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Think Tanks and Power in Foreign Policy

A Comparative Study of the Role and Influence of the Council on Foreign Relations and the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1939-1945

Inderjeet Parmar



Think Tanks and Power in Foreign Policy

Also by Inderjeet Parmar

SPECIAL INTERESTS, THE STATE AND THE ANGLO-AMERICAN ALLIANCE, 1939–1945

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Inderjeet Parmar
Senior Lecturer, Department of Government
University of Manchester, UK

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Part 1

1
Introduction

The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and the Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA) were initiated at a series of unofficial meetings in Paris in 1919. Their aims were identical. They were supposed to be two branches of one institute of international affairs. They went on to become the most important, respected, 'influential' and prestigious organisations for the continuous study of foreign affairs in their respective nations. They publish highly respected quarterly reviews, *Foreign Affairs* (CFR) and *International Affairs* (RIIA). They were consulted by officials who make foreign policy in regard to international treaties and conferences in the interwar years and mobilised for war in 1938 and 1939. They played key roles in advance preparation and planning for the postwar world order. They were, and are, core components of their respective nations' foreign policy establishments and, some would claim, of an Anglo-American establishment. They are part of an elite network that connects corporate wealth, universities, philanthropic foundations, and official policymakers (Shoup and Minter, 1977; Schulzinger, 1984; Wala, 1994; Parmar, 1995b, 1999b, 2001).

In the short period between the two world wars, the official perception of RIIA (also known as Chatham House) underwent radical change. From being seen as an outsider trying to 'muscle in' to what was considered the private domain of the Foreign Office, Britain's foreign policy and relations, Chatham House, by 1939, was seen as a vital national institution, part of which became incorporated into the official machinery of that very Office (Dockrill, 1980). Similarly, the Council was also integrated into the State Department once war broke out in Europe, two years prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Chatham House was founded by, and attracted, some of the most active and important figures – political, intellectual and other – of the interwar years. Arnold Toynbee, the eminent

historian, was its Director of Studies; Lionel Curtis, the founder of Chatham House, and nicknamed 'the Prophet', was one of the most energetic activists of his generation, a 'fixer' working behind the scenes, the mobiliser of men and money; and Lord Lothian (formerly Philip Kerr), who was appointed British ambassador to the United States in 1939. The Council on Foreign Relations also attracted the support and participation of several of the 'best and brightest' of the interwar generation: men such as Hamilton Fish Armstrong, editor of *Foreign Affairs*; Isaiah Bowman, President of Johns Hopkins University and leading geographer; Norman H. Davis, banker, confidant and adviser to President Franklin Roosevelt and Secretary of State, Cordell Hull; Thomas W. Lamont, leading partner of JP Morgan and Co., and Anglophile; and Russell C. Leffingwell, managing partner of JP Morgan. Both think tanks sought and attracted experts with experience, academics who could analyse and study practical affairs and provide 'useful knowledge' which policymakers might use as the basis of policy decisions (Schulzinger, 1984).

Both organisations also sought to enlighten and educate public and policymakers alike, establishing regional committees (CFR) and regional branches (RIIA) to spread the word beyond New York and London respectively. They worked in the universities to establish international relations as an established discipline and to provide students with practical knowledge in order to come to a more 'mature' understanding of the national interest and foreign relations. Both were generously funded by the Carnegie and Rockefeller foundations (Berman, 1983; Parmar, 1992, 1999b, 2002b).

As influential private organisations in liberal-democratic societies, the CFR and RIIA raise a whole host of interesting and controversial questions. In democracies, the 'people' rule: the CFR–RIIA, on the other hand, drew their members and leaders from social and economic elites, and their rationale and raison d'etre from 'scientific' expertise, privileged knowledge. Democracy values openness: the Council and Chatham House, however, operated in secret or semi-secret 'behind-the-scenes'. Democracy values an egalitarian spirit and extols the peoples' virtues; the think tanks' leaders held deep reservations, if not fears, as to the capacities of the masses. Inevitably, the CFR and RIIA have faced accusations of unrepresentativeness and elitism, and of subverting democracy in the interests of big business which wanted to ensure a postwar world order safe for capitalism and Anglo-American domination (Quigley, 1981; Marrs, 2000). Such concerns about the activities of the CFR and RIIA reflect deep worries about the nature of 'Anglo-American' democracy, the role of economic elites and 'experts', and about the role of the state in society. There is

a feeling that somehow such concentrations of elites and experts – minorities in society – in, what are meant to be, democratic and egalitarian social orders, subvert the power of the people. This is especially the case in regard to the United States, but not exclusively so. The argument is that, despite regular elections and changes of government, certain elites seem to remain close to the principal centres of decision-making. That is, they are part of an establishment of power that operates regardless of electoral outcomes and popular wishes and aspirations.

Originating as a term used by the journalist Henry Fairlie about 1950s Britain, 'the establishment' has equally been claimed to exist in the United States, and the CFR is often mentioned as its most important expression. To Fairlie, the establishment is made up of men who know one another; 'who share assumptions so deep that they do not need to be articulated; and who contrive to wield power outside the constitutional or political forms: the power to put a stop to things they disapprove of, to promote the men they regard as reliable, and to block the unreliable; the power, in a word, to preserve the *status quo*'. Included in this are bankers from Wall Street and the City of London, public officials, editors of the most important newspapers, and the leaders of the main political parties. 'The true establishment man prided himself on his bipartisanship, his ability to get on with and work with right-minded fellows of either party' (Hodgson, 1972–73, pp. 4–5). For Godfrey Hodgson, a keen academic observer of the American foreign policy establishment, an establishment may be defined by 'a history, a policy, an aspiration, an instinct, and a technique'; a definition that serves pretty well in this particular study though, it should be noted, that its *sociology* is also of the utmost importance (Hodgson, 1972–73, p. 8; Holland, 1991; Roberts, 1992). Of special interest in regard to the sociological aspects of the establishments in Britain and America – as represented by the CFR and RIIA – is the extent of their permeability, their 'willingness to absorb' men with 'the wrong family pedigree'. According to Max Holland, its openness is 'the genius of the American Establishment, if not America itself . . .' (Holland, 1991, p. 26). Kai Bird has capably chronicled the life and role of an excellent example of such openness, John J. McCloy, a man widely regarded as the 'Chairman of the Establishment' (Bird, 2000). The openness, or otherwise, of the British Establishment is one of the key concerns of the present study (Chapter 2, in particular) (Watt, 1965, p. 1).

Those are the broader issues – the roles of elites or an 'establishment' in democratic societies – that this book seeks to address through examining the membership, leadership, world-view and activities of the CFR and RIIA from their founding but particularly during the Second World War.

War has proved to be the making of the two organisations; hence the focus of this study. They emerged from the trauma of the Great War and 'came of age' during the War of 1939–45. Of course, the Second World War fundamentally altered the structure of world power, as the United States rose to globalism and Britain became increasingly reliant on the United States and the so-called 'special relationship'. In so doing, each state had had to deal with the previous status quo: isolationism and imperialism, respectively. Clearly, 'isolationism' and 'imperialism' were long-lived elements of the political and cultural life of the two countries, and consequently generated values, institutions, and interests that had a vested interest in their maintenance. In Britain and the United States, there were broad sections of public opinion, the press, powerful elements in the main political parties and in Congress and Parliament, not to mention sections of industry, finance and commerce, that were wedded to imperialist or isolationist orientations. The Council and Chatham House each played a key role in criticising and undermining the political and ideological bases of the 'old' order and fostering the intellectual and political bases of the 'new'. War created the context within which the CFR and RIIA could be mobilised to serve the state and to help generate and consolidate the foreign policy 'thinking' – within and without the state apparatus – that would underpin the postwar new world order. That is, the changing structure of world power alone did not and could not 'determine' what postwar US and British foreign policy looked like: organisations of conviction-led men (and a small number of women), with a vision of world order and the willingness and ability to act, were fundamental to the transitions that both countries went through. The CFR and Chatham House, as key elements of the establishment in their respective countries, it is argued here, played significant roles in the transition.

This study is comparative, in two senses: first, it seeks directly to compare the organisations' membership, leadership and world-views, and their relations with their respective states and foreign policy establishments. In addition, this study compares the roles and influence on policymaking and public opinion mobilisation of the 'think tanks' (Denham and Garnett, 1998). Clearly, the fact that they were founded at the same time at joint meetings of British and American delegates to the Paris Peace conferences, with identical aims and objectives, makes the two bodies ideal for comparative analysis (Bosco and Navari, 1994, p. 9).[1] It may be possible then not only to decide which political system was more responsive or open to outside 'pressure' or intervention, which group was better organised, funded, and effective, but also to consider the view

that the United States is 'exceptional' – qualitatively different – and subject to factors alien to European societies, including Britain. It is often argued that think tanks are a 'quintessentially American' phenomenon, a claim challenged by the present analysis (Denham and Garnett, 1998, p. 4). According to Seymour Martin Lipset, America's revolutionary origins, 'the absence of feudal structures, monarchies and aristocracies', led to a creed peculiarly American: wedded to 'liberty, egalitarianism, individualism, populism, and laissez-faire'. The United States, therefore, failed to develop a socially hierarchical society, a populace deferential to authority, or a strong centralised state (Lipset, 1996, pp. 18–19). The exceptionalist thesis implies that American and British politics may be arranged along a series of polarities: as featuring, respectively, a weak state/strong state; strong Congress/weaker Parliament; individualism/group consciousness; egalitarian America/elitist Britain; public opinion power/deference to elites and authority. There are a number of interesting predictions that result from this thesis that will be explored in the present study: *that the CFR would have greater opportunities for access to and influence over foreign policy decision-making as the American state is relatively weak and dispersed; that public opinion is of far greater consequence in the USA than in Britain, and therefore to the CFR; that the CFR would be more egalitarian and meritocratic in composition, outlook and behaviour than Chatham House*.

The study is comparative also in a second sense: it seeks to compare the historical evidence of the activities of the CFR and Chatham House with political science theories of power and policymaking (pluralism, instrumental Marxism, statism, Gramscian and the corporatist school of US foreign relations history). Overall, therefore, this study aims to provide a historical outline of the activities of two important elite organisations, in order to compare them with each other in regard to their policymaking and opinion-mobilisation roles, and to compare the evidence with competing theories of political power in democratic societies.

Why bother with theory at all? What is its purpose? There are those who suggest that the 'facts speak for themselves' and therefore theory is unnecessary, and even damaging because it predisposes the scholar only to look for those facts that 'prove' the theory. To be sure, that is a danger in any scholarly pursuit. Several decades ago, the historian, E.H. Carr, dismissed the 'empiricism' of the English-speaking countries that upheld the idea of 'objective history'. Facts, Carr argued, do not speak for themselves: 'The facts speak only when the historian calls on them: it is he who decides to which facts to give the floor, and in what order or context' (Carr, 1987, p. 11). Our picture of the past, Carr continues, 'has been preselected and predetermined for us, not so much by accident as by

people who were consciously or unconsciously imbued with a particular view and thought the facts which supported that view worth preserving' (Carr, 1987, p. 13; Cox, 2000). The argument of the present study is that testing several competing theories can help overcome the problem, as one is less likely to be predisposed to theories that often fundamentally contradict one another. In that way, it may be possible to take a much more comprehensive view of the historical evidence and to extend the boundaries of the kinds of evidence that might be considered relevant to the study. That is, different perspectives generate different questions and emphasise the relevance, or centrality, of specific 'facts' or kinds of evidence. Clearly, it is unlikely that the scholar operating without a theory is actually doing so. Such a scholar will ask questions and address issues according to some criteria of significance, having determined what is relevant and important and what is not. In the face of a huge quantity of historical (or other empirical) evidence, selection must be made as to what constitutes relevant and significant and what does not. The consequence of this is that the atheoretical scholar will be operating with a set of value judgements that derive from a covert 'theory' or 'understanding' about the nature of society, of power, of a liberal-democratic state, the nature of interest groups, public opinion, and so on. Operating without theory may, in practice, merely mean the unconscious, and unquestioned, importation into research of 'conventional wisdom', based on assumptions that might be somewhat dubious.[2] The present study seeks to test rival theories against the evidence and to consider the case for a new theory based on synthesis of aspects of existing theories.

How will the theories be tested? From each theory will be derived a set of statements as to what that theory would expect to find in the historical evidence in order for it to be demonstrated. The predictions will then be compared with the relevant evidence and conclusions reached. Clearly, theory testing is not a neutral or value-free procedure, particularly in the social sciences (Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987). Nevertheless, the rival claims of theoretical schools should be evaluated against the 'real world' in order to better understand 'how power works' in Britain and the United States. This study, based on extensive archival research in the papers and correspondence of the CFR, RIIA, Rockefeller and Carnegie foundations, State Department, Foreign Office, the British Cabinet, and of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, and the private papers of several leading figures within the two 'think tanks', enables the drawing of conclusions as to the role and influence of Chatham House and the CFR. It will also, then, be possible to consider the theoretical implications of the research findings.

The present study also seeks to go beyond the analytic scheme outlined by Denham and Garnett and attributed to William Wallace. Wallace's 7-point schema for the roles of think tanks includes all the expected elements, including policy analysis, relative detachment from day-to-day political concerns, a degree of involvement and detachment from government and the public information function (Denham and Garnett, 1998, pp. 14–15). The evidence presented in the chapters that follow also portrays the relationships between think tanks and the national, and possibly transnational or international, establishments (such as influential foundations, the press, elite universities, policy-makers and financial and business corporations). That is, the analysis places the think tanks within the context of 'elite power structures' in Britain and the United States, rather than notions of epistemic or policy communities which may be considered political in a rather narrow sense.

The book is structured so as to address those concerns. This chapter (the first of three in Part I of the book) introduces the *principal* theories that are to be tested against the historical evidence. It considers their principal features and claims and what each would predict in regard to the CFR's and RIIA's influence in making foreign policy and public opinion-mobilising (or other) influence. It also discusses the methodology for testing rival explanations, particularly the isolation of several 'key decisions', and the study of public opinion mobilisation.

Chapter 2 introduces the organisations, considering (and comparing) their formation, aims and objectives and inspiration in the contemporary history and development of Britain and America. It examines and compares the elitism of the CFR and Chatham House, in terms of the social origins of their membership and leadership. The chapter also locates the two think tanks within their respective societies, specifically within their 'foreign policy establishments', by examining their interconnections with other sections of social, economic, political and state elites. It also examines their sources of finance, especially significant in which were the Carnegie and Rockefeller Foundations. Finally, the chapter considers the theoretical implications of the findings.

Chapter 3 considers the intellectual, political, religious and racial assumptions of the men (and women, in the case of Chatham House) who founded and led the think tanks. The aim is to contextualise the two institutions in the contemporary development of their respective societies and provide the background history necessary for an understanding of their ideas and activities. It also discusses their specific attitudes towards politics, power, the national interest and foreign policy.

Part II of the book consists of two chapters. Chapter 4 considers the role and influence of Chatham House in British foreign policy formation, taking into account general and specific instances (especially the 'key decisions' outlined in Chapter 1). Chapter 5 does likewise in regard to the CFR and the making of American foreign policy, ending with a comparison of the two think tanks. Both chapters discuss the theoretical implications of the historical evidence presented.

Part III consists of two chapters (Chapters 6 and 7) on the role and influence of the two think tanks on public opinion mobilisation. Part IV contains two chapters (Chapters 8 and 9) on the interconnections between the Council and Chatham House by examining evidence of joint study groups, conferences, correspondence and unofficial diplomacy. It asks the question: did the CFR and RIIA constitute a key component of an emerging 'Atlantic ruling class', a 'special relationship' or an 'Anglo-American establishment'?

Chapter 9 concludes the study with a consideration of the significance of the CFR and Chatham House, the key issues raised and the theoretical implications of the research findings.

Theories to be tested

This section of Chapter 1 outlines several important theories of power and policymaking. As this book is not principally about theories of power, seeking to use them to better understand and explain the historical evidence, the theories are not examined exhaustively; in any case, there is a vast extant available literature on these theories. Five theories are described: pluralism, the corporatist school of US foreign relations history, instrumental Marxism, statism and the Gramscian perspective. While the list is not exhaustive, it does enable a thorough analysis of the CFR and Chatham House from several conflicting perspectives. Additionally, some of the theories selected for testing also share enough features to permit possible synthesis in the concluding chapter. Before this, however, it is important to consider briefly what is meant by 'the state' in this study, as it is the activity – intellectual, policy- and public opinion-related – by state managers and surrounding the state that the study of political influence concerns. Although each theory to be tested contains within it a specific idea and perspective on the role of the state, it is important to outline briefly what is the basic point of departure in regard to the state and its key institutions for the purposes of this particular study. It will then be possible to allow for the varying notions of the state within each theory.

Clearly, there is no universally accepted definition of the state: some definitions are all-encompassing while some deny the existence of the state altogether; there are organisational and functional definitions (Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987, pp. 1–3). In addition, of course, it has already been noted that 'the state' has somewhat different meanings in Britain and the United States. Nevertheless, it is plain that social scientists agree that any general definition would contain at least three major elements. According to Hall and Ikenberry, the first point is that the state 'is a set of institutions', the principal ones being coercive bodies, '. . . manned by the state's own personnel'. Secondly, the state is territorially bounded, located within a society but also looking outward 'to larger societies in which it must make its way'. Finally, the state 'monopolises rule-making within its territory' (Hall and Ikenberry, 1989, pp. 1–2). Of course, qualifications may easily be made to this viewpoint but, as a general definition for use in the study of Britain and the United States in the first half of the twentieth century, it is perfectly adequate.

For the purposes of this study of foreign policy, therefore, the state is defined as the central, constitutionally designated bodies for making and implementing foreign policy within a given territory. That is, in the American case this definition includes the President and White House, the State Department and other departments such as Commerce and Treasury, various ad hoc agencies (usually linked with major departments), and the US Congress (Krasner, 1978, pp. 11–12).[3] In the British case, the state is taken to include the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and its subcommittees, the Foreign Office and other departments such as the Board of Trade and the Treasury, and Parliament. There is no claim to the effect that the departments and entities listed are equal in status or importance to the policy process; the claim is that it is these bodies that play the most important roles in initiating foreign policy innovation and action, are the most important places in which key discussions take place and the most important agenda-setting decisions are taken.

Pluralism

'Pluralism' is the most established and widely accepted theory of Anglo-American democratic systems, despite fundamental criticisms of some of its central features (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962; Lukes, 1980). Nevertheless, it has proven durable and has adapted to changing circumstances and criticisms. It posits that British and American societies' political culture and institutions are characterised by openness, accessibility, equity and free and fair organised competition between opposing social, economic and political forces. Pluralism denies that America and Britain

feature great concentrations of political power that upset or deflect the political systems' pluralistic nature. Pluralists argue that citizens, regardless of social class, gender, race, ethnicity, creed or occupation, can form associations to represent their interests to the relevant authorities. Workers can form trades unions, employers can set up their associations, as can women, minorities, students, farmers, and so on. Such organisations develop programmes and may campaign to alter government policies or to pass new laws either through conducting 'lobbying' of Parliament or Congress, making representations to the relevant departments of government, or through publicity-seeking actions to educate and mobilise public opinion. Specific sections of society, such as scientific and technical experts, may also provide information and advice to national governments on a more or less regular basis (Vincent, 1987).[4]

Pluralists also point to the fact of regular general elections, fought by political parties offering policy choices to the electorate, a free press independent of the state, and a whole range of citizens' rights such as freedom of speech, and association, enshrined in the national constitutions (albeit uncodified in Britain's case). In short, the argument is that the political system, through numerous channels at different levels of political and other power, is responsive to organised groups' and individuals' demands and preferences. The role of the state within pluralism varies according to the particular variant of pluralism. In the main, however, pluralists argue that the state is not an independent entity but is more or less dominated by organised interest groups. Even though state officials 'make' policy, pluralists argue that they do so under the pressure of demands made by more powerful special interests. The role of government is to 'weigh up' conflicting demands so that a 'balanced' policy emerges that satisfies a broader general interest. Pluralism is a *weak state* theory, in which 'government' reacts to external pressure (Dahl, 1961; Krasner, 1978; Skowronek, 1982; Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987).

In this context, organisations such as the CFR and Chatham House would be considered, generally speaking, as associations of concentrated expertise. They would be expected to be *independent of the state and self-interested*, and to provide government with information and advice on foreign relations, in an attempt to influence policy outcomes. In addition, pluralists would argue that Chatham House and the CFR *independently may conduct campaigns to enlighten or educate public opinion*. The degree of influence that the CFR and RIIA might exercise, however, would depend on the quality and policy-relevance of their expertise, the adequacy of their 'political' methods, the timeliness of their interventions and their ability to compete with other such organisations. In a polity characterised

by pluralism, the CFR and RIIA would be expected to constitute just one form of 'input' into the policy process; pluralists would, however, expect *such well-established institutions to be able to exert significant influence over a relatively weak state/governmental system of policy formation*. In short, independence and influence would be the expected findings from a pluralist point of view.

Corporatism

This theory is included here principally because of its prominent place in the study of American foreign relations, particularly in regard to the 1920s and 1930s. The American variant of corporatism, however, given the weak state tradition in that country, is a somewhat low-key one, in comparison with the more statist, European tradition. Nevertheless, it is vital that that version be considered in this study, given that it focuses on a key American organisation, founded and active in the very periods in which the corporatist US foreign relations historians consider so important in political development. Corporatism is, in effect, a variant of pluralism. It shares the view that the state in Britain and the United States is relatively weak vis-à-vis private organised interests which, if anything, have become even more powerful over the course of the past century. Where such organised interests are characterised by *conflict* and *competition* in 'mainstream' pluralism, corporatists focus on the increasing levels of 'conflict management' and *collaboration* between functional blocs – big corporations, agri-business, organised labour – vital to the running of industrialised nations. Such functional blocs, it is argued, collaborate in order to better manage the economy, to try and take ideology out of economic policy, to harmonise the interests of all major economic forces in society, and thereby increase the possibility of social and political stability (Newman, 1981; Crouch and Dore, 1990).

The corporatist school of US foreign relations history, emerging from roots in New Left historiography, argues that twentieth-century American foreign policy may be explained by their perspective.[5] They argue that the rise of multinational corporations, of industrialisation, urbanisation and mass immigration, in the early part of the twentieth century in America, created the conditions for economic chaos, social disorder and political instability. Therefore, the bureaucracies of big business, agriculture, organised labour and government became increasingly intertwined, especially during the Progressive era. Those interests cooperated to address the problems that eluded the market, collaborating through an 'organisational sector' above party competition, market imperatives, and even narrow economic interests. This represents 'an American brand

of corporatism', according to Michael Hogan (Hogan, 1987). Ellis Hawley argues that the leaders of the organisational sector generated a 'new breed of private leaders . . . to build state agencies that could render needed services without supplanting or threatening the new private institutions' (Hawley, 1978, p. 311). In turn, a new generation of public officials also emerged who 'sponsored', without attempting to control or to dominate, private organisations that would serve the 'public interest'.[6] Hogan emphasises the point that one of the important aims of organisation sector leaders was to 'contain the state . . . [to find] a "middle way" between . . . laissez-faire . . . and the paternalistic statism of an Orwellian nightmare' (Hogan, 1990, p. 154). According to Hogan, such was the level of 'interpenetration' between the various interests and the state in the corporatist system that it is 'difficult to determine where one sector leaves off and the other begins' (Hogan, 1986, p. 363, 1987), enhancing the possibilities of domestic New Deal economic reform and of internationalism in US foreign policy. American multinationals, specifically those that were capital-intensive and internationally oriented, allied to organised labour, and east coast financial institutions, made up the core of the New Deal coalition, due to their vested interest in economic growth at home – to the benefit of capital, labour and state legitimacy – based on international prosperity. This, therefore, explains America's rise to globalism, the Marshall Plan, NATO, and so on (Ferguson, 1984; Hogan, 1987; Wala, 1994).

In the British case, clearly, corporatism – in its strong sense – has a longer history. Interestingly, however, very similar justifications are advanced to explain British corporatism as were used by the American foreign affairs corporatists cited above. According to Keith Middlemas, it has been fashionable to think of the 1920s and 1930s as 'slothful in planning' and state interventionism. Yet, he argues, from the Great War onwards, corporatist tendencies were vital in maintaining social and political stability in Britain. Successive British governments had learned the 'arts of public management', and the means by which to mobilise private forces for statist ends or, rather, the 'national interest'. Middlemas further argues that the state was anxious to cede certain duties to private interests, though clearly he is more concerned with organised business and labour. Nevertheless, the corporatist tendency is what is important to note at this point. Middlemas goes on to suggest that during the interwar years private interests adapted and extended the late Victorian era concept of 'public service' – that is, of governance by non-partisan 'fit and proper persons' – 'to cover experts and advisers to government . . .' (Middlemas, 1979, pp. 13–23). This is not at all dissimilar to the concepts

applied to the 'organisational sector' by Ellis Hawley and other American historians.

What is, for corporatists, the role of active 'intellectual' organisations such as the CFR and Chatham House? Where do they fit in to the corporatist scheme? As we shall see, both institutes were well connected with their respective business and financial communities and with officials who make foreign policy. Yet, corporatists appear to neglect their role in America's rise to globalism, as they do intellectual institutions in general. The role of ideology construction and opinion mobilisation, that is, of ideology dissemination, is largely conspicuous by its absence, with the notable exception of Michael Wala's study, from the corporatist literature, which has a rather economistic emphasis. It is one of the aims of this study to outline how corporatists might integrate associations such as the CFR and RIIA into their analysis and thereby provide a more rounded explanation of America's rise to globalism and, in addition, a case will be considered for a corporatist explanation for the role and activities of Chatham House in British foreign affairs during the shift in policy emphasis from empire to an Anglo-American alliance.

A corporatist analysis, then, might expect to find evidence of strong, independent groups, such as the CFR and RIIA which, in coordination with the state, develop foreign policy based on a sense of 'enlightened' public interest. The state's role may be expected to be one of coordination of private groupings with the aim of serving the national interest.

Instrumental Marxism

'Instrumental' Marxists define the state as totally interpenetrated or 'colonised' by the ruling class in capitalist society (Miliband, 1973). They argue that the state is, more or less, merely a committee for the management of the affairs and interests of the capitalist class largely due to the fact that those who lead the state – politicians, civil servants, judges, generals – are derived from or connected with that class. They, therefore, define the 'national interest' in capitalistic terms and shape policies – domestic and foreign – to suit such interests as opposed to the interests of the working class and other subordinate strata. British and American 'democracy', therefore, is a myth, extended only to the extent that it does not threaten capitalist class prerogatives. Since economic power is so unequally distributed, capitalists exercise great influence over the main political parties because they finance election campaigns and own the most important newspapers and magazines through which their platforms are advertised to the electorate who, effectively, are fed a diet of falsehoods to befuddle their minds with 'false consciousness'. The policies of the

governing parties, while seemingly competitive are almost always identical and, therefore, do not threaten the status quo of capitalist domination.

Instrumental Marxists, therefore, view the CFR (Shoup and Minter, 1977) and RIIA *as representing ruling class interests in foreign affairs, given their origins and leadership. They would expect to find in the historical record strong evidence of policymaking influence if not complete domination of the policy process*. Shoup and Minter's analysis of the CFR is the only original account of that organisation from such a perspective; there is no such analysis of the RIIA. Shoup and Minter do not, however, examine the public opinion mobilisation efforts of the CFR, which may sustain a case for the dissemination of 'false consciousness'. The present study will examine this aspect for both the CFR and the RIIA.

Statism

Statists reject 'society-centred' theories, such as pluralism, instrumental Marxism and corporatism, instead emphasising the role of the state as an autonomous actor (Krasner, 1978). They argue, in contrast, that there must be a return to an earlier continental European recognition of the importance and power of 'the state'. As Alfred Stepan notes, such is the power of the state that its legal, administrative and other elements not only 'structure relationships *between* civil society and public authority in a polity but also [attempt] to structure many crucial relationships within civil society as well' (Skocpol, 1985, p. 5, 7). Viewing states as organisations that control specific territories, statists consider the state in an international context. They view the state as the sole determinant of the national interest, which is really little more than the state's own interests, in an international environment of armed and dangerous states. Standing at the interface of domestic society and interstate relations, 'Janus-faced' (Skocpol, 1979, p. 32), the state must manoeuvre for advantage in both spheres in order to ensure its own security and survival. Given the special role of the state in regard to the 'national interest', and its position as the only body that is fundamentally tied to a particular territory, it has a high degree of political space or autonomy from societal interests. State managers, therefore, in their attempts to maintain their state's position in the international sphere often need to reorganise domestic economic or social and other relations (such as the governing coalition of interests that sustains the state) from above, and manage interclass and intra-elite rivalries (Krasner, 1978, p. 11, 18). By approaching state power in this way, statists effectively hand over the initiative behind major policy reorientations to state managers because of the

requirements of their own circumstances. Statists thereby reverse the *weak state* way in which state manager–private interest group relations have conventionally been conceived, even in regard to the United States, a polity widely noted to have a *narrower* (though by no means insignificant) structural 'basis for such autonomy' than any other liberal capitalist democracy.[7] As Krasner points out, however, state actors frequently possess leadership skills that enable them to overcome structural weaknesses or to take advantage of confusion, incoherence or divisions among the corporate sector or within public opinion. As a result, Krasner argues, state managers can affect opinion 'by presenting a coherent view of the situation, which private actors have not been able to develop themselves. Such an exercise of leadership by central decision-makers goes beyond overcoming the opposition of private actors; it can transform potential opposition into passive acceptance or even active support' (Krasner, 1978, p. 19).

Statists also claim that state structures significantly affect 'political culture, [thereby] encouraging some kinds of group formation and collective political actions (but not others), and make possible the raising of certain political issues (but not others)'. In short, they emphasise structural elements of state power (Evans *et al*., 1985, p. 21).

In regard to the CFR's and Chatham House's relations with their respective states, *statists would expect such private organisations to be malleable, to be potential instruments of state power. They would expect private organisations to exercise neither very much, if any, independent influence over the making of foreign policy nor significant independent initiative over their public opinion mobilisation roles. The state would be expected to dominate the relationship by proactively mobilising the expertise of the CFR and Chatham House for its own interests*.

Gramscian theory

Gramscian theory is obviously rooted in a Marxist analysis of power in society. The unequal distribution of wealth and private property (means of production) has profound consequences for the distribution of political power in orthodox Marxism, according to which political power more or less 'reflects' economic inequalities. Consequently, the state is considered to serve, more or less exclusively, the interests of the economically dominant class or classes, using force to maintain itself against rebellions from below. Gramsci, on the other hand, rejects the view that politics and the state automatically and exclusively serve the dominant classes' economic interests, arguing instead that the maintenance of capitalist

power requires politicians and state leaders to struggle, bargain, outmanoeuvre, co-opt, marginalise, exclude, as the case may be, the main economic, social, political and other forces in society (Hall, 1988). That is, Gramsci believes that power in liberal capitalist societies, such as Britain and the United States, is not maintained only, or even mainly, by coercion, but through leadership or *hegemony* (Williams, 1960). This implies that popular consent is a key aspect of power in capitalist democracies, and it is Gramsci's analysis of its construction and maintenance, by intellectuals and political activists, that is particularly compelling.

Intellectual and political leaders develop, Gramsci argues, hegemonic projects that attempt to harmonise a wide variety of interests behind a national political–economic programme, into a *historic bloc*. Gramsci emphasises the state's ideological and political power to construct and reconstruct society, politics and economy in the light of changing conditions and crises of social order. The state, Gramsci contends, in order to construct a historic bloc, tries to educate and mobilise the people in a variety of ways, often through collaboration with other social forces. The government of democracies is conducted with 'the consent of the governed – but with this consent organised . . . The State does have and request consent, but it also "educates" this consent, by means of the political and syndical associations; these, however,' he concludes, 'are private organisms, left to . . . private initiative' (Hoare and Nowell-Smith, 1971, pp. 259–60; Adamson, 1980, pp. 203–04; Femia, 1981, p. 27). In regard to the state's collaboration with private forces, Gramsci develops the notion of 'state spirit', of a feeling among certain leading *private* figures and organisations that they bear a grave responsibility to promote a historical process through positive political and intellectual activity. In every serious movement, Gramsci argues, there is contained a 'state spirit', which 'presupposes "continuity", either with the past, or with tradition, or with the future; that is, it presupposes that every act is a moment in a complex process, which has already begun and which will continue' (Hoare and Nowell-Smith, 1971, pp. 146–47).[8]

Since societies undergo structural – organic – crises, there occurs a series of attempts by the forces of the status quo to 'cure them, within certain limits . . .'. Meanwhile, the opposition seeks to show that the necessary preconditions already exist to make 'possible, and hence imperative' radical change, in order to ward off even greater crises and catastrophes. The opposition develops 'a series of ideological, religious, philosophical, political, and juridical polemics', with the aim of transforming 'the previously existing disposition of social forces' (Hoare and Nowell-Smith, 1971, p. 178).

In relation to this study of the CFR and RIIA, *Gramscians would expect to find strong evidence of proactive state agencies and private 'ruling class' organisations attempting to generate the necessary elite and popular authority for a major reorientation of foreign policy, through the forging of a new political and ideological consensus that had the capacity to attack, undermine and marginalise, if not to eliminate, the forces of the 'old order' (of isolationism and empire)*.

Methodology

As already noted, this study examines a range of archival evidence in order to compare the roles and significance of the CFR and Chatham House, and to help in determining which theory best explains their role and significance. The historical evidence derives from the archives of public and private institutions in Britain and the United States, including the papers and correspondence of several leading individuals related to the two think tanks. The data, therefore, consist of memoranda, notes, letters, minutes of meetings, conference reports, internal discussion papers, study group proceedings and transcripts of meetings, made contemporaneously, for use by the relevant organisations in their day-to-day operations. Both Chatham House and the CFR operated a thirty-year confidentiality rule over most aspects of their work, principally in order to ensure frankness in discussion and debate. People would talk more freely – whether they were academics, businessmen or leading politicians or civil servants – when they knew that their utterances would not be publicised by the press. In fact, the term 'Chatham House rules' is widely used to indicate the confidentiality of proceedings. The consequence of this is that the archival records are very informative as to the inner life and culture of the two think tanks, their thoughts, concerns and anxieties, and their hopes and fears for the future. The records also show where there were conflicting views within the organisations, how the CFR and RIIA were related to other foreign affairs societies, with their official foreign affairs bureaucracies, the universities, colleges and schools. In short, the historical data provide a clear idea of what made the two organisations 'tick' and consequently permit comparison in the manner desired by this study.

Comparison clearly will tell us a great deal about the relative effectiveness of each think tank, their inner lives and sub-cultures, their social origins and educational and occupational experiences, their relative position in regard to state and other important institutions. Comparative method also will reveal a number of useful features of the political–institutional contexts within which the think tanks operated, underlining

the importance of historical differences in the development of modern Britain and the United States.

Despite these strengths, however, comparison also faces difficulties in regard to this particular study. First, the very initiation of the two organisations was a cooperative enterprise – at Versailles in 1919 – and their aims and aspirations, their ideas about the world, were almost identical. The Council and Chatham House did not begin life as watertight organisations, separate and distinct. Secondly, they remained, at one level or another, interconnected thereafter, possibly influencing each other, indirectly at least, throughout the interwar era. Finally, they shared one very important source of funding: the east coast and internationalist Carnegie and Rockefeller foundations. These factors suggest that there are likely to be more similarities than contrasts in the behaviour of the CFR and RIIA, and that any important likenesses are due to their common origins, interconnections and sources of funding. These are clearly influential factors that must be borne in mind. However, it is also clear that the two organisations were forced, to an important extent, to go their separate ways when they departed Paris and returned to the anti-American and anti-British political climates of their respective nations. That is, common origins in the hothouse of peace-making in Versailles, and their cordial continuing interconnections, could not offset the political atmosphere of 'home' – the rising isolationist, and anti-British, tide of America's 'return to normalcy' and Britain's resentment of the United States' abdication of responsibility in refusing membership of the League of Nations and, thereby, its fair share of the burdens of global policing. It was not fashionable to be seen to be too close to the other power, for members of the CFR and RIIA.

In addition to the problems noted above, we must also contend with the fact that there is no scholarly agreement on *how to define or study, let alone 'measure', power*,[9] though it is clear that each school of thought either provides a particular methodology or at least suggests what an appropriate methodology might look like. Nevertheless, some schools share, at least in part, similar approaches to studying the historical evidence.

Pluralists favour 'decision-making' analysis in determining questions of policy influence. They argue (Dahl, 1961; Polsby, 1963; Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987) that power and influence over policymaking are best determined by reconstructing the taking of 'key decisions', thereby allowing observers to decide which particular actor or actors played the most significant role. Pluralists, therefore, recommend the isolation of key decisions against which to assess the influence of bodies such as the CFR and Chatham House. For the purposes of this study, following

consideration of the *general influence* of the two think tanks on their respective countries' foreign affairs, the making of six 'key decisions' has been analysed. Those decisions took the USA closer to globalism and Britain closer to an Anglo-American alliance: first, the 'Destroyes-Bases' Agreement made by the British and American governments in August/September 1940; second, the 'Atlantic Charter' joint US–British declaration of war and peace aims of August 1941, which committed the USA to membership of an international security organisation; Lend–Lease aid (Mutual Aid Agreement), 1942, by which the US agreed to supply Britain's wartime needs in return for the eventual abolition of 'imperial preference'; the Bretton Woods negotiations and Financial Agreements, 1944, that established multilateral economic and financial arrangements, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, IBRD); the formation of the United Nations Organisation (UNO) in 1945; and the US Loan to Britain, 1946, which was conditional on the break up of the Sterling Area. Pluralists argue that the actors with power or influence will have determined the taking of the above decisions (Gardner, 1956; Wilson, 1961; Shoup and Minter, 1977; Woods, 1990; Parmar, 1995b). It must be noted, however, that the results deriving from the decision-making analysis will be considered in the context of the general influence of the two organisations, and not in isolation.

The validity, at least in part, of instrumental Marxism, which favours a weak state approach, could in its policy influence aspects be examined by using the general and specific methodology outlined above. In their study of the CFR, instrumental Marxists Shoup and Minter effectively attempt to show how the elite organisation influenced the making of US foreign policy during and after the Second World War, focusing on several of the 'key decisions' outlined above. The present study seeks to extend that approach to Chatham House. Similarly, the corporatist approach is also amenable to a decision-making analysis, as are the statist and the Gramscian perspectives. Of course, none of the above theories claim to be testable *exclusively* by the decision-making method. The argument here is that decision-making analysis provides a useful means by which to consider the evidence and come to some concrete, if not final, conclusions. The different schools also share a general desire to be systematic and rigorous, if not 'scientific', about studying power, to better delve beneath surface appearances to get to the heart of the matter.

The other aspect of the CFR's and Chatham House's influence, of course, is public opinion mobilisation, which is either central or significant to pluralism, instrumental Marxism, statism and Gramscian theory. It is

argued here that public opinion mobilisation ought also to be an important component of the corporatist perspective and, indeed, Michael Wala has shown how that might be done (Wala, 1994). The aim of educating and mobilising public opinion, for each of the theories in question, is to generate public support for particular ideas, values, attitudes and, from time to time, for specific government policies. Organisations interested in public opinion education normally, at the very least, aim to generate a 'climate of opinion' that will have some influence on official policy-makers at the legislative or executive levels (Denham and Garnett, 1998).

'Public opinion' is clearly a key force in any liberal democracy (Lippmann, 1941; Key, 1961; Rosenau, 1961; Hilderbrand, 1981). It can have extraordinary power at times, especially prior to elections or political, economic and other crises. It often serves as the justification for radical reform, for the persecution of particular groups in society, for declaring war and making peace. It is, after all, 'the people' who are sovereign in a democracy. The problem is that measuring public opinion is extremely difficult, if not impossible. Despite this, *mobilising* public opinion, on the basis of first having gauged it in some way, was one of the key activities and preoccupations of the CFR and Chatham House.

One way forward may be to break down the concept of 'public opinion' into its constituent parts. Clearly, there is no such thing as public opinion as a whole, but there are key sections of society that tend to hold particular attitudes and to play particular roles in the dissemination of attitudes to a broader 'public' (Ginsberg, 1986). There are, for example, the 'attentive public' and 'opinion-formers', who read the 'quality' newspapers and reviews, pay attention to politics and foreign affairs, and disseminate in their respective spheres of society – work, college, neighbourhood, community – the ideas and thoughts contained therein. In essence, it was such segments of society, in the main, that the CFR and RIIA aimed their publications at, believing their message would 'trickle down' to the 'masses'. Consequently, it may be possible to gauge general opinion through Gallup (and other) polls, pioneered and brought to some level of rigour and system during the 1930s and the Second World War, and to gauge the opinions and attitudes of the attentive and opinion-forming publics through examining the messages they received through the circulation of books, pamphlets, radio broadcasts, conference materials, and so on. In addition, both the CFR and Chatham House, from time to time, conducted their own surveys of opinion in order to better frame their research or their message. Such reports as are available have been analysed and provide a very useful source of evidence for this study.

The aim of this study, therefore, is to examine the records of both think tanks to see how they defined public opinion, how they sought to educate and mobilise it, and what were the overall and specific effects with special, though not exclusive, reference to the several key decisions outlined above.

Although this study bears the essential hallmarks of the 'case-study' approach (Yin, 1994) it does not limit its conclusions to the specific cases discussed. The approach of this study is clearly applicable to other elites in other (war and non-war) circumstances, as are the theoretical conclusions drawn in the concluding chapter. The study of Chatham House and the CFR tells us a great deal about 'how power works' in Britain and the United States.

This chapter has outlined the importance of the CFR and Chatham House, and suggested that comparison of their activities and effects enhances our understanding of their respective political and social systems. In addition, comparing their activities with the expectations of a number of competing theories of power not only enhances our knowledge and understanding of 'how power works' in Britain and the United States, but also permits us to consider the possibilities of developing a theory that better explains the power, influence and roles of such organisations. Ultimately, however, this study shows that, in the making of a new world order, the British and American governments were powerfully influenced and assisted by an Anglo-American establishment. It is to the origins and aims of the leadership and membership of a key part of that establishment, as embodied by Chatham House and the Council, that attention now turns.

2
Sociology of the CFR and RIIA

This chapter provides a more detailed introduction to the two think tanks by examining and comparing their origins, aims and the social, economic, political and other backgrounds of their members and leaders. Who were the men who founded the two oldest and most prestigious foreign affairs think tanks in the world? From which walks of life did they emerge? What positions did they occupy at the creation, and how did they progress? What were their political party allegiances, their connections with the worlds of finance and industry or with the state? What were their religious affiliations? What was their position in relation to other elements of the foreign policy establishment? Answers to these questions enhance our understanding of what made the CFR and Chatham House 'tick'.

Clearly, the above interest signifies a very strong belief that social background *matters*. The main point is that the groups of men that formed Chatham House and the CFR, and who became advisers to policymakers, were socialised in specific circumstances, occupied particular social positions, and matured in definite historical periods that shaped the way they saw the world. Those backgrounds also provided them with the confidence, ability and willingness to try to change the world to more closely conform to their views as to how it ought to be. In order to promote change, they formed various societies and organisations, or entered state service, or both, and were further 'educated' or socialised as to the best means to achieve their goals. That is, they were shaped by, and were active makers of, history. As Gramsci notes, the social backgrounds and schooling of individuals is vital to an understanding of how 'organic intellectuals' are developed and elaborated (Hoare and Nowell-Smith, 1971, p. 10). This chapter and Chapter 3 try more definitely to identify who these men were and the conditions that shaped their ideas and actions.[1]

Social background information also plays an important role within several of the theories under consideration in the present study. This is most obviously the case for Gramscians and instrumental Marxists: the social compositions of the think tanks and of the state are central as they make claims about the class bias within the distribution of power in capitalist societies. Corporatist historians of US foreign relations also make claims about the social and economic forces that were critical to political change in the 1930s and 1940s, that is, east coast financial, industrial and other forces. Finally, the American exceptionalist thesis, as applied to the present study, suggests that the United States' is a more egalitarian and open society than that of Britain, with important consequences for the operation of the political system. Statists also make a number of claims that suggest that powerful forces – economic and social – play an important role in limiting, on occasion, the autonomy of the state. Pluralists generally reject claims about the political salience of elite backgrounds, emphasising the countervailing powers of the masses, other elites or veto groups, and the necessity of viewing politics as a distinct domain (Dahl, 1961; Manley, 1983). In addition, however, social background and other data also permit consideration of the pluralist assumption that organised interests are independent, discrete, and do not overlap.

This chapter describes the origins and aims of the CFR and Chatham House, the circumstances in which they were formed, the hopes, fears and desires that they embodied, and how they were organised. It then goes on to examine and compare the evidence as to their social backgrounds, more precisely to locate them in their respective foreign policy establishments.

The common origins of Chatham House and the CFR

The impetus for the formation of what was initially known as the 'Institute of International Affairs', a single organisation with American and British branches, was the First World War, and the fundamental alterations in the structure of global power that it heralded. Most significantly, the War weakened Britain's ability to police the world alone and to maintain the cohesion of the Empire, that is, the principal functions of *Pax Britannica*. Conversely, the War strengthened the United States as a factor in world power, emphasising the point that only some kind of Anglo-American accord or arrangement, within, perhaps, a world organisation, would permit Britain to maintain its global role and influence (Parmar, 1995b).

The Paris Peace Conference brought together the diplomats and political leaders and their numerous advisers, senior and junior, to discuss nothing

less than the future shape of the world. It also brought together the men who conceived the organisations that form the subject of this study. The nucleus of the British group had been formed by requirements of a state at war, as had the American. The men had been recruited principally from academia into state service to conduct background research prior to the end of hostilities in order to prepare the peace. In Britain, the men so recruited included numerous historians: Arnold Toynbee, Charles Kingsley Webster, E.H. Carr, Sir James Headlam-Morley, Lewis Namier, R.W. Seton-Watson, Sir Alfred Zimmern, among others (Watt, 1978, p. 165). They had been fused with the Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office – the 'mendacity bureau', as Toynbee called it (Goldstein, 1988; Sharp, 1988).

The core members of the American group had been brought together by President Woodrow Wilson's chief of staff, Colonel Edward Mendel House, and were collectively known as the 'Inquiry' group. The most prominent men among the Inquiry group and Wilson–House advisers were historians George Louis Beer and James Shotwell, geographer Isaiah Bowman, Walter Lippmann, Thomas W. Lamont of JP Morgan investment bank and Whitney Hart Shepardson. Most of the Inquiry men were Anglophiles, several of them having been closely connected with pro-imperial organisations such as the Round Table movement of British imperialists. Their aims in the Inquiry were to plan America's negotiating position in the peace-making to come after hostilities. War, therefore, and postwar planning were the settings in which a certain experience was gained, an 'inside' knowledge learned, and a consciousness formed. Tendencies that were present before the War, therefore, found institutional expression, developing a habit of mind and confidence that much more could be done to 'manage' a disorderly world. Even more, perhaps, was developed the idea that some men had to take a lead, offer hope, rational and scientific solutions to world problems. Among some of the men of the Inquiry, there was a definite feeling that America's time had come.[2]

The Anglo-American connection, of course, was not forged just by the war. For many on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean, Anglo-American unity was the guarantor of a stable global order and the freedom of the seas, governed by the rule of law. Some of the British advisers in Paris who were critical to the conception of the Institute of International Affairs were deeply involved in the Round Table Movement, inspired by the arch-imperialist Cecil Rhodes and founded by Sir Alfred Milner, former High Commissioner of South Africa (1897–1905) and Secretary of War (1918). Indeed, the chief inspiration of what became the Institute of International Affairs, Lionel Curtis, was, in large part, a product of Milner's so-called

'kindergarten' in South Africa. Rhodes once grandiloquently declared that his ambition in life was the 'furtherance of the British Empire, the bringing of the whole uncivilized world under its rule, the recovery of the United States of America, the making of the Anglo-Saxon race into one Empire' (Shoup and Minter, 1977, pp. 12–13). In his several wills, Rhodes bequeathed funds for the creation of an organisation to preserve and extend the Empire – the Round Table – which Curtis and Philip Kerr (later, as Lord Lothian, British ambassador to the United States, 1939–40) organised and led for several decades (Nimocks, 1968; Kendle, 1975). As noted above, of the American advisers in Paris who initiated the Institute of International Affairs, Whitney Shepardson and George Beer had been American correspondents of the Round Table, and the former had also been a Rhodes scholar (Shoup and Minter, 1977, p. 13).

The meetings in Paris in 1919, then, were not a 'bolt out of the blue' but the continuation and deepening of ties that were already pretty strong, a meeting point for men with a set of similar attitudes and underlying assumptions (as Chapter 3 aims to show). The unofficial meetings in the hotels Majestic and Crillon began as a result of dissatisfaction with peace-making itself: its 'rough and ready', irrational, and war-weary and vengeful public-opinion-led, character. The experts of the Inquiry and the historians of the Political Intelligence Department were being ignored. Decisions were being made that would, in their view, lead to longer-term problems, largely because Prime Minister Lloyd George, President Wilson and President Clemenceau were fearful of public reactions back home lest the peace be seen to be too 'soft' on Germany. In addition, the principle of nationality was thought by the younger Anglo-American elements to be overemphasised, neglecting the importance of the need for greater recognition of a world society that required the pooling of sovereignty in supranational institutions for the common good (Martel, 1994).

With the American delegates housed in the Crillon and the British in the spacious and luxurious Majestic, the lounges of which were ideal for getting to know and talk with civil servants and military and other personnel, the scene was set for the elaboration of ideas and schemes (Headlam-Morley, 1972, p. 1). On 30 May 1919, a joint meeting of British and American delegates decided to establish an Anglo-American Institute of International Affairs, in order to continue in peacetime the lessons learned and the habit of cooperation developed in peace-making (Headlam-Morley, 1972, pp. 132–33). Among the Britons present were James Headlam-Morley, Lord Cecil, Lord Eustace Percy, Harold Temperley, Philip Baker, Harold Nicolson, Philip Kerr, Lionel Curtis, Charles K. Webster,

Clement Jones, Frank P. Walters, Cecil Hurst and J.R.M. Butler.[3] There were nine Americans present, including George L. Beer, Whitney Hart Shepardson, General Tasker Bliss, James T. Shotwell, Archibald Cary Coolidge, Stanley N. Hornbeck and Ray Stannard Baker. Curtis led the meeting. He proposed that a small organising committee be established, with equal US and British representation, to prepare the Institute. He argued that world changes demanded that men of knowledge take the lead in scientifically studying foreign affairs to furnish political leaders with the requisite facts with which to make policy and 'sound' public opinion. 'Right public opinion', he noted in a joint statement with Shepardson, 'was mainly produced by a small number of people in real contact with the facts who had thought out the issues involved' (Dockrill, 1980, p. 74). As Temperley later noted, the hothouse of Paris 'brought together leaders from the same country and the same race', constituting 'effective agencies for creating an opinion on international affairs at once charitable, sane, and well-informed . . . ' (Shoup and Minter, 1977, p. 12).

In addition, a key motive was to further cement Anglo-American relations. As Professor James T. Shotwell had so presciently noted in 1919, Anglo-American relations would be severely strained by the inevitable recurrence of American anti-English and pro-German feelings. 'There would be a strong feeling in America that after all England was not so innocent as she professed to be', that America's entry into the Great War 'was merely an instance of the extraordinary Machiavellian cunning of secret British diplomacy . . . ' (Headlam-Morley, 1972, p. 39). That Curtis and other Round Tablers were profoundly committed to Anglo-American unity is beyond doubt (Butler, 1960; Lavin, 1995). At the 30 May 1919 meeting, men from both sides of the Atlantic, such as Cecil and Lamont, took time to 'praise their common bonds' (Schulzinger, 1984, p. 4).

A joint selection committee was established to ensure that only members of the highest calibre were recruited and to avoid the fate of so many other learned societies that took on incompetent elements merely to help raise funds. The Institute was to be a working expert institution that would lead its field. A decision was taken to establish a record of the Paris Conference, to be edited by Temperley, with contributions from the Americans (Dockrill, 1980, p. 77).

Opposition to the Institute, particularly the proposal that officials become members and engage in discussions, came from the Foreign Office. Eyre Crowe, the Assistant Under Secretary, feared that the official view would come to dominate opinion in any forum in which officials and private citizens were represented; the fears were dismissed by Headlam-Morley, among others, but which others in the Foreign Office

echoed (Headlam-Morley, 1972, p. 132; Dockrill, 1980, p. 75). Old guard Foreign Office officials, as Dockrill argues, 'had long been unhappy about what [Crowe] described as the unwarranted interference in foreign affairs… "busy-bodies"'. In an official Foreign Office minute, Crowe feared that since the 'avowed object' of the Institute was to influence public opinion, assisted by its contact with public officials, the 'inverse' could also occur: that 'Outside opinion…may use the machinery to direct the policy of the Foreign Office into channels specially fertilizing those interests'. Only the Foreign Secretary or his agents are charged to responsibly educate public opinion, Crowe argued. Lord Curzon, the successor to Arthur Balfour as Foreign Secretary, considered the proposal 'subversive of discipline and derogatory to the authority of the Secretary of State'. In the end, Curtis relented on the issue of public officials' membership of the Institute and accepted Curzon's offer of 'helpful sympathy', and Curtis reassured officials that the Institute was to be a non-party organisation prohibited from expressing an institutional view and which would develop 'only on lines helpful to the Foreign Office…'. In addition, the Institute's founders 'hoped to learn unofficially from the Foreign Office the lines upon which the Institute, in the Foreign Office's view, could do useful work' (Dockrill, 1980, pp. 77–81). The relationship between the new Institute and the British state, therefore, prefigured several later compromises of the private group's professed independence.

The Institute separates into national branches

Upon returning to their respective homelands, however, the difficulties of organising the Institute were large: financially, organisationally and politically. The two sets of advisers returned to countries whose public were weary of war and the disappointments of peace-making, the general desire to 'return to normalcy', and rising anti-American and anti-British feeling. Despite their plans, therefore, circumstances demanded that there be two separate, but like-minded organisations, each representing its own country and restricted to its own nationals (Moser, 1999). This chapter now moves to consider the historical origins and social backgrounds of the members and leaders of Chatham House.

Chatham House

Chatham House was inaugurated on 5 July 1920 as the British Institute of International Affairs (BIIA; it gained a Royal Charter in 1926). It was to be an active, working institution for the scientific, non-political and

non-ideological study of foreign affairs; an expert organisation dedicated to educating the public, and furnishing policymakers with the factual basis upon which to make 'sound' policy and 'sound' public opinion. It would seek to attract membership from those best qualified to contribute to rational discussion based on qualifications and/or experience, particularly from the worlds of international business, academia, journalism and diplomatic or governmental experience. The Institute would draw its leaders and members from across the political spectrum. It was to occupy the political centre, a place for open discussion and independent thought.[4]

The BIIA, it was determined, was to establish a number of publications, including an annual register of international events, a quarterly review, and regular books and monographs on specific and general subjects based on in-depth study by organised experts. The Institute, however, was to eschew an institutional policy or 'line'; members were free to hold strong personal opinions but not to impose their views on to the organisation as a whole.

As the number of people who qualified as experts was small, the Institute placed a limit of 1000 members, later revised upwards. Four classes of members were targeted: officials from the Foreign, Colonial and other offices; foreign correspondents; politicians; and academics.[5]

In the course of its first decade, Chatham House established a series of publications that came to be indispensable to newspaper editors, scholars, Members of Parliament, and to sections of the public. In addition, the Institute developed a meetings programme featuring speakers who were qualified by expertise or experience. Its individual and group study system produced numerous memoranda and monographs that were read by policymakers, academics and journalists. Under the editorship of Arnold Toynbee, the Institute's annual *Survey of International Affairs*, an ambitious attempt to record contemporary history, achieved an international readership. The Institute's *Journal* (renamed *International Affairs* in 1931) remains one of the leading reviews in the field, though its early aim was to publicise its own study group and lecture programmes. In addition, Chatham House produced the *British Yearbook of International Law* and a *Bulletin of International News* (Morgan, 1994). Its publications also helped to establish the discipline of international history in the universities, particularly the monumental six-volume study, *History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, an early example of the Institute's determination to publish policy-relevant research (Sharp, 1994).

Funding for the institute came from the City of London, Wall Street and American philanthropic foundations. Curtis's ability to elicit funds was fundamental to the success of Chatham House. Early benefactors included JP Morgan and Co. banker, Thomas Lamont, who donated

£2000 to finance the writing and publication of the Institute's six-volume history of the Peace Conference; Lord Astor, the proprietor of *The Times* and *Observer*; Sir Abe Bailey, South African mine owner; Cecil Power provided £10,000 to assist with building a new meeting hall; and Sir Daniel Stevenson set up an endowment fund of £20,000 to finance the annual *Survey of International Affairs* (Parmar, 1992, p. 30).

Further funds came from various British banks and corporations: the Bank of England offered £6000 over a three-year period, while by the mid-1930s nearly 50 firms (including ICI and Barclays Bank) were donating funds on a regular basis. American sources proved highly important to the development of the Institute. John D. Rockefeller personally donated £3000 for general purposes, while the Carnegie UK Trustees helped with a £3000 gift to establish the Institute's library. Most significantly, in 1932, the Rockefeller Foundation awarded £40,000 over a five-year period to fund research using the study group method (Parmar, 1992, p. 31). Such funding by American philanthropy continued throughout the 1930s and 1940s, providing a relatively secure financial basis for the growth of the institute into the most important and prestigious centre of foreign affairs analysis in Britain.

Clement Jones, in a letter outlining the origins of Chatham House, emphasised a key point about the nature of the institution and its principal inspiration, Lionel Curtis. '. . . a world-wide institution; with endless opportunities for making contacts with all sorts and conditions of men; and, at the centre, a relatively small, hard-working office, embodying the group idea, the team . . . '.[6] As one of his Oxford students stated, Curtis 'believed the way to spread an idea was to capture the elite and convert them and they . . . would spread the ideas' (Parmar, 1995b, p. 66). It is to the nerve centre of the Institute's elite – its leaders and members – that attention now turns. Who were they? What were their social origins and links with the wider foreign policy establishment?

The Chatham House elite

The following section of this chapter analyses the list of 756 founding members for general indications of their status or occupation, based on information provided by members themselves; it then analyses the data related to the RIIA's 103 Presidents and Council officers in four sample years: 1920, 1930, 1940 and 1950. Together, the evidence underlines the elitist character and connections of Chatham House.

The list of the Institute's 756 original members, and of those invited to join, demonstrates the numerous connections between Chatham House and sections of the British elite,[7] including the most active

elements of the British establishment such as the armed services, civil service, academia, business and politics.

There were 106 military officers of high rank, including Brigadier-General J.G. Dill, who was Chief of the Imperial General Staff (1940–41) and Head of the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington, DC (1941–44). Of the 174 members with political or civil service affiliations, 31 were Members of Parliament, such as Austen Chamberlain and J.R. Clynes;[8] 19 were, or later became, diplomats, for example, Ronald Lindsay, ambassador to the United States, 1930–39. There were 42 officials from the Foreign Office alone, including Frank Ashton-Gwatkin, Assistant Under-Secretary and Chief Clerk, 1940–44.

The academic world featured strongly with 113 representatives including Sir William Beveridge, Director of the London School of Economics (1919–37), and Charles Kingsley Webster (Liverpool, Aberystwyth and London universities), secretary of the military section of the British delegation at Paris in 1919, director of the British Library of Information in New York, 1941–42, and adviser to the Foreign Office during UN planning, 1943–46. Of the 113 academics, 86 were connected with Oxford and Cambridge universities.

A final indication of the elite character of the Institute was the high number of titled members. Of the 756 original members, there were no less than 88 peers of the realm and knights, and 142 officers and commanders of the British Empire. Quite clearly, the Institute's Provisional Committee based its recruitment policy on a fairly narrow section of British society.

While the above is summarised from the original members' list, a more detailed analysis of the Institute's leading figures – members of its governing Council and Presidents – for four sample years (1920, 30, 40, 50) is also highly instructive. There were 135 Presidents and Council members in those four years, decreasing to 103 when individuals serving more than one term are taken into account.[9] Among the Presidents (albeit a largely honorary position, but indicative of an organisation's credibility and standing) can be found Winston Churchill, Anthony Eden, Stanley Baldwin, David Lloyd George and Ernest Bevin.[10] Council members include Denis Healey, Arthur Creech Jones, Lord Hailey of the Colonial and Sir Orme Sargent of the Foreign Office, Marshalls of the Royal Air Force, Viscount Portal and Lord Trenchard, and the historian, E.L. Woodward.[11]

Of the 103 Chatham House leaders under analysis, 56 were born in England, nine in Scotland, one in Ireland, and none in Wales, which is largely what would be expected. Eighteen others were born in the United Kingdom but their biographical data are incomplete. Four were born

within the colonies (one, William Beveridge in India) and dominions (three, A.W. Leeper and W.K. Hancock in Australia, and Campbell Stuart in Canada). The United States, Norway and France each contributed one RIIA leader (Waldorf Astor, Karl Knudsen and Alanbrook, respectively). By birth and residence, Chatham House leaders were very much centred on London and the Home Counties.

Generationally, 59 Chatham House leaders were born between 1870 and 1899, 43 between 1880 and 1910, and only 11 between 1900 and 1920. The 1840s and 1850s contributed only one leader each; only three were born in the 1910s. No information was available on 20 leaders. In terms of national developments, the last 30 years of the nineteenth century saw the heyday of British imperialism, the scramble for Africa, British industrial and trading supremacy, the growth of global competition (with the rise of Germany, USA and Japan), an era of British power and the beginnings of anxieties about competitors. Many modern British institutions, such as the public schools and universities, saw their rise or underwent modernisation in this era.

Aggregate findings, demonstrating the exclusive character of Chatham House, under the following categories – educational background, political office, civil service and armed forces' connections, corporate directorships, academia, trades unions, other societies and organisations, religious affiliations, gender balance, and elite club memberships – are summarised below. The information is derived largely from *Who Was Who*, *Who's Who of British MPs*, the *Directory of Directors*, and other directories.

Sixty-three of the 75 Council members (84 per cent) upon whom schooling data were available experienced a public (that is, private) school education. Twenty-nine (38 per cent) had attended a top 'Clarendon' school, such as Eton (13 attendances recorded), Harrow or Rugby. Fifty-six of them (74 per cent) went on to attend Oxford University (36; 14 attended Balliol College and 8, New College) or Cambridge (20); ten attended other universities, while ten trained at Dartmouth Naval College and Woolwich and Sandhurst military academies.

Educational background

CH Council members	School info. available on	No. and % from public school		Clarendon schools (Eton, Harrow, etc.)	
103	75	63	84%	29	38%
Oxford univ.	Cambridge univ.	Other univs		Naval/Military academies	
36	20	10		10	

NB: Some Council members attended more than one university.

Political office

The sample of 103 Institute leaders contained 31 MPs, of whom twelve were Conservatives, ten Labour, seven Liberals and two independents. At one time or another, 28 of the RIIA figures held ministerial positions. For example, those 28 enjoyed eight periods of prime ministerial power, six terms each at the helms of the Foreign and Colonial Offices, and four in charge of the exchequer. In all, those 28 members held 112 governmental positions between them.

Civil service and military links

Sixty of the 103 leaders held, at one time or another, 241 posts of this kind. Twenty positions were held in the Foreign Office, 13 in the Ministry of Information, nine in the War Office and 16 in the British Embassy in Washington, DC.

