Violence: 'Mercurial Gestalt'

Edited by
Tobe Levin

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Rodopi

To my father, M. William Levin, one of the world's most non-violent men, and my mother, Janice M. Levin, who welcomes strangers when they ask, "How are you?" by replying, "Feeling better now that you're here."

Contents

Welcome to an *At the Interface* Project

Cultures of Violence is a multi- and inter-disciplinary research project which aims to identify and understand the prevailing extent of violence in contemporary life. In the process, it will explore the representation of violence in media, art and literature. Violence has been part of societies purporting to unite people, e.g., totalitarian regimes. It has been no less part of societies that set great store on diversity. It remains a horrifying feature of today's world.

Key themes considered in the project are;

- is violence part of human nature?

- war, civil war, terrorism and the metropolis

- religion, religious institutions, and their role in curtailing or propelling violence; religious fundamentalism and violence

- institutional life - including schools and hospitals

- ethnicity, nationalism, and sub-nationalisms; racism and violence

- violence in the private domain - abuse of women and children

- violence in the public domain - the legitimation of violence, law, concepts of punishment, capital punishment

- state violence - militarism and arms competition

- market economy and globalization; poverty and violence

- violence and modernity - the role of science and technology

- youth and violence - gang violence, children soldiers, hooliganism

Dr Robert Fisher
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http://www.inter-disciplinary.net

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Introduction

A lively and perennial dialogue concerning the existence of innate aggression in humans focuses on the question of whether destructive behaviour is "natural" or even "normal." Moreover, the rational proof that aggression is innate requires a demonstration that is logically impossible: in order to show that any behaviour has an innate origin, you would have to find instances of that behaviour that occur independent of environmental influences. Yet there exists no possible instance of such behaviour since even *in utero*, the merest embryos inhabit an environment of sorts.

Furthermore, to say that an innate characteristic is normal is to beg the question. Of course an inborn tendency, if everyone shares it, is "normal." How could it be otherwise? However, "normal" carries the connotation of "acceptable" and the unfettered yielding to a natural tendency cannot uncontroversially be considered "acceptable." Even without adding moral judgments to an evaluation of destructive aggression, we must seriously consider whether engaging in it is adaptive or non-adaptive, whether it aids or obstructs our survival. Hence, we take the approach that in order to intelligently consider the phenomenon of violence, a.k.a. destructive aggression, we must examine it in cultural terms. That is, we must engage in an exploration of its many manifestations in history, personal experience, creative expression, current events, and social and political effects.

Nature. Nurture?

"I didn't hear Yelena's screams," Gila Svirsky wrote to mark the International Day of Eliminating Violence Against Women, but at 4:30 a.m. the police had "found [the body] one flight up … in a pool of blood with stab wounds to her neck and chest, two horrified daughters (aged 7 and 8) at her side, and a boyfriend who claimed that he killed her in self-defence [sic] because she attacked him. Never mind that she was a graduate of a battered women's shelter and he had 3 complaints of assault filed against him. Never mind that she was 31, short and of slight build, and he 50, tall and solid. Somehow he had to stab her multiple times to protect himself."[1] For Svirsky, domestic violence is not an isolated incident but rather cut from the same cloth as states' assaults in our age when the military provides a questionable 'moral' leadership on many fronts, from Iraq to Rwanda to Somalia. For Svirsky, as for many authors

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in this volume, an acceptance of violence as a component of identity challenges all of us who work for a more tranquil world.

   An elevated death toll from the 2004 Indonesian tsunami reminds us, however, that violence is not principally, even primarily, the province of humanity. Nature, too, in its metaphoric fury, tears children from mothers, husbands from wives, livelihoods from fishers; it disrupts economies, threatens epidemics, occasions cataclysmic trauma not easily or quickly overcome. And for each sufferer, the words of Lamartine apply: "Un seul être vous manque, et tout est dépeuplé." [You miss a single person, and the earth is void.]

   The colour of mourning differs, however, when devastation's author is impersonal. Not that people lower their accusatory fingers. Survivors ask, what about early warning systems? Why the dearth of animal corpses? In our age of satellites and navigation systems, couldn't cell phones have been deployed to alert victims to the impending tidal wave?

   Still, when human agents administer violence, our conscience engages more readily, and the issue becomes prevention drawn from a utopian belief that learning enough about aggression's roots can lead to measures that avoid it, thereby staunching blood and tears.

   Answering a call for papers from Rob Fisher's Inter-Disciplinary Net, activists and scholars who gathered in Oxford, U.K., at St. Catherine's College in September 2003 share the conviction that understanding aggression can decrease casualties. So we applied our expertise drawn from the broadest spectrum of fields to so-called 'cultures' of violence.

   Yet, the phrase is an oxymoron, isn't it? How can violence merit such an ennobling moniker, discussed in terms of its nemesis, 'culture'? As Alice Walker puts it in *Warrior Marks*, a film against female genital mutilation, a distinction exists between custom and culture. "People customarily enslaved others," she agrees. "But slavery is not a culture."[2]

   Thus, the "peculiar institution" of U.S. American enslavement whose after-effects resonate in recurrent ghetto carnage gestures toward the complicated mesh of causes and effects to be disentangled by numerous disciplinary approaches. At the conference from which the following papers emerged, for instance, historical and media studies examined the relationship between the "true" story and the public version or selected versions of violent events; ethnographers and sociologists considered the differential effects of aggression on various age groups, genders or ethnicities; literary scholars looked at cultural artefacts related to bloodshed and, of course, political science, social work, education, and a host of other fields followed up, asking whether brutality is a part of human nature, a natural phenomenon, a consequence of human vice, etc.

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Beyond this cornucopia of viewpoints, however, we discern a powerful undiluted theme strengthened by the richness of many tributaries: emerging identities or identity shifts as often defined through violence and responses to it. What factors cause an individual's identity to incline toward aggression? Intuition tells us that early experience of violence will play a role, and that may be true. But in Part 1, *Violence in Theory and Praxis: Torture, Terror, Suicide*, philosophers Patricia Turrisi and Michael Shaffer, in "Theories of Violence and the Explanation of Ultra-violent Behaviour," critique Lonnie Athens' claim to have developed a co-optive 'best explanation' of overt aggression. Athens includes, by fiat, recourse to experience in his causal model, responses to experience becoming the central facts in violent socialization processes that produce ultra-violent actors, or those whose attacks are gratuitous, not perpetrated in self-defence. Though granting that Athens may indeed be right about experience, Turrisi and Shaffer fault him for falling short of methodological rigor. They examine his work within a comprehensive philosophical analysis of current theories, weighing the scientific merit of each attempt to account for "ultra-violence." Athens' caveat approach denies the possibility of discussing the phenomenon with intelligence, whatever perspective is eventually taken or used to reduce its incidence. Why does violence occur? The first step toward an answer includes identifying honestly where scholars land on the issue.

Whereas Turrisi and Shaffer focus on agents, political scientist Oleg Piletsky trains his lens on victims, namely minorities in Europe in the post-Cold War era who suffer from an increasing number of violent attacks against them. To neuter increasing hostility, he proposes, in "E Pluribus Unum: European Nationalism, or Shopping for Identities in the European Union," that identification with the continent rather than the nation must ensue. The difficulty lies, however, in that driving a new, as opposed to traditional, "nationalistic and ethnic antagonism" is, in his view, a "collective refusal of enjoyment." The fear of scarcity, that the welfare state will prove unable to bestow its benevolence on settled as well as immigrant residents, appears to fuel an exclusionary understanding of the nation, now defined in terms of 'self' and 'other'. Displacing an Enlightenment view of citizenship as a contractual relationship to government, an emotional, distorted understanding of Christian culture appears as the basis for legitimate inclusion. Although the affective "foundations of national identity" have been loosened by European Union citizenship, "individual[s] [who] need… something more appealing… than merely an indifferent infrastructure and public institutions of social welfare" can be observed fostering "cult[s] of ethnic origin, ideolog[ies] of return to national roots, religious fundamentalism and, quite often, intolerance toward aliens." Therefore, Piletsky concludes, "the most important challenge facing the democratic multi-cultural state in the

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context of European integration is to … [preserve] the link between social citizenship and multiculturalism."

Should this link not be sustained, recent European history has shown in the Balkans and elsewhere, aggression against minorities turns deadly. Given this intra-national violence and 'ethnic cleansing', Jessica Wolfendale's timely analysis in "From Soldier to Torturer? Military Training and Moral Agency," gains in importance. Wolfendale argues persuasively that the rhetorical portrait of the ideal soldier – honourable, judicious, reflective, and unlikely to commit human rights abuses – is unsustainable in light of training techniques that use B.F. Skinner's Operant Conditioning to disarm these very moral and intellectual qualities. That is, ordinary field exercises can too easily and logically segue into a predisposition to torture. For instance, the concept of professionalism itself motivates the tormenter to split the self, taking pride in the "performance of … professional duties" while identifying infliction of agony as "nothing personal." When career rhetoric joins desensitisation to victims' pain by means of an enemy's dehumanisation, ordinary men and women slip more easily into the persecutor's role. Wolfendale asks us to question this slippage and the high-minded military idiom thereby unveiled as stimulating rather than subverting a propensity to obey without question orders to interrogate using techniques banned by convention.

Kaiama L. Glover, in "A Literature of Terror and Mourning," shares Wolfendale's concern for the threat to identity in cultivating violent politics and psychology. Her focus is Haiti, as unveiled by creative authors who have, in Glover's words, "committed [themselves] to writing - often quite literally - under siege." Glover's exploration of Haitian belles lettres celebrates the "courageous and persistent discourse that acknowledges, counters, and condemns" authoritarian regimes and their sponsorship of "endemic violence." Although the five fictional narratives she explicates answer expectations that the island's literary output will dwell on the degradation of both 'master and slave', she also privileges examples of "the 'flip side' of …violence," stories "equally concerned with portraying redemption and grace in the face of agonizing adversity." A literary critic, Kaiama attends to form as especially suited to content – particularly in work by novelists Philoctète and Frankétienne – and suggests the importance to other disciplines of placing the utterance under an ultrasound of language. How hostility is conveyed – does the prose both mimic and critique it? – can play its own part in urging reconciliation or reproducing violence.

