discourse and thought sits uneasily, of course, with the post-Aristotelian sense of experience as purposefully experimental. This definitive tension is reflected in the tendency of experiential encounters to be set in scenes that are at once natural and cultivated, like Sibbes's scented garden of the heart or Jaques's and Rosalind's forest of exile, where there are "books in the running brooks, / sermons in stones, and good in everything" (2.1.16–17). Spenser sets a similarly doubled scene in Book V of *The Faerie Queene*, where he describes Astræa's education of Artegall in "a caue from companie exiled":

> There she him taught to weigh both right and wrong
> In equall ballance with due recompense,
> And equitie to measure out along,
> According to the line of conscience,
> When so it needs with rigour to dispence.
> Of all the which, for want there of mankind,
> She caused him to *make experience*
> *Vpon wyld beasts*, which she in woods did find,
> With wrongfull powre oppressing others of their kind.
>
> (V.I.7, my emphasis)

Spenser exploits a profound ambivalence here in order to engage the reader in imagining an "experience" that is at once violently immediate,[11] experimentally prepared, and part of an extended process of maturation. The account touches, then, on all three versions of experience we have considered so far but comes to rest on none of them: it is not simply naturalized encounter, retrospective aggregation, or experiment, but a process of knowledge production that moves between all three. Experience is not simply had or gained, but *made*.

The place of this making is dangerously wild, but also thoroughly conditioned by Astræa's (and Spenser's) careful demarcation of a zone in which these encounters can appear necessary and sufficient for Artegall's preliminary training in disinterested justice. The strange conceit of animals "oppressing" other animals and being equitably reprimanded for it rests entirely on the "want … of mankind" in these woods – a want that Astræa has ensured by luring the young Artegall away from his friends and deep into exile. The absence of human culture is meant to allow for a purified, wholly natural production of knowledge, but it also enables the transformation of natural elements into quasi-subjects with quasi-allegorical status. This scene is the only one Spenser gives us from Artegall's long education. In the previous stanza, he is a "gentle childe, / Amongst his peres playing his childish sport"; in the following stanza, he reaches "the ripenesse of man's yeares" and is already possessed of Chrysaor, the "steely brand" of justice that Jove himself once wielded against the Titans (V.I.6.2–3; V.I.8.3, 9). Spenser founds this progression toward godlike justice, then, on a process of maturation that seems deeply compromised by artifice and by temporal elision: it is as if events in the cave and the woods cannot quite be recalled once Artegall has left them on his "new inquest," leaving us with only the bare, repeated plot of the drama ("she him taught, / In all the skill of deeming right and wrong") marked by the fleeting, almost dreamlike, encounter with the "wyld beasts."

The overtones of scenic and temporal artifice that condition Artegall's experiential education again raise the question of how the conflicted production of experience falls, over time, into the pattern of a more settled knowledge. If secular uses of "experience" echo its Protestant uses in a discourse of unmediated events that are nonetheless experimentally "prepared" or "made," they deal as well with a version of Jane Turner's "sad experience." Scattered appeals to "long experience" in the technical manuals appear more often in polemical texts, where they anchor the deployment of a grave, pessimistic knowledge drawn from life against the capriciousness of rumors, fashions, foreigners, or courtly intrigues. This version of experience becomes the occasion for texts like David Lindsay's 1554 *Ane dialog betuix Experience and ane courteour off the miserabyll estait of the warld*.[12] Lindsay's dialogue rehearses, for the most part, the scenes and principles basic to the Christian worldview. Wisdom, drawn from biblical exegesis, is rooted in an acceptance of the radical "mutabilities" and "miserabyll calamities" of earthly life and a turn toward redemption in Christ. Neither the content of this melancholy exegesis nor its framing as a dialogue is unusual. Lindsay's decision to figure experience itself as one of the interlocutors, however, is (as far as I have been able to determine) unique. The primary effect of this choice, which plays almost no consequential role in the bulk of the text, is to locate the aggregated wisdom of "long experience" in a *scene* of experiential encounter.

As in Spenser's treatment of Artegall's education, this scene is emphatically natural to the point of artifice.[13] Lindsay's courtier, unable to sleep, makes his way early one "Maye morning" into "ane Park" where he is comforted (temporarily) by "the craft of dame Nature" (Prologue, stanzas 2–3). It is here, under an olive tree, that he meets the old man who will eventually convince him to renounce his life at court. The first illustrated edition (1566), whose woodcuts are highly variable in detail and quality, sets the opening encounter as follows:

> Within that park I saw appear,
> An aged man that drew me near …
> To sit down he required me,
> Under the shadow of that tree,
> To save me from the sun's heat,

> Among the flowers soft and sweet,
> For I was weary of walking,
> Then we began to fall in talking.
> I asked his name with reverence,
> I am (said he), experience.

Lindsay's courtier has wandered off from the tumult of the social and into a landscape "craft[ed]" by Nature. He is immersed in a sensual surround – the heat of the sun, the touch and scent of flowers – that is also abstract, purified, already performing old Experience's insistence on the insubstantiality of the world. In this edition, at least, the superimposition of nature and artifice, and of immersion and ordered oversight, is captured perfectly between text and image: the sensual scene of the encounter with Experience in Lindsay's verse is pictured



The firſt boke

Courtier, VIthin that parke I ſaw apeere,
An aged man that drewe me nere,
Whoſe berd was well.iii.quarters long
His heare down ouer his ſhulders hong
The which as any Snow was white:
Whom to beholde I thought delight,
His garment angell like of hew,
Of Cullour like the Saphire blewe.
Under an Oliue he repoſed.
Of whoſe preſence I was reioyſed,
I did ſalute him reuerently,
So did he me right courteouſly,
To ſit downe he required mee,
Under the ſhadow of that tree,
To ſaue me from the Sunnes heat,
Amonges the flowers ſoft and ſwete,
For I was wery of walking,
Then we began to fall in talking.
I aſked his name with reuerence,
I am(ſaid he,experience,

Then

Figure 9.1 Courtier's dialog with Experience, from the 1566 edition of David Lindsay's *Ane dialog betuix Experience and ane courteour* (STC 15676)

on a thoroughly abstracted ground marked only by the perspectival checkerboard that delimits representational space itself.[14]

In both Spenser and Lindsay, then, the definitive paradoxes of the appeal to experience – its dual location in intense encounter and distanced contemplation; its transparent givenness and engaged experimentalism; its cyclical insistence on and erasure of a rift between text and embodied presence – take shape as scenes of artificially purified nature. When Shakespeare has Imogen greet "Experience," in another exile and in another cave, he aligns these tensions and this scenic rendering with the fundamental capacities and contradictions of the theater. Imogen's experience is of an unmediated and powerfully felt truth, but both the circumstances surrounding that experience and the truth that it guarantees are problematically double. Her hosts in the cave (Morgan, Polydore, and Cadwal) are not native to the wilds of Wales, but (as Belarius, Guiderius, and Arviragus) to the court itself, and Belarius's two supposed sons are in fact King Cymbeline's sons and Imogen's brothers. Imogen is herself disguised as the boy Fidele, so that each side of this experiential encounter is deceived as to the identity of the other. The first-hand proof of experience against the "report" that "all's savage but at court" is emptied of meaning by the deeper truth that everyone in the cave is in fact *of* the court.

The function of the cave itself is as important in this scene's complex structuring of experiential knowledge as the function of its occupants' disguises. If these supposed Welshmen double as lords and nobles, their cave doubles as their court. Imogen makes this clear in an aside, reflecting that "Great men / That had a court no bigger than this cave /… Could not outpeer these twain" (3.6.82–6). The impossibility of Imogen's "Experience" proving whether or not "all's savage *but at court*" depends not only on the theatricality of doubled identity (nobles who are only *playing* savages) but also on the theatricality of doubled place or scene (a bare stage that can stand for either a court or a cave).[15] This is the crucial overlap between Astræa's purposefully removed cave, Lindsay's checkerboard garden, and Shakespeare's "savage hold" as scenes of the experiential production of knowledge: the strategies that scour them into radically naturalized, experimental zones capable of hosting extra-discursive experiential encounters necessarily erase the markers of their locality, obscuring any possible account of the path back from experience to practical knowledge.

Yet theatrical artifice in no way diminishes the affective force of Imogen's revelation; on the contrary, the conceit in the scene is precisely that Imogen and her brothers "experience" their kinship *despite* the impossibility of their knowing in what it actually consists. In the exchange leading up to Imogen's praise of Experience, Polydore announces that he loves the boy Fidele, whom the brothers have just met, "as much / As I do love my father" (4.2.17–18). Cadwal goes a step further: "The bier at the door, / And a demand who is't shall die, I'd say / 'My father, not this youth'" (4.2.22–4). Morgan, remarkably, is not upset by these declarations. Instead, recollecting that he is not actually the brothers' father, he understands their love for this stranger to be a marvelous effect of the noble blood that they are unaware they have: "O noble strain! / O worthiness of nature, breed of greatness! … I'm not their father; yet who this should be / Doth miracle itself, loved before me" (4.1.23–9). It is this "worthiness of nature," this miraculous recognition shorn of cognizance, that Imogen affirms with "Experience, O, thou disprov'st report!" The claim of experience here is only magnified by the fact that experience disproves a *different* "report" than the one she assumes; the audience knows better, but is meant to experience no less.

The resonance between the capacities and paradoxes of "experience" and those of the theater is equally important in the exchange between Jaques and Rosalind, where what is at issue is not the immediacy of the experiential encounter but retrospective, "sad" experience. Again the setting is an exile in the wild, "exempt from public haunt" and the "flattery" of the "envious court" (2.1.15, 10, 4), and again this setting doubles as the location of a newly naturalized court, where winter winds, replacing doubtful report with immediate sensation, are "counselors / That feelingly persuade" the exiled Duke of his substantiality (2.1.14–15). Jaques, however, seems unable to read the "books in the running brooks" or hear the "Sermons in stones" that the Duke describes; for him, exile only feeds an all-consuming, habitual pessimism about the world in general. An injured stag, the First Lord tells us, is enough to send him on a diatribe which, like those delivered by Lindsay's Experience, "pierceth through / The body of the country, city, court, / Yea, and of this our life" (2.1.59). In one of the many crossings of characters in the woods, Jaques attempts to explain the nature of this prodigious melancholy to Rosalind, who, like Imogen in her encounter with Experience, is in disguise. Jaques's melancholy, he says, is

> neither the scholar's melancholy, which is emulation; nor the musician's, which is fantastical; nor the courtier's, which is proud; nor the soldier's, which is ambitious; nor the lawyer's, which is politic; nor the lady's, which is nice; nor the lover's, which is all these: but it is a melancholy of mine own, compounded of many simples, extracted from

> many objects, and indeed the sundry contemplation of my travels, which, by often rumination, wraps me in a most humorous sadness.
>
> **ROSALIND.** A traveller! By my faith, you have great reason to be sad. I fear you have sold your own lands to see other men's. Then to have seen much and to have nothing is to have rich eyes and poor hands.
>
> **JAQUES.** Yes, I have gained my experience.
>
> **ROSALIND.** And your experience makes you sad. I had rather have a fool to make me merry than experience to make me sad: and to travel for it too.
>
> (4.1.10–27)

We know already that for Jaques this sad experience, unfigurable as any socially particular way of being in the world, *can* be figured formally as the position of a spectator before the *theater* of the world: he delivered his other major melancholic set-piece six scenes earlier, when he introduced his famous account of the "seven ages of man" with the early modern commonplace that "All the world's a stage, and all the men and women merely players" (2.7.139).[16] Now Rosalind focuses her gentle mockery of Jaques's melancholy on its basis in removed spectatorship and its consequent loss of the habitation of his "own lands." For her, to travel is to sacrifice tangible having for touristic seeing, an exchange that can only leave one with "rich eyes and poor hands." Jaques does not resist her assessment, but he introduces the term "experience" as another name for this loss of the material in the empty wealth of the perspective he has "gained." Yet his initial account depended not on the language of sight, but on the language of *alchemy*, the reworking of matter itself. His melancholy has been "compounded of many simples, extracted from many objects." This essential material residue calls into question the extent to which the "sad" experience described in this scene can be fully aligned with the specular, totalizing melancholy the play is concerned with elsewhere. Jaques's fluency with the common trope of melancholic world-viewing seems here to run up against the refusal of its objects to resolve into a single scene (or even into seven ages). Looking back on his own experience, this consummate spectator is confronted with an atomized multiplicity of "simples" that preserve their materiality in its most elementary form.

The exchange between Jaques and Rosalind provides us, then, with an account of "long experience" or "sad experience" seen from the perspective of its completion as (melancholic) knowledge – a perspective familiar, in early modern discourse, as that of the theatrical spectator. It also suggests, however, that this version of experience, when pressed for an account of what it has come to know, turns back toward the corporeal encounters that it claims to have aggregated and patterned, losing the unity of its perspective and unraveling its categories ("neither the scholar's melancholy … nor the musician's … nor the courtier's") back into an irreducible set of singularities. Theater and "experience" confront a shared problem here, each of them asking after the melancholy of knowing spectatorship as it registers its always unfinished removal from the "many objects" and many places and times that make up its "sundry contemplations."

In Imogen's cave, theatrical artifice frames experience as a moment of unmediated encounter by troubling its passage into knowledge; in Jaques's forest, the theater frames experience as a capacious knowledge troubled by its lost encounters. Taken together, these scenes speak to the theatrical medium's peculiar capacity to stage the two most opposed senses of "experience" and to discover in their irreconcilability a rich field of formal play.

Shakespeare's theaters of experience should return us to some of the methodological considerations with which this chapter began. Collingwood's historical theater of the mind, that carefully constructed venue for "the re-enactment of past experience," is built to perform what Imogen's theatrical cave and Jaques's theater of the world cannot: a synthesis between contemplation of the past and immersion in it (1946: 269). When Smith invites us into the phenomenologically "immer[sive] … experience" that he contrasts with the more common scholarly perspective of "a detached, objective *spectator* who can see the whole," he picks up and inverts tropes that echo directly back through Collingwood to Jaques (1999: 10). In these moments, the intersection between the dynamic of experience and the function of the theater marks a struggle to take the measure of our alienation from the past and a desire to counteract that alienation by staging new experiments with the artifices of historiographical method.[17]

Work like Smith's on acoustic and visual experience, Schoenfeldt's on early modern physiology's "near-poetic vocabulary of felt corporeal experience," and explicitly "historical-phenomenological" efforts to show how discourse "may shape and color our emotional experiences" are part of a significant turn in early modern studies, a turn that wants both to acknowledge and to resist the notion that the category of discourse fully subsumes its objects and investments. Early modern "experience" can help us to think dynamically about this re-engagement with the staging of historical practice because it is in constant motion between a number of moments, from the ecstatic immediacy of feeling (Protestant "*experientia*"), to the active creation of the conditions for first-hand perception ("making experience"), to the melancholy passage of apprehension into memory and knowledge ("sad experience"). Any application to early modern discourse of the imperative to "historicize" experience – including the diverse sensory and affective entailments of experience – must attend to each of these moments, and to the transitions between them. It doing so, such an approach will discover its own limits in the persistent challenge that experience poses to our understanding of *how knowledge is produced*.[18] "Experience" remains largely unexamined within our methodologies for precisely this reason; the term delimits the negative space where the impossibility of a different, more immediate way of coming to know history is repeatedly asserted and denied. The specificity of "experience" can only be understood, then, in terms of a turbulent, hybrid poetics unfolding at the peripheries of knowledge production – a "living, busy, active, mighty thing."

10

"Repeat to me the words of the Echo": Listening to *The Tempest*

Allison Kay Deutermann

In 1668, Samuel Pepys attended his seventh performance of *The Tempest, or The Enchanted Island*, a revision of Shakespeare's play by John Dryden and William Davenant.[1] His diary notes that he slipped backstage between acts to ask the actor Henry Harris "to repeat to me the words of the Echo, while I writ them down." Though Pepys had tried to record the part as it was being performed, "having done it without looking upon my paper, I [found] I could not read the blacklead," or pencil. "But now," he triumphantly concludes, "I have got the words clear" (1976: 195).[2] Why did Pepys go to such trouble to "get the words clear"? This chapter offers an answer to this question by examining Pepys's reception in light of seventeenth-century anatomical theory; contests over theatrical audition in Shakespeare's *The Tempest*; and, finally, David Hume's descriptions of sensory perception, which Lowell Gallagher and Shankar Raman propose as a "logical endpoint" to early modern thinking about cognition and the senses in their introduction to this volume (p. 2). I argue that Pepys's audition is key to the production of his bodily hexis or disposition, a process through which he creates a coherent sense of himself as a social and embodied subject.[3] Aided by writing as well as by reading, Pepys's listening involves his entire body. It occurs not just in the moment of the lines' delivery, but in the hours and even in the days preceding and following Harris's performance. It requires repetition, accruing through multiple trips to the playhouse. And, like the part of the Echo itself, it is a kind of performance, one staged before a theatergoing audience and then restaged in the pages of Pepys's diary, as well as (most likely) in the company of his friends and fellow amateur musicians.[4]

Written roughly fifty years before *The Enchanted Island*, and intended for a different theatrical and historical moment, *The Tempest* nevertheless plays a key role in shaping how Pepys would describe his audition decades later. Though the Echo's part is new to the Restoration revision, the centrality of audition is anything but. Set on an island that is "full of noises," where music charms listeners to sleep and tales are told that "would cure deafness," *The Tempest* is deeply concerned with the spiritual, physical, and social effects of listening (3.2.135, 1.2.107).[5] It famously contains a musical soundtrack of its own that charms, stuns, terrifies, soothes, and restores its onstage listeners, and it opens with a synesthetic storm of "thunder and lightning *heard*" that signals its attention to sounds and their reception (1.1.1 sd, emphasis added).[6] My analysis of audition in *The Tempest*, both onstage and off, builds on the important studies of early modern soundscapes and vocal production and reception by Bruce Smith, Wes Folkerth, and Gina Bloom.[7] However, as vital to my thinking as these scholars' work has been, their focus on sound necessarily limits how they approach aural reception. Smith tends to imagine listening as historically and culturally conditioned but as nevertheless uniformly experienced by everybody. Bloom argues for a more varied auditory experience, but whereas she sees a fundamentally gendered distinction between hearers, I see audition as more individualized and situational, even as it is shaped in part by the genre of play performed.

Early modern thinking about audition was perhaps most carefully recorded and produced in seventeenth-century anatomy texts, which describe the ear as performing seemingly contradictory functions – drawing sounds in, on the one hand, and shielding the self from penetration on the other. All listeners, these books suggest, can be organized along a continuum from indiscriminately absorptive to sealed, with gender being just one of the factors determining a hearer's place in line. I argue, first, that this binary of reception – at one extreme, indiscriminately open, and at the other, thoughtfully selective (or, less appealingly, sealed) – was increasingly being mapped onto different theatrical forms; and second, that *The Tempest* critiques this bifurcation. By incorporating competing models of hearing into a single production, and by blending together elements of the two genres with which those models were becoming associated, *The Tempest* offers a sense of hearing as being determined not primarily by genre, but by the choices of the listening subject.[8] Ultimately, *The Tempest* invites audience members to do no less than cooperate in the creation of the dramatist's art through active and engaged audition – an invitation that Pepys accepts some fifty years later while listening to its Restoration adaptation. Focusing on certain sounds to the exclusion of others, Pepys hears in ways that produce his identity as a discriminating listener, and that even contribute to the reshaping and reimagining of *The Tempest, or The Enchanted Island* itself.

Hearing trouble

Early modern English authors betray a peculiar preoccupation with ears and hearing. As historians and literary critics have shown, this instinct was shaped in part by the professed Protestant preference for words over images as well as by low literacy rates and the relative importance of orality in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century culture.[9] In dramatic texts, poems, sermons, books about music, attacks on the theater, and writing about rhetoric and poesy, the physical as well as spiritual effects of listening were persistently examined and described in often contradictory ways. Anatomy texts represent the ear as both an "always open" orifice and an elaborately constructed intruder defense system; hearing, similarly, is described as both a sense over which one has no control and a sense over which one has a great deal of control. Consider anatomists' descriptions of the "outward ear," and particularly the pinna, or fin: the pinna frames what is commonly referred to as "the hole of hearing" – the auditory passage – which is "always open."[10] Its design both captures sounds that would otherwise elude the ear and prevents unwanted matter – everything from peas to dangerously loud noises – from entering the brain. Helkiah Crooke's description is representative. Through the pinna, he writes, "sound is as it were scooped up" into the hole of hearing (1615: 582). Yet the outer ear also blocks sounds like a door, refracting the air "lest it should enter into the ear too cold"; and "if it were not for these breaches many violent sounds would suddenly rush into the ear to the great offense of the hearing" (1615: 576). The same paradoxical functionality is ascribed by anatomists to the auditory canal, which slopes upward as it extends inside the head, becoming increasingly straight and narrow. Ambroise Paré claims the canal was "framed by the providence of nature into twining passages like a snail's shell, which as they come nearer to the *foramen caecum*, or blind hole, are the more straightened, that so they might the better gather the air into them" (1634: 189). He continues, "But they were made thus into crooked winding, lest the sounds rushing in too violently should hurt the sense of hearing" (1634: 189). These twists and turns also protect the brain from "little creeping things … as fleas & the like" that might otherwise slip inside the head (1634: 190). Alexander Read writes that the canal "is oblique; to abate the vehemency of a sound," even as he elsewhere commends the ear's ability to collect acoustic material (1642: 251). Sucking sounds in while slowing their advance, the pinna and auditory canal each perform paradoxical functions simultaneously.