Corporate directorships

Fifty-seven of the 103 leaders (55 per cent) had held at least one directorship. Altogether, the 57 directors held 174 directorships in some of the largest industrial, commercial and financial institutions in the country and Empire. Lt George Macdonogh, for example, was director of several leading corporations, including the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation and Venezuelan Oil Concessions, Ltd, while Sir Andrew McFadyean directed the British North Borneo and twelve other imperial concerns. Sir Roderick Jones was a director of the international news agency, Reuters. Lord Astor, Chairman of the Chatham House Council, owned the *Times* and *Observer* newspapers.

Academic positions

Twenty two academics represented the universities, although many more were involved in the Institute's affairs in other capacities. The 22 academics on the Council held, at one time or another, up to 57 posts between them, of which 32 were at Oxford (25) or Cambridge University (7); 14 posts were at other British universities, and 11 posts were at foreign institutions, including Harvard, Princeton and Calcutta.

In addition to such academic connections, there were nine university chancellors and vice-chancellors on the CH Council, 15 members of university governing boards, and eight university wardens, rectors and proctors. There were four headmasters and governors of public (that is, private) schools as well. Elite schools and universities were, therefore, closely connected to Chatham House.

Trades unions

Trades unionists were heavily under-represented at Chatham House. Given that John Clynes, MP and former leader of the National Union of General and Municipal Workers, had been in the Council from its inauguration, and that at least part of the Institute's inspiration was the rise of the voice of labour due to the Russian Revolution, one might have expected a greater inflow of trades unionists. Even Clynes, however, was a career politician by the time of his elevation to the Council, as were the other labour leaders, Ernest Bevin and Arthur Creech Jones. In fact, only Creech Jones of the labour leaders made it on to the governing Council. In practice, therefore, organised labour was hardly represented at all.[12]

Other societies and organisations

Chatham House leaders were well connected with a number of other imperial societies such as the Royal Empire Society (6 Council members, including Creech Jones, Philip Kerr and Lord Grey); the Victoria League (1); English-Speaking Union (2); Primrose League (1); Rhodes Trust (1); Royal African Society (2); the Commonwealth Press Union (2). In addition, several leaders were active within the Round Table movement, including Lionel Curtis and Robert Brand.

Religious affiliations

Although information on religious affiliations is difficult to obtain, it is clear that Chatham House was led by Anglican Christians, a matter for further consideration in Chapter 3. That several of the leaders of the Institute were connected with the church through family ties is also clear: the fathers of seven of the leaders were anglican priests, including that of Curtis; similarly, fathers-in-law of seven of the leaders were priests. On its own, such data does not appear very significant. In conjunction with other sources and evidence, however, the role of Christianity in the ethos and culture of Chatham House is highly significant. There was one Jewish leader, Viscount Herbert Samuel.

Gender

There were six women among the 103 presidents and Council members, nearly all of whom had a strong interest in the League of Nations. They were: Mrs Oliver Strachey[13] ('Ray'), the constitutional feminist activist; Mrs Alfred (Dame Edith) Lyttleton, the wife of the Rt Hon. Alfred Lyttleton, former Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1903–05 (Dame Edith was active in the League of Nations); Mrs Edgar Dugdale (Blanche Elizabeth Campbell),

who was also active in League of Nations affairs, as head of intelligence (1920–28) and as member of the British delegation to the League in 1932; Mrs M.A. Hamilton, MP (Labour, 1929–31) and British delegate to the League of Nations in 1929 and 1930; Mrs Barbara Wooton, academic in labour and social studies; and Miss Elizabeth Monroe (League of Nations secretariat, 1931; RIIA staff, 1933; Rockefeller Fellow, 1936–37; director of Middle Eastern Division of the Ministry of Information, 1940; diplomatic correspondent of the *Observer*, 1944; on staff of *The Economist*, 1945–58; Fellow of St Anthony's College, Oxford, 1963–75).

Although women are clearly under-represented, Chatham House may be considered relatively enlightened for its time. At least, as we shall see, it was more progressive in this regard than its American counterpart.[14]

Elite social clubs

According to Max Weber, membership of an exclusive club is the 'essential mark of a gentleman'. Of the 103 leaders, club membership information was available on 66 (64 per cent), who frequented at least 53 clubs. Thirty-four members belonged to just one club, while 32 belonged to two or more. Those 66 club members held a total of 129 memberships, with 12 clubs accounting for 94 (72 per cent) memberships. The Athenaeum claimed 20 members; Brooks's 15; Travellers' and Reform 9 each; Carlton, 8; University Club, 7; National Liberal, 6. Finally, five memberships were accounted for by American-based clubs, such as the Century in New York City.

The Institute was firmly entrenched in British elite circles, rather than being representative of the population as a whole. What were the effects of Chatham House of being led by such elites? How did those social and other indicators affect attitudes to society, politics and the development of a 'world-view'? These are questions to be addressed in Chapter 3, but it may as well be signalled now that such backgrounds and affiliations are likely, at the very least, to encourage and foster 'conservative' attitudes that favour either the maintenance of the status quo or the effective 'management' of change in order radically not to disturb existing patterns of power. Clearly, the leaders of Chatham House fell into the latter category. The chapter now turns to an analysis of the origins of the CFR and to a study of its leadership.

Council on Foreign Relations

Upon the peace-makers' return to the United States, the difficulties of organisation along with the rise of a virulent anti-British rhetoric in

Congress almost dashed the hopes of the Institute's American supporters. Consequently, Shepardson and Isaiah Bowman established an independent research group which merged with a pre-existing discussion group (Council on Foreign Relations) headed by Elihu Root, Theodore Roosevelt's secretary of state. The new organisation – also to be called the Council on Foreign Relations – came into being under New York state law on 29 July 1921 (Schulzinger, 1984, pp. 5–7).

The new CFR aimed to be above party politics and signalled its intent by deliberately appointing one well-known millionaire Wall Street lawyer from each of the Republican and Democratic parties – George W. Wickersham and John W. Davis – to President and Chairman of the Board respectively.

The CFR aimed to continue the wartime cooperation between 'men of action' and academics into peacetime (Shepardson, 1960, p. 6). Not content with the 'ivory tower' of ideas for their own sake, the men – there were no women admitted until 1969 – of CFR set up an organisation that was designed to bring 'together experts on statecraft, finance, industry, education and science'. The Council also wanted to 'enlighten' public opinion (CFR, 1947, p. 7). Their views about public opinion formation were identical to those of their British counterparts, as discussions in Paris had shown (Dockrill, 1980, p. 665). In addition, the CFR wanted to influence policymakers. As the Council's survey of its first quarter-century states, it had two principal functions: 'to obtain and evaluate the facts about the relations of the United States with foreign countries; and to make the facts, and the evaluations available to members, government agencies, and the public' (CFR, 1947, p. 62).

The CFR was convinced of its own objective, detached, patriotic and scientific character, aiming to establish an impartial and 'continuous conference on foreign affairs. Similarly, the CFR's journal, *Foreign Affairs*, was also said to be politically value-free and scientific, as were its study groups. *Foreign Affairs* had one overriding aim: "to provide the best opinion procurable" (CFR, 1920, pp. 4–6, 11–12, 37) and its contributors have included everyone from Nikolai Bukharin to Henry Kissinger' (Palmer, 1973; Roberts, 2001a).[15]

The Council's work was not pursued merely as an end in itself: 'it is done because it is needed for an understanding of the major international problems now calling for solution'.[16] Accordingly, Council membership was restricted to American citizens with experience or expertise in foreign affairs. As the numbers of the adequately qualified were bound to be small, membership was less than 120 in 1920. By 1946, this had risen to over 550 members in New York and 300 outside the metropolitan area (CFR, 1920, 1947).

To be successful, the CFR required substantial funds, and these it acquired from its members, well-wishers, and very importantly through the active support of two major philanthropic foundations – Rockefeller and the Carnegie Corporation. Numerous studies of the foundations show that they use their funds for the benefit of existing elites by acting as 'gatekeepers of ideas' through funding certain lines of research at the expense of others (Berman, 1983; Parmar, 1999b, 2002a,b). The Rockefeller Foundation (RF), being especially interested in international studies, was the biggest such source of funds for the Council, providing almost $700,000 between 1928 and 1945.[17] The Carnegie Corporation (CC) also contributed hundreds of thousands of dollars to the Council over the years, mainly to assist the latter's 'adult education' functions.[18] One particular 'educational' project originated and funded by CC and operated by the Council was the establishment of regional study groups and foreign relations committees in numerous cities across the USA in 1938[19] (further details in Chapter 6).

The Council elite

An analysis of the Council's leading members has been conducted for the 1921–46 period, during which the organisation was led by 55 Officers and Directors. Among the CFR leaders were two individuals descended from the earliest colonists: Armstrong was descended from Peter Stuyvesant, the last Dutch governor of New Amsterdam, while Walter H. Mallory claimed to be a descendant of the leader of the pilgrims on the *Mayflower*. In general, CFR leaders were among the most successful men of their generation.

On the whole, CFR leaders had been born in towns and cities on the east coast: 22 out of the 55, of whom 14 were born in New York. Of the others upon whom information was available (17), eight were born in the midwest, four in the south, four abroad (Bowman in Canada; Warburg and Kahn in Germany; May and Williams in Britain), and only one on the west coast (Altschul – San Francisco).

Generationally, the majority (30) of the CFR's 55 leaders were born during the period between 1870 and 1899; 20 of those 30 had been born during the 1870s and 1880s. The 1840s, 1850s and 1900s each contributed only one leader of the Council. Nine were born during the 1860s. It is clear, therefore, that the principal factors in United States historical development that formed the backdrop to the personal development of the CFR's leaders was the aftermath of the Civil War (1861–65), the rise of big business, the development of a more distinct national upper class,

mass immigration, urbanisation, the closing of the western 'frontier', and the rise of US imperialism.

Educational backgrounds

Information on 25 of the CFR's 55 leaders was available. Fourteen leaders attended private schools, including Groton (Frank Polk) and the Volkmann School in Boston (Edward Warner). Two Council leaders were privately tutored. Nine attended state schools in their areas of residence.

Of the 55 officers and directors (for those upon whom educational information was available), 35 (64 per cent) had attended at least one institution of higher education; in total, they had studied at 76 such institutions. Thirty-five attendances were recorded for Ivy League universities: Harvard (12), Columbia (9) and Yale (7); Pennsylvania (4) and Princeton (3). Six attendances were recorded for overseas universities, including two at Oxford (Rhodes scholar, Shepardson and Wesley Clair Mitchell).

Occupational data

Occupationally, CFR leaders were dominated by two professions: law and academia. Of the 14 corporate lawyers, who made up 25 per cent of the Council's leadership, Wall Street firms predominated , including some of the most prestigious and 'blue-blooded'. For example, there was CFR President (1933–36) George W. Wickersham, of Cadwalader, Wickersham and Taft; John W. Davis of Davis, Polk, Wardwell, Gardiner and Reed; Russell C. Leffingwell (before he joined JP Morgan and Co. in 1923) of Cravath and Henderson; and Allen W. Dulles of Sullivan and Cromwell (Smigel, 1964; Barnet, 1972).[20]

Among the 19 academics, making up 34 per cent of the CFR's leadership, Ivy League universities were most frequently represented in fields such as international economics, political science and international relations. One of the leading political geographers in the United States, Isaiah Bowman, a lecturer at Yale University (1905–15), was a Council director and vice-president; leading economist, Edwin F. Gay of Harvard (1920–36), was a senior Council official and director. Other key academics included: Wesley Clair Mitchell, who taught economics at numerous universities, including Harvard, Columbia, Oxford and Cornell; Archibald Coolidge Cary, the Russian expert at Harvard; John Williams, the Harvard economist; and international legal expert, Philip Jessup, at Columbia.

Further links with academia were represented by several university presidents: Bowman went on to lead Johns Hopkins University (1935–50); Henry M. Wriston (Brown); John Huston Finley (State University of

New York); David Franklin Houston (University of Texas); and Harold Dodds (Princeton).

Five of the fifty-five officers and directors held positions within academic professional associations such as the American Geographical Society (Bowman), American Economic Association (Mitchell; Leffingwell), the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (Coolidge) and the Social Science Research Council (Winfield Rieffler of the Institute of Advanced Study, Princeton). Four of the CFR's leaders were also members of British societies with royal patronage, such as the Royal Statistical Society (Mitchell), the Royal Economics Society (Leffingwell; Gay; Mitchell) and the Royal Geographical Society (Bowman).

Finally, a number of CFR leaders held positions on the boards of trustees of important intellectual actors, or intellectual gatekeepers, such as the Carnegie and Rockefeller foundations. In all, 11 (20 per cent) of the 55 leaders held such positions, mainly within the various Carnegie organisations: Carnegie (UK) Trustees (Shepardson); Carnegie Corporation (Leffingwell); Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching (Wriston; Dodds); the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Elihu Root; Malcolm W. Davis; and Philip C. Jessup); the Carnegie Institution of Washington (Root; Wickersham); and the Carnegie Institution of Technology (Otto Kahn). CFR leaders were also represented within Rockefeller philanthropy by Shepardson, Charles P. Howland, Lewis Douglas and Harold Dodds. Finally, there were CFR connections with the Sage and Alfred P. Sloan foundations. Such overlapping connections between CFR men and foundation trustees are all the more significant due to the level of funding of CFR activities by the Carnegie and Rockefeller philanthropy (Whitaker, 1974).[21]

Business connections

The 55 CFR leaders held *at least* (precise figures are difficult to establish as several entries in *Who Was Who in America* end with the words, 'and many more.') 81 corporate directorships, *not including the law firm partnerships* already alluded to (which are businesses in their own right). The corporations concerned were among the largest in the United States: Myron C. Taylor of US Steel and AT&T; Lewis Fraser, Owen D. Young and Philip D. Reed of General Electric; Clarence M. Wooley and Lewis W. Douglas of General Motors; and Frank Polk, Douglas, John H. Finley, David F. Houston and Reed of the Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York.

There are also several connections with investment and other banks: Russell C. Leffingwell was director and past chairman of JP Morgan

and Co. (1923–40); Norman H. Davis, trustee of the Bank of New York; Clarence E. Hunter rose through the ranks of the New York Trust Company; Paul M. Warburg of Kuhn, Loeb, and Co. and International Acceptance Bank; Leon Fraser of First National Bank of the City of New York; Otto Kahn of Kuhn, Loeb; Owen D. Young of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York; William Burden (of the Vanderbilt family) was, among others, director of Brown Brothers Harrimann; and Frank Altschul of Lehman-Goldman, Sachs.

In addition to those banking world connections, numerous CFR leaders directed or were on the board of trustees of several leading insurance and investment companies, including Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York (Frank Polk, Clarence Wooley, Leon Fraser, Lewis Douglas and David F. Houston), General American Investors Company (Frank Altschul), Atlantic Mutual Life Insurance (Wooley), Mortgage Bond Company of New York (Charles P. Howland), Equitable Life Insurance Company (John H. Finley), Prudential Insurance Company (Harold W. Dodds) and Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (Philip Reed).

Finally, the CFR leadership group under analysis also featured a number of leaders of American business associations, indicating a higher-level awareness of the importance of representing business interests in general. For example, there were two Council men connected with the National Industrial Conference Board (Clarence Hunter and Myron C. Taylor), and one with each of the following associations: the Bankers' Association for Foreign Trade (Hunter), the elite Committee for Economic Development (Philip Reed of General Electric), the Business Advisory Council (Taylor), the International Chamber of Commerce (Reed) and the US Chamber of Commerce (Douglas). Two other associations with business patronage drew the attentions of certain CFR men: the National Planning Association (Frank Altschul and Myron Taylor) and the Twentieth Century Fund (Winfield Rieffler). The latter associations have often been identified as representing 'corporate liberalism' in the twentieth century (Eakins, 1966).

Politics and government

Twelve of the fifty-five leaders (22 per cent) had been appointed to a variety of US presidential Cabinet and sub-Cabinet posts in the course of their careers, including a Secretary of State (Elihu Root), Secretary of War (Root), an Attorney-General (George Wickersham) and a Secretary to the Treasury (David F. Houston). There was also a Secretary of Agriculture (David F. Houston) and a Solicitor-General (John W. Davis), and four Assistant Secretaries of the Navy (Edward P. Warner), of Commerce

(William Burden) and of the Treasury (Leffingwell and Norman H. Davis). There were two Under-Secretaries of State (Frank Polk and Norman H. Davis).

In the realm of electoral politics, CFR men were conspicuous by their absence. John W. Davis was the most active in that regard, having been the (unsuccessful) Democratic presidential nominee in 1900 and official candidate in 1924. He did, however, represent West Virginia in the House of Representatives, 1911–15. Elihu Root (Republican) represented New York State in the Senate, 1909–15, while Lewis Douglas (Democratic Party) went to the US House of Representatives, 1927–33 (Browder and Smith, 1986). Only 17 of the 55 CFR men declared their political party affiliations, eight being Republicans and nine Democrats.

Thirty of the Council's officers and directors (55 per cent) reported numerous connections with the federal bureaucracy, 21 of which were with the State Department alone. For example: there were two ambassadors to Britain (John Davis, ambassador extraordinary, 1918–21 and Lewis Douglas, 1947); three special assistants to the US ambassador to Britain (Shepardson, 1942 and 1943–46; Armstrong, 1944; and Rieffler, 1942–44). There were two special assistants to the US Secretary of State (Bowman and Finletter) during the Second World War. Several other Council leaders served as advisers to the Treasury (Leffingwell, Norman Davis, Cravath).

At least nine of the 55 CFR leaders had been at the Paris Peace Conference as official delegates, including the Head of the US delegation, Frank Polk. They included men such as Norman Davis, Walter Lippmann, Allen W. Dulles, Cravath, Shepardson, Archibald Coolidge and Owen D. Young. Indeed, CFR men continued in various ways to represent the United States at international conferences throughout the interwar years. For example, Norman Davis played a leading role in several economic and naval conferences, including the London Naval Conference, 1935. Leon Fraser was a member of the US team at the London Conference of 1933, while both he and Owen Young had played leading roles in drawing up the Dawes and Young (German reparations) plans during the 1920s.

During the Second World War itself, numerous CFR leaders spent time in London, representing either the State Department, as advisers/assistants to the Secretary of State, or as assistants to the US ambassador: for example, Isaiah Bowman, Winfield Rieffler, Shepardson and Hamilton Fish Armstrong. In addition, Edward P. Warner was a part of America's London-based team on the Lend–Lease programme in 1941. Myron C. Taylor presided over discussions on Anglo-American Postwar Economic Problems in 1943, while Philip Reed headed the US Mission on

Economic Affairs between 1942 and 1945. Several played key roles in wartime planning and negotiations associated with the Bretton Woods Agreements and the United Nations Organisation. In particular, Isaiah Bowman played a key role in the formation of the United Nations (for further details, see Chapter 5).

Other societies and organisations

Several CFR leaders were active in other foreign affairs organisations that complemented the Council. For example, Winfield Rieffler was director of the Foreign Policy Association, a national society that promoted broad interest in international relations from a 'liberal internationalist' perspective; Stephen P. Duggan was director of the Institute of International Education which promoted student and scholarly exchange programmes; Frank Altschul was chairman of the international committee of the National Planning Association; Otto Kahn was vice-president of the English Speaking Union, of which Lewis Douglas was a member; and Elihu Root, Malcolm Davis and Philip Jessup played leading roles in the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. There were also six Pilgrims Society members among the Council's leadership: Polk, Altschul, Walter Mallory, Clarence Woolley, Leon Fraser and Lewis Douglas.

There were no trades unionists in leadership positions within the CFR, although some of its regional Committees on Foreign Relations, formed in 1938, did try (not very successfully) to recruit union leaders. According to one regional committee secretary, the failure to recruit organised labour leaders had as much to do with the Council's elitism as it had to do with 'suspicion on the part of labor leaders that they will lose caste with the rank and file workers if they associate too closely with business and industrial leaders . . . '[22].

Religious affiliations, race and ethnicity

Just 25 of the 55 CFR leaders declared their religious affiliations in *Who Was Who in America* (or had such information provided for them in *American National Biography*). Twenty-one of those twenty-five were Protestants (eight episcopalians, followed by three presbyterians, a baptist, a congregationalist, a methodist and a unitarian; six did not mention a specific denomination). Denomination is clearly related to social status. As one view suggests, 'A Methodist is a Baptist who wears shoes and has learned to read and write; a Presbyterian is a Methodist who went to college' (McCormick and LaFeber, 1993, p. 101). Max Weber noted that 'sect membership meant a certificate of moral qualification and especially of business morals for the individual', a means

of social and economic mobility and respectability (Gerth and Mills, 1991, p. 305).

There were four Jews (Frank Altschul, Otto Kahn, Paul Warburg and Walter Lippmann). The inclusion of Jews in the CFR is notable, especially during the 1920s, as Jews were then being excluded from Ivy League universities, such as Columbia, Wall Street law firms, east coast elite resorts and clubs. This suggests that although the Council was an authentic expression of the east coast elite, it was sufficiently open to *like-minded* men of distinction regardless of ethnicity or religion. Nevertheless, there were no self-declared catholics in the CFR in the period under review, nor were there any African-Americans (Grose, 1996).[23] In sum, then, the CFR was a largely white Anglo-Saxon protestant (WASP) organisation which, while unsurprising, is of some significance in regard to its outlook on world affairs and Anglo-American relations.

Gender

No women were permitted to join the Council until 1969. The reasons for this policy of exclusion are unclear. Even an invitation to Vera Micheles Dean (of the Foreign Policy Association) to address a Council meeting in 1946 caused uproar. However, the arguments *against* opening the CFR to female membership are instructive: some argued that women may not be able to keep secrets; that their judgement may not be 'sound'; that women may reduce the candour of the men. One member even suggested that 'inviting ladies to join the Council would be like the Union League taking in Communists' (Schulzinger, 1984, pp. 213–14). Upon a narrowly successful vote to admit women, one CFR man was reduced to tears!

Elite social clubs

The elite social club was central to the CFR's leaders, each of whom held, on average, at least three memberships. In all, 185 club memberships were declared by the 55 Council men. While 11 CFR leaders (20 per cent) declared no club memberships, Myron C. Taylor held 20 alone. The most popular club was the Century in New York City, with 23 memberships from among the 44 club-goers; that is, 52 per cent. Clearly, the Century, 'a private club for men of accomplishment in the arts and sciences as well as business and public affairs', was a key institution for the elite of New York (Chadwin, 1968, p. 44). Twelve memberships were held in the Metropolitan Club in Washington, DC, ten at the Cosmos in the same city, and seven at the Knickerbocker Club in New York. Other clubs of significance include the Harvard (6), University (8), and Down Town (6).

In addition, nine CFR men were members of eight British clubs: Athaeneum (Shepardson, Douglas, Thomas K. Finletter, Dodds and Edward P. Warner); Royal Automobile (Clarence Wooley and Myron C. Taylor); Royal Aero (Warner); Reform (Winfield Rieffler); and Buck's (William Burden); White's (Burden and Douglas); Houghton (Douglas); and The Other (Douglas).

Social background, in any society, is a powerful factor in determining an individual's social, economic and political behaviour, and the restricted backgrounds of Council leaders had a very important bearing on their world-view and predisposition towards the world and Anglo-American cooperation.

As may be seen, the leadership of the two think tanks – Chatham House and the Council – was drawn from a fairly narrow circle of each society, from those who were relatively wealthy, educated at some of the best institutions, employed by important organisations within the business/legal and/or academic worlds, and linked with their respective foreign affairs bureaucracies and governments. The leaders of the Council and Chatham House were among the foremost foreign affairs activists in their societies, filled with a passionate belief in the rightness of their cause and of their own ability to remake the world and ensure peace, freedom, prosperity, stability and progress.

This chapter has examined the sources of leadership of the two bodies and shown that, in terms of their position, they were strategically located to be influential in the foreign policy of their countries and in the discussion of foreign affairs generally. They were connected with their states and makers of foreign policy, with international/imperial businesses, other internationalist foreign affairs societies, with organs of the press and other media, with students in the universities, and with their armed forces. The two shared a common background, on the whole, of christianity, a proselytising religion of those armed with the 'truth' with a sense of duty and mission urging them to spread the 'Word'.[24]

The most important differences between the two think tanks appear to be their divergent attitudes towards the role of women, their connections with electoral politics, business, and to some extent in their school backgrounds. Nevertheless, the differences, in practice, are of little consequence though they may provide some indication of the efficacy of American exceptionalist arguments, particularly those related to the greater levels of openness and meritocracy of American society. Chatham House clearly featured women in leadership positions while the Council excluded them for the first 50 years. The Council's founders, therefore, did not take seriously the demands of American women, recently

enfranchised in 1920, for inclusion in the opportunities offered by their society, while Chatham House was committed to inclusion, in principle, from the very beginning. Even here, however, the women of Chatham House were not especially active within the organisation and their names do not appear with any significant frequency, except at a secretarial level, when important questions are being discussed. That is, while not necessarily tokenistic, the presence of women on the Chatham House Council was politically not very significant.[25]

Chatham House was more closely linked with the House of Commons than was the Council to the US Congress (almost a third of the Chatham House leaders were MPs while just three CFR men had sat in Congress). While no CFR man had enjoyed the office of the US presidency (only John W. Davis had even contested the office), Chatham House leaders had exercised eight periods of prime ministerial power. Here again, however, men such as Winston Churchill and Lloyd George had played no practical role in Chatham House affairs; nor had most of their leaders drawn from Parliament.

The CFR was far more attached to the worlds of business and finance than was its British counterpart, which probably also accounts for the non-participation of labour leaders within the organisation. While nine CFR leaders held important positions in key business organisations, only three of their Chatham House counterparts could claim likewise.

Professionally, lawyers played a greater role in the CFR than in Chatham House. Over a third of CFR men were academics, compared with just over a fifth of Chatham House leaders. It should be noted, however, that the academics of Chatham House were very active within the organisation, making up for their relative under-representation.

In regard to their connections with the Whitehall and Washington, DC, bureaucracies, both institutes were similar: 58 per cent of Chatham House and 55 per cent of CFR leaders were so connected. The CFR men, however, were more likely to be connected with the US State Department (38 per cent) than were Chatham House leaders with the Foreign Office (20 per cent). Ironically, this probably provides support for the exceptionalist argument: being a weak state, the US needed far more input from external elites, especially in time of war, in contrast to the more centralised British foreign affairs machine.

Possibly the most important difference between the two institutes lay in the school backgrounds of their leaders. While 84 per cent of the Chatham House sample had attended public schools (that is, socially exclusive private schools), just over 50 per cent of the Council's leaders had been privately educated. This is important in demonstrating the

greater meritocracy of the Council's recruitment. Private schooling, much more than elite university attendance, indicates upper class origin, as C. Wright Mills argues (Mills, 1956, p. 67). The CFR, therefore, was more open to talent and ability than was Chatham House. The Council was also a little more open to Jews, with four in leading positions, in contrast to Chatham House's one.

Overall, there is something to be said for the American exceptionalist argument though, in practice, its consequences may not have been especially significant. Of course, there is also much material presented above that backs up the assumptions and expectations of corporatism, instrumental Marxism and Gramscian theory. The pluralist argument, however, is severely undermined by the evidence above. Chatham House and the CFR were mired in a complex web of connections with a wide range of other organisations and institutions, undermining the pluralist assumption that independent, special interest groups compete for influence against others who, similarly, are unconnected with the state. The evidence above makes clear that such an assumption is untenable.

Chapter 3 shows that the biographical breakdown provided above had powerful political, ideological, and other consequences for the kinds of ideas and policies pursued by Chatham House and the CFR. It outlines the sources and structure of the world-views held by the leaders of the two institutes of international affairs.

3
The World-view of Chatham House and the CFR

The previous chapter examined the aims and origins of Chatham House and the CFR, and the backgrounds of their leaders, indicating their socially exclusive character. However, in addition to understanding social backgrounds, it is important to examine the political and ideological consequences of such backgrounds; that is, their impact on the character of Chatham House's and the Council's political and other ideas and activities as they related to foreign affairs. Finally, it is important to acknowledge the idea that intellectuals' roles are powerfully influenced by the structure of employment/political opportunities, once their formal educational careers are behind them (Brym, 1980, pp. 15–18).

One aim of this chapter, therefore, is to examine and compare the attitudes held by the leading members of the Council and Chatham House. Were their ideas essentially similar? What was the source of their world-view, their ideological and political outlook? To what extent were their attitudes the product of their schooling or the prevailing climate of opinion during their formative years? What was the impact of their other connections – with universities, banks, the legal profession, with their ethnic/racial group – on their attitudes to their countries' national interests and their foreign affairs activities? In short, how were they affected by their social, economic, religious, ethnic, racial and other characteristics? Before that, however, it is important further to contextualise the leaders of the institutes, both in the world and domestically, as it is within those contexts that their ideas and attitudes developed and matured into particular foreign policy 'orientations'.

The global context, 1870s to 1930s

The development of a national leadership group or stratum does not occur in response to national dynamics alone: the changing pattern of global power relations ensures that a profound influence is exercised on the ideas and outlooks of national leaders. A nation's foreign policy, therefore, is always conditioned by global power relations, which can be the source of the most profound alterations of perception at national and state levels.

The last thirty years of the nineteenth and the first forty years of the twentieth centuries constituted an era of profound change. In that period global empires matured and fell, power shifted from one continent to another, the world was divided among the world's most powerful colonial states, there was a world war, the Great Depression, and the making of a second global conflagration. Power changed hands but not before several millions of people had perished in bloody warfare.

Britain and, to some extent, France were the two most important world powers throughout the period, even if their power was *relative* to the weaknesses of their actual or potential rivals, and was, in the long run, *declining* (Kennedy, 1989; Reynolds, 1991, p. 19). Britain was, during the last quarter of the nineteenth century, undoubtedly the world's greatest power, heading the largest empire known up to that time. With its huge naval force, a *Pax Britannica* was maintained, keeping open the world's sea routes, policing international trade and those who would challenge British supremacy. Constructed haltingly and arguably without any grand design, at its height the British Empire held over 500 million people – mostly in India – and covered 13 million square miles of territory, a quarter of the world's physical surface (Dutt, 1954). Such global power was founded on the fruits of the industrial revolution which, between 1760 and 1830, ensured that Britain produced about 66 per cent of Europe's industrial growth, and almost 10 per cent of world manufacturing output. Between 1830 and 1860, Britain's share of world industrial production leapt to almost a fifth, while in several areas, such as iron, coal and lignite, its share was 53 and 50 per cent respectively. Britain alone conducted 20 per cent of the world's commerce as a whole, and 40 per cent of its trade in industrial products (Kennedy, 1989, pp. 193–94). Between 1870 and 1914, Britain exported capital totalling £2.4 billion and received interest in the region of £4.1 billion (Sweezy and Magdoff, 1972, p. 33). Even during the Great Depression of the 1930s, Britain earned over £155 million from overseas investments (Paish, 1956).

Such economic and commercial dominance induced an enormous feeling of self-confidence in many sections of British society. Although the mood of the nation had changed somewhat by the end of the nineteenth century, the sense of world supremacy returned during the celebrations marking Queen Victoria's Diamond Jubilee in 1897. In reference to the troop contingents marching through London from every corner of the Empire, the *Daily Mail* noted: 'white men, yellow men, brown men, black men, every colour, every continent, every race, every speech .... And you begin to understand, as never before what the Empire amounts to' (Reynolds, 1991, p. 10). Yet the seeds of decline had already been sown – the rise of economic competitors through the spread of new technology, the stranglehold of laissez-faire ideology that had accompanied British supremacy and the failure to build adequate military means to defend the Empire.

Britain's global position declined also due to war. The Crimean War, as far back as the 1850s, had pointed up its neglect of the military (Kennedy, 1989, p. 196). The Boer War (1899–1902) further highlighted such infirmities, forcing Britain to expend huge resources to defeat inferior Boer guerilla forces, and to borrow money from the United States to pay for it (Reynolds, 1991, pp. 61, 68). The Great War of 1914–18 severely damaged Britain's position, despite victory, in regard to her overseas markets in Latin America, India and East Asia. Further market losses occurred during the interwar years, particularly in the Dominions, to the benefit of the United States (Dutt, 1954, p. 155; Ashworth, 1987, pp. 228–30; Reynolds, 1991, p. 105).

War, the undoing of Britain, was a key accelerator of the rise to globalism of the United States. From the end of the Civil War (1861–65) to the war against Spain in 1898, the United States was transformed into a world-class economic power, with profound consequences for the structure of global power. Agricultural output expanded across the board – wheat (256 per cent), corn (222 per cent) and refined sugar (460 per cent) – as did coal (800 per cent) and steel rails (523 per cent). Andrew Carnegie's mills alone produced more steel than the whole of England in 1901. By 1914, USA's per capita income topped the world (Kennedy, 1989, pp. 312–15). The Great War sealed US economic, financial and commercial domination, ending four hundred years of European supremacy. USA emerged in 1918 as the world's largest creditor nation, being owed £1.2 billion by the rest of the world, excluding government loans (Ashworth, 1987, p. 230). In 1913, America had accounted for 14 per cent of world exports; by 1937, USA exported 20 per cent of the world's manufactured goods alone. By 1939, USA owned overseas capital of

over $12 billion, almost $3 billion more than Britain's overseas assets. The financial centre of the world had shifted to the United States, from the City of London to New York's Wall Street (Aubrey, 1964, p. 13).

There were many insightful observers who understood the shape of things to come. Shortly *before* the outbreak of the Great War, Walter Hines Page, America's ambassador in London, declared that 'The future of the world belongs to us', raising the question of what the United States would do in such a position and how it might use Britain. In 1940, shortly *after* the outbreak of the Second World War, Virgil Jordan, head of the National Industrial Conference Board, predicted that as the United States had 'embarked on a career of imperialism in world affairs', the position of Britain would be reduced, 'At best . . . [to that of] a junior partner in a new Anglo-Saxon imperialism, in which the economic resources and military and naval strength of the United States will be the centre of gravity' (Dutt, 1954, pp. 149–51).

While the United States' challenge to British supremacy was predominantly economic, financial and commercial, there were others who constituted a military threat, principally Germany and Japan. Envious of Britain's imperial system and global markets, Germany and Japan saw Britain as the principal road block to their economic progress and prosperity. They wanted their 'place in the sun', 'lebensraum' or 'co-prosperity sphere' and that could be obtained only at the expense of the world's leading imperial power. And, as Britain was committed to maintaining by force that empire which it had acquired by military means, it was probably only a matter of time before a major war broke out (Parmar, 1995b).[1]

At the heart of Europe, with a rapidly expanding population which grew from 49 millions in 1871 to 66 millions in 1913, threatening French security and the European balance of power, Germany had developed a powerful military machine after unification, systems of social welfare and education, and a highly skilled, literate workforce (Kennedy, 1989, p. 270). Its industrial power – in the production of coal, steel, electrical goods and chemicals – was superior to that of Britain; its exports trebled between 1890 and 1913; its merchant navy was second in size only to Britain's; and its share of world manufacturing output (almost 15 per cent) was greater than that of Britain (13.6 per cent) and over twice France's (6.1 per cent).

When the first war to redivide the globe occurred, in 1914–18, Germany met defeat but despite the onerous peace at Paris in 1919, that country grew ever more powerful during the 1920s and 1930s. Even before the end of the 1920s, the German economy produced 12 per cent of the

manufactures of the world's seven leading economies (Krooth, 1980). Of course, the revival of German economic power was hit by the Great Depression but as Adolf Hitler and the Nazis were 'committed to altering the international order as soon as possible', a second war was almost certain (Kennedy, 1989, p. 400).

The rise of Japan, after the Meiji revolution in 1868, was even more spectacular but driven by very similar grievances to those harboured by Germany. Not even close to being a great power in 1890, Japan established its status through internal institutional modernisation, rapid industrialisation, and warfare – with the defeat of China in 1894–95, of Russia in 1904–05, participation in the First World War, and the invasion of Manchuria in 1931 (Minami, 1986, pp. 47–48; Kennedy, 1989, p. 266). By 1938, Japan overtook France in manufacturing output, felt even more acutely that it was being denied its 'due' in the international pecking order – markets and sources of raw materials – and began a massive programme of rearmament to resolve the issue. Behind the banner of 'Asia for the Asiatics', Japan challenged the supremacy of the European powers and carved out its own empire in Asia.

These may be said to be the principal contours of the global pattern of power in the period under consideration. In addition, it is important to bear in mind that the position and role of the Dominions and Colonies formed another key factor in the world. The increasingly assertive nationalism of Australia, New Zealand, Canada and South Africa, and the growing freedom movement in India, provided a further context within which the leaders of Chatham House and the CFR operated, against which they formulated their own ideas and responses (Thompson, 2000).[2]

The domestic context of the CFR

Clearly, the leaders of the CFR, in the main, were born and bred in the United States, a society that was undergoing enormous economic change from a relatively agricultural to an industrial society, with the attendant problems of such transitions – increased concentrations of wealth and income, class conflict, social strife, movements for political change, the importation of immigrant labour and movements of people from the countryside to the growing towns and cities (Faulkner, 1959). Such transformations fostered a series of new institutions, in effect, to assist society to cope with change. A national upper class developed (Mills, 1956; Baltzell, 1964) which in turn established new private schools and universities to help develop the next generation of leaders.

Rejecting localism and parochialism, such leaders would see USA in a national, and even international context (Eisenach, 1994). They moved beyond traditional isolationism and sought to extend the frontiers of freedom and US values, to bestow lesser peoples with the virtues of American representative institutions (Leuchtenberg, 1952–53; Rosenberg, 1982). In place of disorder, chaos, corruption and strife, far-sighted leaders of this type would seek to modernise American politics and national government, root out political corruption and machine politics, regulate big business, and more rationally and scientifically resolve the problems of poverty and the urban slum. The Progressive movement, in response to rapid change, sought to build a modern American state (Lagemann, 1989). In these regards, the men who founded the CFR belonged to a specific generation: their outlook on the world and their own society bore the imprint of the 1890s and 1900s, when most of those men were in their twenties (Mannheim, 1952; Lagemann, 1979). Equally significantly, American society provided ample opportunities to that specific generation's intellectuals to secure employment in a variety of careers that could serve to influence social and political reform.

The formation of the CFR – with its east coast-born or resident members, Ivy League university-educated Wall Street lawyers and financiers, government officials and academics – was emblematic of some of the deeper tendencies within American society that became increasingly apparent with the rise of the Progressive movement and the social engineering experiments of the Great War (Schaffer, 1991). There was a flowering of reform-oriented organisations, professional associations, academic societies and university institutions that were largely animated by the desire to use scientifically derived knowledge to improve Americans' quality of life, to alleviate poverty and social distress, to reform politics and government, and to transform the way Americans viewed themselves and their country's role and place in the world. As Eldon Eisenach argues, such organisations took on 'the characteristics of "parastate" institutions', claiming to stand for the 'collective ends of the national community'. Their own self-concept constituted them as 'the "authentic nation"', while the existing political parties and their institutions, it was charged, stood for narrow, selfish and sectional interests. Consequently, parastates shunned electoral politics because of its domination by corrupt demagogues and condemned legislatures for their parochialism. They tended to favour the extension of executive authority, however, as a vehicle for a broader, global view of American society, economy, politics and foreign affairs (Eisenach, 1994, p. 131).

The parastates' 'statist' proclivities were aptly summarised by one advocate who wrote that 'The state must be no external authority which restrains and regulates me, *but it must be myself acting as the state in every smallest detail of life*' (Eisenach, 1994, p. 131). According to this viewpoint, the 'good citizen' was 'state-oriented' in the sense of seeking to achieve a large public good in his actions in every sphere of life. The existence of such a spirit in the United States was of vital importance, particularly during the First World War. The parastates – churches, universities, reform organisations – mobilised Americans by the tens of thousand to assist the war effort: George Creel's Committee on Public Information, for example, mobilised 150,000 private citizens to promote the war, while the American Protective League galvanised 250,000 volunteers to identify anti-war and other 'un-American' elements in that society. The clergy, as Ray H. Abrams demonstrates, also served the war effort with enthusiasm, forging the unity of the church and state, legitimising the actions of both (Gruber, 1975, pp. 4–6).

Private agencies were taking seriously the problems of American society, politics, economy and culture. Furthermore, they were both studying society through the emerging techniques of academic social science and mobilising politically. In so doing, they became associated with agencies of the federal government that were relatively powerless to deal with the complex and deep-seated problems of early twentieth-century America. The gradually emerging alliance or cooperation between private groups and public power brought into focus the necessity of mobilising public opinion on a range of issues outside the framework of the main political parties (Hawley, 1978). The public opinion that the Progressive groups sought to mobilise necessarily transcended party affiliations and organisations, and defined social and other problems as 'American' problems and not as local or sectoral or sectional. Progressivism was, in this view, a movement that sought to redress the stark realities of American political life: locally based political constituencies, provincial in attitude and anti-national in effect, and a national politics of pork barrel and patronage that made nearly impossible effective national reform and hindered the development of a strong federal executive power.

The weaknesses of American political parties and the fragmented character of its federal-level institutions helped generate a demand, and the necessary forces, for building consensus and coherence in national life which was clearly in the interests of the federal executive. Yet, any steps towards building a viable set of national institutions required the mobilisation of public opinion. It was here that the interests of the executive branch and the parastates interlocked particularly well. The

parastates' outlook on public opinion differed from that held by elected politicians. To progressives, *authentic* public opinion could only be formed after the 'proper' information had been presented and discussed under the guidance of an enlightened elite. Indeed, the progressive elite was the source, it was claimed, of the most advanced ideas which were to be disseminated to 'those immediately below them to organise and direct society'. Thus, the parastates' public opinion mobilisations served to enhance support for their reformist goals and federal authority and institutional reach while simultaneously undermining the institutions of the status quo (Wiebe, 1968, p. 234; Eisenach, 1994).

The anti-party and anti-localist rhetoric of progressives in relation to domestic politics had its counterpart in the realm of foreign policy. Progressives argued that, in foreign relations, America's institutional inadequacies led to weakness, incoherence, foreign mistrust, and a failure to develop a truly patriotic international policy. If America was to take its 'rightful' place in, and fulfil its mission to lead, the world, the nation had to be united; furthermore, it would be necessary to develop a modern political and administrative system (Rosenberg, 1982, p. 8). To achieve the momentum for a more internationally engaged and bipartisan foreign policy, progressives took aim at the principal institutional support for isolationism, the party machine. In the meantime, progressive organisations sought to mobilise public opinion – the conceptualisation of which they pioneered – as a force in its own right, to increase interest in foreign affairs, and to strengthen the hand of the federal government (Eisenach, 1994, p. 76).

Such was the domestic context within which CFR men emerged and seriously thought about America's future. The domestic context of the leaders of Chatham House is examined below.

The domestic context of Chatham House

As noted earlier, the relative position of Britain – economically and militarily – declined in the last decade of the nineteenth century and the first two decades of the twentieth. Certainly, there was a strong feeling of having been overtaken by other countries in the race for markets (Hobsbawm, 1968, p. 178), a feeling that the British nation had become sluggish, inefficient and stagnant. There were strong feelings that the dominant ideology of laissez-faire – the linchpin of the old liberalism – could not help address contemporary problems (Hall, 1984, p. 14). The sense of 'declinism' was reinforced by domestic crises of representation and by the crisis induced by the movement for Irish Home Rule. The

rise of the trade union movement, the increasingly insistent working class demands for the franchise and the development of the women's suffrage movement challenged existing notions of how Britain was governed and by whom, that is, it called into question the whole notion of 'the people' (Dangerfield, 1961). The crisis was also imperial: if the Empire was to crack at its very heart – with home rule for England's very first colony – then what hope was there for the far-flung colonies and dominions in the periphery? (Hall, 1988, p. 101).

In addition, Britain was changing profoundly as a society in the period under consideration. As Shannon argues, 'The years between 1880 and the First World War transformed Britain more swiftly and more profoundly than any other comparable era. British society became more urbanised and sub-urbanised, secularised, democratised; general assumptions about social relationships and politically legitimate behaviour shifted from the basis of vertical and hierarchical community groups to stratified classes; in a word, it became "modern"' (Hall, 1984, p. 15).

As it democratised, and as the role and significance of mass democracy became understood, so grew the realisation among dominant elites of the need to 'educate our masters' (Sylvester, 1974, p. 29) to engineer mass opinion in channels that would not threaten existing patterns of power. And as the problems of the 'common man' came increasingly to the fore – either because of political demands to redress social inequality or because of the physical incapacity of so many of his number adequately to make war (Kincaid, 1973) – so grew the movement for the scientific analysis of poverty, contagious diseases, unemployment, and their efficient alleviation (Hall, 1988, p. 108). As Hall argues, the new-found belief in state and civic/voluntary agency interventionism to tackle social problems led to the emergence of specific bureaucracies: 'These apparatuses, together with the experts and administrators – the "organic state intellectuals" of the period – assumed the positive role of producing and accumulating new knowledge about the specific subjects and categories which came under their disciplinary regimes'. The whole gamut of new governmental agencies and departments had an underlying attachment to 'particular kinds of knowledge: explicitly psychology and eugenics – the sciences of social engineering . . . ' (Hall, 1988, p. 108).

The increasing inadequacies of laissez-faire, then, led to the emergence of collectivist forms of thought, politics and movements for reform (Greenleaf, 1983). The traditional political parties – Conservative and Liberal – were considered by many as incapable of handling the crises outlined above. Hall identifies three specific types of collectivism that emerged at the beginning of the twentieth century as particularly

important: Joseph Chamberlain's mixture of municipal socialism and social imperialism – domestic welfare, protected home and imperial markets, national efficiency; Fabian bureaucratic reformism, led by large-scale state intervention from above; and the 'New Liberalism', armed with a communitarian conception that aimed to preserve individual liberty through state intervention, and an inegalitarian desire to better 'educate' the masses and thereby improve the quality of their political preferences. Hall concludes that the above responses held in common a belief that 'established party labels' were obsolete: 'Collectivism thus took no clear party or doctrinal form. On the contrary, it was instrumental in dismantling established party allegiances and formations' (Hall, 1988, pp. 110–13).

The period from the 1880s to at least 1914 was also the one characterised by the rise of a crusading, evangelical-like reforming spirit among the more progressive elements in British society, owing a great deal to the teachings of T.H. Green and his adherents such as James Bryce. Such was the influence of Green's philosophical liberalism that it replaced utilitarianism and, by its power, initiated and enthused a 'stream of serious young men dedicated to reform in politics, social work, and the civil service, men who would spend their lives in improving the school system, establishing settlement houses, reorganizing charity and the Poor Law, and originating adult education' (Richter, 1956, p. 444).[3] Though Green's influence was greatest at Oxford, it extended throughout the nation and even to the United States.[4] In essence, Green had successfully taken the *emotional appeal* and energy of evangelical Christianity, and converted its search for eternal salvation into a philosophy of worldly active citizenship for the betterment of all mankind. As God was immanent in man and social institutions, history was a progressive development of attempts to attain societal perfection, that is, the realisation of godliness in personal and social life. Effectively, Green's philosophy gave to well-born, privileged Christian men and women, suffering crises of conscience due to the rise of scientific thought and explanations, a viable approach to the world that was both active and this-worldly *and* in the service of their God.[5]

The impact of Green's ideas, according to Richter, was greatest in the Liberal governments of 1906–14, when so many Balliol College (where Green was based) men (31) were elected to Parliament, 23 of whom were Liberals, and four of whom were in the Cabinet (Richter, 1956, p. 444, fn 4). Green's broader impact, on a whole generation of reformers and educators, however, was surely greater than this narrowly parliamentary conclusion suggests.[6]

If social unrest and reform was one of the key backdrops to the development of the leadership group that founded and ran Chatham House, *imperial reform* and a growing interest in world affairs were, probably, even more important. The relative decline of Britain and the growing threats to its position called for analysis and action. The late nineteenth century saw the rise of the Olympic movement, increased international travel and communication, mass migrations from Europe to the United States, educational levels and library provision increased, and there was greater, and better quality, newspaper coverage of international affairs. The Tariff Reform League and the Round Table movement were just two of the attempts to redefine Britain's relationship with the Empire (Thompson, 2000). Such popular interest, especially in imperial matters, helped establish and popularise the notion of a 'greater Britian' – a worldwide union of 'the English-speaking Empire' (Thompson, 2000, p. 10). Imperialist reformers often cared little for party politics or conventional partisanship. As Thompson shows, the movements for imperial reform were extra-parliamentary and non-partisan, while the leaders of the main political parties attempted to organise imperial matters out of politics altogether due to their divisive effects. Imperial ideas – official and unofficial – intersected with domestic matters such as unemployment, poverty, class conflict, the role of government and the ability of British institutions to withstand global competition.

The men and women of Chatham House, therefore, came out of a generation that experienced great changes and threw up interesting problems – times in which old ideas and practices were challenged, modified or rejected – and bore the imprint of their age: increased global competition, America's initial steps on the road to globalism, and Britain's relative decline.

It must be remarked how similar were the tendencies reflected in the United States and Britain at that time: economic change, democratisation, unionisation, social unrest, social reform, imperial questions, and so on. The section below, therefore, examines and compares the specific influences of social background and historical generation on the leadership groups of the CFR and of Chatham House.

Chatham House and the CFR: specific attitudes

The two organisations' leaders shared key, liberal 'core beliefs' congruent with their times: an uncritical attitude towards the character and virtues of scientific belief, and its applicability to social and international issues; liberal internationalism; a belief in the virtues of personal and

institutional independence; public service; non-partisanship in foreign affairs; a belief in their own intellectual/social superiority, a deep-seated elitism; shared religious backgrounds, however secularised, that schooled them in 'muscular Christianity'; an attitude of white, English-speaking people's racial superiority, expressed as 'Anglo-Saxonism'; and an unreflective attachment to the notions of 'manliness' that, in the context of America's initially westward, and later imperial, expansion and Britain's imperial frontier, made the two leadership groups exclusively, or at least largely, male preserves.

The above beliefs, clearly, were not equally strong or intense in every leader in a particular organisation, and certainly not across the two think tanks. Nevertheless, in some combination or another, the above beliefs and approaches unified the leaders within the groups and had brought together the American and British founders in the first place. As the 'scientific' outlook was such a key aspect of the approach to the world of the leaders of the two think tanks, and was so closely connected with several other aspects of their world-view, the following section begins with an analysis of that particular dimension.

Scientism

Clearly, the leaders of the two bodies in question shared a belief in the efficacy of science, specifically in relation to an understanding of international affairs. But what did they understand by 'science' and 'scientific explanation'? From a reading of the two organisations' internal records, correspondence and publications, it appears that their understanding of science focused around a number of factors: first, that they should identify a problem for solution; second that they should collect all the relevant facts; third, they should discuss those facts with experts and others qualified to offer informed comment; and finally, they should make available their findings to policymakers and sections of the informed and attentive publics. Underlying this approach was the assumption that all problems, honestly examined, can be solved. As one internal history of the CFR noted: 'If a contemporary problem is considered impartially by a conference of individuals seriously determined to solve it, then their activities may, it is submitted, be justifiably "scientific"' (CFR, 1947, p. 25).

In the case of Chatham House, this method of group fact-finding, analysis, discussion and the reaching of conclusions, leading to action, had been tried and tested by its forerunner organisation, the Round Table (Lavin, 1994, pp. 62–63).[7] From the end of the 1920s through to the 1950s, at the very least, the Rockefeller Foundation funded research,

publication and other activities – of both organisations – using the empirically oriented *study group method*.

In retrospect, their understanding of science seems naïve. The leaders of Chatham House and the Council seem hopelessly optimistic in their assertions – at the beginning of practically every publication – that their views are objective and impartial, as they do when they claim they were untainted by ideology and politics, suggesting that expertise somehow stood above the social and political contexts within which it flourished (Soffer, 1969–70, pp. 1938–64).[8]

'Scientism', according to Greenleaf, assumes that 'real or genuine knowledge is only possible on the basis of matter of fact carefully observed, catalogued, or categorized in some way and, if possible, measured, quantified, and subsumed under a law or functional generality' (Greenleaf, 1983, p. 239). Such attitudes had become increasingly popular in the nineteenth century, challenging accepted Christian teachings on the origins of life, for example. Certainly, a scientific argument was considered more legitimate than the one thought to be based on speculation, religious faith or vested interest (Greenleaf, 1983). That such could also occur unconsciously, or consciously, and remain undetected within scientific argument is also clear, particularly in the case of Lionel Curtis's arguments and behaviour.

Curtis, in particular, utilised the terminology of science in order to win for Chatham House the backing of influential individuals in politics and finance. Certainly, he conceived of the Institute in scientific terms, at least partly, to cloak its 'pro-imperial/commonwealth' aims. In his private correspondence, there are several letters tracing the history and aims of the Institute in precisely those terms. In a letter to Philip Kerr (later Lord Lothian) in 1938, for example, Curtis noted how he had understood the 'unforeseen limits of the [pro-imperial] Round Table organisation which represented our *tactics*. The foundation of Chatham House was a necessary *tactical change* to effect the same strategic object'.[9] Curtis had made a similar point about the essential continuity of Chatham House's and the Round Table's (RT) aims in an earlier letter to Kerr. In 1936, Curtis had written that while the RT had benefitted from its *research* orientation, it was hindered by the intensity of its pro-imperial leanings: hence the formation of Chatham House. The 'time is gone', Curtis concluded, 'when we need to be afraid of admitting… that Chatham House was the outcome of Round Table work'.[10]

The 'objective' and 'scientific' Chatham House, therefore, represented a 'tactic' in the long-term strategy of strengthening the Empire and, like the Round Table, the ties binding Britain and the United States. As the

US General Tasker Bliss noted in his diary in 1918, Curtis believed that the United States was the key to world power, 'that the great problems of the world now . . . are peculiarly problems for the Anglo-Saxon race'.[11]

According to Clement Jones, a fellow Institute founder and Paris Peace maker, Curtis's aim was to create 'an Anglo-American Institute of Foreign Affairs with offices on both sides of the Atlantic'. The neutral sounding name, Institute of International Affairs, therefore, was adopted for political reasons; it sounded more value-free.[12] In addition, Curtis's commitment to 'science' was, despite his 'scientism', subordinated to 'a transcendental conception of Providence', as Studdert-Kennedy argues (Studdert-Kennedy, 1995).[13]

It is important, therefore, to bear in mind that 'science' had a narrow meaning for the CFR and Chatham House leaders – principally focused around the collection and analysis of facts by experts – and was, at least partly, used as a means of adding further legitimacy to their conclusions.

Elitism

The scientific outlook was also interpreted in elitist and technocratic ways: only those who were properly 'qualified' or trained could apply the techniques of science to social or international problems, and the membership selection policies of Chatham House and the Council were formulated accordingly. It was believed that since such knowledge was limited to the few, and the masses were considered unqualified to comment constructively, the elite minority had a duty to develop and disseminate 'sound'[14] or 'right' thinking, and to provide intellectual leadership (Lippmann, 1941). As Curtis noted in 1940, really significant political change came from the actions of elites, not of the masses, who were too short-sighted in outlook, but eventually came round to see the wisdom of their 'God-sent leadership'.[15]

This essential point was also made by Walter Lippmann, syndicated journalist and CFR founder, in his 1922 book, *Public Opinion*. Lippmann argued for a new secular intellectual *priesthood*, 'an independent, expert organisation' to interpret the facts of politics to the people and their representatives. Certainly, the CFR saw its mission as, in part, to 'enlighten' and 'educate' the masses: recall the original memorandum drawn up in Paris in 1919 by Lionel Curtis *and* Whitney Shepardson, in which they stated that 'right public opinion was mainly produced by a small number of people in real contact with the facts who had thought out the issues involved'.[16] The publications of the CFR and of Chatham House were not for direct mass consumption but were to be mediated and disseminated

by lower-level reviews, newspapers and pamphlets. Similarly, the CFR's strategy for developing 'right' thinking on international affairs was to be achieved 'by using a rifle instead of a shotgun – by working with selected leading individuals and trusting that these will be assisted to right decisions themselves and will in turn, through their influential positions, affect the opinion and action of the masses'.[17] The Council did not feel too comfortable in dealing directly with the masses – it certainly lacked the 'popular touch' (Schulzinger, 1984, pp. 7–8).

Religiosity

Ironically, the scientism of the CFR and Chatham House owed much to the Protestant evangelical tradition in their respective nations. As was discussed earlier in this chapter, the writings and teachings of T.H. Green inspired a generation of men and women to enter public and social service, with a missionary zeal but in the language of rational problem solving, 'resolving' the conflict between religious conscience and scientific explanation. Those so inspired took with them the emotional zeal of the evangelical but applied to public service and national improvement. Similarly, the American Progressive tradition, according to Link and McCormick, 'was inspired by two bodies of belief and knowledge – evangelical Protestantism and the natural and social sciences' (Link and McCormick, 1983, p. 22). The Social Gospel which demanded the purging of sin in all national institutions – business, political, religious, educational – had a powerful impact in urban areas. It transformed a personal quest for salvation into a social ethic. The English and American reform movements were linked through the figure of Jane Addams and were both inspired by the desire to save souls and to address the problems of industrialism and urbanisation. In the United States, it was the Episcopalian Church that was most receptive to the new Social Gospel (Baltzell, 1964, p. 161),[18] though not exclusively (McLoughlin, 1978). It is clear that many Protestant sects were involved in transforming the search for personal salvation into a movement for social/national salvation and 'cultural reorientation', as McLoughlin claims. There were numerous individuals, in fact, drawn from several religious traditions (including Judaism), who led this movement: theologians (Washington Gladden and Harry Emerson Fosdick), philosophers (William James and John Dewey), scientists (Asa Gray and Alfred North Whitehead), political scientists (Herbert Croly and Walter Lippmann), sociologists (Thorstein Veblen and Lester Frank Ward), economists (Richard T. Ely and John Bates Clark) and college presidents (Woodrow Wilson and John Bascom). As McLoughlin argues, the 'key concepts' of

the Progressive era were 'relativism, pragmatism, historicism, cultural organicism, and creative intelligence'. Those concepts produced new values: 'efficiency, integration, systematization, regularization, and professionalization'. Other-worldly concerns, such as the quest for personal salvation, therefore, had generated definite social and political outcomes that were to have a profound effect on the national psyche and, in particular, visions of America's place and role in the world (McLoughlin, 1978, pp. 152–53).

The education of the CFR's leaders in the last twenty years of the nineteenth century – often in private schools (and within their churches and communities) – transmitted the Social Gospel and the reforming spirit. As the Reverend Endicott Peabody, founder of the self-consciously English-style private school, Groton, demanded of his pupils: forget easy living and wealth and privilege and develop 'a determination that this Nation shall be that which we know she can become, a self-controlled, clean-living people ready to respond to the ideals of democracy and Christianity . . .'.[19] As noted in Chapter 2, the men of the CFR were overwhelmingly Protestant in their religious affiliations and were, in addition, often descended from families with clerical backgrounds and occupations. Through schooling and family influences, therefore, the CFR leadership group internalised the spirit of Progressivism and Christian ideals.[20]

Within the American universities at this time, the social sciences grew in stature and importance (Schwab, 1901; Hadow, 1939), bearing the imprint of the Social Gospel, a movement marked by 'a confidence in the moral superiority of America and its people', as evidenced by its support of 'Americanisation' programmes, the Spanish–American War and Roosevelt's imperialism.[21] Figures such as the Yale sociologist, William Graham Sumner (who had initially served in the ministry as an Episcopalian clergyman) and economist and lay Episcopalian, Richard T. Ely (Johns Hopkins and Wisconsin universities), were present at the creation of these disciplines, having been so inspired (Baltzell, 1964, p. 161).[22] In addition, there were the towering figures of the philosophers, William James (Harvard) and John Dewey (Michigan and Chicago), Frederick Jackson Turner (Wisconsin and Harvard) and Charles A. Beard (Columbia) in history, Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr in law and Franz Boas (Clark and Columbia) in anthropology. These were the men who taught at the elite universities – and profoundly influenced teaching at the national level – that the leaders of the CFR had attended. In addition, of course, were the guest lecture courses: at Yale, for example, lectured Sir James Bryce (an adherent and populariser of T.H. Green's teachings)

and Elihu Root, one of the elder statesmen of US foreign affairs and the CFR, extolling the virtues of citizenship and civic duty (Eisenach, 1994, pp. 119–20).

The leaders of Chatham House, as noted earlier, were also steeped in the general religiosity of the late nineteenth century, especially as it transformed into liberal social reform movements. For a number of them, Christianity was 'of explicit and fundamental importance to their work', as Studdert-Kennedy suggests (Studdert-Kennedy, 1995, p. 474). Men such as Lionel Curtis (Lavin, 1995, p. 14)[23] and Arnold Toynbee (McNeill, 1977, p. 441)[24] were educated at public schools (Haileybury and Winchester, respectively) that were heavily indebted to the 'broad church' teachings of Thomas Arnold, headmaster of Rugby. In addition, they were products of Oxbridge, 'institutions [that] were still much more self-consciously Christian, and, of course, imperial than they have since become'. It ought also to be noted that public sentiment during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was marked by liberalism and Christianity. Chatham House leaders, therefore, 'shared and contributed to a formative experience of the British social and political elite' (Kendle, 1975; Studdert-Kennedy, 1995, p. 475; McLeod, 1996).[25]

It is important to understand, however, that the Christian beliefs of Chatham House's (and, indeed, of the CFR's) leaders were inclined towards the practical affairs of state and nation, in guiding history towards its 'inevitable' conclusion, for some at least (especially Curtis and Philip Kerr), in world federation. Whatever their differences of interpretation, however, 'they saw themselves as the rational agents of clearly recognizable and progressive historical forces'. In 1939, for example, when the issue of Federal Union of Britain and the United States was being widely discussed, Curtis suggested the 'conversion' of church leaders to the doctrine as a first step to mass opinion mobilisation.[26] As Thomas Arnold had suggested and taught at Rugby, and which other public schools had imbibed, Christ had principally been interested in 'conduct and not with doctrine', emphasising the 'practical, disinterested service of one's fellow man' (Studdert-Kennedy, 1995, p. 482). Although progress towards the kingdom of God was inevitable, it still required analysis, dissemination and public mobilisations, and a helping hand from believers. The study of history, therefore, to make explicit such progress was vital, as was the effort of political scientists to design new institutional structures that would manage progress (Kedourie, 1970, p. 354; McNeill, 1977, p. 455).[27] And the kingdom of God, unsurprisingly, was strongly to resemble the British Empire which was nothing less than the embodiment of the teachings of Jesus Christ (Parmar, 1992, p. 25).[28] Given the

proselytising character of Christianity (Wolffe, 1994, p. 215)[29] and the widespread belief in the essential truth of its doctrines and practices, it was inevitable that it would form one pillar of support – within a complex of attitudes that further reinforced the religious dimension – for a racialised and pro-imperial world-outlook. As Wolffe argues, 'the bonds between patriotism, imperialism and religion' were powerful and remained so at least until the middle of the twentieth century (Wolffe, 1994, p. 214).

Anglo-Saxonism and the cult of manliness

Scientific/religious attitudes also affected racial attitudes, particularly in the wake of the Darwinian revolution and the popularising of one of its elements, the 'survival of the fittest'. Although some tendencies within the liberal reformist tradition overtly rejected the laissez-faire (individualistic) interpretation of this doctrine (especially in domestic affairs, in favour of collectivism and social welfare) (Semmel, 1960), the strength of Spencerian national/racial Darwinism remained in both Britain and the United States (Hofstadter, 1948, p. 148).[30] 'The White Man's Burden' and the 'civilising mission' impulse of late-nineteenth-century Christianity were strongly (though not exclusively) related to notions of Anglo-Saxon racial superiority. This disposed Chatham House and CFR leaders, scientifically or religiously or in some combination of each, to promote closer cooperation between Britain and the United States as the chief bulwark of modern civilisation (Wolffe, 1994, pp. 220–21).