Psychoanalysis follows this cue, listening closely to expression as both sign and substance of specific practices. In "Hurtling Toward Darkness: Faces of Violence in the Contemporary World," psychoanalyst Susanne Chassey interprets the text her client supplies, hoping to prevent what comes to pass: "One afternoon, a patient who had been in three times

weekly psychoanalytic psychotherapy with me left my office after her session, drove down to the train tracks half a mile from my office, and sat down facing an oncoming train." The spectacular, demonstrative, even theatrical gesture moved Chassey to parallel the form of this individual outrage to terrorist performances, spiralling outward to global violence only to return to her own person, the psychoanalyst in a one-on-one as metaphor for political negotiations between warring military factions. In an elegant fabric of essay and autobiography, report and *belles lettres*, Chassey writes to restore balance and regain the courage to continue with work that is painful, painstaking, and often unsuccessful. Loss of this one talented, tormented patient had thrown the author herself into depression and placed, temporarily, the peacemaking effort on trial. The question becomes, how can the survivor escape the bell jar of helplessness? If the roots of self-violence grow so deep, how can we begin to heal the world? Step by step?

In Part 2, *Violence Secret and Sanctioned: Child Abuse, Apartheid, FGM,* mind and behaviour remain in the spotlight. Here two essays look again at the communicative arts, reflecting on their use in explaining, reproducing, or discouraging aggression. Larissa N. Niec, Elizabeth V. Brestan, and Linda Anne Valle, in "Violence on the Screen: Psychological Perspectives on Child Abuse in American Popular Film 1992-2001," offer a pioneering study – the "first empirical attempt to describe the depiction of child maltreatment" - which found that, not surprisingly, the (maternal) neglect Chassey uncovered at the root of her patient's disturbed identity is, in fact, underrepresented as a source of abuse in film, displaced by the more spectacular, though less often practiced, sexual abuse. The authors, concerned with the film industry's misleading influence on public perception of child maltreatment, uncover myths and other serious deviations from fact. Among victims, for instance, adolescents are over-represented "compared to documented prevalence rates," whereas infants are underrepresented. Furthermore, "prevalence studies consistently find neglect to be the most common form of child maltreatment (55%), followed by physical abuse (24%), and sexual abuse (12%)." In the fifty top-grossing movies covering a ten-year period, however, this relationship is reversed, with sexual abuse most often shown (49%), neglect most infrequently. Perpetrators, too, deviate in film from real-life profiles, sexual abusers for instance more commonly depicted as adult acquaintances not a child's step-parent followed by an adult stranger, whereas data records the greater danger of close familial contact. Nor is it accurate to suggest, as so many films do, that "abused children are destined to become perpetrators of violence," despite a correlation in sequelae between abuse and anti-social behaviour. Movies err in over-representing resultant emotional and behavioural dysfunction, suggesting, inaccurately, an irreparable damage that in turn can influence allocation of

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resources. The authors are concerned with such misrepresentations' "impact [on] legislation, policy decisions … [regarding] limited prevention and service funds (note, for example, the millions of dollars spent on sexual abuse prevention programs in schools annually), child protective services' [choices] of children [to] treat, … and [public] willingness to acknowledge some types of maltreatment (e.g., neglect) as a significant social problem." Myths suggesting that "victims deserve or encourage maltreatment" and that "perpetrators of abuse are not like us" are also debunked.

Similarly apprehensive about representation, abuse of children and media's influence on attitudes, literary critic Tobe Levin reads two novels portraying activism against female genital mutilation, performed on girls to confirm their identities as women. In "Creative Writing of FGM as an Act of Violence and Human Rights Abuse," Levin prefers imaginative literature to "apologetic anthropological, cultural relativist, or sensational … approaches" as promising instruments in campaigns to change perpetrators' minds. Alice Walker's *Possessing the Secret of Joy* (1992) and Ivory Coast writer Fatou Keita's *Rebelle* (1998) challenge the custom directly without over-simplification. Walker's African heroine, Tashi, who voluntarily undergoes FGM believing that loyalty to the anti-colonial struggle demands it, discovers once she emigrates that she had been mistaken, and that such surgery cannot empower, only debilitate. Like Tashi, Keita's heroine leaves her nation but exports a passion for feminist organizing first nourished in her homeland. "Each story documents a coming-to-consciousness regarding the operations' damage to health and dignity, suggesting that, despite being deeply rooted in the millennial soils of custom, women and girls can reclaim their physical integrity, thereby changing [a specific] culture." Each author urges reinvestment in pleasure, *jouissance* in exchange for pain, the cycle of violence smashed by an emerging critical mass.

Influencing collective identity in an effort to both acknowledge and abjure a history dependent on military might, Part Two continues with Kate Flynn and Tony King in "Reconstructing South African Identity after 1994: Museums and Public History." The Truth and Reconciliation Commission has inspired, in addition to financial and judicial adjustments, symbolic reparation for abuses of apartheid. This means re-scripting for increased inclusion the public representation of history in the new South Africa's museums. Directors are complying but without central coordination and plagued by conflicting understandings of precisely how to create "a cross-racial and -cultural civic identity as opposed to the pre-democratic premise of … legally unequal ethnic communities" that had prevailed. On researching public history museums in Gauteng, Northern Cape, Western Cape, Eastern Cape and KwaZulu Natal, Flynn and King found that although the ideal of inclusive "reconciliation" governs rhetoric

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among museum boards, institutions "have not been able to capitalize on this sentiment [given] that, at almost all sites investigated, the vast majority of visitors are either not voluntary (children on school outings) nor South African (foreign tourists)." Is it therefore possible that public history museums and their narratives can "enhance civic cohesion and cross-racial or –cultural understanding"? Or does this kind of historical gerrymandering bode ill for an otherwise remarkably peaceful transition? Is the identity of black apartheid victims prone to erasure? "A crucial role for public history in contemporary South Africa is to assist in bridging the entrenched perceptions that result in distrust, fear and prejudice between groups and [in] encouraging a culture of democratic tolerance, something which in-depth attitudinal studies indicate is sorely lacking."

To encourage a "culture of democratic tolerance" might well be the utopian watchword for the restricted but violence-prone demographic area under ethnographer Karen Lysaght's microscope in "Speaking of Contested Sites: Narrative and Praxis of Spatial Competition in Belfast, Northern Ireland." Concerned with the "anchoring of group myths" in politicized spaces, she combines discourse analysis with geography to describe the investment in aggression by Catholics and Protestants against one another. A template emerges with which to examine other locations as diverse as South Africa, Sri Lanka, or integrated cities in the American South. Recognizing the complexity of the personal and social relations of interviewees, Lysaght remains impartial in approach, proving an excellent example of why cultures of violence ought to be studied and analyzed reflectively rather than through the lens of particular ideologies or agendas. For what Lysaght discovers is that, although in Northern Ireland since the mid 1990s "a lasting 'peace' settlement" has been continually negotiated, its aim to provide both hostile populations "'parity of esteem' politically, economically and culturally," a myriad of factors continue to sabotage tranquillity. The border between Protestant and Catholic micro-communities "is a space where rumour plays as important a role as fact, where motivations are ascribed on the basis of guess work, where limited contact occurs, where schooling is separate and inter-marriage practically non-existent." In other words, distrust is traditional. Take Slatersville/ Oaksdeane, for instance, where literal "high walls make good neighbours." Here the culture of violence treats these zones, i.e., specific streets where Roman Catholic Nationalist and Protestant populations confront one another, as sites of ritualized hooliganism. At such nodes competition in display of group symbols (flags, for instance) escalates into planned and approved demonstrations of force, some simply bored youth's summer evening rock throwing, others exacerbated into "semi-organised" riots. True, the cease-fire has decreased assassinations, but "tension around these volatile spaces" continues, each side interpreting governmental or police intervention from their own belligerent point of view. Narratives

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show Catholics surprisingly muted about the daily precautions exacted by a beleaguered minority status but convinced that, for instance, deliberate efforts are being made to prevent their already overpopulated areas from expanding. Protestants, in contrast, accuse the government of actually siding with the Nationalists. They base this view on the notion that peacekeeping forces are busier in Protestant locales, policing these districts with greater vigour. Catholics, as expected, disagree. Their narratives reveal belief in "the existence of widespread institutionalised sectarianism directed against the Catholic, Nationalist population and enforced by the passive collusion of … security forces with Loyalist mob violence." As for the Protestants, in turn, in angst over Catholic intentions, "they cannot envisage the end point of [a perceived] expansionism as anywhere other than in a United Ireland, where they fear they will become a small, powerless minority population."

If we envision Lysaght's populations' "anchoring" of their hostile distrust for one another as a form of racism, the succeeding chapter, addressing the problem of inter-group hatred, may offer some distant hope. Eleonore Wildburger, in "Racism and Violence: Anti-Racist Strategies in Intercultural Contact Zones," surveys the field of anti-colonialist and anti-racist discourse. She argues that "constructions of a stereotyped 'Other' are produced in political acts that shape socio-political realities," and that stereotypes, if not language itself, are therefore "essential, discriminatory tool[s]." In other words, "language creates 'truth' which justifies imagined models of this very 'truth'." Because "racism must be made unacceptable as a standard on all levels of human encounter," Wildburger focuses on "contact zones as interculturally appropriate venues where participants re-assess their concepts of the 'Other/s' in intersubjective learning processes." The aim, mutual respect and understanding, may ensue. Wildburger notes: "It is my firm conviction that racism as a complex phenomenon can only be overcome through a multi-faceted strategy aiming at well-balanced living conditions, and, above all, at a different concept of 'Otherness'." This ideal can emerge from experience in "interculturally adequate, intersubjective contact zones."

How sorely needed such exercises remain today is clear from comparison to Rwanda, Bosnia, and other troubled sites, and although Jin-hee Lee focuses on a single historical event that took place in 1923, the startling contemporaneity of her discussion complements Wildburger's concern. Part 3 *Violence and Institutions: Butchery, Execution, Riots,* opens with "The Enemy Within: Earthquake, Rumours and Massacre in the Japanese Empire." Here Lee analyzes the Great Kantō Earthquake as an ethical disaster for Japan, natural devastation erupting into unprecedented violence perpetrated by the Japanese majority on its minority Koreans. What had happened? Within hours of the tremors,

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newspapers ceased publication so that, in place of accurate reporting, gossip began spreading in the Tokyo-Yokohama area, accusing Koreans of atrocities against the Japanese. In actuality, Japanese began slaying hundreds of thousands of Koreans, unimpeded by peacekeeping forces and mysteriously unhindered by government intervention. What enabled this event to take place? Lee examines "the development of subjective narratives [about the ensuing] collective violence," focusing specifically on discourse in vigilante trials held to bring perpetrators to justice. What emerges is "a lack of critical evidence and … contradictions in testimony," leaving the incident an "historical enigma." Nonetheless, an examination of courtroom rhetoric leads Lee to conclude that "debate on the cause of and responsibility for the violence" reveals "differentiated treatment of victims based on ethnicity." Furthermore, the disproportionately light sentences meted out to Japanese defendants not only compromise humanitarian "criteria for moral and legal judgment of mass murder cases" but show how Japanese identity, by drawing an exclusionary ethnic boundary, rewarded vigilante action, viewing it as "sacrifice out of loyalty" to the state. Ironically, attempts to "justify the massacre revealed a shared mode of rhetoric called *public* good as a powerful excuse for violence, defining what the *public* meant and whom it should include," with consequences for assimilation policy. Government's inferred role not only in condoning but also encouraging the slaughter of Koreans remains unclear in these competing narratives, yet the rumours show "how the colonized were imagined and utilized as the socially transformative categories of 'Korean-ness' and the 'Japanese public' were constructed."