These anatomical descriptions of the ear reflect less a single, unified model of audition than two distinctly different ways of thinking about hearing and the body. To hear was to absorb foreign, potentially harmful matter involuntarily, but it was also to select certain sounds over others by choice and according to judgment. The ear's twin functions and the modes of reception they supported could be difficult to reconcile, as in Read's jumbled two-sentence description of "the outward ear": "first, it serveth for beauty. Secondly, to help the receiving of the sounds the more readily: for first, it *gathereth* them, being dispersed in the air. Secondly, it doth *moderate* them, that they come gently to the tympanum" (1642: 250–1, my emphasis). Though Read insists on the ear's ability to "moderate" and "gather" sounds – simultaneously protecting the head and aggressively drawing material into the body – the seeming mutual exclusivity of these processes troubles any unified theory of audition. Like other anatomists' descriptions of the ear, Read's supports contradictory ways of imagining this vital sense, helping to construct the multiple models of hearing that would coexist in constant tension during the early modern period.[11]

As spaces where men and women went to listen, London's commercial theaters importantly participated in this cultural conversation. Repeatedly examining the question of what it meant to hear both inside and outside the playhouse, they often reproduced the competing models of audition outlined above. *The Tempest*, Shakespeare's noisy musical comedy, represents listening as both a voluntary and an involuntary process that can be restorative, destructive, or even ineffectual. When Alonso, the shipwrecked King of Naples, fears that his son has been lost at sea, his brother Sebastian insists he has brought this tragedy upon himself by marrying his daughter to the King of Tunis: "you may thank yourself for this great loss" (2.1.124). Sebastian's remark draws criticism from the loyal Gonzalo: "The truth you speak / doth lack some gentleness … You rub the sore / When you should bring the plaster" (2.1.138–40). Sebastian's words are too rough; they will wound the King. Mocking Gonzalo's corporeal metaphor, Antonio calls it "most chirurgeonly," or surgeonly (2.1.141). Yet this metaphor is literalized by seventeenth-century scientific theory, which imagined sound as a material object or as a sort of force capable of producing corporeal transformations. According to Crooke, Paré, Read, and others, sound is as material a substance as food or water. It varies in temperature from "cold" to "hot." The most dangerous sounds are those that are "vehement" – meaning not only loud, but also intense, such as passionate speech.[12] It is these sounds that the pinna is designed to prevent from entering the ear. Once such noises slip inside, they can pierce or corrode the body, puncturing the tympanic membrane that separates the outer from the inner ear and contaminating the listener's interior. The bitter truth Sebastian speaks, then, could touch the "sore" of the King's grief in a literal and material as well as in a figurative sense. It is this physical discomfort that is signaled in Alonso's choice of metaphors, "You cram these words into mine ears, against / The stomach of my sense" (2.1.107–8).[13]

That sounds could wound and otherwise physically transform their hearers is a key supposition of Shakespeare's play, in which music, spells, and poetry work upon the bodies, minds, and souls of its characters.[14] These effects are not always harmful, and can in fact be beneficial. Prospero, Shakespeare's artful magician, uses "heavenly music" to restore his enemies' senses, and his words lull his daughter, Miranda, into the "good dullness" of salubrious sleep (5.1.52, 1.2.185). According to the play, these are magical transformations. Their justification is supernatural, not natural-philosophical, since the "heavenly music" for which Prospero calls is also an "airy charm" – a musical piece that is equal parts song and spell (5.1.54). In a sense, however, Prospero's spells and sweet airs simply exaggerate the potential embedded in *all* sounds to wound or restore those who hear them. When Miranda wakes and tells her father that "The strangeness of your story put / Heaviness in me," it is unclear whether the words that compelled her to sleep were anything more magical than a bedtime story (1.2.307–8).

For all its potential power, then, sound does not always produce material effects on its listeners in this play – or, indeed, produce any effect at all. Spells may be guaranteed to work upon their subjects; speeches, it seems, are not.[15] Even Prospero, the architect of the play's aural magic, recognizes that speech's reception is anything but inevitable. It requires not only the cooperation but also the productive participation of the listener. The strange story with which Prospero lulls Miranda to sleep – the account of how they came to call an isolated island home – is punctuated with anxious, insistent demands for her attention. He tells his daughter to "ope thine ear"; orders her to "mark," "attend," "hear," and "hear a little further"; and, finally, commands her to "sit still and hear" and "cease more questions" (1.2.37, 67, 78, 106, 135, 170, 184). Prospero's fear that his story will not be heard distinguishes it from his other aural charms. In order for it to "work," Miranda will have first to choose to hear her father's speech and then successfully focus her attention upon it. As Gina Bloom argues, Prospero's anxiety implicitly attributes to Miranda a potentially disruptive agency in that her "resistant hearing" critiques his demands for "aural submission" (2007: 156, 155). Prospero's story is a long, digressive tale that rambles over roughly 150 lines. Without Miranda's active participation, there is no guarantee that it will be absorbed.

But Miranda's choice, to hear or not to hear, takes on additional significance when we consider the *kind* of play in which that choice is being made, examining it within its historical and theatrical context. Literary forms are culturally embedded, their conventions reflecting and often informing the preoccupations of the societies that produce them. Staged before audiences who were exhorted to improve how well they heard and to take the effects of listening seriously, early modern dramatic genres have these concerns built into their DNA.[16] Theatrical conventions were shaped in part by the contradictory models of audition outlined in the anatomy texts of Crooke, Paré, Read, and others, and reflected more broadly in the religious and secular writing of the period. Like the anatomies examined above, the period's dramatic literature often wedged competing models of audition into uncomfortably close proximity – allowing them to share space within a single play, or even a single scene. Such is the case with *The Tempest*. Certain dramatic forms, however, seem to depend more thoroughly and consistently on one of these models than the other, even to the point of becoming conventionally associated with particular modes of hearing.

This affinity is true of both revenge tragedy and city comedy, two forms that were being invented on the early modern stage from a mix of classical and contemporary materials. Revenge tragedies, of which *Hamlet* serves as the best known example, routinely represent audition as painful and involuntary. As Raman's contribution to this volume shows, sound plays a key role in marking the vulnerability of the corporeal and political kingdoms under attack in *Hamlet*'s opening scenes (and, indeed, throughout the play). The poison poured into the sleeping King Hamlet's ear, the rumor by which the "whole ear of Denmark" is "rankly abused," and the "words like daggers" that enter Gertrude's ears are generically representative in their excruciating aural violence (1.5.35–7, 3.4.93).[17] While invasive, involuntary hearing is not exclusively a revenge tragedy trope (as Sebastian's sore-rubbing speech makes clear), its centrality to the genre is unusual in some respects. For the revengers in these plays, part of the satisfaction of killing is the opportunity it provides to confess long-concealed hatreds, which are shouted or whispered into the ears of their enemies. Comedies, on the other hand – and particularly city comedies – suggest that other ways of hearing are not only possible but preferable (and in fact socially as well as physically necessary). As in revenge tragedy, in these plays, too, sound is a thing that exists outside the self, penetrating the bodies of its hearers in sometimes painful fashion. Morose of Ben Jonson's *Epicoene* "can endure no noise" and wears a turban around his ears to keep out the city's sounds (1.1.141–2). Yet in *Epicoene* and other London plays, selective audition becomes a necessary skill for an urbane urban life, much like wearing the right clothes or eating at an ordinary. Morose's inability to practice this skill makes him an object of ridicule, an urban monster. Discriminating hearing, then, is a practice that city comedies tend to celebrate for the social significance it confers on those who perform it; revenge tragedies, by contrast, present such discrimination as a skill that few, if any, listeners can perform.

Like the earlier *Hamlet*, *The Tempest*'s focus on hearing develops within a thorough exploration of revenge and the revenge tragedy form. Its attention to audition is therefore best understood as *part* of that generic play. A story of revenge that ends with forgiveness and absolution rather than vengeance, and that is suffused with music and other mysterious "noises," *The Tempest* represents a curious generic blend. Its songs, burdens, and sweet airs recall the comic boys' company productions of John Marston and other playwrights, whereas its plot – up until the final act – follows the arc of a revenge tragedy. As Prospero tells Miranda in his "strange story," he is the rightful Duke of Milan, a title he lost when his brother, Antonio, colluded with the King of Naples to "extirpate me and mine / Out of the dukedom" (1.2.125–6). Prospero causes the shipwreck with which *The Tempest* begins in order to set in motion an elaborate plot, which will conclude – as all revenge tragedies do – with the revenger confronting his enemies. There is no guarantee that this confrontation will be non-violent. In fact, Prospero often seems more inclined to vengeance than to forgiveness. When Ferdinand stumbles ashore, Prospero muses that he "could control thee / If now 'twere fit to do't" (1.2.440–1). And later he darkly observes, "At this hour / Lies at my mercy all mine enemies" (4.1.262–3). The play features a masque that resembles the elaborate, meta-theatrical spectacles typical of revenge tragedy. Like the inset performance put on by *Hamlet*'s wandering players, this show-within-a-show presents Prospero's enemies with the fact of their guilt, and it features the spirit Ariel costumed "like a harpy," cursing the King and his train for their crimes (3.3.52 sd).

Still, *The Tempest* is not a revenge tragedy. It ends not in violence, but in marriage. Prospero forgives Antonio and the King at Ariel's urging, allowing his "nobler reason" to triumph "gainst my fury" (5.1.26), and Naples and Milan are joined through Ferdinand and Miranda's union, which resolves the central conflict of the play while supplying it with a traditional comic structure. *The Tempest*'s island location, moreover, resembles the green worlds of Shakespeare's earlier romantic comedies: otherworldly, liminal spaces in which redemptive transformations become possible. It is this fusion of comic and other conventions that has made *The Tempest* so difficult to classify, leading Shakespeare scholars since the nineteenth century to suggest alternatives to the First Folio's generic labeling of the play as a comedy.[18] Nonetheless, and despite its distinctly green setting, Shakespeare's play clearly borrows elements from city comedy – specifically, it assimilates that genre's interest in discriminating listening. *The Tempest*'s courtly characters creatively interpret, and sometimes willfully misinterpret, one another's speeches in ways reminiscent of comedies by Ben Jonson, John Marston, and Thomas Middleton, which prize the cultivation of a good ear as an essential social skill. Upon reaching Prospero's island, Gonzalo tries to comfort the King with a proverb: "When every grief is entertained that's offered, comes to th'entertainer –." Suddenly, Sebastian interrupts: "A dollar" (2.1.18–20). Gonzalo's proverbial wisdom – that the King should not embrace, or "entertain," grief – is transformed through Sebastian's interjection into a joke about the worthlessness of proverbial advice: "dollar" was an English term for "thaler," a German coin that would be paid to a performer.[19] He thus likens Gonzalo to a street musician or a mountebank, and his advice to empty entertainment. Not to be outdone, Gonzalo uses Sebastian's punning interjection just as creatively, willfully "mishearing" the word "dolour" for "dollar": "*Dolour* comes to him, indeed. You have spoken truer than you purposed." ("You have taken it," Sebastian responds, "wiselier than I meant you should": 2.1.21–2.) In this verbal wrestling match, Gonzalo and Sebastian both listen creatively and defensively, using one another's words to their own advantage. Gonzalo refuses to hear the insult embedded in Sebastian's interjection, while Sebastian continues to listen for holes in Gonzalo's rhetoric.

The discriminating listening practiced by Gonzalo and Sebastian clashes with the corporeally invasive, painful hearing that the King experiences in this very scene. *The Tempest*, then, simultaneously sustains competing models of audition that would seem to be mutually exclusive, and that were each becoming associated with one of the genres blended together in Shakespeare's play: to hear is to be penetrated, often painfully, by foreign material, but it is also to engage selectively in a conscious process, filtering out unwanted sounds in order to focus on those that matter. Certain characters, moreover, seem to be able to switch back and forth between these models. They do not hear indiscriminately and defensively at the same time, as anatomists imagine that they must, but consecutively, according to the specific situation in which they find themselves. Gonzalo, who warns his companions of the physical dangers attached to hearing harsh speech, can nevertheless ignore the sarcastic comments of Antonio and Sebastian. "Here is everything advantageous to life," he begins, in an effort to console the King. When Antonio responds, "True, save means to live," Gonzalo continues as though Antonio had never spoken: "How lush and lusty the grass looks! How green!" (2.1.52–5). Though the one-liners here seem at first to function as asides, as the scene continues it becomes increasingly clear that they are in fact intended to be overheard.[20] Yet Gonzalo shuts his ears against them, suggesting that as a conscious act, or choice, hearing could be governed by the individual listener. It could thus be shaped according to a range of criteria. If in some instances music lulls characters to sleep whether they wish it to or not, in others it delights the ear, appealing to a listener's conscious, critical faculty. According to Caliban, "The isle is full of noises, / Sounds and sweet airs that give delight and hurt not" (3.2.35–6). The "delight" these "sweet airs" provide could be understood as physical (producing pleasure, not pain), spiritual, or aesthetic. They might harmonize the soul with the music of the spheres, or they might simply entertain; and they might do all of these things for the same listener at different times, in different settings. How one hears becomes a matter of choice, as subjects select the auditory mode best suited to the situation.

Sampling "sweet airs"

These observations have important implications for thinking about the reception of Shakespeare's, as well as Prospero's, "art" in performance. Like the characters who people Prospero's island, *The Tempest*'s audience, too, is being treated to its sounds and sweet airs, strange noises, and long speeches. By melding models of audition, as well as the dramatic forms with which those models were becoming associated, Shakespeare takes up the question of what it means to hear in the theater. Modulating the discriminating listening of city comedy, *The Tempest* represents hearing as a conscious act that crucially contributes to the production of the dramatist's art. The play therefore challenges understandings of audition as always either indiscriminate or defensive (unthinkingly immersed or critically detached); it also challenges the distinction between these modes of theatrical hearing as being predetermined by genre. Instead, *The Tempest*'s listeners are invited to choose whether or not this particular play will engage their active aural attention – and, if so, to decide how thoroughly and for how long.

The Tempest's auditory episodes thus participate in the examination of artistic production that the play has been thought to undertake, embodied most clearly in Prospero himself. As the conductor, if not the composer, of the play's magical music, as well as the author and director of its plot, Prospero has long stood for Shakespeare in *The Tempest*'s critical tradition.[21] Certainly Prospero is a creative force, yet his thinking about his audience undergoes something of a sea-change over the course of Shakespeare's play. From a spellbinding magician-poet who paralyzes his listeners into subdued attention, Prospero is transformed into a far less demanding storyteller, one who recognizes that his "project" requires an audience's willing and active participation (Epilogue: 12). At first, Prospero is a domineering showman who uses spells and other aural tricks to bind his audience to his will. The "tempestuous noise of thunder and lightning" with which the play begins stuns Prospero's onstage listeners into a daze (1.1.1 sd). This noisy, spectacular production, followed by a "charm," or spell, causes some of the shipwrecked men to stumble confusedly about the island. It entrances others, locking them in a death-like sleep. Literally paralyzed into pliant submission, the mariners lie "under the hatches stowed," spellbound by Prospero's art until the play's final act (1.2.230). Their paralysis is simply an extreme form of the submissive reception Prospero initially demands of all his listeners, including his daughter: a passive, physiologically transformative model of audition like that found in the revenge plays of the period.

At the same time, as Prospero's anxious insistence that Miranda pay attention suggests, passive aural reception – not only of speeches, but also of plays – is both impossible to guarantee and flawed as an ideal. By the end of *The Tempest*, Prospero has become a different speaker and storyteller, one who allows his audience the agency of choice. No longer spellbinding his listeners, Prospero instead asks for their attention while promising something in return: a good story. His earlier commands to "ope thine ear" are replaced by polite requests to listen:

> I invite your highness and your train
> To my poor cell, where you shall take your rest
> For this one night, which (part of it) I'll waste

> With such discourses as, I not doubt, shall make it
> Go quick away – the story of my life,
> And the particular accidents gone by
> Since I came to this isle.
>
> (5.1.301–7)

Instead of demanding his audience's attention or forcing them into aural submission, Prospero "invite[s]" them to listen to the story of his life. By promising his listeners a *good* story, one that will make the time "go quick away," Prospero solicits rather than enforces their attention. His last act of aural violence, in fact, is to awaken and release his paralyzed listeners, unleashing "strange and several noises / Of roaring, shrieking, howling, jingling chains / And more diversity of sounds, all horrible" in order not to control but to free the mariners, setting them "straightway at liberty" (5.1.232–5).

Prospero's shift from dominating speaker to supplicating storyteller enables his hearers to choose whether or not they will listen to what he has to say. This change in attitude creates risk. His audience may ignore his story altogether, or those who do choose to hear it may respond with contempt, challenging his vocal authority; this latter tactic, importantly, has been Caliban's throughout the play. By accepting active, potentially challenging reception as essential to successful storytelling, rather than thinking of it as threatening, Prospero submits his "art" to his audience's judgment. In other words, he abandons the revenge tragedy model of involuntary and materially transformative hearing for a new ideal of voluntary aural engagement. This ideal represents a less superficial application of the discriminating listening so prized in city comedy. Rather than hearing in ways that accord with an established, socially significant set of tastes, Prospero imagines his audience participating in his story's production.

The play's epilogue extends this opportunity to *The Tempest*'s audience, performing on a meta-theatrical level the same conversion that Prospero himself undergoes – from an understanding of audition as either involuntary and indiscriminate or defensive to a more nuanced understanding of hearing as an act that can be composed to suit the situation. Diana Henderson's chapter in this volume demonstrates how the audience of *Much Ado about Nothing* is invited to query not only Claudio's misinterpretation of sensory material (the "evidence" of Hero's infidelity), but also potentially its own. Extending the reflexive gesture of this earlier play, *The Tempest* charges theatergoers to think about how they hear its sweet airs and other sounds. Ultimately, it is the flexible, adaptive audition newly appreciated by Prospero that proves the necessary complement to *The Tempest*'s playful, self-reflexive generic admixture. By the time we reach the epilogue, the meta-theatrical implications of this play's exploration of audition have shifted center-stage. Spoken by Prospero, its lines offer the audience the freedom to choose and the power to judge what they hear, participating in the play's production and even determining its ending:

> Now my charms are all o'erthrown,
> And what strength I have's mine own,
> Which is most faint. Now, 'tis true
> I must be here confined by you,
> Or sent to Naples. Let me not,
> Since I have my dukedom got
> And pardoned the deceiver, dwell
> In this bare island by your spell;
> But release me from my bands
> With the help of your good hands.
> Gentle breath of yours my sails
> Must fill, or else my project fails,
> Which was to please. Now I want
> Spirits to enforce, art to enchant;
> And my ending is despair,
> Unless I be relieved by prayer,
> As you from crimes would pardoned be,
> Let your indulgence set me free.
>
> (Epilogue: 1–20)

Without the audience's approbation, Prospero – or, rather, the actor playing Prospero – will be forced to remain on the "bare island" of the stage. The play's ending, then, is left in its audience's hands: only their applause and the "gentle breath" of their praise can "release" Prospero from his prison. This invitation, or plea, implies an impressively cooperative understanding of theatrical audition since it requires the listeners' engagement and approval, which can only be solicited, not demanded. Rather than telling the audience to applaud, Prospero merely asks for his listeners' "indulgence." The cooperation entailed by the play's epilogue recalls the reciprocal relationship between man and God in devotional practice, which is itself dependent on an act of listening – of

God's hearing the prayers of the penitent. Prayer here frees Prospero from the purgatory of the epilogue, a space that is neither wholly of the play's fictional world nor separated from it. The metaphor places the audience, rather than the speaker, in a powerful and creative position, signaling the dependence of this artistic project on auditors' voluntary participation in the making of the play-world.

Productive listening

The epilogue's model of voluntary, cooperative audition provides a useful context for understanding Pepys's experience as a theatergoer fifty years later. Returning to the pages of Pepys's diary, I want to conclude by examining his reception in light of the cultural and theatrical prehistory I have been charting; and, at the same time, I wish to consider the mechanics and the consequences of his audition. Doing so will require a shift in focus from Shakespeare's play to its Restoration revision, and from the early to the mid-seventeenth century. While there are important continuities between early and mid-seventeenth-century drama, there are of course crucial differences as well. Restoration theater is, like Shakespeare's before it, embedded in its historical moment. The decades between 1611 and 1667 witnessed enormous cultural and political changes, including civil war, the execution of Charles I, the institution of a commonwealth, and the eventual restoration of the Stuart monarchy. The same period also saw the temporary and legally mandated closing of the theaters. London's drama was inevitably shaped by these events, as were its theaters and the audiences who filled them. The shift from a mix of indoor and outdoor playing houses to the use of strictly indoor spaces, the introduction of perspective scenery and a proscenium arch, and the performance of women's parts by actresses rather than by boys are some of the most notable and lasting transformations to England's commercial drama in this period.

The 1667 *Tempest* transforms Shakespeare's play to complement Restoration tastes and theatrical practices. Some of the most compelling studies of this adaptation, including work by Katharine Eisaman Maus, Catherine Belsey, and Michael Dobson, have focused on changes made to Prospero's character.[22] Unlike the artist-magician of Shakespeare's play, Dryden and Davenant's conjuror does not abjure his magic, break his staff, or drown his books. As Maus (1982: 200) puts it, this Prospero "learns nothing in the course of the play." This alteration has been read as endorsing the shaky but still necessary mythology of the father-king, and of the supposed naturalness of what Dobson (1992: 43) calls its "familial underpinnings." Rightly attentive to the political meaning of the adaptors' edits, these readings have focused less on what they reveal about the theater itself. As different as the two *Tempest*s are, both investigate the aural efficacy of the dramatic project and celebrate its necessarily collaborative nature. The redemption of Shakespeare's Prospero may elude Dryden and Davenant's, who continues to demand perfect obedience and submission from his listeners, but this demand is coded as ridiculous from the start and in the end proves unsustainable. If Prospero learns nothing in the course of the play, his audience is confirmed in what it has known all along: that this island's enchantments depend upon the willing and creative engagement of its on- and offstage listeners.