Stuart Anderson argues that Anglo-Saxonism upheld the idea that 'the civilization of the English-speaking nations was superior to that of any other group of people on the planet; and that the primacy of English and American civilization was largely due to the[ir] innate racial superiority . . .'. By virtue of biological and cultural factors, Anglo-Saxonists held that they possessed particularly virtuous characteristics such as 'industry, intelligence, adventurousness, and a talent for self-government . . .' (Anderson, 1981, p. 12).[31] This outlook, at a time of growing nationalism and imperialism, constituted a set of beliefs that were very powerful particularly as they were underpinned by 'science' (Barkan, 1992). As Anderson emphasises, 'taken together, they had become part of the psychological pattern of the age'. In combination with the expansionist impulses of Christianity, Anglo-Saxonists felt 'duty-bound' to 'extend their superior civilization to less fortunate races', a thankless sacrifice to be made, as noted by Rudyard Kipling, for the good of lesser peoples (Anderson, 1981, p. 23).

Such ideas were espoused by British and American social scientists as much as by politicians (on the left and the right), preachers and

novelists: it was the common sense of the age. Columbia sociologist, Franklin H. Giddings, naval strategist Alfred T. Mahan, Social Gospeler, Lyman Abbott, and the British historian J.A. Cramb, biologist Charles Darwin and sociologist, Benjamin Kidd, among numerous others, promulgated the view that Anglo-Saxons were superior in every regard, with Abbott suggesting that 'the kingdom of God [would be] established on earth through the workings of Anglo-Saxon liberty and progress' (Anderson, 1981, pp. 20–24, 30). Whatever way it was seen, Anglo-Saxon dominion resulted.[32] By the mid-1890s, 'Anglo-Saxonism was a mature intellectual doctrine', accepted by the British and American masses and elites alike' (Anderson, 1981, p. 60).

Given the attachment of Anglo-America to Anglo-Saxonism, it is clear that the leaders of Chatham House and the Council were the bearers of a racialised world-view. They were taught in their schools, colleges and universities, almost regardless of their academic discipline, the principles of scientific and religious Anglo-Saxonism as either a fact of nature or a work of Providence, or both. According to F.A. Glendenning, late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century school histories of Britain contained 'a mixture of patriotism and racial superiority', referring to Africans as 'kaffirs' and West Indians as 'lazy, vicious, and incapable of any improvement'. References to India in school texts often referred only to 'the black hole of Calcutta', the battle of Plassey, and the 'Indian Mutiny' (Glendenning, 1973, pp. 33–44). In the universities and in middle-class opinion, the influence of Sir John Seeley's *The Expansion of England* was very powerful too, calling for the reunification, through federation, of the scattered English-speaking peoples (Aldrich, 1988; Thompson, 2000, p. 18).[33] The ideal, according to one of the most prominent British students of education and empire, was 'to establish an ideal of selfless service to the state . . . a sense of racial superiority as a cornerstone of this selflessness . . . to establish and maintain an imperial chauvinism . . . and . . . to engender uncritical conformity to the values of the group', that is, of their class and nation (Mangan, 1986, p. 116).[34]

J.A. Mangan's study of three public schools' magazines – *Haileyburian, Cheltonian* and *Eton Chronicle* – shows the many ways in which schools acted 'as unremitting agents of seduction for an imperial dream of noble service and intoxicating adventure'. The magazines promoted Anglo-Saxonism and tales of heroic soldiering by alumni in colonial wars. Life was tough, often short, in the empire, but in the spirit of self-sacrifice, English public school boys were urged to do their 'duty' (Mangan, 1980, pp. 31–39), for which their masters tried to prepare them through the overall curriculum, including chapel and sports.

The early nineteenth-century public school ideal of producing Christian gentlemen, gave way in the mid- to late-Victorian imperial era to the ideal of 'muscular Christianity', which erred more towards 'muscular' than the teachings of Christ. As David Newsome shows in his study, the gentler philosophy of Thomas Arnold gave way to the more aggressive ideal of preparing 'manliness' in public school, and other, boys in order to prime them for imperial service. Wellington College, for example, was described as 'a splendid institution for the Nation and for the Empire', turning out 'a hardy and dashing breed of young officers' (Newsome, 1961, pp. 197, 201).

Sports – especially Rugby and Cricket – were used to promote manliness, courage, good health and leadership values. Rifle Corps and drill further regimented the boys. Before long, 'manliness [had] become a cult' (Newsome, 1961, p. 207). The objectives of an earlier age – of 'other worldliness, the beauty of holiness and the satisfaction of self-denial', the 'seminary life' – were replaced by the necessity of using one's God-given physical strength 'to fight in His service, to protect the weak, to conquer nature', to procreate. Such were the ideas of public school headmasters – such as Charles Kingsley of Wellington College – who promoted masculinity (and abhorred effeminacy), physical activity and a Spartan spirit that encouraged, among other things, cold baths. The upper-middle classes were, at that time, 'saturated with imperialistic notions . . . [that] welcomed the spirit of aggressive patriotism which helped to allay their fears of German militarism and foreign commercial and industrial rivalry' (Newsome, 1961, pp. 201, 210–11). As a consequence, they supported the public schools in their endeavours to generate muscular Christians for imperial (and domestic social) service.

The leaders of Chatham House were men of their time. Their racial attitudes reflected Anglo-Saxonist tendencies. Lionel Curtis's correspondence, for example, is replete with letters about the racial (that is, Anglo-Saxon) basis of the post-1945 world order, references to the 'white man's burden' and the connections between Providence and Britain's imperial role.[35] In commending plans for federal union, Arnold Toynbee emphasised the need to maintain 'a certain homogeneity of moral and political tradition and outlook between the parties', such as that between Europeans, Americans and the dominions.[36] Curtis (and federal unionists in general) faced a key problem as they could not publicly be seen to exclude non-European peoples from a possible future federation. Streit suggested to Curtis that while India could not be excluded, it could not be represented in a federal parliament on a population basis as it would be in a position to dominate. Therefore, using

the example of black Americans' disfranchisement in the southern USA, he suggested literacy tests be applied to restrict the size of the Indian electorate.[37] By 1945, Curtis had hit upon the best way to achieve the same result: *taxable capacity*. By basing representation on that principle, New Zealand would emerge the best represented, while the 'representation of the Asiatic countries like India and China' would be reduced 'to manageable proportions'.[38]

A review of Curtis's book, *World Order*, in 1939, noted that his plan was based on 'race and tradition' and on 'ideals [that] are traditionally those of the Christian Anglo-Saxon . . .'.[39] Another, more critical reviewer, noted that Curtis put 'English-speaking peoples first' along with the Protestant churches, 'as if they had a monopoly of divine truth, ignoring the contributions of the ancient churches of East and West'.[40] It is important to note such voices of dissent opposed to prevailing racial ideas, demanding a more inclusive international system.[41] Curtis also faced criticism from within Chatham House: at a meeting of the 'World Order' study group, Hugh Wyndham pointed out that in neither South Africa nor USA had federation 'improved the lot of the black man. The federation . . . might turn out to be a great blonde beast . . .'.[42] Nevertheless, Curtis continued mobilising support for federal union, even going so far as to urge the Minister of Information, Alfred Duff Cooper, to issue 'guidance' to the British press prior to reviewing Streit's new book, lest it receive any unfriendly attention. Duff Cooper, who supported Streit's thesis, helpfully agreed to impress 'upon Editors how undesirable it would be that any criticism should appear likely to cause harm to Anglo-American relations'.[43]

Curtis was at the centre of a flurry of transatlantic activity that included fellow Chatham House leaders, the Labour leader, Ernest Bevin, Americans like Streit and several private foreign affairs organisations, including the CFR. Philip Kerr fully shared Curtis's racial ideas, often referring to the responsibilities of world power as 'the white man's burden' (Butler, 1960, p. 69).[44] Barbara Wooton (CH Council member, 1940–41), supported Curtis's racial ideas on 'Anglo-American hegemony' but, for tactical reasons (because of opposition from 'a great part of the world, who do not see us as we see ourselves'), suggested the federation be broader-based (Kendle, 1975, p. 255).[45] Ernest Bevin, who had become close to Chatham House through participation in the British Commonwealth Relations conference of 1938, was 'won over' to the idea of 'organic union' by 1945, as predicted by Curtis.[46]

Ultimately, the leading men of Chatham House, an organisation that owed its inspiration to the imperialist Round Table movement, were, as

Kendle concludes, 'unashamed Pan-Anglo-Saxon nationalists' and may not have entirely believed that the 'backward races' would ever be able to govern themselves. As a Round Tabler, John Dove, noted in 1919, it was difficult to give up notions of the 'savage' that had been implanted by early socialisation (Kendle, 1975, p. 304; Rose, 2000).[47]

The men of the CFR were, we have seen, also impelled to social and national service, sharing progressivism's evangelical inspiration, and were subject to the same ideas regarding Anglo-Saxonism, national Darwinism and the cult of manliness.[48] As Mangan and Walvin suggest, the manly ideal won many 'powerful adherents and public advocates among the middle-class Yankees of the east coast of the United States' (Mangan and Walvin, 1987, pp. 2–3). The aristocracy of talent that epitomised Harvard and Yale bore the hallmarks of Anglo-Saxon culture: 'excells (sic) in manly sports, carries off the honors and prizes of the learned professions . . . which in peace stands for the public honor and renown, and in war rides first into the murderous thickets. Among east coast establishment men, there was a yearning for a life of toil, of strenuous activity, a "warrior ideal" that was more appropriate for the rugged Western frontier than on Wall Street thickets' (Higgs, 1987, pp. 160, 162). Theodore Roosevelt, who was in close contact with British big-game hunters and frontiersmen, thoroughly typified the 'frontier spirit', 'the manly qualities that are invaluable to a nation' underlining that ideal's kinship with its British imperial counterparts (MacKenzie, 1987, p. 178). Roosevelt lauded Groton school, where he had sent two of his sons, for its 'sturdy, resolute purposes, which represent all that is loftiest and truest in our American life'. Given the growing importance of Groton's example, other private schools had strengthened their own efforts to generate 'manly' qualities (Ashburn, 1944, p. 176).

Although Hamilton Fish Armstrong, a CFR founder and editor of *Foreign Affairs*, was not as Anglophile as some among his Council colleagues, he was nevertheless predisposed to notions of Anglo-Saxonism. As his delightful childhood memoir notes, Armstrong avidly read the imperial adventure books by British author, George Alfred Henty. Armstrong notes that he learned 'more history . . . [from these books] than I ever absorbed at school'. He especially mentions *With Clive in India* and *The Lion of St. Mark*. In fact, one of his heroes was General 'Chinese' Gordon of Khartoum, about whom Armstrong wrote a magazine article, depicting how Gordon had been killed by 'wild Arabs', the 'Mahdi's fanatics' who, in addition, had 'been hacking to pieces every human being they could find . . . ' (Armstrong, 1963, pp. 84, 121–22).[49]

John W. Davis was an Anglophile, Anglo-Saxonist and a supporter of the unity of the English-speaking peoples. His father had been a traditional southern racist – supporter of white superiority and opponent of black voting rights – and the young Davis generally agreed with him. He achieved one of his greatest ambitions when he was appointed ambassador to London, where he won the hearts of 'society', government and press. One newspaper noted that Davis spoke 'like a poet of the Stars and Stripes and Union Jack floating together over the Houses of Parliament and Westminster Abbey' (Harbaugh, 1973, pp. 94, 143).

Russell C. Leffingwell, a director of the CFR over several decades and trustee of the Carnegie Corporation provides another example of Anglo-Saxonism. Leffingwell's correspondence contains numerous references to the infirmities – moral and other – of Slavs, Orientals, Asiatics, and, on occasion, Jews. In a private memorandum, Leffingwell dismissed German demands for colonies because British and American expansion had been into 'empty spaces, or spaces empty except of savages, nomads or squatters . . . '.[50] Of American expansionism, Leffingwell wrote that they had pursued policies of 'war of extermination against the Indians and aggressions against Mexico . . . ',[51] which were justified by the belief that the Indians were mere 'savages'. There are also references to Japanese 'fanatical' tendencies and the intellectual capacities of 'darkeys'.[52] Conversely, English statesmen were invariably praised for their straightforwardness and for lacking 'the deviousness' attributed to them by the 'Hebraic' mind.[53] In short, the only race that was beyond criticism was the Anglo-Saxon and, in defence of their interests, Leffingwell was happy to fight. Anglo-Saxonism was, in the words of Richard Hofstadter, 'the dominant abstract rationale of American imperialism', though the same could be said for the British Empire. In concrete terms, of course, economic and strategic interests were fundamental to conceptions of national security, and the maintenance of peace and freedom though their *rationalisation* was often couched in racial or ideological terms, such as Anglo-Saxonism and liberal internationalism (Hofstadter, 1948, p. 48).[54]

Liberal internationalism

Probably more than any other single dimension, 'liberal internationalism' united the leaders of the Council and Chatham House and separated them from their opponents, American 'isolationists' and diehard imperialists respectively.

The principal components of the two organisations' 'internationalism' consisted of a belief in the necessity of international organisations to represent opinion and encourage the peaceful resolution of disputes,

and to police the peace and provide international security. In economics and commerce, they believed in an open world trading system within a multilateral framework of international organisations (Schulzinger, 1984, pp. 30–32). It was their general belief that the nation state could not resolve all its problems unilaterally but only within a set of world-wide organisations. General global prosperity and stability, they believed, would be the foundation of Anglo-American prosperity. It was a position generally endorsed by Wilsonian internationalists in USA and by British liberal imperialists, the most important of which were represented by the CFR and Chatham House respectively (Woods, 1990; Bosco and Navari, 1994; Navari, 2000).

From the mid- to late-nineteenth century, there developed an eagerness to promote internationalism among American east coast elites (Iriye, 1977; Ambrosius, 1991)[55] and British imperial reformers and federationists. Early steps in this direction included the international court at the Hague and numerous declarations about the pacific settlement of international disputes (Olson and Groom, 1991, pp. 42–45). After 1918, the leaders of the CFR and the Institute supported the League of Nations, the brainchild of President Woodrow Wilson, although the US Senate refused to ratify American membership (Divine, 1967). That elicited huge disappointment in the ranks of the numerous internationalist groups in USA as well as on the part of the leaders of Chatham House, especially Curtis, Philip Kerr, Arnold Toynbee and historian Charles Kingsley Webster. There was a very strong feeling that the American people had turned their backs to the outside world and had reverted to an irresponsible 'isolationist' position that, in effect, destroyed the fledgling League of Nations (Divine, 1967, p. 10).[56]

In promoting internationalism, both leadership groups placed great importance on developing Anglo-American cooperation. In that regard, it may be argued that the exclusivist ideals of Anglo-Saxonism were transformed for far broader consumption (particularly in the ethnically diverse USA and to bolster the anti-Axis nations) into some form of Anglo-American amity. The language of biologically determined racial superiority was generally jettisoned by the 1920s and 1930s, in favour of *culturally determined* explanations of the inequality of nations and peoples, as exemplified by the work of George Catlin and, to some extent at least, Clarence Streit. Catlin, in proposing a federal union of English-speaking peoples, rejected the racial but emphasised the cultural bases of such an association. By 'Anglo-Saxony', he argued, he was referring to 'a cultural bloc, with common traditions, habits, culture and (by and large) political views. The very core of that culture is a notion, not of

race, but of freedom'. In fact, contained within Catlin's analysis are most of the essential elements of Anglo-Saxonism without the biological aspects: Anglo-American cultural superiority, a hierarchy of races' and nations' cultural and political capacities, and the moral obligations of the superior to the inferior peoples (Catlin, 1941, p. 20).[57]

Although internationalists maintained an aura of 'idealism' (desire for peace, negotiations, novel international institutions, sometimes pacifism) (Olson and Groom, 1991, pp. 73–74), the hard-nosed character of the leaders of Chatham House and the Council must not be underestimated. One can find among their number several (for example, Curtis, Sir Alfred Zimmern,[58] even Arnold Toynbee) who went on record as supportive of world government, a universal state, and so on. However, the same men also recognised certain fundamentals of balance of power and of national-interest-driven world politics. In their desire to construct international organisations, the most significant leaders of the two think tanks never lost sight of the fact that they led *national* organisations, dedicated to 'national service', sworn to loyal service of 'their' state and 'people'. That is, they were patriotic internationalists (Iriye, 1977).[59]

The writings of several CFR and Chatham House men demonstrate this assertion. The American speeches of Lord Lothian (Philip Kerr), British ambassador to Washington, DC (1939–40), one of the founders of the Institute and confidant of Lionel Curtis, clearly show his appreciation of the mutually reinforcing strategic and economic interests of Britain and the United States. One of the main things that links Lothian's analysis with that of his American counterparts is his debt to the writings of Alfred T. Mahan, the American naval strategist.[60] Lothian noted that the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 was 'fundamentally a strategic doctrine' that undergirded American safety and British enforcement of the 'freedom of the seas'. In addition, he noted, there were economic foundations to peace in the nineteenth century: the role of sterling as a world currency, enabling increasing levels of international trade; a near-free trade international regime; free immigration to the new world, that relieved the population pressures in Europe. And behind all the prosperity generated in that century stood *naval power*. Peace, Lothian stressed, 'comes from there being overwhelming power behind law . . . ' (Grigg, 1941, pp. 1–16).[61] During a study group's proceedings in 1928–29, Lothian (then Philip Kerr) had pointed out that USA and Britain were further united by their manufacturing and trading interests enabling them, he claimed, 'to influence the development of the rest of the world to suit their economic requirements if there is intelligent cooperation between Wall Street and the City, Washington and London'.[62] It was clear to

Lothian that naval and economic power were inextricably combined and the German threat to British power demanded an Anglo-American solution. Despite his deep religious faith, therefore, he had about him a deep-seated 'realism' such that he was something of a 'practical mystic', as Grigg suggests (Grigg, 1941, p. xxxv).[63]

Council leaders were, as examination of their public and private papers shows, highly 'realistic' and practical in their understanding of the bases of national security and world peace. As a Council report of 1937 stated, 'There can be no peace except on the international groundwork of economic and financial stability . . . '.[64] The most real politik aspects of CFR thinking emerged powerfully during the War, especially in their War and Peace Studies Programme (WPS) for the US State Department, of which more will be written in Chapter 5. Here it is sufficient to note that power was a fundamental basis of CFR leaders' understanding of international relations.[65]

To be sure, the 'internationalism' of the CFR and Chatham House had religious, scientific, and racial dimensions. At the same time, however, and intermingled in the rhetoric of blood ties, of kith and kin, of the construction of the kingdom of God on earth and so on was a profoundly 'realistic' assessment of the elements of power that determine global outcomes. In domestic affairs, both organisations stayed out of party politics in their attempts to guide foreign policy beyond the irrational and corrupting force of elections, and to build a bipartisan consensus. In that regard, too, the two groups of leaders showed a realistic appraisal of how the power of opinion might be mobilised so as fundamentally to alter the climate within which foreign affairs were discussed and analysed.

The world-views outlined above were shaped by the historical circumstances of the late Victorian and Edwardian eras and the numerous mutually reinforcing social mechanisms that exerted power over hearts and minds: the family, church, school, university, the press and numerous experiences that cannot be encompassed in any 'institution'. The geographical proximity to Europe of the US east coast establishment, the numerous family, cultural and financial ties with Britain, an acute awareness of the rising power of the United States, and its concomitant 'responsibilities', made it almost inevitable that some men would found internationalist organisations to confront global change. The leaders of Chatham House were the product of similar forces and tendencies but with the Empire in a state of change, if not decline. They too were formed to confront global change and to chart a passage through very turbulent times. Each national group admired the other: the CFR men

generally admired the liberal character of Britain's empire, the degree of autonomy granted to the dominions, and the steps taken in the formation of a commonwealth. For their own part, Chatham House leaders admired the democratic spirit of America, its liberal constitution, its non-militaristic attitude, and its growing power potential. It was in this context that each organisation attempted to form its own agenda and 'line' and tried to influence their nation's foreign affairs. It is to this that we turn in the next part of the book by considering the roles and influence of Chatham House and of the CFR in the making of British foreign policy during the Second World War.

Part 2

4

The Role and Influence of Chatham House in the Making of British Foreign Policy

The previous chapter examined the backgrounds of the founding generation of Council and Chatham House leaders, establishing their scientific outlook, liberal internationalism, elitism, religiosity and Anglo-Saxonism. This chapter aims concretely to establish that, despite official disclaimers, Chatham House had an enduring *de facto* institutional policy or 'line' that constituted the basis of the Institute's attempts to 'influence' the making of official British foreign policy. Secondly, the chapter introduces the principal mechanisms through which Chatham House attempted to influence official policy. Chatham House was actively mobilised during the Second World War and several leading figures were placed at the heart of the making of British foreign policy with the potential to *influence* and to *implement* official policy. The chapter considers the policy-related influence of Chatham House first by outlining the activities of key individuals and of two specific arms of the organisation (Foreign Research and Press Service and the Institute of Pacific Relations' work). Secondly, it considers the Institute's influence by examining its role in the making of 'key decisions' that moved British policy closer to that of the United States and away from traditional ideas about the central importance of the British Empire. Those decisions are: the 'destroyers-bases' agreement of August 1940; the 'Atlantic Charter' declaration of August 1941; 'Lend–Lease', 1942; the Bretton Woods Agreements of 1944–45; United Nations formation, 1944–45; and the US (and Canadian) Loan, 1945–46. In combination, the above approaches permit an analysis of influence that is both specific and general.

The Chatham House organisation

The elected Chatham House Council met monthly to make policy; numerous committees – including finance, research, meetings, conferences, study groups, publications, library – implemented policy, while paid staff ran the Institute's daily affairs. Whereas Chatham House had just one secretary in 1921, by the late 1930s there were 74 paid staff members (King-Hall, 1937, p. 29). The Meetings Department, for example, organised a variety of meetings for different purposes: their aim was to permit experts to address the entire (or more select elements) membership on issues of current significance. The Study Groups Department brought together experts, officials and practitioners to examine a particular problem and, often, to publish a report on their findings. There had, for example, been study groups on Anglo-American Relations (1928–29), The Problem of International Investment (1937) The British Empire (1937) and Sanctions (1937) (King-Hall, 1937, pp. 136–37).

The Information Department and Library were vital elements of the Institute's activities aimed at informing the public, journalists, teachers and policymakers. The Information Department collected material of relevance to foreign affairs, including the speeches of makers of foreign policy, propaganda material, Chatham House memoranda and published studies by foreign organisations. It also operated a highly effective press-cuttings service. Department members also interviewed field-experienced individuals with special information, briefed members of parliament, and advised schools and colleges on drawing up international relations syllabi or course materials. Together, these collections provided the empirical basis of a number of Chatham House publications, including the annual volume, *Documents on International Affairs*, a companion to Toynbee's annual *Survey of International Affairs*, the *Bulletin of International News* and a series of Information Department papers (King-Hall, 1937, pp. 44–51). *International Affairs*, the Institute's house journal, recorded the meetings and discussions at Chatham House.

Chatham House also arranged or participated in several series of international conferences, such as the International Studies Conference, British Commonwealth Relations and the Institute of Pacific Relations. It was, by the outbreak of the Second World War, the premier British private organisation for the study and discussion of foreign affairs.

CH mechanisms for influence

Chatham House had several means by which to try to influence official foreign policy. First, a number of Chatham House leaders occupied

important positions within the state, particularly Philip Kerr (Lord Lothian), the British ambassador to the United States, 1939–40 and, to some extent, Lord Halifax, his successor. Arnold Toynbee, the CH Director of Studies, headed the Institute's Foreign Research and Press Service (FRPS) that, by 1943, was incorporated into official research operations. Toynbee also acted as an 'unofficial' Foreign Office emissary, as did Charles Kingsley Webster and Ivison Macadam (secretary of RIIA), during trips around the United States during the War (1940–42). Webster was also head of the British Library of Information in New York City during the early part of the war and, later, liaised closely with the Foreign Office in developing British policy towards UNO. Chatham House leaders such as Curtis, Lord Hailey and Arthur Creech-Jones (Labour's postwar Colonial Secretary), were also deeply involved in British foreign policy towards the Far East through the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR).

The Chatham House line

Practically all Chatham House publications carry a disclaimer to the effect that it is precluded by its Charter from advocating an institutional policy. Chatham House was designed to be a forum for discussion among experts with no other end than the production of 'materials' from which those responsible for policymaking could benefit in a general way. Chatham House claimed to be impartial, scientific and objective, a claim to be examined in light of the evidence available from its archives (Kedourie, 1970).

It was in the spirit of disinterested study and research, not policymaking, that Chatham House claimed to operate, according to Stephen King-Hall (a CH Council member). Chatham House's function was scientifically to arrange the facts 'so that other people may be in a better position to frame policies'.[1]

However, it is clear from the Institute's desire to include officials among its membership, study groups and speakers that Chatham House research maintained a close relationship with the policymaking process. From the statement made by King-Hall, it is evident that the Institute aimed to conduct the 'pure research' that should form the basis of policy. Realistically, however, what does the term 'pure research' mean? Could an organisation like Chatham House ignore the major international 'problems' of its time and still retain its credibility among busy policymakers? Given its origins in the aftermath of the First World War, and the pressing problems of European security and the role of Britain and the United States in world affairs, such a detached attitude would

inevitably come under heavy strain. The real question is, how did Chatham House come to determine what were the 'key problems' that required analysis if it was to make a contribution to official policymaking? In this respect, the intensely pro-imperial, patriotic and statist proclivities of those who led Chatham House ought to be borne in mind.

The question of a Chatham House 'line' – based on their leaders' world-view – may only be addressed through an analysis of its publications, the topics of its meetings, the conclusions of its study groups, and the stance taken by its leading members.

It has been claimed that Chatham House publications were a 'motley collection' with no guiding thread to connect them, that their tradition was empirical, that is, guided by the practical concerns of policymakers (Knapp, 1970, pp. 138–39). In that respect, the lists of publications advertised in Chatham House annual reports reveal that all of the key issues in international affairs of the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s were covered: the problems of the British empire, economic crises, collective security and disarmament, sanctions, the Far East, the problem of nationalities, and so on. In addition, hundreds of meetings were held on a far broader range of issues, while the study group system permitted more detailed consideration of the same. Chatham House was a serious British forum for discussing foreign affairs for those who occupied the political 'mainstream'.

The Anglo-American tendency within Chatham House is clearly highlighted in any examination of its study group proceedings and meetings. For example, the 'Special Group on Anglo-American Relations' (1928–29), chaired by Kerr, concurred with his view 'that the interests of the United States and Great Britain are so nearly identical', making cooperation essential. The City of London and Wall Street, and the politicians in London and Washington could potentially 'influence the development of the rest of the world to suit their own economic requirements . . . '. Britain and America, Kerr claimed, were united against Napoleonic-style political autocracy, Bolshevik-type revolution, militarism, conscription, and 'the diplomacy of threat and force', a strong basis for future cooperation.[2]

Dozens of meetings confirmed the pro-Anglo-American alliance convictions of Chatham House. In all except two meetings on the United States, the speakers favoured Anglo-American cooperation.[3]

Two speeches by Archibald Rose, a prominent member of the Chatham House Council and a former Foreign Office China expert, pointed up the importance of Anglo-American cooperation in the Far East. Rose noted the importance of Britain's economic interests in the region

which were sharpened by the depression of the 1930s,[4] including imports and exports, shipping, insurance, investment and industrial cooperation.[5] Given American trading interests in the region, Rose suggested that there was a welcome 'new spirit of cooperation between the United States and our own country'.[6] In the ensuing discussion, Toynbee emphasised the dangers and opportunities for Britain in the Far East: the United States, he argued, was independently interested in the Far East because of her own economic and security interests and due to her common security interests with Canada, Australia and New Zealand vis-à-vis Japan. The US would not dissociate herself from those interests, Toynbee added, and would convert those Dominions into her own if Britain were to abdicate her responsibilities in the region. The US was a Far Eastern power with which Britain could usefully cooperate against Japanese militarism.[7]

In 1934, Kerr (by then, Lord Lothian) reiterated his views on the need for an understanding with the Americans in the Pacific. In fact, he opined, 'It is suicide for us not to [cooperate with the USA] . . . '. Lothian also signalled Britain's increasing reliance on the United States, however, by noting that Britain must 'make it clear to the United States that we will go wherever she goes but that we cannot go it alone'. He added that a more active United States would be to Britain's advantage, 'for the United States was the balancing factor in the world'.[8]

Public officials also briefed Chatham House from time to time as to the attitude of the United States towards Britain or Britain's own approach to that country. For example, Sir Stafford Cripps, British ambassador to the Soviet Union, reported on his five-month tour of the Far East, informing members that despite American mistrust of Britain's intentions, and their fear of an Anglo-Japanese 'deal', they were 'prepared at the moment for parallel action', a clear indication to the Institute as to the position in 1940, to be used as required in Chatham House activities.[9]

An even more frank assessment regarding Anglo-American relations was provided by Frank Ashton-Gwatkin, who was simultaneously a member of both the Chatham House Council and the Foreign Office. In February 1941, Ashthon-Gwatkin presented a paper to the Institute's Economic Group entitled 'The New Order', which he suggested ought to be considered as unofficial and private.[10] 'It contains', he wrote, 'some categorical statements that should not be taken too seriously'.[11] The paper represents a highly important trend of official opinion being confidentially communicated to a private foreign affairs audience that was not only connected with British governmental and elite private opinion but also to important pro-British US and imperial elites.

Ashton-Gwatkin argued that if Britain were to win the War, she should demand 'the bisection of Germany . . . ' in order to 'tame' her. The end of the War, Ashton-Gwatkin suggested, will 'find the United Kingdom in a strong position, having control over most of the world's shipping . . . surplus production . . . . With such a command over an exhausted and perhaps starving Europe, the UK . . . should be in a favourable position (if not equally exhausted) to impose her will. *If we have the USA beside us and in agreement with our policy*, our economic control will be almost world-wide, and our power to make a constructive peace will be irresistible.'[12]

Ashton-Gwatkin urged advance preparation of Anglo-American cooperation, despite the fear that the American authorities 'are still thinking along most-favoured-nation lines'. Britain needed to draw in the United States to help administer the colonies which, he urged, ought to be under 'international trusteeship'. With the United States beside her, Britain, through a number of 'international' schemes of control, would be in a very strong position to 'lay down conditions for the post-war settlement' across most fields of international trade, raw materials, communications and manufacturing. The United States, he concluded, was the 'natural partner' of the British Empire. Ashton-Gwatkin argued that the US needed to be educated to provide postwar dollars to Europe to aid recovery. In that, as in all else, he noted, 'the role of the USA will be of decisive importance'.[13] He concluded the paper with a call for further study of ways to build Anglo-American accord, in order to 'iron out' 'the clash or the adjustment between the British Isles' and Dominions' economic policy and the United States' economic policy, which is clearly going to be one of the dominant considerations of the future. *If anybody is going to study these questions further, in any regular programme of studies, it seems to me those two things are the two of predominant importance*.'[14] [italics added].

The arguments advanced in Ashton-Gwatkin's paper represented no call for 'pure research'. In effect, Ashton-Gwatkin provided an unofficial communication from officialdom on the main lines along which the Foreign Office believed Britain's postwar position would develop. In the context of Ashton-Gwatkin's official position in the Foreign Office, his paper to a Chatham House study group could not be taken anything other than with the utmost seriousness and could be understood as a clear indication of how Chatham House ought to develop its programme.

As the War progressed, the Institute's framework of perceptions became even more clearly pro-Anglo-American cooperation. As one thing

Britons lacked during the War was a clear idea of the lines along which 'responsible' Americans were thinking about the postwar world, Chatham House sent emissaries to scout US opinion. One such trip was undertaken by the Institute's Secretary, Ivison Macadam who, after attending a North Atlantic Relations Conference in the US in 1941, reported that American opinion seemed to favour participation in postwar reconstruction, the building of an international organisation, participation in an international police force, and US financial assistance to other countries.[15]

Numerous other examples of a pro-Anglo-American alliance attitude in Chatham House could be provided, showing that the attitude was a *de facto* institutional policy.[16] When the leaders of an organisation so obviously favour a specific line of thought and action, over a sustained period of time, it cannot but have the most profound effect on their selection of research problems and topics, and their particular terms of reference. Chatham House was not, and could not be, detached and 'independent' in the manner it claimed. On the contrary, it was completely absorbed in the practical problems of British foreign policy and aimed to assist official policymakers in their solution.

Chatham House: general role in British foreign policy

This section of the chapter provides an overview of the range of Chatham House individuals and sub-groups that operated, as a precursor to more specific consideration of their role in the making of the designated six key decisions. It begins with an analysis of the role of Lord Lothian.

Lord Lothian was appointed ambassador to the United States in August 1939 and died in December 1940. Lothian's tenure at Washington, DC, was highly effective in improving Anglo-American understanding at a time when Britain desperately needed US assistance. As an 'amateur' diplomat, Lothian's appointment was deeply resented within the Foreign Office though it was championed by his old friend, Lord Halifax, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Birkenhead, 1965, p. 74; Roberts, 1991, pp. 255–57).[17]

Lothian admired, liked (Jeffreys-Jones, 1986) and was close to many influential Americans, including leading members of the CFR such as Norman Davis, Lamont and Shepardson. In addition, he had met many Americans through his work in the Rhodes Trust, the Round Table, and his commitment to Christian Science. He was well travelled in the

United States and acquainted with a fair range of political, business, academic, journalistic and other leaders (Reynolds, 1983, p. 3).

He eschewed no opportunity in his attempts to create conditions favourable to Anglo-American amity. In matters military and commercial, Lothian was adept at spotting opportunities to ease Anglo-American relations at a time when isolationist opinion in the US Congress and press was very strong.

On the military front, Lothian recommended and achieved acceptance of America's offer of 'non-political staff talks' about the defence of Singapore, Dutch East Indies and Australia.[18] In mid-1940, Lothian recommended and achieved the exchange of technical information between the two countries in order to further make feasible defence cooperation. Premier Churchill, however, postponed the military mission as he felt that the Americans were asking for too many British military secrets. Lothian opposing postponement, wrote to Churchill (through Lord Halifax) urging swift action because 'our inaction . . . was providing another argument for the defeatists [in the US] who maintain that it is no use backing a lost cause'. Churchill conceded the case and on 25 July 1940, held a meeting to determine the details.[19]

On the trading question, Lothian was very active in 'ironing out' irritating problems for specific sectors of US agriculture. For example, when Britain, in an attempt to conserve her dollars, switched her purchases of apples and tobacco from the United States to Greece and Turkey, thereby upsetting southern US agricultural interests, it was Lothian who suggested that buying American products might be the wiser policy, given the dependence of Britain on the USA. His recommendation, despite Foreign Office annoyance, was followed.[20]

So enthusiastic was Lothian to try to bring America into the War, and to attract her to a new global role in the postwar era, that he even attempted to mobilise American anti-communist sentiment. In a period when American opinion was opposed to the War, and its leaders wary of appearing too close to Britain and thereby attracting congressional criticism, Lothian urged them to think ahead. If the United States did not aid Britain, the latter would be forced to liquidate all her overseas investments and undermine her postwar reconstruction efforts. Lothian argued that: 'These [overseas] investments [were] essential . . . to the maintenance of . . . working class [living standards]. If they disappear altogether there might be a . . . violent social revolution in England' to address.[21] The note was never sent to President Roosevelt, because of Treasury opposition, but nevertheless illustrates the creativity that Lothian brought to bear as ambassador.

Lothian's influence was also important in regard to the destroyers-bases deal and the origins of Lend–Lease (on which more below), contributing significantly to the influence of Chatham House in British foreign policy.

Other emissaries to USA[22]

Although Lothian's official position permitted far greater opportunities for influence on British foreign policy and on Americans' attitudes to Britain, Chatham House was also represented by 'lower-intensity' emissaries such as Toynbee, Webster and Macadam. Each in his own manner contributed to the development of policy and the provision of intelligence to policymakers.

Arnold Toynbee visited the United States as part of his duties at FRPS, in order to consult with 'worthwhile groups', including 'editors, lawyers, educators, and other professional people'. He took with him one basic message and returned with another. To the Americans he preached that they must look outward after the War; to Britain, that India was the principal barrier to positive Anglo-American cooperation. Toynbee, therefore, 'prescribed the "liquidation of Imperialism" . . . as the only way to resolve American suspicions of the British Empire' (McNeill, 1989, pp. 183–84).

Charles Kingsley Webster was head of the American Section of FRPS and, for a time, head of the British Library of Information in New York. He had travelled widely within the United States since the late 1920s, holding posts at Harvard, Minnesota and California universities, and carried out a coast-to-coast lecture tour for the Foreign Policy Association. Upon the outbreak of the War, Webster visited the United States to make contacts and gather intelligence. During his visits, Webster built up a huge range of contacts with over a dozen universities, with private foreign affairs groups, over a dozen major newspapers, and State Department officials, A.A. Berle and Leo Pasvolski.[23]

Toynbee's, Webster's and Macadam's visits to the USA will be considered more fully in a later chapter, on Chatham House–CFR interconnections.[24] Here attention will focus on some of the effects of such visits, which are difficult to gauge. Certainly, they added to British officials' knowledge of the attitudes of certain sections of Americans' opinion, mainly the professional middle-classes, strengthened contact between the State Department and the Foreign Office, between those private individuals in both countries drafted into state service during the war, and between Chatham House and American philanthropic foundations, especially Rockefeller. Finally, such visits provided information as to the machinery of postwar planning that was being developed across the

Atlantic and an opportunity to exchange ideas. Given the constant anxiety within the Foreign Office as to the possibility of US postwar isolationism, any information from the US foreign policy establishment was welcome.

Foreign Research and Press Service

In addition to the efforts of individuals, Chatham House made a significant contribution to British foreign policy formation at an institutional level, through FRPS, established in 1939 with a grant-in-aid from the Foreign Office (Longmire and Walker, 1995, p. 13).[25] Secret discussions between the Foreign Office and Chatham House had begun as early as May 1938 to examine the role the latter might play in time of war. By February 1939, Lord Astor, Chairman of the CH Council, was instructed at the outbreak of war, 'to provide for the immediate incorporation ... of the institute into the general scheme of national service'.[26] The aims of FRPS were to review the foreign press abroad; to produce, as requested by the Foreign Office, 'memoranda giving the historical and political background of any given situation'; and to produce any other documents as required.[27] FRPS was housed in Balliol College, Oxford, because of the German bombing of London. Its Director, Arnold J. Toynbee, believed that the FRPS's role was 'to help shape official British policy with respect to the post-war settlement' (McNeill, 1989, p. 182), a view at odds with Lord Astor's opposition to Chatham House's participation in 'the formation of policy or the conduct of propaganda', a difference of opinion that was to re-emerge in stark form as the War progressed.[28]

Frank Ashton-Gwatkin was the key link between the FRPS and the Foreign Office. Always positive about FRPS and its Director, Ashton-Gwatkin recommended easy access for FRPS to official documents in order to conduct their research more effectively. Further, he recommended closer links between FRPS personnel and their Foreign Office counterparts. Finally, Ashton-Gwatkin urged close liaison between FRPS and the Cabinet Committee on War (or Peace) Aims, first, because its chairman, Arthur Greenwood, valued FRPS and, secondly, because of the vital contribution that the new body could make to a future peace settlement. Ashton-Gwatkin argued that: 'Any peace settlement ... [would require] ... the application of a vast range of knowledge about matters political, geographical, historical, social, economic, scientific', and he warned that 'peace might come suddenly; and its coming might find us unprepared'.[29] It may be recalled that Ashton-Gwatkin had made much the same point in his paper, 'The New Order', to a Chatham House study

group. Chatham House received further commendation from R.A. Butler, Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and a member of the Institute since 1926. Butler demanded that FRPS men be used by the Foreign Office as they would give 'practical assistance to Departments'.[30]

FRPS was organised into several sections – American (headed by Webster), German (J.A. Hagwood), British Empire (Alfred Zimmern), Low Countries (G.N. Clark), Latin America (R.A. Humphreys), USSR (Bernard Pares), International Institutions (H.J. Paton) and so on.[31] It also contained many other leading academics such as R.W. Seton-Watson, C.A.W. Manning, A.G.B. Fisher and Norman Baynes. Robert Keyserlingk writes there were 131 staff in all, with 11 professors, 23 paid research assistants, 24 volunteer researchers and 74 assistants and clerical staff (Keyserlingk, 1986, p. 544). After some controversy in the House of Commons, FRPS's budget was reduced from £80,000 per year to almost £68,000 (in 1942), of which about £6000 came from Chatham House.[32]

FRPS's place in the official machinery of government brought it into close liaison with numerous departments and services, such as the Ministry of Information, the intelligence services, the Treasury, the Cabinet, and with private agencies connected with those bodies.[33]

Once fully established, FRPS was answering questions and enquiries for a whole range of departments and purposes. In the two months to mid-May 1941, FRPS received over 270 separate enquiries, including thirty confidential memoranda for the government, anthologies of extracts from foreign governments' documents, and so on.[34] The papers that FRPS and other Chatham House members prepared for officials' use were a combination of those designed for immediate, practical use, those providing key background material for decision-makers, and those that contained speculative projections of possible future global events.

G.E Hubbard, a former Chatham House Director of Information, wrote a paper arguing that the Allies had to keep China in the War and that British propaganda could play a vital role. Hubbard feared that that if China played a major role in Japan's defeat, she would demand territorial concessions which might be less harmful to British interests following a subtle propaganda campaign.[35] The response from one FO official, T.E. Bromley, suggested that Hubbard was thinking along lines favoured by officials.[36]

In a paper on Japan, Geoffrey Hudson examined the future scenario at the end of the European war: would the Soviets fight, or make a deal with, Japan? Would there be a civil war in Japan? What should Britain and the United States do? The discussion that ensued among officials

over this paper noted its realistic though rather 'gloomy' prognosis. Officials also showed a ruthless outlook towards Japan, pointing out that should that country descend into 'class and civil war' the Allies ought not to 'intervene for the sake of restoring order. Let the Japanese kill each other', they concluded.[37]

The defeat of Japan, another paper emphasised, would also present the problem of decreased Western prestige in the region, as the invincibility of the European powers had been irretrievably punctured. In addition, there was likely to be chaos and disorder in the region, the growth of Chinese anti-imperialism and Chinese influence in south-east Asia, and the corrosive role of American 'anti-imperialism'. The latter, however, it was thought, may well be dissipated by 'the fears which American business circles [with their heavy investments in the region] would feel if there was a prospect of disorder and civil wars'. The United States had, for example, intimated that it would be prepared to participate in an international security force.[38]

There were, as the War progressed, numerous other papers by FRPS members on the Far East and other issues, which were discussed and commented upon by Foreign Office officials. What is clear is that the FO took seriously the points raised in those papers, even if there was almost always present a certain resentment that outsiders had breached 'sacred' territory in discussing the affairs of state. As Gladwyn Jebb commented in a fairly balanced assessment of the role of the FRPS's 'wise men', while it meant 'new and good brains' assisted policymaking, it also could lead to their becoming 'the tail which wags the dog', and generally trying to 'throw their weight around'.[39]

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Anthony Eden, was sufficiently impressed by the papers of FRPS that he determined that they should prepare handbooks for use 'in connection with the post-war settlement'. The handbooks, Eden argued, should define key problems and 'describe the difficulties in the way of their solution'. Their format, he urged, ought to be 'historical, factual and objective . . . [in order that] . . . ministers and senior officials could judge the recommendations put up to them by their departments'.[40] The handbooks proved useful to officials and were sent out to the British embassies at Washington, DC, at Chungking (China) and elsewhere.[41]

Even as early 1940, the work of Chatham House men, in the Ministry of Information (in the case of Sir Frederick Whyte – CH Council member and Director of the MoI's American Division) and in the Foreign Office, was favourably evaluated by officials. Whyte was commended for his ability to 'get into' the American mind.[42] As understanding Americans'

thinking was such a vital element of the Foreign Office's postwar planning, officials were delighted to discover that FRPS had arranged, in collaboration with the CFR and the Rockefeller Foundation, to host an American scholar. Whitney Shepardson was invited to come to London for 2–3 months and exchange ideas on postwar issues. According to John Balfour of the FO's North American department, it was an 'excellent idea' and ought to be followed up by the establishment of an American Research Centre.[43] As Toynbee noted in his application for funds to pay for the US visitor, close contact made 'frank discussion of differences easy and natural'.[44]

By July 1941, the Foreign Office seemed very pleased with the contribution of FRPS to their work: all departments of the ministry reported good working relations with the wartime body, commended the high quality of FRPS reports across the whole range of subject areas, and provided specific instances of where FRPS papers had been of special significance. For example, Nicholls of the Southern department commended the work of R.G.D. Laffan, whose paper on the Istrian frontier had 'formed the annex to a paper submitted to the Cabinet'. T.N. Whitehead, of the North American department, commended the invariably high quality contributions and papers of Webster, who had also 'done good work in making contact with groups in America and exchanging views and information with them'. Finally, Arthur Greenwood, the Minister for Post-War Reconstruction, found the contributions of FRPS to be 'of very substantial help in the preliminary survey of European reconstruction problems'.[45] Robert Keyserlingk argues that FRPS was especially influential in framing policy towards south-east Europe.[46]

By the end of 1942, discussions began merging FRPS with the FO's Political Intelligence Department (PID) and thereby coming entirely within the control of the ministry. Webster, Alfred Zimmern and Toynbee favoured this, preferring to sever the connection with Chatham House and thereby serve the state more effectively. Ashton-Gwatkin and others, in the Foreign Office, however, had felt FRPS best served the nation by remaining 'half Chatham House and half Foreign Office'.[47] For Jebb, incorporation would put the Foreign Office firmly in charge of FRPS' 'wise men' and, 'owing to their seeing FO papers, [FRPS would be] less inclined to indulge in nebulous theories and impractical suggestions',[48] a comment curiously at odds with the general Foreign Office line.

There was a split on the FRPS–PID merger within Chatham House, with Lord Astor opposed. The Foreign Office argued that a merger was necessary because FRPS work now required access to 'highly confidential' documents.[49] Eden argued that, 'I must be able to convince foreign

Governments that the Foreign Research and Press Service is my sole responsibility and is to be regarded as . . . any other department of the Foreign Office'.[50] Within Chatham House, opponents of merger argued that the Institute had spent over £12,000 on FRPS that could have been devoted to other matters. They were not convinced that FRPS would be more effective under complete Foreign Office control. Eventually, however, Chatham House concurred with the merger of FRPS with the PID, which went ahead in April 1943, to form the Foreign Office Research Department (FORD).[51]

The range of FRPS work, under its 'half Chatham House-half Foreign Office' arrangement, its increasing intimacy with numerous departments and individual officials of the Foreign Office, their increased access to official secrets and confidential policy documents, and their eventual incorporation into the FO, all suggest its political significance. As a private body, it was increasingly close to the heart of policymaking and planning, an important source of expertise and intelligence with regard to its connections with the Chatham House network and its relations with private groups in USA. Even further, individuals in FRPS promoted Anglo-American cooperation during their visits to the USA when they met public officials, and foreign policy elites in New York and Washington, DC. It is notable also that despite incorporation FORD scholars retained their contacts with Chatham House and carried out numerous functions, particularly in relation to mobilising opinion in favour of Anglo-American accord. In addition, the CH Reconstruction Committee continued to have strong input from Arthur Greenwood's Cabinet committee and, through Ashton-Gwatkin, from the Foreign Office. Incorporation, therefore, did not lead to separation of Chatham House and government; it further developed an already long-lived and evolving relationship between unofficial expertise and state power.

Institute of Pacific Relations

Extremely close relations also existed between the Foreign Office and the British section of the Institute of Pacific Relations, of which Chatham House formed the national council. The IPR, which was formed in 1925, was 'a federal body through which the problems of the Pacific regions are studied by national Councils and Institutes in Australia, Canada, China, England, Japan, New Zealand, the Philippines, and the United States . . . '. In short, any state with borders or 'interests' in the Pacific Ocean, was eligible for membership. Each national council appointed a representative to the Pacific Council, the IPR's governing body.[52] For many years, however, Chatham House, suspicious of the

possible rivalry with its own Round Table organisations and sister institutes of international affairs in the Dominions and Colonies, remained aloof from the IPR. There was also, according to one of the IPR's founders, a fair amount of elitism in Chatham House attitudes towards the IPR (Hooper, 1995, p. 208). However, as the situation in the Far East worsened in the late 1920s and especially after Japan's aggression in Manchuria, China, in 1931, neither Chatham House nor, in fact, the Foreign Office could afford to ignore the IPR.

The IPR, which was based in New York, was dominated by its American national section, to the annoyance of Chatham House and Foreign Office officials (Hooper, 1995, p. 81). This was especially the case because the IPR's conferences became a forum for the critical discussion of Britain's colonial record. Chatham House and the Foreign Office, therefore, were keenly interested in being represented at all levels of the IPR organisation. They perceived their role as defending Britain's achievements in the Far East and further 'educating' the Americans on the problems of colonial administration, a responsibility which they hoped postwar United States administrations would share with Britain. The Far East was seen as a key region in which Anglo-American cooperation was essential, paralleling, therefore, the work of FRPS outlined above. And as in the case of FRPS, the independence of Chatham House from policy-making and propaganda functions was severely compromised. The only difference was that, unlike over the incorporation of FRPS into the Foreign Office machine, there was no split within Chatham House over the effective cooptation of its IPR-related activities; indeed, Chatham House invited such measures from the Foreign Office.

In order to participate effectively in the IPR's 1942 conference at Mont Tremblant, Canada, Chatham House requested Foreign Office *financial assistance, suggestions for agenda items and policy guidance*, citing the need to defend the imperial record at an occasion likely to generate severe criticism of British colonialism. Britain needed a strong delegation, Chatham House recommended, in order to present 'the facts of the situation' on India and the Dominions, and to promote 'post-war cooperation and understanding between the United Nations', that is, the USA.[53] In addition, there was concern that the 'British position' be 'fairly presented' in IPR official publications.[54]

Frank Ashton-Gwatkin and the FO's Far Eastern department had, during the 1930s, assisted Chatham House IPR conference delegations on several occasions. By 1942, Ashton-Gwatkin stressed the need to provide official funding for the Chatham House IPR delegation.[55] In addition, Ashton-Gwatkin urged that FRPS produce a briefing document, requested

by Chatham House, for the delegates, much as the FE department had done in the 1930s. The document, argued Ashton-Gwatkin after attending a meeting of Chatham House's IPR Committee, ought to outline 'the features of a possible Far Eastern settlement after the war, with special reference to British interests and British policy'. Authorship would not be attributed to FRPS (or the Foreign Office) and, as in the past, might lead to publications that promoted Britain's position.[56]

Ashton-Gwatkin's view was backed by others in the Foreign Office. A notable minute laid out the position very clearly. The Americans are not fighting in the Far East 'to preserve the British colonial empire'. Consequently, the minute continued, 'Any suggestion on our part that we expect to resume full possession of these territories on the old footing will be badly received', possibly provoking a reaction that 'would have serious repercussions on the whole American attitude towards collaboration with ourselves for post-war reconstruction'. It would 'be wiser to think out instead some method, acceptable to American sentiment, for preserving to our use those things in the colonies which are valuable to our national prosperity. It should not, for instance, be impossible to get our raw materials, and to participate in the trade and development of these areas, under a joint mandatory system', underwritten by 'an American guarantee'. The 'advantages', therefore, 'may well compensate for the loss of imperial prestige involved in some sacrifice of sovereignty', the minute noted. As to the 'Chatham House experts', the minute argued that they must be well briefed and be given 'some indication of the lines on which the Cabinet were thinking'.[57] Henry Ashley Clarke, head of the Far Eastern department, enumerated Britain's vital interests as stability, vital economic interests and Anglo-American security cooperation.[58]

On the financial front, Chatham House had originally envisaged funding a delegation of six from their own resources, but claimed, in July 1942, that they were unable to finance any at all. This presented a problem as asking Parliament to fund a delegation that the Foreign Office had gone to great lengths to suggest was 'completely unofficial' and 'private' would compromise its integrity. Consequently, it was decided that Chatham House be exempted from paying its annual FRPS subscription for 1942–43 and pay for the IPR delegation from the saving.[59]

The delegation was led by Lord Hailey of the Colonial Office (and a Chatham House Council member), released from his official duties. Arthur Creech-Jones, a Labour leader and CH Council member, was also to attend, helping to promote the view that the group was diverse and would 'not appear too well rehearsed from a particular brief'.[60] In any

case, Hailey felt that he could keep Creech-Jones 'within bounds', should he feel moved to make inappropriate suggestions.[61] Other delegates included Frederick Whyte, Sir George Sansom, Harold Butler and Sir John Pratt. The latter, who was an experienced old 'China hand' in his own right, was shown confidential Foreign Office documents on Britain's prospects in the Far East, which left him 'wiser and sadder', according to Jebb.[62]

The Delegation was, therefore, in part made up of state officials, with the rest either selected or endorsed by the Foreign Office and other ministries. It was also fully funded by the Foreign Office. The delegates were fully briefed on official views of the Cabinet and the Foreign Office on Britain's attitude to the Far East. All Chatham House conference documentation received prior official endorsement. In essence, there was nothing unofficial about the delegation, apart from the attempt to dress it up as unofficial.

During the Conference itself, delegates reported that they were rebutting criticism of Britain. Lord Halifax noted how officials within the delegation were helping to produce 'a more realistic understanding of the problems of the Far East'.[63] At one point, when there had been an attack on the Colonial Office, Creech-Jones, 'dressed like a labour leader', stood up angrily and 'rounded on the whole lot of them': while there had been mistakes in administration, he would admit of no 'Basic or fundamental criticism of our imperial role . . . '.[64]

Lord Halifax's report on the Conference focused on several positive and negative aspects. He noted that despite subjecting Britain's record to severe scrutiny, the Conference was a useful forum for constructively dealing with such misconceptions. In addition, the issue of US postwar responsibilities had been aired. The American delegation, Halifax emphasised, 'were expressing a fear, and not a wish, when they stated that American participation in post-war security measures could not be counted upon'. Personally, they were, in the main, 'anxious for a break with isolationist tradition', while the State Department officials among them – Stanley Hornbeck and Max Hamilton, for example – felt that the US would be more active in postwar world affairs.[65]

Halifax also reported that a number of Conference delegates had seen through the 'unofficial' façade of the British delegation. They 'insinuated', Halifax complained, 'that the United Kingdom delegation was "packed", that it "played with its cards close to its chest", and that generally it had come prepared to take an unprogressive imperialistic stand'.[66] Indeed, Michael Straight, an American delegate, condemned the British stance and described Creech-Jones as 'a typical stooge from Transport House . . . '.

Straight went much further, arguing that the British delegation was effectively suggesting 'Anglo-American domination of the Pacific' or an 'Anglo-American Empire' when, in fact, the American tradition had been 'anti-imperialist'. Straight claimed that he had tried to explain to Lord Hailey that unless Britain genuinely respected that tradition (Straight dismissed 'international administration' as a worthless 'concession'), there would be no postwar international organisation.[67]

The Conference, then, was an occasion for mutual education, a vital function in the middle of a war for the men who were trying to determine the shape of the postwar world. Pushing the Anglo-American cooperation line clearly irritated the Americans, who, being aware of the ethnic diversity of their fellow citizens and the historical strength of isolationist sentiment, preferred the language of 'international organisation' and the 'United Nations'. This was not lost on the British delegation. As one Foreign Office official argued, the Anglo-American cooperation issue 'simply does not go down with Americans – liberal or otherwise. Postwar cooperation must be advocated . . . in terms of the United Nations if it is to make an appeal. In the event, Britain and the United States may share the major burden, but it must be in a world organisation, *using an international vocabulary*'.[68]

Following the Conference, the Foreign Office and Chatham House planned jointly to strengthen the latter's position in the IPR by promoting their own candidate, Hugh Byas, for editor of the IPR's journal, *Pacific Affairs*, the appointment of a permanent CH representative at the IPR's secretariat, and the establishment of an Anglo-American Committee to study Pacific matters. Ashley Clarke emphasised the FO's long-held view that 'if the studies of Chatham House are really to serve a useful purpose, it is in our interests that they should be on the right lines'. Consequently, Ashley Clarke concluded, 'we should give . . . [them] our help on matters of principle'.[69] In late 1943, when Chatham House plans were afoot to establish an 'Anglo-American Pacific Study Group', the Foreign Office gave full financial backing for a small Chatham House delegation, including Macadam, Hailey and Whyte, to travel to the IPR's headquarters in New York.[70] What had been a long-term relationship between the Foreign Office and Chatham House's IPR conference work, therefore, had become more institutionalised, defined as important on the grounds of 'national policy'.[71]

Chatham House's active participation in the IPR's Conference of 1945, at Hot Springs, Virginia, USA, was also fully funded by the Foreign Office, in addition to supplying numerous officials as delegates and policy briefings for the senior members of the UK group.[72]

Chatham House, in its capacity as the British national committee of the IPR, played an important role in British foreign policy. It retained very close long-term relations with the Far Eastern department of the Foreign Office and, through Frank Ashton-Gwatkin, with other relevant sub-sections of the FO. It was considered by the Foreign Office to be reliable and trustworthy enough to be given specific informal policy guidance in order to better perform at IPR conferences. Chatham House delegations received full funding in order to travel to and from conferences. Finally, the Foreign Office, and other ministries, appointed officials as conference delegates in order to promote the aims of official policy – to defend Britain's record in the Far East and to try to encourage a more understanding attitude towards colonial and postwar security problems among the American delegation. The work of Chatham House in regard to these conferences was, in fact, regarded as a vital national interest. In effect, Chatham House became an arm of official foreign policy; it implemented official policy.

Taken in combination with the work of Lord Lothian, as ambassador to the United States, Toynbee, Webster and Macadam, as semi-official emissaries to the USA, and of FRPS, the Institute's IPR activities suggest that it had become a key element within the machinery for making and implementing foreign policy of the British state. Chatham House engaged in postwar planning, current policy-development, speculative studies about postwar scenarios, practical studies about background questions facing peace-makers, and creative policy-implementation. It served as a channel for intelligence into the Foreign Office, especially from its American contacts which, added to the official sources of the embassy in Washington, DC, constituted a vital source of information about what 'worthwhile' groups in the United States thought about Britain, the Empire (especially India), and America's willingness to 'rise to globalism' in the postwar era. Chatham House, therefore, occupied an important position in the British foreign policy establishment, overlapping with state elites and private expertise, articulating the functions of each into a more coherent whole. Clearly, there were tensions within Chatham House and the Foreign Office about the precise arrangements for the division of labour, especially in regard to the FRPS. But this does not detract from the central point that there was a clear division of labour, endorsed in practice by all parties, which articulated Chatham House and official policymakers and led to the emergence of the principal contours of Britain's postwar foreign policy favouring an Anglo-American alliance. The presence of Chatham House individuals and research bodies and study groups within the orbit of the British state may not have

shifted the orientation of official thinking but they certainly greased the wheels, shouldered some of the burden of increased pressure on hard-pressed officials, added new dimensions to the work of forming and implementing policy, and added the credibility of a private organisation of over two decades standing to official efforts to defend the historical record and to progress to a world in which the responsibilities of global power were to be shared by the Anglo-Americans.

Chatham House and key decisions

Key decisions

One very important dimension of an organisation's influence is its ability to influence the making of 'key decisions', decisions the taking of which changes government policy in a significant way and has consequences for the future. In regard to the making of foreign policy, the influence of CH is to be considered by examining its role in the taking of six key decisions by the British Government that, it is claimed, cumulatively represented a policy shift that emphasised the overwhelming importance of an Anglo-American alliance at the expense of the continuation of the 'traditional' policy of Empire. That is not to say that Empire was no longer to be seen as important to British interests, only that Anglo-American cooperation was considered more important than the maintenance of Empire at any cost, especially if maintenance conflicted with the declared policy of the United States.

The key decisions are briefly described and explained below:

Destroyers-for-bases Agreement, August 1940

As a result of this 'deal', the United States agreed to supply to Britain 50–60 old naval destroyers in return for long leases to eight British-Caribbean military and naval bases and an official declaration by His Majesty's Government that the Royal Navy would not be scuppered in the event of German victory in war but would continue to fight from Empire bases. The significance of this Agreement is that it effectively drew the United States into the status of a 'non-belligerent', as opposed to its official policy of neutrality; the US was now firmly allied to Britain in the war against Germany (Divine, 1979, p. 96).[73] Within the British foreign policy elite, the Agreement was also viewed as an expression of 'the unity of the English-speaking peoples' and the 'beginning of an Anglo-Saxon bloc' (Reynolds, 1981, pp. 128–30).

Atlantic Charter, August 1941

The Atlantic Charter was a joint declaration of Anglo-American war aims. Its aim, from the British Government's point of view, was to prevent the United States from drifting into postwar 'isolationism', as it had done after the Great War, by committing her to postwar policies favouring an international organisation (Woodward, 1962, p. 430).[74] The Charter committed both powers to pursue 'no aggrandizement, territorial or other', after the War, and no territorial alterations that 'do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned' (Gilbert, 1989, p. 222). To Churchill and his principal Foreign office adviser, Sir Alexander Cadogan, the Charter signified that 'Neutral America had associated herself with belligerent Britain in a statement of common goals for war *and* peace . . . ' (Reynolds, 1981, p. 259).

Lend–Lease, 1941–42

The British decision to accept American 'Lend–Lease', the system by which the United States assisted Britain's war effort with war materials without the necessity of controversial loans, was ratified in 1942 by the Mutual Aid Agreement. Instead of loans, Britain agreed to reconsider (under Article VII) the position of 'imperial preference', a system of preferential tariffs within the British Empire, in postwar international economic relations (Reynolds, 1981, p. 167; Woods, 1990, p. 61).[75] Described by Churchill as 'the most unsordid act in the history of any nation',[76] Lend–Lease signified the increasing significance of Anglo-American cooperation as the key factor in wartime and postwar world affairs, and the concomitant declining significance of Empire (Parmar, 1995b, p. 16).

Bretton Woods, 1944–45

Britain hereby agreed to the establishment of a new international financial and economic order. The Bretton Woods negotiations resulted from the obligations of Article VII of the Mutual Aid Agreement of 1942, under which Britain had effectively given a 'commitment [to accept]… America's conception of the post-war world economy' (Reynolds, 1981, p. 167), as one largely free of imperial preference. The Bretton Woods Anglo-American financial negotiations led to the formation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD, otherwise known as the World Bank).

UN formation, 1944–45

If Bretton Woods formed the economic and financial basis of a new world order, the United Nations Organisation (UNO) was to form the

political and military basis of postwar security and peace. The taking of this decision by the British Government constituted another step that shifted authority away from the Empire and towards Anglo-American accord and cooperation.

US loan, 1945–46

This decision to take a loan of $5 billion from the United States (and Canada) further cemented the shift from Empire to Anglo-American cooperation in Britain's foreign policy as the loan was tied to a number of conditions: Britain was to liberalise her commercial policy and the Sterling Area; recommend Parliamentary ratification of the Bretton Woods Agreements; and permit sterling convertibility one year after the advancement of the Loan (Parmar, 1995b, p. 170).

Taken together, those six decisions were vital in reorienting British foreign policy away from traditional reliance on the Empire and towards a 'special relationship' with the United States. The political and other forces responsible for the taking of such fundamental decisions may reasonably be considered to be among the most important within the British political system, and constitute one means for assessing the role and influence of Chatham House in the foreign policy process. The role, if any, of Chatham House in the taking of the designated key decisions is analysed below.