Lee's attention to violence on such a broad scale includes questions about the police and their failure to ensure tranquillity. Clinical psychologist William Vlach is equally attentive to law enforcement and officers' ability to withstand stressful, erratic and unpredictable challenges without becoming aggressive themselves. Drawing on his extensive clinical insight, Vlach notes, "When police misbehave, the very basis of a free society comes into question. If an officer harms individuals from a less powerful group (ethnic minority, children, women, the poor…), the defenceless suffer needlessly. This [anguish] may also spark mass disorder and further violence." In "When Saviour Becomes Serpent: The Psychology of Police Violence," Vlach examines the "mythic power of police work and its mercurial gestalt," sharing insights and anecdotes from over twenty years' experience with urban law enforcement personnel. Vlach's "psycho-ethnography of a culture of violence" mines historical background and socio-cultural factors to illuminate the "psychological dynamics" behind officers' resorting to unwarranted aggression, loss of control threatening their equanimity the most. Resilience theory and law enforcement professionalism then inform suggestions for preventing deviation from prescribed roles as protectors and helpers, including

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scrutiny of violence-prone personalities during initial candidate screening, legal sanction, counselling, and increased diversity on the police force.

Diversity, or specifically, gender difference, is the object of analysis in Vivien Miller's concluding chapter about women on death row. "Equality in Life Presumes Equality in Death: Gender and Execution in Sunbelt America" reveals that females are both more vilified for their crimes than men and less likely to be punished for them. This paradox draws on a combination of sympathy, religious feelings and profound gender expectations in the culture of the American South. Identifying specious arguments for and against execution of female capital criminals, Miller wonders whether the radical feminist claim to equality should also apply unequivocally to women murderers sentenced to die, given the lower incidence of lethal crime among the female population. She doesn't answer directly but traces controversy surrounding the executions of Karla Faye Tucker, axe-murderer turned born-again Christian and first woman to suffer a Texan electric chair in over a century, and Judias Buenoano, the "Black Widow" four times convicted of poisoning husbands for insurance money, executed in Florida in 1998. With approximately fifty women in the United States awaiting execution, a miniscule fraction of the male rate, it takes spectacular cases to place the issue at the forefront of public awareness. And although the jury on equality in gender sentencing remains undecided, discussion of women on death row means an overdue focus on prison conditions for male prisoners as well, and reopens debate around the death penalty itself. It also challenges the way violence and identity as a gendered human being, a man or a woman, may, or may not, be linked. In sum, the cases of women executed in Sunbelt America reveal an entire range of attitudes toward violence, most of which draw on cultural bias not uncritical of 'masculine' aggression.

As a whole, then, the collection asks, what is to be done?

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[1] Gila Svirsky gsvirsky@netvision.net.il E-mail to: Coalition of Women for Peace CWJP@yahoogroups.com "License to Kill," *Israeli Feminist Forum* (24 November 2004).
[2] Alice Walker and Pratibha Parmar, dirs. *Warrior Marks*. Video. 1993.

Part 1

Violence in Theory and Praxis:
Torture, Terror, Suicide

Theories of Violence and the Explanation of Ultra-Violent Behaviour

Patricia Turrisi and Michael J. Shaffer

Abstract

Various scientific disciplines offer radically different accounts of the origin of violence, but it is not clear how the study of violence is to be "scientifically" grounded. Moreover, social scientists, biologists, anthropologists, and neurophysiologists differ about what sorts of acts constitute violence and how it is to be explained. In this chapter we investigate whether any of these general theoretical approaches can be clearly considered to be the best approach to the explanation of the origination of violent behaviour, and our specific aim is to examine the controversial explanation of violent behaviour offered by Lonnie Athens. The scientific study of violence currently uses some dozen major theories that fall into four major categories to account for violence among humans. Most assume violence is deviant and caused by factors that preside over the person, whether internally or externally. Natural theories attribute violence to congenital causes such as genetics, hormonal conditions, gender, or pathologies such as schizophrenia or bipolar disease. Biological conditions that are said to account for violent behaviour include brain damage, physical abuse, and malnutrition. Theories attributing violence to external causes claim violent actions arise from gender socialization, mental illness, or conditions in the home, school and society. Media-induced violence is a popular theory among sociologists, while some neuropsychologists study the influence of exposure to violent acts upon neurological states. An exception to theorists who find violence to be deviant, primate anthropologists are apt to explain violence as a normal evolutionary adaptation. Remaining theories hold that violence is random, inexplicable or simply "crazy," in other words, impervious to explanation. In this paper we analyze an array of types of theories of violence in contrast to an approach that purports to be the best explanation, that of Lonnie Athens in *The Creation of Dangerous Violent Criminals* (1992) and *Violent Criminal Acts and Actors Revisited* (1997): the violent socialization of the person through a four-stage holistic and experiential process. We conclude that Athens' theory is not the best explanation of violent behaviour when compared with its competitors on the basis of typical accounts of what it is to be the best explanation of a phenomenon.

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Key Words: causal explanation, causal mechanisms, Athens, Lonnie, violence, violent socialization, best explanation, origin of violence, behaviour, situated human experience.

1.   Introduction
          Theorists in various scientific disciplines have offered radically different accounts of the origin of violent behaviour in humans, but it is not clear how the study of such violence is to be scientifically grounded. This problem is made more complicated because both what sorts of acts constitute violence and what needs to be appealed to in explaining violence differ according to social scientists, biologists, anthropologists and neurophysiologists. This situation generates serious ambiguities in even attempting to ascertain the differential *bona fides* of these various explanatory programmes. Therefore, there is little theoretical reason to suspect that efforts to prevent violence will have any appreciable effect. In this paper we expand on one particular attempt to solve this problem.

2.   **Diversity in the Study of Violent Behaviour**
          Various sociologists, psychologists, neuropsychologists, and anthropologists have proposed detailed theories intended to explain why certain individuals become *ultra-violent*, i.e. violent in a way that does not simply involve self-defence. The theories proposed by these theorists, however, appeal to a plethora of causal factors. It is reasonable to believe, as a result, that the lack of a shared framework concerning this issue has inhibited progress with respect to the practical management and prevention of violence in society, and it is not even remotely clear which discipline is most suited to studying the causal aetiology of aberrant violence in humans, let alone which particular theory can *best* account for the aetiology of ultra-violence.
          Despite this extreme theoretical diversity, etiological theories of violent behaviour fall into four major categories, each designed to explain serious violence in humans in different ways.[1] These approaches are: (1) biological purism, (2) environmental purism, (3) eclecticism, and (4) interactionism. Theories of these four types assume that violence is deviant behaviour caused by factors that influence the person in question, whether internally or externally. Biological purists are internalists and attribute violence to organic causes found in the organism such as genetic comportment, hormonal conditions, low serotonin levels, gender, or pathologies such as schizophrenia or bipolar disease. Environmental purists attribute aberrant violence to external causes including brain damage, physical abuse, malnutrition, gender socialization, media influence and conditions in the home, school and society. Eclectics incorporate both internal and external factors into the explanation of such

violent behaviours, while maintaining that these multiple factors are individually distinct. Finally, integrationists, appeal to both internal and external factors in explaining deviant violent behaviour, but they hold that such multiple factors are not individually distinct.

What are we to make of this theoretical and disciplinary morass? Clearly we have good reason to believe that there is a real phenomenon here to be explained, especially when one notes that various, often repeated, studies, like that conducted in Philadelphia, have resulted in the alarming data that something like 6 percent of the 10,000 male subjects studied committed 71 percent of homicides, 73 percent of rapes, and 69 percent of aggravated assaults.[2] It is surely reasonable to believe that there must be some cause, or set of causal factors, that explain the ultra-violent behaviour of this relatively small group. However, there does not appear to be anything even remotely like consensus concerning how this phenomenon ought to be explained, a situation especially troubling as this issue has a deep practical importance. We should recognize that only once the correct, or approximately correct, account of the aetiology of violence is identified can we hope to have a significant and reliable influence in preventing such behaviour. The point is structurally analogous to the role of etiological assessment in the treatment of diseases, but we apparently do not even know where to start in attempting to explain this phenomenon. Consequently, there is a pressing need to rectify this situation that afflicts the study of violent behaviour by trying to establish which theoretical approach is most suited to explain ultra-violence.

3.   Athens' Theory

In response to the lack of univocality concerning basic theoretical issues associated with the study of violence, Lonnie Athens has put forth a novel but highly controversial explanation of the origin of violent behaviour that is explicitly intended to be the best explanation of such behaviour. This is especially clear in Athens (2003) as critics of his earlier work had pointed out that his theory failed to explain both differences in frequencies of violence across the sexes and across various communities. Athens (2003) addresses these criticisms, arguing that in focusing on the experiences of ultra-violent offenders Athens' theory offers differentially the best explanation of such behaviour. This section summarizes the most important elements in Athens' theory, and the sections that follow expand on work presented elsewhere in which we contend that in fact it does not qualify as the best explanation of ultra-violent behaviour.

Athens' theory makes the fundamental claim that the four main competing types of theories all fail to include the crucial explanatory element, what Athens refers to as "human experience." His theory involves the basic idea that subjects must undergo four critical experiential stages prior to becoming ultra-violent societal deviants. For this process,

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Athens uses the ugly neologism "violentization," and in the most current version of his theory (2003) the four component stages of violentization are as follows:

(i)   Brutalization.
(ii)   Defiance.
(iii)   Violent Dominance Engagements.
(iv)   Virulency.