There are more of these onstage listeners in the adaptation than in Shakespeare's play. Miranda is given not only a younger sister, Dorinda, but also a foster brother named Hippolito, who is the rightful but dispossessed Duke of Mantua. Saved as an infant by the exiled Prospero, Hippolito has since been secluded in a cave and deliberately kept out of his foster-sisters' sight. Like Shakespeare's, Dryden and Davenant's Prospero is a domineering storyteller, but he loses control of his audiences' reception much earlier and more completely than in the 1611 play. Insisting in act 1 that Miranda "attend" and "mark" his tale, he wills her into submissive sleep with his story (1.2.52, 65).[23] Yet this Prospero is also routinely disobeyed by his daughters, whose eagerness to see the mysterious creature "man" makes them deliberately deaf to their father's commands. "I would fain see him too," Dorinda confesses; "I find it in my Nature, because my Father has forbidden me" (2.4.131–2). When the two sneak off to Hippolito's cave, the suspicious Prospero cries out, "Miranda, Child, where are you?" His call implicates both the girls, since Dorinda has been left in her sister's care, but Prospero's younger daughter creatively equivocates: "'Twas you he nam'd, not me," and stays behind with Hippolito (2.5.29–30). That his children will ignore his advice and disobey his commands as they hurtle toward sexual maturity is a fact of which the audience is made aware almost from the beginning. The awe-inspiring speaker of Shakespeare's play is thus transformed into the toothless senex of farce, whose strict warnings fall on willfully but also selectively deaf ears.[24]

Prospero's "great Art," moreover, which "Charm[s]" the islands' guests and "perform[s] as much as magic can," ultimately proves insufficient for effecting the play's happy ending (1.2.338–41). This requires instead the willing and imaginative participation of Ariel, who not only urges Prospero to forgive his enemies, but also intervenes to prevent this comedy from *becoming* a tragedy of revenge. In *The Enchanted Island*, Alonzo and Antonio are repentant from the beginning, rendering Prospero's forgiveness all but inevitable. The real risk for revenge emerges later.[25] Hippolito, who has never seen a woman before, is so delighted with Dorinda that he logically concludes he must have all of the women in the world. This makes Ferdinand his rival, and when the two engage in a clumsy duel, Hippolito is seriously wounded. With his young charge apparently dead, Prospero declares, "No pleasure now is left me but Revenge" (4.3.38). His earlier comic plot is abandoned: "Know, by my Art, you shipwrackt on this Isle … my vengeance / Wou'd have ended; I designed to match that Son / Of yours with this my Daughter" (4.3.133–6). Now instead, "Blood calls for blood; your Ferdinand shall dye" (4.3.150). It is Ariel who then makes the play's happy ending possible, explaining to Prospero that "For thy sake, *unbid*," or unasked, he has traveled the world to collect balms that have already restored Hippolito's health (5.1.42). Grateful but otherwise unchanged, Prospero continues to act the autocrat, deciding that he will keep this happy news from Ferdinand a while "that it may be more welcome" (5.1.84). Prospero never relinquishes his role as enchanter, but this does not seem to matter. His authority has always depended upon the willing participation of his fellow actors, who listen to or ignore him at will. Dryden and Davenant's play therefore presents to its audiences a model of theatrical reception similar to the one imagined in Shakespeare's epilogue. It is creative, cooperative, and individualized, expressive and even artistically inclined.

Examples of such reception occur throughout the play. Like *The Tempest*, *The Enchanted Island*, too, is suffused with sounds and preoccupied with hearing, and it stages scenes of similarly careful and productive listening. These include the "part of the Echo" that Pepys asked Henry Harris to repeat. A sort of hearers' duet, the piece begins when Ariel echoes Ferdinand's weary "here I am," temporarily distracting him from the grief he feels over the supposed death of his father (3.4.6). As Ferdinand "sing[s]" his "sorrows to the murmurs of this Brook," the unseen spirit answers him, leading them to perform one of the play's many musical numbers (3.4.25–6). Though the Echo's part enchanted Pepys from the beginning, the same cannot be said for the play as a whole. I quote his first entry on *The Tempest, or The Enchanted Island* in its entirety:

> [November 7, 1667] Up, and at the office hard all the morning; and at noon resolve with Sir W. Penn to go see *The Tempest*, an old play

> of Shakespeares, acted here the first day. And so my wife and girl and W. Hewer by themselfs, and Sir W. Penn and I afterward by ourselfs, and forced to sit in the side Balcone over against the Musique-room at the Dukes-House, close by my Lady Dorsett and a great many great ones: the house mighty full, the King and Court there, and the most innocent play that ever I saw, and a curious piece of Musique in an Echo of half-sentences, the Echo repeating the former half while the man goes on to the latter, which is mighty pretty. The play no great wit; but yet good, above ordinary plays. Thence home with W. Penn, and there all mightily pleased with the play; and so to supper and to bed, after having done at the office.[26]

Seeing and hearing Dryden and Davenant's play performed, Pepys seems initially to have been unimpressed, finding it only "good above ordinary plays." Instead, as is often the case with Pepys, his diary entry suggests that he was much more interested in what was happening offstage than on, noting where the "great many great ones" were sitting *vis-à-vis* himself and his companions and commenting on the structure of the theater itself. Concentrating on his proximity to the "Musique-room" and on the size and social make-up of the crowd through most of the play, Pepys tunes in only to the part of the Echo, a series of sounds he chooses to hear, describe, and later record even more precisely. His focus on this part, then, is exceptional. He hears it differently – more attentively, and more memorably – than the rest of *The Enchanted Island*.

Ignoring the business of the stage in favor of other sights and sounds, concentrating his aural attention only on certain parts of the production, Pepys would seem to be a playwright's worst nightmare. Yet his theatrical audition in fact mirrors the very possibility ultimately encouraged in Shakespeare's play and modeled in Dryden and Davenant's "part of the Echo": it is conscious, selective, active, and aesthetically productive. For Maus (1982: 206), Ariel's ingenuity suggests the relocation of the "potential for a creative political order" from the monarch to "the loyal, resourceful subject." I understand Ariel's ingenuity as fundamentally artistic. The spirit's echo transmits creative potential to the listener rather than the speaker, or to the audience rather than the playwright. That Pepys's auditory choices helped to shape the dramatists' art, and that the listening Pepys himself participated cooperatively in the play's production, are points supported by the history of the Restoration revision. *The Tempest, or The Enchanted Island* became ever more spectacular and more musical over the course of the seventeenth century, from Shakespeare's play through Dryden and Davenant's revision to the opera by Thomas Shadwell.[27] These changes complement Pepys's – and quite probably other theatergoers' – likes and dislikes as well as the auditory choices those preferences inspired. Unsurprisingly, given Pepys's financial and emotional investment in his skills as a singer and instrumentalist, his diary reveals a consistent focus on the play's musical numbers.[28] He expresses enthusiasm not only for the Echo, but also for the songs and dances of Stephano, Trincalo, and Mustachio (the Boatswain in Shakespeare's text). On February 3, 1668, he writes, "this day, I took pleasure to learn the tune of the Seamens dance – which I have much desired to be perfect in, and have made myself so" (1976: 48).[29] Like the part of the Echo, the seamen's dance is new to the Restoration revision. The later, operatic revision of Shakespeare's play would have given Pepys and other auditors even more opportunities to listen to, remember, and perform such pieces, suggesting a collaborative theatrical process in which actors, playgoers, and playwrights are all engaged.

Through these auditory acts, Pepys also cultivates a sense of himself as a carefully but selectively listening subject, one capable of focusing his ears on the sounds that matter and of making use of what he has heard. He writes after another trip to the playhouse, "After the play done, I took Mercer by water to Spring-garden and there with great pleasure walked and eat and drank and sang, making people come about us to hear us" (1976: 196). It is tempting to imagine Pepys and Mercer singing the tune of the seamen's dance or the part of the Echo, drawing on Pepys's earlier efforts to memorize these pieces as they performed their cultural competence before yet another Restoration audience – the men and women who moved through the socially significant space of Spring Garden. Whichever songs they sang that night, Pepys's scrupulous attention to *The Enchanted Island*'s music expresses a desire both to learn and to perform it, thereby confirming and displaying his ability to do so. Like his work "at the office" where his economic and social status as a civil servant was produced, or like his walking, eating, drinking, and singing in Spring Garden, Pepys's theatrical audition thus contributes to the production of his bodily hexis. It creates him as an embodied social subject, one whose auditory choices are shaped not by genre alone but by individual preferences. No doubt, these preferences were themselves structured by Pepys's affiliation with particular social and political groups.[30] However, I am more interested in the fact that Pepys records these selections as though they are uniquely his – shaped by supposedly innate likes and dislikes – and in the ways in which the act of choosing itself becomes constitutive of Pepys's subjectivity. By repeatedly making auditory choices, in other words, Pepys accustoms himself to the practice, creating his identity as a selective auditor.

Predicated on sensory impressions and cultivated through custom and practice, Pepys's identity seems to be produced in much the same way David Hume would describe decades later in *A Treatise of Human Nature*.[31] Without arguing for a direct line of influence between Pepys and Hume, I want to suggest that Pepys's audition charts an aesthetic as well as a social prehistory for this way of thinking. According to Hume, all ideas are produced through sensory "impressions," or perceptions, which are fleeting, but to which we nonetheless ascribe an outside source that is both distinct from ourselves and more or less unchanging (1978: 187). It is the constancy and coherence of certain impressions that makes this imaginative work possible:

> These mountains, and houses, and trees, which lie at present under my eye, have always appear'd to me in the same order; and when I lose sight of them by shutting my eyes or turning my head, I soon after find them return upon me without the least alteration.
>
> (1978: 194)

Even if these mountains, houses, and trees do undergo alteration – if a tree falls on the roof of a house – our impressions of them nonetheless "preserve a coherence, and have a regular dependence on each other" that enables us to imagine their continued existence (1978: 195). We become accustomed to this way of thinking through habit and repetition, the "thousand instances" in which our interrupted impressions nonetheless remain consistent (1978: 204). And yet, Hume insists, there is no rational justification for this belief. What holds true for external objects also holds true for the self. Identity is a fiction produced through the imagination's binding together discreet perceptions into a seemingly constant and coherent subject. By repeatedly ordering perceptions in this fashion, we become accustomed to the act of producing ourselves and to the idea that such an identity exists; "what we call a mind," however, "is nothing but a heap or collection of different perceptions, united together by certain relations, and suppos'd, though falsely, to be endow'd with a perfect simplicity and identity" (1978: 207).

Like Hume, who looks inward and describes what he sees – fleeting, interrupted sensory impressions of mountains, houses, and tress – Pepys describes what he hears, producing less a description of the play than an impressionistic account of his own reception. This reception is discriminating and voluntary, focused on pieces of the play rather than on *The Enchanted Island* as a whole, and sometimes focused on other sounds entirely. It is also productive, both aesthetically and personally, conditioning future revisions of *The Tempest* and cultivating Pepys's sense of himself as a particular kind of listener. The play itself may have helped to perform this identity into being. Catherine Belsey has argued that the Restoration *Tempest* resolves a "crisis of knowledge" central to Shakespeare's play. By refusing to consent to Prospero's control, Caliban challenges his authority and suggests there are limits to the knowledge on which that authority is based. In Dryden and Davenant's play, by contrast, knowledge becomes empiricist and, as such, "a property of the subject and a legitimate source of dominion" (1985: 81). I understand Prospero's dominion as dependent upon his audiences' cooperative engagement and, therefore, as less absolute than Belsey describes. But I agree that sensory knowledge is crucially linked to the production of the subject in Dryden and Davenant's play. Treated each of the eight times he attended *The Tempest, or The Enchanted Island* as an audience member whose aural reception was not guaranteed – less a passive act predetermined by genre than a fluid process shaped by a series of conscious choices – Pepys becomes just such a listener. The repetitive practice of focusing on the Echo reaffirms his ability to focus, which in turn becomes key to the aesthetic production of his embodied self.

As different, then, as Shakespeare's play and its Restoration adaptation are, both imagine theatrical audition as individualized, situational, and aesthetically productive. *The Tempest* does so by fusing together elements of revenge and comedy, as well as the models of audition with which each was becoming associated, and by critiquing their bifurcation on the early modern stage. This generic fusion is present to a lesser extent in Dryden and Davenant's play. Nonetheless, the Restoration revision preserves and develops *The Tempest*'s interest in selective, voluntary audition as a creatively productive act – both within the play and among its audience. It is by listening carefully to Ferdinand's vocal performance, for example, that Ariel creates the part of the Echo Pepys so admired. And it is by tuning his own ear to the Echo's part – both from his seat in the "balcone" and backstage, as Henry Harris "repeat[ed] to me the words of the Echo" – that Pepys demonstrates his own preference for *The Enchanted Island*'s music. As the later, even more musical version of this play suggests, such choices matter, influencing artistic productions as well as the ways in which individual theatergoers thought about the listeners who made those choices. Like the manner in which Pepys held his pencil or sat in his seat, his listening would have been structured by and at the same time have helped to perform into being his social status, rendering it legible to his fellow theatergoers. It also would have helped to shape what Pepys and others were to hear in subsequent trips to the playhouse. The creatively productive process in which *The Enchanted Island*'s listeners are engaged is therefore both a socially and an artistically constructive one, integral to the building of a culturally competent self and to the completion of Prospero's "project."

Headed home with Sir William Penn – discussing the play that he, his "wife and girl," Lady Dorsett, "the King and Court," and numerous unnamed others had seen and heard – Pepys may have displayed the fruits of his focused audition, or he may not have. He may have discovered that his own choices differed from those of his companions', or that they overlapped. Either way, the auditory choices that Pepys made in the Duke of York's theater, and the repeated practice of choosing, would have importantly shaped his understanding of himself as someone capable of making such choices in the first place. How and what he heard each of the many times he attended that heavily revised "old play of Shakespeares" would have helped to mark Pepys as an avid and aurally adept theatergoer – one who could, finally and with repeated effort, "get the words clear."

11

Mind the Gaps: The Ear, the Eye, and the Senses of a Woman in *Much Ado About Nothing*

Diana E. Henderson

> **CLAUDIO.** Another Hero?
> **HERO.** Nothing certainer.
>
> *Much Ado About Nothing* 5.4.62[1]

Nothing? In our postmodern world as in Shakespeare's early modern one, the questions posed by sensory interpretation are fundamental and worrisome, with political and ethical consequences. The debates sparked by photographs documenting torture by US military forces at Iraq's Abu Ghraib prison, especially after Susan Sontag's final meditations upon them, starkly reinforced the complexity involved in transforming an image into narrative through verbal representation. So did the disturbing presence of a woman – named, of all things, England – before the camera's eye, and the question of whether her "onstage" presence within some of those consciously composed images signified agency.[2] The political urgency of performance and interpretive judgments prompted by Shakespeare's written characters is far less obvious but the evaluative processes required may be even more fraught. Here too, more obliquely, the way we read those characters called women informs what we notice and make of their present-day legacy, agency, and representation – with consequences for ourselves, our students, and our reading publics. In what follows, I move between text and image, sight and sound, and past and present in an attempt to capture the multiple – rather than merely duplicitous – signifying potential of one especially elusive figure of femininity. En route, my analysis emphasizes the "multi" in multimedia (whether early or late modern) as well as the responsibility and social location of the interpreter in creating the types of sensory and ideological convergence that become "common sense."

Hero's voice

> Nowe we see in a glasse, even in a darke speakyng: but then (shal we see) face to face. Nowe I knowe unperfectly: but then shal I knowe even as I am knowen.
>
> *The holie Bible The first Epistle ... to the Corinthians* 13.12 ("Bishops Bible")

The senses are hard to separate. Trying to describe his sensuous "dream" in language, Shakespeare's Bottom resorts to paradox and seemingly botched Pauline allusion: "the eye of man hath not heard, the ear of man hath not seen …" (4.1.209–10). But Bottom is not alone in his synesthesia; even his biblical source text, as translated by William Tyndale and maintained by Bishop Matthew Parker, has St Paul "see" "in a darke speakyng." Likewise the rhetorical traditions inherited by William Shakespeare delight in catachresis. Nowhere is the play of confusion among sight, sound, and word more overt than in *Much Ado About Nothing*, whose very title announces the interpretive duplicity that can become the stuff of either comedy or tragedy. "Noting" and "nothing," as often remarked, might easily sound the same in Elizabethan pronunciation. Even in writing, the distinction relies upon that precarious letter, the often silent "h" that nevertheless bothers Beatrice (an "aitch," an "ache") on the morning of her cousin's would-be wedding (4.3). The "h," marking the difference between noticing and not, between merely having ears and using them to hear, stands well for the dramatic character whose name begins with that character: the often silent but highly significant Hero.

Though her story constitutes the main dramatic plot of *Much Ado*, Hero has always been upstaged by her cousin Beatrice, my Lady Tongue. Beatrice and Benedick's witty wooing soon won audience: in one of those rare bits of evidence about early reception history, Leonard Digges wrote for the 1640 *Poems*, "let but Beatrice / And Benedick be seen, lo in a trice / The Cockpit, galleries, boxes, all are full" (Shakespeare 1998: 10). Indeed, when William Davenant restored them to the stage in 1662 in *The Law against Lovers*, he combined their "merry war" with bits of *Measure for Measure* – leaving out Hero entirely. With her went much of the ado about no-thing.

Ironically, it is Hero's virtue that makes her easy to overlook: she rarely speaks in public, seeming to epitomize the feminine "chaste, silent, and obedient" ideal to the point of utter passivity. Repeatedly, her uncles, Don Pedro, and even her "shrewd" cousin address her directly yet wait for (or expect) no reply. To the reader especially, she becomes an object at best, at worst an absence. In performance, the sensory landscape is more complicated, and allows exploitation of the gaps between seeing and hearing, and consciousness of the difference between a speaking subject and a visible subject of speech. It is up to the director and performer to decide whether Hero's silence indicates complaisance in her given role or others' patronizing presumptuousness (or both), yet it seems worth noting that if Hero is anything, she is no fool.[3]

After all, speech can be dangerous when desire is involved. Even in her silence, merely being the object of others' affections and designs expressed in speech allows Hero to be perceived as active in a pejorative sense. Don John, hearing of Claudio's interest in her, deems her a "very forward March-chick" (1.3.41), and when Claudio forces Benedick to "note" her, the results are not flattering. Yet with equal irony, Hero's path of following social prescriptions to the extreme of invisibility and silence does not protect her honor. As Carol Cook points out, "it is the often silent Hero who figures the threat of difference for Messinan men" (1986: 190).

The received sense of Hero's passivity, it should be noted, depends on the cultural assumption that equates speech with activity. While the bulk of early modern literature on the senses (not to mention most subsequent critical and gender theory) works off this assumption, hearing has also been acknowledged to be a more complicated – and more *active* – process than the speech/silence dichotomy implies.[4] One must have ears to hear. Sometimes silence itself speaks, adding overtones to the spoken message, qualifying or enriching its meaning. From the first, Hero is the figure to whom such perceptual paradoxes adhere. She at least attends: she notes, she hears. In this play about interpreting signs, Hero's first line incisively "translates" Beatrice-speech for her slower-witted or less informed father: "My cousin means Signor Benedick of Padua" (1.1.27). Her second line remarks matter-of-factly upon that other character who is "not of many words" (in public), Don John: "He is of a very melancholy disposition" (1.1.116, 2.1.5). Amidst disputation and lobbying, paternal imperatives and subversive suggestions, Hero observes, speaks simply, and listens.

Moreover, like Emilia in *Othello*, Hero is a character who begins by saying little (even when cajoled by a nearby female to stand up for herself) yet will speak quite a bit when men leave the room. And even before, as long as they are masked and the ritual occasion removes her from paternal earshot. Her first actual dialogue, with the masked Don Pedro in 2.1, reveals that Hero *has* had ears to hear. She starts by invoking the cultural norms of proper behavior she has so far upheld, only to invert power relations so that it is now the man (a prince, no less) who must "walk softly, and look sweetly, and say nothing" to gain her company; moreover, she "may say so when I please" and that is "When I like your favour" (2.1.62, 65, 67). Hero thus signals her awareness of mimicry and men, and her particular attention to her cousin's recent advice to find a "handsome fellow, or else … say, father, as it please me" (2.1.40–1). While hearing might be conceived to be a more passive sensory activity than seeing (more feminine, more receptive, more like Hero), hers, as evidenced through her speech, is nevertheless active listening.

Given this initial burst of Heroic wit, her public silence once Claudio has won her may seem odd: like Claudio, she needs Beatrice's prompting (or rescue) – in her case to avoid public speaking by stopping Claudio's "mouth with a kiss, and let[ting] not him speak neither" (2.1.235–6: the negations are notable). Again, Hero seems to take her cousin's advice, though the implication that speech would be more mortifying than a witnessed kiss remains intriguing. Is it that she would feel unequal to the public verbal competition, as the last clause implies? Is she so thoroughly "tongue-tied" – to invoke a phrase from *The Winter's Tale* that will be used to describe Hermione, another unjustly accused woman who will have to return from the dead?

I raise that late Shakespearean specter in order both to depart consciously from a psychologically based characterological reading and to recall Howard Felperin's provocative deconstruction of Hermione's indisputable innocence as charged.[5] Hero could be seen to suggest similar kinds of doubts, if we read her willingness only to kiss and "tell[] him in his ear that he is in her heart" as proleptic justification for distrust of a character who seems different in public and private, seen and heard (2.1.239). Such distrust emerges faintly in the critical commentary that attends to Hero in acts 3 and 4. For example, more than one scholar suggests an analogy to the surreptitious behavior of Bianca in *The Taming of the Shrew*, because we discover that Hero displays a bit of temper on her wedding morning. The local absurdity of the accusation regarding Hero (who, in an "all-female" scene with servants, has the nerve – or nerves – to want to wear her own choice of wedding gown) is less interesting than the presumption of impropriety whenever a female character departs from a norm of public (non-)speaking that even these critics would concede to be unnaturally constraining.[6] That is, the irrational fears and suspicions acted out absurdly by the male accusers within the play echo in the scholarly concern that women are privately not what they seem in public – a fear that Hero's rhetorical shifts, even more than Hermione's acts of politeness, could appear designed to invoke.