Destroyers-bases deal, August–September 1940

The destroyers-bases deal between Britain and the United States brought into sharp relief the differences of opinion within the Cabinet, between traditional imperialists, such as Lord Lloyd, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, and those who considered that Anglo-American cooperation, in the short and long terms, was in Britain's national interests. Additionally, it showed that there were a number of pragmatists in the Cabinet who, though committed to the Empire, were willing to 'trade' aspects of its integrity if it brought the United States into more active engagement with world affairs.

Lord Lothian was clearly the key to this particular decision. It was he who had requested that Prime Minister Churchill, in return for American destroyers, 'give the assurance [to the USA] about the future of the [British] fleet . . . and . . . agree to the air and naval facilities in question'.[77] The latter referred to Britain's attempt to impress upon President Roosevelt that to defend America he must assist the defence of Britain; unless FDR (as President Franklin D. Roosevelt was popularly known) gave practical support, neither Lothian and, later, nor Churchill would

make a commitment as to the future of the Royal Navy, in the event of Britain's defeat by Germany. Britain wanted to pull America closer to itself and into hostilities with Germany. The Royal Navy was a bargaining chip. Lothian's role was to relay messages as well as to try and encourage a more conciliatory Cabinet attitude towards America's position, and to impress upon FDR that there was nothing inevitable about handing over the Navy to a neutral United States (Reynolds, 1983).

In time, after a great deal of anxious political manoeuvering, Roosevelt agreed that Britain constituted America's own line of defence, and asked for the leases to a number of Britain's Caribbean islands, without the transfer of sovereignty. Lothian urged, once again, that the Cabinet agree to FDR's requests. Dissension, however, occurred, with Lord Lloyd arguing that 'Leases on a large scale in the oil fields of Trinidad, if once given to the Americans would amount to a virtual cession of sovereignty'. American investments of 'plant and capital', Lloyd argued, would give them a 'controlling interest' over the islands.[78] The Foreign Office, however, along with Lord Halifax, favoured the Americans' terms. John Balfour of the North American department justified the agreement thus: '. . . the future of our widely scattered Empire is likely to depend on the evolution of an effective and enduring collaboration between ourselves and the US for which we cannot reasonably hope unless we share with America the strategic facilities enabling her to discharge her part of the responsibility of guarding the English-speaking peoples'. This view summed up the attitude of Lord Halifax who, a few weeks earlier, had credited Lothian with originating the list of minimum British defence requirements (to be requested from USA) that the War Cabinet finally accepted in return for the Caribbean bases.[79]

Lothian had contributed much to the making of the destroyers-bases agreement of 1940, at a time when British and American anxieties about their own defence were particularly acute. He applied pressure on FDR by emphasising the uncertain future of the Royal Navy and on Churchill to provide 'sweeteners' to the US, such as a military mission, staff talks, secret information, in order to promote more effectively a positive US attitude to the destroyers agreement. In addition, Lothian played a significant role in promoting the destroyers-bases deal to the American public, in close association with pressure groups linked to the CFR (on which more will be written in later chapters). He well understood the US political system and the necessity of public opinion mobilisation prior to governmental action.

Lothian's and, by extension, the Institute's influence was, therefore, significant. Had Lothian not been the ambassador in Washington, DC,

in 1939–40, the completion of the destroyers-bases deal may have been considerably *delayed*, although there is little doubt that something very much like it would, eventually, have emerged, in his absence. There were political and other forces in Britain and the United States that would have urged such a deal and seen it through to fruition. Ultimately, however, it was Lothian who was the key to what actually happened. To what extent did he act as a Chatham House leader? This is difficult to disentangle: his entire adult life was spent in pro-Anglo-American groupings – Milner's kindergarten, the Round Table, Rhodes Trust, Chatham House. His associations with such bodies were cause and symptom of his ambassadorial activities. Interestingly, he maintained his links with such private bodies throughout his time as ambassador and, additionally, liaised closely with their American counterparts. Through Lothian, independent as he was, worked the life-long influence of Lionel Curtis and the movement in British society that he represented.

In addition to its broad influence as noted at the beginning of this chapter, Chatham House exercised specific influence as well. Influence in one policy area, or even in one aspect of foreign policy, however, does not necessarily mean influence across the whole range of issues, as analysis of the next decision shows.

Atlantic Charter, August 1941

Although there had been concerns over the promulgation of war aims within the British government, none had explicitly been expressed until the 'Atlantic Charter' declaration of August 1941 (Reynolds, 1981, pp. 252–61). The decision to issue a joint British–American declaration of aims was taken on behalf of the Government by Prime Minister Churchill in consultation with the Permanent Under-Secretary of the Foreign Office, Sir Alexander Cadogan. They had been taken by surprise by the suggestion of drafting war aims by Roosevelt, on the very first evening of their conference off the Newfoundland coast. The Cabinet knew of the decision to issue a joint war aims statement only after it had been agreed. Consequently, the Atlantic Charter, which brought the USA closer to Britain and hostilities and, in the longer run, for the purposes of postwar reconstruction, had received no immediate input from any other governmental, let alone non-governmental, sources. It shows the extraordinary powers of the British prime minister to make binding international commitments, a key aspect of British executive power normally contrasted with the greater power of the US Senate to override presidential authority.

Nevertheless, the Charter was proclaimed a victory for Britain as it committed America to postwar international economic and military collaboration. It also, however, committed both powers to work towards 'access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world' for all nations, signalling to many that Churchill had bargained away imperial preference. Leopold Amery, Secretary of State for India, later wrote that 'I only wish I were in a free position to say what I think about the Atlantic Charter and all the other tripe which is being talked now, exactly like the tripe talked to please President Wilson'. In fact, Amery preferred a Europe united under Hitler to US 'domination': he was willing to countenance 'a measure of economic as well as political servitude to Germany' (Louis, 1992, p. 146). There was further Cabinet-level disquiet over the Charter's third clause, which appeared to grant all nations, including Britain's colonies, the right to self-rule (Reynolds, 1981, p. 259).

Other significant clauses of the Atlantic Charter committed the two powers to building international economic collaboration and expressed their belief in the desirability of a world system of military security (McDonald, 1974, pp. 18–19).

While it showed that the broad attitudes held by Chatham House leaders were reflected in Cabinet debates, the Institute cannot be said to have exercised any influence over this particular outcome (Reynolds and Hughes, 1976, p. 13; Hill, 1991, pp. 200–15).[80]

Lend–Lease, 1941–42

Lend–Lease was of fundamental importance to the economic relationship between Britain and the United States during the War. As a result of Lend–Lease, Britain received $27 billion of military and other supplies, as well as the initiation of negotiations with USA that led to postwar Anglo-American economic and commercial cooperation (Parmar, 1995b, pp. 162–63).

The role of Lord Lothian in the *origins* of Lend–Lease was very important. Almost alone among his colleagues in the making of British foreign policy, Lothian understood the internal dynamics of the American political system, particularly the need to mobilise public opinion. While others waited on the Roosevelt Administration to act on Britain's wartime supply requirements, Lothian advanced practical plans to place before the US president. First, he suggested Churchill place Britain's precise economic and military needs explicitly in writing to FDR and, secondly, he urged a publicity campaign in the USA, designed to 'provoke public discussion and force the administration's hand' (Reynolds, 1983, p. 43).

Although Churchill feared such a letter could strengthen the hands of the 'defeatists' in Washington, DC, it *was* sent and had a very positive effect, especially when seen in conjunction with Lothian's publicity efforts in the United States. Lothian's press comments, and Churchill's letter setting out the interrelationship between Britain's needs and the world strategic position, helped to crystallise ideas already forming in FDR's mind of the need for a comprehensive solution to Britain's supply problems (Reynolds, 1983, p. 54).

Of course, Lothian died in December 1940, and the issue of Lend–Lease remained unresolved in practical terms until early 1942. Ultimately, a solution to the problem of supplying Britain's wartime needs, without revisiting the war debts controversies that had dogged interwar Anglo-American relations, was resolved by Britain's effective acceptance of a commitment to end imperial preference. Article VII of the Mutual Aid Agreement of 1942 bound both powers to 'promote advantageous economic relations between the two countries and for the betterment of world-wide economic relations'.[81] Despite the opposition of Leopold Amery in Cabinet, however, it was decided that the advantages of the Mutual Aid Agreement outweighed the disadvantages.[82]

Lord Lothian played an important role in kick-starting Lend–Lease negotiations but had not lived to see the fruits of his labours. Chatham House's outlook, once again, was represented in Cabinet but its principal leaders played no role in the making of this key decision.

Bretton Woods agreement, 1944–45

This agreement created the institutional basis of the postwar economic order, often referred to as the 'Bretton Woods' order, leading to the founding of the IMF and the World Bank. These institutions were generated as a result of Anglo-American talks mandated by Article VII of the Mutual Aid Agreement. Their construction owes nothing to the role of Chatham House. Once again, however, the debates in Cabinet reflected the divisions between traditional imperialists and those who saw the future in Anglo-American terms (Parmar, 1995b, pp. 164–69).

United Nations Organisation

Charles Kingsley Webster was the Chatham House leader who played the most significant role in regard to developing Britain's policy towards the UN. He was head of the American section of FRPS and was, later, to work closely with H.M. Gladwyn Jebb of the Foreign Office's Economic and Reconstruction department. Webster's interest in international

organisation was long-lived: he had been an enthusiastic supporter of the League of Nations in the interwar years.[83]

In his three years' collaboration with Jebb, Webster provided much needed historical sensitivity to the practical problems of international organisation, particularly from the perspective of smaller nations. As an expert, Webster viewed with alarm the ability of politicians, especially the prime minister, to override important practical concerns and advance schemes that were deeply flawed.

Reynolds and Hughes point out that the context within which Webster operated – the lack of significant expertise within the Foreign Office on international organisation, the relatively long period in which planning for the UN took place, the supportive roles of Anthony Eden and Alexander Cadogan – was conducive to increasing the influence of expertise. They show that Webster, as a realist, was sufficiently aware of the need to take into account economic, strategic, social and cultural patterns of global change in designing an international organisation. He was, in conjunction with Jebb and American representatives, to emphasise the importance of sufficient representation of small powers – such as the Dominions – in the new world organisation. This would increase Britain's own influence in the organisation and help settle disputes more efficiently.

One of Webster's contributions was (in March 1943) to draw up a paper on 'Principles for the Washington Discussions' on world organisation, which the Foreign Office used to brief ministers. In his Principles, Webster emphasised that, regardless of the precise form of the world body, the participation of the United States and USSR was vital, that the rights of smaller powers be safeguarded, that regional councils be considered a lower priority than an international organisation, that regional security arrangements, 'such as a Western European . . . or a North and South Atlantic system', be held as a fall-back position if the world body failed. He also noted the importance of reviving France to its former positions and the necessity of security arrangements within the international organisation. Webster attended the Dumbarton Oaks Conference (Washington) as well as the San Francisco Conference of 1945, at which the UNO was created. In each case he participated fully in delegation discussions, technical committees, and held informal talks with his American counterparts. Upon his return to London, Webster was appointed Special Adviser to the Minister of State on United Nations Affairs.

Webster had clearly been an important element in the construction of Britain's planning for an international organisation, bringing with

him 'an insight into the deep underlying trends and tendencies in the onward march of world history', as Reynolds and Hughes put it. Webster's historical insights, attained from detailed archival studies of the Congress of Vienna (1815), were a valuable resource to the Foreign Office, as was his practical experience of peace-making in 1919–20 and his detailed knowledge of the workings (and failings) of the League of Nations (Fagg, 1961, p. 178; Jebb, 1972, pp. 120, 128). His historical studies had also confirmed his belief in the enduring importance of the role of power in international relations, underlying his realism in deliberations on UN formation. Webster's American contacts – in the State Department, the CFR, the universities and foundations[84] – provided him with important insights into US planning for world organisation making his, and Jebb's, tasks much easier (Reynolds and Hughes, 1976, pp. 39, 94).

In addition, he contributed his enormous capacity for hard work and, to a degree, his ability to 'educate' professional civil servants. As Reynolds and Hughes conclude, however, Webster was not alone in British planning and it is undoubtedly the case that such planning would have proceeded without major problems if he had not been so involved. Against this, of course, is the fact that Webster was at the right place at the right time, and it was he who did so much of the planning work for which, it may be argued, his academic, the First World War and Paris Peace Conference experiences had prepared him. His contribution ought not, therefore, to be underestimated (Reynolds and Hughes, 1976, p. 108).[85]

US loan, 1945–46

American Lend–Lease ceased one week after the victory over Japan, leaving Britain in a difficult financial position. Britain hoped for assistance in the form of a financial gift from USA but instead was offered a long-term interest-bearing loan. In addition, the loan of $5 billion was conditional upon British ratification of the Bretton Woods Agreement and the liberalisation of the Sterling Area and British commercial policy. Finally, sterling was to become freely convertible into dollars one year from the beginning of the loan period.

Needless to say, the conditions caused furore on the British political left and right. Nevertheless, the loan was ratified, as was Bretton Woods, by large majorities in the House of Commons, in December 1945 (Parmar, 1995b, pp. 170–71). The role of Chatham House, as in the cases of the Mutual Aid Agreement (with the exception of Lothian), the Atlantic Charter and Bretton Woods was marginal.

Conclusion

Chatham House may be said to have exercised both specific and general influence on the making and implementation of British foreign policy during the Second World War. Its work through FRPS, the IPR, and the activities of Lord Lothian as ambassador, and of Charles Webster as UN planner, constitutes clear evidence that the organisation and its *ad hoc* bodies and associated individuals, were intimately associated with the Foreign Office. Yet, it is also plain that Chatham House did not, in any sense, control the Foreign Office. Indeed, it seems clear that the outlook and attitudes of Chatham House leaders, at all levels, were very similar to that of the official makers of policy. Where they differed was generally concerned with tactics, details, timing and emphases, rather than fundamentals. Of course, in a crisis such differences can be important. In the main, however, it may be concluded that Chatham House experts were mobilised to serve the state and did so in creative and practical ways. They enhanced the capacities of official policymakers in directions and in ways that did not fundamentally challenge official assumptions. Indeed, that was one of the underlying reasons why Chatham House was selected to occupy such a position: it was considered 'safe', respectable and 'worthwhile'.[86]

What does the historical evidence contribute to testing rival theories of the distribution of political power? The pluralist view, which emphasises the independence of interest groups and their selfish and competitive character, appears to be heavily undermined by the evidence. Chatham House did not maintain its independence – parts of it were merged with the state (FRPS), other parts operated as semi-official state agencies (IPR). In effect, Chatham House violated its own Royal Charter: it became involved with policymaking and implementation under the wing of the state. A little more might, however, be stated in favour of pluralism, especially in regard to the role of public opinion, in chapters on that topic (Chapters 6 and 7). In terms of policymaking, it would appear that the state was far more powerful than Chatham House which, given pluralism's weak state emphasis, is a particularly severe criticism.

Instrumental Marxism must also receive some critical consideration. Given the big business connections of Chatham House, the relative lack of control over policy exercised by the Institute undermines that particular perspective. Once again, the state appears as far more powerful a force than orthodox Marxism would suggest, converting Chatham House into an arm of official foreign policy within an agenda largely determined by the state.

The Corporatist school, as applied to the history of US foreign relations, finds some partial support from the historical record outlined above. Private forces, claiming to represent society as a whole, free from political partisanship and market-place rivalries, increasingly intertwine with state agencies to resolve policy problems and generate consensus. The state coordinates, but does not control, the private groups which retain their independence and integrity. Chatham House was non-partisan and, formally committed to no specific economic interests, claiming to be driven by 'national interest' considerations alone. To some extent Chatham House did conform to this viewpoint. However, corporatists underestimate state power. In effect, the British state did control Chatham House, in all its various guises. In one case (FRPS), it formally 'nationalised' a private body. The cooperation/coordination element of corporatism, however, is useful as it conforms to the historical evidence. It represents a truer picture than either instrumental Marxism or pluralism. It is important to bear in mind, however, that the US foreign relations version of corporatism makes no allowance for the role of intellectuals in shaping policy outcomes or in generating a consensus around new foreign policy and global orientations, preferring to focus instead on functional economic blocs in society (industrialists, bankers, organised labour and farmers, for example).

The statist view, which emphasises state power, finds much to commend it in the historical evidence. State officials were well organised in a bureaucracy with a strong history, esprit de corps and international orientation. They examined their external (non-state) environment and selected an important body to aid their deliberations, planning and policy-implementation. State officials established the agenda for Chatham House research and study, and supplied policy-guidance and delegates to assist its conferences programme (IPR). What may be missing from this analysis, however, is some understanding of Chatham House culture. Perceiving power as a zero-sum game, as exercised by one group 'over' another, statists underestimate the importance of private associations like Chatham House. Although they operated within guidelines set by the Foreign Office, Chatham House leaders acted out of a sense of purpose and conviction that was lifelong and sincere. Had the British state suggested that the postwar agenda was radically to be other than pro-Anglo-American, there is little doubt that Chatham House men would have left state service. That is, they were self-motivated and when they cooperated with state agencies and officials, it was because they shared ideas and perspectives and felt duty-bound to make a contribution to serving the public or nation in a time of need. The state also

needed the capacities – intellectual, expert, practical – of Chatham House. It could not have adequately coped in wartime without private efforts and expertise. Though not fundamental, Chatham House did make a serious contribution to policymaking, planning and implementation during the War without which such processes would not have worked as well. Statists, then, may need to soften their insistence on state autonomy and assign some significance to private effort and the culture of public service which Chatham House represented.

The Gramscian approach emphasises the power of the state and the private forces – especially intellectuals – in building political and societal consensus to overcome structural crises in capitalist societies. Building hegemony, in this view, requires leadership that appeals across social class divisions and specific societal interests, articulating a coalition that upholds a new consensus, in this case focused around social, economic and international planning. Building a new world order, in which Britain would cooperate closely with the United States through the medium of formally international organisations, required effecting of a policy-shift of some significance to imperial Britain, requiring technical and practical expertise. Effectively jettisoning Britain's relative independence in world affairs for a policy-orientation that subordinated it to the greater, and growing, power of the United States, required significant state mobilisation. A strong state needed to mobilise strong groups – such as the intellectuals and experts focused on Chatham House – to legitimise its own radical foreign policy reform programme. Without such 'private' group mobilisation, the state would be isolated and vulnerable to challenge, especially when the forces of imperial traditionalism were so strong within and outside the state machinery itself. Where the Gramscian view may require modification, along lines suggested by statism, is in its traditional focus on the domestic sources of power and political behaviour. Internal politics, however, as we have seen, were clearly predicated on recognition of changes in global patterns of power and assessments of Britain's strengths and weaknesses, and new opportunities and threats to her worldwide interests. There is no reason, however, why the Gramscian explanation cannot incorporate that element of statism and emerge stronger thereby.

In sum, Chatham House was a significant force in British foreign policy during the Second World War and its role is best explained by Gramscian theory as supplemented by certain insights from statism. The next chapter aims to consider the foreign policy role and influence of the CFR and to examine its theoretical implications.

5
The Role and Influence of the CFR in the Making of American Foreign Policy

This chapter establishes the fact that the Council, in effect, developed and maintained a particular 'line' in American foreign affairs, provides an introduction to the nature of the organisation's functions, examines its principal mechanism for exerting policy-related influence, and attempts to assess the general and specific level and nature of any such influence. As was the case in Chapter 4, the decision-making method (focusing on the same decisions that were considered in the British context) will be utilised to provide specific evidence of the influence of the CFR. The chapter ends by comparing the influence of the Council with that of Chatham House.

The Council's organisation

The CFR was governed by a Board of Directors who met monthly to make policy decisions. There were numerous sub-committees for specific purposes, such as membership, finance and research. In addition to the Chairman of the Board, there were several other officers, including an Executive Director, Walter H. Mallory, who was the mainstay of the Council's bureaucracy, organising its meetings, conferences and applications for funds to the foundations.

The Council invited prominent diplomats and politicians to address its members on a monthly basis, to keep its members informed of the latest developments and thinking in world affairs. In addition, discussion groups were set up to better inform members interested in specific policy fields. The Council also organised specialist study groups to focus on particular aspects of foreign affairs, such as Soviet Russia (1923), the Far East (1924), Caribbean Affairs (1925), Anglo-American Relations (1928), and so on. The study groups, in a manner very close to its Chatham

House counterparts, brought together experts, practitioners, policymakers and foreign correspondents, and often produced a report of their findings.

In addition to its reports, books and journal, the Council published the annual *United States in World Affairs*, edited by Shepardson and William O. Scroggs, and *Political Handbook of the World*, edited by Mallory.

The CFR's 'line'

The Council consistently declared itself above partisanship and ideology. Its publications, such as *Foreign Affairs*, were declared impartial. The imprint of internationalism, however, could not be masked. As Schulzinger argues in relation to *Foreign Affairs*, 'no reader could be fooled into thinking that the journal was anything other than a plea for a forward United States foreign policy' (Schulzinger, 1984, p. 11; Grose, 1996, p. x).

Insider accounts of the Council continue to stress its impartiality, however (Bundy, 1994; Grose, 1996). In addition, they argue that the CFR could never operate an institutional 'line' because of internal dissension. They stress also the fact that authors of *Foreign Affairs* articles have ranged from Nikolai Bukharin to Henry Kissinger, and that communists such as Fidel Castro and 'isolationists' such as Smith Brookhart (US Senator, Iowa) have addressed its membership. They tend to downplay, however, the degree of intemperate and intolerant feeling generated within the Council by such invitations. In the case of Brookhart, the Council was split by dissension between its Wall Street and academic members, with the former furious that dangerous 'demagogues' should be permitted to address such an esteemed body. In Castro's case, insiders do not mention vitriol directed at the Cuban leader that forced him prematurely to leave the meeting (Parmar, 2001, p. 34).

Therein lies an important factor in the Council's thinking: as long as its membership policy selected 'sound' internationalists, the occasional 'isolationist' speaker could not threaten its internal unity. Indeed, such speakers would provide ballast for the view that the Council was hospitable to all schools of political thought (Schulzinger, 1984, p. 19; Wala, 1994, p. 26).

Within the internationalism of the CFR, a prominent place was reserved for Anglo-American cooperation. Council members and leaders were, in general, Anglophile and admired the liberal character of the British Empire, and cherished the two nations' shared cultural and historical ties. Being hardheaded realists, however, Council men were very much concerned with the strategic importance of Britain and its global possessions, and of the necessity of Anglo-American cooperation

for world security, economic prosperity, and the workability of international institutions.[1]

CFR mechanism for influence

The principal mechanism that the Council possessed that enabled it to play a policy-related role in wartime America was its War and Peace Studies (WPS) project. In addition, a number of specific CFR leaders played important roles in key areas, such as the making of a number of 'key decisions', usually through their affiliation with the WPS project. Such leaders include Isaiah Bowman, Hamilton Fish Armstrong and Whitney H. Shepardson. Although it is clear that such men were active in a number of other roles, as the biographical evidence presented in Chapter 2 shows, their commitment to the CFR was long-lived and very deep. Their formation and leadership of the CFR was symptomatic of their globalism as well as a forum for more clearly focusing their efforts radically to alter America's perception of its role in world affairs.[2]

The WPS programme of the CFR

The WPS programme of the CFR was the American equivalent of Chatham House's FRPS. Both WPS and FRPS were drafted into state service for the duration of the War, within their respective countries' machinery for making foreign policy. Both were steadily taken into greater and greater confidence by official policymakers and can, therefore, make some legitimate claim to have played an influential role in advanced planning for the creation of the postwar world. WPS began life as a cooperative CFR–State Department programme in 1939; was incorporated into the Department's new Division of Special Research (headed by Leo Pasvolsky) in February 1941; and its key members were strongly represented on the Department's Advisory Committee on Post War Foreign Policy in 1942.[3] By 1943, an informal grouping of leading CFR men and public officials, known as the Informal Agenda Group, emerged; they were referred to as 'my post-war advisers' by President Roosevelt (Shoup and Minter, 1977, p. 153). Its trajectory, therefore, was not too dissimilar to that followed by FRPS (which began life as a private initiative – with Foreign Office support – and was gradually fully incorporated into that department by its merger with the Political Intelligence Department and the creation of the Foreign Office Research Department in 1943).

What role did the WPS programme play in forming (or implementing) US foreign policy during the War? What were its functions for the State (or other) departments? What did WPS enable the American state to do which it may otherwise have been unable to do? For instrumental Marxists, Lawrence Shoup and William Minter, there is no question that the CFR (through WPS) played a dominant role in policymaking during the Second World War. They claim that the CFR had 'great power vis-à-vis government . . . ' and that such power translated into 'de facto control over the state' (Shoup and Minter, 1977, p. 161). Conversely, Robert D. Schulzinger argues, in effect, that the CFR was simply 'present' during the proceedings. The Council itself claimed that the 'real touchstone [of the WPS programme] is the usefulness of the studies for the government'.[4] The Council had always viewed its 'research – fact-finding, arranging, recording and interpreting', as oriented towards practical problem-solving, 'not pursued merely as an end in itself . . . '.[5] The WPS programme, therefore, represented an ideal opportunity for the Council to help change the course of US foreign policy.

It is the aim of this chapter to evaluate empirically rival claims about the Council's influence and to try to make sense of any influence or non-influence. Whatever the outcome of the empirical element of this study, it is agreed by all CFR scholars that the CFR was present and actively involved in research and debate within the corridors of power in Washington, DC.

WPS was certainly influential and credible enough to attract some of the brightest men of the generation. The project utilised almost a hundred members, particularly from the academic world, including economists Jacob Viner (Chicago) and Alvin Hansen (Harvard), and historians William L. Langer and Crane Brinton (Harvard). There were representatives of the armed forces, including Major General George V. Strong (chief of Army Intelligence) and Admiral William V. Pratt (retired chief of Naval Operations). Corporate lawyers and future officials Thomas K. Finletter and John Foster Dulles, along with leading bankers and industrialists, Norman H. Davis, Frank Altschul and Ralph Flanders, were well represented. From the press were drawn military and foreign affairs experts such as Hanson Baldwin (*New York Times*), George Fielding Eliot (*New York Herald Tribune*) and John Gunther.[6]

The members of WPS were very active and productive. Meeting for long sessions at the Council's New York headquarters, the project's groups met on 253 separate occasions, while their steering committee met ten times, and its staff 96 times. In all, they produced 682 memoranda and draft reports for consideration by policymakers (Notter, 1950, p. 54).

As the Council's own summary of the WPS programme claims, its memoranda divided into papers on the strategic position in Europe and the likely prospects there and in other regions of the world, brief general background reports, policy papers related to particular possibilities that may face the United States during and after the War, and other papers that sketched out the outlines of American foreign policy and its attitude to the eventual peace conference.[7]

The WPS programme was initially established at the suggestion of the CFR (in September 1939) to develop ideas as to the nature of American national interests and to provide vital assistance to a hard-pressed State Department by supplying background information. In their discussions with the State Department, Armstrong and Mallory assured officials that they did not wish to usurp the role of the Department nor to make American foreign policy. They wanted to help the United States seize its historic opportunity to become '*the premier power in the world*' (Italics added). The CFR wished to establish a foreign policy 'brain trust', an aim of the Council that went back to its very origins at Paris in 1919 (Schulzinger, 1984, p. 61).

The problem, however, facing the Council and the State Department was of how to differentiate the supply of 'background' material and general advice about the nature of US foreign policy and other more specific recommendations, from actual policymaking itself, especially in the eyes of its critics. Politically, the State Department was terrified of public exposure of the involvement of the CFR, given the bitter debate between isolationists and interventionists. In its qualified support of the WPS project, therefore, it was made clear that the State Department could not permit the WPS to be publicised, recommending that the *Rockefeller Foundation* support it, which the RF duly assented to do to the tune of $44,500. Overall, the Foundation was to provide around $300,000 to fund WPS between 1939 and 1945.[8]

Assistant secretary of state, George S. Messersmith, in welcoming the CFR's initiative, noted how the Council gave the Department 'confidence that groups of men with the *proper background and understanding* in the country and under *such direction and leadership* as that which the Council has shown, were giving thought to these problems . . . '.[9] Messersmith in effect acknowledged that the Council was not only exceptional but *one of us*. It was coming home.

The work of the WPS programme officially began in mid-December, 1939, when four separate groups emerged to conduct research and analysis, headed by a Steering Committee (chaired by Armstrong). There was one group charged with the study of Armaments (led by Allen

W. Dulles), one for Economics (Viner and Hansen), another for Politics (Shepardson), and one for Territorial questions (Bowman). They proceeded to produce around 250 memoranda by the time that the United States entered the War.

The groups were motivated by great power considerations, Wilsonian one-worldism or the belief in global interdependence, the necessity of a general international organisation (as opposed to regional schemes), the belief that the US had vital interests across the entire globe, and a desire to ensure 'predictability' in the world (Schulzinger, 1984, pp. 62–70). This set of ideas and preferences are very similar to those held by the Chatham House leaders in FRPS, and consequently, they came to fairly similar conclusions.

While the Armaments group concluded that the great powers should disarm the enemy states and smaller powers through an international system that permitted the great powers more room for manoeuvre, the Politics group arrived at similar conclusions in regard to international organisation. The smaller powers' role in any international organisation needed to be circumscribed and subordinated to the decisions of the great powers, Shepardson and his collaborator, Grayson Kirk, noted. Rejecting regionalism, because the United States was a *world* power, the Politics group reiterated the conviction that there was just one interdependent world, in which the actions of one power could threaten the interests of all. Consequently, only an international organisation led by the great powers could effectively maintain security.

In harmony with the other groups, Bowman's Territorial group conducted study of the disruptive nature and effects of nationalism, particularly in the Middle East, underlining once again the necessity of pooling sovereignty in international organisation. Meanwhile the Economics group considered the position of the US in the world economy and the necessity of opening up the British Empire to American goods. Alvin Hansen, the populariser of Keynesianism in the United States, advocated the free convertibility of all currencies, the establishment of an international monetary fund, within a system of payments founded on the American dollar (Schulzinger, 1984, p. 68).

There can be no more plain an exposition of the WPS' attitude to international economics than that contained in a paper by the Economics group (E-B34). That paper, jointly authored by Arthur Upgren and William Diebold, Jr, entitled 'Methods of Economic Collaboration: Introductory: The Role of the Grand Area in American Economic Policy', outlined the extent of the globe's resources and markets that the United States economy 'required' in order to sustain itself without resorting to radical

economic restructuring. In the words of memorandum E-B34, 'The Grand Area, then, is the amount of the world the United States can defend most economically, that is, with the least readjustment of the American economy'. The memorandum justified the Grand Area – which consisted of huge tracts of the globe, including the British Empire, the Far East and the Western Hemisphere (at a minimum) – as the principal means for waging the war-effort as well as for safeguarding the US economic system in the long-run, 'in times of war as in times of peace'.[10]

The Grand Area scheme, however, was not only interested in economic arrangements: it also related international security concerns to its economic preferences. Therefore, E-B34 further noted that the Grand Area would very likely require protection from rival blocs – the German bloc, for example – against which it would require internal unity (by preventing defections from within) and possibly force against such rivals.[11] As Santoro notes, here may be discerned the embryonic notion of the 'containment' thesis, articulated by State Department planner, George F. Kennan in 1947, and published in an article in *Foreign Affairs* (Santoro, 1992, p. 93). The Grand Area scheme implied that the United States held the key to global economy and security.

As already noted on several occasions, however, there was a special place in the 'new order' reserved for Britain. E-B34 stated, therefore, that 'Anglo-American collaboration is the key to the integration of the Grand Area', in war and peace. Although Anglo-Saxon ethnic affinities played an important role in such statements, there were strong practical benefits associated with such cooperation. In fact, only Anglo-American, or 'American-British', as the CFR preferred to term it, cooperation could fully integrate the Grand Area. To be successful in peacetime, when the 'outside pressure of a common enemy [was] removed', the Area would have to 'detect present and prospective clashes of interests, define them so far as possible, and seek means of eliminating, alleviating, or compromising them' (Santoro, 1992, pp. 95–96). E-B34 noted, however, that British and American interests were not identical 'nor entirely parallel'. There would be policy disagreements 'but also real clashes of interest which can be resolved only to the hurt of certain groups within one or the other country'.[12] Neither would American public opinion accept a policy of 'sustained [exclusive] American-British collaboration on ... post-war reconstruction ... [and] a new international order under American-British auspices ...'. Instead, a series of WPS papers urged a 'limited partnership by consent', warning against 'any tendency to perpetuate an exclusively Anglo-American overlordship of the world, however beneficent this may seem at the outset'.[13]

Britain's position, on the edge of Europe, was considered to be of vital strategic importance. George Fielding Eliot, the military correspondent of the *New York Herald Tribune*, argued that British postwar power would be a vital factor in American influence. 'From the cold-blooded American viewpoint . . . Britain is a primary illustration of the doctrine of advanced bases . . .'. That is, USA should never permit an enemy to possess bases that could be used to attack her, although she should try to acquire advanced bases to attack her enemies.[14]

As Shoup and Minter note, such papers were discussed with State Department officials, especially Leo Pasvolsky, prior to their wider circulation to the Secretary of State and others (Shoup and Minter, 1977, p. 131). This is an important point that they make which has consequences for their arguments relating to the CFR's domination of the policy-planning and -making process. That the CFR placed their ideas before 'lesser' officials prior to wider circulation to the political leadership, suggests that influence was flowing in both directions, that there was genuine interaction among like-minded men sharing very similar, if not identical, perspectives on the need for a globalist foreign policy.

At the global level, it is clear that the United States, according to the WPS' personnel, aimed to play a dominant role, seeking 'partners' only to the extent that it was practical or politically wise to do so. As a paper by the Politics group asserted, the United States was working to develop 'a new concept of nationhood in which sovereignty [of other nations] will be subordinated to the requirements of the organised world community', as determined by the United States.[15] Concretely, such American preponderance was to be exercised through a series of international economic, financial and military organisations.

One of the greatest threats to the principles and plans of the WPS project was American isolationism. In their deliberations within and outside the State Department, there was a consistent fear that isolationism was the biggest enemy facing the practical realisation of their globalist ideas and that it had to be combatted at every turn. In late 1942, for example, a year after Pearl Harbor, a CFR study group noted that isolationists were merely 'biding their time . . . [T]hey do not have to present plans or reasoned arguments. They have only to wait for inertia to overtake Americans', as had occurred after the First World War. 'They are political opportunists', the argument continued, 'experienced in the art of guerrilla warfare, with an arsenal of prejudices and traditions at their disposal'.[16] On several occasions, therefore, and through practical action, the Council urged stronger State Department and Administration action to combat 'the enemy within'.[17]

The Council and the State Department worked very closely on the various groups within the WPS programme. Clearly, the arrangement yielded a number of positive results, as will be seen below. Such intimate relations with an outside group, however, also caused some friction within the Department, as some career officials felt that the Council men were operating so as to maximise their own positions and role within the Department. Harley Notter, the assistant head of the Division of Special Research, complained that career officials were being outmanoeuvred by the machinations of Bowman, Armstrong and Philip Mosely. Notter claimed that Bowman, chair of the Territorial group, was discussing confidential matters with other CFR men such as Walter R. Sharp. In addition, Notter accused Bowman *et al.* of arranging shadow group meetings at which were discussed strategies for the official meetings. The privileged status of the CFR within the Department irritated career staff, Notter suggested to Pasvolsky and other officials, especially when career staffs' contributions to planning were overlooked. It also irritated Notter that CFR men were splitting their official State department duties with work at CFR headquarters in New York. Finally, by September 1942, Notter drafted a letter of resignation, citing in part the increasingly powerful position of the CFR within the Department. The Council, he argued, was 'increasing [its] control of the research of this Division [of Special Research] . . . The moves [by the CFR] have been so piecemeal that no one of them offered decisive objection; that is still so', Notter stated, 'but I now take my stand on the cumulative trend' (Shoup and Minter, 1977, pp. 158–60). Notter did not, ultimately, resign. Nor, however, was anything done about his complaints. The CFR continued its work as before, without any official censure. Notter's complaints, it ought to be noted, focused on internal procedural irregularities rather than matters related to the 'national interest'.

Overall, however, the work of the CFR's WPS project was highly thought of by the State Department. Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, thanked the CFR noting that its 'spirit and activity were cordially appreciated by the Department'.[18]

General influence of the CFR

Clearly, the WPS initiative generated an active programme of research and discussion within and outside the State Department, about issues related to the War and the postwar world. How influential was this activity, however, in policymaking itself? On this question, as on so many others concerning the Council, there is a difference of opinion. Shoup

and Minter consider the CFR to have been extremely influential while Schulzinger assigns it a minor role in the planning process.

In his first report to the Rockefeller Foundation, Mallory claimed that the Council had helped in setting the boundaries of debate on first principles of the US national interest, within government. Mallory argued that the CFR's role had been to 'reinforce the hands of the more thoughtful men in the Department who were attempting to achieve a coherent general policy'.[19] Mallory wanted no credit for the WPS as having affected governmental decision-making, only to make clear to the Rockefeller Foundation that the Council's work had kick-started a planning process that was vital in avoiding the mistakes of the First World War. Armstrong explicitly argued that the United States had entered the Second World War 'with more maturity' directly as a result of the Council's advance preparations (Schulzinger, 1984, pp. 74–79). Isaiah Bowman was even more bullish about the WPS programme after Pearl Harbor.[20]

One decision in which Council influence is acknowledged by all CFR scholars is the issue of Greenland. Bowman's Territorial group had written a memorandum in early 1940, 'The Strategic Importance of Greenland', which advanced the view that should Nazi Germany conquer Denmark, Greenland (a Danish colony) would fall into the Nazi orbit, giving them a foothold in the Western hemisphere. Such a foothold, Bowman suggested, might give the Germans power to interfere with transatlantic flights and provide them with important meteorological information. Bowman, therefore, urged Roosevelt to declare Greenland to be under the protection of the Monroe doctrine, whereby the United States had, since 1823, declared the Western hemisphere to be its own concern rather than an area for European interference. Roosevelt, the very day after Germany overran Denmark in April 1940, summoned Bowman to a meeting to explain the issues. At a subsequent press conference, Roosevelt declared Greenland to be a part of the American continent. Later in 1940, Roosevelt 'carried the memorandum to a Cabinet meeting and cited it as the basis for some conclusions he had reached' (Shoup and Minter, 1977, p. 123; Wala, 1994, pp. 40–41).

It is clear that the CFR exerted important influence in this case. One of their groups had foreseen a potential key problem and had suggested a solution that was considered and acted upon by the President. They did not 'force' the President's hand, however, but operated an identical framework of thought about national defence as the American state, from which emerged a particular policy suggestion. Indeed, it is a fact that, at least since 1921, it was the established policy of the United States

that it would not 'recognize the existence in a third government of the right of pre-emption to acquire the interests of the Danish Government' in Greenland, due to 'the importance of Greenland's geographic position . . . '.[21] (In light of Notter's earlier objections to the role of the CFR in the State Department, this particular document might represent a pre-emptive strike at possible later Council claims of influence.) *It is important to bear in mind that, ultimately, it was a CFR group that identified the problem, brought it to official attention, at a particular time, and in an appropriate manner.*

The Council was on less secure ground when it claimed that the Politics group had motivated the President to repeal the 1939 neutrality legislation. On this question, while the CFR's stand on the matter is clear, the Council was not alone in urging repeal (Schulzinger, 1984, p. 74).

The Armaments group was arguably more successful. Its suggestions that the United States station troops on Caribbean bases, send a goodwill naval mission around the Pacific, and appoint an American commissioner for Malaya, were taken up by the Administration. Its longer-range ideas about the development of international police forces for defeated and occupied nations were ignored (Schulzinger, 1984, p. 75).

The case of the attitude of the WPS groups to Japan and the Far East is interesting because it illustrates the character of the Council's influence, and one of the key reasons for the debate between some CFR scholars about such 'influence'. While Shoup and Minter proclaim that the Japan case shows CFR influence, Schulzinger stresses the numerous points of difference between the suggestions advanced by CFR men and actual policy outcomes.

In the case of US policy towards the Far East, an appreciation of the role of this region in the 'Grand Area' scheme is vital, as noted below. The CFR's interest in the Far East had long focused on the emergence of a strong China market, the raw materials of the region upon which the US economy depended, and the economic threat to such interests of Japan, as indicated in the records of their numerous study groups.[22] In the CFR's view, Japan's imperialist designs in Asia represented a major hindrance to America's attempts to consolidate the 'non-German' world. WPS groups, including Economic, Financial and Territorial, examined the options and determined, through specific research, that the Japanese economy was 'peculiarly vulnerable to blockade' due to its dependence on raw materials' imports. A policy of trade embargo of Japan along with aid to China was suggested which, it was hoped would also protect Britain's positions in the region. On this basis, a paper, 'American Far Eastern Policy' (E-B26), was issued in January 1941, and passed on to

Cordell Hull. Seven months later, the paper's two main recommendations – embargo of Japan and aid to China – were official US policy. Such are the claims made by Shoup and Minter, based on a close reading of the historical evidence.

Schulzinger, however, claims the CFR was not influential in regard to Far Eastern policy. He correctly argues that such ideas about undue Japanese influence were standard fare since the late 1930s; that is, the WPS groups were saying nothing new. In fact, Schulzinger argues that the specific suggestions of the Territorial group – that the US attempt, for tactical reasons, to woo Japan from the Axis – fell on deaf ears, as Hull took a very aggressive line in late November 1941 (Schulzinger, 1984, p. 78).

The main difference between rival arguments is in the differing approaches taken to 'influence', illustrating once again the methodological difficulties associated with such an endeavour. Shoup and Minter argue that the CFR and the State Department shared the same outlook on America's changing place in the world, the temptations offered by new opportunities for global pre-eminence, and in their analysis of the threats to such prospects. The foundations of official and CFR thought, therefore, were identical. They all wanted the same thing. Any differences, therefore, were merely tactical, on matters of detail and timing, rather than first principles. Broadly speaking, Shoup and Minter are correct in drawing such conclusions. And given the Council's pre-eminent and privileged position in the State Department's planning machinery, the CFR should not be seen as a 'just' another group, or merely as repeating an accepted policy line. The fact is that it was Council members who wrote policy papers at particular times on specific topics and circulated them to the appropriate Administration leaders. They acted as catalysts as well as crystallisers of policy thought.

Yet, Schulzinger's perspective on influence cannot lightly be dismissed. It offers specificity and detail, comparing Council ideas and suggestions with policy outcomes. It finds the Council's influence to have been marginal in most cases. It is such specificity that underlies the decision-making method of discovering influence, to which further attention is given below.

CFR influence over key decisions

The six key decisions around the taking of which specific influence may be discerned, are the same as those used as one test of Chatham House's influence, in Chapter 4. To recap, those decisions were selected because

they were part of a cumulative process that eventually led to a close postwar alliance between Britain and the United States. For the United States, the decisions led to such an outcome as part of America's rise to globalism and embrace of active engagement with world affairs, under the banner of liberal internationalism. Cooperation with Britain, therefore, was considered as one key step on the road to globalism and away from interwar isolationism.

Destroyers-bases Agreement, 1940

The Council's influence in the taking (by the Administration) of this decision was minimal. The Council (in its WPS form) did not prepare policy papers on this specific subject, nor did they engage in major discussions within the Administration. They did play an important role in public opinion mobilisation on this issue, however, but that is more appropriate to discuss in Chapter 6. In part, however, the activities of the Council contributed to the eventual decision to transfer American destroyers for British bases, as Secretary of State Hull and President Roosevelt were 'lobbied' by individuals, such as Henry Coffin and Henry Luce operating within ad hoc groups led by Council luminaries. The lobbying consisted of discussions with Hull and Roosevelt, who had stressed the legal barriers to transfer and the fact that there was an upcoming election in November 1940 to consider, in the context of Congressional isolationism (Chadwin, 1968, pp. 80–81).

Atlantic Charter, 1941

Shoup and Minter claim that the Council was the driving force behind the promulgation of the Atlantic Charter, which established American support for postwar international (initially Anglo-American) economic and military cooperation and institutions. Shoup and Minter argue that the Charter's main function was propaganda, in order to inspire the peoples of the US and Britain and those of the colonies and occupied nations. The text of the Charter, Shoup and Minter claim, was written under the guidance of Sumner Welles, assistant secretary of state and Council member. They provide no evidence, however, to back up this final assertion. As Schulzinger argues, the open trading system urged by the Charter resulted from the anti-imperial preference attitudes of Cordell Hull, the Secretary of State, and of the Treasury Secretary, Henry Morgenthau, Jr. In fact, far from representing the CFR's views, economists Alvin Hansen and Jacob Viner held strong reservations about the vagueness of the Atlantic Charter, and its aim of restoring national sovereignty suggested that the principles of global economic interdependence had

been undermined. In addition, Hansen and Viner felt that the problems of currency exchange and world trade had not been addressed (White, 1961; Schulzinger, 1984, p. 75).

However, Santoro claims that the sheer weight of CFR-produced papers on Anglo-American relations, among others, served as a form of influence by osmosis, in the interaction that they generated within the Administration. While such influence may be beyond conventional measurement, it certainly ought not to be lightly dismissed, as CFR men did the work of translating 'the general ideas of the establishment into an almost "technical" language . . . ', in the absence of an adequate State Department planning organisation. Therefore, Santoro argues, the CFR and the State Department, interacting through the writing and discussion of detailed papers, 'provided the groundwork for the summit between Roosevelt and Winston Churchill at Placentia Bay in August 1941' (Santoro, 1992, pp. 110–11).

Mutual Aid agreement, 1942

The Mutual Aid Agreement of February 1942 provided for wartime American aid to Britain and, in effect, committed Britain to bring to an end the system of 'imperial preference' in favour of an open international trading regime. Consequently, it was a treaty of great significance for both nations, a fact acknowledged by many British leaders and contemporary observers (including the arch-imperialist, Leopold Amery) (Woods, 1990, p. 61).

While the CFR was broadly in favour of ending imperial preference and supported an open international system, it appears that its WPS programme played no role in the taking of this decision. Of course, official action in support of Britain is explicit in practically all of the memoranda and papers of the WPS prior to February 1942. Nonetheless, there is no evidence, beyond one paper of November 1941, P-B31, 'Considerations Affecting a Lend–Lease Settlement With Great Britain', that the WPS played any significant role. P-B31 urged the United States speedily to agree on Lend–Lease aid to Britain. Beyond that, however, there would appear to have been little input on this decision from the Council. Yet, as Randall Woods argues, Lend–Lease was seen by 'shrewd heads' in Washington, DC, 'as a device that could be used to alter the structure of international trade and finance, and determine the global balance of power in the postwar world' (Woods, 1990, p. 9). That the WPS programme played a marginal role in the process of decision-making in this case severely undermines the positions taken by Shoup and Minter.

Bretton Woods agreements, 1944–45

Article VII of the Mutual Aid Agreement bound Britain and the United States further to discuss the institutional arrangements for a new international financial and economic order. The financial conversations that resulted created two of the most important elements of the postwar world order, the IMF and the World Bank. While it is clear that the IMF and the World Bank were means by which the Grand Area was to be economically and financially integrated, it is also transparent that the CFR played a marginal role in their creation.

Shoup and Minter argue that the groundwork for such institutions was carried out within the WPS programme. It is certainly the case that economists Alvin Hansen, Winfield Riefler and Jacob Viner first identified the need for such international institutions as a bank, development authority, and a stabilisation fund. It is also the case that such ideas would have flowed around other departments through interdepartmental committees, on which Leo Pasvolsky sat, for example. In addition, there were a number of technical committees of which Hansen was a member. Nevertheless, the actual work underlying the creation of the IMF and World Bank, *as Shoup and Minter openly recognise*, was conducted by Harry Dexter White of the Treasury, who was a member of neither the Council nor its WPS project (Shoup and Minter, 1977, pp. 166–69).

This is a very instructive case study of the influence of the CFR, one which torpedoes Shoup and Minter's thesis most forcefully. More than any of the other decisions, it is on the Bretton Woods question that the credibility of their positions must rest. If, as they claim, the Council was representative of the New York financial oligarchy, and if that oligarchy was, in effect the ruling class of America, the absence of the Council in the creation of the IMF and World Bank is simply stunning. The principal institutional innovations of the War, which shifted the centre of world finance from London to New York, and instituted the dollar as the world's new premier currency, were elaborated and undertaken not by the New York City-based CFR but by officials in Washington, DC.

UN formation, 1943–45

The CFR had long supported the creation of an effective international security organisation to deter aggressors and to maintain world peace. Therefore, the WPS project was predicated on the belief that the United States would play a leading role in the formation of such an organisation, one that, as has already been seen, would be founded on American power and definitions of 'reality'. A new United Nations' Organisation

(UNO) would integrate the world politically and militarily, just as the IMF and World Bank and other institutions would integrate the world economically and financially.

Isaiah Bowman, who headed the Territorial group and was a member of the Political group of the WPS, played a significant role in the creation of the UNO. In particular, Bowman and other CFR members, Hamilton Fish Armstrong and Walter Sharp, alongside individuals very close to the Council such as CFR founder James T. Shotwell and professional internationalist, Clark Eichelberger were well represented on the International Organisation (IO) sub-group of the Political group (Schwark, 1985, p. 361). In addition, CFR men – Bowman and Davis – were members of the Informal Agenda Group, headed by Secretary Hull, established in January 1943. This group grappled with all the most important issues associated with international organisation: When to form the organisation? Who was to lead it? What would be the role of the smaller powers, of a general assembly, of an international police force?

As Schulzinger shows, the WPS groups spent many months dealing with the above problems in great detail (Schulzinger, 1984, pp. 83–94). They discussed regional plans and universalist principles, the question of timing the formation of the UN to maximise public support, of trimming the 'veto power' of small states in a 'one state-one vote' system, and the problems of national jealousies in any new international army. According to Shoup and Minter, Bowman was clear in his own mind that since the days of overt imperialism were over, the United States needed to maintain its own 'security' while avoiding 'conventional forms of imperialism'. The answer was to 'internationalise' the exercise of US power through a new organisation (Shoup and Minter, 1977, pp. 169–70). The deliberations, according to Hilderbrand, 'brought to light' some of the 'cardinal principles of postwar organisation' (Hilderbrand, 1990, p. 15).

The Informal Agenda Group (IAG) played a leading role in shaping the UN. They met frequently with President Roosevelt, advising him and Hull in the taking of important decisions. For example, the work of the CFR men in the US positions taken at the Moscow Conference of 1943, was widely acknowledged.[23] Between December 1943 and July 1944, the IAG drafted the documents that determined the United States' positions at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference of 1945, which furthered the movement towards an international organisation (Hilderbrand, 1990, p. 30). As a member of the State Department's Policy Committee, Bowman claimed to have 'prepared the final memorandum used at Dumbarton Oaks . . . '.[24] The documents were read by Hull and then scrutinised by three distinguished jurists: Charles Evans Hughes (CFR member),

John W. Davis (a CFR leader) and Nathan L. Miller. Once approved, the plan was discussed by, among others, Bowman and Davis, with Roosevelt, who issued a supporting public statement on the very same day (Notter, 1950, p. 247; Hilderbrand, 1990, p. 47).

Notter, however, is clear that the influence of the documents of the WPS groups was not the decisive factor in the making of the UN or of the US policy towards the new organisation (Notter, 1950, p. 114). Conversely, Hilderbrand points out that, with some modifications, it was the IAG's plans that 'formed the basis of the draft charter that the State Department eventually presented' at Dumbarton Oaks. Notter further undermines his own claims when he adds that Bowman and Armstrong were considered so central to the US delegation to the San Francisco Conference of 1945 (which set up the UN), that they were designated 'principal' advisers, functioning as 'senior negotiators'. He also acknowledges the 'marked extent to which the structure for the extraordinary preparation in this field was carried over into the negotiating structure', that is, the institutionalisation of the role of the CFR, in particular (Notter, 1950, p. 417, 419; Hilderbrand, 1990, p. 48). Notter's pique at the privileged position of the CFR in the State Department's planning machinery is the most likely explanation of his failure fully to acknowledge the outside group's influence (Schulzinger, 1984, pp. 135–36).

Bowman also played an important diplomatic and advisory role, as Edward Stettinius's (US Under-Secretary of State) 'chief expert on world organisation' during their trip to London in 1944. Bowman, for instance, repeatedly raised the issue of international trusteeship of dependent territories, suggesting that the United States needed to take control of Japanese islands in the Pacific, and that trusteeship 'would be bound to camouflage their actions' (Hilderbrand, 1990, p. 56). In addition, Bowman took the opportunity to discuss with Richard Law, the Foreign Office Minister of State, and Charles Webster, issues concerning American and British planning for a postwar international organisation (Campbell and Herring, 1975, p. 51). In informing British officials of the Americans' position, Bowman took credit for strengthening the hand of officials against the regional councils favoured by Churchill (Smith, 1986, 1994, p. 297).

It is clear that the WPS groups of the CFR operated at the very heart of the State Department and Presidential thinking about the nature, powers and character of a postwar international organisation. The bulk of the planning for the UNO took place in groups established by, or allied with, the WPS programme. Bowman acted both as an adviser to Hull, Roosevelt and Stettinius, and as a link with British official thinking

about the UN. The planners were also among the core officials that accompanied the delegations to the Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco conferences. Those facts set the CFR men apart from all other private foreign affairs organisations in the United States. They have as legitimate a claim to influence as any active civil service team may advance in the making of the UN. However, theirs was not necessarily the decisive voice: the agenda for world organisation had been set by Roosevelt through the Atlantic Charter, while universalism was a principle held dear by Secretary Hull.

Nevertheless, it was ultimately several men from the CFR who established the framework of thought about international organisation, who drafted the discussion papers debating the key issues, and who tried to draft the structure and functions of the proposed organisation. The fairest conclusion is that the CFR and the State Department worked closely together to produce the organisation that resulted from their discussions. Cordell Hull, however, was adamant that Bowman had played the most critical role in the founding of the UN.[25]

The US loan to Britain

The United States decided to terminate Lend–Lease aid one week after victory over Japan, causing Britain to despatch Lord Keynes to Washington to negotiate financial aid to offset her balance of payments problems. The decision to terminate, according to Woods, 'contributed to a disintegration of Britain's international financial position and drastically reduced its ability to defend its interests around the world' (Woods, 1990, p. 301). The loan, it was hoped, would offset some of the problems facing Britain, while also, in return, forcing Britain to open up her declining Empire to American commerce.

Clearly, the position and postwar role of Britain was a key concern of the Council's Anglophile leadership. On the other hand, CFR leaders aimed to maximise America's own position in relation to Britain's. Their stance, therefore, was that a loan ought to be offered to Britain, rather than a gift, especially as it would better assuage congressional criticism and midwestern Anglophobia. The most active CFR member on this issue was Will Clayton, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. As Clayton informed a Council study group in March 1946, a loan to Britain was essential to offset her $3 billion trade deficit. The danger to the United States, he added, was that Britain may turn to imperial preference, thereby endangering America's multilateral plans. According to Fossedal, Clayton agreed with General Robert E. Wood, chairman of Sears, Roebuck and Co., that 'If you succeed in doing away

with the Empire preference and opening up the Empire to United States commerce, it may well be that we can afford to pay a couple of billion dollars for the privilege.' (Fossedal, 1993, p. 187). Even more frankly, Jacob Viner noted that a loan was the only way to ensure the defence of Western values and, rather pointedly, the military defence of Western interests (Wala, 1994, p. 156).

Clayton was politically astute enough to know that Congress would not tolerate anything other than a commercial transaction. Consequently, the loan was to be interest-bearing and conditional upon the free convertibility of sterling (within a year), the effective break up of imperial preference, and the early ratification of the Bretton Woods Agreements (Woods, 1990, p. 332).

According to Lloyd C. Gardner, the US loan was 'a turning point' in American foreign policy because it permitted the United States to develop a more coherent economic policy for postwar recovery, to build the basis of opposition to the Soviet Union's own postwar plans, and cement 'an Anglo-American alliance . . . ' (Gardner, 1970, p. 118).

Ultimately, however, the loan was a product of many different forces within the American administration: inter-departmental conflict between the Treasury and the State Department and between economic nationalists and multilateralists. Although Clayton was a key figure in the negotiation of the Loan and its accompanying conditions, it is highly probable that such a Loan agreement would have emerged in his absence (Woods, 1990; Fossedal, 1993). Nevertheless, Clayton's role was significant in this decision and the Council, therefore, claim some credit for having influenced a policy outcome.

Conclusion

The Council was an influential institution during the late 1930s and the Second World War. Its principal mechanism for policy-related influence, the WPS programme, was located at the very heart of the American state's capacity for postwar foreign policy planning. Indeed, the WPS organisation was, in effect, the blueprint for the State Department's own initial steps towards a planning organisation. The CFR, with the First World War-experienced leaders, men who had either participated in the Inquiry and/or served at Paris in 1919–20, established the need for long-term planning, set up an organisation, and 'sold' it to the State Department. As such, the CFR won itself a unique position and role inside the Department; no other private group came so close to the heart of the making of foreign policy.

In specific terms, the CFR may claim influence. It was able to mobilise dozens of leading academics, lawyers, journalists, bankers and others with knowledge and experience of foreign affairs for wartime service to the state. That is, it was influential in establishing an ad hoc civil service that helped plug a vital gap in the machinery of American government. In the absence of such a mobilisation, postwar planning and deliberation would have been seriously disadvantaged and delayed. In fact, its absence may well have forced the Administration to look to Congress to finance an expansion of the State Department which, in 1939, would have been almost impossible given the anti-war/isolationist sentiments of public opinion.

The CFR was also influential in certain policy decisions, most notably in declaring Greenland to be under the protection of the Monroe Doctrine, and some operational military decisions. In the 'key decisions', however, its record is mixed. It played an indirect role in the destroyers-bases decision (see Chapter 6 for greater detail), though did not participate in its taking in Washington, DC. The same goes for the Atlantic Charter declaration, the Mutual Aid Agreement and Bretton Woods. The formation of the UN was probably the most important achievement of the WPS, and the US Loan to Britain was also important.

The most important point is that the Council was ever-present at the heart of postwar planning. Its impact was direct and indirect and in many ways may almost be beyond measurement. As Santoro suggests, the sheer weight of WPS papers, memoranda, reports, personnel, all circulating in the State Department and on inter-departmental committees, must have exerted an influence for the assessment of which no adequate instrumentation has yet been devised.

Yet, the evidence does not suggest that Shoup and Minter's claims are substantiated. The CFR did not control the American state; on the contrary, the state proved remarkably flexible and strong, showing capacities not adequately recognised by either instrumental Marxist theory or pluralism. The American state did not bow to external 'group pressure'; rather, it recruited experienced, expert-based private elites to conduct covert postwar planning as a precursor to further building its own capacity. Once recruited and set to work, the State Department and President Roosevelt showed that they had their ideas about postwar foreign policy, in line with which the WPS had to operate; indeed, the Council was largely happy to do so.

The above suggests the efficacy of a statist explanation of the CFR's wartime role. The problem with this view, however, is that it merely reverses the way previous theories have tended to view power. In place

of group/class power over the state, statism advances the notion of state power over the group/class. Yet the evidence permits conclusions that are more nuanced. The picture of the WPS operation at the heart of the State Department is not mainly one of conflict and struggle for power, Harley Notter's resignation missive notwithstanding. The evidence presents a picture of a very serious and busy office peopled by men on a shared mission to move America firmly into the global 'driving seat'. That is, the two 'sides' were united in action to achieve a common objective for the achievement of which they constructed a manageable division of labour. If a choice must be made as to which of the two 'sides' was the more powerful, then the American state carries the day, according to the evidence. But such reasoning obscures a more important insight into the workings of political power in this case.

The corporatist school of US foreign relations' history clearly resonates with a cooperative view of state–group relations. The relationship of the CFR and the state was extremely close such that it is genuinely difficult to distinguish where the initiative of one began and the other ended. Yet, corporatism is, ultimately, a version of pluralism and this is its weakest point. It retains a commitment to the superior power of the private group and accords only a weaker coordinating power to the state. The evidence refutes this interpretation of events and relationships.

It is to the Gramscian view that attention must be turned to find the most adequate explanation of the historical evidence. It contains the best elements of several of the other theories. It permits the state a high degree of autonomy, as does statism, but without suggesting that it only exercises power over others. For Gramsci, the state assisted private organisations to mobilise to advance its own causes, to legitimise its own interests, and to promote *their own interests* as well. In building hegemony, the state brings into closer cooperation with itself a whole range of interests, including expert elites. Such self-motivated elites neither accept state dictates nor make excessive demands on the state. They see themselves as part of the state itself, sharing its problems, burdens, goals and achievements. That is, they embody Gramsci's notion of 'state spirit'. They tend to see the state as the force for coherence, stability and order in social and national life, and as the force for reform in times of stress and crisis.[26] The CFR's WPS programme is best explained by this perspective, as an attempt by progressive American foreign affairs experts to assist the country in a period of world crisis to come to terms with its changed position, role and responsibilities. It was an attempt to engage in the technical and political work that such changes necessitated. The CFR did not claim a monopoly of wisdom or knowledge, just a powerful

commitment to globalism that resonated with Roosevelt's Administration. In that context, it is entirely reasonable to find that the CFR groups were more important in some decisions than others and that the official makers of policy, with superior resources, were consistently more influential than the Council.

Comparison of CFR and RIIA

Consideration of the evidence on policy-related activties of the two think tanks shows that they played very similar roles in their respective societies. Both organisations helped to articulate private elites with the state, to mobilise expertise for policy-related functions in time of war. As non-partisan (that is, non-political party) organisations, they assisted the building and intellectual elaboration of a new consensus that promoted the goals of liberal internationalism – Anglo-American collaboration, international organisation, a more 'open' world system – undermining the 'old order' of 'isolationism' and 'die-hard' imperialism.

In their respective societies, each organisation played a similar role though serving slightly different needs. As the American state was historically weaker than the British, enjoying lower levels of legitimacy in the eyes of public and Congress, and as the main political parties were fractious, and because knowledge of foreign affairs was so limited, the Council was able to play a very important role. The Council secretly assisted the State Department to prepare for globalism, to bring into debates and discussions both Republican and Democratic Congressmen, to strengthen the executive vis-à-vis the Congress. In terms of postwar planning, the Council *initiated* such planning and strengthened the hand of pro-planning elements in the State Department. In addition, its 'Grand Area' concerns placed systematic examination of American national interests onto the bureaucratic/political agenda.

In the British case, however, given the more centralised character of the state, the longevity and esprit de corps of the Foreign Office, Chatham House played a more supplementary role. It did not wholly create planning machinery; it was mobilised to do so by the Foreign Office itself and, when deemed essential by officials, was 'nationalised' – wholly absorbed into the official machinery of state. The WPS programme of the Council, on the other hand, remained private and, significantly, privately funded, suggesting the political significance of Congress in foreign affairs in contrast to the weakness of the House of Commons, and the more fractious divisions between and within the main political parties in the two countries.

The theme of centralisation/decentralisation in differentiating the United States and Britain also finds expression in the roles of the Council and Chatham House. In the British case, Chatham House was the only credible foreign affairs institute in the country. It was based in London, rarely moving beyond its confines, and drawing its members and speakers from Westminster, Whitehall and the City. It was a comprehensive organisation as it dealt with all aspects of Britain's foreign relations and its discussion and dissemination, including a strong presence in the IPR. The Council, however, was far more narrowly focused as there were several other organisations that 'competed' with it (for funds, for example) such as the Foreign Policy Association, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the IPR, the Yale Institute of International Studies, among others. The CFR, therefore, and its complementary 'competitors', operated in different ways, in an informal division of labour, to try to achieve more or less the same ends sought by Chatham House. The Council saw itself as the pinnacle of the 'foreign affairs' community, an elite within an elite.