Each stage of this causal process refers to a form of human experience, but such experiences come in two types: unitary and composite. Unitary experiences are elemental and distinct, whereas composite experiences are agglomerations that are more than the sum of the elementary experiences out of which they arise.

The brutalization stage is a composite experience made up of the sub-experiences of violent subjugation, personal horrification, and violent coaching. Brutalization involves the physical and mental abuse of subjects followed by the shameful recognition of this fact and ends with the subjects being encouraged to inflict such abuse on others or to fight back. The defiance stage is a unitary experience that involves the subjects' self-evaluation and attempts to solve the violence-based problems they face. The third stage, violent dominance engagements, involves a unitary experience whereby the subjects fight, often physically, to establish relations of superiority. Finally, the fourth stage, virulency, is a composite experience that involves attaining violent notoriety, an aura that instils social trepidation in others during interactions, and malevolency, wherein the subjects fully give in to the idea that deviant violence is the preferred method of interaction when faced with confrontation. In any case, it should be clear that Athens has presented a complex causal model of how people become ultra-violent based primarily on the idea of human experience, and, in specifically addressing differential frequencies of violence across sexes and communities, he is asserting that his theory is the best explanation of that phenomenon.

4.   The Nature of Mechanisms and Explanatory Inference to Causes

Recently, a considerable body of work has appeared attempting to improve understanding of mechanisms and their role in causal explanation. Specifically, the work of Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden and Carl Craver (MDC) on mechanical models in neuroscience and cognitive psychology provides us with a convenient and theoretically neutral methodological framework in terms of which psychological mechanisms like Athens' theory of violent behaviour can be lucidly

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discussed.[3]

The MDC theory of mechanisms is closely related to the notion of causal explanation defended most notably by Wesley Salmon.[4] The significance of specifying the mechanism responsible for a phenomenon is that in doing so we uncover how that phenomenon occurs, what is generally known as a 'how possible' explanation. To do this we must construct and then decompose the mechanical process in question into the entities and activities involved in the regular change that constitutes the phenomenon from its starting state to its completion. As a result, we find that mechanisms are complex stable arrangements of entities and activities. These comprise some regular *functional* process that constitutes part of the empirically accessible causal structure of the world.

Mechanical explanations of phenomena are therefore a species of functional and causal explanation. However, MDC are clear that not all mechanical models employed in these sorts of causal explanations are complete, and such incompleteness can occur in one of two ways. First, *mechanism schemata* are abstract descriptions of mechanisms the parts of which must be filled in to capture the sub-steps of a causal process, but which are continuous from start to finish. Second, *mechanism sketches* are abstract descriptions that are discontinuous from start to finish and so involve one or more gaps that must be treated as 'black boxes', in the standard sense of that expression. Black box sub-steps are thus regarded as parts of phenomena in need of further mechanical explanation. A phenomenon is completely explained only when we can offer a full mechanical model for that phenomenon.[5] MDC are then careful to point out that mechanisms are discovered or constructed in a piecemeal fashion, and so typical mechanical models offered as explanations are incomplete. In other words, most mechanical explanations really take the form of mechanism sketches, and are, therefore, to some degree, incomplete explanations.[6]

One aspect of this approach to mechanical explanation in need of more detailed attention and germane to our purposes is how to verify that a given mechanical model, or sub-mechanism that is part of a larger mechanical model, is actually instantiated in some system in the world. Initially, such explanations can only be regarded as 'how possible' explanations, but what we really desire are 'how actual' explanations.[7] What needs to be appended to the MDC account of mechanical/causal explanation is an account of how the associated existential claims are to be confirmed so that competing mechanical models can be differentially compared as more or less correct explanations of a given phenomenon. In what follows we propose some basic conditions that must be satisfied in order to justifiably claim that one explanation is differentially better than another.

Offering a complete account of explanation here is impossible

given spatial limitations. Nevertheless, for our purposes we can at least suggest that claims for the instantiation of any particular mechanical model can only be regarded as confirmed when all reasonable alternative accounts of the data have been effectively eliminated as realistic possibilities, that the differential *bona fides* of competing explanations can only be assessed when there is a well-defined phenomenon to be explained, and that the concepts contained in the explanatory model are relatively well-defined empirical concepts.[8] It is simply not epistemically acceptable in any scientific discipline to infer that the existential claim concerning a particular model is true from data that are compatible with several such models. In any case of causal modelling one must differentially eliminate all reasonable competing models of the data in order to empirically establish some model as the correct representation of a given phenomenon; [9] there must be a common phenomenon to be explained; and it is not scientifically acceptable to "explain" any phenomenon by appeal to ill-defined and/or non-empirical mechanisms.

    If, due to our background knowledge, we believe that a particular set of data, d, could possibly be evidence for three extant incompatible phenomenological models, M_1, M_2 and M_3, we can only legitimately assert the existential claim that d is an instance of process M_1 (or a sub-process of M_1), by falsifying the existential claims that d is an instance of process M_2 and that d is an instance of process M_3. What this highly artificial sort of example suggests is that in order to confirm the existential claim associated with a given model and a given data set, one must falsify, or at least significantly disconfirm, all of the existential claims associated with all plausible alternative models of the data in question.[10] We will refer to this methodological principle as the causal modelling principle, and it will be understood qualitatively as follows:

> (CMP') Given a body of data d and existential claims $_k$ associated with models $_n$, where n > 1, we are entitled to assert that the causal mechanism(s) definitive of M_i, where $M_i \in _n$, are likely instantiated in d, if and only if, it is not the case that there is a plausible model M_j, where $M_j \in _n$ and i ≠ j, for which the associated existential claim has not been shown to be unlikely relative to d,[11] and M_i is itself plausible.[12]

This is neither an exceptionally strong nor controversial methodological criterion, and it seems reasonable to assert that any acceptable scientific existential claim ought to satisfy CMP'. This is just part and parcel of good causal reasoning in the experimental sciences.[13] Controlling for alternative and confounding causes by ruling out relevant alternative causal models is a ubiquitous scientific practice. If d turns out,

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unambiguously, to be evidence for M_1 because we have ruled out all other serious alternative empirical claims as being very likely, then we can legitimately, but defensibly, assert that mechanisms like those posited in model M_1 exist.[14]

So, if there are no clear cases at all where the data supports a particular model unambiguously, then we ought to be suspicious about the existential claim concerning that model; i.e. whether or not the phenomenon is a concrete example of the theoretical process. Furthermore, if this is true, then the data the model attempts to unify as being of a piece may, in fact, turn out to be the result of a heterogeneous set of mechanisms. In other words, it may not be the case that any of the individual members of the partition of plausible theories $\square_n$ accounts for every element of the data used in constructing a particular phenomenon. In effect, in such cases it may turn out that the data is not evidence for any one specific phenomenon or model, even if this is not immediately apparent.[15]

5.   Athens' Theory as the Best Explanation of Ultra-violent Behaviour

Having surveyed Athens' theory and introduced a methodologically neutral framework in which such explanatory theories can be usefully discussed, it should be clear that we can treat Athens' theory as a proposed mechanical model of the psycho-social process of violentization in the MDC sense. Violentization is a theoretically proposed sketch of a mechanical model as understood in (i)-(iv). Moreover, it is clearly the case that Athens takes his theory to be differentially superior to the alternative types of theories (1)-(4) for at least two reasons. First and foremost in Athens' mind, it is based on human experiences, while none of those types of theories incorporates such causal factors at all. Second, *pace* his critics, his theory can explain the differences in frequency of ultra-violent behaviour observed across the sexes and different communities. Regarding this second point, Athens is arguing that his theory is at least as good as the alternatives on that score, and regarding the first point he is insisting that any adequate methodological approach to the explanation of the cause of ultra-violent behaviour must be based on human experience. In effect, he is asserting that the phenomenon in question must be an experiential phenomenon in the sense described above.[16] Nevertheless, given this construal of Athens' theory and our minimal version of the theory of causal explanation based on the MDC concept of mechanical explanation, it should be easy to see that Athens is, contrary to his own affirmations, in no position to assert that his theory is the best explanation of ultra-violent behaviour. This is true for numerous reasons, some of which we can now consider.

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First, since Athens' theory of violentization is incomplete insofar as the sub-steps of that proposed process are not themselves well understood or clearly defined, his theory cannot be regarded as anything more than a mechanism sketch. Perhaps the theory is such that the relevant sub-process types could be rendered complete, but as it stands the theory is insufficiently precise to qualify as the best explanation of ultra-violent behaviour.

Second, as our opening remarks suggest, it is not at all clear that there is a single phenomenon here to be explained. This is true because what counts as ultra-violent behaviour is a matter disputed by various disciplines. More fundamentally, it is not even clear what *type* of phenomenon aberrant violence is. Sociologists categorize it as a social phenomenon, psychologists as a psychological phenomenon, biologists categorize a biological phenomenon, and so on. Moreover, even with these more specific domains it is not clear that violence not employed in the pursuit of self-defence is itself a homogeneous phenomenon. Considering our third and fifth critical observations, those focused on the claim that Athens' theory fails utterly to satisfy CMP', it is highly reasonable to suspect, in fact, that ultra-violent behaviour is a seriously heterogeneous behaviour. As such, theories like Athens', which appear to assume a priori the homogeneity of violent behaviour, are not very plausible candidates for the best explanation of violent behaviour.

As just noted, our third critical point is that, *pace* Athens, the mechanical model of violentization is not the best explanation of ultra-violent behaviour even if points one and two were dealt with adequately. Consider again what Athens claims in his 2003 article, that his theory: (a) is capable of explaining differential frequencies in the incidence of ultra-violent behaviour across the sexes and different communities and (b) that any adequate theory of such violent behaviour must be based on human experience in the sense described earlier. Concerning (a), Athens points out that the difference in female incidence of ultra-violent behaviour is to be accounted for in terms of women's physical inferiority and consequent lack of success in winning violent dominance engagements, and that differences in incidences of ultra-violent behaviour across communities can be accounted for in terms of social and/or cultural differences in attitudes towards and experiences of such violence, particularly as they are manifested in stages (iii) and (iv). However, this is beside the point, as the fact that Athens' theory does explain such features of the phenomenon in question does not show that his mechanical theory is *differentially superior*. At best it would be on a par with its competitors and would be actually superior only if the competitor theories were incapable of explaining these phenomena.