Such a reading, however, leaves out the particular socially situated dynamics of watching that this play likewise demands that we "note" (not least through the inclusion of the transcendently comic Watch). Within the fiction, there is nothing odd about being playful during a masque, considering the topsy-turvy game setting of that occasion – as the three other dancing encounters confirm. Nor, given that Hero has been both enlisted and licensed by her father to "act" in order to ensnare Beatrice, need we find her subsequent rhetorical extravagance in the orchard necessarily outside her "part."[7] To find the changes in the tone and manner of Hero's speaking odd or inconsistent is effectively to ignore the fiction's variable social constraints, the dynamic gendered context within which she speaks.

For the theatrical audience is privileged in being positioned as the most voyeuristic Watch of all, listening to and seeing what Hero would never wittingly say in front of its "public ear."[8] By contrast and crucially, Claudio cannot hear, and will not see, the episodes where Hero speaks forth playfully, peevishly, and even politically (in her artificial simile between honeysuckles in "the pleachèd bower" and court favorites, 3.1.7–11).[9] If we start to empathize with Claudio's mistrust, then, we do so through a sensory rather than rational form of sympathy. Our own looking and hearing must trump our analytic memory, for Claudio has seen much less than we and is relying much more completely on hearsay alone: his is a "weaker" position for judging than our own – if indeed we consider ourselves reliable witnesses and interpreters.[10] That conditional should give us pause, given the context of a play in which almost nobody overhears correctly and the most "reliable" witnesses are fools or knaves. (See McDowell's discussion in this volume of the complex early modern dynamics involving senses, emotions, and reason.) Knowing and noting more, if we take Shakespeare's entire script into account, do not lead logically to a distrustful skepticism (and the overly swift conjecture of Claudio's "Farewell Hero!") so much as to humility and uncertainty when confronted with sensory overload and contextual overdetermination. We too "knowe unperfectly" – here is a lesson that Claudio and Don Pedro (and, alas, many critics) do not have ears to hear.

Especially for a romantic comedy, there is a "dark speaking" in this narrative – even before it takes its potentially tragic turn.[11] But there also seems to be an active striving towards redemption from within this sensory uncertainty, in a sociopolitical as well as spiritual sense. That is, a fundamental embrace of doubt "frees" the audience (and Benedick) from reiterating the more particular doubt sanctioned, and indeed made normative, by the language and culture of Messina: the gendered distrust of the sexual female which haunts the play, from Leonato and Benedick's originary banter about Hero onwards. This is not a topic to be evaded by a purely linguistic deconstruction (à la Felperin); if one leaves out symbolic embodiment and the social context, one effaces the fact that it must always be a Hero (or a Hermione, or a Desdemona) whose potential to change and become other from "herself" signifies corruption and chaos. The play confronts both the connection and the absurdity of this cultural logic in Don John's few yet priceless words: "Leonato's Hero, your Hero, every man's Hero" (3.2.78). Once the slippage is formulated, its elaborate "proof" of female infidelity through "unperfect" hearing and seeing is only a matter of time. Sense perception meets ideologically blinkered interpretation. With the myth of singular identity thus exposed, Hero becomes the local habitation and the name of airy nothing.[12]

The importance of being Hero

> So Hero's ruddy cheek Hero betrayed,
> And her all naked to his sight displayed …
> Christopher Marlowe, *Hero and Leander*, Sestiad II, ll. 323–4

Let us return, then, to the written "characters" constituting Hero. In examining the wordplay within and about her name, we also look back to a classical tradition become comic, and forward to the symbolic logic of this Hero's strange conclusion. Is Hero Greek to us? Shakespeare chose to make her so: in Bandello's source narrative for *Much Ado*'s main plot, the character was named Fenicia – seemingly a more appropriate name for a Messinan mistress.[13] Among the many names of Italian, English, and Iberian derivation in *Much Ado*, Hero stands alone etymologically, perhaps hearkening back to the ancient Greek Sicilia where her twin/fulfillment Her(mi)o(ne) would one day imaginatively reside. Or, more likely, reaching out from the play to a set of texts both classical and modern for a grammar-school alumnus: Virgil's *Georgics* 3, Ovid's *Heroides* or (in George Turbervile's translation) the *Heroycall Epistles* 18 and 19 (what's in a name, indeed?), and the Greek romance of the "divine Musaeus" lately recreated by Shakespeare's own divine forerunner, Christopher Marlowe. His *Hero and Leander*, having circulated famously in manuscript since 1593, was first published with George Chapman's continuation in 1598, just before "Another Hero" trod the boards. Moreover, the same year saw publication of Henry Petowe's alternative continuation in which, suggestively albeit in awkward verse, Hero survives a prison stay and the lovers live happily ever after.[14] Three English variations on Musaeus: clearly this was a story – and a name – re-echoing through London playwriting circles.

Obliquely, these earlier texts set the stage for the ruptured wedding plot of *Much Ado*. Virgil's passing reference in the *Georgics* stresses the passion and youth of the two doomed lovers as the climax of their tragedy approaches. Leander swims within a violent seascape of billowing waves whose echoes drown out all human sounds even as he will soon drown in the darkness:

> quid iuvenis, magnum cui versat in ossibus ignem
> durus amor? Nempe abruptis turbata procellis
> nocte natat caeca serus freta; quem super ingens
> porta tonat caeli, et scopulis inlisa reclamant
> aequora; nec miseri possunt revocare parentes,
> nec moritura super crudeli funere virgo.
>
> (Virgil ll. 258–63)

> What of the youth, in whose marrow fierce Love fans the mighty flames? Lo! In the turmoil of bursting storms, late in the black night, he swims the straits. Above him thunders Heaven's mighty portal, and the billows, dashing on the cliffs, echo the cry; yet neither his hapless parents can call him back, nor thought of the maid who in cruel fate must die withal.
>
> (Loeb translation: 172–3)

In the Latin, the fated death of the maiden concludes the allusion, set against the cries of parents and the ominous darkness of the night.

Ovid's epistles of Leander and Hero likewise stress their imminent doom, writing one another as for seven nights the stormy seas thwart their assignations. In Turbervile's Elizabethan translation, Leander recalls how Hero's torchlight guided him through the darkness to "her gladsome lookes," as he now strives to "feede thy hungrie eyes." He hopes "that thy Lampe be burning aye / for feare I swimme awrie": it will be the loss of this light that shall doom him. Even more evocatively, Hero herself laments in the third person that "Hero can doe nothing else / but cleape hir lovers name," while confirming her hidden passion: "more than any wight would deeme, / I rage with ardent love." Despite desperate worries and premonitions of death, Hero vividly desires her lover to come "And lay those armes of thine / Upon my backe, that oft were beate / with sea of belking brine" (Ovid 121, 126, 127, 133).

These classical precedents remind us how much of Shakespeare's plot similarly is a night story: the masquing, the spying, the ritual penance. Moreover, if Claudio knows his country's classics (as a Florentine stereotypically would), here is a vivid precedent for imagining Hero as a desirous woman receiving a night visitor. The crucial "missing link" in Shakespeare's transformation of Hero from the stuff of erotic tragedy to complex comedy nevertheless is Marlowe, who changes the focus as well as the tone in his Heroic epyllion.

Marlowe's sestiads chart the earlier stages of the lovers' romance, from their famous first encounter to the bed of consummation. Retaining the desire of Ovid's Hero and the traditional night/sight/light cluster of associations, Marlowe adds an emphasis on deceptive wit (Leander's sophistical attack on chastity) and appearance (Hero). She enters wearing a veil of artificial flowers that "man and beast deceives," and "stole away th'enchanted gazer's mind; / For like sea-nymphs' inveigling harmony, / So was her beauty to the standers by" (I.20, 104–6). This beguiling and oxymoronic "nun" of Venus is also, by Leander's comic logic, Venus's none: "One is no number; maids are nothing then, / Without the sweet society of men" (I.255–6).[15]

Nothing without men – and nothing with them, too, as the double-bind questioning of "Another Hero" at the altar will reveal. Shakespeare re-turns this matter from witty play to potential tragedy, now one of sense perception and prejudice rather than overwhelming passion or fate:

> CLAUDIO. Now if you are a maid, answer to this.
> HERO. I talked with no man at that hour, my lord.
> DON PEDRO. Why then are you no maiden.
>
> (4.1.79–81)

The negativity of Hero's dilemma long ago bemused that comic logician Lewis Carroll, who wrote to Ellen Terry about "a 'Hero-ic' puzzle of mine" (Shakespeare 1979: 157): why does neither Hero nor Beatrice explain where Hero did in fact sleep that night? By the faux-logic of Marlowe's Leander's, however,

> This idol which you term virginity
> Is neither essence subject to the eye,

> No, nor to any one exterior sense,
> Nor hath it any place of residence
>
> (I.269–72)

QED, Hero the virgin has no "place of residence" the night before her wedding. She was not with Beatrice, she was with no man. Borachio informs Don John, "I will so fashion the matter that Hero shall be absent" (2.2.35) – but that's almost redundant. Her defense is, aptly, the absence that most becomes a maid.

Marlowe's poem repeatedly and ironically resounds in Shakespeare's plays.[16] When Leander "'O Hero, Hero!' thus he cried full oft," it was because his sight of her was thwarted by the seas (II.147); when Claudio cries "Oh Hero, what a hero hadst thou been" it is because he thinks he has seen too much (4.1.93). The echoes highlight the contrast between Greek romance and passion on the one hand, and the manipulated matches and deliberate desire in Messina on the other: "Where both deliberate, the love is slight; / Who ever loved, that loved not at first sight?" (I.175–6). Well, Claudio, for one:

> O my lord,
> When you went onward on this ended action,
> I looked upon her with a soldier's eye,
> That liked, but had a rougher task in hand,
> Than to drive liking to the name of love.
>
> (1.1.222–6)

Claudio's "liked, but" says it all. Yet the Marlovian echoes also confirm that rhetorical and sensory traps persist and await the naive, even in prosaic Messina. Indeed, if the exemplarily conventional Claudio could fall prey to false conjecture, what man in the early modern theatrical audience would have felt secure that *his* reason could overcome the powerful combination of sense perception, imagination, and emotion?[17]

Most significantly, Marlowe provides the precedent for Hero's body to become a site (and sight) of split subjectivity available for male interpretation: "So Hero's ruddy cheek Hero betrayed, / And her all naked to his sight displayed" (II.323–4). In a final twist on Hero's light within Marlowe's poem, her blushing cheek like an "orient cloud" creates a false dawn that reveals her naked body to her lover. No wonder, then, that in *Much Ado* the meaning of *another* Hero's blushing becomes a test case, for Claudio, Leonato, and Friar Francis in turn. Thus Claudio:

> Behold how like a maid she blushes here!
> … Would you not swear
> All you that see her, that she were a maid,
> By these exterior shows? But she is none:
> She knows the heat of a luxurious bed:
> Her blush is guiltiness, not modesty.
>
> (4.1.29, 33–7)

For the aptly titled "Count" Claudio, "she is none" – but in this context that judgment is inaccurate – a miscount, if you will. Shakespeare relentlessly reminds us how hard it is to evaluate the particular case, whether one appeals to sense impressions or textual precedent. Thus it is not only Claudio's final rhetorical question that rings with more complications than he intends: "Is this face Hero's? Are our eyes our own?" (4.1.66). While his eyes are not in fact his own, the question of blushes remains murkily contingent on another question: which Hero?

> HERO. Oh God defend me, how am I beset!
> What kind of catechizing call you this?
> CLAUDIO. To make you answer truly to your name.
> HERO. Is it not Hero? Who can blot that name
> With any just reproach?
> CLAUDIO. Marry that can Hero,
> Hero itself can blot out Hero's virtue.
>
> (4.1.71–6)

To resolve the play's traumatic encounter with this morass of indeterminacy and contradictory interpretations, Hero "itself" must continue her symbolic journey to more absolute nothingness, and, ultimately, a duplicity that confounds number. When Friar Francis's alternative reading of her face allows Hero a chance to respond to an actual question, she does not even know what man she sinned with: "They know that do accuse me, I know none" (4.1.170). Nothing certainer: I/eye know/no none/nun. Hero will temporarily become a nun in order to be perceived as none in order to appear to Claudio's eye more alive than when she lived. The contortions of this plan are obvious even to the Friar, as is its potential to fail.[18] But this scene and plan do succeed in moving Hero's story from the world of empirical proof to an almost completely semiotic and symbolic register, in which sound and sense, name and fame, nothing and knowing coalesce.

Her-O

> … for incorporeal Fame,
> Whose weight consists in nothing but her name,
> Is swifter than the wind
>
> *Hero and Leander* II.113–15

In an essay that makes much of the sound of O, Joel Fineman traces Othello's name back to the Greek for desire.[19] Building upon the "disrupting and disjunctive thematic opposition" he discerns in Shakespeare "between visionary presence and verbal representation," he understands the "O" sound "both to occasion and to objectify in language Othello's hollow self" (Fineman 1991: 151). Further associating "this sound – these abject *O*s" – with Lacan's *objet a*, "that is, what for Lacan is the occasion of desire and the mark of the Real," he asks why Othello's "tragic passage into empty, retrospective self occurs at the climactic moment when the hero names his name." Fineman's answer lies in an analysis of how "the speaking subject is constitutively precipitated, as ruptured or as broken subject, as an effect of the language in which he finds himself bespoken – and no more so self-evidently than when the subject speaks explicitly about himself" (1991: 152).

Fineman's suggestions bear eerily upon this other figure of nothingness, who in her moment of public humiliation is brought to declare herself in the third person, in question form: "Is it not Hero? Who can blot that name / With any just reproach?" The verse pauses – the strong caesura at her "proper" name and the line break at "that name" – present an opportunity for the ghostly characters of other Heroes to echo within the silence. Here is the potential problem when we recognize that our eyes, our voices, and our names are not "our own" but "given." Thus Hero is framed both by Borachio's visual plot and by the overdetermination of the aural signifier. Claudio's iteration of "Hero itself" spells out the problem. "Hero" is sublimed into the essence of a projected female – at which point, be "she" in fictional Messina or on the early modern stage, her doom is imminent.

Hero. The *objet petit a* become *o*. Here-O. Presence only as a void, a cipher. Hear-O. "I will not hear you," Don Pedro harshly replies when

Leonato accuses the noblemen of killing his only child, Hero. And, ultimately, Her-O. The difference of her, not his – and not Will's – O. In her name, and that difference from "Othello" and "willow" (to cite the words of which Fineman makes so much), lies the difference of gender. Thus it is – it must be, and must be *heard* – "by the name of Hero" that Borachio has wooed Margaret, his duplicitous desires sullying the fame of both women and causing Hero's "death." This is the truly absent presence of Hero's "character(s)."

The glass of Hero's dark speaking reflects critical assumptions like a Rorschach test. To William Hazlitt in 1817, "Hero is the principal figure in the piece, and leaves an indelible impression on the mind by her beauty, her tenderness, and the hard trial of her love" (Brown 1979: 30–1). By contrast, theater critic James Agate writes in 1933 that "Hero can never be this play's bright spot" (Brown 1979: 224), anticipating F. H. Mares's assertion that we might care more were Hero a "more positive character" (Shakespeare 1998: 35). But of course this is precisely what Hero cannot be: it is through Hero that we are allowed to tarry with the negative. Yet, *pace* Agate, within the play's symbolic register, Hero becomes crucially aligned with the return of light, in the scene where her most absent presence of all heralds the reinstatement of social order and comic community. And in choosing to write this last act for Hero, Shakespeare departs from the tragic logic of both gender differentiation and fractured identity that Fineman reveals in *Othello*.

We can again discern structural resemblances with that other Sicilian play in which we are required to awake our faith in order to resurrect a woman's chastity, her potent nothingness. But in the world of Shakespeare's late romance, it takes sixteen years for the remorseful slanderer Leontes to earn his second chance. In *Much Ado*, redemption is a comparatively sprightly two-step program, moving from the men's ceremonial cleansing of Hero's name at her (empty) tomb (5.3), to the morning betrothal where Claudio must pledge to marry blindly before being granted the sight of "Another Hero" (5.4). This temporal condensation puts even more pressure on these rites as symbolic – thus resulting in even more widespread bafflement or dismissal among modern critics and performers alike.

The sequence begins with Claudio ascertaining that they have arrived at the right monument: it is still dark. He then hangs the epitaph upon her tomb: "Done to death by slanderous tongues, / Was the Hero that here lies" (5.3.3–4). Changing her name from "shame" to "fame" in a single verse couplet, Hero now "lives in death" (8). Likewise, the words will outlast their speaker by becoming written characters: "Hang thou there upon the tomb, / Praising her when I am dumb" (9–10). The hymn to the "goddess of the night" that follows asks pardon for "Those that slew thy *virgin knight*" (italics mine) in tones of O (moan, groan, woe, go) at midnight – an almost monotonous reiteration of the sounds and associations that accompany the antique legend of Hero. But in a line that can hardly be of Claudio's composition, the song concludes: "Graves, yawn and yield your dead / Till death be uttered, / Heavily, heavily" (19–21). This ritual is coming perilously close to lawful witchcraft, idolizing the "nothing" that is not in the grave, approaching the abyss where, in the dead of night, the dead of night utter death.

In "Silence and the Poet," George Steiner writes of three ways language gestures beyond itself, of what lies where poetry ends. In one tradition, the poet reaches a great light; in another, music. "But there is a third mode of transcendence: in it language simply ceases, and the motion of the spirit gives no further outward manifestation of its being. The poet enters into silence. Here the word borders not on radiance or music, but on night" (Steiner 1977: 46). This is the most frightening of conclusions. Yet even as Shakespeare's song leads to death, it remains a song; and so simultaneously, after a pause ("heavily") for silence, the play's movement away from the abyss begins … through ritual, through music, and, ultimately, through light:

> Good morrow, masters. Put your torches out
> The wolves have preyed; and look, the gentle day,
> Before the wheels of Phoebus, round about
> Dapples the drowsy east with spots of grey.
>
> (5.3.24–8)

So speaks one wolf, Don Pedro, in an image of daybreak redolent with echoes of another Hero, Marlowe's blushing bride of false morning. Out from the tunnel of unspeaking silence come voices, echoing. "But this breaking free, the human voice harvesting echo where there was silence before, is both miracle and outrage, sacrament and blasphemy" (Steiner 1977: 34).

So too the strange scene to follow, the second half of this ritual conclusion. Unmasking and speaking simultaneously, s/he who is and is not Hero returns from the dead:

> HERO. And when I lived I was your other wife,
> And when you loved, you were my other husband.

CLAUDIO. Another Hero?
HERO. Nothing certainer.
One Hero died defiled, but I do live,
And surely as I live, I am a maid.
DON PEDRO. The former Hero, Hero that is dead.
LEONATO. She died, my lord, but whiles her slander lived.
FRIAR FRANCIS. All this amazement can I qualify …
(5.4.61–7)

Critics and performers, like Friar Francis, too often leap to "qualify" this moment. But the point theatrically should be quite the opposite, even for we who have "known" all along that Hero lives: if we are to delight in this as a happy ending, we too should be amazed. As in the previous scene, Shakespeare constructs an elaborate web of speech, sound, and silence for us to hang upon, through which to awaken our faith.[20]

He surely does not choose the realist's path. In Bandello's source story, the rediscovered heroine has a year to change her looks so radically that her former lovers truly do not recognize her. Collapsing time, Shakespeare instead presents us with "Another Hero" looking precisely like the character slandered by sight and seldom heard, ready to marry the man who did not repent or mourn her passing until forced by masculine testimony to acknowledge his "mistaking" (5.1.242). But by juxtaposing visual constancy with verbal difference, the play now creates a scene of redemption from what is typically (hearkening back to Fineman) the very stuff of Shakespearean (tragic) subjectivity. "That's he that was Othello, here I am," the abject tragic hero soon will say (5.2.284). But before that, in a defiant inversion of gender and genre, Shakespeare also wrote words that gesture toward another conception of subjectivity. "One Hero died defiled, but I do live," the newly unabjected hero(ine) declares.

How do we ever know the person we see before us? How can we trust her? The play teased its earliest audiences both visually and aurally, prompting them to notice not only the usual performative gap between boy actors and the characters they played but also the difference between this Hero and her classical namesake. A site of rupture within the symbolic order, the "death" and resurrection of Hero provides a quasi-magical solution to the recalcitrant, otherwise unresolved problems of social and sensory perception. Much depends on whether this ritual return from the darkness "speaks." Carol Cook reads Hero here as a "scapegoat" – a framed victim still. Harry Berger and others stress the return of the social status quo. But if we hear both the surrounding confusion of tenses and the confident self-assertion with which Hero's first-person voice comes forward to declare "I am a maid," this performative moment should register as more than a trick or a treat. Hero is now the mysterious nothing and the many, Her-O whole and yet still multiple and other. That this Hero lives is nothing short of miraculous.

Hero on screen: the sounds of silence

> [Q]O, o,o,o[Q]
> [F]Do you see this? Look on her: look, her lips,
> Look there, look there![F]
>
> *King Lear*, 5.3.308–9

R. A. Foakes's composite text of Lear's dying words neatly captures the impossible double trajectory of Hero's narrative, of female nothingness – re-turned (remorselessly, relentlessly) to tragedy. The father's misguided anger and subsequent grief that were forecast in Leonato's speech over Hero's collapsed body finally come to horrible fruition: the Messinan's "Do not live, Hero, do not ope thine eyes" (4.1.116) is cruelly fulfilled as Lear moans his woe (in the Quarto's reduction to Os) over the sightless Cordelia. The Folio Lear directs our attention to sight and sound merged, but the playwright now refuses to satisfy his (and our) desperate wish for the daughter's resurrection and the sound of *her* O. We do not even get that implausibility of a revival before death, as *Othello* provided. Both the "miracle" of trickery (and writing) that allows a happy conclusion to Beatrice and Benedick's romance (5.4.91) and the more "amazing" resurrection of Hero are twisted in *Lear*'s tragic landscape; and though one unfortunate child, Edgar, will survive being "nothing" by becoming another (Foakes 2.2.192), the female hero will not. She will say, and then not say, nothing.