In terms of general influence over policy, Chatham House was significantly advantaged by the appointment of Lord Lothian as ambassador to the United States. As shown in the previous chapter, Lothian played an important role in generally promoting closer cooperation between Britain and the United States, 'ironing' out several problem issues in the fields of international trade and military cooperation. In addition, Lothian and a number of other Chatham House emissaries (Toynbee, Webster, Macadam) made a very favourable impression on US public and elite opinion during their several trips to that country. The CFR could not really match such personnel in those particular positions of authority, although Whitney Shepardson and Isaiah Bowman did much to promote the Council's work during their visits to London. On the other hand, such efforts reflected the relative positions of the two countries, whose foreign policies each organisation sought to formulate and promote. Britain needed the United States much more than the latter needed her.

Another significant policy-related role played by Chatham House but not by the Council was in Far Eastern affairs. Chatham House was the British national section of the IPR, providing it with another source of influence in British foreign policy. Since Chatham House was the principal, if not the only, foreign affairs society in Britain, it was a 'natural' choice for such a role. There existed greater pluralism in the United States, however, and the functions that were carried out by Chatham House under one roof were shared among a number of separate, though remarkably like-minded, groups in the United States.

In relation to specific policy influence over 'key decisions', the presence of Lord Lothian was critical to the first (destroyers-bases agreement), and important to the third (Lend–Lease), while the Council played almost no policymaking-related role at all (though, as will be seen, they played a key role in public opinion mobilisation on the former issue). Chatham House, then, can claim to have played a significant role in the first decision and in the origins of Lend–Lease aid.

In regard to the second (Atlantic Charter), fourth (Bretton Woods) and sixth key decisions (US Loan), neither Chatham House nor the Council can claim significant influence, though the latter has more claim to significance over the US Loan decision (due to the role of the Council's Will Clayton). Both the Council and Chatham House, however, played significant roles in their respective government's policymaking towards the UN, the fifth key decision. As an international organisation took pride of place among the principles of the two think tanks, the formation of the UN was a source of great satisfaction to their leaders.

Overall, Chatham House was probably more important in more key decisions (3 out of 6) than was the Council (2 out of 6). This finding challenges the idea about Britain's being a strong state, while America's was weak. The American exceptionalist thesis is not demonstrated, according to this decision-making analysis. The CFR ought to have been more influential, according to this view, because of the diffused character of American state power. An exception certainly should be made in regard to foreign affairs, as the executive has greater power in this domain than most domestic policy areas. In contrast, the power of the British state may not be so overwhelming as it is often understood to be.

On the other hand, the above conclusions should be considered in context: the Council's very significant role in establishing novel postwar foreign policy planning mechanisms, for example. Perhaps the Council's most significant wartime contribution was that very state-building effort itself, the precursor to the State Department's own subsequent policy-planning ambitions, the significance of which was longer lasting. The significance, even if it is impossible to measure, of Santoro's evaluation that the sheer weight of Council activity, its hundreds of papers, reports, and memoranda, and meetings and debates, by a process of osmosis seeped through into the whole policy machine, ought not to be discounted. Informal means of influence ought always to be considered alongside more formal means. While the decision-making method allows for the evaluation of influence in specific circumstances, there are forms of influence that it cannot adequately 'measure'.

In the same vein, the influence of Chatham House must be seen in the context of a state that was already, by stealth, drawing closer to the United States and Anglo-American cooperation. It was the trend of the time. Chatham House, then, was not influential in the classic sense of forcing the state to do something it otherwise would not have done, but was 'pushing against an open door'. A similar conclusion may be drawn in regard to the Council and the American state.

Ultimately, both the Council and Chatham House were important to their respective states in the Second World War. Their leaders and members were recruited to state service while others were not. Their views were solicited, their papers were read and discussed, their personnel were made policy advisers for the entire duration of the War. They were in the state, while others were outside. Those facts, in themselves, mark out the Council and Chatham House as different, more significant and interesting. Neither organisation overtly sought to 'make' foreign policy even though different leaders entertained slightly varying ideas about their role. Both were driven by the desire to perform a 'public service' in a time of national emergency, an outlook that characterised their generation.[27] They entered the state to assist; they did. They saw the problems of foreign policy from perspectives that were, in principle, almost identical to that of their respective foreign policy officials. Together, in a careful division of labour that took into account the constitutional roles of public officials and private experts, they made postwar foreign policy. That the representatives of the CFR and CH managed to be more influential on some issues than others is, therefore, to be expected. That state officials were more powerful in certain areas is also predictable. Theirs was not an antagonistic relationship but a mutually cooperative one, even if their specific roles differed. Their ultimate goals were identical.[28]

The Gramscian notion of 'state spirit' sums up much that was most significant in the relationship between private elites and the state.

Part 3

6
The Role of the CFR in the Mobilisation of American Public Opinion

The transformation of the United States into a power able and willing to take a leading role in world affairs was not achieved solely through policy changes in Washington, DC, let alone simply by changes in the structure of world power. This chapter examines the vital role of the CFR in transforming American public opinion from 'isolationist' to 'globalist' as an important aspect of America's rise to globalism. In this regard, the Council focused its energies to undermine and marginalise isolationism while promoting its own internationalist views as the best means to achieve the American national interest(Parmar, 1999a).[1]

As noted in Chapter 3, the Council progressives believed that *authentic* public opinion could only be formed with elite guidance. As, for example, progressive intellectual Franklin Giddings of Columbia opined, 'the legitimate and rightful appeal is always from any dissent of the governed now to that . . . consent which . . . will be freely given when all the facts are clearly seen, and when the reason and conscience of the governed [are] fully awakened and matured' (Wiebe, 1968, p. 234).

In foreign relations, progressives called for 'internationalism' and 'bipartisanship'. If America was to take her 'rightful' place in the world and to fulfil her desire to lead the world, she had to be united and develop a modern political and administrative system (Rosenberg, 1982, p. 8). In effect, progressive organisations sought to mobilise public opinion – the conceptualisation of which they pioneered – as a force in its own right (Hilderbrand, 1981; Eisenach, 1994, p. 76), to increase interest in foreign affairs and to strengthen the federal executive.

The CFR emerged from such a background particularly catalysed, as its leading members were, by America's experience of global warfare, their desire for American activism internationally and the failure of the US Senate to ratify American membership of the League of Nations.

This chapter, in part, explores and tests the effectiveness of the Council in an area of major importance for the organisation – public opinion mobilisation – frequently neglected by scholars in recent years, with the exception of Michael Wala, who have usually focused on the impact of the Council on *policymaking* in Washington, DC, most frequently in an attempt to prove or disprove the notion that the organisation was a 'ruling class' vehicle that dominated the foreign policy process in the 1939–45 period (Shoup and Minter, 1977; Wala, 1994). Yet, as Dean Acheson, a prominent former Secretary of State, suggested, there may be something 'uniquely and typically American' in private groups of citizens volunteering to agitate publicly for a pro-governmental foreign policy. The effects of such private action, Acheson suggested, were felt by national policymakers (Acheson, 1969, pp. 240–41). This raises points of immense interest to students of political power: What is the character of such private groups? And what do these groups' activities tell us about 'how power works' in a democratic society? In the context of this chapter, what role did the CFR publicly play in the critical transition from isolationism to internationalism in America's foreign policy? Answers to such questions about the CFR highlight the efficacy of Kraft's observation about the origins and role of the foreign policy establishment, which was to win the Second World War, destroy isolationism and 'make internationalism not only respectable but beyond serious question', and make American foreign policy bipartisan (Kraft, 1966, p. 188).

The roles of public opinion and parastates that have been raised above, and are examined below, necessarily raise theoretical issues regarding the causes and management of policy shifts in the American political system. The implications for pluralist, corporatist, instrumental Marxist, statist and Gramscian explanations will be considered after the presentation of the case material on the CFR. At this point, however, this chapter considers the Council's perspective on public opinion and the bases upon which it was constructed; the CFR's programme for mobilising public opinion and its observable effects; and finally draw some theoretical and general conclusions.

The CFR and the enlightenment of public opinion

In examining the CFR's public opinion role, it is evident that there was a dual purpose in this area of its activity. First, the Council was interested

in data-collection, the gauging of opinion in different sectors of society. Secondly, the Council was interested in opinion mobilisation, developing its tactics according to the sector of the public in mind.

The elitism of the Council's membership was paralleled by the elitism of its mission to 'enlighten' public opinion. The leaders of the Council saw themselves as the kind of independent scientific experts Lippmann had called for. The Council's leadership perceived its mission as one of identifying and focusing activities on key leadership segments of American society, the so-called 'opinion-formers' as the initial step towards the education of the whole population. Although always a small minority of the population, the attentive public, according to Rosenau, 'clearly plays a crucial role'. It is these 'small blocs of opinion-holders', V.O. Key, Jr, argues, who 'often energize – or brake – the machinery of state' (Rosenau, 1974, pp. 4, xxxiii), making the winning of this bloc of critical importance. This was a central tenet of Council philosophy too often overlooked by scholars of elite power – that the American citizenry was perceived to lack the levels of deference that allowed elites to rule unchallenged, a fact of which Council leaders were fully cognisant. Their principal duty, therefore, was to study the necessary means of overcoming such non-deferential attitudes in order to transform public opinion from being the basis of foreign policy to '*an instrument of foreign policy*'.[2] Council leaders, fearing a return to post-1918 isolationism, never took public opinion for granted.[3]

Despite this concern about the importance of public opinion, however, the elitist spirit of the Council usually (but not always) made them rather timid in moving among the 'masses'. Indeed, one of the chief criticisms of the Council by those who would convert the masses by working for internationalism in the isolationist heartland – the mid-West – was precisely that the CFR seemed too 'limited to Manhattan . . . ' and a small and self-satisfied local membership.[4]

Given the Council's self-perception as a university of international affairs, it is all the more surprising that quite sustained attempts *were* made to establish regional committees on foreign relations across the United States from the late 1930s onward. The Council also, more naturally, isolated Ivy League university students as a focus of its educational programme, as they were seen as future leaders. Quite intermittent and hesitant steps were also taken during the War to directly contact church leaders and farmers' representatives. For the 'attentive' and 'opinion-forming' publics, CFR produced *Foreign Affairs*, along with a number of other publications, most of which appeared on university international relations course reading lists across America.[5] The Council has also been

connected, despite disclaimers to the contrary, with more popular organisations – such as the Foreign Policy Association (FPA) – and with single-issue opinion-mobilisation groups such as the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies (CDAAA). Finally, the leading individuals of the Council established other popular or single-issue organisations – the Century Group and Fight For Freedom (FFF) – to campaign for a declaration of war by the US administration.[6] It is to the operationalisation of the Council's definition of public opinion mobilisation that attention now turns.

The universities

Between 1936 and 1942, conferences were held at the CFR's New York City headquarters, financed by grants from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Their aim was to provide a bridge between foreign policy 'old hands' and the emerging elites from key universities.[7] The fundamental goal was to focus the attention of serious students on the practicalities of US foreign policy, specifically the problems facing the adoption of an *internationalist* foreign policy. Organising 'Conferences for University Men' was seen as a key step towards gaining extra ground for 'internationalism' in the late 1930s as war looked increasingly inevitable.

The Council took a long view of the impact of the conferences, believing that training young men to 'think straight' in 1940 was vital as 'the younger generation alone will shape the formative years that ensue'. And focusing on young scholars would shape their 'outlook . . . lectures and their own students'. As Mark Chadwin notes, by 1940 university students were the most pacifistic section of American society. The Columbia University Peace Committee, for example, declared that 80 per cent of students were against arming belligerent powers and half did not want US armed forces to increase in size.[8] The Council was, therefore, making its intervention in the increasingly controversial debate on war, peace and US national interests, within a student community susceptible to influence from various directions.

The conference themes were fully integrated into a practical world-view that was characteristic of Council thinking: three focused on Neutrality policy and its alternatives, one on 'Alternative Trade Policies' and another more broadly on 'The Bases of American Foreign Policy'. The students were selected by respected figures in academia such as Professor James W. Angell at Columbia, William L. Langer and John H. Williams at Harvard and Nicholas J. Spykman at Yale. These and other academics selected 17 students for the first conference from the above-named

universities. Later conferences included students from the University of Pennsylvania, Johns Hopkins, Amherst, Brown, Dartmouth, Swarthmore, Chicago, Cornell and others. Student representatives usually averaged at around 15 for a two-day conference at which they would be addressed by various foreign policy experts, bankers, government officials from the State and Commerce departments and newspapermen. At the December 1936 conference, for example, sessions were addressed by Francis B. Sayre, Assistant Secretary of State and author of *America Must Act* (1936) and Eugene P. Thomas, President of the National Foreign Trade Council.[9]

Prior to the conferences the students were sent 1000 pages of relevant reading – some for and against intervention and some quite neutral.[10] Accompanying the preparatory materials for one of the conferences was a series of statistical tables on US imports and exports flows, composition by commodities, and so on compiled from mainly official sources. The interesting points to note about these tables were the series of observations that a Council man had added below most tables which sought to clarify certain aspects of the data presented. While the observations made were accurate enough, the obvious nature of the comments suggests a great deal of anxiety about the students' statistical skills or, more probably, fear that students might miss the importance of certain data that constituted a key part of the internationalist argument.[11]

The role of the students at the conferences was to listen, engage in question and answer sessions, discuss and debate during the meetings and meals breaks. At dinner on the second evening, selected students would speak on behalf of the contending 'factions' among their number.[12] All of the mainstream views on foreign policy were represented at each of the conferences, including 'isolationism/economic nationalism', usually in a minority capacity, however. Almost 50 per cent of students – at nearly all five conferences – favoured the status quo, that is, the established policy of the US Administration. In March 1940, for example, of the 15 students, 4 supported immediate US intervention into the Second World War, 4 isolation and 7 a 'wait and see' policy of flexibility.[13]

To evaluate their impact, the Council asked for feedback from students and non-Council participants. The Council also drew its own conclusions as to the state of students' knowledge/ignorance and the beneficial effects of the meetings.

On the whole the reports of all participants were favourable. Stanley Hornbeck of the Far Eastern section of the State Department wrote that many of the students came to the conferences with misconceived notions, 'knowing' things that were not true, having been 'captivated by certain slogans . . . '. The conference, however, had put them straight. Even more

than this, the conferences served as a listening post for the government, because they indicated what the American public would 'stand for' in policy terms.[14] Thomas Lamont felt that the conference had forced the younger men 'to revise their estimates' as to the nature of US foreign policy.[15]

Later conference reports reiterated similar sentiments on their impact on students' attitudes. In April 1937, one Council man remarked that he was encouraged by the students' 'realistic point of view' as to 'what humans can accomplish in the world as we find it'. The students' speeches at that conference, however, he concluded, 'reflect a keen appreciation of the objectives and methods of American foreign policy'.[16]

The conference reports also charted the changing attitudes of students as German militarism became more menacing. By the February 1939 Conference, it was reported, students had rejected the Neutrality Acts as a hindrance to a 'sensible' policy, even though there was no consensus as to what should supplant them. By March 1940, not a single man accepted the so-called Gerald Nye–Walter Millis interpretations of America's reasons for entering the Great War, that is, the idea that it was the vested interest of US big business allied with British propaganda that pushed/pulled USA into hostilities. The Council did not take all the credit for this conversion of student opinion – it did allow for George Gallup's suggestion that 'men were influenced more by events than by propaganda'.[17] Council leaders were clear, however, of the need to interpret events 'properly'.

Students' responses were overwhelmingly positive about the nature, content and style of the conferences. Such positive feelings and many other assumptions of this group of the east coast's youthful elite, were summed up by the letter of Malcolm K. Wilkey, a senior in Government from Harvard, in June 1940. After suggesting how important the 1940 conference was in developing 'straight thinking', he went on to say that he had become 'more interventionist than before, and now I think absolutely the best thing to do is to declare war on Germany . . . '. Then he went on to comment on his somewhat conventional view (that the 'masses' always follow their leaders),[18] failing to realise, however, that a great deal of hard work went into mobilising public opinion. Certainly, CFR leaders were never so complacent and public opinion polls, before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, never showed more than 21 per cent of the population in favour of US belligerence (Chadwin, 1968, p. 197).

The impact of the Conferences was felt in several ways. One young instructor gave an informal report to his social science colleagues upon return to campus, while Professor Helmreich noted in 1938 how he

worked conference ideas into his classes. But perhaps the most telling comment on the April 1938 Conference was from an unnamed instructor who commented 'that the Conference did what the State Department crowd presumably hoped that it would do; namely, it gave us all more trust in what the State Department is doing and hence makes us less prone to criticize. If we do continue to criticize the Department, I think at least all of us who were present . . . will criticize with more understanding.' [19] The attempt to mobilise opinion, therefore, according to this student, had been successful.

The influence of these conferences continued, therefore, well beyond the confines of the sessions themselves and of the relatively small number of students directly involved, being frequently felt in classroom and more informal discussions. That is how this CFR initiative must be viewed: as an attempt to generate a climate of opinion within the student body through specially selected groups of seniors and instructors.

The Council further enhanced the potential for influence distributing students' speeches to hundreds of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace's college-based 'International Relations Clubs', where they generated broad discussions on America's foreign relations. Student conference reports were also published in the campus newspapers of all the major participant universities.[20]

The Conferences had a number of longer-term effects as well. Six students, for example, went on to be nominated and selected for full membership of the Council. Two of these six – Payson Wild of Harvard and William Diebold, Jr, of Swarthmore – went on to participate in the Council's 'War and Peace Studies' research programme. Information on three other students shows that one (Roger Maynard) joined JP Morgan and Co.; another (Francis T. Williamson) joined the State Department as a Foreign Service Officer in 1944; and Charles P. Kindleberger went on to become an international economist and author of two dozen books (CFR, 1946a).[21] Indeed, Kindleberger went on to write, albeit a near half-century later, one of the key texts justifying American global hegemony, *The World in Depression*, arguing that it was the lack of a hegemonic power managing the world economy that had been a principal cause of the great depression, a line that was dominant in CFR (and other) circles in the 1930s, and which was manifested in the 'Grand Area' concept developed by the Council during the Second World War. Interestingly, the Council memorandum that defined the 'Grand Area' concept – the regions of the globe designated as vital to the American economy – was co-written by William Diebold, Jr, a Conferences for University Men participant.[22]

The effects of such programmes are always difficult to gauge, but a concerted attempt was being made to mobilise bias, to set an agenda and therefore to tell students what and how to think about America's foreign relations. Secretary of State Cordell Hull, as the Council learned in 1938, was personally very interested in 'undergraduate reactions [and] their angle of approaching American foreign relations . . . '. Secretary Hull, State Department officers reported, frequently and unofficially discussed the Conferences with his colleagues and regarded them as 'outstanding of their kind'.[23] This initiative shows that *persuasion* and *education* were at the heart of the Council's agenda, in conjunction with a supportive State Department, that *engineering consent* within a key segment of public opinion was vital to the CFR.

The Council's understanding of public opinion formation, and the strategic role of the brightest students was practised almost 20 years before the publication of Elihu Katz's and Paul Lazarsfeld's (1955) study, *Personal Influence: The Part Played by People in the Flow of Mass Communications*, which emphasised the vital role of 'opinion leaders'. That strategy was also applied in the Council's regional elites programme.

The regions

The original idea for regional committees on foreign relations came from the directors of the Carnegie Corporation (CC) in 1937 as part of their interest in 'adult education'. One early supporter of this initiative, Phillips Bradley, a political scientist at Amherst, concluded that the project was vital in creating 'public support for an intelligent foreign policy'.[24] The CC gave the CFR $37,500 in 1938 to establish a number of regional committees on foreign relations[25] to 'aid in stimulating greater interest in foreign affairs on the part of community leaders in widely separated areas' (CFR, 1946b, p. 48).

Initially, seven committees were established in Cleveland, Denver, Des Moines, Detroit, Houston, Louisville and Portland (Oregon). By 1944–45 there were 20 committees with 927 members in all, in cities across America, including Birmingham, Los Angeles, Seattle, Salt Lake City, St Paul-Minneapolis, Tulsa and St Louis.[26]

According to Percy Bidwell, Organizing Secretary of the committees, an educational programme, conducted by Council-led regional committees, would address the problem of a lack of knowledge of foreign affairs. 'The United States', Bidwell emphasised, 'because of its predominant economic and military strength, has an unparalleled opportunity to participate decisively in shaping the postwar world'. The role of the

committees was to develop local community leadership groups for the constructive discussion of American foreign policy that would act to promote policies of globalism and to criticise, undermine and, ultimately, eliminate isolationist tendencies (Dalgliesh, 1946, pp. iii–viii).

The membership of regional committees was 'confined to men [no women] who occupy positions of leadership in their communities'; their numbers were kept deliberately small to aid frank discussion; their composition reflected their communities although representation of labour and farmers was acknowledged to be a little thin.[27] The Council's report for 1942–43, when there were 17 regional committees, indicates the socio-economic nature of their membership: the largest single occupational group was composed of 206 businessmen – including Charles E. Wilson, President of General Motors – which constituted about one-third of the total. Educators, such as Professor John Condliffe of the University of California, Berkeley, made up 16 per cent, and lawyers 15 per cent. Despite 'sincere attempts to enlarge them', the smallest groups were made up of 15 trade unionists (2.3 per cent) and 11 farmers (1.7 per cent).[28]

Financed by generous annual grants from the Carnegie Corporation (totalling almost $170,000 by 1945), the committees were gradually expanded in the immediate pre-war and war years. The Council first selected a small executive committee in each city and paid a $250 annual honorarium to the Secretary-Rapporteur to meet minor expenses and to liaise with the New York Council. The Council gradually knitted together the programmes of the regular committees, sent out important and respected speakers and organised an annual national two-day conference in New York. Francis P. Miller, the first Council organiser of the committee programme and then Bidwell who succeeded him, would regularly tour the committees and meet their leaders and members, to 'discover how effectively they were attaining the aims for which they were established'. The committees also wanted New York's guidance in the formulation of study plans and selection of discussion leaders, permitting Bidwell to compare the reactions of the committees on common topics at regular intervals (Miller, 1971).[29]

The annual conferences were a vital opportunity for the Council to solve outstanding administrative problems, to 'nationalise' the work and outlook of the regional committees, and to invite appropriate policy-makers to address the committee men. In 1944, for example, Benjamin V. Cohen, General Counsel for the Office of War Mobilization, led a discussion on 'Problems of Demobilisation and Foreign Policy' and Dean Acheson, Assistant Secretary of State, examined the problems associated

with establishing a new international organisation. Bidwell argued that such discussions were effectively national in scope since the representatives of 20 cities were participating. 'From these sessions they carried back new ideas and new points of view which they communicated in reports to their Committees.' In addition, the committee men who gathered in New York developed a 'strong *esprit de corps*' and began to view their efforts as part of a nationwide and not purely local project. The Council also, for several years, published and circulated annual regional committee reports, *Some Regional Views on Our Foreign Policy*, and then replaced them with more specific surveys in 1944. In 1945, the Council began compiling a survey of local activities in international relations for the benefit of the State Department's Office of Public Information.[30]

The Committees, under Council guidance and in response to local demand, studied America's foreign policy problems from a practical point of view. While prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour the committees had focused their attention on the 'isolation or intervention' question; after the attack, inter-Allied relations and postwar reconstruction.[31] During 1943, the committees attempted 'to define the true interests of the United States . . . ',[32] closely paralleling the Council's attempts to do likewise under the auspices of the State Department. In 1944, Cordell Hull permitted members of the State and the Treasury departments to visit the committees 'as a part of their official duties',[33] so important was their work considered as war neared its end.

Judging the success of the Council's regional committees' programme is difficult. In March 1940, Percy Bidwell had complained to Rockefeller Foundation official, S.H. Walker, that 'there is a certain air of unreality' Council discussions of public opinion, due to their New York City and class affiliations.[34] The committees on foreign relations were helping to rectify this problem. By 1945, Bidwell believed that the committees had been highly successful because they provided a forum for busy men to learn about US foreign relations through discussions and functioned as 'a training school for national service'. He pointed out that the ex-chairman of the Detroit committee, William Knudsen, was now Director of the Office of Production Management; and that Will H. Clayton, the first chairman of the Houston committee had been appointed Assistant Secretary of State (for his role in the US Loan decision, see Chapter 5). Other members had taken up positions in the Office of War Information, Office of Strategic Services, and the State, War and Navy departments. According to Bidwell, the local committee members had demonstrated through their organisation of, and attendance at, hundreds of meetings that the committees had become important parts of the communities in which they

operated. It was not only the 30–40 members in each city who benefited: 'indirectly, through many channels, the ideas and opinions which are generated and clarified at the meetings spread through each of the twenty communities'. The local newspaper editors who participate in discussions write editorials reflecting the committee sessions. 'Committee members . . . in daily contact with scores of their fellow townsmen, give wide circulation . . .' to committee conclusions. To Bidwell, the committees had been entirely successful in 'guiding American opinion in a critical period in our national life'.[35]

Independent reports that are available, especially from the local committee secretaries, tell much the same story: Dr R.A. Tsanoff of the Houston Committee reported in 1942 that his committee had helped evolve 'intelligent judgement' among its members, and that their meetings were of 'unique and irreplaceable worth' and had, 'through numerous social channels', major influence in the city and its environs. Mr J. Van Dyke Norman, Louisville Committee Secretary, suggested that 'our own membership derives a great deal from our discussion meetings . . .' leaving unaddressed the question of broader influence.[36]

Conducting a review of the Carnegie Corporation's grants to several foreign policy organisations and initiatives, Nathaniel Peffer emphasised that some of the committees on foreign relations were 'thorough and substantial' in their procedures and effects, while some were more 'perfunctory'. The local meetings, he suggested without substantiation, were 'too much . . . just an occasion to listen to a speech and ask questions', and the results had not, therefore, been proportional to the investment of Carnegie funds.[37]

A more upbeat assessment, however, came after a tour of the committees by Allen W. Dulles, the lawyer, diplomat and Council leader, in 1940. He had been delighted by the work done by the committees and by the fact that they had unanimously backed official American support for Britain and France.[38]

The State Department also took a different view from Peffer's, suggesting in 1944 that the CFR conduct an 'Inquiry on Minimum American Commitments to a Postwar Security System' with two purposes in mind: first, to gain a summary of the views of all local committee members; and secondly, 'to get their estimate of probable reaction of persons in their communities . . .'.[39] Even a postwar assessment of the Committees (in 1952) concluded that the State Department saw them very positively 'in the forming and supporting of sound foreign policy'.[40] During the Second World War itself, the State Department's attitude towards unofficial foreign policy groups was to 'discreetly guide . . . [them] in channels which

seem to the Department to be useful and away from schemes which the Department feels are dangerous or Utopian . . . '. The importance of the committees, from this perspective, was shown by the desire on the part of the State Department to try to manipulate their discussions and, indirectly, local public opinion. As Assistant Secretary of State, Hugh Wilson, suggested to his colleague, Breckenridge Long, in mid-1940, the CFR should regularly 'send a man here on current questions. This man could talk with the proper people in the State department, preparing a memorandum on his own which would not be attributed to the Department, and circulated for the confidential information of the men on the selected [Committees on Foreign Relations'] list. We could arrange with Mr [Francis P.] Miller', he added, 'that the men on the selected list would not be notified that this was State Department material'.[41] Miller, as the original Organising Secretary, recorded, the Committees were important 'listening posts to sense the mood of the country . . . [as well as playing] . . . a unique role in preparing the nation for a bi-partisan foreign policy . . . ' (Miller, 1971, p. 87).

W. Harold Dalgliesh's 1946 survey of committee members' opinions as to the successes and failures of the committees yielded an overwhelmingly favourable response. There was some dissent too, however: one wrote that 'Our Council is a group of well-fed gentlemen of the socially (sic) elite who listen politely, quiz the speaker gently and go home . . . As a group our Council plays no part in community life'. This member appears to have missed the point: local committees were not supposed to function *as groups* in local life; they were designed to reach key contact men – respectable leaders – who would then act *as individuals* in their respective spheres of life, spreading the internationalist gospel. Quiet conversations, not monster rallies, the rifle not the shotgun, were the modus operandi of the Council's committee programme. The vast majority of Committee members, however, were very positive as to the effects of their group on local opinion. Members from San Francisco and Los Angeles reported, for example, that though they were small in number, their members were 'men who get around' and exert influence informally. One member claimed that since the LA Committee consisted of many radio commentators, academics and public discussion group leaders, it had widespread influence. The Salt Lake City Committee reported that 'the whole tone of our relations to foreign countries has changed materially . . . since this Committee was established'.[42]

The Committee programme, therefore, represented a major part of the CFR's public opinion mobilisation strategy, reaching as it did local notables and their associates in selected regions and cities. As the State

Department attitude to these committees clearly demonstrates, they were perceived, at the very least, to be a very useful means of opinion-gathering and for the unofficial dissemination of official policy thinking. The role played by the CFR within the universities was therefore applied across America among strategically placed groups with community standing. In the case of the newspaper editors and radio commentators, the Council reached highly influential individuals through whom it could disseminate its ideas. The Council was mobilising opinion; in addition, it was educating particular groupings to exercise leadership in their own spheres of influence. As they did not bar isolationists from membership, the committees played an important role in persuading many of them that their attitudes were obsolete.

The State Department attempted overtly and covertly to influence the committees or to set their agenda to conform to official thinking, with the active cooperation of the Council's leaders. In addition, the CFR used its committees to supply the State Department with regular information regarding the evolution of opinion in the regions and as sounding boards for sensitive ideas within the Administration. Again, there is strong evidence here of a state agency attempting to construct a bipartisan constituency supportive of its own thinking through the use of a nominally private group.

Group opinion and foreign affairs

The CFR also made a number of other attempts to gauge and influence public opinion through a study group on 'Foreign Policy and Public Opinion' in 1943–44. The original aim of the study group, according to Percy Bidwell, was to explore group attitudes, specifically focusing on the churches, organised labour, farm organisations and business groups. The Council was interested in the results in order to 'find out what specific commitments, what pledges in advance, the American people will stand for', in relation to the postwar settlement. Members of this study group included Richard S. Dickey, a Special Consultant to Cordell Hull, whose work focused particularly on foreign policy public opinion; Malcolm W. Davis of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and of the Office of Strategic Services (Research and Analysis branch); Dr Lyman Bryson, Director of Education at Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS); Nicholas Roosevelt, Assistant to the publisher of the *New York Times*; and Oswald Garrison Villard, Editor of *The Nation*. It was clearly the aim of this group to cross-check with other public opinion 'knowledgeables' the ideas and information provided by the sectional

representatives. The attendance of Richard Dickey suggests the importance attached to this initiative by officials who make foreign policy, and the attendance of Wayne Johnson (Democratic National Committee Treasurer), a regular visitor to the White House, ensured that the lines of communication stretched to the very pinnacle of political power in the country.[43] The study group never achieved its objectives of reaching labour and business – running out of steam after briefly examining church and farm organisation opinion in 1944.

Churches and foreign policy

The Council was interested in the declaration on world peace – 'The Six Pillars of Peace' – by the Commission to Study the Bases of a Just and Durable Peace of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ (FCCC), and the joint 'Catholic, Jewish and Protestant Declaration on World Peace' by the FCCC, the National Catholic Welfare Conference and the Synagogue Council of America. The CFR specifically wanted to know the practical impact of the declarations especially as to whether the religiously minded would prefer a system of alliances, or an updated league of nations as the basis of postwar security; whether churchmen would accept the American use of 'force against aggressors' and the reduction of tariffs to promote international trade.[44]

In the opening meeting of the study group, which was chaired by George Gallup, Bidwell explained to the churchmen, editors and foreign policy experts that all the American plans for a world organisation would fail unless supported by the public. He pointed out the fears of official and unofficial policy elites that while the majority of Americans 'agree *in principle* that this country should not revert to isolationism after this war . . . ', they may not be so supportive of *specific* commitments.

Dr Luman Shafer spoke on behalf of the Commission on a Just and Durable Peace. The Commission was, according to Mark G. Toulouse, 'vitally connected' with the name of its Chairman, John Foster Dulles, under whose leadership it became remarkably influential. Dulles, along with fellow Commission member and leading theologian, Reinhold Niebuhr, led the FCCC in a *real politik* direction, urging the adoption of concrete proposals which could be used 'to make an impact on actual [foreign] policy decisions by educating public opinion . . . '. Indeed, Dulles had met with FDR a week after the launch of the Commission's peace aims statement – 'Six Pillars of Peace' – to assure him that the statement would be fully discussed in the churches and that he would try to crystallise public opinion behind postwar international cooperation.

Shafer explained to the CFR study group that his organisation's statement had been purchased by hundreds of thousands of people, and he emphasised that he aimed to 'prevent a postwar lapse into disillusioned isolationism'. He warned the Group, however, that his members were not interested in any international police force 'used by a military alliance to maintain the *status quo*'. Should this happen, he argued, the churches would become pacifistic and politically aloof after the war.

Reverend R.A. McGowan, a member of the Committee on Economic Life of the Catholic Association for International Peace (CAIP), spoke of the Catholic view of international affairs as having been principally influenced by their more recent migration from Europe. Catholics, he argued, were more intensely patriotic because of 'their fear of losing through alliance or other entanglements with Europe any of the freedom which America has given them'. Catholics who stayed on the east coast, as opposed to those who moved west, he argued, were more anti-European and isolationist. He also pointed out that with the exception of 'a few oblique persons', Catholic pacifism was almost non-existent, and that there would be little objection 'to the use of force against aggressors', as long as it occurred within the framework of international organisation and law. The CAIP's work, according to historian George Q. Flynn, represented 'the most sophisticated and consistent attempt by a Catholic group to form a religious attitude on foreign policy questions', its main concern being with 'educating Catholics on the need for international cooperation'. The CAIP was highly influential among young Catholics, having established 87 Catholic Peace Clubs (CPC) in universities across America by 1937, which had been officially endorsed by President Roosevelt. The CPCs were anti-pacifist and the CAIP ensured that they boycotted a pacifist and communist-led nationwide 'peace strike' in schools and colleges in April 1937. McGowan himself rejected the Neutrality Laws as 'defective and dangerous', irresponsible, as failing to distinguish between aggressor and victim, and for refusing Presidential discretion in an enormously complex issue-area.

According to Miscamble, Catholic isolationism was of great concern to the makers of foreign policy, especially FDR, who consistently sought 'to bolster those Catholics supporting his policies', with the aim of tilting Catholic opinion 'in his own favour before it might be turned to influence him' (Flynn, 1976, pp. 7–9, 19; Miscamble, 1980, p. 235; Toulouse, 1985, pp. 49, 61, 63, 68).

The Group's activities is an excellent example of the very concrete functions of the Council: consulting with church leaders about the politics of public opinion among the religiously inclined about their

propensity for internationalism and for the use of force in international relations. The CFR brought in a range of influential religious bodies and representatives many of whom were in direct contact with the US President already, to further examine the nature of the commitments they could expect from particular policies. This is evidence of the efficacy of Gramscian thought, in particular. Gramscian ideas emphasise that real politics speaks to *things as they are* in order to lead them to where they *ought* to be. The CFR's church group was an important part of that process.

The CFR, therefore, assisted the state (FDR and the State Department) which was highly interested in church opinion and sought to keep it under surveillance and under control, showing a level of pro-activity not normally associated with that Administration (specifically in the foreign affairs area).

Organised agriculture and foreign policy

This group was led by W.W. Waymack, editor of the *Des Moines Register and Tribune*, a Midwesterner long-involved with the problems of the region's agriculture, having served on several private and governmental commissions, and the study of foreign policy. He was a Pulitzer prize-winner for distinguished editorial writing in 1937, and was appointed Special Adviser to the State Department in 1942. Bidwell was especially keen, therefore, to hear Waymack's estimate of farmers' attitudes on the issues of an international police force and US tariff reduction. His newspaper championed of internationalism in the Midwest for many years (Campbell, 1962, p. 149).[45]

The farm-region spokesman surprised the study group by arguing that internationalism had become a key force among farmers across America, as measured by majority support for anti-tariff positions and an international police force. He described how several organisations – the American Farm Bureau Federation (AFBF), the Farmers' Union, the National Grange – had come out in favour of internationalism, and how their influence was spreading. Campbell shows that the AFBF's policy had shifted remarkably on the tariff question by quoting its president, Edward A. O'Neal of Alabama, in 1940, arguing that farmers, along with everyone else, had failed to appreciate the fact that America's rise from a debtor to a creditor nation 'called for a new foreign policy'. The 'extraordinarily influential' AFBF, as Campbell calls it, also backed FDR's rearmament programme by 1940, supporting the extension of aid to the Allies. The policymaking position, however, favoured FDR. Campbell concludes that

the President's political skills in manipulating numerous contending forces were so clear that 'the ultimate' influence lay with the political and governmental apparatus. Nevertheless, the AFBF had done a remarkable job in the educational field. As Waymack emphasised, farmers' opinions had shifted remarkably since 1942 as a result of a great educational effort among them by state and country farm bureaus.[46]

After this meeting the Group never met again, and this line of activity appeared to come to a close. However, the reports of the church and farm discussion leaders were used by the Council, especially in their policy-formation functions in the State Department. The principal role of this particular study group was for Council men, and others connected with foreign policy formation, to *gather* intelligence, to listen to what churchmen and farm organisations were saying about *specific* postwar US commitments and to question some of their representatives. Such intelligence could then be passed through the WPS project, through John Dickey and other channels, to official policymakers to be used by them in shaping the form and perhaps even the content of their public pronouncements.

Once again the foreign policy establishment's deep-seated concern about isolationism becomes clear. Such concern was genuinely warranted, especially among the Protestant clergy where pacifism was particularly strong (Meyer, 1961).

The Council and pressure politics

The Council, though it claimed to be non-political, engaged in efforts to rally the 'mass public', especially in the period immediately following the fall of France in May 1940. These interventions into the area of mass appeals are interesting, first, because the Council had previously left the moulding of 'mass opinion' to 'lesser' organisations and, secondly, because of the pivotal cooperation (to say the least) of President Roosevelt in the Council's efforts. Although the CFR was never 'officially' connected with mass initiatives, it is clear, as Michael Wala suggests, that 'the strikingly high number of prominent Council members who participated . . . does not allow one to regard such participation as merely "private functioning"' (Wala, 1994, p. 171). Thirdly, of course, we may directly address Gaddis's view that corporatist analysis cannot explain the interventionist–non-interventionist debates of 1939–41.

There were four principal attempts by the Council to influence public opinion, mainly in the period immediately after the collapse of France in the face of the German blitzkreig in May 1940 and up to the Japanese

attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, which are considered below: the 'Summons' initiative; the 'Century Group'; CDAAA; and FFF. Interestingly, both CDAAA and FFF made definite attempts to mobilise black Americans behind their interventionist campaigns (Chadwin, 1968, pp. 184–86; Parmar, forthcoming).

Attempts to rally mass opinion began through a group of the Council's leading members – Miller, Stacy May, Winfield Riefler, Shepardson, G.F. Eliot among others – in alliance with a number of non-CFR individuals.[47] Meeting in early June 1940, this group decided to urge an immediate American declaration of war on Germany. The group issued a 'Summons to Speak Out', signed by 30 influentials across America, including Walter Millis, who had written a 'revisionist' history of the First World War that had strengthened isolationism during the inter-war period.

Most of the country's major newspapers carried the 'Summons' as a news story or, in one case, considered it worthy of editorial comment (*St Louis Post-Dispatch*). Chadwin notes that the 'Summons' was overshadowed by news of Italian aggression against France the previous day, which obviously dominated the press on 10 June 1940. Nevertheless, the Italian aggression was condemned in the press by Henry Stimson, who was shortly afterwards appointed Secretary of War, and others, who called for greater aid to Britain. In addition, several papers carried a full-page advertisement by playwright Robert E. Sherwood, who was acting under the auspices of the FDR-backed and -inspired CDAAA (led by William Allen White), demanding that USA 'Stop Hitler Now'.[48] In that context, Chadwin suggests, it may be argued that the Council's 'Summons' had a strong effect.

But these Council 'war hawks' did not stop with this 'one-ad campaign' for intervention and war. Recognising that public opinion was not ready for a war declaration, a few of the 'Summons' group continued to meet in order to 'bring America to her senses'. This new group became known after the New York club in which it met – the Century – and had three main objectives: first, to persuade the public of the necessity of 'all aid short of war' to Britain, that is, transfer of 50–100 US naval destroyers (*a demand suggested by FDR himself* in talks with White on 29 June 1940, which White relayed to the professional internationalist activist, Clark Eichelberger who, in turn, passed it on to the Century Group) (Johnson, 1944, p. 91; Wala, 1994, p. 177).[49] Secondly, through a programme of news releases and radio addresses they attacked the fallacies they saw in isolationism, and proposed a number of policy options to the government designed to culminate in America's entry to the war.

One of the chief criteria for Century Group membership was political influence and connections to be used in the service of interventionism. The Group included individuals with access to President Roosevelt – Dean Acheson, Herbert Agar (Editor, *Louisville Courier-Journal*) and Robert Sherwood – and to the Republican leader, Wendell Willkie – Lewis Douglas and Allen Dulles. Will Clayton, the Texan cotton-broker and CFR member and, later in the War, Assistant Secretary of State, also played an important role. A large proportion of the Group's members were professional writers, editors or publishers – including Elmer Davis of CBS radio (and later head of the Office of War Information) and Henry Luce, proprietor of *Time*, *Life* and *Fortune*.

Acting as a professional and well-disciplined force, the leaders of the Century Group assigned tasks to each individual in order to achieve their objectives. After a meeting on 11 July 1940, Henry Luce and Henry Coffin (President of the New York-based Union Theological Seminary) went on to meet Secretaries Hull and Stimson; Francis Miller set up a coordinating office; Lewis Douglas began to liaise more closely and formally with White's Committee and with Wendell Willke. White's role was of the utmost importance in ensuring that Willkie did not make foreign policy a partisan issue. FDR, White wrote in his autobiography, 'talked in utmost confidence with me and let me talk in turn confidentially with Wendell Willkie, which I did and I hope with some effect. At least', he concluded, 'we kept the foreign issue out of the [1940 Presidential Election] campaign . . . ' (White, 1946, pp. 642–43),[50] an excellent example of the power of some groups to organise certain issues out of politics.

From its small headquarters, Miller established contact with editors and journalists, including Ralph McGill of the *Atlanta Constitution*, W.W. Waymack of the *Des Moines Register and Tribune*, Barry Bingham of the *Louisville Courier-Journal*, Dorothy Thompson, Walter Millis and Ernest K. Lindley of the *New York Herald Tribune*, among others. These contacts gave 'news coverage and editorial expression to interventionism, as well as providing information about changes of public opinion in confidential letters to the New York office'.

Having focused on a 'destroyers-bases deal' as the most urgent of the immediate tasks, the Group and the White Committee sent some of its members to talk with FDR with two memoranda urging official action. An obviously supportive FDR *gave approval* for the Group's 'radio program of education' and further suggested 'that a radio address by General Pershing, commander of the American Expeditionary Force in the First World War and the nation's most revered military figure would be helpful'.

FDR appeared fearful, in part, of the legalities of a destroyer transfer to Britain, although he did favour such a move, despite a 1917 law prohibiting the sale of destroyers to belligerents. While FDR began the political process of enacting a destroyers-bases agreement in Cabinet, the Century Group and White's Committee began a publicity campaign 'to condition public opinion to the idea . . . ' and, thereby 'make it politically possible for Roosevelt to act'. The Century Group persuaded Pershing to make a radio broadcast, which was written by Herbert Agar and Walter Lippmann. Pershing's broadcast received very favourable national press coverage and was seen by Miller as 'the turning point in our efforts to create a public opinion' favourable to presidential action (Miller, 1971, pp. 98, 101). Pershing received over 700 letters from the general public in response to his speech, 75 per cent of them positive. The *New York Herald Tribune* printed a front-page photograph of Pershing being congratulated by Cordell Hull, while the *New York Times* published the story under the headline, 'Pershing Warns U.S. to Aid Britain by Sending 50 Destroyers Now'.

The Century Group also arranged for a number of other broadcasts, including one by Admiral William H. Standley demanding the transfer of destroyers; and another by Colonel William Donovan urging compulsory military service in the cause of peace. The Group also promoted the visits of leading British churchmen, educators, trades unionists and women (Chadwin, 1968, pp. 91–94).

It is difficult to measure the influence on public opinion of the Century Group's propaganda campaign but one thing is clear: that by mid-August, at the height of their campaign, the opinion polls showed that 62 per cent favoured the sale of destroyers to England, as opposed to 53 per cent in mid-July (Chadwin, 1968, p. 104). As Schulzinger argues, once the ground had been prepared with the public, press and the opposition leader, FDR could safely announce the destroyers-bases agreement on 3 September 1940 (Johnson, 1944, p. 117; Schulzinger, 1984, p. 71).[51]

As the 1940 presidential election approached, FDR distanced himself from the Century Group, and the newly formed isolationist America First Committee began to 'expose' the Century's interventionism and influence. Century members, however, wanted to further their cause of 'awakening' the American people to their true interests. William Agar was assigned the task of mobilising Catholics for interventionism; Bishop Henry W. Hobson and Henry Van Dusen would work with Protestants, Will Clayton with big business, Van Dusen among students, and Ernest Hopkins and Henry Wriston among college presidents. Katherine Gauss Jackson and Helen Everitt were assigned to work on women's magazines and organisations. This programme was based on

the view expressed by Herbert Agar that politicians 'appear to insist on a "public demand" before they are willing to lead, [therefore] we believe we must do everything in our power to create such a demand'. The Group, however, was not content to merely promote interventionism, it was also keenly aware of the necessity of criticising, undermining and eliminating isolationism everywhere in USA. The work among Roman Catholics sought to split that community's isolationist consensus. The group's spokesmen denounced the America First Committee as a 'Nazi Transmission Belt'. Their women's section attacked female student isolationism and pacifism on the campuses. Their business section propagandised the National Association of Manufacturers, and also attacked the outspoken isolationist, Henry Ford, as a 'profoundly ignorant man'. During the debates on Lend–Lease in the US Senate, Century Group member Ulric Bell (who later joined the Office of War Information's domestic propaganda efforts)[52] tried to identify isolationists – falsely in this case – with Mussolini and anti-semitism.

Despite all these activities, however, the Century Group was frustrated by its lack of influence on genuine grass-roots opinion, and determined to form an organisation that would galvanise America for war. In April 1941, the FFF was born, claiming that it 'has no political affiliation, no connection with any group or special interest in society'. Its members included college presidents, professors, labour leaders – A. Philip Randolph, for example – authors, actors, journalists, lawyers, businessmen and government officials. Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Editor of the CFR's journal, *Foreign Affairs*, was especially active in this organisation. One month after its launch, FFF had 273 local chapters in 65 cities, with statewide organisations in 9 states. The national committee instructed local chapters to keep subversion out and to recruit clergymen, the young and the ethnic minorities of occupied nations. FFF also established links with over 650 small town newspapers that agreed to take a weekly story from the organisation.

The FFF was especially successful in its bid to win the support of organised labour. By publicising its support of collective bargaining, the virtues of FDR, and a strike of 1700 machinists in San Francisco in May 1941, and recruiting (through Democratic National Committee Treasurer, Wayne Johnson) Dan Tobin of the Teamsters' Union, FFF found itself inundated with union members. Through its Labor News Service, FFF sent weekly articles to shop stewards and union newspapers. By October 1941, at least 21 union executives and 1600 shop stewards were participating in the Neutrality Laws repeal campaign (Chadwin, 1968, pp. 180–84).

CDAAA and FFF attempted to mobilise black Americans too. Though it would be difficult to doubt the sincerity of some of their leaders in this regard, such black mobilisations appeared to be an 'after-thought', as once noted by one sceptical black leader.[53] In addition to such tardiness, it is clear that pro-war Southern segregationists were not, at least not very frequently, openly to be challenged by their more liberal Northern pro-war counterparts. The Committee's secretary, for example, objected to a particular piece of propaganda which 'refers to the right of colored citizens to vote in the South'. She did not 'object personally; she simply', it was reported, 'says that our committees in the South with which she is working cannot use it'.[54]

Nevertheless, the warhawks organised black branches in Harlem and Chicago, alongside two university chapters (at Howard and Lincoln). Having few connections with the black masses, they sought to mobilise the leaders of black opinion – trades union leaders (A. Philip Randolph), churchmen (Adam Clayton Powell), academics (Ralph Bunche) and newspaper editors. To raise funds, the Harlem branch organised a baseball match between two leading teams from the National Negro League.[55]

The most positive aspects of the CDAAA/FFF black mobilisation campaign focused on the need to fight racism at home and abroad, to link the fight against Hitlerism with the struggle against domestic racial discrimination and inequality. The warhawks' leaders, especially Herbert Agar, were highly critical of America's past record in racial matters, and hoped to wean black Americans away from perceived 'indifference' to Hitlerism or active support for isolationism and communism (Layton, 2000, p. 39). In addition, they saw continuing racial discrimination in the defence industries as divisive and inefficient as it diminished maximum production efforts. It was in this area that FFF, in particular, made a most important contribution by supporting President Roosevelt' s Executive Order banning such discrimination. They were, although somewhat begrudgingly, assisted in their efforts by an important CFR member, William Knudsen, who headed the Office of Production Management (OPM). It is also clear that Agar and others clearly recognised the importance attached to domestic US race relations by the peoples of Asia and Africa, and sought to utilise the opportunities offered by the War to try to promote civil rights reforms (Agar, 1942, p. 42).

The effects of work among black Americans are difficult to gauge. Certainly a lot more research is needed. Nevertheless, it may be concluded that many blacks were given a forum to express their views, linked to a national organisation; that an important contribution to debate in the black press was made; that a potential channel for recruiting black

leaders into the American state was established; and that community indifference and/or isolationism were challenged. Finally, the lesson learned by east coast elites from the experience must be appreciated: domestic racial matters were now considered in the context of America's global image.

The warhawks of the CFR who set up the Century Group, the CDAAA, and then the FFF were a highly active and well-connected movement, particularly in the New York area. While they did not succeed in their central aim – to force the US to declare war – they were successful in influencing the making of, and public promotion of, key *steps* to war – the destroyers-bases agreement, in particular. They were also effective as an anti-isolationist propaganda body, casting doubt on notions of continental impregnability and on the democratic credentials of isolationist leaders. As a force in the shaping of public opinion, their influence must not be underestimated. They were a critical group in preparing the public mind for war. As Chadwin concludes, the warhawks familiarised and educated the public with warlike positions, vitally aiding the President when the time for policy changes finally arrived (Chadwin, 1968, pp. 271, 273).

The pivotal role of the state

Of special interest is the pivotal role of President Roosevelt in keeping himself informed of the currents of private opinion and activity – as Schlesinger noted, FDR consistently aimed to 'check and balance information acquired through official channels by information acquired through a myriad of private, informal, and unorthodox channels and espionage networks . . .' (Nadel and Rourke, 1975, p. 377)[56] – and of the State Department in mobilising private organisations to campaign for official policy goals. As Nadel and Rourke argue, the State Department has long resorted 'to organizing outside group support itself'. In fact, they suggest, the State Department 'can be extremely adroit in organizing pressures to which they seem to be responding but which they are in fact initiating. The organization of such apparent pressure-group activity thus provides a means by which these agencies can conceal their own central role in the policy process. The initiative appears to lie with the outside organizations, but the activities of these external groups are actually instigated by the agency itself' (Edel, 1951, p. 163; Nadel and Rourke, 1975, p. 394).[57] The role of the state, therefore, needs to be taken much more seriously than it so often is when discussing the United States, especially within pluralist and corporatist accounts.

The state used the CFR's 'front' organisations to engage in the mobilisation of *mass* public opinion, including labour unions. Given the CFR's predominantly business class leadership, its FFF initiative, in particular, suggests its ability and willingness to develop a concrete politics for its time.

The importance of the CFR

The role of parastate organisations in American politics has been fundamental, particularly during the twentieth century, reflecting the significance of the voluntarist tradition. Universities, churches, women's organisations, trade unions and several other types of organisation offered their services to society and state particularly, but not exclusively, during wartime. The Progressives' notion of civic duty and virtue, of being part of an 'elect' people with a higher destiny found expression in a crusading spirit in domestic and foreign affairs (Tiryakian, 1993; Harrison, 1997).

Formed at the very end of the Progressive era, the CFR carried on such traditions in its own measured way, into the 1920s and beyond. It was extremely successful in institutionalising progressive values, expressing them in a language acceptable to the times, and assisting officials who make US foreign policy. It became by the 1920s and 1930s, the central institution of the American foreign policy establishment, bridging the 'public' and 'private' sector divide.

The CFR–state relationships outlined in this chapter suggest that officialdom took that organisation seriously. The Conferences for University Men were clearly of major importance to members of the Administration because, as Hornbeck of the State Department recognised, they constituted not only a site for political persuasion but also because they served as 'listening posts' for the government. In addition, of course, the Conferences confirmed the 'truthfulness' of the internationalist path for most student participants in the hard-headed language of American national interests and in the idealistic American tradition that emphasised the necessity of shouldering the burdens of global responsibility and leadership. These students were among the class expected to take up future leadership positions in business, government, law and academia. As even the 'conservative' functionalist sociologist, Talcott Parsons, argues, the educational system is the means by which 'individual personalities are trained to be motivationally and technically adequate to the performance of adult roles . . . [and] . . . of the commitments and capacities which are essential prerequisites of their future role performance' (Miliband, 1973, p. 215).

Similar observations are relevant with reference to the Committees on Foreign Relations which also acted as 'listening posts' for the Administration. In the Committees–state relationship, however, there *were* State Department plans to manipulate members of local committees to receive policy documents/discussion papers attributed to the Council but which were actually official, or at least officially inspired, State Department memoranda.[58] As Chadwick Alger demonstrates through research on 'external bureaucrats' in US foreign policy, State Department relationships with such outsiders are more often motivated by the desire to 'transfer . . . internal bureaucratic perspectives to the outside . . . [and] . . . since the external bureaucrat is likely to be influential in his private area of activity and one whose words are widely circulated, he provides a useful communication link to a wider public' (Alger, 1962, pp. 61–62).

An even stronger case of instrumentalism may be made in relation to the state–FFF relationship, which Chadwin details. White House aides were in daily contact with FFF officers, while some Cabinet members privately encouraged the FFF's promotion of US belligerence against Germany. On at least four occasions, the White House actually instructed the FFF to take specific actions to further Administration policies (Chadwin, 1968, pp. 201–06). This was in addition to FDR's support for the Century Group's and the CDAAA's programme of pro-war radio broadcasts, and his suggestion that a speech by General Pershing would be 'helpful'.

This evidence does not square with notions of an all-powerful CFR and a weak state led by politicians with little independence of thought. At the heart of the relationship was a strong state with its plans and goals; and an important private group which realised that the state/administration could only act effectively if public opinion could be educated and mobilised. The CFR was used by the Administration to privately advance a programme that was officially endorsed and supported. Council men, particularly Norman Davis, were strongly animated by a feeling of loyalty to the state and by the desire to find solutions to the problems of state in a manner that was socially responsible. They espoused a philosophy of national interests – that excluded no-one explicitly – that privileged no class, region or economic sector. In fact, Davis stressed the importance of such an attitude – of 'loyalty to the state' (which must be one of the most rarely used phrases in American history) – in his Commencement Address at the University of Georgia in 1930.[59] This way of looking at the state and society, akin to a feeling of noblesse oblige, summed up at least part of the sub-culture of the CFR, and therefore its attitude towards the internationalist foreign policy of Franklin Roosevelt.

While the two worlds intersected in myriad ways, decision-making power rested in the hands of officials. And it was their pragmatism and political skills that finally determined the manner of America's progress towards becoming a globally oriented power.

The CFR's role was essentially cooperative, not competitive. There were areas of disagreement over tactics, not over the long-term trajectory of the United States as a global power. In short, there was a division of labour between the state and the Council, with the Administration committed to a slow and sure policy of interventionism in world affairs but politically unable – in a nation that wanted to stay out of war – to publicly declare its true intentions. The Council, however, as a private organisation was not bound by such constraints; it, or its ad hoc bodies, could call for a declaration of war largely as it pleased. Council men did not fight Congressional or presidential elections. Their role, in their own minds, was to act as a vanguard for a new conception of America's global role and for the concrete steps that, they believed, needed to be taken by the Administration in order to realise that new conception.

What has been outlined above is a highly interactive relationship between the state and a private organisation in which the flow of influence, in the strong sense, radiated out from the state to the Council and through the Council (and its organisations) to a broader public. But individuals like Francis Miller and Whitney Shepardson were neither dupes nor robots; they were active, self-motivated and critical individuals who had come to believe that America's hour – or as Henry Luce put it, her century – had arrived. Some of them believed that they were prophets ushering in a new age of benign American influence in a dangerous world. They decided to take action to promote their cause; but they were influenced in their tactics by an understanding of 'how power works' in the United States, that is, through the generation of a public debate and the mobilisation of public opinion prior to effective action by state managers (though, in this case, the process began with encouragement from state managers).

Theoretical implications

The foregoing provides an opportunity to assess the applicability of a variety of existing explanations of 'how power works' in the United States. It is important to compare what pluralists, corporatists, instrumental Marxists, statists and Gramscians would expect to find in the historical record with the evidence garnered from the CFR case.

Orthodox pluralists would expect to find strong evidence of powerful, fiercely independent private interest groups dominating the political process in their attempts to influence malleable state actors with few discernible independent interests and goals (Bentley, 1935; Dahl, 1961; Truman, 1967).

While the evidence from this study provides substantial support for the notion of private group power, pluralism fails to account for the degree to which the American state acted independently either to promote its interests through a private organisation or to provide covert support for pro-state private action. Second, pluralism and instrumental Marxism cannot explain the degree to which the CFR, an organisation with large-scale business support and a highly prestigious leadership and membership, cooperated so actively with and deferred so readily to the state. The CFR did act in a manner private interests classically do in pluralist theory, by making appeals to elite and mass opinion. Such appeals, however, were hardly ever contemplated or implemented *without prior reference to the wishes and consent of the Roosevelt Administration*. This was the case with practically every CFR initiative discussed above, most notably in relation to the regional committees, the Century Group and the FFF. A view of politics, therefore, that focuses on politics as group *competition*, cannot explain why the state and the Council could cooperate so effortlessly. It is the conclusion of this study that pluralism fails to provide an adequate account of the activities of the Council or of the American state.

Given the close interconnections between the state and the Council, the corporatist synthesis associated with Michael Hogan merits serious consideration. Corporatism posits that the twentieth century witnessed the rise of large-scale corporations, functional groups and governmental bureaucracies that became increasingly intertwined. Corporatism is characterised by 'elites in the private and public sectors [who] collaborate to guarantee order, progress and stability; [such]... collaboration creates a pattern of interpenetration and powersharing that makes it difficult to determine where one sector leaves off and the other begins...', though corporatists still privilege private group power vis-à-vis the state (Hogan, 1986, p. 363). Corporatist analysis would, therefore, expect to find a very close relationship between the CFR and the State, particularly because of the Council's close links with corporations, banks and agribusiness. There is a great deal of evidence in this study to suggest the efficacy of a corporatist analysis. State–CFR collaboration bridged the 'public–private' divide in every area of mutual interest and advantage: in the university work, the regions, and in pressure politics. Such evidence challenges Gaddis's view that corporatism fails to explain periods of conflict. The

evidence above indicates that private groups, in alliance with the state, engage in political conflict in order to engineer a new consensus.

Yet, corporatists do not recognise the importance of the Council to the development of a new consensus within and between corporatist blocs and on the development of a new foreign policy orientation for the United States. Corporatism lacks an analysis of the intellectual activists who reflected, defined, explained and took advantage of the great structural changes that form the core of the corporatist perspective (Hogan, 1998). Second, the corporatist view of the state remains bound by 'weak-state' considerations. The Council was an important organisation of corporatist forces but, in its relationship with the state, it was clearly subordinate to the official makers of foreign policy. Corporatism fails to account for the power of the state which this study emphasises. It is concluded, therefore, that while corporatism enjoys a number of advantages over orthodox pluralism, and ought to be further developed to take account of the Council's role, it fails to provide an adequate account of the activities of that organisation or the state.

The statist view, as expounded by Skocpol, Krasner and Mann, privileges the state and criticises 'society-centred' theorising. Focusing on the autonomy of the state owing to its special position as the only guardian of the national interest in an international environment of armed and dangerous states, statists reverse the usual way in which state manager–private interest group relations have been conceived (Krasner, 1978; Skocpol, 1979; Evans *et al*., 1985; Mann, 1988).

The power of the American state clearly increased significantly due to the Great War and the New Deal, especially with respect to information-gathering and dissemination capacities, collective expertise and higher levels of popular legitimacy. In the person of FDR, elected to four consecutive terms of office, and of his Cabinet and other appointees, there was a continuity of leadership across the 1930s and 1940s and a certain long-term political trajectory, if not vision, guiding the Administration.

Statism, therefore, would predict that the American state would not only be highly proactive in its attempts to mobilise public opinion, but would be the *most powerful* force in that area of activity. In its relationship with the Council, statists would expect the state to prevail over a private interest group. There is, as the historical evidence shows, substantial evidence to support that view, most notably with regard to the CFR's regional committees and its 'pressure' politics. The Roosevelt administration was not content, as is often suggested, to wait passively upon public opinion; rather, it played an active role in transforming it.

By vesting all power in the state, however, statism negates what in this case study has been shown to be a vital aspect of power in a democratic society: the freedom to organise privately, to propagandise publicly around a specific programme, and to attempt to influence public opinion. This is an important aspect of any democracy, and maybe even more significant in the United States where state *legitimacy* has traditionally been weak, even if state *power* has inexorably increased. In this case, the legitimacy of a respectable private group was used by state managers to promote official policy and policy ideas. It was apparent that the American state could not act alone in forging a new world order or in changing America's relationship to global politics. The American state had to mobilise its social support base in order to help construct a globalist consensus, in the face of fierce opposition. The CFR performed a necessary function that the State Department could not itself overtly perform because of Congressional opposition to 'official propaganda' within the United States. It did, therefore, 'depend' on non-state actors. This should not, however, be read as a fundamental retreat from statism's emphasis on 'state power' because, even within conditions of 'dependence', the state was not merely another actor in the political order, seeking support for its ideas and policies in a 'free market of ideas'.

The second problem with the statist model, in common with instrumental Marxism, pluralism and corporatism, is that its view of power is 'power over' not 'power shared' between the Council and the state. In this case, however, the relationship was essentially cooperative as it operated within a mutually agreed division of labour, which statism does not address. Neither the CFR nor the state, according to the historical evidence, actively tried to force the other to do something it would not otherwise have done. In fact, the Council spent much of its time trying to *enable* the state to do what it had already decided to do, after active encouragement, not diktat, from the state.

Such a relationship is difficult to explain within an unqualified statist framework. A Gramscian perspective, however, that focuses on 'state spirit' and bridges the public–private divide is more compelling. The notion of state spirit, of a feeling among certain leading figures and organisations that they bear a grave responsibility to promote a historical process through positive political and intellectual activity, bears a striking resemblance to parastates, as Eisenach uses the term. Parastates saw themselves as epitomising the state and state interests in their everyday lives, possessing an acute sense of their duty to promote the 'national good', which explains the Council's 'enabling' role with regard to foreign affairs.