However, things are not even this good as our fourth point shows. Athens' account of ultra-violence and its particular distributive features

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would be on a par with its competitors only if the concepts he employs in such an explanation were empirical concepts that are well-defined, but clearly, on these counts, Athens' theory fails. In appealing to human experience Athens is stunningly unclear about what such experiences are supposed to amount to. In his early work he cavalierly assumes that everyone can understand this empirically legitimate concept. His methods, however, reveal something of what he has in mind. Athens built his theory on interviews with a small sample of several hundred hardened criminal recidivists; he asked those subjects to relate from memory experiences that led to their ongoing violent behaviour. At least three comments are in order concerning this methodological practice. To begin, it is not at all clear that the subjects' narratives are true. Such reports may be intentionally falsified or manifest the misinformation effect and/or distortions of memory commonly discussed in the psychological literature on memory and testimony.[17] Subject's *reports* of past experiences are not obviously reliable empirical guides to actual past experiences. Next, and more importantly, even if the subjects' reports were veracious, it is not clear that they are the pertinent and actual causes of their ultra-violent behaviour.   Simply because patient *x* reports having had certain experiences at the time of a violent incident in no way implies that those experiences were the actual causes of *x*'s behaviour. Finally, given the small sample size and non-randomized nature of Athens' selection of subjects, it is not at all clear that any results obtained via his methods can be generalized.

Finally, and most disastrously, even if we ignore our other points, Athens' theory is not a differentially superior explanation to its rivals. The only substantial count on which Athens bases his claim that his theory is superior to theories of types (1)-(4) is that they leave out human experience as the essentially important causal factor *necessary* to explain the genesis of ultra-violent behaviour. Why should anyone who defends any of the alternative types of theories accept this restriction on admissible causal models? It is simply asserted as a restriction on methodological approaches to the explanation of the phenomenon in question without, as we shall see in the sections that follow, any substantive argument. In effect, Athens begs the question of the causes of such behaviour against the defenders of competing theories of ultra-violent behaviour when asserting that his theory is explanatorily superior because it is not a version of any theory of types (1)-(4). This is merely poor methodology that cannot possibly satisfy CMP'. In fact, he has done nothing more than to arbitrarily stack the deck against competitors by imposing a totally unwarranted and empirically substantive restriction on the explanation of ultra-violence so as to guarantee that his theory will be the best explanation. It is nothing of the sort, and given the plethora of problems associated with it we should not be self-deceived into believing

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that we are any nearer to explaining the genesis of deviant violence in humans by supposing that we must include human experience in our causal accounts of its aetiology.   So, even after looking at Athens' critique of alternative methodologies and his claim that any adequate methodological explanation of violent behaviour must be based on human experience, it is clear that Athens has not made his case. Indeed, as pointed out in earlier sections, assuming *a priori* the need to include subjective human experience in the causal explanation of ultra-violent behaviour simply begs the question against those more materialistically and quantitatively minded theorists. Athens might be right about this issue, as a matter of fact, but surely not as a matter of *a priori* methodology.   Recall Peirce's famous claim about such *a priori* speculation:

> It makes of inquiry something similar to the development of taste; but taste, unfortunately, is always more or less a matter of fashion, and accordingly metaphysicians never come to any fixed agreement, but the pendulum has swung backward and forward between a more material and a more spiritual philosophy, from the earliest times to the latest…This method, therefore, does not differ in a very essential way from that of authority[18] (Peirce 1877, 119).

To accept such an empirical restriction as, essentially, a matter of authority is not to do science at all; it is to succumb to the worst sort metaphysical fancy.

6.   Conclusions and General Lessons

We draw two important conclusions in light of our critique. First, Athens' theory is at least no better and likely much worse than its competitors on mechanical accounts of explanation (e.g. MDC with the CMP'), and it achieves the appearance of best explanation by methodological subterfuge rather than honest empirical toil. As a result, it cannot be seriously entertained as the best explanation of ultra-violence absent some non-question-begging justification for the claim that complete explanations of criminal violence in humans must include reference to situated human experience, and whether this is true depends on substantial issues in the philosophy of mind and psychology. In any case, the *a priori* imposition of restrictions on scientists concerning which types of theories to pursue and which types of causal factors to appeal to have no place in the *scientific* study of criminally violent behaviour, and surely doing so cannot solve the substantive empirical problem concerning which causal factors actually generate ultra-violent behaviour.

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   Second, and perhaps more importantly, our discussion entails a more general lesson about the study of ultra-violence and other such phenomena. We inquired earlier whether it might or might not be worth developing situational interactionism into a full-blown schema, and we conclude that it would be worthwhile, with a caveat. The caveat is that we seek to ascertain whether there are good empirical reasons to privilege on a list of desiderata for a good explanation of violence (or other similar phenomena) the corollary explanation of the subjective experience of violence as a factor in determining future violence. Again, the usefulness of this endeavour turns on substantive and controversial issues in both psychology and the philosophy of mind but is ultimately an empirical matter concerning the nature of the subjects in question. What we advocate as a healthy and sound approach to making progress with respect to the causal explanation of violence and other such phenomena is that we pursue careful interdisciplinary *empirical* study of the multitude of factors that likely contribute to the creation of ultra-violent individuals. What we caution against is the sort of aimless metaphysical speculation that attempts to solve empirical problems by fiat.

Notes

[1] See Lonnie Athens and Jeffery T. Ulmer, *Violent Acts and Violentization: Assessing, Applying and Developing Lonnie Athens' Theories*, Vol. 4 of *Sociology of Crime, Law and Deviance*, ed. Jeffery T. Ulmer (Oxford, UK: Elsevier Science Ltd, 2003).

[2] See W.W. Gibbs, "Seeking the Criminal Element" in The *Scientific American Book of the Brain*, ed. Antonio Damasio (New York: The Lyons Press, 1999).

[3] For related approaches, See, for example, Machamer et al., *Theory and Method in the Neuroscience* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2001), Craver, Carl. "Role Functions, Mechanisms, and Hierarchy**."** *Philosophy of Science* 68 (2001): 53-74, and also Bechtel, W. "Cognitive Neuroscience" in Machamer et al., and Glennan, S. "Mechanisms and the Nature of Causation." *Erkenntinis* 44 (1996): 49-71, and "Rethinking Mechanistic Explanation." *Philosophy of Science* 69 (2000): S342-S353.

[4] See Wesley Salmon, *Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984) and Machamer et al., 7.

[5] See S. Glennan, "Rethinking Mechanistic Explanation." *Philosophy of Science* 69 (2000): S347.

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[6] For a more or less complete account of partial explanation, see Michael Shaffer *Idealization and Empirical Testing*. Ph.D. Dissertation. (Miami: University of Miami, 2000).

[7] The point is noted in Machamer et al., p. 21, and is implicit in the discussion of the adequacy of mechanical models in Darden and Craver.

[8] Of course, given the CDM account, what is required is that mechanical explanatory theories are such that they are empirical and completable.

[9] This point is closely related to Nancy Cartwright's conception of inference to be the best cause. See Nancy Cartwright, *How the Laws of Physics Lie* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983.), 92. To clarify, by 'eliminate' we mean only that competitor hypotheses must shown to be significantly less explanatory.

[10] The sort of reasoning going on in such cases is similar to inference to the best explanation as described in Gilbert Harman, "Inference to the Best Explanation." In *The Philosophical Review* 74 (1965):88-95. It might be best understood as inference to the best causal model. In such reasoning we appear to be attempting to select the best causal model with respect to the data. As such, it is not really strictly required that we falsify all alternative existential claims, only that we make it clear that one of the set of plausible existential claims associated with the competing models is more likely than its competitors. The main point is that one must at least take into account all alternative models that have existential claims with non-marginal likelihoods.

[11] As in the case of the simpler formulation of the CMP', we must interpret unlikely here to mean of sufficiently low likelihood, and, again, we believe that this is partially a contextual matter.

[12] The ''' attached to CMP here is meant to distinguish CMP' from CMP as presented in Shaffer and Oakley, "Some Epistemological Concerns about Dissociative Identity Disorder and Diagnostic Practices in Psychology." *Philosophical Psychology* 18: 1 (2005): 1-29.

[13] For extensive discussion of such practices, see Deborah Mayo *Error and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).

[14] Of course, all such reasoning is nonmonotonic, and so any conclusion arrived by such a procedure is revisable.

[15] This, of course, is a common problem in science in general.

[16] We will return to this issue in later sections when we discuss Athens' specific criticisms of the types of theories with which his theory competes.

[17] See, for example, E. Loftus, *Memory*. (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1980).

[18] C.S. Peirce, "The Fixation of Belief." In *The Essential Peirce: Volume 1*., eds. Nathan Houser and Christian Kloesel (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), 119.

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E Pluribus Unum: European Nationalism or Shopping for Identities in the European Union

Oleg Piletsky

Abstract

This chapter examines the development of nationalism and globalisation throughout twentieth-century European history, from the formation of nation states to the current debates on the European Union and globalisation. Its challenge to the contemporary critique of ideology opens the way for a new understanding of social conflict, particularly the recent outbursts of nationalism, violence and ethnic struggle. I argue for Zizek's claim that what drives nationalistic and ethnic antagonism is a collectively driven refusal of enjoyment. Every nationality has created its own narrative of how other nations deprive it of the vital part of pleasure, the possession of which would allow it to live fully. And the only way to overcome this ideological obstacle is to foster a new national identity based not on an historic and national heritage but on the principles of liberal democracy and constitutional freedom.

Key Words: citizenship, integration, nationalism, national identity, new nationalism, and constitutional democracy.

> If I knew something that would serve my country but would harm mankind, I would never reveal it; for I am a citizen of humanity first and by necessity, and a citizen of France second, and only by accident.
>
> *Montesquieu*

1. Introduction

Will the 21st century in Europe be one of international cooperation and globalisation based on the model of the European Union, where state borders increasingly lose their significance? Or will the resurgence of "new nationalism" and xenophobia result in conflict, as the rest of Europe follows the pattern of Yugoslavia?

The crisis of national identity in Western Europe is related to the rise of a new nationalism that operates at many different levels, ranging from extreme xenophobic forms to the more moderate types of cultural nationalism. This new nationalism is characterised more by hostility against immigrants and marginalised social groups than

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against other nations. As a product of social fragmentation it is moti-
vated less by notions of cultural superiority than by the implications
multiculturalism has for the welfare state.

Provocatively, it could be argued that what drives nationalis-
tic and ethnic antagonism is a collectively driven refusal of enjoyment.
What we conceal by imputing to the other the theft of pleasure is the
traumatic fact that we never possessed what was allegedly stolen from
us: the lack is originary; enjoyment constitutes itself as "stolen," or, to
quote Hegel "it comes to be through being left behind."