Awareness of this tragic direction and the contrasting possibilities of his sensationally attuned storytelling would seem to give even greater power to Hero's exceptionally happy ending in modern performances. On screen, where sight is conventionally held to trump the word, one might also expect Hero to be the beneficiary of modernization, at least in terms of conventional sympathy: now embodied by a female actor instead of a boy, the paradoxes implicit in her early modern character(s) recede, stabilized by the normative realism of mass market film/video. Moreover, in the wake of feminism's multiple waves, the camera's eye would appear to render more starkly visible her framing by the conventions of what Berger calls the Messinan Men's Club. Yet as Kenneth

Branagh's 1993 feature film demonstrates, translating Shakespearean texts to new media does not yield such predictable results. Capturing much of the play's humor and featuring several shining performances, Branagh's *Much Ado* succeeded as a popular comedy – no mean feat – but Hero's story was not the beneficiary. Should this be a cause for concern?

No matter how resonant her signifying, of course, Hero when performed cannot be exclusively a sign or symbol. As Anthony Dawson observes, in the particular case of drama

> The actor … uses his body to falsify his body, or better, to break away from it … the audience must put aside its sense of what the actor's body seems to be telling it (e.g. that this person, say Burbage, is in pain, angry, erotically aroused) in order to read meaning, i.e. what is represented – the *person* of the character. But at the same time it cannot forget the actor.
>
> (1996: 36)

The perceptual gaps Dawson emphasizes may be diminished though they do not disappear with modern conventions of naturalistic actor training and gendered casting. Film reduces this complexly embodied human form from three dimensions to two, and edits that form's performance into a sequence of images. Yet the play of performing body, fictional characterization, symbolic meaning and audience perception(s) remains rich and sometimes mystifying. In Hero's case, whether the actor's style registers identification or craft, the story in which she participates calls attention to her as the sign and marker of normative femininity.

Especially given the collaborative process of filmmaking, to jump to conclusions about Branagh's, or even actress Kate Beckinsale's, representation of Hero is to elide this dense perceptual layering. If done hastily it can precariously resemble the process, dramatized within *Much Ado*, by which the blushing Hero is transformed into a false "sign and semblance." Calling attention to such an ironic parallel encourages humility and the appropriateness of attending to detail and local variations; nevertheless, it does not erase the perceptual and social effects of particular filmic choices. In attributing responsibility to the director, I use a conventional shorthand allowing the focus to zoom in on the artistic and ideological consequences of Hero's screen visualization and vocalization.[21]

Branagh's choices become more striking – and more apparent *as* choices – when contrasted with two televised productions selected from the two decades prior: one adapting A. J. Antoon's New York Shakespeare Festival staging set in turn-of-the-twentieth-century America (1973; co-directed by Nick Havinga), the other, the second BBC/Time-Life period version designed exclusively for television (1984; directed by Stuart Burge). All produced "post-*Feminine Mystique*," these three *Much Ado*s epitomize different forms of screen visualization, aligned at least at their origins with film, theater, and video. In addition to raising further questions about variation over time and within different subgenres of screen performance, they reveal opportunities – taken, missed, or dismissed (and diss-Missed?) – to see Hero and the main plot's symbolic logic anew.

In screen media, the camera can direct the audience's gaze to a silent listener in ways a stage director can only envy. Such techniques clearly can create an active space for Hero early in her narrative, and both the 1973 and 1984 televised *Much Ado*s do emphasize Hero's aural and visual attentiveness to Beatrice. The former, set in small-town America in the wake of the Spanish-American War, includes a Hero (April Shawnham) who sometimes resists – and sometimes colludes with – her bolder cousin. Hero will not drink beer instead of lemonade as Beatrice (Kathleen Widdoes) dares do, but she will overcome her hesitation and join the other women for a secret cigarette during the dinner-dance. Predictably, Hero nearly chokes (the classic comedy sign of a naïf), and the abortive rebellion turns into a frantic cover-up when her father enters. Nevertheless amused rather than cowed when her cousin goads her, this Hero gets an interpellated retort, interjecting an extratextual "Beatrice …" in a warning (albeit gentle) voice when Lady Tongue goes too far.

In the BBC's early modern period production, Hero (Katharine Levy) is even more focused on Beatrice (Cherie Lunghi), admiring and smiling at her repeatedly, though this in no way diminishes Hero's pliable obedience to her father's wishes or her subsequent amusement with Don Pedro. The choice (perhaps encouraged by the small screen) to begin with only four people in scene 1 – Beatrice and Hero sitting by a courtyard fountain, listening eagerly to the Messenger's conversation with Leonato – makes Hero's pattern of attentiveness, as well as her interest in news of Claudio, all the more obvious.

By contrast, Branagh's film, although gesturing at the past in costume, begins with Hero merely one of a large, seemingly classless community quickly set aflutter by news of the soldiers' return from an unspecified conflict – with all present evidently aware of her affection for Claudio, looking at her and chuckling when he is named.[22] From the start, this Hero has no secrets or privacy, and thus the textual contrast between her quiet propriety in mixed company and her more bold, playful tones with women (or when masked) does not register. And in a rural Tuscany where everyone gets naked before the opening titles conclude, the serious policing of chastity that would constrain a "proper" woman's tongue – and eyes – never comes into focus. Instead, Hero repeatedly makes eye contact (in a maidenly way) with Claudio, lingering at windows until Beatrice returns to drag her away. This Hero is a looker rather than a listener. Branagh's decision to establish an intimate, rollicking world without physical reserve makes some lines, such as Claudio's query regarding Leonato's heirs, preposterous, and reduces Hero's silence to mere schoolgirl bashfulness. Moreover, her smiling silence when her father instructs her to accept the prince – rather than the young man with whom she is clearly enamored – becomes downright odd: her untroubled response takes obedience to the edge of vacuity.

But then, Branagh's film is not interested in looking through Hero's eyes; as his account of making the film confirms, he was more interested in looking *at* her through Claudio's. "The deception of Claudio was most important in this screen adaptation. In theatrical versions this character is often dismissed for his gullibility," he observes (Branagh 1993b: xv). Russell Jackson, who served as literary consultant, concurs: "It might be claimed that in Kenneth Branagh's film by textual adjustments and by the camera's ability to register feeling in an actor's face, Claudio is done more favours than is usually the case on stage" (Jackson 1994: 117). Indeed he is, at least structurally, but the question persists: to what end? What made it intolerable in 1993 to tell the story of the gullible (or callow or arrogant) young man as constructed in Shakespeare's text? Conversely, what made it acceptable to alter Hero's part radically, in ways that encourage doubts about *her* intelligence, if not her loyalty? For not only does this Hero do as her father instructs: she positively *runs* forward to dance with Don Pedro when he merely asked if she would "walk" with him. Undermining her seeming devotion to Claudio, this manic moment of mute merriment substitutes for her lines of Heroic wit at the masque, all of which are cut.

Gone as well is the women's scene on the morning of Hero's wedding, and for the same reason: given Branagh's focus on making Claudio's behavior sympathetically plausible, "this scene with the girls [*sic*] seemed finally to frustrate" (Branagh 1993b: xv). We might wonder who in the audience would be frustrated by the second of only two all-female scenes in the playtext. Moreover, while Hero's voice is being cut, another voice is inserted into the night scene prior: Borachio saying "Hero, Hero" as he has sex with the barebacked Hero-substitute at her window. Just as the act 2 masquing scene aligns the camera with a tearful Claudio's perspective on Hero, we watch this crude representation along with Claudio (and Don Pedro), witnesses to a scene as spectacularly present here as it is spectacularly absent in Shakespeare's play. Branagh explains: "It seemed that if we saw this occur on screen, it would add a new dimension to our understanding of Claudio. The proof of her disloyalty is one of a number of crucial events that take place on the night before the wedding" (Branagh 1993b: xv). Excising lines of unreliable narrative and false logic ("Leonato's Hero, your Hero, every man's Hero"), the film substitutes "ocular proof" that can make Claudio seem as much the sentimental victim as is this reduced version of Hero, so long as we choose not to think but only feel – and feel the privileged young man, at that. The play's emphasis on responsibility for one's vision, for one's susceptibility, for one's choices based on one's societally informed as well as perceptual conjectures, all recedes.

Russell Jackson shifts responsibility to the film medium itself, commenting that "In the business of 'showing and telling' it is not surprising that the audience should witness with Claudio the apparent treachery of Hero" (1994: 117). Yet theater is just as obviously a site for show-and-tell, and for more than two millennia it has been acknowledged that part of theater's art lies in visual withholding as well as display.[23] Having chosen to film a story so obsessively attentive to the flimsiness of sensory evidence and its ability to frame the female, Branagh's display of a false "Hero" to our voyeuristic eyes works against the narrative's larger lessons. Instead, it reinstates a classic film economy as troubling as is the sexual economy that finds "nothing" between a maiden's legs. Although in some dimensions the film allows the woman's part its due (Beatrice's, notably), in the main plot the effect of editorial choices works otherwise. The upshot is this: in creating the illusion of plausibility and sympathy with Claudio's perspective, the camera colludes in distancing, silencing, and indeed framing Hero more relentlessly than Borachio could.[24] With a directorial approach like this, who needs an artful Don John?

The television versions confirm that the screen does not necessitate Branagh's choices – though the differences among screen media may be one factor encouraging them. Longer and (especially in the case of the BBC/Time-Life *Much Ado*) more focused on reproducing the text, the televised *Much Ado*s make more space for the "other" Hero: the one whose tongue loosens in the company of women, who generates extended similes (3.1) and takes issue with her maid (3.4). In the earlier scene under A. J. Antoon's direction, Hero in the conservatory not only enjoys baiting Beatrice but also (together with Ursula) turns on a sprinkler system to drench the ill-placed eavesdropper; this neatly motivates Beatrice's marriage-day cold. In the BBC production, Katharine Levy's voice is discernibly lower and more forceful in these all-female encounters, and she is even more clearly getting her own back through mockery of Beatrice's domineering pride and volubility. In her morning encounter with Margaret – who likewise seems aware of a rare opportunity to aim a few jabs at those who command her – the banter is sharp-edged. The effect is to allow more variety, tension, and awareness of the social contexts shaping the women's behavior.

Turning back from these televised versions to Branagh's film, one notices even more starkly the diminishment of Hero's speaking voice and active role. Kate Beckinsale is not even allowed to initiate the gulling of Emma Thompson's Beatrice: instead, the film sequence starts with Ursula's "But are you sure Benedick loves Beatrice so entirely?" The acting choices and simplified dynamics lead one to see the characters, especially Hero, as personal "types" rather than socially attuned, obscuring the serious undercurrents of the main plot's sensory fable. Consider the treatment of Hero's denials during the wedding itself, when an unusually active Claudio (Robert Sean Leonard) goes on a rampage, knocking down decorated poles after hurling her away as the "rotten orange." While Beckinsale, like the other Heros, does deny the false charges, she starts crying earlier and keeps crying later: for most of the scene she is in tears, near-hysterical, or out cold. In the BBC version, by contrast, Levy works through a wide range of emotions before succumbing to tears. Sadly concerned for Claudio even as he exits, she only collapses when her father attacks her (Beckinsale faints while the princes are still present), and continues to move between anger, forthright denial, and tears throughout the interview with Friar Francis. The larger implications involving the complexity of sensory interpretation and the gendered unfairness of her predicament remain visible.

And thus we return to the importance of Hero's resurrection, the movement from midnight mourning to a miraculous morn. To make this ritual resound, performances must let Hero speak in all her voices, and in her absences. Many versions haven't, on stage as well as screen.[25] Branagh's film is merely a more recent – though importantly, the most widely seen – instance in which the signs that could become wonders are diminished. Gone are the phrases that make her ultimate apparition haunting: "Another Hero," "Nothing certainer," and "The former Hero." As Deborah Cartmell remarks, everything that might interfere with a cheerful happy ending is cut, reducing the threat of death or misrecognition (2000: 51, 61ff). While Beckinsale emphatically announces "I *am* a maid," the context makes her words sound less like a solemn vow than a good performance: as the screenplay states, the (ever-present) crowd "applauds." Perhaps the director, having played Benedick, would reply that "man is a giddy thing." Yet that line too is deprived of its moral victory as a result, lacking the dangers overcome, the gendered threats and inversions fully acknowledged, the risk of loving nevertheless taken. Benedick's becomes merely a funny, not an earned and mature inconsistency. Without the ache and awareness of society's uses of gender differentiation, all the ado about noting indeed evaporates into nothing.

Again, this was not the only possible route for a screen *Much Ado*. The televised versions, even or especially where the setting allows their gender politics to seem a thing of the past, do remember that Hero plays a focal role in the ritual conclusion. Taking advantage of the medium's ability to superimpose images, Antoon and Havinga's rainy mourning scene includes a softened image of Hero's face fading in and out during the song at her monument: an absent presence indeed. The weather substitutes for the (largely inaudible) lyrics of "Pardon, goddess of the night," as a thunderstorm reinforces the burden "Heavily." Claudio's final couplet delivered as a voiceover implies that he has indeed internalized as well as acted out his penance, the technique giving him invisible narrative authority, and a misty sunrise confirms that a brighter day is dawning. Appearing to assume (I would say rightly) that this penance suffices within a production that includes Keystone Kops, the directors forgo a serious or singular finale for Hero. From here on, the comedy is played lightly for laughs, returning Claudio to a play-world in which all the women are veiled and ride a merry-go-round. His punchline revelation, "Another Hero," is performed directly to the camera, an aside that reinforces this version's preference for a meta-theatrical (and now meta-televisual) rather than metaphysical frame. Nevertheless, there has been masculine growth, giving reason for celebration.

The BBC production takes both penance and restoration more seriously. Claudio (Robert Reynolds) reads his public recantation solemnly, centered within a dark, symmetrical full-body tableau. Furthermore, Burge refuses to disconnect night and day: black-caped anonymous mourners wear deathly white masks as they somberly circle her tomb, and soon after, Hero and the other women enter wearing similar white half-masks. Don Pedro (Jon Finch), having spent the night asking graves to "yawn and yield your dead," rather understandably crosses himself as he confronts "Hero that is dead!" Here alone the potential of heavenly witchcraft hovers, at least for the superstitious Spaniard. The impact of revelation carries over to the final resolution between Beatrice and

Benedick (Robert Lindsay), who bring discernable past experience and intelligence to the comic proceedings.

The silver lining in Branagh's desire to make Claudio empathetic may be the extended attention to the penance ritual, moving from male processional chorus to Claudio's speech and finally to a solo rendition of the song by Patrick Doyle.[26] However, the segues into and out of the scene undercut its larger symbolic function: the sequence begins with a foreground shot of Hero and Antonio watching the procession from the balcony of their villa, reminding us that she is rather prosaically alive, and not even isolated from the male world; it ends with a shift to morning – but the morning of Benedick, not Don Pedro (whose lines are cut) or Hero's return. Reversing scene order here allows a nice comic deflation for Branagh's Benedick, who gets to sing his bad poetry right after the "straight" song at the grave, but at an obvious cost to the trajectory of the main plot. That's entertainment!

Fidelity (Hero's, the film's) is and is not the issue here. Enough good work has been done on Shakespearean film to make a defense of visual transformation superfluous, nor am I sounding a reactionary note by attending to Branagh's cuts and changes: my concern is with the particular pattern of decisions that evacuates a potentially dramatic female character and diminishes the cultural and perceptual problems her story conjures. Certainly Branagh's directorial vision, not least his choice to privilege Beatrice, provides a refreshing change from the traditional literary and cinematic framing of the strong female as medusa-like object – traditions not so monolithic or hegemonic as has sometimes been argued, but potent nonetheless. Yet his film also replicates and extends a performance tradition that makes less of Hero – and in that process, the camera becomes his co-conspirator. Ultimately, a combination of modern market incentives, social relations, and the director's visual priorities, rather than anything intrinsic to the medium per se, reduced the unexceptional woman's part – and led to a less troubled, more sentimental instantiation of the social order that nearly destroys her than was the case in Shakespeare's sixteenth-century text.

The televised *Much Ado*s, by contrast, took advantage of the medium's flow and divisions to include more Hero as well as more of Shakespeare's text. Of course, the difficulties of adapting Shakespeare to the smaller screen are well known, and the very leisure of their pacing dates them; arguably the energy of the Antoon and intelligence of the Burge production are better communicated now as parts rather than wholes – in the form of that educational supplement *par excellence*, the video clip or DVD chapter. Viewed in this light, the dearth of recent television productions using Shakespeare's words becomes more troubling, the downside to the late twentieth-century popularity of big-screen Shakespeare.[27] As fewer students attend theater, and particular film versions retain something close to hegemonic status in shaping a consensus public view of Shakespeare's plays, it is worth wondering whence will come the refreshingly different eye that will find a way to match this Shakespearean text and plotline with the dominant culture's purported belief in gender equity. Will it be left to YouTube? Might the digital age and niche marketing encourage only local Heros?

From my perspective, comfortably answering yes to those questions smacks less of authentic populism than of quietist acceptance of an inequitably gendered status quo in mass entertainments and an inadequately ambitious vision for the performing arts. For without a more concerted effort, in all senses, one cedes the likelihood of a large-scale progressive role for art as culturally transformative as well as entertaining. The responsibility should not be shouldered by Branagh: he has done more than enough in successfully melding Shakespearean performance with popular media (including the verse). Only those of us in academia who wish he would realize our dreams could have the audacity to consider his films the problem rather than an opportunity for analysis and the springboard for further efforts. Ultimately, his treatment of Hero is less cause than symptom: of phenomena such as studio (i.e. adult) acceptance of fourteen-year-old boys as the most valuable target audience for blockbuster filmmaking; of unconscious acceptance by (male) artists that it is the young man's perspective that must be made generally congenial; and of presuming that nobody really wants to tarry with the normative woman's story, the Hero who is neither superwoman nor rebel. If these assumptions are correct, the fault, Dear Brutus, lies not in our movie stars but in ourselves.

*

> How can we hope that through the eye and ear
> This dying sparkle in this cloudy place
> Can recollect these beams of knowledge clear
> Which were enfus'd in the first minds by grace?
>
> (Sir John Davies 1954: 475)

The legacy of centuries, we are often reminded, does not change in a generation. Even when it does – say, with the election of an African-American president – it is ethically irresponsible not to widen one's gaze beyond the stars, the charismatic trailblazers, the witty heroines. We need to look and listen to the many, aware of the norms embedded within the stories we still find it appropriate, and even pleasing, to tell. Noting the unexceptional woman's part and narrative transformation could, and can, still make some difference – revealing that the more complex work of perception and interpretation, not "just the facts," is often what matters most.

I began by alluding to a twenty-first-century scandal with obvious political resonance, in which an unexceptional woman's presence and potential agency was neither redemptive nor transformative. As instances of female collusion in acts of violence and victimization mount, the statistics continue to reveal the overwhelming normalcy of masculine dominance. Against such a daunting background, early modern fictional females and the subtleties of sense perception may seem arcane material for escapists. And yet, at the root of the most sensational current events lie the senses, and the ways they shape and are shaped by our perceptual assumptions, built on the legacies of history and the stories our societies continue to tell and perform. What we notice from the past as well as present can change, allowing new facts and stories to emerge from the darkness.

Without the "dark speaking" of Hero's story, *Much Ado About Nothing* can seem frivolous indeed, or (despite the untamed wit of Beatrice) a mere instantiation of the boy's club. But by staying herself while constantly becoming another – through voice, through placement, through signification – Shakespeare's Hero moves us to notice the unresolved problems of this comedy, including fraternal murderousness and unabated male jealousy as well as the dilemmas of sense perception. The only "solution" comes in the move to symbolic romance, through ritual removal, semiotic distancing, and, in her final reappearance, the embodiment of an unnatural perspective that is and is not. But in becoming romance, the play does not thereby forget the gendered social anxieties it has both mocked and rehearsed. It reminds us once more of what has been missing far too often. Finally, Hero speaks out – firmly, on her own terms – in the company of men. The nightmare of Her-O is over, for those who have ears to hear. The world finally comes, more humbly, to its senses. Do we need "Another Hero"? Nothing certainer.

Notes

Chapter 1

1. All references to Shakespeare in this chapter are from *The Riverside Shakespeare* (1997).
2. For a discussion of the key Aristotelian texts in which "common sensation" is treated (*De anima*, *De sensu et sensibilibus*, and *De somno et vigilia*), see Heller-Roazen (2007: 31–42).
3. This heritage includes literacies of affect promoted by the late-medieval religious movement known as the *Devotio moderna* and exemplified by the meditative protocols of Thomas à Kempis and Ignatius Loyola. See *Devotio Moderna* (1988).
4. For helpful overviews of this tradition see Kerr (2002: 134–48) and Milbank (2003: 61–137).
5. All biblical references, unless otherwise indicated, are from *The New Oxford Annotated Bible* (NRSV).
6. The sense of synesthesia available to Shakespeare's educated contemporaries would have been found in medieval and humanist commentaries on key texts of Aristotelian psychology (*De anima*, et al.), where the received orientation of the term – toward the senses' shared capacity to perceive sensation – remained in circulation. See Heller-Roazen (2007: 79–89). A helpful discussion of the medieval commentaries on synaesthesia is in Casagrandi (1990: 21–57). Important twentieth-century recuperations of synaesthesia as a common neurological and perceptual phenomenon are in McLuhan (1964) and Merleau-Ponty (2003).
7. See, for example, Smith (1999: 3–29), Folkerth (2002: 1–33), Harvey (2003: 1–21), and Paster et al. (2004: 1–20).
8. For another approach, see Febvre (1973: 12–26).
9. In addition to the above-mentioned studies addressing early modernity, a growing body of work examines the senses in later historical periods. See, for example, Corbin (1986, 1995), Starobinski (1989), Classen (1993), de Bolla (2003), Picker (2003), and Jütte (2005).
10. We do not suggest that biological *models* are not culturally shaped. To take one early modern instance, consider Helkiah Crooke's theory of hearing, which describes a functional link between empirical data about hearing (whether or not loud noises damage the ear) and the physical shape of the ear (the way in which the bones strengthen the tympan, the ridges on the outer ear). Whether biological knowledge today concurs with Crooke's morphological argument is not the point; the point is to observe how the causal premise of Crooke's model is informed by historical and cultural assumptions sedimented in Crooke's era (and not necessarily in ours).
11. As Nancy puts it, "the sense of the word *sense* traverses the five senses, the sense of direction, common sense, semantic sense, divinatory sense, sentiment, moral sense, practical sense, aesthetic sense, all the way to that

which makes possible all these senses and all these senses of 'sense,' their community and their disparity, which is not sense in any of these senses, but in the sense of that which comes to sense" (1997: 15). Nancy's phenomenology also reminds us of the differential intensities of the senses – in effect, their inherently dramatic propensity. Every sensory register, he points out, "bears with it both its simple nature and its tense, attentive, or anxious state: seeing and looking, smelling and sniffing or scenting, tasting and savouring, touching and feeling or palpating, hearing and listening" (Nancy 2007: 5).