The role of intellectuals, of course, is of central interest to Gramscian thought, as is the need for political activists to construct consensus out of the myriad of conflicting interests that characterise complex societies. While Gramscian thought is highly sensitive to long-term structural change, it remains acutely aware of the role of conscious actors in the making of history (Williams, 1960, p. 587).

The Gramscian perspective concerning state power and the political role of private organisations allows a great measure of state autonomy *and* political space for ideological mobilisation by private elites. Most persuasive is his notion of hegemonic projects which emanate from intellectual and political leaders in capitalist societies that attempt to harmonise a wide variety of interests behind a national programme, in this case globalism/internationalism. Gramsci's ideas emphasise the state's political and ideological power – as opposed to the conventional Marxist focus on economic – to construct and reconstruct society, politics and economy in the light of changing conditions and crises of social order. The state, Gramsci contends, tries to educate the people in a variety of ways, often through collaboration with other social forces. There is 'a multitude of other so-called private initiatives and activities . . . which form the apparatus of the political and cultural hegemony of the ruling classes', he argues. The government of democracies is conducted with 'the consent of the governed – but with this consent organised . . . . The State does have and request consent, but it also "educates" this consent, by means of the political and syndical associations; these, however', he concludes, 'are private organisms, left to . . . private initiative . . .' (Hoare and Nowell-Smith, 1971, pp. 259–60; Femia, 1981, p. 27). Gramscians would expect to find in this study strong evidence of proactive state agencies and private 'ruling class' organisations attempting to generate the necessary elite and popular authority for a major reorientation of America's foreign policy, through the forging of a new political and ideological consensus that had the capacity to attack, undermine and marginalise, if not to eliminate, the forces of the 'old order' of isolationism. Thus, the collaboration of the state and CFR – in the universities, regions and in pressure politics – may be explained as part of a solution to a growing crisis of the social order, the addressing of which required vigorous and fresh initiatives and ideas to unite the forces of 'progress' behind a programme of domestic reform and global responsibility, from which the whole 'historical bloc' (and, therefore, society) would benefit, as would the state from its enhanced popular authority.

It seems then that the Gramscian theory of power comes closest to explaining the nature of the relationship between the CFR and the

American state. Although corporatist and statist perspectives are more effective than orthodox pluralism, they are still inferior to Gramscian analysis. The Gramscian perspective incorporates all the critical elements in play in this case: (1) intellectual hegemony is required prior to fundamental political change, such as the shift from isolationism to internationalism; (2) the struggle for such hegemony is in a small number of private hands, the people who generate and disseminate new thinking in an attempt to make it the 'common sense' of the age; (3) the state must educate the public and generate consent both independently and in cooperation with private elites; (4) there is in every successful challenge to the status quo a 'state spirit' that motivates the leading figures and organisations, which the parastates clearly manifested; and (5) public opinion construction is central to any project for change.

What most clearly renders the Gramscian analysis superior to its rivals is the fact that it does not examine power too narrowly as 'power over' someone else. The Gramscian notion of state spirit transcends the public–private divide and allows for the flow of information, ideas and influence in both directions. It sums up in a very fundamental way the attitudes and actions of the CFR. The CFR was precisely a type of parastate organisation which played a key role in mobilising Americans for globalism, animated by a spirit of service to the society and state.

7
The Role of Chatham House in the Mobilisation of British Public Opinion

In a manner similar to the CFR, Chatham House leaders professed great interest in the enlightenment of public opinion. As a factor in the conduct of foreign policy, 'public opinion' was of increasing importance, particularly because the causes of the First World War were widely attributed to autocratic rule, secret diplomacy and the unaccountability of makers of foreign policy. As a self-consciously modernising force, the individuals who formed Chatham House sought to broaden the discussion of, and decision-making in, foreign affairs.

Broadly, public opinion played three roles in the thinking of Chatham House leaders. First, a mobilised public opinion would help to undermine the influence of conservative forces that adhered to autocratic styles of making foreign policy (Bosco and Navari 1994, p. v), breaking the entrenched privileges of an old-fashioned, elitist and aristocratic Foreign Office. Second, a properly 'educated' public opinion would permit the formation and implementation of more 'sound' foreign policy. In this regard, a mobilised public opinion would act as a counter to the electorally minded sloganeering that party politics promoted and encouraged, helping instead to create a climate of opinion which would nurture more measured debate over alternative foreign policy options (Schieren, 1994, pp. 50–51).[1] In addition, the cross-party character of Chatham House was an attempt to work on the culture of the party system from within the ranks of the political parties themselves (Martel, 1994, pp. 15, 23). Thirdly, an educated public opinion would help to legitimise official foreign policy and the state.

From the outset, however, it must be understood that Chatham House interpreted public opinion, as demonstrated below, in very restricted ways. That is, it was 'opinion' in the Edwardian sense – the opinion of those in the City, Parliament, the universities and the press and, of course, in London's exclusive gentlemen's clubs – that Chatham House leaders actually meant, in most cases, rather than that of the general public (Bosco and Navari, 1994, p. i). Nevertheless, living in an age of democratisation, the rise of the working class voter and the female suffrage movement, as well as a period of state crises (Hall, 1988), Chatham House men retained the term 'public opinion' as a largely rhetorical device. That is, although Chatham House was born amidst discontent over the Foreign Office's monopoly over foreign affairs and the demand that the doors be thrown open to the 'people', the people they were referring to were the 'political nation', not the masses. At the very heart of Chatham House's definition of public opinion resided the elitism bred in a generation and social stratum that had been educated at elite schools and universities, entered the principal professions and the City, received imperial training, and was thoroughly soaked in the belief in its own intellectual superiority. They were a leadership class and the rest, once properly educated, would, and should, follow.

In taking such positions, Chatham House demonstrated its centrist character. In regard to democratic reform, it located itself between Tory diehards and Labour Party socialists, between militarism and pacifism, between aristocratic rule and the working class, between jingoistic imperialism and proletarian internationalism (Navari, 1994, p. 354). It was a force for moderate, balanced and carefully managed social and political change (Schieren, 1994, pp. 42, 44). Finally, Chatham House was a force that may be located somewhere between the state and civil society, not quite the independent body that it claimed to be and not a simple instrument of state power. Herein lies a fundamental truth about Chatham House's role in British society: it was essentially a 'state-spirited' organisation, a parastate institution in the words of Eldon Eisenach (1994), a self-consciously private organisation in the service of a state it sought to perfect.

The discussion in this chapter continues with a more detailed examination of the Chatham House definition of 'public opinion' and establishes the elitist nature of that definition; followed by an analysis of how the Institute operationalised that particular definition, that is, the institutions through which public opinion was to be influenced; and ends with a number of conclusions concerning the state–Chatham House relationship, and its implications for theories of power and the state.

Chatham House and public opinion

Although the origins of Chatham House lay partly in the desire to broaden access to foreign affairs and issues to a wider public, the evidence shows that Chatham House still had a fairly restrictive and elitist conception of 'public opinion' (Toynbee, 1969, p. 61). Founder Lionel Curtis's own elitist conception of how public opinion is shaped was developed long before the idea of Chatham House had even occurred to him. Deborah Lavin highlights Curtis's elitism as Beit Lecturer at Oxford University in 1912–13, where he saw his role as instructor of the future administrators of the Empire, in the 'New Imperialism' (Lavin, 1982, p. 107).

Those ideas of the way public opinion is shaped through the elite, and of the unity of theory and practice, were the foundation stones of the institutes of international affairs that were proposed at Paris in 1919. At Paris, it was proposed to establish a forum for foreign policy experts to meet other experts, members of parliament, journalists and academics in order 'to educate public opinion'.[2] In a memorandum written jointly with Whitney Shepardson, Curtis advanced the view that 'right public opinion was mainly produced by a small number of people in real contact with the facts who had thought out the issues involved'.[3] Consequently, the proposed institutes should focus not on the general public, but on educating the educators, the 'quality' end of the public opinion spectrum. The institutes would be like a 'common market of ideas of educators and at the same time . . . the logical training ground for under-secretaries of state'. Curtis further emphasised that 'even the proposed yearbook should not be designed for direct consumption by the public at large'.[4]

Curtis clearly saw public opinion as contested terrain when he concluded that an annual register of events be produced so 'as to concentrate public opinion on the questions which most demand attention at any given time'.[5] It was in line with Chatham House's aim of mobilising its supporters and marginalising its opponents (Martel, 1994, p. 27).

Two decades later, Curtis's views had not altered. In a short note, Curtis maintained that wise leadership was the preserve of an elite minority rather than the masses who seldom, if ever, recognise in time key problems for solution. 'Such changes' as are made 'are made by minorities under God-sent leadership'. Echoing the progressive academics who had tutored the young men who founded the CFR, Curtis concluded that all elites had to do was to base proposals 'on sufficient consent which in time [would] become . . . majority consent'.[6]

Curtis and Shepardson were not alone in advancing such a conception of public opinion. In fact, it was more or less the conventional wisdom

within the British political elite. The former Foreign Secretary, Viscount Grey, provided strong support for such concepts in his speech at the founding meeting of the Institute in 1920. He believed that the Institute's main responsibility was to provide facts about current international problems, show their inter-relation and a sense of their respective value. This, Grey argued, would 'lay the foundations for sound public opinion'.[7]

The formation of elite public opinion, however, could not actually always be done in public. Frank discussion, it was argued, would be jeopardised unless confidentiality of some of the proceedings could be guaranteed.[8]

By the 1930s, the position of Chatham House within foreign affairs circles was firmly established. This was confirmed by another former Foreign Secretary, Sir Austen Chamberlain, who announced, at the Institute's third annual dinner, that 'if the nations of the world are to understand each other's problems, it must be through the interpretation and guidance of the elite, through studies such as you [Chatham House] are carrying on'.[9] The hopes of the founders of the Institute were slowly being realised.

While the sophistication and leadership qualities of the existing foreign policy elite, of which they were a central component, were accepted without question by Chatham House, their attitudes towards other sections (in fact the majority) of the British public were questionable. Ian McLaine highlights these attitudes in his study of the Ministry of Information by quoting an RIIA memorandum of 1939 on wartime propaganda (requested by the government). In the memorandum, the Institute argued that the general public did not need to know the whole truth about the War, and that their support for the war effort could be maintained by the provision of a few 'simple facts, anecdotes, descriptions and so forth'. In fact, Ivison Macadam, the Institute's Secretary, suggested the need to 'shepherd public opinion' on occasion (McLaine, 1979, p. 22).

Such beliefs, of course, sprang from the unrepresentative nature of Chatham House membership, a fact that did not go unchallenged by some members. Lord Marley, for example, suggested in 1932 that the Institute should have more members 'drawn not from the bourgeois or intelligentsia class, but from that much larger class, the working class of Great Britain'.[10] Another member, Mr E.F. Wise suggested that the members of the working class and trade union movement had been excluded from Chatham House.[11]

The highly practical and elitist nature of Chatham House deliberations was pointedly demonstrated by its Reconstruction Committee in

mid-1941: the objects of the Committee were 'practical and not academic', and were directed towards 'certain fundamental issues, germane to a situation with which a British Government may be faced, the attention first of instructed people and then of a broader public, and also assisting in the gathering of such information as will be needed to form sound opinions on these issues'.[12]

Similar tendencies operated within the FRPS of the Institute, which was asked in 1940 to produce a series of handbooks for the use of ministers and officials. Arnold Toynbee of FRPS pointed out that there were, in fact, four types of people that needed information relating to questions of peace and security: first, the statesmen and their senior advisers needed briefs setting out 'the essential facts, the main alternative courses of action, the "pros" and "cons" of each'; second, the middle rank departmental specialists who needed to provide details to their seniors; thirdly, 'in order to carry out a policy that they have taken up, the statesmen have to carry the public with them and, first of all, to gain the support of an instructed minority (particularly the publicists and journalists)'; and finally, there was 'the Penguin-reading public' of more educated people and workers.[13]

Clearly, the Institute saw itself as a source of enlightenment in an age of ignorance, which in 1919 had tied the hands of the peace-makers. The Institute, therefore, set itself the task of providing the factual basis for a 'sound' public opinion that would back up the actions of the national leaders. Having such a self-image, however, and in seeing British society in such an elitist way, it may be argued that Chatham House effectively jettisoned claims of its objective, non-ideological and non-political character. It clearly operated with a set of attitudes that constituted a particular outlook on the world, on British society, the political and foreign policy processes, the factors underpinning British external power, and so on. Such a set of attitudes, which involve numerous value judgements, ideological partisanship in practice and the exclusion of leftist and right-wing modes of thought, cannot be described as objective.[14] On the basis of elitist conceptions, Chatham House leaders focused their efforts in a bid to form 'sound' opinion on the 'educators' of public opinion, that is, the press, universities, officers in the wartime Armed Services, and, to a degree, the trade unions. They also recognised the importance of schools and of business. Finally, Chatham House attempted to educate and crystallise foreign policy opinion in the provinces through a system of groups and branches in numerous cities, including Manchester, Durham and Newcastle, Edinburgh and Glasgow.

The press

Chatham House's connections with the press were many and varied, the most powerful being those with *The Times* and the *Observer* newspapers. The relationship with *The Times* will be examined in some detail shortly. At this stage it may be more useful to outline the quantity and variety of the Institute's press world connections.

From the original 756 members of 1920, we find over a dozen names from the 'fourth estate', foremost among them are: C.P. Scott of the *Manchester Guardian*; R.M. Barrington-Ward of the *Observer*, and later editor of *The Times*; Geoffrey Dawson of *The Times*; Sir Roderick Jones, proprietor of Reuters; R.D. Blumenfeld of the *Daily Express*; Dr E.J. Dillon of the *Daily Telegraph*, and so on.[15]

In addition, data for Chatham House Council members from four selected years – 1920, 30, 40, 50 – show 16 further press connections. Among the proprietors/directors we find Robert Brand, Viscount Astor and Campbell Stuart of *The Times*. Among editors and correspondents there were four connections with *The Economist*: Hilton Young, Elizabeth Monroe, Donald McLachlan and Geoffrey Crowther.[16] Monroe had been the *Observer's* diplomatic correspondent in 1944, another of Astor's newspapers. Many of the above-named were also inducted into government service during the Second World War, especially the Ministry of Information (MoI), testimony to their perceived skills in publicity and propaganda. Roderick Jones was a member of the MoI's advisory council in 1939, along with Campbell Stuart (who later became Director of Propaganda in Enemy Countries); Monroe was Director of the Middle East division, 1940–44; Ivison Macadam was Assistant Director-General and Principal Assistant Secretary, 1939–41; W.J. Hinton worked for the MoI, 1940–45, with the period from 1942 in New York as Director of the British Information Services, taking over from Charles Kingsley Webster of FRPS. Geoffrey Crowther was also employed by the MoI, 1941–42. J.W. Wheeler-Bennet, the historian, also played an important role for the MoI in USA during the 1939–44 period, becoming head of the New York office of the British Political Warfare Mission in 1942.[17]

Of course, to draw too strong conclusions about the influence of RIIA on public opinion from such data would be premature. One would have to examine the actual activities of these individuals to establish influence. However, these connections cannot be ignored. They suggest that RIIA was a well-connected organisation that had taken active steps to operationalise its public opinion forming strategy of linking up with the makers of public opinion.

Turning now to a more qualitative analysis of the connections between RIIA and the press, paying particular attention to *The Times*, we find further evidence of similarities of press and Institute attitudes. Before advancing any further, it must be reiterated that the isolation of influence emanating from one group to another is problematic. In the context of more or less continuous association and connections, all we may hope to do is to recognise key players and to map the universe of ideas that they promoted. Within such a framework, we find a fair amount of evidence to indicate the importance of the position of the Institute.

The founding of the Institute was greeted with generous coverage by the 'quality' press. Indeed, the coverage was so favourable that it could have been written by the Institute itself. The *Observer* hailed the Institute as heralding a new era of democratic control of foreign policy which was 'the rightful successor to the dynastic and imperialistic policies which have harvested periodic war all down the ages'. The key to such democratic control was, the article suggested, 'popular knowledge . . .[and] . . . public education'. The *Observer* fully supported the Institute's aims and working methods which would 'set interest [in foreign affairs] stirring in an ever-widening circle'. The article concluded with the hope that the Institute would soon 'have proved itself one of the war's most fruitful consequences and a powerful factor in a sound, instructed, and alert public opinion'.[18] A *Times* editorial welcomed the founding of the Institute as 'likely to be a useful educational agency' especially in supporting the League of Nations. In a fairly lengthy leader, the editor warned the fledgling Institute 'to shut out the pushful crank and pedants of a certain aggressive creed, the politician fair and ever generous to every country but his own, and the many varieties of Bolshevists, avowed or unavowed'.[19]

Evidently, the exclusion of left-wing opinions within the Institute was firmly established from its very foundation. In a separate article covering the inaugural meeting, *The Times* gave considerable space to J.R. Clynes, the Labour MP and a founder of the Institute. Speaking in favour of the resolution to establish the Institute, Clynes argued that it was especially important for the education of the labour movement, the leaders of which were becoming increasingly conscious of foreign affairs. Clynes felt that 'it was indeed strange that the power[s] which presided over the fate of nations should not have called into being an institution such as that proposed many years ago'.[20]

Such attitudes, expressed in a newspaper like *The Times*, could not but assist in creating a favourable reception for the new Institute within the

elite. As McLachlan states in his biography of Barrington-Ward, *The Times* was 'the gazette of the British ruling class'. The power of *The Times* 'over its readers lay in its ability to project day by day in news and comment what the establishment in its various groups was wanting, thinking and saying'. *The Times* spoke to and was consciously directed at 'the whole range of executive, professional and political men and women, who by their calling, intelligence and education, rank as the most influential constituency in Great Britain' (MacLachlan, 1971, p. 1). *The Times*, through its editors and other personnel, was connected with the individuals and circles that had created the *Round Table* journal (through editor Geoffrey Dawson) and who later set up Chatham House: Philip Kerr and Lionel Curtis in particular (whom Barrington-Ward had met at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919) (MacLachlan, 1971, pp. 52–59).

Additionally, various individuals connected with *The Times* tended to have strong pro-American attitudes, both during the interwar years and during the Second World War. Sir Campbell Stuart, for example, the newspaper's Managing Editor over many years, wrote that all 'through life I have had no greater preoccupation . . . [than to use my] . . . *Times* position . . . to endeavour to improve' the relations between Great Britain and the United States (Stuart, 1952, p. 81).

Barrington-Ward and E.H. Carr, a leader writer, were both favourably disposed to strong Anglo-American cooperation after the Second World War (McDonald, 1984, p. 134). According to McLachlan, 'by the end of 1941 . . . [Barrington-Ward] . . . was even discussing with friends a joint Anglo-American (with China and Russia) commission to investigate how to raise the world's standard of living' (MacLachlan, 1971, p. 220). Earlier in 1941, Carr had been inspired to write a leader on unemployment and war by the pro-American Lord Lothian, Britain's ambassador to the USA. Apparently, Lothian had been telling Dawson 'that the Americans now regarded unemployment, next to war, as the great social evil, and that we should hammer on that if we wanted to convince them of our sincerity'. At one point during this conversation, Dawson turned to Carr and suggested that he 'might like to write something about this'. That, wrote Carr, 'was the sole origin of "Two Scourges", my first leader as a member of the staff of *The Times* that made a hit outside, being quoted with warm approval in the House of Commons' (MacLachlan, 1971, p. 220).

In combination, such connections and attitudes made *The Times* favourably disposed to the Institute and its activities, provided an important outlet for Institute news and publications. An especially favourable reception was usually accorded to the Institute's *Bulletin of International News* and other studies on current questions. The topics covered by such

surveys included the Anglo-American Trade Agreement,[21] Italian Colonies,[22] Europe under Hitler,[23] Russian Resources,[24] postwar security.[25] In each case, the surveys were given lengthy and favourable treatment, and praise for being 'informative and concise',[26] 'particularly timely' and as 'excellent'.[27] As may be expected, *The Times* reported such surveys in a completely uncritical manner largely because it shared the assumptions of those who had written them. *The Times* accepted without question the terms and perspectives within which the surveys had been conducted. In such circumstances, influence is notoriously difficult to measure. Yet the myriad of connections and overlaps between the Institute and *The Times* speak volumes. Such connections do not dictate content; rather they set the tone in a more general and diffuse way. As the journalist Anthony Bevins argued in early 1992, in an article on tabloid anti-Labourism, correspondents do not need to be ordered to write certain things in certain ways, the culture of the newspaper (created by the proprietors and editors) itself 'informs' them of the agenda and the parameters of discussion.[28] This is amply demonstrated with reference to Barrington-Ward who, as editor, told his correspondents in Nazi Germany to 'bear . . . in mind' the fact that he supported appeasement (MacLachlan, 1971, p. 101).

In the case at hand, therefore, the influence of the pro-American, RIIA-connected Astor family, which also owned *The Times*, should not be dismissed. *The Times* also regularly reported on Chatham House annual dinners,[29] the formation and activities of the FRPS,[30] the opening of the Manchester and Scottish branches,[31] and the work of the Chatham House representatives on the IPR. From these and other writings in *The Times*, a clearly pro-RIIA tendency, and a pro-Anglo-American cooperation attitude may be discerned. The latter was not, to be sure, the result of RIIA 'pressure', yet it complemented the RIIA's own pro-American leanings,[32] and thereby contributed to the education of 'public opinion'. When, in 1944, Chatham House expanded into a neighbouring building, *The Times* took the opportunity further to promote the Institute. A leader article emphasised that the presence of Richard Law, Minister of State at the Foreign Office, was proof of 'the part which the institute plays in creating informed and objective public opinion on foreign affairs'.[33] As Bosco argues, there was a 'special relationship' between Chatham House and *The Times* (Bosco, 1994, p. 8).

The *Observer* was also closely connected with Chatham House, owned as it was, from 1911, by the Astor family. Through the Cliveden connection, all the Astors were very close to Milner's Kindergarten, although Viscount Astor had been at New College, Oxford, with Philip Kerr and

fellow Round Tabler, Robert Brand (Cockett, 1991, pp. 1, 16). The *Observer's* policy was to be 'tied to no group, no sect, no interest', although its mission was declared to be to rid the world of national rivalries and social injustice. For example, the newspaper wanted to help build 'world-wide organic control' rather than 'the mad competition of nations', ideas that were strongly held within Chatham House circles (Cockett, 1991, pp. 122–23). During the period in 1939–40, just after FRPS was established, causing considerable controversy in the House of Commons over the size of the government's grant, the *Observer* defended the Institute's past record, the usefulness of its reviews of the foreign press, and the 'scientific, reliable machinery of world information' it was establishing, providing thereby 'an essential national service'.[34]

It is difficult genuinely to know how much influence Chatham House exercised through the press. David Astor, long associated with Chatham House and the *Observer*, wrote in a letter to Lionel Curtis, that a newspaper 'can and should . . . . Cultivate a certain viewpoint in its readers', which he distinguished from advocacy of a specific policy (Cockett, 1991, p. 174). Cockett argues that Astor was fundamentally committed, in the postwar years, to the Marshall Plan, NATO and an 'Anglo-American alliance', the noted outlook of Chatham House itself. Research on the power of the press tends to support the view Astor outlined to Curtis. An in-depth survey of newspaper readers, across the class spectrum, by Mass-Observation, noted that press influence 'on opinion certainly does exist, particularly in the long-term sense of reinforcement of opinions already held'. The study further argued that it is among 'relatively knowledgeable readers that the newspaper is most likely to influence opinion . . . . Especially . . . in the sphere of foreign affairs . . .' where press content may encourage 'the formation of new ideas, in that it sows seeds and implants suggestions . . .'. The process of opinion formation is long term, almost imperceptible and, as most readers read their newspaper uncritically, subtle (Mass-Observation, 1949, pp. 87–88).

Chatham House and the armed forces

The original list of 756 members contained over 100 officers from various parts of the armed services. During the 1939–45 period, such connections became even more important and were extended in scope, especially with reference to 'political education' for sevicemen. 'Talks to the troops' or 'courses for forces', as they were known within Chatham House, occupied a great deal of Institute time and resources during the War, and were seen as a vital part of the Institute's role as 'educator of public opinion'. Alongside a number of other initiatives, Chatham House

received funding from the York Trust, a Leverhulme foundation, to initiate a programme of education on foreign affairs for military officers.[35] With that function in mind, Chatham House had made contact with the British Army Education Corps in April 1941 and had begun to supply elementary discussion papers for Army use.[36] In line with the conventional procedures of Chatham House, their educational programme was targeted directly at officers, rather than enlisted men, with the conviction that the officers would pass on their knowledge and understanding to the 'men' in weekly lectures and discussions.

Between September 1942 and August 1943, Chatham House arranged 15 courses for the armed services: '8 at the request of the Army Bureau of Current Affairs; 6 at the request of the Canadian Army Eduacational Services; 1 for officers of the Royal Navy and officers and non-commissioned officers of the RAF'.[37] Each course was attended by 300 officers, and 4500 had attended by August 1943. By the end of the War, 12,000 officers had attended such courses (RIIA, 1946, p. 9). For the organisation of such lecture courses, Chatham House was able to secure the services of 'the best available authorities on their subjects . . . very often government servants'.[38] Examples of officials include Frank Ashton-Gwatkin, Assistant Under Secretary and Chief Clerk at the Foreign Office,[39] and H.M. Gladwyn Jebb, Head of the Foreign Office Reconstruction Department.[40] The British officers were also able to listen to the ideas of one of the architects of the postwar 'containment' doctrine, George Kennan, on 'The USSR and her Western Neighbours'.[41]

The courses were envisaged by Chatham House as the nucleus of an ever-widening circle of influence. The memorandum of 1943 on these courses argues that they 'are arranged with the object not only of giving information to those attending, *but principally of providing them with information which they in their turn can pass on to their men in the weekly ABCA* [Army Bureau of Current Affairs] *discussion periods*'.[42] To the Institute, such courses were a vital part of the government policy process, the creation of an 'enlightened' public opinion that would back official policy. To that end, and to meet the demands and sacrifices of the postwar period, such an education was essential for 'the soldier of today'.[43]

Courses were therefore organised on a wide variety of key topics: United States–Soviet relations, the Far East and the Pacific, the British Commonwealth, France, Italy, Germany, and so on. Although the transcripts of the talks themselves are not available in the Chatham House archives, very brief summaries are provided and give a hint of the tone and content of such sessions. For example, Charles Webster lectured on US foreign policy, describing its development since the Monroe Doctrine.

The section on 'USA and Britain' states, in note form: 'Unique relation; cultural, legal, religious ties; commercial rivalry'.[44] In light of Webster's well-known desire for postwar Anglo-American cooperation, an educated guess may be made as to the line taken in such talks and discussions. Similarly, the notes for Sir Frederick Whyte's talk on the postwar Pacific region end with the conclusion: 'Sustained Anglo-American cooperation essential.'[45] In 1942, British officers were addressed on the topic of 'The USA-USSR' by a leading American warhawk, Lt Commander Herbert Agar.[46] Unfortunately, there is no record of Agar's speech or of the officers' reactions to it. On the basis of Agar's evangelical belief in America's moral crusade to create a better world, however, his message must have been pretty clear. How it was received by his audience would have made fascinating reading.

In addition to the lectures, Chatham House provided answers to queries through its Information Department, and also supplied 'short "Information Notes" ... especially for army purposes'.[47] By the end of the War, the educational programme was to be extended to the Royal Navy, to the Workers' Educational Association, and to junior executives in industry.[48]

Lionel Curtis, an 'inveterate propagandist', as he called himself,[49] was also involved in armed services' education during the War. Curtis utilised his connections with Oxford University (as a Fellow of All Souls' College and as Chatham House's official representative at FRPS at Balliol College) to organise a series of week-long courses for Allied servicemen during their periods of leave. The courses dealt with postwar reconstruction, international affairs, Anglo-American federation and the British Commonwealth, and elicited numerous letters of thanks from participants. One letter, from an Australian serviceman, argued that there was 'an ever-increasing interest in international affairs ... springing up everywhere, and particularly in the Services. We quite often hold discussion groups in ... [my] unit ...'.[50] An American officer wrote that 'Your opinions crystalize [sic] viewpoints I have been attempting to formulate.'[51] Indeed, so successful was Curtis that he was appointed by the University of Oxford/Reading Regional Committee on Education for HM Forces to lecture on 'Dumbarton Oaks' to army and RAF officers at St Hilda's College.[52]

The influence of the 'courses for forces' is impossible to discern. The kind of evidence that is required to address this issue is missing. Chatham House itself felt that their effects were far-reaching, especially in numerical terms, reaching tens of thousands of servicemen and women during the course of the War. As one soldier noted about ABCA: it 'is the reversal of the idea that the soldier must not think for himself,

let alone talk for himself or be interested in politics or world affairs . . .' (Crang, 2000, p. 118).

Conversely, there is evidence that suggests that so 'patchy' was the level of commitment of commanding officers to ABCA, it may well be that large proportions of servicemen never even received the lectures that Chatham House had trained 12,000 officers to offer (Crang, 2000, p. 128). Summerfield reports, however, that about 70 per cent of soldiers attended ABCA discussion groups that were considered very good or sufficient by the servicemen themselves (Summerfield, 1981, p. 150).[53] Overall, the programme itself received wide dissemination during the 'working hours' of servicemen and would have acted as a stimulant to discussion and thought, and broadly would have contributed to Chatham House's (and the Foreign Office's) aim of promoting pro-Anglo-American cooperation and pro-United Nations thinking. Finally, as the Lord President wrote to Prime Minister Churchill, the ABCA sessions 'clearly acted . . . as something of a safety valve' in the armed forces.[54]

Chatham House and academics

As noted elsewhere, over 100 of the original 756 members of the Institute belonged to the world of academia. Of the 113 academics, 86 were based at either Oxford or Cambridge. Data from Chatham House Council membership for the four sample years (1920, 30, 40, 50) also shows a high representation of academics in leading positions – 14 out of the total 103 members.[55]

One of the key means of mobilising academics for war was the Institute's FRPS, founded in 1939 with Foreign Office funding and initiative. Briefly, the aim of FRPS was to review the foreign press and to produce background historical and political memoranda for use by officials.[56] The work of FRPS was so favourably considered by the Foreign Office departments that in 1943 it was merged with the Political Intelligence Department to form the Foreign Office Research Department (McNeill, 1989, pp. 198–99). Of particular advantage to the Government was the work of Arnold Toynbee and Charles Webster, in visiting the United States during wartime. Toynbee and Webster played an important role in providing the Foreign Office with information concerning Americans' views of the postwar settlement and the role that the United States might play in world terms (Parmar, 1992).

Academics were also one of the key groups activated by the RIIA in its bid to 'educate' the Armed Forces in conjunction with ABCA. Between 1942 and 1945, no fewer than 37 academics, many of them repeatedly, lectured on all aspects of Britain's foreign relations. For instance, Max

Beloff spoke to officers about the Soviet Union;[57] while Alan Bullock addressed the German question;[58] L. Dudley Stamp, Cassell Reader in Economic Geography at the London School of Economics, spoke on postwar economic security;[59] and R.W. Seton-Watson lectured on South-Eastern Europe in November 1943.[60] In those ways, Chatham House was a key part of the means by which growing wartime interest in 'courses dealing with problems of reconstruction in the domestic field and in the sphere of international relations' was met (Universities Extra-Mural Consultative Committee, 1947, p. 4). The University of London, for example, set up a series of courses on the 'United Nations', designed to bring eminent speakers to undergraduate and postgraduate audiences. At Oxford, with strong assistance from Chatham House, extra-mural courses sought to cater for the 'greater desire to get a clear idea of what we were fighting against and what we were fighting for...' (Universities Extra-Mural Consultative Committee, 1947, pp. 15, 18).

Far from perceiving academics and their role as being confined to 'ivory tower' theorising, the RIIA and official policymakers saw them as a vital element of the policy process, that is, vital in ensuring public acceptance of official policy, an unusual interpretation of the democratic concept that government be based on the 'consent of the governed'.

After the War, Chatham House leaders wanted to continue their work within the academic community, especially by establishing branches in the universities (RIIA, 1946, p. 12). Before the War, Chatham House had even extended its activities into the schools. For example, in 1939, Commander Stephen King-Hall of the Chatham House Council, addressed pupils on 'The Defence of the Realm'; in 1940, Professor E. H. Carr spoke to children on 'What Are We Fighting For?'. There are two further meetings recorded for 1941 and 1942.[61] The programmes had begun in 1936, with a talk by Sir Austen Chamberlain 'on Foreign Affairs (for older boys and girls)'. King-Hall also reports that two (unpublished) studies were conducted by Chatham House in 1936 on 'the Contents of Primary School History Text-Books' (King-Hall, 1937, pp. 131, 138). Evidently, the education of 'public opinion' had to start early.

Chatham House and organised labour

As the quotation from J.R. Clynes cited earlier shows, the Institute aimed from its beginning to educate working class opinion. Clynes wrote a short pamphlet in 1919, dedicated to reconciling the interests of the Labour 'Internationale' with those of the League of Nations (Clynes, 1919). The Institute's conception of the size of the task of educating the working class, however, was summarised by Philip Kerr. He wrote that 'The more I see of him the more I love the British working man, but he's most

fearfully ignorant, and as soon as he begins to use his brains, like the rest of us he goes dotty. What he needs is Mind, he's got heart, and what the capitalists need is Love, they've got brains.' Kerr's biographer also demonstrates Kerr's opposition to Bolshevism and support for capitalism (Butler, 1960, pp. 83, 267, 269). Clynes, a former 'mill-boy', also argued that institutions such as the League and, by implication, the League of Nations Union and Chatham House, would prevent the workers 'from losing their heads when their emotions are appealed to or when their intelligence is deceived' (George, 1918; Clynes, 1919, p. 4). As Lavin notes, Curtis and the Round Table group activated many lecturers and writers to address workers' and trade union committees, especially in support of the imperialist idea (Lavin, 1982, p. 105). Professor Sir Alfred Zimmern was convinced that real social change would occur 'through the masses . . .' although 'the masses had to be informed, inspired and led by those with a vision of how things might be' (Martel, 1994, p. 16). The work in this area, however, was always rather restricted, indicating little interest in trade union activity within the Institute. Perhaps the membership of 12 Labour MPs (in the 1920–50 sample) was considered sufficient to look after such matters? Or the three trade union and Trades Union Congress officials on the Chatham Council, for the sample years, were enough?[62]

Of course, many trade unionists were in the armed forces during wartime and might have received RIIA material through ABCA. Yet, it was only after the War that courses were organised for workers. Three series of such meetings are recorded, and only the briefest information on them is available. The first series of meetings occurred in early 1946 and was organised in conjunction with the Workers' Educational Trade Union Committee in London, and addressed the necessity of a firm alliance with the United States. R.F. Harrod, editor of the *Economic Journal*, and G.D.A. MacDougall of Oxford University, addressed the meetings. A second series of meetings was organised in April–July 1946, for the Workers' Education Association, and featured Martin Wight of the RIIA's research staff. A final series addressed postwar economic problems, featuring lectures by Alec Cairncross and A.J. Brown of Oxford.[63]

Provincial branches

Its Charter permitted Chatham House to establish branches in the Empire, Dominions and other areas, as appropriate.[64] The general view was that setting up such branches would be helpful in several ways in meeting the aims of the Institute, particularly in stimulating interest in foreign affairs. The Chatham House Council, however, was reluctant to permit uncontrolled expansion due to fears of lowered standards and unnecessary financial burdens on London.

Nevertheless, the Scottish Branch was established in 1938, 'representing both the learning of the Scottish Universities and the experience of the great industrial centres . . .'.[65] At its founding meeting, Lord Normand noted that the Branch was to be seen as 'not as a factory, but as a laboratory'. Lionel Curtis added that the Scottish Branch could do what Chatham House had done, that is, 'leavened public opinion in England, brought it nearer the truth and rendered it saner'. In 1938, the Branch had 91 members, growing through the War to 141 in 1945.[66] The Branch held dozens of members' meetings, inviting Scottish and other experts to address them on topics of current interest. For example, in 1941–42, the members were addressed by a leader of the CFR, Whitney Shepardson, on 'The United States and the War', while Curtis spoke on 'Post-War Planning of a Durable Peace'. Frank Ashton-Gwatkin, also addressed the Scottish Branch on the planned 'Re-organisation of the Foreign Service'.[67]

The Scottish Branch seemed to attract between 20 and 30 members for meetings on a regular basis, with a highest attendance of 98 in 1939. There was, however, some concern that certain members were inviting along their very able, but poor, sons to meetings. According to Watson, the fathers were normally 'uninterested' while the sons were 'able' but poor.[68] Other less well-paid people were also deterred from membership: academics were unable to afford the annual subscription of £4 and 4 shillings.[69]

The formation of a Manchester Branch was delayed by the War, until December 1945. Until then, the Manchester members operated as a 'Group', with about 15 experts. They held several meetings during the War period, including 13 in 1944. One meeting was addressed by Lt T.J. Hamilton of the US Army, on 'The Future of Anglo-American Relations'. By December 1945, the Manchester Branch had grown to 100 members, including historian Max Beloff.[70] A Group was also established in Newcastle and Durham in 1944–45.

The branch formation programme was beset by indecision and doubts in London. While Chatham House was described as 'instigating and supporting' branch formation in the Dominions, its attitude to provincial branches was merely to 'encourage' formation 'where any initiative in this direction was apparent among the local populations'.[71] Conversely, there were those who championed branch formation and expansion as it would have positive international and national implications. One such Chatham House member, J.H.B. Savage, wrote that a series of branches would provide for 'clear presentation of the facts . . . . Facilities to hear debates, to listen to talks by authorities and experts . . .'. The

overall aim, Savage argued, was 'to build up a nation which, when it does speak on any question of international importance, can do so with real knowledge, without being led astray by Press Magnates or Party Politics'.[72]

There were fears in Chatham House on a number of fronts: first, some feared the financial implications for London; second, some feared a lowering of standards of membership by permitting branches; thirdly, the extra administrative burden on the London staff; and, finally, that it may be difficult to persuade the best speakers to travel to the provinces.[73] As it stood in 1938, Chatham House members were concentrated residentially in London and the Home Counties. For example not a single other regional county contributed 20 or more members. While there were 111 members living in Surrey, 82 in Oxfordshire, and 50 in Hampshire, there were eight Wales residents, and just one member from Shropshire.[74] But there was also a concern with the possible influence of Marxists, especially in Manchester. This is hinted at by a letter by L.F. Behrens, who was particularly keen to start up a Branch in Manchester. In a cold but courteous letter to London, Behrens asked 'the Council to trust us' in regard to obeying the Royal Charter and in believing that there were no 'insidious and disruptive tendencies to "leftist divergency"…'.[75] Finally, some expressed the concern that, should Chatham House permit more branches to form, 'it might lead to a state of "the tail wagging the dog"'.[76] This is exactly what Gladwyn Jebb had said in regard to Chatham House's Foreign Office work during the War.

The overall effect was that, apart from the Scottish Branch, none of the branches and groups were especially successful in raising awareness of international questions or in recruiting appropriate members. In a letter of reply to someone interested in setting up a Chatham House group in Sheffield, the then Director, Kenneth Younger, noted that the Institute might have been better served if it had attached itself to broader public affairs groups, such as the Luncheon Club in Manchester, rather than striking out on its own. The unstated reasoning was that there simply was not enough provincial interest in foreign affairs.[77] Nevertheless, the thinking behind the initiative should be noted. As Curtis was quoted as arguing in 1938, in a *Times* article announcing the formation of the Scottish Branch, the role of the Institute was to provide people with the knowledge and interpretative basis upon which to form opinions on foreign affairs. On domestic issues, he stated, people had their own experiences to guide them. It was the job of the Institute to furnish them with knowledge about areas beyond their experience.[78]

Conclusion

Clearly the Institute was a key organisation in foreign affairs in Britain during the Second World War. It played an important role in both policy implementation (FRPS and IPR) and as an instrument for public opinion creation and reinforcement. As mentioned earlier, in the discussion of Institute–academic connections, Chatham House operated with a curious and unusual interpretation of democracy as being necessarily based on the 'consent of the governed'. In the usual sense of the concept, ideas and preferences flow from the people to government which represents the general will. In the Chatham House usage of that concept, policy and ideas flow from the state elite to the masses, whose consent must be organised. Chatham House's role was to act as the instructor of 'attentive public' opinion, that is, the press, academics and army officers, who would, in turn, instruct those in their realm, that is, readers, students and enlisted men, respectively. The evidence therefore suggests that theories emphasising state weakness must be questioned and modified, if not rejected outright. Certainly the state's agenda-setting role fostered and mobilised the Institute to act (consciously) on behalf of official policy preferences. While the purely documentary evidence does not show a neat unilinear relationship between government policy and RIIA public opinion forming activities, it does indicate important areas of active cooperation and shared perspectives. State interest was served by the Institute in creating forums and courses, publishing surveys and bulletins for wide sections of the attentive public. While the state actually made the policies, the Institute was a vital component of the process of engineering the 'consent of the governed' (Parmar, 2000).

The state–Chatham House relationship was clearly very close, with Chatham House involved in practically all aspects of Britain's foreign relations. The nature of the relationship in the sphere of opinion mobilisation, however, was determined by the fact that the British state and Chatham House shared almost identical attitudes to foreign affairs, leading the latter to promote policies and ideas that disseminated pro-Anglo-American alliance perspectives. The consequences of this for the theoretical explanations of interest to this study are very interesting. From a pluralist viewpoint, while a superficial argument might suggest that mobilising opinion is a classic pluralist strategy, a deeper analysis suggests otherwise. Chatham House was so close to key elements of the British state that it could not reasonably claim to have been acting independently. Even if Chatham House had wanted to, it could not have propagated a particular line to the public and remain connected with

policymaking through its FRPS. If pluralism means anything at all, it means attaching great importance to private interest group independence from the state and the advancement of campaigns springing from sectional interests. Chatham House was too closely identified with the state to even consider such 'muscular' behaviour. When it ran campaigns to mobilise the public, its programmes did not seriously challenge the emerging pro-Anglo-American cooperation consensus. Chatham House cannot be characterised principally as a competitive organisation: it cooperated with the state and acted as the promoter of their shared views.

The corporatist model, then, might be said to have significant applicability, given its central focus on cooperation and consensus. The incorporation of Chatham House into the state's policymaking machinery, as seen in Chapter 4, and its opinion mobilisation activities into a 'state consensus' are significant factors in undermining corporatism. Ultimately, the power within the relationship does not appear to reside with Chatham House which, alongside pluralistic and instrumental Marxist accounts, corporatism would predict. The power of the state to set the agenda of policymaking, to incorporate Chatham House men into its official and unofficial propaganda activities, was simply too great. Even more, the para-statist self-definition of Chatham House leaders meant that they did not fear nor challenge this: They accepted it because they were committed to that definition of their role as a supplement to the state, an augmenter of state power through the legitimacy that was often publicly accorded 'private' groups.

The statist viewpoint clearly has much to commend it, given the power that the state machinery for making foreign policy displayed in relation to Chatham House. Chatham House was drawn into the state's orbit because it shared the latter's view of Britain's national interests and how they would best be pursued through Anglo-American cooperation in the postwar order. Where this perspective falls short, however, is in underestimating the significance of Chatham House, its leaders and the role of self-motivated 'private' citizens. In emphasising state power, statism neglects the fact that Chatham House leaders were private citizens on a 'mission', not the playthings of state power, nor dupes easily manipulated to serve ends with which they fundamentally disagreed. An adequate theory that explains 'how power works' must be broad enough to accept not only the state power but also the importance to liberal democracies of private elite groups *committed to* the state but not *of* the state.

Clearly, the Gramscian argument, therefore, becomes central: state power, allowance for private ruling elite groups that mobilise public opinion, small groups which act as catalysts for particular lines of thought

and as forces for undermining and, potentially, eliminating opposition tendencies in their bid to promote a new consensus, a new order. The roles played by Chatham House and the CFR were, in important regards, very similar and may successfully be classified as 'state-spirited', groups with an acute sense of their own historical necessity, superior insight and historic mission to create and promote a new world order.

One of the principal differences between the strategies of the CFR and Chatham House was in their estimation of the role of regional elites. This was largely due to the central importance of London in national affairs and the relative insignificance of the House of Commons in foreign affairs. This may be contrasted with the more diffuse character of the US political and social elite, the size of the territory of the United States, and the significance of Congress in foreign affairs. Even so, however, the Council's *instinct* was very similar to that of Chatham House. Council man Russell Leffingwell, for example, was completely opposed to the regional committees on foreign relations. He argued that 'Foreign relations is a subject about which, particularly in wartime and indeed at any time, the greatest circumspection needs to be observed.' He was concerned that the number of regional committees increased 'more rapidly than we have men and leadership available for them'. Overall, he believed that 'miscellaneous chatter about foreign affairs is likely to do more harm than good' (Parmar, 1999b, pp. 364–65). Walter Mallory, the CFR's executive director, also favoured the withdrawal of Carnegie Corporation funding for the regional committees as their effect was to 'dilute . . . [the] real work [of the CFR] by a widespread general education program . . .'.[79] A fear of losing control, therefore, was shared by the leaders of both think tanks, lest the high standards set in London and New York be jeopardised.

Another, and perhaps even more important, difference in the political strategies of the two organisations was the Council's use of 'pressure politics' and their complete absence from the avenues exploited by Chatham House. The CFR, albeit through ad hoc organisations, mobilised mass opinion through rallies, public meetings, petitions, newspaper advertisements, sports events and radio broadcasts. This illustrates the greater significance of public opinion in the American political system and of the importance of bi-annual congressional elections and the importance of the US Congress in foreign policy, than was, and is, the case in Britain. The American political system is far more responsive to the public mood because shifts in public opinion may have short-term electoral consequences for incumbents. Consequently, the creation of a climate of opinion for aid to the allies, for greater levels of US belligerence,

for the curtailment or repeal of neutrality legislation, was a greater imperative prior to congressional and, especially, presidential action. Roosevelt did not want to act until there was a public demand for a particular initiative, such as the 'destroyers-for-bases' deal; hence his administration's collusion with CDAAA and FFF. This particular aspect of the CFR's activities had no Chatham House equivalent, thus providing significant support for the American exceptionalist thesis.

While that would suggest that the United States' political system is more pluralistic than Britain's, it does raise some important questions about the way in which the system may be exploited by those with the greatest financial resources, political connections and access to the mass media. Rather than demonstrating the vigour of a pluralistic system, the evidence in relation to the CFR suggests that that system is especially prone to manipulation in a capitalist democracy.

In the case of Chatham House, their public opinion strategy was tailored to a system that generally discouraged independent public interest in foreign affairs. The House of Commons played a minimal role in the making of foreign policy; consequently, the lobbying of MPs through various means was an 'outsider' strategy, employed by those – trades unionists, women, strikers – who had few significant political connections with the executive. In comparative terms, therefore, the United States' political order may be said to be more open and more responsive than Britain's.

Both groups attempted to build coalitions of disparate groups, including business, academia, organised labour (however intermittently and without too much conviction), students, racial minorities (CFR), the armed services (CH) and regional elites. Of course, political systemic differences meant that the precise means differed, and that different structural forces had to be overcome or marginalised (isolationists and diehard imperialists). Such differences notwithstanding, however, the roles of the two think tanks were remarkably similar, indicating that the American and British systems produced similar outcomes by different means, that their shared underlying political culture was the reason. What is beyond doubt, however, is the fact that each group played fundamentally important roles in its own nation's attempts to construct a new world order.

The next chapter considers, given their shared outlook, roles, and common origins at Paris in 1919, whether the Council and Chatham House were part of a 'transnational capitalist class', a beneficent 'liberal Atlanticist community', or may best be explained in Gramscian terms, perhaps, as an 'Anglo-American establishment'.

Part 4

8

CFR–RIIA Interconnections: A Transnational Ruling Class, Liberal Atlantic Community or Anglo-American Establishment?

The CFR and Chatham House were not only intimately connected with a myriad of national establishment societies and organisations, as indicated in Chapter 2, but also with one another. This chapter aims to examine the extent and nature of such interconnections from 1919 to 1945. It will be seen that the connections between the two internationalist think tanks were many and varied, ranging from personal correspondence, cooperation in publishing and disseminating literature, exchanges and other visits, joint international conferences and study groups. In addition, of course, they were founded at the same meetings at Paris in 1919–20 and, during the 1920s through the Great Depression to the end of the Second World War, they were financially sustained by the great American philanthropic foundations. However loosely, then, it may be claimed that the leaders of the two think tanks were components of an Anglo-American 'establishment'.

It is important to bear in mind that certain claims have been made, implicitly and explicitly, about the character of the CFR and Chatham House, their international roles, interconnections, and results in regard to promoting Anglo-American cooperation. This chapter explores four sets of theoretical approaches to this subject: van der Pijl's transnational capitalist class view, the Gramscian view, the liberal 'Atlantic community' view and the statist view.

Rival interpretations

Kees van der Pijl argues that the best explanation of international relations must include an analysis of capitalist ruling class fractions that have

competing (and sometimes common) interests, which develop ideologies and policies to promote global capitalist accumulation. He further argues that capitalism, as a world system, develops international networks – social, economic, ideological – and begins the process of creating a transnational capitalist class. Pijl claims, however, that the state is a key relatively autonomous means by which world order is established and maintained. The *state/society complex* is central to Pijl's claims. Pijl also claims to share the neo-Gramscian outlook of Cox and Gill, with attendant interest in public opinion and mass mobilisations (Pijl, 1998, pp. 3–4).

Pijl analyses a number of antecedents of transnational classes, including freemasonry (Pijl, 1998, pp. 99–106) and the Rhodes–Milner group, evidence of which he takes, somewhat uncritically, from the writings of Carroll Quigley (Quigley, 1981). The Rhodes–Milner group is better known in the present study as 'Milner's Kindergarten', the training ground of several of the men who went on to found Chatham House, including Lionel Curtis and Philip Kerr. The Rhodes–Milner group stood for Empire federation and Anglo-American cooperation, and had a number of prominent American members, including Walter Lippmann, Thomas Lamont and Whitney Hart Shepardson. Following Quigley, Pijl claims that this represented a nascent transnational class, representing the interests of particular fractions of capital in London and New York.

On the formation of Chatham House and the CFR, however, Pijl merely argues that a single Anglo-American Institute of International Affairs was 'still-born' because of domestic political considerations but, even more importantly, because of conflicts of financial interests between Wall Street and the City of London. In the 'absence' of evidence, Pijl claims that no intellectual or other meaningful Anglo-American cooperation took place. In the struggle over European war debts and German reparations issues, US money interests (Dawes and Young Plans, for example) prevailed (Pijl, 1998, p. 114). Ultimately, this indicates the *economistic* character of Pijl's outlook, even though he suggests that he takes seriously politics, intellectuals and the state.

For Pijl, the CFR and RIIA were relatively insignificant institutions in the period in question. The only role he assigns is one of some sort of 'sounding-board' role to the CFR, mentioning some participation in the Second World War State Department planning and the Council's '1980s project' of some 30 years later (Pijl, 1998).[1] Chatham House is hardly acknowledged at all, despite its associations with the Round Table and Milner's kindergarten.

From Pijl's theory we may expect there to be *neither meaningful cooperation nor significant interconnections between the two think tanks*.

The Gramscian view, particularly as developed by Cox (1993) and Gill (1990), suggests that there would be international cooperation between private actors, including intellectuals. Working from a theoretical framework which seriously considers economic interests and ideas/ideology as equally important, Gramscians argue that hegemonic historic blocs that prevail nationally also seek to establish their hegemony internationally (Cox, 1993, p. 58). In this quest, it is not only the state but also private elite organisations and actors that engage in building hegemony and alliances with other states and foreign private forces. As Gill argues, private international organisations are forums for state-based and private forces to meet, to 'come to know and influence each other' (Gill, 1990, p. 122). This approach recognises the importance of economic interests at the same time as recognising the equally powerful role of ideas and institutions, that is, of politics.

Consequently, Gramscians recognise the importance of groups such as the CFR and Chatham House as the intellectuals who developed the blueprints for a new world order of international cooperation (Gill, 1990, p. 53). Gill argues that such organisations may be said to belong to an 'international establishment', characterised by 'intersecting domestic establishments' (Gill, 1990, p. 155). According to Gill, the formation of the CFR and Chatham House is part of a process of development of 'private international relations councils' that dates back to the Round Table movement and continued with the Bilderbergers in the 1950s, offering opportunities for networking with other elites across borders, and for uniting 'diverse interests for a common civilisational purpose . . . [and] to act to absorb political frictions between constituent elements' (Gill, 1990, p. 123). This is especially important when intergovernmental relations may be 'strained'.

Gramscians, therefore, would expect significant interaction between Council and Chatham House, although they would not rule out a certain level of friction, reflecting the 'nationalist' internationalism that characterised the two think tanks.

The differences between the Gramscians and Pijl are not vast but they do reflect the former's greater and more consistent commitment to the equal importance of economic, political and intellectual forces. In both formulations, however, it is clear that the interests served by the actions of private and state forces were principally, though not exclusively, of elites or dominant classes. The third view to be considered here – the liberal view – suggests that the outcomes of international cooperation are more equally distributed, that they serve a broader range of societal and international interests, not primarily those of dominant Anglo-American elites.

The 'liberal Atlantic community', or special relationship, perspective provides a lower level explanation of international relations, specifically of Anglo-American cooperation. This view emphasises factors such as common language, ties of family and religion, a shared literary and political–cultural heritage, and so on (Nicholas, 1963, pp. 22–23). Of course, economic and strategic interests are not entirely absent, but they are generally subordinated to the deeper affinities of Anglo-Saxon peoples (see Chapters 2 and 3). According to Herbert Nicholas, it is difficult to conceive of British policy towards the United States as 'foreign policy', as the relationship is more familial, judged in 'moral, Anglo-Saxon' terms, rather than considerations of power and national interest (Nicholas, 1963, p. 23).

Consequently, *liberals would expect Britain and the United States to cooperate, both at formal and informal, public and private levels, and expect a fair degree of personal correspondence, transatlantic visits, and attempts to build Anglo-American consensus*.

For liberals, such as Herbert Nicholas and H.C. Allen (Allen, 1959, p. 19; Dumbrell, 2001, pp. 9–11), *the aim of such cooperation would be to forge ever closer ties between the peoples, and to promote a common Anglo-Saxon civilisation, as opposed to the less democratic and militarist traditions of Continental and other powers, and world peace and prosperity*. In fact, the liberal perspective bears remarkable similarities to the *self-professed* attitudes of the leaders and members of the Council and Chatham House. Its testing, therefore, permits comparison between the expressed sentiments of think tank leaders and their concrete actions. It is distinguished from the perspectives of Pijl and the Gramscians largely in terms of *motivation and effects*. That is, Marxists attribute the drive for a new Anglo-American alliance and new world order to capitalist self-interest rather than more benevolent and popular factors/pressures; in turn, the effects tend to fortify the positions of the ruling class in economic and global terms.

The statist view, as argued earlier, centres on the autonomy and power of the state to determine political outcomes. From this, *we would expect the evidence to show that the state played a decisive role in creating private group interconnections, especially in the area of foreign affairs, and that the groups were largely instruments of state power*.

This chapter considers the applicability of the above theories to the historical evidence of CFR–RIIA interconnections. The following sections of this chapter begin with indications of the strong personal relationships that existed between the leaders of the two think tanks before going on to describe the more formal means by which they maintained

their fraternal relations. Given the breadth of interconnections between the two think tanks, it becomes clear that there existed a strong establishment with a mission to build an Anglo-American alliance that would be the cornerstone of a new world order. The aim in this chapter is to provide an analysis of the numerous types of CFR–RIIA interconnection, rather than a chronology of such interactions.

Personal correspondence

As one might expect given their numerous educational, social and political similarities, examination of their correspondence reveals the existence of several long-term friendships between leaders of the CFR and Chatham House. Still, such relationships were in themselves insufficient to account for the forging of such close cooperation as occurred,[2] undermining the 'special relationship' perspective.

Given the hardheaded character of the men who led the two organisations, there had to be shared convictions and real, material power that mobilised to achieve outcomes of global proportions. That is, the men of industry, finance and politics, alongside the men of practical knowledge, were not motivated principally by ties of blood and sentiment, but by a hardheaded appreciation of the trajectory of their country in the world scheme of things, of the rising power of the United States and the waning of the Pax Britannica.

Their correspondence, therefore, also took in national interests, foreign policy analysis, the factors of global power, the possibility of Anglo-American cooperation, the construction of international security institutions, and so on. They cooperated because they were constructing a new world order, centred on Anglo-America, in which they were to share power and responsibility and reap fabulous rewards (and burdens).

An examination of Curtis's correspondence with Whitney Shepardson more than adequately conveys the 'mixing up' of the personal and political elements of the relations between Chatham House and the Council. Their correspondence takes in matters that are personal, such as their close years-long friendship, and even the fact that Shepardson's son chose to write his undergraduate thesis on Curtis's life and work, entitled, *Lionel Curtis: Commonwealth Builder*.[3] Indeed, Shepardson's wife, Eleanor, was the former (and first-ever) (English) secretary at Chatham House.[4] Shepardson was Curtis's principal collaborator in the Paris meetings that led to the formation of the two institutes of international affairs in 1919, intimately connected with the Round Table organisation, a former Rhodes Scholar educated at Balliol.[5]

It is very difficult to disentangle the personal and the political in the case of Curtis and Shepardson. They clearly enjoyed a decades-long personal friendship. It is pretty evident, however, that they were very much inspired by the same ideas, religiosity, elitism of outlook, the desire to live a 'useful' and active life, to bring together 'men of action' with 'men of ideas'. They were also passionately committed to Anglo-American cooperation in the construction of a new world order, an Anglo-Saxon foundation for global peace, stability and prosperity. That is, their personal friendship was the superstructure supported by their shared ideas and ideals as to the future means of 'saving' the world.

Their correspondence, on the whole, reflects two men's dealings with the world. They also provided each other letters of introduction in order to smooth each other's path to meeting influential people in their own country. They discussed the affairs of Chatham House and the Council, the promotion of each other's foreign policy ideas in their respective countries and the politics of Anglo-American relations.[6] For his own part, Curtis also utilised Shepardson to introduce other Chatham House men to American men of power.[7]

On other occasions, Shepardson extolled the virtues of the friendship between Ivison Macadam of Chatham House with officials at the Council, especially Walter Mallory and Hamilton Fish Armstrong. Such relations permitted the foreign affairs institutes to share information and experiences.[8] Such interconnections also led to the perception that both institutes would enjoy benefits, especially from the wealthy American foundations. Shepardson firmly believed that the fact that Chatham House was so valued by the Rockefeller Foundation would lead to some kind of 'indirect advantage' to the Council.[9] In addition, Chatham House tried to 'learn' from the experience of the Council's regional Committees on Foreign Relations in order to better administer their own branch-building programme.[10]

Shepardson and Curtis worked effectively also to promote each other's books. For example, Shepardson wrote a supportive review of Curtis's book, *Civitas Dei*, in *Foreign Affairs* in April 1938. Later, in 1939, Shepardson eagerly informed Curtis that the publishers of *Civitas Dei* were using the similarities between its thesis and that of Streit's Federal Union, to further promote the former's sales.[11] In turn, Curtis did his best to urge the publication of a book of Shepardson's speeches, 'by hook or by crook', in Britain, and the transmission of final proofs to the RIIA's FRPS 'for study and submission to His Majesty's Government'.[12]

On a more 'political' note, Curtis and Shepardson were intimately involved in promoting Philip Kerr's (Lord Lothian) position as ambassador

to the United States. In addition to Lothian's own long-lived American connections, Shepardson, as Kerr's closest American friend, eased Kerr's passage into certain sections of American east coast society.[13] Other east coast elites, such as Thomas W. Lamont and Norman H. Davis, head of the American Red Cross and confidant of both President Roosevelt and Cordell Hull, also assisted Lothian. Lamont attempted to smooth US press attitudes towards Britain by arranging private meals between them and Lothian.[14] Lamont even reserved a private apartment in New York City for the exclusive use of the ambassador.[15]

Upon Lothian's untimely death, Curtis urged Lord Halifax to replace his old collaborator and friend in Washington, DC.[16] The very following day, Shepardson cabled Curtis to ensure that 'a good man' replaced Lothian. Curiously, Shepardson's cable asked for a man 'honestly free of class consciousness and not too deeply attached conservative doctrine also a proud patriot and a tireless fighter'.[17] Curtis, through his connection with Chatham House Council member and Foreign Office senior official, Frank Ashton-Gwatkin, relayed Shepardson's cable, with a letter of his own, to Halifax, urging him to put himself forward for the job. Curtis noted a few days later that Shepardson's cable 'may have tipped the scale against a decision which might possibly have lost us the war',[18] though he declined to mention any other candidates for the post. Before the end of December 1940, Halifax was appointed ambassador and set off for Washington, DC, with a letter of introduction to Shepardson and a brief history of the CFR–RIIA.[19] Curtis also urged a very willing Shepardson to meet with Halifax, which he did, with positive results, including an 'off the record' talk at the CFR.[20]

Curtis was also in close contact with Clarence Streit, the former American journalist, who had popularised the idea of federal union between the United States and Britain (Streit, 1939, 1941). As noted earlier, Streit's and Curtis's ideas were complementary, helping spawn a transatlantic, though primarily Anglo-American, movement.[21] Curtis believed that his *Civitas Dei* [Kingdom of God] provided 'the deeper foundations upon which Streit's bolder proposals rest. The two books are strangely complementary . . . his book comes at exactly the right moment.'[22]

Acutely aware of the negative political repercussions, Curtis declined to write the preface to the British edition of Streit's book, fearing the consequences should 'the Borah's and Johnsons and Howes [US isolationists] . . . put it about that your thinking is inspired by British propogandists [sic]?'[23]

The Anglo-Saxonist character of federal union ideas was not always only implicit. As the Archbishop of Brisbane wrote to Curtis that just

'as Providence made us first to realise what is meant by "the white man's burden", so Providence may now be calling us to lead the way to a new world order'.[24] Numerous contemporaries of Curtis's, including Chatham House colleagues, criticised the racial character of federal unionism, but to no avail. Hugh Wyndham, for example, argued that federalism had done nothing for the black people of North America and South Africa, and that the plans looked like a 'great blonde beast' bent on 'power politics'.[25]

Clarence Streit's movement was closely linked with several leaders of the CFR, including Shepardson and Lamont. John Foster Dulles, in his personal/political correspondence with Curtis, emphasised 'the possibility of developing, as between the democratic and Anglo-Saxon peoples or some elements of them, an organic relationship . . . '.[26] The proponents of federalism, in CFR–RIIA circles, were deeply inspired by what they believed to be the redemptive power of Anglo-Saxon civilisation, the only force capable of saving the world from totalitarianism.