Therefore the most important challenge facing the democratic
multi-cultural state in the context of European integration is to find
ways of preserving the link between social citizenship and multicul-
turalism.

2.   Progress of Nationalism

Amazed by the progress of civilisation, Vladimir Solovyev, a
renowned Russian liberal philosopher, convinced his readers at the
end of the 19th century that nationalism had no moral justification nor
was it even possible in an era of tight, multidimensional, and con-
stantly growing links among countries, peoples and cultures.

Almost in the same time frame, Konstantine Pobedanostsev,
the most extraordinary and controversial representative of the Russian
school of thought, considered nationalism an unknown and great force
destined to play a fatal role in the history of humankind, especially if
nationalism combined its forces in a joint conspiracy with democracy.
As we witness nowadays, the reactionist turned out to be more far-
sighted than the liberal.

Nationalism of the 20th century is first of all a result of the
demise of great Empires and social fragmentation. The process had
three stages, starting after the First World War when Russia, Austria-
Hungary and Turkey collapsed and disintegrated. The main emphasis
in the creation of new nations was put on the ethnic component, pri-
marily because the empires suppressed the national cultures of sub-
jected peoples. Although it appeared fairly straightforward, the reality
was different: the Empire is not a hotel where each people occupy a
separate room. Its organisation is less rigid. The Versailles system
divided what was to some extent indivisible. Many empire subjects
did not become full members of newly emerged nation-states but re-
mained aliens. Many Germans found themselves in Poland, France,
and Czechoslovakia and, hence, the "protection" of the German-
speaking population became one of the "official" reasons for German
aggression. Romania and Hungary had not solved the issue of Tran-
sylvania. Todor Zhivkov carried out the policy of negative assimila-

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tion against the Turks. Soviet Russia swiftly "finished off" the issue of national self-determination of its suburbs.

The second stage began with the collapse of the colonial system. In Africa and Asia emerged a great number of big and small ethnic and ethno-religious nationalisms. The Organisation of African Unity recognised the square borders imposed by the colonisers without taking into consideration the real picture of territorial distribution among the African peoples. It was probably one of the most feasible solutions in the 60's; they could allow for the anti-colonial war to turn into inter-tribal. However, with time, that decision turned out to mean total disaster for Ethiopia, Somalia, Rwanda, and perhaps, the whole of Africa.

The third stage was signalled by the break-up of the USSR and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation. The standoff of the two military blocks froze and paralysed Europe for almost forty years. The fall of the Berlin Wall awoke European nationalists, separatists, and extremists. The United Europe project was once again endangered. The humanitarian catastrophe in Yugoslavia proved that worse than Empire could be its hasty deconstruction. Meanwhile, in the republics of the former USSR, there began a process of intensive national development, accompanied by discrimination against Russians and local ethnic conflicts. Discrimination on national grounds was one of the stumbling blocks Latvia and Lithuania had to overcome in order to be allowed to join the "European Family."

Among other factors, modern nationalism is tightly linked to the migration of large masses of population and collapse of the traditional way of life. This process started in the 19th and was accomplished in the 20th century. The destruction and famine of war made people look for a better life in other countries, not exposed to the vanquishing impact of hostilities. Industrialisation spurred a tremendous migration from rural areas into cities and towns. Together with their homelands, they left in an irreversible past their close communities, traditions of mutual respect and identification, co-operation, rituals and customs, everything that constitutes the foundations of national identity. But the individual needs something more appealing, more intimate and alive to rest upon than merely an indifferent infrastructure and public institutions of social welfare. This something to rest upon became a cult of ethnic origin, the ideology of return to national roots, religious fundamentalism and, quite often, intolerance toward aliens.

And finally, nationalism of the 20-21st century results from stress and malaise. It was ordinary middle and lower class individuals who personally experienced the ultimate injustices and discontent oc-

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casioned by world politics - precisely those people who provided fertile ground for Nazi ideology.

To recap, collapse of Empires, migration, loss of national roots and the individual's dissatisfaction are the four interlaced sources of nationalism in the 20-21st century.

What is nationalism comprised of in the 20-21st century? Back in the 60-80's it was suggested that ethnic groups coexisting within a social entity differ not only in such obvious features as their appearance, language, culture, and religion; the most important distinction is rather a drastic difference in the level of education, everyday activities and incomes. It is believed that every ethnic group aims at fulfilling its social or even political role[1]. Therefore, it was suggested that ethnic conflicts are a struggle for resources. Bear in mind, moreover, that interactions between ethnic groups are based on the principle of domination. One is either a chief or an Indian. Yet there is a third option, to step aside and be satisfied with less. Most of the time, however, ethnic conflicts are not merely struggles for resources, for one's own share of the pie, but also for the right to distribute the pie. The problem occurs when all these objectives and faceless processes get politicised and filled with nationalistic myths and ideologies of revenge; when there emerges a well-driven fury of the mob and accurate blueprints of gas chambers. It seems that having survived the two world wars humanity should have sorted its priorities out, tried and eliminated ethnic tensions, and come up with democratic methods of conflict prevention and management. Yet, the temptation to use the ethnic factor as a means of politics turns out to be stronger than common sense.

Arnold Toynbee suggested that the ultimate danger for humanity was a merger of nationalism with socialism. This indeed occurred in Nazi Germany. Fortunately, it lasted only twelve years, and its defeat was convincing. As for nationalism, it turned out to be very resilient, uniting itself with democracy. What is worse, democracy is eager to serve the nationalistic myth. Proponents and supporters of independence and self-determination seriously hope to build a state where the rights and privileges of the once oppressed nation, and now the main ethnic group, would be strengthened and set in democratically established legislation. At the beginning of "Perestroika," Estonian sociologist Mikk Titma suggested that a native ethnic group should have ultimate priority in its territory or land. This claim became a foundation of post-Soviet nationalism. It reminds us of Joan of Arc's "to be free from strangers in one's own country and to have one's own supreme ruler."

The union of ethnic nationalism and democracy gives birth to "ethnocracy," which inherits the worst qualities from its parents-from

nationalism, hostile intolerance to foreigners and marginalised groups, from democracy a false belief in the ultimate righteousness of popular will. This is one of the most perverse political ideas of modern times: namely, the assumption that because the state was justified by and had to rest on nationality, the national state was the ultimate expression of political wisdom and development. When sentiments formerly attached to the ethnic group are transferred to the state, and 'national' attachment becomes identified with patriotism, we enter the range of nationalism, and nationality, which has been the ward of national liberalism, becoming as nationalism its *enfant terrible*[2].

3.   New Europe – New Nationalism

A great deal of attention has been paid to the so-called crisis of national identity in Europe in recent times, viewed as primarily related to the advent of a new order, which in turn spurs a rise in new nationalisms operating at various levels, ranging from extreme xenophobic forms to more moderate cultural nationalism. What this means, in the most general terms, is an accelerating process of globalisation: of trends and processes that transcend the boundaries of national states and ethnic communities, and that serve to bind together into common economic, political, and cultural patterns the various populations into which the globe is at present divided.

It has been suggested that under post-Cold War Era conditions, the nation-state is discarding its universalistic claims and has unleashed a nationalism of resistance to the new forces such as globalisation and increased immigration[3]. Latest trends seem to indicate that instead of trying to include immigrants, strategies of exclusion are preferred and that the dichotomy of Self and Other is gaining ground. Recent analysis of the situation in Europe reveals that exclusion is growing in the definition of citizenship, which is becoming embedded in a politics of personal identity embedded in a resurgent national identity[4]. Ultimately we are facing a more important question: can we possibly have a multicultural society based on a shared political culture of citizenship as opposed to one based on cultural traditions?

Analyzing the mechanism of individual loyalties, Michael Ignatieff contends that nationalism falls into two types.

First, civic nationalism is premised on the belief that the nation should include all those - regardless of race, colour, creed, gender, language or ethnicity - who subscribe to the nation's political creed[5]. This nationalism envisages the nation as a community of equal, rights-bearing citizens, united in a patriotic attachment to a shared set of political practices and values, hence its name, civic. It is believed that this nationalism is necessarily democratic since it vests sovereignty in all of the people.

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      Ethnic nationalism, on the other hand, maintains that an individual's innermost attachments are inherited, not chosen. The community defines the individual; the individual doesn't define the community[6]. This psychology of belonging may be filled with deeper meaning than civic nationalism's, but the sociology that accompanies it is a good deal out of sync with reality. The fact, for instance, that two members of the same ethnic group who share the same ethnic identity may unite against another ethnic group will do nothing to stop them from fighting each other over jobs, spouses, scarce resources and so on. Common ethnicity, in itself, does not lead to social cohesion or community, and when it fails to do so, as it must, nationalist regimes are necessarily impelled towards maintaining integrity by force rather than by consent. This is one of the reasons why ethnic nationalist regimes are more authoritarian than democratic[7].

      What are the factors that differentiate the new from the old nationalism and thereby reveal the new nationalism as more prone to undermine multiculturalism? The main difference appears to be that the new nationalism is primarily a nationalism of exclusion, whereas the old was one of inclusion[8]. Therefore the Other of the new nationalism is most likely to consist of immigrants and marginalised groups than competing nation-states.

      If we follow Karl Deutsch's line of thought, nationalism today is likely to be more a product of breakdown in social communication than a functional element of nation-building. It has been suggested that the new nationalism results more from the crisis of the nation-state. It is clear that as a totalising ideology nationalism is experiencing a severe crisis, or to put it correctly, it is the sense of nationalism that is in crisis. Nationalism no longer appeals to ideology but to identity - ideology is being refracted through identity. It is, supposedly, closely related to the crisis of the welfare state and ideas of the historical community[9].

      Nationalism in the new Europe is, therefore, not about cultural superiority but about preserving differences. Its main emphasis is on the incompatibility of cultures and the inability of the welfare state to provide for all. What is being witnessed these days is nothing other than the separation of the state from the nation. This could be a corollary of processes of globalisation, which have uprooted the state and set free a whole series of identity politics. It appears that the state is no longer dependent on a national culture and has frequently rejected certain core elements. Here originates opposition to the new nationalism and the state. The new nationalism is more likely to develop from "below" and not from "above" like the old nationalism, which was meant to fulfil the pragmatic designs of elites. Nationalism in Europe

is mostly directed against the state in the name of cultural and social identity and is not, for the most part, a state-seeking nationalism[10].