12. For an influential account of this history, and of Montaigne's place in it, see Popkin (1979), chapters 1–3 passim.
13. See, for instance, Kiernan (1996: 68–85).
14. If Paulina repels these longings it is less because touch enables a superior form of cognition to hearing and seeing than because touch would disclose what arguably exceeds any determinative sensory content, even as this excess supplies the senses with their inner dynamic: life and movement. The data of touch stand as a sign for what lies beyond. Kissing the statue would reveal something not to be captured by the material content of Paulina's claim that "The ruddiness on her lip is wet; / You'll mar it if you kiss it, stain your own / With oily painting" (5.3.82–84).
15. There is a small cottage industry of works dealing with Montaigne's influence upon Shakespeare. But the title of Paul Yachnin's article on *The Tempest* offers a pertinent aphorism for our purposes; see "Eating Montaigne" in Grossman (2007: 157–72).
16. The phrase refers to the fundamental aims of Bacon and Tommaso Campanella to locate in the wealth of "animal sensation" the "fundamental principle of all things" (Heller-Roazen 2007: 168).
17. The estimation of Bacon's project has fluctuated from one extreme to another, as Antonio Perez-Ramos's monumental study of Bacon shows (see Perez-Ramos 1988). Lisa Jardine's work exhibits a similar historicizing impetus (see Jardine 1974). But twentieth-century scholarship has generally been divided between seeing him as a (largely failed) metaphysician or as a (only partly successful) empiricist. Karl Popper is emblematic of the former tendency, while Alfred North Whitehead exemplifies the latter. More recently, Stephen Gaukroger locates in Bacon the first comprehensive attempt to wrench natural philosophical thought from the domain of virtuous living, in order to set it on the path to understanding and reshaping natural processes. According to Gaukroger, Bacon seeks to put in place a new set of communal scientific practices through which the weakness of the senses can be countered. See Gaukroger (2001: Chapters 1 and 4).
18. Unless otherwise noted, we follow James Spedding's standard translation, which captures the nuances of Bacon's prose far better than Peter Urbach's modern rendition of the *Novum Organum* does. On occasion, we have retranslated passages to emphasize implications missed in Spedding's version. Throughout, the Latin originals are taken from Bacon (1863b).
19. Our translation.
20. That the ostensibly given facts of nature depend upon existing institutional, cultural, and mental frames to emerge *as* facts at all holds true in Bacon's texts for the related ideas of the thing and of experience as well. Desroches convincingly argues that Bacon's contribution to modern thought – and

the reason why he continues to be our contemporary – lies in his offering a *theoretical* paradigm uniting rationalism and empiricism. Bacon sees himself as having "established a true, lawful, and lasting marriage between the empirical and the rational faculties (whose sour and ill-starred divorce and separation have brought confusion to all the affairs of the human family)" (Bacon 1994: 14). Desroches suggests that we have too hastily read this "marriage" either in terms of the domination of the empirical (in both senses of the phrase), or as the domination (unrecognized by Bacon) of metaphysical reason. Rather, his "true, lawful, and lasting marriage" between empiricism and rationalism does not simply bring these two together, but self-reflexively establishes the theoretical conditions of possibility for them to be brought together.

21. Our modification of Spedding's translation.
22. To cite Desroches, "What the eye perceives here … *is not what is known*, at least scientifically. What we take on faith is only that which we see can be made known, is knowable, *not* the objectivity of the object (as it were) that presents itself in this visual moment" (2006: 141).
23. Our translation.
24. Our translation.
25. Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae Philosophorum*, 1:16, quoted in Madison (1981: 293).
26. See Madison (1981: 300–2).
27. Merleau-Ponty acknowledged a certain debt to the skeptical orientations of Montaigne and Hume; see, for example, "The Primacy of Perception and Its Philosophical Consequences" (1964: 12–42).
28. "The philosophy which unveils this chiasma of the visible and the invisible is the exact opposite of a philosophy which surveys. It plunges into the perceptible, into time, into history, toward their jointures" (Merleau-Ponty 2007: 336).
29. See also Nancy's meditation on the word in the essay "Corpus": "Being exposed, exposing: it is the skin, all the various types of skin, here and there open and turned into membranes, mucous, poured out inside of itself, or rather without either an inside or an outside, absolutely, continually passing from one to the other, always coming back to itself without either a locus or a place where it can establish a self, and so always coming back to the word, to other bodies to which it is exposed, in the same gesture that exposes them to itself" (1993: 205).
30. For a discussion of Shakespearean word-play in relation to homonymic usage in early modern English, see de Grazia (1990: 143–56).

Chapter 2

1. Quotations from Shakespeare's plays throughout are from the Oxford Shakespeare (Wells and Taylor, eds 1988).
2. While other texts typically refer to the first messenger of act 1.2 as an unnamed "Sergeant," the Oxford Shakespeare refers to him as "Captain."
3. In stressing the rational and sensible levels of the soul as well as the complex interactions of the faculties within the soul, I offer a supplemental correction to some current phenomenological readings of Shakespeare (and of

early modern affect more generally) that too strongly emphasize the material nature of the passions at the expense of these distinctions. While historical phenomenology has performed important recovery work in raising awareness about how widespread, influential, and complex theories of sensation, cognition, and affect were in the Renaissance, it also, in an effort to escape presumed "post-Cartesian" biases, has tended to undervalue the contemporary discussions of the soul, particularly its rational endowment, in favor of a materialist privileging of the body. As a result, important psychological distinctions are lost, with a corresponding loss of nuance. Katherine Rowe's intriguing reading of emotions in *Macbeth* offers a case-in-point. Written for *A Companion to Shakespeare's Works* (2003), the essay presents a historically sensitive account of "humoral self-experience" (51) and finds in Macbeth an example of an anti-Stoic strain in Shakespeare's approach to affect in the tragedies. To arrive at her reading, however, Rowe ignores distinctions between the multiple decision-making powers in early modern discussions of the soul, a word that appears in several of her long quotations from period sources but not in the body of her own text. As a result, her conclusion – "Macbeth's tyranny, surprisingly, turns out not to be a function of inconstant passions but of passions too sternly disciplined" (54) – is nearly opposite to the one the present chapter develops. An over-emphasis on materialism counters the implicit promise of historical phenomenology to eschew anachronism. I deal with this and related issues at greater length in my essay, "The View from the Interior: The New Body Scholarship in Renaissance/Early Modern Studies" (2006).

4. As H. James Jensen points out, throughout the Renaissance, this notion of understanding as the primary faculty for "distinguishing good from evil, right from wrong" is essential for apprehending Neoplatonic theories of art because such art "appeals to, and depends on, the understanding, in its most elevated sense" (1976: 10, 19).
5. Lest we think the early moderns' descriptions of sensation too convoluted or complex, even our most popular accounts dwarf theirs in length and complexity. For example, Joseph LeDoux's description of the system of physiological responses to "fear-arousing sounds" is five pages long and includes two diagrams of the sound system and its links to the thalamus, the auditory cortex, and the amygdala (2002: 120–4).
6. Jaarsma further contends that the early contrast between Banquo and Macbeth fades by act 2, and that Banquo's guilt at Duncan's murder and his exposure to evil causes him to behave more like Macbeth in his final scenes. The early contrast of the faculties of the two characters, however, remains consistent throughout. Banquo may join Macbeth in suffering insomnia, but he is never capable of Macbeth's "horrible imaginings."
7. In his discussion of what he describes as Macbeth's suicidal tendencies, Arthur Kirsch, for example, calls Macbeth's "ambition and fear" the "two emotions or drives – 'passions of the mind,' as they were called in the Renaissance – that most dominate him, usually simultaneously, and that constitute the deepest as well as the most ostensive manifestations of his self-absorption" (1984: 269).
8. In this same collection, Katherine Rowe's essay on Davenant's *Macbeth* argues that between Shakespeare's and Davenant's versions, cultural perceptions of dramatic "face-to-face" exchanges, like that between Ross and Lady Macduff, shifted from a model of "affective contagion" in Shakespeare's play to a

"more self-possessed, calibrated give and take" in Davenant's (Paster et al. 2004: 171).

9. As Jensen, drawing on Coeffeteau, explains, the "understanding generalizes and abstracts a specific action of happenstance, comparing it to abstract truth or analyzing it in itself. Some of its functions, therefore, are distinguishing good from evil, right from wrong" (1976: 10). Louis L. Martz finds the same idea in Lorenzo Scupoli's *The Spiritual Combat* (1598): "As long as the understanding remains unbiased by the passions, it will easily distinguish between truth and falsehood, between real evil masquerading as good, and real good under the false appearance of evil. However, as soon as the will is moved either to love or hatred by the object, the understanding cannot form a true estimate of it, because affection disguises it and imprints an incorrect idea" (1954: 128).
10. I borrow this useful locution, which acknowledges the close connection between bodily and mental processes, from Paster (2004: 11–12).
11. The first admonition, "beware Macduff," sounds like common sense; but more importantly, it "harp[s]" – gives "voice to" (*OED* sense 7) – Macbeth's "fear aright" and becomes a strictly affective appeal, in that the spirits refuse to answer Macbeth's aborted request for clarification, yet Macbeth accepts his first impression regardless.

Chapter 3

1. Concerning the physics of vision, Richard L. Gregory (1997: 20–2) offers an approachable account for non-scientists. Concerning the measurement of light rays in nanometers, R. W. G. Hunt (1987: 17–19) provides the same kind of user-friendly information. Concerning the workings of rods, cones, and ganglia, Leo M. Hurvich (1981: 26–39) obliges. The electrical cross-systems of the brain are currently a hot topic in cognitive science, about which Raymond W. Gibbs (2006) offers a succinct account. Still dominant in cognitive linguistics is Noam Chomsky's proposition that human brains are hardwired to translate inchoate experience into words according to universal principles of syntax. A readable assessment is offered by Ray Jackendoff (2002). The workings of diaphragm, larynx, tongue, lips, and nose in the production of speech are explained by Dennis Fry (1979).
2. Recent examples of the privileging of the visual over the verbal in Gestalt explanations of perception include Steven Lehar (2003) and Richard D. Kakia (2002).
3. See de Saussure (1960: 66). The pictograms of tree (Latin *arbor*) and horse (Latin *equus*) appear on pages 65 and 67.
4. See Derrida (1998). In de Saussure's formulations and Derrida's, the signifer is always present, even as the signified remains absent, "half way between a mental image, a concept and a psychological reality," as Umberto Eco summarizes the situation in *A Theory of Semiotics* (1976: 14–15).
5. See Gurr (1996: 81–2).
6. *Cymbeline, King of Britain*, 5.6.230–1, in William Shakespeare (Wells and Taylor, eds 2005). Further quotations from Shakespeare's scripts are taken from this edition and are cited in the text by act, scene, and line numbers.

7. The parallel instance in *The Winter's Tale*, the violent act whereby a husband attaches one set of words to the image of his wife and tries to destroy the other set, occurs much earlier in the play, in the trial scene, when Leontes' accusations have their effect and "*Hermione falls to the ground*" (3.2.146 sd). At her reappearance in the play's last scene Hermione once again provides the focal point for all the onstage characters: their looks and their words converge on her. The figure who, like a transgressor in the marketplace, implicitly bore a placard reading "Whore" becomes, in Paulina's "chapel" (5.3.86), a miracle-working statue that Paulina all but inscribes as "Saint."
8. Dessen and Thomson (1999), s.v. "fireworks," 93. See also "fire" (92–3), "lightning" (133), "squib" (212), "thunder and lightning" (230–1), and "thunderbolt" (231, incorporating *Cym.* 5.5.186 sd).
9. Donne (1633: sig. NN3v).
10. On the so-called extramission theory of vision see Lindberg (1976), pp. 10–11 (Galen), 11–15 (Euclid), 15–17 (Ptolemy) 88 (Pliny), 90 (Augustine), 159–60 (Leonardo da Vinci).
11. Cited in Katharine Park, "The Organic Soul" (1988: 470). My account of early modern theories of perception is indebted to Park's articles on the embodied soul (pp. 464–84) and the intellective soul (pp. 485–534) in that volume. See also her unpublished thesis "The Imagination in Renaissance Psychology" (1974).
12. Figure 1 in *Optics*, reproduced in Descartes (1988: 66).
13. Lomazzo (1598: sig. QQ6v). Further quotations are cited in the text by signature number.
14. Roach (1985: 27).

Chapter 4

1. See Carman and Hansen's introduction (2005: 1–25) for a survey of various accounts of Merleau-Ponty as a foil to Lacan, Derrida, and Deleuze, among others.
2. The term "historical phenomenology" was coined by Bruce Smith in "Premodern Sexualities" (2000: 320). Paster employs it in *Humoring the Body* (2004). See Adam Rzepka's genealogy and critique of the term in this volume.
3. Martin Jay argues, however, that Merleau-Ponty's attempts to provide a positive account of vision ultimately fail (1993: 306ff).
4. See Felperin (1985: 8–9), as well as Enterline (1997), Erickson (1985), and Traub (1992). For a discussion of the play that integrates a deconstructive reading of the play with an ethical vantage point derived from Levinas, see Knapp (2004).
5. Otherwise comprehensive treatments of the play that neglect 5.1 include those of Adelman (1992), Traub (1992), and O'Connell (2000). One of the best discussions of this scene is that of Gross (2001).
6. Recently the sensory overload in the final scene of *The Winter's Tale* has been seen as a possible sign of allegiance to Catholic ceremony and to the sensuousness inherent in Catholic worship. Michael O'Connell suggests that scene "presses the audience into idolatry" (2000: 141), while Phoebe Jensen (2004)

argues that the play intervenes in controversies about festivity and Marion O'Connor (2003) places the final scene within the context of iconomachy.

7. Nigel Llewellyn demonstrates that issues of representation also influenced debates around funeral monuments: "Three-dimensional visual art was especially capable of potentially deceptive verisimilitude and monuments, with their characteristic extensive polychromy, were problematic since their effigies appeared to be accurate replicas of the deceased" (2002: 246). Catherine Belsey (1999: 85–127) places the familial dynamics of *The Winter's Tale* within funerary sculpture representations.
8. For a recent discussion of performance and bodily knowledge from the perspective of embodied cognition, see Rokotnitz (2006).

Chapter 5

I would like to thank Walter Kalaidjian, Elissa Marder, and the editors of this volume for their thoughtful responses to earlier drafts of this chapter.

1. See Hirschfeld (2003) and Anderson (2006: 169–206). On the "latency" of traumatic experience, see Caruth (1995: 8–9). See also Laub's observation that trauma survivors "live not with memories of the past, but with an event that could not and did not proceed through to its completion, has no ending, attained no closure, and therefore, as far as its survivors are concerned, continues into the present and is current in every respect" (1992: 69).
2. On visuality and Marlowe's poem, see Steane (1965) and Miller (1989). Among many accounts of the sense of sight and the workings of perspective in *Lear*, see Goldberg (1984), Orgel (1984), Lupton and Reinhard (1993: 218–29), Turner (1997), and Pye (2000: 87–104).
3. For a related discussion of vertigo and poetics, see the brilliant account in Stewart (2002: 145–95).
4. In addition to the essays in Harvey's collection, such scholarship includes Nordenfalk (1985), Boyle (1998), Assaf (2005), Mazzio (2005), Rowe (1999), and Sherman (2000). Vinge (1975) offers an excellent overview of the status of touch in early modern literary, philosophical, and artistic contexts.
5. Crooke's authorities include Galen, who identified the stomach as an organ of touch "because [its] sense is most exquisite … [and] the mouth of the stomacke is wondrous sensible" as well as others who located touch in "the partes of generation."
6. On this point, see Rowe (1999: 86).
7. As Caroline Spurgeon long ago suggested, one might see "a human body in anguished movement, tugged, wrenched, beaten, pierced, stung, scourged, dislocated, flayed, gashed, scalded, tortured and finally broken on the neck" (1968: 339). For a more recent account of touch in *Lear*, see Mazzio (2003: esp. 184–5).
8. On falling and trauma as it relates to matters of language and referentiality, see Caruth (1996: 73–90) as well as Kaufman (1998), who examines Caruth's argument.
9. For an overview of critical discussions of the poem's supposedly fragmentary status, see Campbell (1984). Henry Petowe and George Chapman published continuations in 1588.

10. In this vein, Susan Stewart's Levinasian insight that "the caress does not know what it seeks" would help to explain the shifting and playful modalities of the speaker's account of Leander, in which narratological and erotic wanderings so strikingly come together (2002: 168).
11. For a classic account of Lear's protracted ending, see Booth (1983).
12. On the staging of this ambiguity, see Dessen (1975), Peat (1980), Goldberg (1984), Orgel (1984), Schleiner (1985), and Turner (1997).
13. For the argument that the text supports the staging of a real jump and fall, see Schleiner (1985), who discusses Renaissance notions of treating disturbed minds.
14. See Pye's related discussion of the scene as opening a space of fantasy that "subvert[s] the entire mechanism of empiricist apperception and the subjectivity implied by it" (2000: 92).
15. Indeed, it is perhaps this "bleeding" quality that explains why Jan Kott (1974) famously likened this scene of falling to the moment in Beckett's *Waiting for Godot* when Vladimir and Estragon attempt suicide by hanging.
16. As such, these lines may be seen to foreshadow those that Tribble discusses in which the newly revived Lear appears to find little assurance that he is alive in the fact that he "feel[s] this pin prick" (4.7.56).
17. The implied vision includes a figurative "hanging" in the form of the man who gathers seaweed "halfway down" the cliff and that is linked to the fear of a "turn[ing]" brain and a "toppl[ing] down headlong."
18. On spider webs and spiders as emblems of tactility, see Harvey (2003: 12–13) and Vinge (1975).
19. Significantly, because the object on view subtly recalls the "crows and choughs" that Edgar evokes for Gloucester at Dover, it may be read as kind of stand-in for the desire to inhabit a body akin to those imagined creatures who defy gravity by "winging the … air."
20. On this point, see Jacobus: "Without breathing, one would not acquire the sensation of inhabiting the dimensionality of either space or time. For Anzieu, breath structures the third dimension, orienting the body and giving it a sense of volume, along with a psychical 'sound-space' within which there are rumblings, echoes, and resonances" (2005: 132).

Chapter 6

1. A version of this chapter was published in *Comparative Drama* 43 (Spring 2009: 1–18).
2. See, for example, Rabkin (1967: 186, 191) for an account of readings that contrast the values of Rome and Egypt. See also Wolf (1982: 328) for a characterization of the usual way the polarity has been read: Egypt as "regenerative, hot, emotional, the center of love and overripe sexuality"; Rome as "duty, public service, military valor, reason, and policy." See Harris (1994: 409) for an account of the controversial role of gender in this polarization of the play.
3. Gillies (1994: 118).
4. Gillies (1994: 118).

5. Evans, ed., *The Riverside Shakespeare* (1974). All quotations from the play come from this edition.
6. See Freeman (1999: 443–60) for a reading of the elemental language in the play in terms of the cognitive image schemas: CONTAINER, LINKS, and PATH. Like any dichotomy, my differentiation of Rome and Egypt ultimately breaks down. Toward the end of the play, for instance, Cleopatra adopts a consciously Roman language when dealing with Caesar: "all the world, tis yours, and we / Your scutcheons and your signs of conquest" (5.2.134–5). Antony uses Egyptian and Roman language interchangeably.
7. Cunningham (1559: folio 6).
8. Raman (2002: 16) argues that a new sense of colonialist space was produced by developments in cartography and astronomy: "Out of this historical conjuncture comes a new figure: the abstract, geometrized spatial grid, itself allied with an understanding of Western reason as the universally valid form of rationality. Against the background of an ostensibly neutral and homogenous space, 'India' and the 'East' take shape as *places*, as geographical regions 'produced' by concrete practices in accordance with specific needs."
9. See Tennenhouse (1986: 146) for the idea that the play enacts a similar shift in the representation of political power, showing "that a whole way of figuring out political power has been rendered obsolete." He calls the play "an elegy for the signs and symbols which legitimated Elizabethan power."
10. Gillies (1994: 4).
11. Raman (2002: 16).
12. For the division between the "two cultures" of science and literature, see Snow (1993).
13. Donne refers in "The first Anniversary" to ways in which the "new Philosophy calls all in doubt," including erosion of belief in the elements: "the Element of fire is quite put out," replaced by "Atomies"; see John Donne, "The first Anniversary," lines 205–14, in Grierson (1912).
14. See Wilson and Keil (1999) entries on "intuitive" sciences, also called "Folk Biology," "Naïve Mathematics," "Naïve Physics," "Folk Psychology."
15. See McCloskey (1983: 122–30); Shanon (1976: 241–3); and Büttner et al. (2002) for ways in which intuitive physics resembles pre-Newtonian science. Some have argued that McCloskey and Shanon oversystematize intuitive science, but whether they do or not, it seems persuasive to me that Aristotelian science represents a rather elaborate systematization of intuitive science, however unsystematic that may be in its natural state. See Wilson and Keil (1999) for general accounts of intuitive ("naïve") sciences and the controversies over their nature.
16. See Crane (2004: 3–23).
17. Toulmin and Goodfield (1962: 85–6).
18. Toulmin and Goodfield (1962: 87). See Paster in Paster et al. (2004: 113–29) and Floyd-Wilson in the same volume (130–46) for the interaction of the human humoral system with its environment.
19. Meinel in Dear (1997: 176), and Kuhn in Dear (1997: 236).
20. Latour (1999: 170).
21. Floyd-Wilson (2003: 1–2).
22. Floyd-Wilson (2003: 47).
23. Adelman (1992: 177).