Curtis was at the centre of an Anglo-American pro-federalist campaign in the very late 1930s. He propagandised political parties, influential journalists and religious organisations. His links with the Pilgrims Trust, with Dulles and the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ (and, later, its Commission for a Just and Durable Peace) and with the American columnists Dorothy Thompson and Walter Lippmann, were fully exploited in the cause of Anglo-American alliance.[27] Curtis also urged Lothian, as ambassador to the USA, to help Streit refine his ideas so that India and, by extension, other 'coloured or Asiatic' nations, would not be offended by the racially exclusive character of federal union.[28] Lothian also met with other like-minded individuals, such as George Catlin, the author of *Anglo-Saxony and its Traditions*, which claimed to share the ideas of Streit and 'owe[d] a debt to Lionel Curtis'. Catlin's ideas were openly Anglo-Saxonist.[29]

Lothian, despite publicly declaring, partly due to friendly advice from American friends,[30] against British propaganda in the United States, was very closely connected to numerous individuals who supported American aid to the Allies, including the CFR's own Century Group (see Chapter 6). Desperate to receive an accurate assessment of Britain's war requirements, the Century Group, with encouragement from Aubrey Morgan, of the British Library of Information in New York contacted Lothian.[31] Lothian suggested a lunch-meeting with Van Dusen (who represented the Century Group)[32], and subsequently, the latter sent Lothian notes of Group meetings, outlining their propaganda campaign, upcoming meetings with Republican leader, Wendell Willkie, and with Secretary of

State, Hull, and the prospect of further meetings with the ambassador through the person of Whitney Shepardson.[33]

An initial meeting between Helen Hill Miller, who was an 'unofficial' associate of the Century Group, and Lothian was kept secret to protect the ambassador and the Group, as the latter 'had no authority whatever for dealing with the British Government'. Lothian also supplied information to the Group through the Hollywood scriptwriter, former London correspondent of the *New York World* and Century Group member, John L. Balderston. Balderston received direct intelligence from Lothian and used it in 'regular newsletter' releases to the entire American press. Helen Hill Miller had known Lothian since Oxford, where Francis Miller had been a Rhodes Scholar. Once again, the shared political interest in aiding Britain was cemented by long-standing transatlantic social ties.[34]

Lothian supplied the Century Group with two 'private and confidential' memoranda on 'British Defense [sic]' and 'on needs of Great Britain' in late July and early August 1940, respectively. In the first memorandum, Lothian outlined Britain's lack of naval destroyers and flying boats and the negative impact on Britain's ability 'to repel an invasion . . . '.[35] The second memorandum gave direct advice and suggestions for political changes *within* the United States, citing the sections of the Neutrality Acts that prevented the flow of American persons, goods and loans to the Allies. The memorandum urged the 'Adoption of a status of no-belligerency instead of formal neutrality', because it would provide 'Great moral encouragement to Great Britain' and also facilitate Neutrality and other Acts' repeal, including a 1917 law forbidding the sale of warships.[36] In addition, Lothian helped the Century Group to initiate a programme of speeches by visiting British speakers as well as a series of British radio broadcasts to American audiences (Chadwin, 1968, p. 94). After the 'destroyers-for-bases' deal was announced, Curtis sent his 'Hearty congratulations' to his old friend, Lothian.[37]

One of Lothian's closest American associates was Thomas W. Lamont, who had first met Lothian and Curtis at Paris in 1919, where Lamont was an economic adviser to President Wilson. Keen to promote Anglo-American cooperation, Lamont was only too aware of the political sensitivity of his JP Morgan partner status, especially given the congressional hearings of the 1930s that had linked that firm with dragging the US into the First World War because of its own financial interests. Not only was that theme promoted by American isolationists but also by German propaganda.[38] Lamont was, therefore, somewhat reticent to be seen to be publicly associated with any movements that suggested pro-British feeling.[39]

Lamont played a 'behind-the-scenes' role in CDAAA. He assisted CDAAA financially, made suggestions for pamphlets, commented on publicity material, and even edited important statements in order to make them more 'cohesive' or 'stirring'.[40] So secret was Lamont's participation that Robert Sherwood, the playwright and confidant of FDR, was totally unaware of his role. Sherwood even solicited Lamont's support for CDAAA in a private letter to him.[41] William Allen White, who had made an urgent request to CDAAA to steer clear of east coast financial institutions, corresponded with Lamont on a regular basis, gaining his consent to serve on a 'special committee' of CDAAA, some kind of ad hoc 'backstage' advisory group.[42] White wrote to Lamont that he did not think of him as a 'Morgan partner' but as 'a wise man whom I could turn to whenever I needed any facts that you have. So I have written you often in confidence and in terms that might not be understood by carping persons who didn't realize the quality of our relations.'[43]

Lamont, then, was engaged with Lothian *et al*. on the British side and with pro-Allied groups on the other, helping to smooth the path to Anglo-American cooperation. In addition, Lamont was in frequent contact with the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, and with FDR. Indeed, Lamont's part in the recruitment of White to head up the CDAAA was done with the full knowledge and support of the State Department and FDR.[44]

Frank Altschul of Lazard Freres and a founder member of the CFR was an Anglophile and, like Lamont, a tireless worker for better Anglo-American relations (Roberts, 2003). He kept close contact with the Century Group, suggesting that they obtain General Pershing to make a nationwide radio broadcast in favour of the destroyers-bases agreement, and in briefing Wendell Willkie on the same subject (Chadwin, 1968, p. 89). Altschul also acted as adviser to the British Embassy on how to promote their cause in the United States, kept in touch with Lothian, and with the latter's close friend, Robert Brand, a partner at Lazard's in London. Brand had been with Milner in South Africa, a founder of the Round Table movement and Chatham House (Roberts, 2003, p. 4).

It is clear from the evidence cited above that private relationships and long-standing social connections played an important role in Anglo-American cooperation building in the critical years of 1939–41. Individuals linked with the CFR and with Chatham House were at the centre of a number of campaigns for both immediate and long-term change: Shepardson in the selection of a new ambassador, Lothian in the activities of the Century Group (and its sister organisations) and Curtis in the federalist campaigns. While some of the above evidence consists of the informal use of private friendships for political purposes, the next section

considers the role of more formal, official visits facilitated by the two think tanks.

Official visits

Chatham House leaders were frequent visitors to the United States, particularly during the late 1930s and after the beginning of the War. Ivison Macadam, Arnold Toynbee, Charles Webster and Sir Frederick Whyte, for example, made a number of trips to the United States, on which they reported back to Chatham House and the Foreign Office. From the CFR, Whitney Hart Shepardson, Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Isaiah Bowman, Alvin Hansen and Henry P. Van Dusen of (CDAAA/FFF) made official and unofficial visits to London, usually as part of the Rockefeller Foundation's Anglo-American scholar-exchange programme.[45]

Ivison Macadam

Macadam visited the United States, with the full support of the British Government,[46] between 23 August and 13 December 1941, in order 'to find out what intelligent groups throughout the country were thinking about post-war problems'. This was the first of two wartime visits that Macadam made, in part because his American wife lived in Portland, Oregon. It was clear that Chatham House sensed the need for direct information from the United States, in order for them to make more accurate plans for the postwar period.[47] Macadam's visit, which took in a nationwide speaking tour of numerous organisations, including all 13 of the CFR's regional Committees on Foreign Relations was, therefore, of vital significance.

Macadam also attended, alongside Charles Webster, Geoffrey Crowther and Frederick Whyte, the Conference on North Atlantic Relations, to renew contacts with officials of the Carnegie Corporation and the Rockefeller Foundation, and to meet with US government officials. The Conference aimed to create a forum for discussions between like-minded Britons and Americans of the importance of Anglo-American cooperation. In the main, there were no 'extreme' American elements present, that is, no isolationists, anti-New Dealers, and so on. The Conference discussed concrete Anglo-American tasks in economic warfare, postwar economic reconstruction and the barriers to political and military collaboration.[48] The British group's participation at the Conference was funded by a $1200 grant from the Carnegie Corporation, of which Whitney Shepardson was trustee.[49] Macadam noted that they had met 'a group

of worthwhile people' including several un-named members of the US administration.[50]

Chatham House records of the numerous other meetings addressed by Macadam, and of the subsequent discussions, suggest that Macadam received a friendly, but not wholly uncritical, welcome. While the League of Women Voters in Portland, Oregon, were impressed by Macadam's 'perfect speech' which neither 'scolded' nor made anyone 'feel inferior' and made everyone 'want to help' Britain,[51] the CFR's regional committees were a little more robust.

The inspiration, and funding, for Macadam's tour of the 13 regional CFR Committees on Foreign Relations came from Arthur W. Page, trustee of the Carnegie Corporation and close associate of the CFR, in consultation with Shepardson and Walter H. Mallory, executive director of the CFR.[52] Macadam's aims, as reported by the *Houston Post*, were to '. . . Map Plans for Post-War World', a function that the CFR itself was heavily involved in.[53] That was precisely Page's and Shepardson's idea for Macadam: that he should prevent the much-feared post-hostilities 'drifting apart' of USA and Britain, due in part to 'the competition for markets' and the American people's tendency to withdraw military forces once the war is over. Page and Shepardson wanted Macadam to bring home to Americans 'the responsibilities of their strength'.[54] Lord Halifax, Britain's ambassador in USA, noted that 'Chatham House was in a unique position to explain to these worthwhile groups the sort of problems which we were discussing in London', and for 'London', in turn, to better understand American viewpoints.[55]

According to records of the numerous meetings addressed by Macadam, he argued that Chatham House needed information as to the 'degree of probability that effective cooperation from this country [USA] would be forthcoming' in the postwar period.[56] It was on this issue that there occurred a degree of friction, underlining not only the uncertainties that persisted in both countries about what the future would hold, but also the functions of groups such as Chatham House and the CFR, as institutions that helped to bring to the surface underlying disputes and disagreements and latent suspicions.

The reports show very clearly that the Council's members were much concerned by several blocks to Anglo-American cooperation: first, some members in Nashville feared that most Americans still favoured isolationism and self-sufficiency, while others felt that memories of the aftermath of the Great War were still alive, and would hinder Anglo-American cooperation. Interestingly, in light of the subsequent Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, others argued that the United States would need

'a drastic shock of some kind (*preferably* a military one) . . . to convince the people that the present conflict is really ours . . . ' (Italics added). Others added that Anglo-American cooperation also needed to take into account 'the fact that', after the War, 'England would be our natural economic enemy'.[57]

The meetings in Des Moines and Providence also proved a little less than certain about future cooperation. Macadam faced a number of isolationists in each committee, except for Louisville. While there seemed to be greater faith in American participation in the job of feeding the starving peoples of postwar Europe, there was some dissent on future general economic cooperation and on participation in an international organisation. Overall, however, it seems that committee members were supportive of international joint policing efforts, a world organisation, and cooperation over the problem of Germany. According to the report, 'A substantial segment of Committee opinion was represented by the general proposition that . . . the only program for now and after the war is to plunk for Anglo-American control of the world.' The two powers already controlled 'the essential raw materials of world trade, the necessary foundation for a peaceful world order'. Other speakers added that, of the two powers, the leadership role was 'due the United States if we wanted to take it . . . ' and that the USA ought to develop 'some unifying principle, some idea or aim which will command adherence before any merely practical arrangement . . . '.[58]

The views represented above are typical of what Macadam found across the range of the CFR's regional committees. There was genuine concern at the historical tradition of isolationism, suspicions of British 'neo-imperialism', of the cunning imperial power exploiting American resources for selfish ends.[59] The discussions were always thorough, frank and critical, with none of the certainties of an American assumption of a global policeman role that often comes with hindsight. Nevertheless, there was unanimity that, should America become involved in 'a shooting war', the prospects of interventionism in postwar reconstruction and an international organisation would distinctly improve. Macadam was applauded by Committee-men in terms not too dissimilar to those employed by the League of Women Voters: he had been diplomatic, had not assumed that the United States would back Britain, and had often used the phrase, 'what you may wish to do'.[60]

Macadam's assessment of the situation in the United States did not differ greatly from that of the men he had addressed. Indeed, he often noted that, with the American shops full of foods and goods virtually unobtainable in Britain, and people taking long holidays and only reading

about the European war, 'it will be a miracle if the United States does come into the war'. Macadam despaired of the position in which the American administration found itself, as the Americans did not 'see the war as their affair . . . '.[61] He had also attended a rather sobering America First-organised mass rally, which acted as 'a useful corrective to the ideas on intervention which one naturally picks up from one's [respectable and worthwhile] friends'.[62]

Nevertheless, Macadam pursued a hectic programme of meetings and interviews with a range of American elites, drawing a number of conclusions. He believed that the United States, after the War, would take up its 'responsibilities' as a creditor nation and an arsenal of democracy. Additionally, he returned from the USA convinced that Chatham House had a vital role to play in maintaining contact with unofficial American groups interested in postwar planning and in acting as a clearing house between them and government. Macadam met with a number of 'new' people, making special contacts of 'use' to Chatham House, FRPS or the Foreign Office. For example, he was much impressed by the work of Professor Hadley Cantril in studying public opinion at Princeton.[63] Macadam was also impressed with the work of Alvin Hansen, the Harvard economist, Special Economic Adviser to the Federal Reserve System and CFR leader of the WPS Programme. He recommended that Chatham House open its doors to Hansen when he was stationed in London as adviser to ambassador John Winant. Macadam advised his secretary that Hansen 'might like to use Whitney's [Shepardson's] room [at Chatham House] as a base for contacting nongovernment groups interested [in] reconstruction'.[64] In addition, Macadam suggested that a secretary at CH help Hansen to arrange meetings with, among others, Ernest Bevin.[65]

As a result of his visit, the supply of information between Britain and the United States, between the CFR and Chatham House, and between the State Department and the Foreign Office, improved immensely. Macadam had dealt with issues of concern to Committee-men and other Americans, outlined the case for fighting Hitler, and had suggested lines along which future Anglo-American cooperation might take place. He had, thereby, helped to 'iron out' certain frictions, ameliorate some suspicion and allay some fears about the character of future British policy. It was not all 'plain sailing', of course, but Macadam had made real what had been an aim of Chatham House: to help build Anglo-American cooperation. So successful was Macadam's visit that he made another extended visit to USA between November 1943 and February 1944. Meanwhile, Arnold Toynbee made a useful trip to the US in 1942.

Arnold Toynbee

Toynbee's tour of the United States also included addressing meetings of nine of the CFR's regional committees, mainly in the south and west of the country.[66] He met numerous 'worthwhile groups', including 'editors, lawyers, educators, and other professional people interested in international affairs' (McNeill, 1989, p. 183). He met with CFR leaders and Rockefeller Foundation trustees and officials, and was reported to have done 'an unusually good job with our Foreign Relations Committees . . . ', according to Mallory.[67] The visit, made at the suggestion of Whitney Shepardson,[68] was funded by a grant of $2500 from the Rockefeller Foundation, via the offices of the CFR.[69]

Shepardson, who was in London as a special assistant to the American ambassador, had informed Toynbee of the work of the CFR within the State Department (that is, about the WPS Project), news which provided the *official* inspiration for Toynbee's American tour. Shepardson, according to Toynbee, had told him that 'there is now a secret Division of the State Department for dealing with peace settlement and reconstruction business and that the part of the Council on Foreign Relations which corresponds to the F.R.P.S. is now working under instructions from the Division [of Special Research]'.[70] It was decided, therefore, that FRPS ought to try to obtain CFR papers related to WPS. The *original* inspiration, however, may well have been a Peace Aims group (of FRPS) meeting at Balliol College, Oxford, at which Henry P. Van Dusen of the Union Theological Seminary (New York) and of the CFR-led FFF organisation, suggested 'inter-visitation between Britain and America' by Christians.[71]

The sensitivity of such 'inter-visitation' was emphasised by Mallory: so far as Toynbee's planned trip to the US was concerned, he should be clear that the CFR's work in the State Department was to be kept 'secret', and any 'collaboration between the two Governments would have to be arranged direct and would have to be carried on through official and semi-official channels'.[72] Toynbee's aim was to find out as much as possible about the CFR's work in the State Department and establish cooperation so far as possible between 'the two F.R.P.S.'s'.[73]

From the Foreign Office's perspective, Toynbee was expected to contact only 'worthwhile groups' and not waste his time on public speaking engagements for 'not very valuable audiences'.[74] It ought to be noted that Toynbee took leave of absence from FRPS and the Foreign Office to undertake his US visit, underlining the political sensitivity of sending such emissaries across the Atlantic at that time.[75] The whole aim of such secrecy was to prevent arousing isolationists' suspicion that Britain was trying to engage a wholly willing State Department into recruiting

US power behind an imperialist plan to dominate the world. Indeed, Mallory's concerns about direct inter-governmental cooperation were symptomatic of this. Both Chatham House and the CFR were more than willing to engage in unofficial diplomacy and negotiations and research collaboration but wanted the framework to be agreed by the State Department and Foreign Office officials. As Toynbee pointed out to N.B. Ronald of the Foreign Office's North American department, it was up to officials and ministers to negotiate an agreement between the Foreign Office and the State Department, so that on '"plain-sailing" [that is, non-controversial] subjects' the FRPS and the WPS Project might exchange ideas and personnel, and provide a mutually beneficial flow of policy and other papers.[76]

Once in the US, during the late summer/autumn of 1942, Toynbee (with Ronald) had two successful meetings with Leo Pasvolsky, head of the Division of Special Research. Pasvolsky responded positively to Toynbee's desire for exchange of ideas, papers, personnel, and topics for discussion, and suggested that Toynbee meet with all FRPS's 'opposite numbers'.[77] In a very systematic and practical way, Pasvolsky outlined how the FRPS–Division of Special Research collaboration would work. In effect, the two groups would separately draw up lists of 'questions on which the responsible statesmen will have to make decisions' and outline 'the minimum amount of information, on each of these questions, which the statesmen will need in order to make their decisions'.[78] Although this process was considered as a neutral administrative/bureaucratic exercise, it clearly has political implications: issues and issue-areas could be framed in ways that conformed to the predispositions of the individuals and organisations concerned, permitting significant inputs from unofficial, unrepresentative and unaccountable private interests.

To Pasvolsky, the aim was for the two sides to cooperate in areas of shared concern and to expand the areas of shared concern by bringing to light 'definite points of difficulty'. He wanted to see the tables of contents of the Foreign Office handbooks being prepared by FRPS in case there were issues not dealt with which the State Department considered important. Secondly, after the writing and exchange of drafts, representatives of the two sides might come 'together to try to draft an agreed statement which could be taken as a common factual basis for the eventual negotiations between the responsible British and American statesmen'. So positive was Pasvolsky that he suggested that he and his colleague, Harley Notter, plus other Division members would visit London to further explore this area of collaboration.[79]

Toynbee candidly noted, in the report of his US tour, that he had met a 'representative cross-section of the leading elements in American life' rather than 'the great mass of the American people'. The people he had conversed with and consulted and whose detailed ideas he had considered were, therefore, 'unrepresentative of the majority of their own countrymen', a point of great importance when it comes to assessing the theoretical implications of the whole host of CFR–RIIA interconnections outlined in this section of the chapter.[80]

In addition to Pasvolsky, Toynbee had met numerous businessmen, labour and farm representatives, university academics and churchmen associated with the 'non-pacifist wing of the Protestant Churches'. Apart from addressing the CFR's regional committees, Toynbee also met with several officers such as Mallory and Armstrong, and close friends of the Council, including Thomas W. Lamont, Professors Jacob Viner, Edwin Gay and Alvin Hansen, Henry Van Dusen and John Foster Dulles.[81]

With practically all groups that Toynbee met, India and the related issue of British colonialism were considered the greatest threats to post-war Anglo-American collaboration. Americans considered it 'urgent' that Britain move seriously towards genuine self-government in India and the establishment of international administration of the colonies, with a view to eventual independence. Americans were concerned that the reimposition of European colonial rule in south-east Asia would be conducted by American troops, with attendant 'casualties': 'Why should American boys give their lives to re-establish European colonialism?' was of utmost concern to US public opinion. The history of the Vietnam War shows that concern to have been far-sighted.

Next to the Indian/colonial question, many sections of Americans were suspicious of Britian's trade and currency policies, according to Toynbee. Many believed that the Ottawa Agreements would be reinstituted after the War, leading to intense Anglo-American rivalry. Toynbee argued that Americans, even those who were 'intelligent and well-informed', did not realise that Empire preference was 'a corollary of the [American] Smoot-Hawley Tariff', and that Britain would only resurrect Ottawa if there were no other alternatives. According to Toynbee, 'the chief external determining factor in British trade and currency policy will be the trade and currency policy of the United States'.[82]

Once again, Chatham House had played a significant role in British foreign policy. Toynbee had established links with new contacts, renewed old ones, created new lines of Anglo-American experts' cooperation, collaboration between the Foreign Office and the State Department,

brought to the surface important American concerns over Britain's colonies and cemented ties between Chatham House, the Rockefeller Foundation and the CFR. All of this had been accomplished under the auspices of a private visit but was to have significant implications for the British foreign policy process. One could hardly have found a better example of a 'state intellectual'.

Charles Kingsley Webster

Webster probably comes closest to Toynbee in regard to being a 'state intellectual'. He also visited the United States both due to his official position as head of the British Library of Information in New York and, before that, as head of the American Section of FRPS. In the latter respect, Webster visited USA between 31 March and 15 May 1941.[83] According to Webster, one of his purposes, in alliance with others, was to 'educate public opinion, especially in the United States, to the permanent and fundamental abandonment of isolationism, and to the acceptance by the American public of a responsibility for creating and maintaining a future world order'.[84]

Webster was very well connected with influential Americans and British diplomats, and was to use such links to 'guide things along the right lines' during his American posting.[85] Webster's closeness to important east coast elites was confirmed by his election to membership of the Pilgrims of the United States (chaired by Thomas Lamont) in November 1941 and to the Century Club (headquarters of the CFR-led Century Group) in May 1942.[86] Webster also worked closely (and covertly) with Henry P. Van Dusen in attempting to mobilise Protestant and Roman Catholic opinion behind the Allied cause.[87]

Webster, like Macadam and Toynbee, was a tireless servant of British foreign policy, managing to link up with the CFR, the foundations and a wide range of university academics, private foreign affairs associations and the press, including the *New York Times*, the main west coast newspapers and influential weeklies like *Nation*, *Life* and *New Republic*. He also held meetings with Walter Lippmann, and State Department officials such as Pasvolsky, Herbert Feis, Stanley Hornbeck and Adolph Berle. Among the other contacts that he cultivated were Professor James T. Shotwell, Quincy Wright and John Foster Dulles.[88]

The achievements of Chatham House's visitors to the United States were impressive in the range of elite contacts and the intensity of their engagement with the burning issues of the day. The political effects of such 'inter-visitation' must not be under-estimated. Macadam, Toynbee, Webster and, for that matter, Frederick Whyte and Geoffrey Crowther,[89]

had built individual and organisational links with influential Americans and even participated in mobilising American public opinion. Lothian, as ambassador, had secretly been collaborating with the Century Group and others in promoting the destroyers-bases agreement. Curtis had helped build the case for Anglo-American federation, in alliance with Streit, Lamont and others. There was a clear line of communication and action across the Atlantic, at unofficial, semi-official and official (governmental) levels to increase cooperation and build the ideological, political and organisational basis of a new, Anglo-American-led, world order. Chatham House and the CFR were at the heart of that effort.

American visitors to Britain

America's CFR visitors to Britain were an important, though small, group that included Shepardson, Isaiah Bowman, Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Hansen and Van Dusen. Unfortunately, their papers do not fully reveal their activities. Nevertheless, as seen in the mentions of Chatham House connections and correspondence, they played a very important role in providing intelligence, advice and guidance on the evolving character of US policy and public opinion, as well as engaging in direct negotiations over the construction of the UNO.

Whitney Shepardson visited London, at the urging of the Rockefeller Foundation and support from the Foreign Office, to observe the work of FRPS, in spring/summer 1941.[90] The Rockefeller Foundation granted Shepardson $3000 to visit London, at Chatham House's invitation, 'to facilitate an understanding among groups on both sides of the Atlantic as to the tendencies and investigations underway'.[91] Toynbee had proposed that Rockefeller fund an Anglo-American scholarly exchange programme, after ensuring, through his various contacts, that the State Department and Foreign Office were supportive of the idea.[92] On both sides of the Atlantic, the CFR and Rockefeller Foundation were reluctant to move on any proposal unless the State Department had assented.[93]

Shepardson was introduced to civil servants in the War Cabinet Office and, of course, the Foreign Office, and also met a range of unofficial postwar planning groups.[94] The occasional references to Shepardson's visit in the correspondence of Toynbee, Webster and the Rockefeller Foundation, suggest that it was very successful. According to one letter, Shepardson 'obtained a picture [of the situation in Britain] which few other people could have obtained in so short a time', and had initiated 'a series of ventures which will further post-war reconstruction in its soundest phases'. In addition, Shepardson's visit had presaged a 'unique

opportunity in the history of great nations', most notably, 'official recognition of determined experts whose opinions would be consolidated and incorporated in such problems as post-war reconstruction'.[95]

Of the other visitors to Britain, the most important was Isaiah Bowman, whose London conversations with Webster, Jebb and others, concerning the new world organisation, were the subject of discussion in Chapter 5. Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Alvin Hansen and Henry Van Dusen, as well as a number of other less well-known Council men, visited Chatham House and the Foreign Office, and made contributions to the cementing of ties and the provision of friendly intelligence and advice to the British authorities. In all cases, however, they operated in line with official US policy and with the tacit assent of the State Department. That is, despite the close friendships built over several decades, the shared outlook on world affairs, national interests as expressed by state officials still took precedence over personal relations. However Anglophile were Council men, and pro-American were Chatham House leaders, they still retained ultimate loyalty to 'their' state and were careful to not stray over the line.

In concluding this section of the chapter, it is clear that there were a myriad of Anglo-American interconnections – personal, political and financial – that tied together the CFR and Chatham House. The following section, on joint study groups, shows even more clearly their central role in creating the conditions for Anglo-American harmony.

Joint CFR–RIIA study groups

The myriad of relationships outlined above were strengthened by a continuous stream of speakers from both organisations crossing the Atlantic to address their counterparts and by numerous joint study groups, strengthening Anglo-American relations in key areas. From the late 1920s to the 1950s, Chatham House and the Council organised at least five joint study group initiatives, composed of men drawn from their respective government, business, academic and other communities (Roberts, 2001b). The material considered below further seriously undermines Pijl's thesis that since there was excessive Anglo-American economic and financial rivalry in the 1920s, no authentic other cooperation took place.

Priscilla Roberts provides rich details of the activities of the two organisations in creating the conditions for discussing issues that went to the very heart of Anglo-American controversies in the interwar years, such as naval rivalry (joint study groups of 1928–29), Anglo-American economic competition (1930), war debts, trade practices and currency stabilisation (1936–38). Roberts shows that the Council and Chatham

House ultimately created forums for the discussion of national viewpoints, with a view to providing either a solution or some arrangement with which both powers could live. They did not resolve every question, particularly the vexed one of British war debts: All they hoped to do was to provide a forum in each country where the representatives of the other could be heard (Roberts, 2001b, pp. 34–35).

The overall effects of the joint study groups, meetings, and conferences, were to develop an elite with strong governmental connections that, when it came to war, could be utilised both to mobilise the United States to back the Allies and to prepare the way for postwar Anglo-American cooperation. The next section of this chapter outlines the role of the two think tanks during the War in regard to their joint study group activities, indicating the continuing influence of interwar period practices.

Wartime joint study group

An American–British Group was convened by the CFR between December 1943 and April 1944. Its membership included a number of CFR leaders – Altschul, John W. Davis, Lewis Douglas, Lamont and Mallory – businessmen and government officials. On the British side, members included Ivison Macadam, John Wheeler-Bennett, Michael R. Wright and Sir George Sansom.[96] The Group's purpose was to bring together British and American officials, with alternating chairmen, in their private capacity as individuals, to discuss a range of issues with a view to coming to 'solutions which the Group as a whole can support'.[97] This indicates the blurring of lines between officialdom and private individuals: the CFR wanted men who were officials because they brought with them 'the benefit of their especial competence', but to an environment in which they could speak frankly and without fear of compromising confidentiality: Chatham House rules applied.[98] The clear aim was to get some unofficial assessment of the official position of each government. As Shepardson had noted of an assessment of Robert Brand's, during an earlier joint study group, of what HMG would be willing to pay in settlement of its war debt, 'People like Brand . . . don't suggest figures unless they have a pretty good idea of the government's view' (Roberts, 2001b, p. 35). Since Shepardson sent on Brand's note to the State Department, it is clear that unofficial views eventually ended up in the hands of officials. In addition, it was noted that the members 'will have in mind . . . the probable public reaction to any proposal which is suggested'.[99]

The official–private distinction was, in effect, undermined even more by the fact that the Group worked within the terms of official agreements,

such as the Atlantic Charter and the Cairo Declaration agreed between the British and United States governments. When it came to discussing the postwar treatment of Germany and Japan, therefore, the Council and Chatham House were exploring questions that their own political leaders were grappling with.[100]

The discussions of Germany and Japan revealed fairly similar concerns among both national sub-sections of the Group. They reiterated the need to punish the aggressors, to restore them to their original frontiers, and then to ensure their re-entry into the comity of nations, under the watchful eye of both Britain and the United States but also a new world security organisation. The conclusion of the Group in regard to Japan stands also for Germany. 'The terms imposed upon Japan should not . . . be so vindictive as to undermine the moral foundations of whatever security system we might be able to devise.'[101] Later meetings discussed a future world security organisation, the 'Economic and Financial Problems of Mutual Concern to the United Kingdom and the United States', India and the Dependent Areas, and Europe.[102]

Conclusion

The CFR and Chatham House intersected and overlapped, were thoroughly 'mixed up' together. As Geoffrey Crowther, a Chatham House Council member, noted, he was the only member of his family 'without American citizenship'.[103] There were numerous other intermarriages, familial ties and frequent transatlantic visits. Above all, however, they shared a broad vision of a new world order led by Anglo-American power which they saw as self-evidently beneficent and well intentioned. It was that decades-long-held belief in the Anglo-American salvation of the world that led to the meetings in Paris in 1919, to a new form of organisation scientifically to explore international relations and their respective national interests, and their close cooperation in meetings, study groups and conferences. That is, the men of Chatham House and the Council, while fully paid-up believers in practically all the arguments that make up the 'special relationship' ideal, were ultimately hardheaded proponents of national interest. It was just that they believed that the only way their own country's national interest could be achieved was through international cooperation, open trading systems, international financial institutions and a general security organisation, all based on the solid foundation of an Anglo-American alliance.

Although the dream, especially among the British group, was for a broadly equal relationship between the two countries in the new

world order, it was evident to most of them that America had become the principal factor in world power, at least in terms of Britain's survival in the early phases of the War. It was American public and, to an extent, elite opinion, money and men that needed mobilisation. A stream of visitors from Chatham House, therefore, flowed to the United States in search of those valuable resources. There were American visitors to Chatham House as well but their mission was far less critical.

The empirical interconnections between the two think tanks have been shown. It remains now to evaluate the hypotheses promoted by rival schools against the evidence presented.

The evidence shows significant CFR–RIIA cooperation and interconnections in the period under review. It also shows their connections with the business, academic and governmental communities. The Pijl hypothesis, therefore, does not explain the evidence, as it predicted that there would be little or no significant cooperation and interconnections. The main problem appears to be that, given the relative lack of secondary literature on this question, Pijl falls back on his basically economistic outlook, his focus on inter-capitalist rivalries between 'Wall Street' and the 'City'. The evidence shows that the two think tanks were fully aware of such rivalries, plus numerous others, but worked to air them in closed elite circles, to try to minimise their impact. The evidence suggests that active intellectuals, from many walks of elite life, including big business, made an important contribution to discussing issues that their official political leaders found too sensitive, or discussed issues in advance of their becoming problems for political action, or considered problems from first principles as opposed to an ad hoc manner. Pijl's economism prevents him from fully utilising the Gramscian element of his thought, thereby missing a very important element of interwar political history. Pijl's neglect of CFR–RIIA cooperation stands in contrast to the attention paid to freemasonry, the Round Table movement and the cold war era Bilderbergers. CFR–RIIA interconnections are passed over largely because Pijl prioritises Anglo-American economic and financial rivalries and competition as the prime movers of interwar history. The evidence, however, does not sustain an argument that prioritises economic determinism. That is not to imply that economic interests were not a vital part of postwar planning by the British and American states and their respective elite think tanks. It is to argue that while economic concerns were important, and were interconnected and enmeshed in arguments about stability, security and global order and peace, the latter concerns cannot be reduced to mere epiphenomena. From what Pijl has explicitly argued, the roles of the two think tanks were insignificant.

It may still be possible, however, to *utilise* the evidence of RIIA–CFR cooperation and interconnections to shore up Pijl's analysis. Working on the plurality of interests represented by various 'fractions' of the ruling class, it would be possible for certain sections to engage in Anglo-American cooperation while others rejected it. So, while the City and Wall Street may have not seen eye to eye, it would be entirely possible for ideological/intellectual institutions, which can think more broadly of the changing patterns of world power. The CFR and RIIA, therefore, while being strongly connected with their respective national financial interests, could rise above specific interests and operate as the 'collective intellectual', along Gramscian lines. In short, the evidence of cooperation violates Pijl's neglect of the CFR and RIIA: it need not necessarily invalidate his overall analysis.[104]

For this to be the case, however, Pijl would need to apply Gramscian thought more consistently in his analysis, shedding the undue focus on economic interests that inspires most of his work. A Gramscian analysis of the 1920s and 1930s shows that within a particular hegemony (of US isolationism, narrow nationalism, parochialism, and competition and rivalry), there are also the seeds of a new order being sown and nurtured by men and women dedicated to regime change, the forces representing a new historic bloc developing a new hegemonic project of globalism and Anglo-Americanism.

The 'special relationship' view of Anglo-American relations and Chatham House–CFR relations has much to commend it in light of the evidence above. Its main problem is that it ultimately implies two things: first, that the relationship is principally predicated on historical, linguistic and ethnic ties, with a minor role for economic and strategic factors, that is, national self-interest; and secondly, that the relationship was motivated by the desire to benefit the whole world, that the US and Britain, the Council and Chatham House, were merely the instruments for achieving that greater good. While it is not to be doubted that many good things emerged from the relationship, it is clear that the relationship was not designed to benefit the whole world, that Anglo-American power to determine the fate of the world was its principal motivation. Domestically, the think tanks pursued policies that focused mainly on elite interests and aspirations. 'The people' rarely entered their concrete activities. 'The people' were often the objects of their actions or the barriers to a new world order: but they were never consulted or represented in the halls of the Council or Chatham House. In short, for an explanation that is founded on the attachments of the 'two peoples', it fails to account for the fact that 'the peoples' were entirely excluded from the

two organisations that played such a great part in building an alliance between the two nations. This view excludes a proper analysis of elites and elite power in liberal democracies and the role of the 'masses'. When Chatham House and CFR elites referred to 'the people', they actually meant 'we elites'.

The statist view finds some evidence to support its state autonomy perspective. The actions of the two think tanks' leaders were carried out in full coordination and consultation with their respective states. On occasion, certain actions were *not* carried out on the basis of advice from state managers. Think tanks' leaders established their agendas for research and discussion often on the basis of advice received from their political leaders or they based their discussions on the basis of past inter-governmental agreements, such as the Atlantic Charter. All this suggests that the statist view explains much. However, there are also a number of shortcomings. The level, range and intensity of private individuals' and organisations' engagement with the issues are beyond statism's explanation. Secondly, statism does not explain the cooperative character of the state–private group relationship, as its understanding of power is zero-sum, of 'power over' not 'power with', that is, in cooperation with extra-state forces. It does not tell us why those groups acted as they did, at their own expense and time, and without any guarantees that their work would be taken seriously. Statism, therefore, provides only a partial explanation of the evidence.

Clearly, the Gramscian view is the one accepted here as best explaining the historical evidence. It captures the intellectual elements of the activities of the think tanks, their other connections with the state and the academic and business communities, their 'ideology' of 'public service', and their focus on policymaking and on opinion mobilisation.

Godfrey Hodgson's analysis of the 'foreign policy establishment' is appropriate. He notes what the originator of the concept, Henry Fairlie, meant by it: men who were non-partisan, well known to each other if not to the general public, 'who share assumptions so deep that they do not need to be articulated . . . ' and 'who contrive to wield power outside the constitutional or political forms . . . ' (Hodgson, 1972–73, p. 5). Hodgson's own definition more than qualifies the CFR and, indeed, Chatham House, as linchpins of the Anglo-American establishment. Hodgson argues that the establishment is defined by 'a history, a policy, an aspiration, an instinct, and a technique'. In practically every regard, this definition captures the interconnections between the two think tanks. *Historically*, Hodgson pinpoints the First and the Second World Wars as the crucibles for establishment-creation, for bringing together the lawyers, businessmen,

government officials and academics. Its *policy* was defeating isolationism and promoting liberal internationalism. Its *aspiration* was 'quite simply to the moral and political leadership of the world'. Its instinct was always centrist, 'moderate', reasonable, 'avoiding ideology and steering the middle course . . . '. Its *technique* is to work 'out of the public eye' and through mobilising opinion and through influencing government (Hodgson, 1972–73, pp. 8–13).

In effect, there was an establishment that united around a concept of a new world order based on Anglo-American power. The establishment mobilised its tremendous resources in both the countries to achieve its ends, which generally required undermining the ideological/intellectual base of the old order of isolationism and diehard imperialism, of the parties and institutions that fostered it, and the construction of the new hegemonic project and its historical bloc of forces. Chatham House and the CFR were vital elements of that process, as 'state-spirited' private actors.

9
Conclusion

This study has tried to show that, despite their relative public obscurity and lack of self-advertising in the mass media, Chatham House and the CFR have played key roles in, and between, their respective national establishments. They have provided leading forums for experts and policy-makers from several walks of institutional life, including the press, elite universities, the embassies and foreign policy bureaucracies, and the business and financial communities, to meet, to discuss and to conduct detailed study and investigation, and assist in the making of foreign policy and the crystallisation and mobilisation of elite, attentive and, on occasion, mass public opinion. Formed in the aftermath of the First World War, they built the organisational foundations and cemented intra-foreign policy establishment ties that made them 'natural' candidates for mobilisation by their state *before* their countries had even entered hostilities in the Second World War. They played fundamentally important roles in the creation of the foundations of the postwar international order, with the Anglo-American alliance at its very heart.

The 'special relationship' between Britain and the United States was, to a significant degree, the result of the decades-long efforts of Chatham House and the CFR. That very fact, in conjunction with the elitist and unrepresentative character of the two organisations, undermines the idea that the Anglo-American alliance resulted from latent popular or ethnic affinities between the 'two' peoples. The men of the two institutions took a variety of attitudes to a sentimental attachment of the two nations, despite their commonly held belief in the importance of Anglo-American cooperation. That is, the most important reason for an alliance between the two countries, according to the historical evidence of the attitudes and actions of the Chatham House and Council men, was that they

shared *almost* identical ideas of their national, political, economic and strategic interests (Cull, 1995, p. 8).[1]

In the course of their attempts to build Anglo-American cooperation, it is possible to discern the gradually decreasing reliance on racial imagery or language, that is, of Anglo-Saxonism, and its increasing secularisation into the language of 'advanced' versus 'backward' areas of the world, of 'imperial responsibility' or 'the white man's burden' to 'international trusteeship', of peoples more attuned to free institutions and self-government and those with a tendency to 'need' international assistance, or development aid, for several generations. That is, racial rhetoric was replaced by the idea of cultural deprivation, biology by culture. The 'good war' against Hitlerism, and the theories of white racial superiority upon which the latter was based, destroyed the foundations of overtly racial/biological explanations of the 'problems' of 'dependent' peoples (Terkel, 1985).[2]

This study has compared the two institutions over time, from their founding at Paris in 1919 to the end of the period that many acknowledge to have been their zenith, the Second World War. For them, it was a 'good war', as Studs Terkel (in his case, ironically) termed it. In their elitist social and economic characteristics, their attitudes to society and world, to foreign policy and global order, to the state and the individual, the Council and Chatham House displayed numerous similarities. In their activities, in their respective liberal democratic societies – in educating and mobilising important sections of the population and in assisting officials who make foreign policy – they pursued similar goals. Their organisations, on the whole, may be considered also to have been very similar. It was natural for them that, born at Paris, the 'twins' continued to be almost inseparable, despite the ups and downs of international relations. The problem, however, in arguments about 'American exceptionalism', is that 'all societies, observed closely enough, are distinctive, while all societies, observed with sufficient distance, are simultaneously similar' (Shafer, 1991, p. vi). Clearly, this is the case in the present study.

To many, especially Marxists, those similarities are due to the fact that Britain and the United States are capitalist liberal democracies. Given those fundamental characteristics, such societies, despite certain historical differences, would predictably generate similar political institutions, political culture and private elite organisations for cultural, political and educational (propaganda) purposes. That is, taking a broad view, most Marxists would easily explain the contents of this study (Miliband, 1973).[3]

If we were to take a narrower, more finely textured view, however, some would contend that our conclusions might differ, and support

a different thesis, that of American exceptionalism (Lipset, 1996). This view would point out the differences between the two institutions, their members and leaders, their degree of focus on public opinion, the degree of influence over policymaking or degree and manner of integration into the state, their overall operating styles. In Chapter 1, it was pointed out that the exceptionalists would expect the CFR to have greater opportunities to influence the state than did Chatham House, that public opinion would be of greater significance to the Council, and that the American organisation would be more egalitarian and meritocratic.

Chapter 2 showed that Chatham House leaders were far less likely to be connected to the Foreign Office than were Council men to the State Department, suggesting that the 'weak state' argument in relation to the United States, to some extent at least, holds water in the realm of foreign affairs. It also showed that CFR leaders were drawn from a wider range of social-class backgrounds, as measured by private education, than those from Chatham House, that is, that the Council was reflective of a more meritocratic society (although the Council, unlike Chatham House, excluded women until the early 1970s). Subsequent chapters show that the Council was far more attuned to 'public opinion' in its activities, more concerned with congressional opinion, and the effects of such pressures on the Administration. The fear of a return to isolation after 1945 haunted CFR men much more than hard-line imperialism did RIIA leaders, mainly because Congress was more in touch with popular opinion shifts and was more powerful in foreign affairs than was the House of Commons. There is a genuine difference here between the two organisations: the Council engaged in 'pressure politics' which Chatham House was completely unsuited for.

How significant were such differences? Did they outweigh the numerous similarities? These questions are not easily answered, partly because of the nature of the evidence. The most significant difference between the CFR and Chatham House probably lies in the former's focus on public opinion. Qualitatively, however, while it tells us something about the particularities of US history, political culture and the mechanics of its political institutions, its import may be fairly insignificant. Does it matter that the CFR adapted its organisation to suit its political context? Does it really support the idea of American exceptionalism, of *fundamental qualitative* differences between the US and European societies? The most important issue must surely be that the *outcomes* produced were clearly very similar.

The CFR's WPS programme was also far more fundamental to the US State Department than was the Institute's FRPS to the Foreign Office,

suggesting the US state's relative weakness. Even here though, the role of state managers was far more important in specific policy outcomes than that of the CFR. This indicates that the American state was increasing its own strength and capacities, preparing itself for globalism, based, in part only, on the role of external bureaucrats. The evidence of state proactivism in policymaking and, for that matter, in opinion-mobilisation programmes, suggests that the state was not quite as weak as the American exceptionalists usually assume. In addition, Chapters 4 and 5 show that Chatham House, in the context of a 'strong state', was more influential in the making of British foreign policy than was the CFR in the American context. The exceptionalist argument is thereby further undermined.

Ultimately, both organisations played important roles in their society, producing similar outcomes by differing means.

Other theoretical implications

The pluralist theory of power is clearly deficient in relation to the evidence presented in this study. This is largely because the two groups analysed did not operate as independent, competitive and self-interested pressure groups, attempting to force concessions from the state. Both the CFR and Chatham House were interconnected with a broad range of organisations and institutions, engaged in cooperative relations with the state, and did not even see their own interests as in any way divorced from those of the broader establishment or state. Both did, of course, engage in pluralistic behaviours, such as opinion mobilisation. Even in those cases, however, their programmes were developed and conducted in close consultation with the state.

The corporatist model comes somewhat closer to explaining outcomes, given its focus on the degrees of state–private group interpenetration and power sharing. Corporatism blurs the distinctions between state and private life and activity which the evidence corroborates. It still, however, has a problem with explaining the degrees of proactivity of both the British and American states. In the corporatist view, the private groups lead and the state merely offers a degree of coordination. The evidence, however, shows a more powerful role for the state in terms of opinion mobilisation, policymaking and agenda-setting. In addition, it shows the groups' leaders accepting a role differing from, and subordinated to, state managers.

Despite various kinds of ideological differences between them, instrumental Marxism shares certain problems with both corporatism and pluralism. The most important one relevant here is that it views the

state as relatively inert and passive, as an instrument in the hands of private (albeit economic) forces. While the CFR and RIIA were closely connected with their respective industrial, commercial and financial communities, it is clear from the ways in which the two organisations were organised and operated that they were not straightforward 'tools' of big business. Moreover, even if they had been, the fact remains that they were, in general, unsuccessful in determining policy outcomes. This was the case even in areas of policy in which big business interests might have been expected to participate more vigorously in and exercise significant influence over. For example, the formation of the IMF and the World Bank owes much less to the impact of Chatham House, the CFR or any pro-business lobbies, than to state managers, such as Harry Dexter White and Lord Keynes and the bureaucracies behind them. The instrumental Marxist elements of the works of Kees van der Pijl, therefore, are undermined by the evidence in the policy influence chapters.

The role of the state is central to the conclusions drawn thus far, but cannot adequately be accommodated by the three theories considered above. What must not be forgotten, however, is that corporatism, in particular, captured something vital in the evidence cited in this study, which is interpenetration of the 'public–private' domains.

Statist analysis is evidently important in this case. Both states showed their ability to define goals and developed capacities to achieve them. They had objectives that could not be reduced to some sort of aggregation of private group interests, but could, in large part, be discerned from the changing structure of global power and the relative positions and trajectories of the United States and Britain. The state, therefore, is central, and the evidence in this study places its leading personnel at the heart of the process of policymaking, policy-implementation and opinion mobilisation.

Statism, however, despite its advantages over the other theories examined thus far, leaves an important gap in our full appreciation of the activities of the CFR and Chatham House. That lies, surely, in the interrelations and inter-connections between the private organisation and the state, their qualitative relations and the outcomes of genuine cooperation within a division of labour endorsed by both 'sides' as correct and proper. It is the argument here that the Gramscian model offers the best explanation of the evidence cited in this study. It explains the importance/significance of the state and state managers, the fact that the making of policy is related to the functions of intellectuals (state intellectuals), of the importance of the 'collective intellectual', and that generating popular and elite consensus is not done by the state alone,

but in conjunction with the actions of private ruling class forces. According to Gramsci, 'the consent of the governed' is engineered by the State along with 'the political and syndical associations . . . private organisms, left to . . . private initiative'. Such 'private initiatives and activities . . . form the apparatus of the cultural and political hegemony of the ruling classes' (Hoare and Nowell-Smith, 1971, pp. 258–59).

According to Thomas Bates's view of Gramscian hegemony theory, 'the powers-that-be in the state' have an enormous advantage in constructing public opinion. This is fine so far as it goes. It ought also to be added that the state constructs public, and elite, opinion by mobilising or, rather, focusing and re-focusing and by cooperating with, certain elements of civil society. Organisations like the Council and Chatham House were strategically important within their respective national establishments in their own right, playing a re-structuring and rationalising role, within a shared state–private elite agenda (Bates, 1975, p. 363). Chatham House and the CFR were strategic elites or as Gramsci calls them, 'the active minorities, the elites, the avant-gardes . . . ' who formed public opinion because they constituted 'a centre of formation, of irradiation, of dissemination, of persuasion . . . '. Their role was to act on the basis of 'current reality' and construct public and elite opinion supportive of state policies (Gill, 1990, p. 122).[4]

Gramscian thought, then, contains elements of corporatism (with its roots in the economy, as with instrumental Marxism) without ceding power to private forces; it contains a deep appreciation of statism without permitting it total power because of the fundamental role of private elites. In this regard, Gramsci's concept of 'State spirit' is of special significance. It shows that private elite groups can be private and not necessarily attempt to coerce or pressurise the state because they *believe* in the state, that they are, at a transcendent level, the embodiment and makers of the state, its servants and its heirs. Those imbued with state spirit are at the very heart of every serious social movement, a collective consciousness that 'presupposes "continuity", either with the past, or with tradition, or with the future; that is, it presupposes that every act is a moment in a complex process, which has already begun and which will continue' (Hoare and Nowell-Smith, 1971, p. 146). Eldon Eisenach's concept of 'para-states' also captures this. As Eisenach points out, American progressives argued that 'The state must be no external authority which restrains and regulates me, *but it must be myself acting as the state in every smallest detail of life*' (Eisenach, 1994, p. 131). The leaders of both Chatham House and the CFR were motivated by a sense of mission, of history, of a collective elite responsibility for the development of their

society and state in the context of global challenges and opportunities. Chatham House and Council men were 'politicians' in the Gramscian sense that they were, collectively, 'a creator, an initiator', a force that moved not 'in the turbid void of his own desires and dreams . . . [but was based] . . . on effective reality . . . [acting practically] in order to dominate and transcend it'. To such forces, 'What "ought to be" is . . . concrete . . . ; the only realistic and historicist interpretation of reality' (Hoare and Nowell-Smith, 1971, p. 172). Such a viewpoint almost completely nullifies the distinction between politics and civil society, between 'state' and 'society', indicating the ability of Gramscian thought to transcend the artificial boundaries between them and to explain the behaviour and inter-relations of state and think tank officials.

The biggest problem for Gramsci is the fact that he wrote little about foreign affairs and tended to consider them in fairly conventional Marxist terms, that is, as the external expression of capitalist-dominated societies. In that regard, statism makes a very important contribution, one which Gramscian thought can assimilate with some profit. Given the level of autonomy granted to the state by Gramsci, and his suggestion that great powers have greater 'relative international autonomy' than others (Hoare and Nowell-Smith, 1971, p. 264), it is a fairly small step to recognise that part of state autonomy derives from interstate matters for which the state is centrally responsible. The state stands, Janus-faced, looking outward to the world, considering the threats and potential threats posed by other powers and opportunities that the developing international situation offers, and inward at the essential strengths and weaknesses of its domestic territorial base, such as the economy, the degree of social and political unity, the level of education, the physical and psychological condition of its citizens and their readiness for conflict or war. As it is territorially bound, the state's health and survival depend on an adequate assessment of requirements of both its external and domestic environments, lending it a degree of autonomy. As the only 'body' or set of institutions with at least some responsibility for every aspect of society, and certainly the only body responsible for 'territorial integrity', the state is further differentiated from other domestic organisations and interests, lending it another key source of autonomy.

Such autonomy may be assimilated within a Gramscian analysis, thereby endowing it with greater explanatory power. Gramscian analysis then becomes an explanation of the behaviour of states, of private domestic actors and of private international actors, *particularly* in their inter-relations. This approach to think tanks and the state, in the cases examined in this study, permits us to allocate relative powers to different

actors in a broad policy process which includes the actual making of policy, the agenda-setting behind policymaking, the construction of international institutions, the mobilisation of private expertise and intellect and its integration into the machinery of the state, the construction of a supportive public- and elite-opinion base, and the generation of a broadly favourable 'climate of opinion'. It 'permits' the state to be strong, or to be developing strength, but also permits 'state-oriented' elites a vital role, in a mutually understood and agreed 'division of labour'. Conversely, this state/elite configuration, or historic bloc, not dissimilar to van der Pijl's state/society complex, also represents the basis for destruction or marginalisation of forces that stand in the way of its core hegemonic concept or project. In the current study, the state and its allied associations may be seen as standing at the centre of a system of power, towards which all powers gravitated in order to exercise influence. That core state/society complex, however, acted as a force of attraction and repulsion, drawing in those powers that were trusted and considered respectable, and that shared its goals and methods, and repelled those that stood outside the main project of globalism/Anglo-American alliance, as the way of the future.

Knowledge, knowledge institutions and intellectuals, however, must be analysed within the context of the 'establishment' or establishments, rather than as independent or 'free-floating' forces. They must be viewed as part of resilient, overlapping and interlocked elite power structures. Intellect and the 'house of power', as Lewis Coser refers to the state, are closely connected, as is the former to the cultural and social infrastructure that modern capitalist democracies have fostered since the eighteenth century. Coser concludes, however, that 'power' and authentic 'knowledge' cannot be reconciled, that 'It is impossible to mix the pursuit of knowledge and the exercise of political power' (Coser, 1965, p. 323). This study shows that particular kinds of knowledge, at specific periods of history, can synthesise with political strategies and produce very significant domestic and global power shifts.

The CFR and Chatham House nurtured the concept of an Anglo-American alliance from the end of the Great War, when diplomatic relations between Britain and the United States were strained, to say the least, to right into and after the Second World War, when the 'special relationship' concept prevailed. Their ideas did not change very radically. What did change was the global order and the recognition by the 'men of power', the political leaders of the two countries, that Anglo-American cooperation was the best means for either protecting and maintaining a global role (Britain) or rising to globalism (USA). The organised intellect

and expertise of the two think tanks was mobilised and re-focused in order to achieve the states' objectives, which were the aims of Chatham House and the CFR as well.

The effects of the CFR and Chatham House were of great significance in designing and developing a new world order after the Second World War. The Anglo-American alliance remains the linchpin of British foreign policy to this day, with successive prime ministers, *regardless of political party affiliation*, paying great heed to the word from the White House. The 'special relationship' between American presidents and British prime ministers is often considered to be the product of ideological affinities, for example between Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher or Bill Clinton and Tony Blair. The fact is, however, that the Anglo-American relationship transcends party differences, that practically all prime ministers have paid homage to Washington, DC. From Clement Atlee to Tony Blair, Labour leaders have stood 'shoulder to shoulder' with the United States. There were, of course, greater forces at work than the two think tanks considered in this study. But their role in cementing the relationship at a critical period, at providing an intellectual, political, military and economic rationale, in having developed institutionalised expertise of practical use to the state, and in generating a changed climate of elite, attentive and public opinion, assisted the process of alliance-formation immeasurably. For both good and ill, Chatham House and the CFR showed the critical importance of organised and mobilised knowledge in the process of domestic political change and global reconstruction.

Notes

1 Introduction

1. Andrea Bosco notes the importance of the CFR and RIIA in 'bringing about a special relationship between the two leading Anglo-Saxon democracies'.
2. A good example of the results of 'atheoretical' research and writing is critiqued by Howard Abramowitz, 'Historians and the Red Scare of 1919–20 in Detroit', in J. Joel and G.M. Erickson, *Anti-Communism. The Politics of Manipulation* (New York: MEP Publications, 1987).
3. Krasner defines the state as 'central decision-making institutions and roles . . .'.
4. For a more critical analysis of pluralism, Manley (1983) argues that, despite the 'leftward' drift of pluralism in the mid-1970s, its traditional basic principles ought to be taken seriously as representations of how power in America was officially supposed to work.
5. In this study, of course, the corporatist model will also be applied to the RIIA. Indeed, Michael Hogan suggests that that is one of its strong points: corporatism offers a flexible analytical device for comparing national systems' responses to similar global forces.
6. Ibid., Hawley, p. 311. Hawley suggests that within this corporatist system, 'the state properly functions as coordinator, assistant, and midwife rather than director or regulator. In such a system', he continues, 'there are deep interpenetrations between state and society, and enjoying a special status is an enlightened social elite, capable of perceiving social needs and imperatives and assisting social groups to meet them through enlightened concerts of interests'; pp. 312–13, footnote 3. This is, given the evidence to be present in the present study, a somewhat benign view, when applied to the CFR, for example. Therein, however, lies a key similarity of outlook between corporatists and pluralists: a generally optimistic view about power and outcomes in liberal democracies.
7. Evans, Skocpol *et al*., p. 12. In her essay, Skocpol cites Krasner's and her own work as evidencing areas of American state autonomy; Krasner, pp. 18–19. Krasner notes the weakness of the US state and the fragmented nature of political power. He stresses, however, that matters related to foreign policy are dealt with by agencies and institutions that are relatively insulated from organised private pressure, particularly when state actors depend upon their *own* resources to implement policies; where they rely on Congress, or private organisations, state actors may be forced to compromise.
8. The leaders of CFR and RIIA certainly were conscious of history – classical western and modern – of the evolution of its values and institutions, and the necessity of progress within particularly vital aspects of 'tradition'. They were animated by a spirit of social responsibility, public service and the development and strengthening of state authority in a time of profound social, political

and global crisis and change. For Gramsci, such intellectuals may even come to believe 'that they *are* the State . . .' (Hoare and Nowell-Smith, 1971, p. 16).

9. Power is, Lukes (1986, p. 26) argues, 'an "essentially contested concept"' – one of those concepts which 'inevitably involve endless disputes about their proper uses on the part of their users'.

2 Sociology of the CFR and RIIA

1. It must be clearly understood that there is no implication here that social destiny is entirely historically determined. As has just been pointed out, history shapes people but is in turn shaped by them.
2. The disappointments of Paris for this group of experts were signalled by their treatment on board the *George Washington* during their passage across the Atlantic: they were accorded the worst accommodation and facilities.
3. Headlam-Morley was Foreign Office (FO) adviser (Political Section) at Paris, 1919, and a diplomatic historian; Cecil was head of the FO's League of Nations Commission; Percy was the FO's representative on the League of Nations Commission, 1919; Temperly was a member of the British Military Section at Paris, 1919, and a diplomatic historian; Baker was Head of the League of Nations Section, Paris, 1919; Nicolson was FO adviser (Political Section), Paris, 1919, and a diplomatic historian; Kerr was Lloyd-George's private secretary, 1916–21; Webster was Secretary to the Military Section, Paris, 1919; Jones was Assistant Secretary to the War cabinet, 1916–20 and secretary to the British Empire delegation, Paris, 1919; Walters was private secretary to Cecil, 1919; Hurst was secretary of the Legal Section (FO), Paris, 1919; Butler was member of the Military Section, Paris, 1919.
4. 'Report of the Executive Committee of the BIIA', in *The British Institute of International Affairs* (London: BIIA, 1920); Memorandum by Curtis and Shepardson, Chatham House Archives (CHA) 2/1/2 (Morgan 1994).
5. BIIA Executive Committee Report (London: BIIA, 1920, pp. 7, 24).
6. Letter, Jones to Cleeve, in CHA 2/1/2a, p. 7.
7. The members' list is published on pp. 56–82, Report of the Executive Committee of BIIA, 1920.
8. Chamberlain was Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1919–21; Foreign secretary, 1924–29; and First Lord of the Admiralty, 1931. Clynes was a Labour MP, 1906–31 and 1935–45, and Home Secretary, 1929–31; and one time President of the National Union of General and Municipal Workers.
9. These figures are derived from Chatham House annual reports.
10. Churchill was twice Prime Minister (1940–45; 1951–55); Baldwin was thrice Prime Minister (1923–24; 1924–29; 1935–37); Eden was Foreign Secretary (1935–38; 1940–45; 1951) and Prime Minister (1955–57); Lloyd George was Prime Minister (1916–22); Bevin was Minister of Labour and National Service (1940–45) and Foreign Secretary (1945–51).
11. Creech Jones was National secretary of the Transport and General Workers' Union (1919–29); Labour MP (1935–50); PPS to Bevin (1940–45); Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies (1945–46) and Colonial Secretary (1946–50). Hailey was a colonial administrator (1902–34) and author of a landmark report on African development, financed by the Carnegie Corporation;

he was regarded as a pretty 'safe pair of hands' by the Foreign Office and Chatham House officials, as we shall see. Sargent entered the Foreign Office in 1906 and was appointed Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs (1946–49). Woodward was Fellow of All Souls' College (1919–44) and Editor (with R.D.O. Butler) of Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–39.

12. It is also clear that Clynes, Bevin and Creech Jones were on the right wing of labour politics, suggesting that they were considered 'safe' by those who dominated Chatham House.
13. The names published by Chatham House itself are used here, indicating something of the status of women at the time.
14. Norman Davis of the CFR, noted that in time CH leaders had come to regret their decision to admit women. Internal memorandum of conversation, S.H. Walker with Davis, 19 March 1937; Rockefeller Foundation Archives, RG1, 100S, Box 97, Folder 873; Rockefeller Archives Center, Tarrytown, New York.
15. *Foreign Affairs* was founded in 1922.
16. *Annual Report of the CFR. Report of the Executive Director 1934–35* (New York: CFR, 1935, p. 5).
17. Memorandum, 'Postwar Policy in Support of International Relations', Joseph H. Willits, RF Director for the Social Sciences, 14 May 1945, Rockefeller Archives Center, Rockfeller Foundation Archives, RG 3 Administration, Program and Policy, Series 910, Box 8, Folder 67.
18. Figures derived from Carnegie Corporation (CC) Annual Reports; Columbia University, New York.
19. Annual Report of the CFR, 1937–38, p. 8.
20. Barnet for a critical look at the role of lawyers in US foreign policy, pp. 55–56. Smigel notes the elite social connections of some of the major firms: Davis-Polk featured 26 of its 38 partners in the *Social Register*, noting how such firms 'try to maintain an upper-class image' (p. 177). Smigel also mentions the elite positions of other law firms with connections with the CFR: Cravath, Swaine and Moore (p. 114), Cadwalader, Wickersham and Taft (p. 70), and Sullivan and Cromwell (p. 11). Finally, Smigel documents the anti-semitism of the major 'Anglo-Saxon' Wall Street law firms, particularly during the 1920s and 1930s.
21. Whitaker relates that since Rockefeller Foundation trustees cannot vote funds to an organisation in which they have an interest, on one occasion all its trustees had had to leave the room when funds to the CFR were being discussed; p. 100.
22. 'Report to the Carnegie Corporation on the Work of the Foreign Relations Committees of the Council on Foreign Relations during the 1942–43 season', in Box 127, CC Papers. As early as 1920, Lionel Curtis had noted the dominance of business interests in what became the CFR, and had urged the recruitment of men like the American Federation of Labor's Samuel Gompers; see letter, Curtis to Frances Kellor, 23 August 1920, in 3/6/Cou B (1) – Council on Foreign Relations, CHA, London.
23. Grose, in an insider account of the CFR, argues that had there been any sufficiently qualified African-Americans, they would have been recruited. Despite several articles in the CFR's journal, *Foreign Affairs*, the outstanding African-American, W.E.B. Du Bois, played no part in the Council's affairs.

24. The leaders of Chatham House and the CFR, therefore, approximate, in several respects, the general definitions of 'establishment' (Hodgson, 1972–73; Parry 1969, pp. 86–89).
25. Nevertheless, there is clearly room for a study of the women of Chatham House.

3 The World-view of Chatham House and the CFR

1. According to Winston Churchill, violence had built and then maintained the Empire. Britain's commitment to retaining the Empire was nicely summed up by First Sea Lord, Admiral Chatfield in 1934: 'we have got most of the world already, or the best part of it, and we only want to keep what we have got and prevent others from taking it away from us' (Parmar, 1995b, p. 25).
2. Imperial reform was a key part of politics in the Edwardian era.
3. Richter argues that Green was the most influential thinker in 'British thought and public policy' at that time.
4. The impact of a Green-ian novel, *Robert Elsmere*, by Mrs Humphry Ward, was very great, with sales of around 500,000 in the USA in its first year (1882), while in Britain it also circulated in hundreds of thousands; op. cit. (Richter, 1956, pp. 452–53; Eisenach, 1994, p. 14). Additionally, James Bryce exerted some influence in delivering Green's ideas in lectures at Yale, entitled *The Hindrances to Citizenship* (1909). Bryce stated: 'Each member of a free community must be capable of citizenship. Capacity involves three qualities – Intelligence, Self-Control, Conscience. The citizen must be able to understand the interests of the community, must be able to subordinate his will to the general will, must feel his responsibilities to the community and be prepared to serve it by voting, working or (if need be) fighting. . . . The last, Conscience, or a sense of civic duty, is the rarest' (Richter, 1964, p. 344).
5. Richter argues that Green's message 'was directed at the middle class, at men with philanthropic impulses, with consciences to be touched, and a guilt about their ebbing faith that could be turned into a guilt about their privileges'; op. cit. (1956, p. 467).
6. Op. cit., Richter (1964), for a more detailed analysis. An interesting analysis by one of Green's most ardent disciples may be found in Muirhead (1908).
7. American progressives were empirical: 'investigation of the facts and application of social-science knowledge to their analysis; entrusting trained experts to decide what should be done; and, finally, mandating governments to execute reform' (Link and McCormick, 1983, p. 24).
8. Soffer argues that 'The new social scientists started with sanguine expectations about their ability to explain, and eventually to solve' contemporary problems. They had a 'moralistic faith that truth and right must prevail against error and evil'; p. 1953. It was taken as given that science inevitably would lead to 'progress' towards a better society; p. 1939.
9. Letter, Curtis to Kerr, 24 June 1938, in Lionel Curtis Papers, Box 12, Correspondence; italics added.
10. Letter, Curtis to Kerr, 6 December 1936, Curtis Papers, Box 98.
11. Bliss diary entry in Miss Cleeve's Papers, CHA 2/1/2a; the diary entry was dated 22 December 1918.