The idea of the nation-state is very problematic, as the state is no longer seen as the primary focus of national culture. The sovereignty of the nation-state has been eroded from above by globalisation and from below by the resurgence of nationalism as well as the rise of new social movements.

The main reason for this is that the new nationalism focuses on the internal problems of the nation-state. Most of the time this type of nationalism is directed against disadvantaged and marginalised groups within the national entity. In Italy, for instance, northern nationalism is primarily expressed against southern regions. What is even more important is that the state itself is seen as the enemy of society, in this case the product of a corrupt political order. It is popular discontent with the situation within society and the state that is perceived to have abandoned the nation. Nationality then becomes a new battlefield in which social identities can compete with each other.

Obsessive adherence to the national Cause is precisely what remains the same throughout this process; here we encounter the Real, that which "always returns to its place," the kernel that persists unchanged in the midst of radical upheavals in society's symbolic identity. It is therefore wrong to conceive of this rise of nationalism as a kind of reaction to the alleged European betrayal of national roots - the idea being that because European integration ripped apart the entire traditional fabric of society, the only remaining point on which to rally is national identity. It was already the European power that produced the compulsive attachment to the national Cause[11]. The ethnic cause is thus the leftover that persists once the societal and state ideology disintegrates.

Slavoj Zizek has suggested that the process of social fragmentation and popular discontent can be attributed to the fundamental nature of capitalism and its inherent structural imbalance, its innermost antagonistic character: the constant crisis, the constant revolutionising of its conditions of existence. Capitalism has no "normal," balanced state: its "normal" state is the permanent production of an excess; the only way for capitalism to survive is to expand[12]. It is thus caught in a vicious circle: producing more than any other socioeconomic formation to satisfy human needs, capitalism nonetheless also produces even more needs to be satisfied. This constitutes a pernicious cycle of desire, whose apparent satisfaction only widens the gap of its dissatisfaction. To a certain extent it is the fundamental nature of capitalism that calls into play the fundamental and extreme aspects of nationalism by destroying the traditional fabric of societal relations and interactions.

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Many social scientists have pointed out that increased immigration and moves towards greater European integration will further exacerbate the new nationalism[13]. Not that the point is highly contestable, but it needs to be borne in mind that this new nationalism, while ostensibly focused on immigrants and other marginal groups, is not, in fact, a nationalism as such. It is first of all a result of social fragmentation and the failure of democratisation.

If this point is looked at from the psychoanalytical perspective, it appears that the element which holds together a given community cannot be reduced to the point of symbolic identification: the bond linking its members always implies a shared relationship toward a Thing, toward Enjoyment incarnated. This relationship toward the Thing, structured by means of fantasies, is what is at stake when we speak of the menace to our "way of life" presented by the Other: it is what is threatened when, for example, a white Englishman is panicked because of the growing presence of "aliens." What he wants to defend at any price is not reducible to the so-called set of values that offer support to national identity. National identification is by definition sustained by a relationship toward the Nation qua Thing. This Nation-Thing is determined by a series of contradictory properties. It appears to us as "our Thing," as something accessible only to us, as something "they," the others, cannot grasp; nonetheless it is something constantly menaced by "them."[14]

We always impute to the "other" an excessive enjoyment: he wants to steal our enjoyment (by running our way of life) and /or has access to some secret, perverse pleasure. The basic paradox here is that our Thing is conceived as something inaccessible to the other and at the same time threatened by him. According to Zizek, the problem is apparently unsolvable as the Other is the Other in one's interior. The root of racism is thus hatred of one's own enjoyment. There is no other enjoyment but one's own. If the Other is in me, then the hatred is also my own. What we conceal by imputing to the Other the theft of pleasure is the traumatic fact that we never possessed what was allegedly stolen from us: the lack is in the origin. Enjoyment constitutes itself as "stolen," or, to quote Hegel's formulation from his Science of Logic, it "only comes to be through being left behind."

As a populist movement, the new nationalism thrives on the failure of political programmes to realise social demands. A frustrated populism, it mobilises people against the state. German extreme nationalism as well as the milder nationalism of the majority in the early 1990s was primarily a 'welfare nationalism', inspired by a desire to maintain current living standards[15]. Indeed, this new nationalism, exclusive in nature, opposed the old-fashioned German nationalism rallying for unification of the country on the grounds that unification was

at best premature, and at worst, something to be opposed on princi-ple[16]. Alienation and disappointment are very powerful motivating forces in the new nationalism, which cannot be explained by the 're-turn of history' thesis so much favoured by media critics in recent times. If the old nationalism was a product of the spread of education among the middle classes, the new nationalism is a product of the fail-ure of education and civic consciousness[17]. The imagined enemies are not enemies of the state, but social classes and groups, and in particu-lar immigrants.

Scottish nationalism, for instance, is primarily a nationalism inspired by the failure of the Union of the two kingdoms to provide democratic institutions-hence the slogan 'Independence in Europe'. While certainly drawing on a vague cultural sense of Scottishness, the SNP does not normally appeal to archaic cultural traditions but to op-position against Tory hegemony. Therefore it came as no surprise when the SNP leadership shifted its positions at the party's national council. Instead of the old demand for independence negotiations as soon as the SNP won a Scottish general election, the strategy is for a referendum of the Scottish people after an election victory. Similarly in much of eastern and central Europe, and particularly in the Russian Federation (with the emergence of such parties as the Party of Na-tional Unity and Liberal Democratic Party of Russia), the new nation-alism is embraced as a direct result of frustration with liberal reform-ism and the new social divisions that it has brought about.

Delanty suggests that the new nationalism results from a shift from state to society and expresses a sense of widespread alienation and frustration deriving from social exclusion and deep social divi-sions[18]. This explains why it is immigrants and social groups within the nation-state rather than other nation states who are being singled out by xenophobic movements. There is, in short, a widespread fear that the national model of the welfare state cannot provide for all groups; this stimulates a frustrated sense that the state is unresponsive to social demands. If Delanty's thesis is correct, then there is no evi-dence whatsoever that, say, the extreme nationalism of the French National Front is related to a fear of European integration. Indeed, the opposite may be the case, as is suggested by the European New Right who advocate a new racist European identity, and that something like a new European nationalism is emerging[19]. Le Pen himself does not articulate open hostility to other European nations and does not oppose European integration. He stands for the exclusion of immigrants from Europe and not just from France.

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4.   European Identity Imagined or Real?

The depiction of a state as a nation-state in the way pre-scribed by the ideology of nationalism is under attack due to the shift-ing of its functions, as these have been transferred in part to the Euro-pean Union. The European states can no longer be seen as a commu-nity that can itself determine who are citizens ("we") and who are not ("they"). This does not, however, herald the beginning of a new 'we,' of the new nation-state of Europe. The European Union does invest in the establishment of new common traditions ('invented traditions') in order to become a community ("imagined community"), but this has not yet led to a European nation. Creating a nation does not operate upon command. Despite all the information and propaganda, despite the EU symbols including a flag, an anthem, a passport, a currency, the European dimension in education through the Erasmus pro-gramme, the activities of citizenship such as the right of petition and voting rights for the European Parliament (with no legislative powers), despite the introduction of a legal European citizenship through the European Union treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam, despite all this, the ideology of European "nationalism" has not yet caught on.

It is interesting that, in an era when national culture is under severe stress, promoters of Europe are codifying a model of cultural identity that has been rendered a source of deep conflict on the level of the nation-state on the supra-national level. The attempt to forge a unified and homogeneous model of European identity can succeed only by recourse to the heritage of Christendom and its modern secu-lar constructs such as race. Consequently, we find Europe being de-fined largely in terms of its cultural heritage, the spiritual discourse of culture from Athens to Maastricht. European identity is thus more defined in terms of culture than of citizenship. This is because citizen-ship is still seen entirely in terms of national citizenship. European citizenship, to the extent to which the concept is meaningful at all, is simply derivative of national citizenship, for European citizenship presupposes citizenship in an EU member state. European citizenship does not then ultimately offer an alternative to national citizenship, and European identity as it is currently being codified is simply a cul-tural reification.

The European Union does, however, behave like a nation-state in legitimising the exclusion of migrants. Within the EU, per-sons, goods, services and capital move freely, but the European Union shuts itself off from outsiders as if it were a nation-state. That points to common external borders just like those of a nation - intensification of checks at the external borders and a common visa policy within the context of the 'external borders convention'. The European Union legitimises this on the basis of the unquestioned concept of citizens

versus non-citizens, a paradoxical situation, and contributes toward the erosion of the old nation-states while establishing at the same time those same ideals.

We can presuppose that defining European identity in purely cultural terms - the Christian bourgeois Enlightenment heritage - is a post-Cold War construct primarily directed against Islam as a post-communist world malaise. Thus, the cultural obsession with uncovering an Origin is coupled with a focus on the Other as a means of defining European identity[20].

Contemporary cultural production facilitates the formation of multiple identities. It is far easier today to have multiple identities than in former times when, as Smith argues, national identity was a substitute for class-consciousness. Growing numbers of people have dual or even multiple loyalties. Now things are more complicated. Therefore, new manifestations of nationalism are far more likely to take diffuse and subtle forms. However, not all forms are exclusionary. Examples can be found in Britain in the rhetoric of New Labour, which seeks to reconstruct the democratic project. It would appear that Extreme Tory Europhobia during the BSE crisis and tabloid Germanophobia during the European Championships do not resonate with the public. This, once again, supports the thesis that ideology is being refracted through identity in the articulation of a new cultural politics in which adversarial poles are less apparent.

Acknowledging that the new politics of nationalism is a politics of cultural contestation articulated around social issues, we can recognise that the issues to which the new nationalism is a response can be claimed by democratic politics of citizenship. In other words, in the present context of debate on European integration, Europe is a new cultural space, for which several cultural forces compete. It is extremely difficult to predict what this might inflict, but clearly, it will challenge the idea of national citizenship.

Obviously, European citizenship is a genuinely new kind of citizenship, not merely derivative of an already existing national citizenship. It will have to enfranchise immigrants who frequently do not have any citizenship rights. It has been suggested that European citizenship can thus compensate for shortcomings of national citizenship and embrace the universalistic norms of European nationality in a new form. Now multilayered, European citizenship supplements national citizenship. This, however, still leaves European citizenship at a disadvantage *vis-à-vis* national citizenship with its extensive history of political tradition to which people feel their deepest attachments. This is one of the risks of a new European citizenship, to remain merely nominal in nature.