24. See Paster (1993: 23–63).
25. As Henry Harris (2002) suggests, spontaneous generation was both believed, and doubted, from antiquity until it began to be disproved in the seventeenth century, first by Francesco Redi, who demonstrated that rotten meat would not generate maggots unless exposed to flies. Aristotle wasn't clear about exactly how it worked in material terms, arguing at one point that the heat of the sun was the crucial factor, but later arguing that some form of divine "pneuma" or "psyche" was necessary for life; see Toulmin and Goodfield (1962: 88–9). Spontaneous generation is thus at the heart of questions about material change, the nature of matter, and the interrelationship of matter and spirit.
26. Nicolet (1991: 2).
27. Nicolet (1991: 20).
28. Nicolet (1991: 36).
29. Raman (2002: 90, 97).
30. See Loomba (1989: 127), who argues that "whether the fight should take place on the Roman element, the land, or Cleopatra's medium, the water, is at once a matter of military strategy and a measure of Antony's emotional and political affiliations."
31. Freeman (1999: 457–8) notes the significance of this elemental dissolution and its accompanying failure of vision in terms of cognitive image schemas.
32. Harris (1994: 417).
33. See Crane (2004: 9–10) on the fact that early modern atomic theory raised the threatening possibility that void space, or a vacuum could exist, contrary to Aristotelian teaching.
34. See, for example, Yachnin's analysis (1993: 343–63) of the disjunction between Caesar's language of command and the loyalty of followers like Dolabella.
35. Harris (1994: 417).
36. Aristotle (1991: 539a18–26).
37. Aristotle (1943: 762a19–28).
38. Quoted in Harris (2002: 5).
39. Harris (2002: 13).
40. Latour (1999: 154).

Chapter 7

1. See Mack (1951–2: 502–23).
2. On the comparison between seeing and hearing in the play, see Anderson (1991: 299–313).
3. Shakespeare (1982). All subsequent references are indicated in the body of this chapter.
4. Spelling modernized.
5. See, for example, Richard Braithwaite (1620: 4) and Alexander Ross (1620: 27, 21). As John Banister's *The Historie of Man* (1578) testifies, the privilege afforded by the eyes' physical position harks back to Galen's opinion that "the eyes must worthily in the highest place be constitute [as befits their

function], and therefore the head … be a most necessary seat unto them, in whose proper angles they are peaceably retained, and strongly munited from all extern and accidental injuries" (6v). Mary Crane (2001: 125) notes that the "image of a fortified human head, attempting to protect its cognitive machinery from outside influence … recurs throughout the play."

6. The chapters by McDowell and Marchitello articulate this normative presumption more fully. According to Mark L. Caldwell, there was a broad agreement on how the senses normally worked, even though the "differences made inevitable by the lack of universally admitted premises, the collision of contradictory classical authorities, and the obscure nature of the subject" meant that there was no shortage of controversy regarding details. See Caldwell (1979: 144–5).
7. Wright justifies this correlation by claiming that experiencing a passion is accompanied by a dilation and contraction of the heart, it being "most convenient thereto," since it is "fiery." His description reflects what Katharine Park (1988: 469) calls the "hydraulic" model underlying Renaissance psychology, namely "a clear localisation of psychological function by organ or system of organs." The printing history of *The Passions* reveals surprising connections to Shakespeare. William Webster Newbold's (1986) introduction to his edition of Thomas Wright's *The Passions of the Mind in General* notes that Wright's influential text (it underwent four editions between 1601 and 1630) was printed by Valentine Sims, "well known as the printer of five Shakespeare Quartos, including the 1603 bad quarto of *Hamlet*" (1986: 53). Moreover, the second edition was dedicated to the Earl of Southampton, the dedicatee of both *Venus and Adonis* (1593) and *The Rape of Lucrece* (1594).
8. Coeffeteau (1621: n.p.). See McDowell's chapter in this volume for a fuller discussion of Coffeteau, and especially of the roles of the other two "interior powers," imagination and memory.
9. Tiffany traces Hamlet's description of his grief to "a Protestant distrust of theater's power to present truth to the eye" (2003: 314). That Hamlet does not entirely negate *any* connection between his outward appearance and his grief within is also noted by David Hillman (in Hillman and Mazzio 1997: 91).
10. Among many others: James L. Calderwood (1983), Francis Barker (1984), Katherine Eisaman Maus (1995), and Gail Kern Paster (2004).
11. This endeavor extends Crane's line of argument in *Shakespeare's Brain* regarding the play's "contradictory accounts of the cognitive processes 'within' that result in (or prevent) purposeful action in the world" (2001: 120).
12. In *Humoring the Body*, Paster rightly notes in passing that for the early modern epoch "motions" constitute a general category comprising "movements and changes of state" (2004: 31), so that "passion is a change of state knowable *as* and also *by means of* changes, defined as broadly as possible, in the outer world" (2004: 10). But her book does not explicitly develop any further the category of movement, change or motion itself.
13. Locke's later use of the word to mean "a moving, stirring, agitation, perturbation (in a physical sense)" (see *OED*, sense 2) suggests the continued importance of corporeal movement to the idea of emotions, even as the more recognisably modern sense becomes dominant.

14. Aristotle uses *kinesis* and *metabole* interchangeably to indicate the most general concept of motion. On this nexus of movement and temporality, see Martin Heidegger (1988: 233–5).
15. In a discussion that resonates with Hamlet's advice to the players, Crooke distinguishes between the senses and mirrors, in order to refine Aristotle's definition in *De Anima* of sense as "that which can receive sensible forms without any matter." Taking issue with the implication that the senses are defined thereby only in terms of their potentia or power ("can receive"), Crooke insists that, beyond having the power to do so, the senses do "indeed and really perceive; for a glass also doth receive sensible forms without any material substance, and yet that perception is no sense" (1616: 652).
16. Thus Coeffeteau's sense of the passions as extraordinary movements, which lead the "heart beyond the bounds, which nature hath prescribed it" (1621: 18). This sentiment is echoed in Polonius's misdiagnosis of Hamlet's condition: "This is the very ecstasy of love, / Whose violent property foredoes itself / And leads the will to desperte undertakings / As of any passion under heaven / That does afflict our natures" (2.1.102–6). By contrast, Reynoldes would claim more neutrally that passions are "nothing else, but those natural, perfective and unstrained motions of the creatures unto that advancement of their natures" (1640: 31–2).
17. For the overview below, I lean heavily on Campe's argument and sources in Chapter 2 passim (1990: 119–37).
18. Nizolio (1553), cited in Campe (1990: 119).
19. Barboro (1544: 416), cited in Campe (1990: 122).
20. In Campe (1990: 122), citing Philip Melanchthon's 1540 *De Anima*.
21. As Paster argues, "[we] must be prepared to accept such reports of mind and body literally in order to track the semantic transformations that overtake bodily locutions as they slowly change from being names for material bodily phenomena such as humor, spirit, and temper to being primarily abstract figurations for the individual psychological characteristics of the disembodied self" (2004: 26).
22. The literature on this speech is vast. Essays that undertake to summarize the main points raised by earlier critics include Irving T. Richards's "The Meaning of Hamlet's Soliloquy" (1933: 741–66), and V. F. Petronella's "Hamlet's 'To be or not to be' Soliloquy" (1974: 72–88). See also Harold Jenkins's attempt to resolve the apparent contradictions in the soliloquy (1982: 490).
23. Though, of course, the suspension of this possibility is equally crucial to the speech. As Philip Fisher perceptively remarks, "The argument of 'To or not to be' proposes that all life be understood as lived within the shadow of a killing that does not take place: the killing of oneself" (1991: 45).
24. Cited in Jenkins (1982: 491). A related sentiment is voiced in *The Nicomachean Ethics*: "but he would be a sort of madman or insensitive to pain if he feared nothing, neither earthquake nor the waves, as the say the Celts do not" (Aristotle 1980: 66).
25. Crooke's *Microcosmographia* is an especially useful text because its extended "exposition of the controversies belonging to the senses and their instruments" (1616: 647) brings together the most representative and influential voices in this arena (including Aristotle, Galen, Placentius, Caspar Bauhine, John Banister, and André du Laurens).

26. Aristotle's critique of Zeno's paradoxes shows his awareness of the difficulty of specifying the nature of movement. As Friedrich Kaulbach's careful interpretation of Aristotelian movement argues, "The concept that seeks to grasp movement must likewise be mobile in order to catch up with it. It must capture movement in the situation where [movement] finds itself between limits and the overgoing of limits, between multiplicity and the continuous unity of the multiple. Movement is always in limbo" (translation mine). See Kaulbach (1965: 3).
27. Greenblatt (2001: 207–8).
28. Crane suggests that the two senses of the word became intertwined because "a 'pressing' argument was probably also 'pregnant,' or filled with matter." In her reading of *Measure for Measure*, she notes a third sense that seems to originate in Shakespeare's "conflat[ing] *pregnant* with *pregnable*, meaning 'assailable, vulnerable'" (2001: 160).
29. Fisher argues that *Hamlet* reverses the "classical" trajectory characteristic of the passions, from anger to mourning, and "At one level, the resulting paralysis is the outcome of a paradox within the passions: anger and vengeance can precede settled mourning, but cannot follow it" (1991: 45).
30. See Chambre (1660: 131). Cited in Campe (1990: 124). Compare René Descartes, *The Passions of the Soul*, I, Art. 33 (1649).
31. See Campe (1990: 123–4). See also Fisher's argument, which sees *Hamlet* as engaged in rearranging the vocabulary of the passions "so as to spell out, not some new state within the passions," but rather their "aftermath," that is, "a historical situation in which the central description of human nature no longer required the passions as one of its elements" (1991: 45–6).
32. I need hardly add that this is not the *only* function of seeing in the play. As James Schiffer suggests, the play is also deeply invested in the connections between vision and memory, particularly in the power of sight to resuscitate emotions (1995: 69).
33. Tiffany (2003: 311–13) summarizes the more than twenty direct references to the ear in the play to argue that the play's emphasis on aurality "demonstrates the cultural influence of the Reformed pastors' stress on the ear as the pathway to salvation, and of the general Protestant distrust of deceptive spectacle" (313).

Chapter 8

1. Shakespeare (1982: 1.1.24, 28, 31, 44, 56–7 and 59–61). Subsequent references are to this edition of the play.
2. Among the many important early modern treatments of the senses and the perceptual system more generally are Andreas Laurentius (1599), Thomas Wright (1604), and Helkiah Crooke (1615). Sean McDowell's chapter in this volume offers a useful discussion of early modern faculty psychology in which the proper relation and functions between sense perception and conjecture are carefully ordered and described (but which go spectacularly wrong in *Macbeth*).
3. For other important recent discussions, see Mazzio (2005: 85–105) and Paster (2004).

4. This collapse of the perceptual body – and the consequent loss of the possibility of experience altogether – results in a non-specific kind of paralysis correlated with Hamlet's inability to act (a trait identified by some readers and critics as moral in nature). *Hamlet* stands, as it were, at the opening of a long history of generalized paralysis – a history we know as alienation (in its various forms) – that seems to attend upon modernity itself.
5. This understanding of the production of knowledge has affinities with (and can be compared to) Adam Rzepka's interrogation in this volume of early modern concepts of the nature of "experience." In his discussion of Astræa's education of Artegall in Book V of Spenser's *The Faerie Queene*, for instance, he observes how experience is "not simply naturalized encounter, retrospective aggregation, or experiment," but a process that ranges among all three models. "Experience," Rzepka concludes, "is not simply had or gained, but *made*" (164).
6. Repetition, or doubling, is generally seen as a structural feature of the play. For influential discussions of *Hamlet* and repetition, see Hawkes (1985: 312–32) and Derrida (1994). For a discussion of repetition and sense perception in *Hamlet*, see Caldwell (1979: 40, 135–54).
7. For a powerful discussion of the nature of the scientific experiment as designed to produce artificial experience, see Dear (1995); see also Dear (2001), especially Chapter 7.
8. For a groundbreaking study of early modern science in general, and the use of scientific instruments (or machines) in the production of knowledge in particular, see Shapin and Schaffer (1985).
9. See especially Maus (1985). See also Schoenfeldt (1999).
10. Shapin and Schaffer (1985: 36) quote a famous passage from Thomas Birch's four volume history *The History of the Royal Society of London for the Improving of Natural Knowledge* (1756–7) that helps to illustrate Hook's understanding that scientific apparatuses "*enlarged* the senses": "his design was rather to improve and increase the distinguishing faculties of the senses, not only in order to reduce these things, which are already sensible to our organs unassisted, to number, weight, and measure, but also in order to the inlarging of the limits of their power. … Because of this, as it inlarges the empire of the senses, so it besieges and straitens the recesses of nature: and the uses of these, well plied, though but by the hands of the common soldier, will in short time force nature to yield even the most inaccessible fortress" (3.364–5).
11. See Latour's distinction between "constructivist" and "realist" conceptions of knowledge in early modernity (1993: 18). Latour offers a powerful reading of Shapin and Schaffer's book (1993: Chapter 2, esp. 15–35).
12. After a tour of the castle elaborately depicted as a body (complete with the requisite orifices for ingestion and evacuation, together with tongue and teeth, stomach and lungs, arteries and veins, etc.), Sir Guyon and Prince Arthur are admitted to the "stately Turret" (II, 9.44.8) that constitutes the brain of the castle/body and there find "three noble sages, / The wisest men … that liued in their ages" (II, 9.47.8–9): Imagination, Judgment, and Memory.
13. The Yale editors cite C. S. Lewis's identification of Maleger not as Original Sin, "but as the effects of that sin on the physical body of man: pain, sickness, death" (Spenser 1981: 1135).

14. Indeed, Old Hamlet's ear itself becomes a figure for the entire state poisoned through the (narrative) treachery of "a brother's hand" (74): "'Tis given out that, sleeping in my orchard, / A serpent stung me – so the whole ear of Denmark / Is by a forged process of my death / Rankly abus'd – but know, thou noble youth, / The serpent that did sting thy father's life / Now wears his crown" (1.5.35–40). This in fact is the first of two forgeries: the second (similarly off-stage) is Hamlet's forgery, in his father's "voice/hand," of Claudius's letter to England.
15. A brilliant reading of Hamlet's idealization of his dead father is in Adelman (1992: 24–6).
16. Shankar Raman's chapter in this volume offers a powerful discussion of the ear in *Hamlet* as that mechanism that allows for the (re)introduction into the world of the play of those "missing terms whose absence virtually drives Hamlet mad: moving, acting, becoming" (133).
17. The same faith also informs Hamlet's final invocation of the somatic response: "You that look pale and tremble at this chance, / That are but mutes or audience to this act, / Had I but time – as this fell sergeant, Death, / Is strict in his arrest – O, I could tell you – / But let it be" (5.2.339–43). This speech serves to align Hamlet with Old Hamlet, neither of whom will be permitted to tell their harrowing tale, and both of whom can be said to leave the matter of re-narration in the hands of another.
18. Or perhaps, more appropriately, because of all of these factors. For once we posit something like an interiorized subject (or a theatrical "person") for display upon the stage as an object for our entertainment, for our consideration, and for our judgment, we have then introduced the fundamental crisis of modernity: the necessary condition of subjectivity as a kind of basic – or structural – alienation. For a discussion of the idea of a "theatrical person," see Dawson (2001: 11–37).
19. Here I follow the lead of Bruno Latour on the practices of science and Peter Dear on the nature of the scientific experiment. In *Science in Action* Latour writes, "A machine, as its name implies, is first of all, a machination, a stratagem, a kind of cunning, where borrowed forces keep one another in check so that none can fly apart" (1987: 129). For a powerful consideration of the experiment and artificial experience, see Dear (2001).
20. Perhaps a word of caution is required at this point. I want to be careful not to give the impression that Hamlet pursues his revenge in anything like a systematic fashion. Indeed, this has long been understood as one of the issues at the very heart of the play: Does Hamlet pursue revenge, or is revenge something he rather falls into in the play's climactic moment? Answers to this question have given rise to the more or less conventional reading of the play in which Hamlet is seen, if not as a failed, then at least as a reluctant, avenger.
21. The passage quoted here follows from the language of Q2; both Q1 and F provide slightly different versions – and both share the "erasure" of the "I" at the center of Hamlet's proclamation. F reads, "Haste, haste me to know it, that with wings as swift / As meditation or the thoughts of love / May sweep to my revenge." In *Hamlet in Purgatory*, Stephen Greenblatt comments on this elision: "Meditation and love figure the spectacular rapidity of thought, not only the virtually instantaneous leap of the mind from here to the moon

but that leap intensified by the soul's passionate longing for God or for the beloved. It is as if the desire for haste is so intense that it erases the very person who does the desiring: the subject of the wish has literally vanished from the sentence. Yet the metaphors Hamlet uses have the strange effect of inadvertently introducing some subjective resistance into the desired immediacy, since meditation and love are experiences at a far remove from the sudden, decisive, murderous action that he wishes to invoke" (2001: 207–8).

22. This speech has led critics to consider deeply what we might call the *textuality of memory*. This work has been achieved by means of two analytical or interpretive paths that should be considered complementary in nature: criticism of a decidedly deconstructionist bent – illustrated (for example) by the work of Marjorie Garber (see "*Hamlet*: Giving Up the Ghost" in *Shakespeare's Ghost Writers*, 1987) and Jonathan Goldberg (see "Shakespearean Characters" in *Shakespeare's Hand*, 2003) – and a more explicitly historicist work on "the book of memory" as represented, for example, by Peter Stallybrass (2001: 287–316); see also Stallybrass et al. (2004: 379–419).
23. This is also the theme of Hamlet's final soliloquy, which in part reads "Now whether it be / Bestial oblivion, or some craven scruple / Of thinking too precisely on th'event – / A thought which, quarter'd, hath but one part wisdom / And ever three parts coward – I do not know / Why yet I live to say this thing's to do, / Sith I have cause, and will, and strength, and means / To do't" (4.4.39–46).
24. Perhaps this glimpse of the reconstituted smooth body – of *Hamlet Machine*, to borrow the title of Heine Müller's riff on Shakespeare's play – provides some measure of refuge from the "slings and arrows of outrageous fortune," since (as the rest of that famous speech suggests) death offers neither rescue nor release. Hamlet's machine fantasy is, in a sense, a more hopeful (because more rational) version of the "willful will-lessness" that Sean McDowell argues as being characteristic of Macbeth's clearly irrational abandonment of the system of conjecture provided by faculty psychology (2006: 22–4).
25. Dear's work is important in helping us to understand this transition, especially its relation to the experiment: "The new scientific experience of the seventeenth century established its legitimacy by rendering credible its historical reports of events, often citing witnesses. The singular experience could not be evident, but it could provide evidence" (Dear 1995: 25).
26. Hamlet's speech continues, and as it does, it makes clear the degree to which the observation of the somatic response is itself vulnerable to mere performance: "Give him heedful note; / For I mine eyes will rivet to his face, / And after we will both our judgments join / In censure of his seeming" (3.2.84–7). The obvious comparison is to Hamlet's dismissal of "actions that a man might play" in act 1: "Seems, madam? Nay, it is. I know not 'seems'" (1.2.76).
27. This is both the attraction and the dread of the automatic body: it functions with a machinic reliability and the regularity of pure mechanism, but at the same time perhaps threatens to (d)evolve into the soulless automaton that haunts the emergent culture of science in the period, from the anatomical researches that succeed in demonstrating physical structures (the fabric of the human body) but fail to locate life's animating force, to the mechanical

philosophy of Descartes and Hobbes, to the long-lived obsession with the fabrication of actual automata in ventures as diverse as garden architecture and the construction of automatic musical instruments.

Chapter 9

1. See www.shakespeares-globe.org/abouttheglobe
2. See www.shakespeares-globe.org/theatre
3. The past few decades have seen a number of efforts to historicize "experience" as a discrete concept, though these have focused almost entirely on uses and explications of the term since the mid-nineteenth century. On experience in twentieth-century philosophy and critical theory, see Martin Jay's sweeping study, *Songs of Experience: Modern American and European Variations on a Universal Theme*. See also Joan Scott's seminal indictment of experiential claims in her essay "Experience" (1992), which extends Teresa de Lauretis's suggestion, in *Alice Doesn't*, that experience is a process by which "one places oneself or is placed in social reality and so perceives and comprehends as subjective … those relations – material, economic, and interpersonal – which are in fact social, and, in a larger perspective, historical" (de Lauretis 1984: 159). Michael Pickering (1997) provides an important counter to Scott's line of critique.
4. I do not have space in this chapter to engage with Collingwood's colleague Michael Oakeshott, whose treatment of history as a modal "arrest" of experience subordinates it to idealist philosophy on the basis of its lack of automomy. In a strict sense, Collingwood shares Oakeshott's rejection of "the suggestion that we may seek in the past a pre-thinking stage of experience" (1933: 11), but his thoroughgoing attempt to link past and present experience through "acts of thought" is a markedly different project from Oakeshott's.
5. See also Carla Mazzio and Douglas Trevor's introduction to *Historicism, Psychoanalysis, and Renaissance Culture* (2000). Katherine Rowe (2003) proposes a "material phenomenology" of emotion, and Julian Yates (2003) employs a "redefined phenomenology." Each of these projects suggests some of the difficulties that accompany the transplantation of "phenomenology" from its philosophical context.
6. The naturalized signification of experience by the signs of old age can also be registered in cases of their unnatural disjunction: thus King Henry, in *The Second Part of Henry the Sixth*, notes the newly rebellious Earl of Salisbury's "frosty head" and asks, "art thou old and want'st experience? / … For shame in duty bend thy knee to me, / That bows unto the grave with mickle age" (5.1.169–72).
7. Foucault opposes *commentaire* to *critique*, whose emergence he dubiously places at the turn of the seventeenth century. In the mode of *critique*, "discourse becomes in turn an object of language … one no longer attempts to uncover the great enigmatic statement that lies hidden beneath its signs; one asks how it functions" (1970: 80). Handbook writers like Southerne, of course, are doing neither; they assume the transparency of the relationship between things and signs, but also insist on the insufficiency of discourse

when it is too far removed from physical encounters with the objects or substances in question.