12. Letter, Jones to Margaret Cleeve (Chatham House secretary), n.d., CHA, 2/1/2a.
13. As Studdert-Kennedy concludes of Curtis and the historian John Seeley, they 'advertised a positivistic methodology which neither practised'; p. 483.
14. Lord Grey of Falloden, the former Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, stated that the Institute should not only publish the facts 'but show their relation to each other and give us an idea of the value of the respective facts .... It will not', he suggested, 'interfere with policy, but provide materials from which politicians, statesmen and journalists can form sound opinions in regard to policy'. *Report of the Council* [of Chatham House], 1925, pp. 5–8.
15. Curtis, 'Notes on War and Peace Issues', 7 October 1940; Curtis Papers, War Aims and Peace Settlement, Box 100. In fact, even fellow leading members of the Round Table were, according to Curtis, somewhat backward in recognising the need for change and had to be 'pushed' along by his undoubted 'God-sent leadership'; Curtis Papers, Round Table, Box 811.
16. Memorandum, CHA 2/1/2, p. 1.
17. Memorandum, 'Project for Popular Education in International Affairs Proposed by the Carnegie Corporation', by Walter H. Mallory (CFR Executive Director), in CFR File – Foreign Relations Committees 1937–40, CC Archives.
18. In the CFR leadership group under consideration in the present study, there were eight Episcopalians including Elihu Root and John W. Davis.
19. Quoted in Schulzinger; p. 1. Groton was respected by parents as promoting 'character' among its scholars, and if it took a Christian form, so much the better. It was also seen as encouraging a life of public service, reaching its culmination in the martial spirit of Grotonians in the Great War. See also, Ashburn (1944).
20. Elements of such ideas may be seen in the following: Wriston (1959); Armstrong (1963); and Browder and Smith (1986). Davis's biographer also illustrates the essentially progressive, though guiltily secular Episcopalian, character of his subject's motivation (Harbaugh, 1978).
21. McLoughlin, p. 178. Many Social Gospelers, such as William Gladden, espoused the 'survival-of-the-fittest' concept in regard to the struggle of Christianity for a high place among the world's religions. 'Of course, [American] Christianity was bound to triumph', Gladden believed, solve the problems of war and peace and 'Americanize the world'.
22. Richard T. Ely and a group of young economists founded the American Economic Association in 1885 to 'spread their vision for revitalizing the nation'. They were on a crusade for hearts and minds, for an increase of the role of the state in society (McLoughlin, 1978, pp. 169–70).
23. In addition, Curtis's time at New College, Oxford, coincided with the appointment of W.L. Courtney, 'who taught philosophy with style and enthusiasm ... urging his pupils to read Hegel and T.H. Green's *Prolegomena to Ethics* with its exposition of the moral state based on Will' (Lavin, 1995, p. 11). True to Green, Curtis went on to voluntary work among London's East End poor and, later, to a period promoting reform of local government; p. 20.
24. Toynbee was significantly influenced by 'a fiercely evangelical great uncle' who lived with the young Toybee's parents, helping 'to imprint far-ranging familiarity with the King James Bible on the young boy'.
25. McLeod argues that there was a 'religious boom' in England in the late nineteenth century, especially (though not exclusively) centred upon the

upper-middle classes. Consequently, Christian-oriented arguments in regard to international and colonial affairs were received by a receptive audience. According to J.W. Shepardson, Curtis's ideas were grounded in 'the rule of reason, the idea of progress, and the Christian religion . . . ' and he was also 'evangelical in spirit . . . '. Shepardson, *Lionel Curtis: Commonwealth Builder* (undergraduate dissertation, Harvard, 1949, pp. 2–4). Kerr was influenced, as was Curtis, by the teachings of T.H. Green and ideas of the 'new imperialism' at Oxford.

26. Letter, Curtis to G.W. Howard (of Jonathan Cape publishers), 1 March 1939. Curtis wrote that the only way to achieve world government, via Federal Union, was to plant the 'idea into the minds of masses of people, the churches, and so on' through which politicians would be 'overridden'; Curtis Papers, Box 14.
27. Despite their practicality, however, there was a strong element of mysticism about the two men. Curtis was nicknamed 'the Prophet' while Toynbee claims that he had had a number of mystical visions.
28. The British Empire, according to Curtis in a more pragmatic mood, was a vital factor in Britain's ability to relate on equal terms with USA and USSR, after 1945. See, letter, Curtis to Archbishop Lord Lang, 13 December 1943; Box 28, Curtis Papers.
29. As Reginald Heber (later Bishop of Calcutta) wrote in a poem in 1819: 'Can we, whose souls are lighted/ With wisdom from on high/ Can we to men benighted/ The lamp of salvation deny?/ Salvation; oh salvation!/ The joyful sound proclaim/ Till each remotest nation/ Has learned Messiah's name'.
30. Though Anglo-Saxonism preceded, and did not require, social Darwinism to survive, Hofstadter argues that 'Darwinism and the imperial urge were bound to be fused'.
31. Anderson further states that Anglo-Saxonism upheld the 'Darwinian concept of unavoidable competition and conflict among unlike peoples' and, consequently, urged that 'the two leading branches of the Anglo-Saxon race should work together for their mutual benefit, and should be constantly on guard to protect their varied and worldwide interests against the ambitions of rival races and nations'.
32. Kidd's book, *Social Evolution* (1894), was extremely successful in both Britain and USA: it was favourably reviewed by Theodore Roosevelt and went through ten printings within its first year; in Britain, it had sold 250,000 copies by 1900.
33. Seeley was Professor of History at Cambridge (1869–94). His book was based on lectures given in 1881–82, selling 80,000 copies within two years and remaining in print until 1956 (Aldrich, 1988).
34. As the headmaster of Harrow school, J.E.C. Welldon, noted, that the object of education was to encourage scholars 'To serve the State, to honour the State, to live, and, if need be, to die for the State – that is the office of a good citizen'; cited in Mangan, p. 130.
35. Letter, John Foster Dulles to Lionel Curtis, 11 January 1939; letter, Archbishop of Brisbane (name illegible) to Curtis, 19 May 1939: Curtis Papers, Correspondence, Box 13.
36. Letter, Toynbee to Curtis, 16 February 1939, in Curtis Papers, Correspondence, Box 13; letter, Curtis to K.E. Laurence, 10 August 1944. In another letter (to US Supreme Court Justice, Owen Roberts, 12 October 1945) on the same

subject, he wrote that the white countries would be 'mad' to permit free migration as they 'would be flooded from Asia', making America's 'present colour problem' seem like 'childs (sic) play'; Curtis Papers, Correspondence, Box 30 and 33.

37. Letter, Streit to Curtis, 13 May 1939. According to Streit, literacy tests would be better than the south's 'grandfather clause' which was 'used . . . to deprive negroes of the vote'. Curtis Papers, Correspondence, Box 16.
38. Letter, Curtis to Captain Nugent Head, 6 December 1945, Curtis Papers, Correspondence, Box 34.
39. Mason Wade, *New York Times*, 10 September 1939.
40. Reverend A.L. Byron-Curtiss, *Churchman* (New York), 15 September 1939.
41. See the following letters to Curtis: David D. Dodwell, 27 December 1939, urging India a position in the new order; P.N. Sapru (President of the National Liberal Federation of India), 2 April 1939, urging the same; W. Jennings (Vice-Chancellor of University of Ceylon) to Curtis, 20 September 1943; Curtis Papers, Correspondence, Box 20, 16 and 28, respectively. Jennings noted that Christianity, 'a religion associated with "Imperialism" is nearly everywhere suspect east of Suez and south of Malta'.
42. Minutes, 'World Order Preparatory Group', first meeting, 17 July 1939; Curtis Papers, Box 110–11. Wyndham suggested that, to succeed, all plans had to be universal and unconcerned with race or creed. Chatham House sold and distributed the World Order papers; minutes, CH Council, 14 February 1940; memorandum by Curtis, 25 January 1940; Curtis Papers, Box 110–11.
43. Letters, Curtis to Duff Cooper, 21 April 1941; Duff Cooper to Curtis, 2 May 1941, Curtis Papers, Correspondence, Box 23. Curtis was also in contact with Ernest Bevin, Minister of Labour and National Service, who supported federal union (letter, Curtis to Bevin, 22 May 1941, thanking Bevin for his support); Curtis Papers, Correspondence, Box 23.
44. Kerr also believed in the 'integration of the English-speaking world . . . '; Butler, p. 116, as did Toynbee; see Arnold Toynbee Papers, Bodleian Library, Box 119: in a letter, Toynbee wrote that 'the English-speaking peoples' were the future of world politics; letter to Reverend William J. Paton (World Council of Churches), 17 April 1941.
45. Letter, Wootton to Curtis, 21 January 1942, Curtis Papers, Correspondence, Box 25. Kerr often referred to the duty of 'civilised control over politically backward peoples . . . '.
46. In a letter to Lionel Hichens, a fellow Milnerite, Curtis stated how impressed he was with Bevin who had taught him much about the close links of British and Australian and New Zealand labour movements, and predicted that 'the organic union of the British Commonwealth will gradually emerge as the creed of the Labour party', 21 August 1938. By 1945, Bevin had become a follower: see letter congratulating Curtis on favourable speeches, on world organisation, made by Bevin, from, for example, Frank Ashton-Gwatkin (Far Eastern department of the Foreign Office, and fellow Chatham House Council member), 24 November 1945; Curtis Papers, Correspondence, Box 12 and 34, respectively. Curtis did not keep secret news of his influence on Bevin's ideas; letter Curtis to Sir Alan Lascelles, 17 January 1946, Curtis Papers, Correspondence, Box 35.

47. Dove confessed to his friend and fellow Round Tabler, Richard H. Brand, in 1919: 'Do you remember your nursery ideas of a savage? Can a man who is nearly stark naked and brown and painted and whose long black hair calls up "Man Friday" running across the sands from the cannibal bonfires, ever be really fit for a vote? . . . I still, I confess, feel old prejudices pulling at me'.
48. Mangan and Walvin argue that the cult of manliness was widely pervasive between 1850 and 1940, in Britain and USA, and also, through schools and churches, among the working classes.
49. Armstrong also notes the frequency with which he and his family 'prayed for Queen Victoria'; p. 110.
50. Memorandum, 'Notes on the Treatment of Germany', 1944, in Russell C. Leffingwell Papers (Group 1030), Series II: Memoranda; Manuscripts and Archives, Sterling Memorial Library, Yale.
51. Letter, Leffingwell to Lamont (Chairman, J.P. Morgan), 22 December 1939, in Leffingwell Papers, Series I: Correspondence, Box 4.
52. Letters: Leffingwell to Henry J. Haskell, 15 May 1944, in Correspondence, Box 3; Leffingwell to Robert H. Brand (Round Tabler and Lionel Curtis confidant), 11 August 1947, in Correspondence, Box 1.
53. Letter, Leffingwell to Lamont, 3 October 1938, in Correspondence, Box 4.
54. Letter, Leffingwell to Lamont, 17 September 1945, in Correspondence, Box 4. Leffingwell wrote that there could be no world government as the 130 million Americans would be outvoted by Indians, Chinese and Russians. 'I'd rather fight', he declared, 'for my freedom and my country's freedom than surrender it to the Orientals'. Hofstadter (1948) notes that 'Anglo-Saxonism, belligerent or pacific, was the dominant abstract rationale of American imperialism'.
55. Iriye acknowledges that Wilsonian internationalism was a combination of idealism and national-interest-driven politics; p. 234.
56. See also Kerr's comments during the proceedings of a Chatham House Study Group on Anglo-American Relations, 1928–29, in which he argued that US isolationism was unprincipled and an attempt 'to avoid responsibility'; CHA 9/1.4, Admiral Richmond's Note on Kerr's Memorandum; p. 3.
57. Catlin's schema retained a place for Scandinavians and the Dutch. Anglo-Saxony, he claimed, was united by 'a common *tradition*, the tradition of Milton and Cromwell, Jefferson and Lincoln, as well as by common speech and civilization', which is only slightly narrower than 'Western civilization itself'. The federal union could be with those 'we' feel are 'one' of 'us', he concluded, rejecting thereby Africans, Indians, and the peoples of the Middle East; p. 47.
58. Zimmern was Classics scholar at Oxford, member of the Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office, 1918–19, and a specialist in international relations.
59. Iriye (1977) terms this tendency as 'Nationalistic Internationalism'; p. vii.
60. Mahan's most influential study was *The Influence of Sea Power on History 1660–1783* (London: Sampson Low, 10th edn, n.d.; originally published in 1889).
61. Speech to the Pilgrims of the United States, 25 October 1939. Numerous CFR men were members of the US Pilgrims and shared the outlook of Lothian on naval and economic questions.
62. Admiral Richmond's note on Kerr's memorandum, in Study Group on Anglo-American Relations, Special Group, CHA 9/1.4, p. 5.

63. Like Curtis and Toynbee, Kerr had experienced 'revelations', one of which heralded his conversion from Catholicism to Christian Science in 1914.
64. CFR Archives, RG, Group C – Anglo-American Relations, Vol. 7, 1936, p. 4.
65. See Memorandum, 'The division between internal and external concerns of a state, and the traditions and recent practice of American diplomacy in this regard'; see also, Annex A to this memo, 'Reasons for continuous voluntary association by the United States with Great Britain in matters, involving other countries, in which both have a political interest'; all in RG, C, Vol. I, 1922. See also, Report, 'Anglo-American Naval Question', 1 June 1929, in RG, I, Anglo-American Study Group, Vol. 2, 1928, p. 3.

4 The Role and Influence of Chatham House in the Making of British Foreign Policy

1. 'Fifth Session of the Conference of Institutions for the Scientific Study of International Relations', Milan, Italy, May 1932, in CHA, Study Groups Committee, Lord Trenchard's Private File, Vol. 2, 1931–32, p. 2.
2. Admiral Richmond's Note on Kerr's Memorandum, in Study Group on Anglo-American Relations, Special Group, CHA 9/1.4, pp. 1–9.
3. Those meetings featured pro-Japanese sentiments. The first speech, by Captain M.D. Kennedy, was entitled 'Russo-Japanese Tension in the Far East', October 1934; and the second was by Admiral Sir Barry Domvile, entitled 'The Strategic Aspects to the Situation in the Far East', February 1938.
4. Archibald Rose, 'The Crisis in the Far East', February 1933, CHA 8/183, p. 5.
5. Archibald Rose, 'The Present Situation in the Far East', February 1933, CHA 8/257, p. 16.
6. Rose, CHA 8/257, p. 8.
7. Toynbee, CHA 8/257, p. 27.
8. Lord Lothian, 'The Crisis in the Pacific', December 1934, CHA 8/362, pp. 14, 24.
9. Sir Stafford Cripps, 'The Situation in the Far East', May 1940, CHA 8/663, p. 345.
10. Frank Ashton-Gwatkin, 'The New Order', Economic Group Paper 3, 18 February 1941, in CHA 9/22b Group Papers.
11. Ashton-Gwatkin, preface to paper.
12. Ashton-Gwatkin, p. 7.
13. Ashton-Gwatkin, pp. 7–11.
14. 'Discussion on The New Order', 21 March 1941, CH Committee on Reconstruction, CHA 9/22b, p. 17.
15. Ivison S. Macadam, 'America Enters the War', January 1942, CHA 8/787, pp. 27, 39. Macadam was Secretary and Director-General of Chatham House, 1929–55; and Assistant Director-General and Principal Assistant Secretary in the Ministry of Information, 1939–41.
16. T. Tallents, 'The Relations Between Australia, New Zealand and the United States', March 1942, CHA 8/865; G.E. Hubbard, 'A Far Eastern Pacific Programme', June 1945, CHA 8/1130; John Keswick, 'Britain in the Far East', January 1946, CHA 8/1189; and the proceedings of the Anglo-American Pacific Group 1943, in CHA 9/30a.
17. Halifax had befriended Kerr and Curtis in South Africa and 'came under their influence'.

18. Telegram, Lothian to Foreign Office, 30 September 1940, in FO 371/29145; PRO, London.
19. Full details in FO 371/24241.
20. Minutes by Lothian and Butler, FO/37125138.
21. Note by Lothian, October/November 1940, in HMG Treasury files, T.160–995/F 19422, Public Record Office, London.
22. For a more detailed examination of the Institute's emissaries to the United States, see Chapter 8.
23. See Webster Papers, specifically Section 8/13, BLPES, London.
24. Geoffrey Crowther, editor of *The Economist* magazine and Chatham House Council member also made a Rockefeller Foundation-funded visit to the USA in 1940–41 to contact organisations involved in postwar planning; see Crowther folder, in RG 1.1 Series 401S, RAC.
25. FRPS was in place at the Foreign Office by 8 am on 2 September 1939, one day before the declaration of war by Britain on Germany.
26. RIIA 20th Annual General Meeting Proceedings, November 1939, in RIIA annual reports, p. 8.
27. Report on FRPS by Frank Ashton-Gwatkin, 31 January 1941, in FO 371/29145.
28. RIIA 20th AGM Proceedings, November 1939, p. 8.
29. Report on FRPS by Ashton-Gwatkin, FO 371/29145.
30. Ibid.
31. Charles Kingsley Webster Papers, FRPS specialist staff list, 18 November 1939, pp. 5–7.
32. Minutes, FRPS Committee, 29 April 1942; CHA 2/1/7a.
33. 'FRPS Organisation of Research Liaison', Annex II, minutes, first meeting, FRPS Committee, 16 May 1941; in CHA 2/1/7a, FRPS.
34. Annex III, Report on Enquiries from March 1941, in minutes, FRPS Committee, 16 May 1941, CHA 2/1/7a.
35. G.E. Hubbard, 'The Importance of Propaganda to China', FO 371/31760, 1 April 1942.
36. Minute on Hubbard's paper by T.E. Bromley, 9 April 1942.
37. Hudson, 'Future Possibilities in Japan', in FO 371/31827, 3 December 1942; minutes by Dening, H.M. Gladwyn Jebb and Lord Hood, 11 December 1942, 29 December 1942 and 28 December 1942, respectively. The quotation is of Lord Hood.
38. 'Britain's Post-War Prospects in the Far East', in FO 371/31774, 11 August 1942.
39. Minute by Jebb in a discussion on 'The Future of FRPS and the Political Intelligence Department', FO 371/31499, 25 September 1942.
40. FO 371/32481, 6 January 1942.
41. Letter, Hubbard to Ashley Clarke, head of the FO's Far Eastern department, in FO 371/31774.
42. FO 371/24252.
43. Minute by Balfour, 19 April 1941, in FO 371/29145.
44. FRPS memo to O'Brien of the Rockefeller Foundation, 28 April 1941, in FO 371/29145. Shepardson was granted $3000 by the Rockefeller Foundation 'to facilitate an understanding among groups on both sides of the Atlantic as to the tendencies and investigations underway'; see Funding Note, 15 May 1941, in Shepardson folder, Box 99, RG 1 100S CFR, RAC.

45. Information derived from minutes and letter in FO 371/29145, 15 July 1941, 16 July 1941 and 2 September 1941, respectively. Another paper, written in November 1942, 'Security Measures Against Germany: Dismemberment and Truncation', went on to become the basis of a Central department paper to the Cabinet.
46. Keyserlingk explains that the FRPS's own experts were in accord with their FO counterparts as to the nature of south-east European problems. 'As a result', he argues, 'FRPS's multinational or confederation policy suggestion for this region of Europe became official policy'.
47. Letter, Ashton-Gwatkin to Toynbee, 31 March 1942, in FO 371/32482.
48. 'The Future of FRPS and the PID', FO 371/31499.
49. Letter, N.B. Ronald (Foreign Office) to Ivison Macadam, 21 November 1942, in FO 371/31499.
50. Letter, Eden to Astor, 7 December 1942, FO 371/31499.
51. Minutes, CH Standing Orders Committee, 23 November 1942, in Curtis Papers, Box 25.
52. Curtis, speech to Chatham House, 26 January 1932, CHA 8/180.
53. Foreign Office minute (name illegible), 16 June 1942, FO 31801.
54. See communique, dated 12 May 1942, from the Chatham House IPR Committee to the Foreign Office, FO 371/31801.
55. Minute by Ashton-Gwatkin, 3 July 1942, FO 371/31801.
56. Minutes by Ashton-Gwatkin, 22 May 1942 and 3 June 1942, in FO 371/31801.
57. Foreign Office minute (name illegible), 16 June 1942, FO 371/31801.
58. Minute by Ashley Clarke, 25 June 1942, FO 371/31801.
59. Letter, Ashley Clarke to Ivison Macadam, 22 July 1942, FO 371/31801.
60. Reporting on an informal meeting of the IPR Committee, Ashley Clarke noted the importance of delegates not speaking with 'one voice . . . if the unofficial nature of the delegation is to be sustained . . . '; minute by Ashley Clarke, 16 September 1942, FO 371/31802.
61. Minute on the IPR delegation by Ashley Clarke, 19 July 1942, FO 371/31802.
62. Minute by Jebb, 4 November 1942, FO 371/31803.
63. Halifax's note on the IPR Conference, 9 January 1943, FO 371/35905.
64. Colonial Office report on the IPR Conference, 22 December 1942, FO 371/35905.
65. Full Report of the IPR Conference, Lord Halifax to Eden, 3 February 1943, FO 371/35905.
66. Full Report of the IPR Conference, Lord Halifax to Eden, 3 February 1943, FO 371/35905.
67. Letter, Michael Straight to Mrs L.K. Elmhirst, 23 February 1943, in FO 371/35905.
68. Minute by un-named official, 8 February 1943, FO 371/35905; italics added.
69. Minute by Ashley Clarke, 5 July 1943, in FO 371/35907.
70. Letter, Hailey to Halifax, 20 September 1943; letter, Eden to Halifax, 7 October 1943; letter, Macadam to Ashley Clarke, 2 November 1943; letter, Sherwood to HM Treasury, 9 November 1943; minute by Foulds, 8 November 1943; FO 371/35907. The cost of sending the delegation was £2046.
71. Letter, Hailey to Halifax, 7 October 1943, FO 371/35907.

72. See letters and minutes in FO 371/41769, demonstrating the Foreign Office's role in financing, guiding and selecting the delegation.
73. As Prime Minister Winston Churchill noted, 'the transfer of destroyers . . . [was] a long step towards U.S. entry into the war . . .' (Reynolds, 1981, p. 128).
74. The Atlantic Charter aimed to bring USA 'into close collaboration over economic reconstruction . . . to get some kind of international organisation which would put into effect the terms of the charter'; (Woodward, 1962).
75. Significantly, the Lend–Lease Act of 1941 actually provided only 1 per cent of Britain's war needs in 1941, while 84 per cent came from Britain herself.
76. (Reynolds, 1981, p. 161).
77. The quotation is from FO 371/24241; see also, file FO 371/24240 for Lothian's role.
78. War Cabinet Minutes, WM (40) 146th Conclusions, 19 May 1940, PRO, London.
79. Balfour, 14 August 1940, FO 371/24241. Lord Halifax, War Cabinet paper, WP (40) 276, 'Grant of Air Facilities to the United States', 18 July 1940.
80. Webster and Toynbee, however, had participated as FRPS members in the work of the Cabinet Committee on War (and Peace) Aims and noted the importance of an international organisation.
81. WM(42) 1st meeting, 1 January 1942.
82. WM(42) 23rd meeting, 12 January 1942.
83. This section relies heavily on the study of Webster by Reynolds and Hughes (1976). Unless otherwise stated, all references are taken from this source. For more on Webster, see Bindoff and Clark, 1962, pp. 427–47.
84. As Bindoff and Clark note, wherever Webster went (in the USA), 'he sought out the wielders of power and the framers of policy . . .'; p. 435.
85. Indeed, Jebb wrote in July 1945 to congratulate Webster for his 'immense contribution . . . to this country . . . [and] the whole organisation'.
86. Indeed, E.H. Carr's alternative to FRPS was rejected on the basis of Carr's unpredictability (Haslam, 1999).

5 The Role and Influence of the CFR in the Making of American Foreign Policy

1. See CFR study groups on Anglo-American relations, 1922, 1928, 1936, during the Second World War and during the postwar period.
2. In a private e-mail to the author, Lawrence Finkelstein, a wartime intern in the State Department (and, later, a member of the CFR and an officer of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) expressed doubts as to the motivation behind CFR leaders' ideas and actions. Against this should be weighed the entire history of the CFR, its origins and formation and consolidation. Its leaders did not regard the Council as a social club to which they belonged. They saw it as an organisation that would assist the state to defeat isolationism and build a globalist foreign policy; private e-mail, Finkelstein to Parmar, 3 May 2002.
3. *The War and Peace Studies of the Council on Foreign Relations* (New York: CFR, 1946), pp. 2–6.
4. Ibid., p. 13.

5. CFR Annual Report. Report of the Executive Director, 1934–35 (New York: CFR, 1935), p. 5.
6. *The War and Peace Studies*, pp. 19–24.
7. Ibid., pp. 25–48.
8. Resolution to fund the CFR, 5–6 December 1939, RG I, Series 100, Box 99, Folder 893, RFA, RAC.
9. Memorandum of Conversation, Messersmith, 12 September 1939, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Decimal File 811.43, Council on Foreign Relations, National Archives, College Park, Maryland. As a Rockefeller Foundation official, J.H. Willits, put it, the State Department saw the Council men as endowed with 'initiative . . . responsibility . . . discretion . . . [men] it could trust'; memo, 17 January 1941; Box 99, Folder 100S, CFR – War problems – Reports 1940–41; RFA.
10. War and Peace Studies Files, CFR Archives (these have recently been transferred to the Seeley G. Mudd Library, Princeton University, New Jersey).
11. E-B34, CFR Archives, p. 2.
12. Ibid., pp. 2–5.
13. P-B20, 'The Political Conditions of American-British Partnership', 4 June 1941; P-B23, 'Basic American Interests', 10 July 1941; and P-B28, 'Institutional Arrangements for Postwar American-British Cooperation', 17 September 1941.
14. P-B19, 'The Island of Great Britain as a Factor in the Strategy of American Defense', 16 May 1941; War and Peace Studies Files, CFR.
15. P-B23, 'Basic American Interests', by Walter R. Sharp, 10 July 1941; War and Peace Studies Files, CFR.
16. Robert Blakely, Digest of Discussion, 'The United States and the United Nations in War and Peace', Study Group, first meeting, 4 December 1942; RG, D, XII, 1942.
17. P-B90, 'Means of Securing Sustained Popular Support for American Participation in Postwar International Organisation'; pp. 1–4.
18. Shoup and Minter (1977, p. 157). See also, letter, Hull to Norman Davis, 1 October 1942; letter, Pasvolsky to Stettinius, 20 November 1943; both in RG 59, Leo Pasvolsky Office File, 1942, Box 3, and 1943–44, Box 5; Records of the Department of State.
19. Parmar (1995a, p. 88); Record of Interview with Mallory at Carnegie Corporation, 8 February 1941, CC Grant Files, CFR (through 1945), CC Archives.
20. The USA was 'the arsenal of Democracies [sic]' and '*must accept world responsibility*'. As a result of Pearl Harbor, he noted, 'the importance of our [War and Peace] Studies has been doubled or trebled . . .'; letter, Bowman to Armstrong, 15 December 1941; Isaiah Bowman Papers, Correspondence; Eisenhower Library, Johns Hopkins University.
21. Policy Summaries – Document H67: 'Colonial Problems: Future Status of Greenland', 13 October 1943; in Records of Harley A. Notter, Miscelleaneous Subject Files – Box 14, National Archives.
22. For example, Far East Study Group – Group F – Vol. 1; letters, Batchelder to Armstrong, 21 August 1924, 12 September 1924 and 6 November 1924; CFR archives.
23. As Grayson Kirk, a State Department consultant, CFR research secretary and member of the Yale Institute of International Studies, told J.H. Willits of the Rockefeller Foundation, the Council originated the Moscow Agreement of

1943. Pasvolsky also credited the Council with important influence in that regard; memo of conversation, Willits and Kirk, 22 November 1943 and memo of interview, Willits and Pasvolsky, 3 December 1943; in Box 99, Folder 897, RG1 Projects, Series 100S, CFR – War Problems; RFA, RAC.

24. Letter, Bowman to Hamilton F. Armstrong, 7 June 1946, in Bowman Papers, Correspondence: Hamilton Fish Armstrong.
25. In two separate letters, Hull acknowledged Bowman's significance. To Bowman, Hull wrote that 'The work of no other person among the several who rendered outstanding service during . . . [the formation of a world organisation]. . .excelled yours'; letter, Hull to Bowman, 30 July 1945. To Professor DM Robinson (Johns Hopkins University), Hull reiterated his view that there was 'no one upon whom President Roosevelt and I leaned on more heavily . . . ' than Bowman; letter, Hull to Robinson, 12 January 1946; Bowman Papers.
26. As Bowman noted in a Commencement Address at the University of Cincinatti, 'What is an American?', it must be 'not wealth but service' and sacrifice to which graduates should aspire: 'honor, service, sacrifice, greatness . . . '; Bowman Papers: Speeches, 5 June 1942.
27. In this regard, the Council's record of the WPS programme is accurate. It recognised that in any liaison between government and a private group, each should retain its independence within a collaborative relationship; see The War and Peace Studies of the CFR, p. 2.
28. As Leo Pasvolsky noted, the WPS programme's main contribution to foreign policy was 'independent appraisal of important problems – not criticism of the Department's policies'; minutes of a meeting of the Steering Committee, 9 December 1944, copied to the Rockefeller Foundation; Folder 898, Box 99, CFR – War Problems; RFA, RAC.

6 The Role of the CFR in the Mobilisation of American Public Opinion

1. It is clear, however, that the internationalist–isolationist dichotomy is too simplistic, as it has been demonstrated, notably by corporatist historians, to be at odds with the historical record. Nevertheless, the participants in the seismic foreign policy shift that did occur categorised the past as 'isolationist' and the future as 'internationalist', basing their strategies on that understanding.
2. CFR, *Report of the Executive Director 1947–48*, p. 31 (emphasis added).
3. Recall the WPS memorandum, for example, by George Fielding Eliot, 'Means of Securing Sustained Popular Support For American Participation in Postwar International Organization', P-B90, 20 November 1944.
4. Letter, Brooks Emeny, President of the Cleveland Council on World Affairs, to J.D. Rockefeller Jr, 14 August 1944, RG III 2Q, Office of the Messrs. Rockefeller (World Affairs), Box 4, Folder 29, RAC.
5. Nathaniel Peffer (Columbia University), 'Memorandum on Carnegie Corporation Grants in the Field of International Relations', 17 April 1944, in CC Grant Files, Box 187, International Relations.
6. The FPA was founded in 1918; the CDAAA, in the spring of 1940, as was the Century Group; and the FFF in April 1941.

7. CFR, Conference for University Men on 'Neutrality and Collective Action', 6–7 February 1936, p. 3, in CEIP Papers, Boxes 354–356, Folders 64202–64218, Columbia University; hereafter cited as conferences followed by the appropriate date and page number.
8. CFR, Conferences 14–16 March 1940, CFR Archives, p. 6; Chadwin (1968), p. 9.
9. CFR, Conferences, 1936, p. 4; and *New York Times*, 20 April 1940. CFR, Conferences, 1936, pp. 5–6, Appendix C.
10. CFR, Conferences, 1936, p. 3.
11. For example, beneath the table on 'Percentage Distribution of U.S. Export Trade by Continents of the World', it is observed that 'Europe is by far our best customer, taking about one-half of our total exports. A loss of this market, whatever the reason, would be well-nigh irremediable'. CFR, Conferences, Vol. 3, pp. 1–8.
12. CFR, Conferences, 1936, p. 4.
13. CFR, Conferences, 1940, p. 5.
14. CFR, Conferences, 1936, Appendix C, p. 4.
15. CFR, Conferences, 1936, pp. 5–6.
16. CFR, Conferences, 1937, p. 6.
17. Yet, not all developments pointed in the same 'positive' direction. In July 1941, Norman Davis, head of the American Red Cross, CFR Director and confidant of President Franklin Roosevelt and Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, lamented the students' factual ignorance, wondering what the universities were doing. CFR, Conferences . . . 1940, p. 5. Letter, Davis to Butler, 29 July 1941, in Box 355, Folders 64323–64342, IV Organizations, CEIP papers.
18. CFR, Conferences . . . 1940, pp. 15–16.
19. 'Final Report of the Conferences for University Men', 13 July 1938, Box 355, IV Organizations, Folder 64219, CEIP Papers, p. 3.
20. 'Final Report of the Conferences for University Men', 25 May 1937, in Boxes 354–356, Folders 64202–64218, IV Organizations, CEIP Papers.
21. *Who Was Who in America*; CFR, *The War and Peace Studies of the Council on Foreign Relations 1939–1945* (New York: CFR, 1946).
22. See previous chapter.
23. Peffer, 'Memorandum', p. 10, 'Final Report on the Conferences for University Men', Folders 64244–64246, CEIP Papers.
24. Memorandum, Mallory, 'Project for Popular Education in International Affairs Proposed by the Carnegie Corporation', 1 November 1937; memorandum, Bradley to Keppel, 21 September 1937, p. 8, CC archives, CFR file, Foreign Relations Committees 1937–40.
25. Annual Report, Carnegie Corporation (New York: Carnegie Corporation, 1938).
26. Percy W. Bidwell, 'A Seven-Year Survey of an Educational Project in International Relations 1938–1945', Box 127, CFR, CC Papers.
27. Bidwell, 'A Seven-Year Survey . . . ', p. 3, Box 127, CFR, CC Papers.
28. The membership contained national politicians, including Representatives from Birmingham, Alabama (John Newsome), Louisville and Kentucky (Emmet O'Neal), and at least one US Senator, Homer Ferguson of Michigan. Frank Capra and Walt Disney were in the Los Angeles committee. There were numerous press men, including W.W. Waymack of the *Des Moines Register and Tribune*. The rest of the membership consisted of bankers (8.5 per cent), local government officers (4.5 per cent), church men (3.9 per cent) and

physicians (2.5 per cent). 'Report to the Carnegie Corporation on the Work of the Foreign Relations Committees of the Council on Foreign Relations during the 1942–43 season', in Box 127, CC papers. Appendix to 1943–44 CFR report to the CC; and Table III of same report.

29. Bidwell, 'Report on the Work of Foreign Relations Committees, Season 1941–42', Box 127, CC Papers.
30. Bidwell, 'Seven-Year Report', pp. 4–5.
31. Bidwell, 'Committee Report 1941–42', p. 2.
32. Bidwell, 'Committee Report 1943–44', p. 5.
33. CFR, Annual Report. Report of the Executive Director 1944–45, p. 14.
34. Record of Interview, 27 March 1940, RG1 Series 100, International, Box 97, Folder 874, RAC.
35. Bidwell, 'Seven-Year Report', pp. 6–7.
36. Bidwell, 'Committee Report 1941–42', p. 8.
37. Peffer, 'Memorandum', p. 11.
38. Letter, Dulles to Miller, n.d., CC Grant Files; Committees on Foreign Relations 1937–40.
39. 'Report to the Carnegie Corporation of the Work of the Committees on Foreign Relations of the Council on Foreign Relations during the 1943–44 Season', p. 4, Box 127, CC Papers.
40. 'Memorandum for Counsel of Carnegie Corporation', pp. 14–15, 30 June 1952, CC Grant Files, 1946–55.
41. Letter, Wilson to Long, 13 July 1940; memorandum, Charles W. Yost, Division of Special Research, to Leo Pasvolsky, 14 April 1942, p. 1.
42. Memorandum by Dalgliesh, April 1946, CC Grant Files – CFR – Foreign Relations Committees 1946–49, pp. 9–12, Box 529A.
43. Bidwell, letter to George Gallup, American Institute of Public Opinion, 24 December 1943, CFR Record of Groups, Vol. XV, 1943/44 A. 'Foreign Policy and Public Opinion'. Dickey's function was to research foreign policy public opinion and to liaise with private organisations. See also Edel (1951, p. 153).
44. 'The Attitude of Religious Bodies towards the Participation of the United States in the Postwar Settlement', Study Group meeting, 8 February 1944, p. 1; in CFR RG, Vol. XV, 1943/44. FCCC was founded in 1908.
45. Letter, Bidwell to Waymack, 13 January 1944, 'Foreign Policy and Public Opinion' study group file.
46. 'Foreign Policy . . . ' study group, second meeting, 25 April 1944, pp. 1–5; ibid., Campbell, pp. 141, 154, 193. According to *Fortune* magazine, the AFBF was 'a private lobby sponsored and supported by the government it seeks to influence . . . the country's first semi-official lobby'. See 'The Farm Bureau', June 1944, pp. 157–58.
47. Chadwin is the source of evidence for the section below unless otherwise indicated.
48. Wala (1994, pp. 173–76). White was a prominent Republican and influential editor of the (Kansas) *Emporia Gazette*. White's name, as head of CDAAA, was suggested to Eichelberger (a CFR member, Republican and professional internationalist) by State Department official, Joseph C. Green, after consultation with FDR.
49. The 'destroyers-bases' deal, according to Johnson, was 'the President's idea, not White's'.

50. The CDAAA was not a spontaneous or even fully private organisation, even though the original idea for it came from JP Morgan partner and CFR leader, Thomas Lamont. There was always 'close cooperation with the Roosevelt administration . . . [the] main objective . . . [being] not to convince the administration to change its policy or even to modify it [but] to convince public and Congress' to back American belligerence. As White noted, 'I never did anything the President didn't ask for, and I always conferred with him on our program' (Wala, 1994, pp. 174–79). White's notion of service to the President was further illustrated when he, as head of the CDAAA, rejected the use of American naval convoys to escort Lend–Lease aid being transported to Britain. 'When the President is for them [convoys]', he wrote, 'I'm going to support them, of course. But I do not believe that our organization should keep nagging him and needling him . . . . I don't think our organization is doing any service to the President in building up public sentiment that will force his hand'.
51. According to Johnson, the CDAAA and the FFF 'aided greatly in crystallizing public sentiment for the release of the destroyers'.
52. RG 208 – Records of the Office of War Information (Records of the Office of Facts and Figures, Decimal File of the Director 1941–42, pp. 330–40, Box 15), National Archives, Washington, DC.
53. Letter, Eugene Kinckle Jones (National Urban League) to Rogers Greene (CDAAA), 27 June 1940; in MSS Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies (MC 011), Box 8; Seeley G. Mudd Library, Princeton.
54. Memorandum, 'Literature for Mr. Lewis', sent by Mrs Thomas to Mr Greene, 10 June 1941; CDAAA papers, Box 8.
55. Box 29, Fight For Freedom Papers (MC 025), Seeley G. Mudd Library, Princeton.
56. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr, cited by Nadel and Rourke.
57. Edel notes that the co-option of numerous CFR men into the wartime State Department was as much 'with an eye to their influence in private circles as well as [with] . . . their special knowledge of foreign affairs'.
58. See letter, Wilson to Long, 13 July 1940, RG 59, Decimal File 811.43, Council on Foreign Relations, National Archives.
59. Speech by Davis, University of Georgia, 18 May 1930, in Catalogued Correspondence, Nicholas Murray Butler Papers, Columbia University. Davis admonished those men of education who 'minimize their obligation to the State'. 'We must', he said, 'be loyal to certain objects in life and one of our loyalties should be the State'.

7 The Role of Chatham House in the Mobilisation of British Public Opinion

1. The Chairman of the Institute's governing Council, Viscount Astor, though a former Conservative MP, was never genuinely committed to the party machine; see, Cockett, 1991, p. 14.
2. Memorandum, Lionel Curtis and Whitney Hart Shepardson, in CHA, 2/1/2, p. 1.
3. Whitney Shepardson was a professional lawyer with close links with the State Department. He was Director of the CFR, 1921–66.
4. Memorandum, Curtis and Shepardson, p. 2.

5. Curtis and Shepardson, p. 13.
6. Personal Notes on War and Peace Issues, 7 October 1940; Curtis Papers, Box 100, War Aims and Peace Settlement 1939–40, Bodleian Library.
7. *British Institute of International Affairs* (London: BIIA, 1920, pp. 12–14).
8. Report of the Executive Committee, in BIIA, p. 3.
9. Sir Austen Chamberlain, 'Speech to the Third Annual Chatham House Dinner', *International Affairs*, November 1932, pp. 840–41.
10. *Annual Report*, 1931–32, p. 7.
11. E.F. Wise, *Annual Report*, 1931–32, p. 8.
12. 'Report of Committee of Reconstruction', 16 July 1941, CHA 9/19a.
13. Toynbee, 'Research Topics: In What Form Should They Be Produced?', 22 April 1940; Webster Papers, Section 8/5, BLPES.
14. Indeed, the objectivity of Toynbee and others was often called into question on the question of a Jewish homeland and the Italo–Ethiopian War; see Bosco and Navari, 1994, eds, pp. ii–iii. In addition, the disastrous policy of appeasement was fervently supported by Chatham House; see Crozier, 1994, pp. 205–60.
15. BIIA Executive Committee report, pp. 56–82. The other names were J. St Loe Strachey of the *Spectator*; J.A. Spender, editor of the *New Statesman*; Sir Stanley Reed of the *Times of India*; John M. Murray of the *Athaeneum*; Shane Leslie of the *Dublin Review*; P.P. Graves of *The Times*; William T. Goode of the *Manchester Guardian*; and Arthur A. Baumann of the *Saturday Review*.
16. Crowther was editor of *The Economist*, 1938–56. He later became Chairman of The Economist Newspaper Ltd; Monroe was on the staff between 1945 and 1958; McLachlan was its assistant editor, 1947–54; and Young had been editor, 1908–10.
17. Wheeler-Bennett, British Library of Information, New York, 1939–40; Assistant-Director, British Press Service, New York, 1940–41; Special Assistant to the Director-General of British Information Services, 1941–42.
18. *Observer*, 4 July 1920, p. 12.
19. *The Times*, 5 July 1920, p. 15.
20. *The Times*, 6 July 1920, p. 16. Clynes was an MP, 1906–31 and 1935–45; Home Secretary, 1929–31; and one time President of the National Union of General and Municipal Workers.
21. *The Times*, 7 March 1938, p. 16.
22. *The Times*, 3 January 1941, p. 5, a leading article.
23. *The Times*, 3 April 1941, p. 5, another leader.
24. *The Times*, 19 July 1941, p. 5, a leading article.
25. *The Times*, 30 June 1943, p. 2.
26. 'Anglo-American Trade. A Chatham House Study', *The Times*, 7 March 1938, p. 16.
27. 'The Resources of Russia. Agriculture and Industry in the Ukraine. Movement of Arsenals', *The Times*, 19 July 1941, p. 5.
28. Anthony Bevins, 'Cometh the election, cometh the smear', *Independent*, 3 February 1992, p. 19.
29. *The Times*, 30 June 1939.
30. *The Times*, 8 November 1939; 24 July 1941; 4 March 1943; 15 April 1943.
31. *The Times*, 26 October 1945; 14 May 1938, respectively.

32. For example, see articles entitled, 'Foundations of Power in a Changing World', *The Times*, 19 November 1943; 'America in the Pacific', *The Times*, 22 October 1941, reprinted in *Far Eastern Crisis. Dream and Reality* (London: The Times, 1941).
33. *The Times*, 'New Chatham House', 18 May 1944.
34. *Observer*, 'Chatham House: Public Servant', 11 February 1940.
35. See file in CHA, York Trust Grant, 2/III/12. Chatham House received approximately £2000 pa from the York Trust. See also, Briggs, 1991.
36. CH Archives, 9/19a.
37. Memorandum, 16 July 1943: 'Advanced Courses on International Affairs Arranged at Chatham House', CHA, 11/1/54, p. 1.
38. Memroandum, 16 July 1943, p. 1.
39. Ashton-Gwatkin spoke on 'How Diplomacy Works', 8 October 1944, CHA 11/1/26.
40. Jebb spoke on 'The Framework of International Relations after the War', 7–9 December 1944, CHA 11/1/30.
41. 2–4 March 1944, CHA 11/1/22.
42. Memorandum, 16 July 1943, p. 1. For more on ABCA, see Williams (1942) and MacKenzie (1992).
43. Memorandum, 16 July 1943, p. 1.
44. 'USSR-USA', 18–20 September 1942, CHA 11/1/1, p. iv.
45. 'After the Pacific War', 27–29 September 1945, 11/1/36, p. iii.
46. Appendix, 'Army Courses Arranged at Chatham House', in 'Report to the Trustees of the York Trust', 1 July 1943; CHA 2/III/12.
47. Memorandum, 16 July 1943, p. 1.
48. 'RIIA: Report to the Trustees of the York Trust. Additional Note on Developments', 18 September 1944; in CHA 2/III/12.
49. Letter, Curtis to J.H.B. Savage, 19 November 1934; CHA 5/1a.
50. Letter, Flight Officer Ted Loonam to Curtis, 17 July 1944; Curtis Papers, Reel 101.
51. Letter, Lt Col. B. Rawley to Curtis, 20 September 1944; Curtis Papers, Reel 101.
52. Letter, L.K. Hindmarsh to Curtis, 6 November 1944; Curtis Papers, Reel 101. Curtis was a very skilled public speaker, as was demonstrated by a series of BBC radio broadcasts in 1943 which were featured prominently in *The Listener*; see letter, Christopher Salmon (BBC Talks) to Curtis, 27 February 1943; Curtis Papers, Box 136, Scripts of Broadcasts.
53. The survey was carried out among 5000 convalescing soldiers.
54. Draft minute from the Lord President to the Prime Minister, n.d., ca 1943; Cabinet Papers, CAB 123/230: ABCA, PRO, London.
55. Annual Reports, 1920, 1930, 1940, 1950, for details. Key academics included E.L. Woodward, J.W. Wheeler-Bennett and J.W. Headlam-Morley.
56. Report on FRPS by Ashton-Gwatkin, 31 January 1941, FO 371/29145.
57. August 1945, CHA 11/1/35.
58. Bullock, Fellow of New College, Oxford, lectured in June 1945, CHA 11/1/33.
59. Stamp lectured in December 1944, CHA 11/1/30.
60. Seton-Watson was Masaryk Professor of Central European History, London University, CHA 11/1/18.
61. Annual Reports, 1938–42.
62. The three were: J.R. Clynes; Barbara Wooton, TUC and Labour Party Research Department Research Officer, 1922–26, and CH Council member,

1940–41; and Sir Vincent Tewson, Secretary of the Organisation Department, TUC, 1925–31, Assistant General Secretary of the TUC, 1931–46, and General Secretary, 1946–60, and CH Council member, 1950–51.
63. See CHA 11/1/- file for all details.
64. CHA 5/1a, General Correspondence, 1934–46.
65. *Annual Report*, 1937–38, p. 49.
66. *Annual Report*, 1937–38, pp. 50–51, 91; Annual report, 1945–46, p. 44. The Scottish Branch was represented by three members of the Chatham House Council: Leonard Harper Gow, Lord Provost Watt and W.S. John Watson.
67. *Annual Reports*, 1941–42 and 1944–45.
68. John Watson, 'Note of Points for Discussion with Mr. Macadam', 18 May 1939, CHA 5/3c.
69. Minutes, Glasgow Committee meeting, 23 January 1948; CHA 5/3d.
70. *Annual Reports*, 1943–44 and 1945–46.
71. 'Informal Council Meeting: Business Arising', 11 December 1935, CHA 5/1a.
72. Letter, J.H.B. Savage to Curtis, 17 November 1934, CHA 5/1a.
73. 'Proposed Branch of Chatham House in Manchester: Extract from Council Minutes', 9 November 1938; CHA 5/1a.
74. Schedule of membership by county, in CHA 5/1a.
75. Letter, L.F. Behrens to Lord Meston, 12 November 1938, CHA 5/1a.
76. *Annual Report*, 1937–38, long extract on branch formation, p. 12.
77. Letter, Kenneth Younger to the Lord Bishop of Sheffield, 9 March 1960; CHA 5/1b.
78. *The Times*, 'Foreign Affairs as a Study: Scottish Branch of Royal Institute', 14 May 1938.
79. Record of Interview, Russell C. Leffingwell (Carnegie Corporation trustee) and Walter Mallory, 22 December 1941, CC Archives, CFR – Foreign Relations Committees (regional committees), 1941–45, Columbia University.

8 CFR–RIIA Interconnections: A Transnational Ruling Class, Liberal Atlantic Community or Anglo-American Establishment?

1. Pijl allots more significance to the CFR in 1940–41, however, but principally in regard to lobbying efforts for aid to Britain and an American war declaration; see Pijl, 1984, p. 112.
2. In particular, see the entire correspondence of Curtis with numerous Americans connected with the CFR, especially Whitney Hart Shepardson, in Curtis Papers.
3. Box 855, Curtis Papers (Round Table). The dissertation was written by J.W. Shepardson at Harvard University in 1949.
4. Letter, Curtis to Harold Macmillan, 23 September 1937, Box 873, Curtis Papers (RT); boxes 872–874: Whitney Shepardson's Papers and Correspondence relating to Curtis, 1921–53.
5. Letter, Curtis to Macmillan, 23 September 1937, Box 873.
6. Letter, Shepardson to Brandeis, 26 September 1925, Box 872, Curtis Papers (RT).
7. Letter, Curtis to Shepardson, 1 March 1941, Box 873; Curtis asked Shepardson to meet with and assist Charles K. Webster.

8. Letter, Shepardson to Curtis, 17 October 1930, Box 872.
9. Letter, Shepardson to Ivison Macadam, 14 November 1932, Box 872.
10. Minutes, (Special) Meeting of the CH Council, 19 April 1944; in CHA4/MACA/p.
11. Letter, Shepardson to Curtis, 28 March 1939, Box 873.
12. Letter, Curtis to Macadam, n.d. but ca 2 June 1942. Shepardson, *The Interests of the United States as a World Power* (London: Oxford University Press, 1942).
13. Letter, Curtis to Shepardson, 24 December 1940, Box 873. Kerr socialised frequently with the Shepardsons, taking tea with them from time to time; letter, Shepardson to Curtis, 2 October 1939, Box 873.
14. Letter, Lamont to Sir Gerald Campbell (Minister, British Embassy), 3 February 1941; Lamont Papers, Box 84, Folder 22; Baker Library, Harvard University.
15. Letter, Lamont to Lothian, 30 October 1939; Lothian to Lamont, 4 November 1939; 15 December 1939; Box 402, Lord Lothian Papers (GD40/17), National Archives of Scotland, Edinburgh. Lamont and Lothian met on numerous occasions to discuss foreign affairs, US neutrality laws, and so on; see, Lamont Papers, Box 105, Folder 11.
16. Letter, Curtis to Halifax, 13 December 1940, Box 22.
17. Curtis's Personal/Diary Note, 20 December 1940, Box 100.
18. Letter, Curtis to Shepardson, 28 December 1940, Box 874; Curtis's Personal/Diary Note, 21 December 1940, Box 100; 22 December 1940, Box 100.
19. Letter, Curtis to Halifax, 24 December 1940, Box 22.
20. Letter, Curtis to Shepardson, 24 December 1940, Box 873; Letter, Shepardson to Curtis, 19 March 1941, Box 23.
21. Letter, Curtis to Shepardson, 1 February 1939, Box 873.
22. Letter, Curtis to Shepardson, 6 April 1939, Box 873.
23. Letter, Curtis to Streit, 9 February 1939.
24. Letter, Archbishop of Brisbane to Curtis, 19 May 1939, Box 13.
25. Minutes of meeting, World Order Preparatory Group, Chatham House, 17 July 1939; Curtis Papers, Boxes 110–111.
26. Letter, Dulles to Curtis, 11 January 1939, Box 13. Curtis wrote the Foreword to Dulles's *War, Peace and Change*, according to a letter to Shepardson, 6 April 1939, Box 873.
27. See numerous letters in Boxes 15 and 16 in Curtis's papers.
28. Letter, Curtis to Lothian, 17 May 1939; Lothian to Curtis, 18 May 1939, Box 16.
29. Letter, Catlin to Lothian, 8 March 1940; Box 399, Lothian Papers (GD40/17). Lothian invited Catlin to meet with him at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel to further discuss his ideas; telegram, Lothian to Catlin, 11 September 1940.
30. Lamont, for example, cautioned Lothian not to 'get up a propaganda machine' in the US as it was likely to be counter-productive; letter, Lamont to Lothian, 15 December 1939, Lothian Papers, Box 402.
31. Letter, Francis P. Miller to Professor J.R.M. Butler, 21 September 1956, Lothian Papers, GD40/17/516/3. Letter, Henry P. Van Dusen (Union Theological Seminary, New York) to Lothian, 1 July 1940, Lothian Papers, Box 405.
32. Telegram, Lothian to Van Dusen, 2 July 1940, Lothian Papers, Box 405.
33. Letter, Van Dusen to Lothian, 19 July 1940, Lothian Papers, Box 405.
34. Letter, Francis P. Miller to J.R.M. Butler, 21 September 1956, Lothian Papers, Box 516.

35. Lothian, 'Memorandum on British Defense', 28 July 1940, Lothian Papers, Box 516.
36. Lothian, 'Confidential Memorandum on needs of Great Britain', ca 2 August 1940, Lothian Papers, Box 516.
37. Letter, Curtis to Lothian, 18 September 1940, Curtis Papers, Box 22.
38. 'Summary in Translation from Excerpt of an Article in *Das Reich*, 9 February, 1941, Entitled "Democracy for 20 Milliards"'; Lamont Papers, Box 209, Folder 32.
39. Letter, Lamont to Dorothy Thompson, 31 December 1938; Lamont Papers, Box 133, Folder 18.
40. Lamont, 'Memorandum for JP Jones [CDAAA]', 5 June 1940; Lamont Papers, Box 21, Folder 6.
41. Letter, Sherwood to Lamont, 11 June 1940; Lamont Papers, Box 21, Folder 6.
42. Letter, Lamont to William Allen White, 12 July 1940; Lamont Papers, Box 21, Folder 6.
43. Letter, White to Lamont, 10 December 1940; Lamont Papers, Box 21, Folder 10. JP Morgan and Partners had ruled themselves out as possible agents of the British Government, for the purposes of securing loans and so on, due to the sensitivity of US public opinion; see Box 84, Folder 19, Lamont Papers for correspondence with the British Embassy.
44. Message, Lamont to Cordell Hull's secretary, 9 January 1940; 'Memorandum for the President', Lamont to FDR, 15 May 1940; Lamont Papers, Box 127, Folder 24.
45. See RG1.1 401 and 401 S, RFA, RAC.
46. Letter, Macadam to Margaret Cleeve, 24 October 1941; CHA4/MACA/o.
47. Ivison Macadam, 'America Enters the War', 8 January 1942, CHA Meetings, 8/787.
48. North Atlantic Relations Conference, Report of the UK Group, Covering Note, n.d.; CHA4/MACA/m. Macadam made another such visit to USA and Canada between November 1943 and February 1944, addressing four Committees on Foreign Relations and several branches of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs. He also met several CFR, Foreign Policy Association, IPR, Rockefeller and Carnegie leaders; CHA4/MACA/p.
49. Letter, Macadam to William Lockwood (American Committee for International Studies, Princeton), 13 February 1942.
50. Letter, Macadam to Cleeve, 8 September 1941; CHA4/MACA/n.
51. Letter, Mary Burns (Corresponding Secretary, League of Women Voters, Portland) to Macadam, 25 September 1941; in CHA 4/Maca/m: Macadam Files: Confidential File of US/Canada Visit, 23 August to 13 December 1941.
52. Letter, Macadam to Mallory, 18 November 1941; Mallory to Macadam, 14 November 1941; in CHA4/MACA/m.
53. *The Houston Post*, 'British Leader Visits Houston to Map Plans for Post-War World', 26 November 1941.
54. Letter, Macadam to Lord Astor, 18 October 1941; CHA4/MACA/o.
55. Letter, Macadam to Cleeve, 24 October 1941; CHA4/MACA/o.
56. 'Committees on Foreign Relations. Discussions following Mr. Macadam's Lectures: Nov. 6–20, 1941'; in CHA4/MACA/m.
57. 'Committees on Foreign Relations. Discussions following Mr. Macadam's . . . ', p. 2; in CHA4/MACA/m.

58. Ibid., p. 5.
59. See also, meeting at Portland, Oregon, 4 December 1941; also in CHA4/MACA/m.
60. Letter, Professor Robert H. George (Providence Committee on Foreign Relations) to Macadam, 25 November 1941; CHA4/MACA/m.
61. Letter, Macadam to Cleeve, 12 September 1941; CHA4/MACA/n.
62. Memorandum, to Miss Margaret Cleeve from Ivison Macadam, New York City, 10 November 1941; CHA4/MACA/n.
63. Letter, Macadam to Cleeve, 12 September 1941; CHA4/MACA/n. For more details of Cantril's Public Opinion studies at Princeton (Parmar, 2002b).
64. Letter, Macadam to Cleeve, 17 September 1941; CHA4/MACA/n.
65. Letter, Macadam to Cleeve, 16 September 1941; CHA4/MACA/n.
66. Letter, Walter H. Mallory to Macadam, 9 October 1942; CHA4/Toyn/12.
67. Letter, Mallory to Macadam, 9 October 1942; CHA4/Toyn/12.
68. Inter-office Note, Cleeve to Macadam, 9 July 1942; CHA4/Toyn/12.
69. Letter, Macadam to Toynbee, 9 July 1942; CHA4/Toyn/12.
70. Letter, Toynbee to N.B. Ronald (FO North American Department), 17 June 1942. In fact, Ronald had already learned this from the British Embassy in Washington, DC, in a letter from R.I. Campbell, 16 May 1942; both letters in Box 117, Miscellaneous File, Toynbee Papers.
71. 'Notes of a meeting of the Group on "Peace Aims" [FRPS], Balliol College, Oxford', 2–3 October 1941; letter, Paton to Toynbee, 22 December 1941; letter, Paton to Peace Aims Group (FRPS), 6 July 1942; Toynbee Papers, Box 119.
72. Letter, Toynbee to N.B. Ronald (FO North American Department), 16 August 1942; Box 92, Journeys, Toynbee Papers.
73. Ibid.
74. Letter, Ronald to Toynbee, 10 July 1942, Box 92.
75. In his report on the visit, Toynbee noted that the Foreign Office and ambassador Halifax consented to his meeting with numerous groups so long as he 'made it clear that any views I expressed in such discussions were purely personal to myself'; see, 'A.J. Toynbee: Visit to the United States, August 23rd to October 20th 1942', in Box 92.
76. Letter, Toynbee to Ronald, 16 August 1942, Box 92.
77. Letter, Toynbee to Professor Sir Alfred Zimmern (FRPS), 3 September 1942, Box 92.
78. 'Note by Mr A.J. Toynbee of two talks with Mr. Leo Pasvolsky', Washington, 15 October 1942; Box 92.
79. 'Note by Mr A.J. Toynbee of two talks . . . '; Box 92.
80. 'A.J. Toynbee: Visit to the United States, 23rd August to 20th October, 1942'; Box 92.
81. Annex to 'A.J. Toynbee: Visit to the . . . '; Box 92.
82. 'A.J. Toynbee: Visit to the . . . '; Box 92.
83. Webster, 'Short Report of Visit to the Universities and other Organisations of the United States, March 31–May 15, 1941'; section 8/13, Webster Papers.
84. 'Memo for Professor Webster', n.d. or author's name, entitled, 'On the Collaboration of British and American Scholars in the Study of Long-Range Problems'; section 8/13, Webster Papers.

85. Letter, Webster to Bracken, 27 October 1941; Webster Papers, section 1/22.
86. Letters: Elihu Church to Webster, 6 November 1941; C. Burlingham to Webster, 22 May 1942; section 1/22, Webster Papers.
87. Letter, Webster to Bracken, 27 October 1941; section 1/22, Webster Papers.
88. Listing of Webster's US contacts in section 8/13, Webster Papers.
89. Crowther's US visit was funded by a $1500 grant from the Rockefeller Foundation: Funding Note, Geoffrey Crowther, Visit to the USA, 1940–41; RG1.1 401S, RFA, RAC.
90. FO371/29145.
91. Funding Note, 15 May 1941, CFR: Shepardson, Whitney 1941; in Box 99, RG1 100S, CFR, RFA, RAC.
92. Letter, Charles Webster to Toynbee, 14 October 1941; letter, Toynbee to Willits (Rockefeller Foundation, RF), 1 December 1941; memorandum by Toynbee to RF: 'Attachment of American Scholars to the FRPS: Memorandum for the Rockefeller Foundation', 1 December 1941; all in RG1.1 401, Box 5, Post-War Reconstruction – Exchange Scholars 1940–41, RFA, RAC.
93. Inter-Office Correspondence, Willits (RF) to Fosdick (President, RF) *et al.*, 30 January 1942, RG1.1 401, Box 5.
94. Letters, Charles Webster to Brand, and to Sir David Scott, 28 June 1941 and 1 July 1941, respectively; section 1/21, Webster Papers.
95. Letter, 'Pat' O'Brien (RF) to Tracy B. Kittredge (RF), undated, RG1.1 401, Box 5; RFA.
96. Attendance list, American-British Group, Record of Groups (RG) XV, CFR Archives, Seeley G. Mudd Library, Princeton.
97. CFR, 'A Statement Regarding the American-British Group', 14 December 1943, RG XV, CFR.
98. Letter, Percy W. Bidwell (CFR Director of Studies) to all invitees, 30 November 1943; RGXV, CFR Archives.
99. CFR, 'A Statement Regarding the American-British Group', 14 December 1943; RGXV.
100. See separate reports on 'The Treatment of Defeated Germany' and 'The Treatment of Defeated Japan'; RG XV, CFR.
101. CFR, 'The Treatment of Defeated Japan', 6 January 1944, p. 15; RG XV, CFR.
102. CFR Reports in RG XV, CFR.
103. Geoffrey Crowther (RIIA), 'Pros and Cons of an Anglo-American Alliance', Study Group Reports, CFR, 13 October 1943; Record of Meetings XI; CFR Archives.
104. Pijl (1995) *suggests* such possibilities but does not pursue the matter.

9 Conclusion

1. Cull points out how sceptically the British government viewed the Anglophilia of sections of US opinion.
2. On the role of the anti-Nazi war in ridding the world of overt racial perspectives, see Barkan (1992). For an interesting discussion of a similar shift in racist rhetoric, within the racist 'New Right', see Uebel (2002).

3. In the preface, Miliband argues that western societies, 'despite their many diversities, have enough basic features in common to provide a general context for a study of the role which the state plays in them'.
4. As Augelli and Murphy (1988, p. 22) point out, however, hegemonic elites do not necessarily need mass consent; 'tacit agreement', 'passive acceptance', even 'indifference' or 'unexpressed dissent' would do. In the American case, however, given the relatively greater importance of public opinion, something more active was required of elite, attentive and mass opinion.

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