8. This is already clear not only in the primary meaning but also in the etymology of *experientia*: the conjunction of *ex* and *peri* suggests the active establishment of the circumferential limits of knowledge, but the fact that the root here is shared not only by "experiment" but also "peril" (Latin *periculum*) entails the more precise connotation of a risky transgression of those limits.
9. "Experiment" is itself in occasional use in the sixteenth century, and it remains distinguishable from "experience" to some degree. Hugh Platt's 1594 catalog of new inventions, *The jewell house of art and nature*, refers on its title page to "sundry new experimentes … set downe, according to the authors owne experience." More often, however, "experience" derives a rich ambiguity from a mixture of the two senses.
10. It is true, of course, that many works of instruction and advice in the period depended mostly or entirely upon the collection and organization of authoritative sources and commonplaces, and I certainly don't mean to suggest that the older sense of experience as common knowledge was not active in such works. It should also be noted that the threshold between experience and experiment that interests Dear involves the application of mathematically formal measurement and recording to discrete experiences, and that sixteenth-century handbooks are sufficiently interested neither in systematic record-keeping nor (for the most part) in mathematics to qualify as "experimental" in this narrower sense.
11. The ferocity of Artegall's justice is easy to miss in this stanza, partly because of the ambiguous phrasing of "with rigour to dispense" but primarily because of the emphasis on balance and equity. By the middle of the next stanza, however, we are told that "wilde beasts did feare [Artegall's] awfull sight, / And men admyr'd his overruling might; / Ne any liu'd on ground, that durst withstand / His dreadfull heart, much lesse him match in fight, / Or bide the horror of his wreakfull hand, / When so he list in wrath lift vp his steely brand" (V.I.8).
12. Lindsay's *Dialogue* went through at least seven editions. The last three, printed in London between 1566 and 1581, were purged of the vernacular "Scottish tung" that Lindsay defends in the section entitled "Ane exclamatioun to The Redar, Twycheyng the wryttyng of Vulgare, and Maternall Language" and "made perfit Englishe." The relationship between claims to experience, the rise of the vernacular, and various reforming projects is particularly complex in Lindsay's case, partly because of the tripartite opposition of Latin, Scottish, and English, but also because the broad sweep of his targets makes his agenda difficult to classify.
13. It must at least be noted that this conjunction of nature and artifice often goes by the name "pastoral," though I am hesitant to open even a modest window onto what has been a vast and complex critical conversation about the lineaments of this genre. The sense that that the pastoral mode, in its stylized evocations of a simplified natural life, "has an affinity for paradox" (as Louis Montrose puts it) or that it expresses "a double longing after innocence" (for Renato Poggioli) certainly speaks to one of the key aspects of the naturalized scene of experience as I describe it here (Montrose 1983: 452;

Poggioli 1975: 1). It is also probable that work like Raymond Williams's *The Country and the City* (1973) stands to illuminate the sociopolitical stakes of late sixteenth-century appeals to experience. In general, however, the happy, bucolic landscapes of leisure that Elizabethan pastoral in particular is interested in rendering differ significantly from the zones in which "experience" is encountered, whether those zones are meant to enable powerful revelation, risky experiment, or initiation into a view of the world's "miserabyll estait."

14. Lindsay's Prologue, which immediately precedes this scene, is riven by ambivalence about whether the comfort offered by the park is natural, artificial, or somehow both. The courtier begins with a rhapsodic account of its beauty, but this only leads him into a rejection of the ornate classical tropes through which he is attempting to describe it.
15. This scene translates into fully theatrical practice an anxiety that Shakespeare relegates to an apologetic Prologue in *The Life of King Henry V*, where a chorus laments the insufficiency of the "unworthy scaffold" of the stage for a drama of national scope and wishes it had "A kingdom for a stage, princes to act" (Prologue: 3). In *Cymbeline*, the "savage hold" or "rude place" (3.6.65) of the Welsh cave doubles as a court (if not the extended kingdom that a court symbolizes) by virtue of its representational bareness rather than in spite of it. Two of the denizens of this rude place, of course, are princes who, despite an upbringing far from court, act like themselves.
16. The early modern function of the theater as a template for an all-encompassing knowledge of the world (a *theatrum mundi*) extended well beyond the commonplace that Jaques cites. William N. West has shown the close interdependence of the figure of the theater and the pursuit of encyclopedic knowledge in the period – an interdependence, he suggests, that was capable of "producing new experiences" and "new possibilities of experience" (West 2002: 110). West's study picks up in places on Frances Yates's groundbreaking exploration, in *The Art of Memory* (1999), of theatrical mnemonic devices, some of which also aspired to stage the underlying symbolic structure of the universe.
17. Frank Ankersmit calls this ambivalent investment in the past "sublime historical experience," and argues that such experience constitutes a moment in all historiographical practice that precedes and remains autonomous from arguments about historical truth or causality (2005: 14–15). "The sublimity of historical experience," he writes, "originates from this paradoxical union of the feelings of loss and love, that is, of the combination of pain and pleasure in how we relate to the past" (2005: 9). The ensuing attempt to justify and explicate this state of mind as "the nature and origin of historical consciousness" goes far beyond the limited scope of my inquiry here, which aims to inform historiographical uses of "experience" in early modern studies with a preliminary archeology of the term's early modern uses.
18. The tendency for some version of unmediated experience to intrude on even the most vehement and prominent exhortations to "historicize" is symptomatic of this recursive resistence. Thus Stephen Greenblatt's ringing denunciation, in 1990, of the transhistorical assumptions of psychoanalytic interpretation in favor of "multiple, complex, refractory" histories comes to rest on "intimations of an obscure link between these distant events and

the way we are." What is now obscured but still available is our "experience of the past" (1990: 217–18). Greenblatt is, in fact, almost as well known for his repeated insistence on the importance of this "experience of the past" in a broad sense as he is for barring such transhistorical communions from the realm of method. His Presidential Address at the 2002 conference of the Modern Language Association defined the "ethos of the profession as a whole" in terms of a "dream of contact" ("attempts at contact," "experiences of contact," "intense, directly personal contact") that punctuates and extends what might otherwise be an unbearable alienation from historical subjects who "have long since vanished into dust."

Chapter 10

1. Pepys would see the play a total of eight times. See Pepys (1976).
2. Unless otherwise indicated, all references to Pepys's diary are from Volume 9 of Latham and Matthews's edition (1976).
3. The phrase "bodily hexis" is Pierre Bourdieu's, defined in *Outline of a Theory of Practice* as "political mythology realized, *em-bodied*, turned into a permanent disposition, a durable manner of standing, speaking, and thereby of *feeling* and thinking" (1977: 93, italics original).
4. The performative quality of Pepys's diary is described by Berger (1998: 557–91).
5. All citations to *The Tempest* are taken from the Arden 3 edition (Shakespeare 2003).
6. Michael Neill (2008: 36–59) writes that Shakespeare's *Tempest* possesses a "soundtrack" that not only asserts "the superiority of the aural tradition," but also crucially contributes to the meaning of the play.
7. See Smith (1999), Folkerth (2002), and Bloom (2007).
8. *The Tempest*'s hybridization of comedy and vengeance is, of course, not unique: revenge tragedy's dark humor and comedy's violence are widely recognized. What distinguishes *The Tempest* from these other plays is the degree to which it self-consciously critiques the generic bifurcation of competing modes of hearing in order to introduce a new model of theatrical reception.
9. Citing the Old Testament commandment against the worship of "any graven image" (Exodus 20:4), Protestant reformers rejected the elaborate visual culture of Catholicism in favor of the word. Due to relatively low literacy rates, this shift entailed a privileging of audition and the creation of what Bryan Crockett terms a "cult of the ear" (1995: 56). See also Fox (2000). The attention to hearing does not mean that vision was neglected: on the continued importance of the visual in Protestant culture, see Crawford (2005, esp. 7–9 and 190 n. 21).
10. Numerous anatomy texts use the phrasing I quote here. See Vicary (1548: 35), Crooke (1615: 696 and passim), and Paré (1634: 172).
11. Hearing was a "vital sense" in that it was considered crucial for salvation. For more on early modern sermons, particularly those on the parable of the sower, and their instructional interest in audition, see Crockett (1995: passim), Smith (1999: 261–9), Folkerth (2002, passim), Green (2005: 53–74), and Bloom

(2007: 112–17). On the centrality of hearing in Protestant culture and the development of what she terms "aural theater," see Tiffany (2003: 307–24).

12. Crooke writes that the auditory canal protects the inner ear from "a *vehement* and violent noyse such as the shooting of ordenance, thunder & such like" (1615: 588, italics mine). The word "vehement" as quoted here refers to the relative strength of a noise's volume, but "vehement" also means "Intense, severe; rising to a high degree or pitch" (*OED*, "vehement, *a*," I.1).
13. Vaughan and Vaughan gloss this line as "a metaphor of forced feeding" (Shakespeare 2003: 191 nn. 107–8).
14. See Cutts (1958: 347–58), Coletti (1974: 185–99), and Neill (2008: 49).
15. Even music is unreliable. When Caliban tells the shipwrecked seamen that "The isle is full of noises, / Sounds and sweet airs that give delight and hurt not," he is correcting their emotional, and perhaps physical, response to the island's soundtrack; they should be "delighted" by these airs as though by the music of the spheres, but instead they are terrified (3.2.135–6).
16. On this point see Crockett (1995) and Folkerth (2002).
17. Citations to *Hamlet* are taken from the Arden edition (Thompson and Taylor, eds 2006).
18. *The Tempest*, like *The Winter's Tale*, *Pericles*, and *Cymbeline*, is alternatively labeled a romance, tragicomedy, tragicomic romance, or simply a "late play." For a history of this generic trouble, see Mowat (2005: 129–49).
19. Vaughan and Vaughan (2003: 186 n. 20) gloss this line with a quote from the *OED* – "The English name for the German thaler, a large silver coin" – and explain Sebastian's willful misunderstanding of "entertainer" as "paid performer."
20. Vaughan and Vaughan (2003: 186, n.10) claim that this "sarcastic badinage" begins as a private exchange, but that after line 13 in the text, "they clearly mean to be overheard." I suggest instead that the lines are spoken for two onstage audiences simultaneously from the very beginning of this scene.
21. This critical tradition extends as far back as the nineteenth century, if not earlier. Thomas Campbell wrote in 1838 that Prospero is a "hero" who "typifies" Shakespeare (quoted in Neill 2008: 59, n.57). For an important recent response see Barker and Hulme (2002: 195–209).
22. Maus (1982) sees in Prospero a model for a newly limited, yet still necessary, fantasy of patriarchal kingship; Dobson (1992), building on Maus, reads the Restoration Prospero as a model "not just of father-kings but the authority of fathers *tout court*" (43). Belsey (1985) reads Prospero as a liberal humanist subject for whom knowledge "is a property of the subject and a legitimate source of dominion" (81).
23. All citations to Dryden and Davenant's play are taken from *The Tempest, or The Enchanted Island*, in Novak and Guffey (1970: X, 1–104).
24. According to Maus, Prospero is "kin to the neurotic and domineering father of a farce" (1982: 196).
25. It is also preordained. Part of Prospero's motivation in keeping Hippolito separate from Miranda and Dorinda is that Hippolito's horoscope has predicted disaster if ever he encounters a woman.
26. Pepys (1976: vol. 8, 521–2). It is not "an old play of Shakespeares," in fact, but the Dryden and Davenant revision that Pepys saw and heard performed.

27. Whether Thomas Shadwell wrote the operatic *Tempest* is a matter of debate. The attribution originates in John Downes's 1708 *Roscius Anglicanus*, which claims the play was "made into an opera by Mr. Shadwell." See Downes (1968: 34).
28. On Pepys's musical training, talent, and aspirations, see vol. 10 of *The Diary of Samuel Pepys* (1976: 258–82).
29. According to Latham and Matthews, the word "tune" is inserted: the original line seems to have stated, "this day, I took pleasure to learn the Seamens dance – which I have much desired to be perfect in, and have made myself so." Whether Pepys already knew the words to the song and had only just learned the tune, or he had learned "this day" the tune but had yet to memorize the words, is unclear. Either way, Pepys here draws a distinction between words and music that reveals something interesting about how he heard both.
30. That tastes are socially significant and at the same time preconditioned by class structures is argued by Bourdieu (2000).
31. Hume is drawing on and revising earlier empiricist work by, among others, John Locke. See Belsey (1985: 79–81).

Chapter 11

1. All citations refer to F. H. Mares's 1998 Cambridge edition unless otherwise noted.
2. Sontag (2004) echoes early modern theorists' worries about the gaps and potential discord between sight and the word, discussed by Bruce Smith in this volume; see also the essays by Judith Butler and others in *PMLA* 120(3), reflecting upon Sontag's 2003 *Regarding the Pain of Others*. When sentenced to three years in military prison, Lynndie England declared of her participation in acts of torture devised by her erstwhile boyfriend: "All I did was what I was told to do" (Buruma 2008: 10).
3. Gay (2001: 70) believes the play "achieves its conservative victory also by flattering the audience's intelligence, encouraging us to despise the callow foolishness of the conventional Claudio (and to a lesser extent, of Hero)" and to identify with Beatrice and Benedick instead. This essay challenges the conclusion that the text merely flatters its audience. In the wake of her feminist and subsequent queer analysis, we may no longer wish to presume a match between heterosexual "couples" – forcing Hero to become a callow fool by association. Beatrice, that universally acknowledged wit, stands by her cousin with zeal hard to imagine were this true. Berger and Cook have produced the most influential considerations of Hero's role. My analysis parts company with Berger's regarding her relationship with Beatrice; reaching his speculative zenith in analyzing Hero's 3.1 epic simile, he asserts that "Beatrice is the rebellious favorite" in order to cast Hero as the gender traitor working on behalf of the Messinan Men's Club (2001: 18–19). By keeping Hero's multiplicity focal (versus reducing her to one function, or a "cipher" as Cook does), we may view even her cipher-like "nothingness" differently: after all, dramatic characterization is crucially about change, in either behavior or perception. Nevertheless, these essays paved the way of attending to gendered societal structures of *Much Ado*. More recently, Clayton (2002) and

Reiff (2004) have argued for a virtuous, intelligent Hero – within a realist framework whose sufficiency this chapter contests.

4. See Smith (1999: passim) on listening as well as sound; also Folkerth (2002: 18) and the Gospels and Pauline scriptures; in this volume, see especially Deutermann's helpful delineation of the contrary functions and agency attributed to the ear.
5. While the current shelf-life of literary studies makes citing this decades-old deconstructive essay seem itself a bit like raising the dead, the challenges set out by that project have not disappeared, nor has the influence of such readings diminished – despite the odd diminishment of their contribution to Shakespeare studies. See, for example, McDonald's claim when surveying recent theoretical approaches that "deconstruction *per se* made little impact on Shakespeare studies … thus a separate section [on it] seems unearned" (2004: xiii). The 1997 and 2001 reprinting of Berger's skeptical – if not cynical – 1982 take on *Much Ado*'s sexual politics testifies to the ongoing impact of a certain type of reading-against-the-grain informed by deconstructive and psychoanalytic practice that does not go far *enough* in analyzing the characterological premises and gendered hierarchies with which it toys.
6. See Mares's often excellent introduction (Shakespeare 1998: 35). It takes only Hero's dialogue with Don Pedro for Berger to transform her initial quietness into a false appearance ("Hero *peels off her mask* of soft, sweet silence") and claim thereby that "*we suddenly see* why the Prince's bastard brother had called her a 'very forward March-chick'" (Berger 2001: 15, italics mine).
7. One can also posit a more complex naturalistically conceived character in Hero's 3.1 tongue-lashing of Beatrice, as the good girl gets her own back (I cite two performances making the most of this "revenge" below). But my emphasis here is to present an alternative to psychological realism as the normative "solution" to this interpretive challenge.
8. Folkerth (2002: 35ff) draws attention to the early modern phrase "the public ear" and its displacement in modern culture by the public eye: in Hero's case, both are involved.
9. This truly odd simile raises questions akin to those Gallagher (1995) explores in examining Gertrude's description of Ophelia's death. Its overdetermination provides further grounds for pursuing the symbolic resonances of Hero's representation – i.e. for the direction of this chapter's next sections. Are our voices our own? No more or less than our eyes.
10. The one exception should have strengthened Claudio's faith: we do not hear what she says in his ear in act 2, but he does – and confirms Beatrice's interpretation that it is love.
11. See Deutermann in this volume on Shakespeare's use and complication of generic assumptions in *The Tempest* related to hearing, as linked with revenge tragedy and city comedy. Notably, even as *Much Ado* sparkles with wit and play, it is framed by a would-be fraternal revenge tragedy and is located squarely within a single town (even if far from a Jonsonian city).
12. Obviously "something" happened involving Margaret and Borachio, Hero's absence being its enabling condition.
13. Had Shakespeare wished, he could alternatively have borrowed the name Ginevra from another possible source story, in Ariosto's *Orlando Furioso*.

14. And beyond: after "fully many years" as lovers who "lived in fame," they are metamorphosed into pine trees, "Whose nature's such, the female pine will die / Unless the male be ever planted by" (in Marlowe 1979: 110).
15. See Shakespeare's sonnet 136, where he argues that "Among a number one is counted none" and thus "For nothing hold me, so it please thee hold / That nothing me." The logic – and appeal to "Will" – flouts cultural assumptions about chastity (see "Shakespeare's Will" in Fineman 1991). On the one as a unit distinct from number, see Raman (2008). Summers claims of Marlowe's poem that "The poignancy of Hero's predicament results from her particular vulnerability as a sexually responsive woman in a patriarchal society that applies a sexual double standard" (2000: 143–4). Although, like Cahill in this volume, Summers detects less flippancy in Marlowe's poem than do I, his reading (juxtaposed with Shakespeare's act 4) illustrates the dilemma of *any* Hero's position, with *or* "without the sweet society of men."
16. *As You Like It* famously quotes half the couplet cited herein, and Benedick explicitly recalls the legend (though not which version) when trying to compose a love poem: he proclaims that "Leander the good swimmer" was no more in love than he (5.2.23). Marlowe's comic sequence wherein Hero blushes and hopes Leander will address his "saint" echoes when Romeo meets Juliet (which likewise includes a notable nurse, and demonstrates that the differentiation between comic and tragic romance can be fine indeed).
17. I explicitly echo McDowell's terms elsewhere in this volume to illustrate the parallelism with his reading of *Macbeth*'s likely impact for an early modern audience shaped by the sensory complexity of faculty psychology.
18. Don Pedro tells Leonato (not listening to his own line break), that while his "heart" is sorry for Hero's death, "she was charged with nothing / But what was true, and very full of proof" (5.1.103–4).
19. "The Sound of *O* in *Othello*: The Real of the Tragedy of Desire," in Fineman (1999: 143–64).
20. Indeed, much of the fifth act reinforces the importance of this resurrection, including the notoriously strange intensity of Leonato's and Antonio's emotions at its start.
21. For more on the need for methodological attention to process in writing about Shakespearean performance, see Henderson (2006). I applaud Russell Jackson's sharing his sense of the process working on Branagh's films, even when the recorded rationales do not seem to me adequate.
22. On Branagh's populism and its limitations, see Lehmann (1998); a revised version appears in *Shakespeare Remains* (Lehmann 2002).
23. In fact, several stage productions (following Berlioz's opera) have, like Branagh, added a tableau at Hero's window. Michael Langham's 1961 production even used the actress playing Hero in it, creating a corporeal "every man's Hero" and making something out of nothing more thoroughly than the slanders of Don John and Borachio ever could. This indicates that the pattern derives less from adaptation to a more visually centered medium than from discontent with the story and characterization itself – on this point, Branagh is refreshingly direct.
24. Crucial to this shift (and the conclusion's ideological import) is Denzel Washington's winning performance as Don Pedro: because he appears both

restrained and reasonable in supporting Claudio's view and sharing his vision, their susceptibility to "mistaking" seems more than the product of a youthful character's passion – yet (just as crucially) less than a comment on a flawed masculine hierarchy that perceives selectively.

25. For example, Garrick cut over thirty lines of the women's pre-wedding scene and William Oxberry, Charles Kean, and Henry Irving removed it entirely.
26. Sheppard (2005) generalizes that the songs in Shakespeare no longer register for watchers. Perhaps the lyrics don't initially affect her students; but as with popular music, popular films are often experienced repeatedly, and for repeat viewers the relentless repetition of Doyle's melodic lines (and the foregrounded words of "Sigh no more") give weight to both songs' lyrics and emotive effects. So does the contrast with Benedick's inept lyricizing.
27. The radically modernized recent BBC versions, like many spinoffs, do not capture enough of the textual and sense-related specificity I am highlighting to illustrate these particular perception problems. They may, however, illuminate Hero and her kin in welcome new ways.

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