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The power of national citizenship is reinforced by strong sentiments proceeding from above to strengthen national identity and make it of utmost importance in the spectrum of multiple identities. In this light the UK Home Secretary David Blunkett has said: "Acquiring British citizenship should be more than a bureaucratic process." There has even been some talk of introducing a British-ness test for immigrants.

5.   Conclusion

The task of creating a European constitution and citizenship could be a means of articulating a European identity built on the recognition of diversity. Such an identity, Habermas argues, "is founded on the constitutional principles anchored in… political culture and not on the basic ethical orientations of the cultural form of life predominant in that country."[21] Therefore immigrants are not expected to give up their cultural traditions but are required to accept the minimal political culture of citizenship.

It is important to point out that European identity, as a real concrete identity, is, like all identity formation today, part of a process of multi-identification. Identification is not confined to just one set of value orientations but is diffuse and open-ended. One can be simultaneously a European, a member of a particular nation-state, an ethnic community, a class and a social movement.

Identities today are not exclusionary but can be chosen. European identity is not then in opposition to national identity. Thus, one of the most important challenges to European identity will be whether it can be defined in a way that will allow Europeans to live without a common enemy and provide democratic identification for a post national Europe.

Existing conceptualisations of identities and citizenship are, as yet, expressed as institutions based on a 'we/they' distinction. With globalisation, the need to enrich these arises. The new conceptualisations and practices concerning identities and citizenship require new institutions that recognize a diversity of actors, at different levels with partially overlapping sovereignty. A post national citizenship strikes us as an important condition for dealing adequately with difference and equality in a multicultural world. This involves returning to first principles and, distinguishing between nationality and political organisation, making the appropriate political adjustments,[22] thus bringing the distorted ideal of the French Revolution - "We are a nation, therefore we must be free" – back to the initial form of the free individual transformed into a citizen. These citizens, then, because free and equal, are bound in a community.

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The fact is that national culture today is not a fixed and ho-
mogeneous set of beliefs, ideologies, and traditions but is a rapidly
changing and open-ended framework of cultural choices. It cannot be
separated from other cultural developments. There is then little evi-
dence to suggest that people in general - the populations of Europe and
in-coming immigrant populations - have identities that are not nego-
tiable.

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From Soldier to Torturer?
Military Training and Moral Agency

Jessica Wolfendale

Abstract
　　It is a fact of modern warfare both that torture occurs, and that torture is nearly always committed by trained military personnel acting under orders. This paper examines why this is so. I argue that, contrary to the rhetoric of military ethics, there is a significant connection between modern military training and the psychological readiness to commit acts of torture. The military profession claims that it strives to develop soldiers who are honourable, courageous, patriotic, and able to maintain high moral standards. These are laudable ideals, but the reality is quite different. I argue that both modern military training and accepted military practice undermine the capacity for moral reflection that would enable soldiers to embody those traits. The modern soldier is trained in such a way as to make moral deliberation and reflection about the legitimacy of orders and the use of violence extremely difficult. Because of this, the move from ordinary soldier to torturer is not a leap but a gradual continuation of already learned habits. Far from being an aberration, the psychological dispositions that enable torture are an exaggerated version of those of the good soldier. Therefore, we have good reason to question the legitimacy of both the modern training methods, and the sincerity of military rhetoric.

Key Words: Torture, Professionalism, Military Training, Character, Military, Killing, Routinisation, Dehumanisation, Desensitisation, Soldiers

　　Torture is an abhorrent act. Most of today's armies officially condemn the use of torture. Modern officers and soldiers are supposed to, indeed are *obliged* to, disobey an order to perform torture. The "just following orders" excuse is now widely discredited. Modern soldiers should in theory *never* become torturers.

　　Yet it is a fact that most torture takes place in a military environment, and is performed by trained military personnel. Torturers *are* soldiers. However, there seems to be a huge moral gulf between the ordinary soldier and the torturer. We generally do not think that soldiers are committing crimes when they obey orders. Neither do we think that there is necessarily anything immoral about the role of soldier and the obedience that that role requires. This raises two questions: how do soldiers become torturers? Why do soldiers become torturers?

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       I will address these questions in three parts. In the first section, I draw a picture of the modern soldier. An analysis of military rhetoric reveals both the military's perceptions of itself as a profession and the character traits of the ideal fighting man or woman. This picture of the modern soldier provides a point of contrast for the second part of this paper, which analyses the psychological dispositions and training used to develop a readiness to torture. In the final section, I compare the character of the torturer with that of the modern soldier as it is developed through modern training methods. I demonstrate that, contrary to the rhetoric of the military, the psychological dispositions created by modern training methods are fundamentally in conflict with the character traits of the ideal uniformed personnel. The training undermines the faculty of moral deliberation and moral reflection that would enable actual enlisted men and women to embody the character traits of the ideal soldier.

       Far from creating troops with moral courage and integrity, modern military training creates a moral framework and psychological dispositions that are disturbingly similar to those that aid the perpetuation of torture.

       First, however, it is necessary to consider the military's own claims. What kind of soldier does the military seek to create?

1.   The Military Profession and the Good Soldier

       The modern military sees itself as a profession and the role of soldier as a professional role. According to common theories of professional ethics, the military is justified in claiming the status of a profession. Briefly, the commonly accepted criteria for a profession can be summarised as follows. First, a profession is defined in the literature as an occupation that serves an important human need (such as health or justice), a need that is essential for a flourishing human life. This criterion is usually considered to be the most important feature of a profession, but the following criteria are also considered important: a profession should have a monopoly of the provision of a service - a monopoly protected by the use of entry requirements, licenses, administrative bodies etc; a profession should require a high level of training, both technical and intellectual; a profession should be governed by ethical guidelines (either codified or customary or both); and professionals should exercise a high degree of autonomy in carrying out their duties. Due to the important nature of the services provided by a profession, the concept of a good professional also often includes a moral component, and the acts and duties of the professional are governed and justified largely on moral grounds. Thus the concept of the good professional entails more than technical competence or a mastery of the requisite skills; it also implies certain morally laudable character traits[1].

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A quick analysis reveals that the military fulfils these criteria. The goal of the military profession is to protect and serve the security and interests of the nation-state. This aim is clearly important to human society. Indeed it might be said that without protection from threat, there could be no human society at all. The military therefore fulfils the most important criterion for a profession.

The military also easily meets the other criteria. It requires a high degree of training for its members; is an autonomous organisation with internal codes of conduct and regulative bodies; and is subject to strong moral scrutiny (from within and from without)[2]. The modern military officer and soldier, as a professional whose role is to protect vital interests, is subject to higher moral scrutiny than members of less important occupations, and because of the importance of their role, must maintain a high moral character. We expect soldiers and officers not only to be competent in the performance of their technical duties, but also to be men and women of integrity and moral strength. The consequences of an officer with a bad moral character could be extremely serious and far-reaching[3].

The military, it can therefore plausibly be claimed, is a legitimate and indeed essential profession, one that is crucial to the very survival of society. Soldiers in the military are therefore fulfilling vital professional roles. As professionals, their actions are justified so long as they further the ideals of the military, and so long as they live up to the high moral and technical standards required[4].

What then is the ideal character for the military professional? According to Anthony Hartle in *Moral Issues in Military Decision Making*, the characteristics of the good soldier arise from three different sources: the functional requirements of the role, the moral values found in the wider society, and the moral values and principles underlying the treaties and conventions governing the laws of war[5]. From the combination of these three sources, it is possible to derive a list of military virtues. The functional requirements of the role - the need for swift and efficient response to threats to national security - result in the need for discipline, trust, and obedience. The protection of the wider society requires patriotism, self-sacrifice, and loyalty. The protection and upholding of the humanitarian values embodied in the laws of war require integrity, honesty, and moral courage[6].

The modern soldier should therefore embody a wide set of military virtues - should display obedience, patriotism, courage, integrity (defined as a consistency both of character and of moral values[7]), loyalty, trustworthiness, and honesty. Of these, integrity and obedience are claimed to be the "*sine qua non* of the military institution."[8] Integrity is crucial because of the importance of the trust relationship between an officer and his subordinates, and because of the consequences of the loss

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of this trust[9]. Obedience is crucial for the disciplined and rapid response to military needs. Yet this obedience is not meant to be blind obedience. The good soldier should possess the moral strength (integrity) to carry out orders that might endanger themselves and their men, and the moral strength to *refuse* orders that violate the moral principles of the laws of war, or that are blatantly immoral. The obedience of the good soldier is obedience tempered by moral integrity. As stated in the website for the Australian Defence force, the good soldier is one who "…complies with directives, orders and policies in a positive and mature manner, but challenges and reports unethical/ illegal orders or behaviour."[10]

From the above discussion it is clear that the ideal soldier embodies a set of virtues that is both admirable and honourable. A soldier who embodied these virtues should have the moral judgment to know when an order is illegal or immoral, and the moral courage to disobey such an order. Such a soldier would never consent to the use of torture. That, at least, is the rhetoric. Yet, soldiers *do* become torturers. Given that the ideal soldier would refuse such a role, we must wonder what kind of soldier would carry out the illegal and immoral act of torture.

2.   Who are torturers?

Common sense might lead us to hope that torturers are soldiers who are sadists or psychopaths. However, contrary to what we would like to believe, studies have shown that torturers are generally neither sadistic nor psychopathic. Instead they are usually soldiers chosen on the basis of their obedience and commitment to the ideology of the regime[11]. For example, the findings of psychologists Mika Haritous-Fatouros and Janice Gibson, who conducted a study of Greek torturers, concluded that

> …there was no evidence of sadism, abusive, or authoritarian behaviour in the Greek torturers before they entered the army, that there was nothing in their family or personal histories to differentiate them from the rest of their nation's male population of their age at that time, and in the years after they stopped torturing, they lived what seemed to be normal lives.[12]

In fact, the testimony of victims *and* the testimony of torturers confirm that sadism is a trait that is actively *discouraged*. The official training manual of the Khmer Rouge states that

> The purpose of torturing is to get their responses. *It's not something we do for the fun of it….* It's not something that's done out of individual anger, or for self-satisfaction.[13]

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A sadistic torturer is an inefficient torturer - one who loses control, and so one who is less likely to achieve results. One does not need to be a sadist - in fact one should not be a sadist - to be a good torturer.

Given that torturers are not selected from the most sadistic or depraved soldiers, but from the most committed and obedient, how do such soldiers become torturers? How does torture become an acceptable part of a soldier's duties?

A. Making Torturers

The words of torturers themselves provide a valuable insight into how they see what they do.

> "I'm here," the officer, whose name was Massini, told [the] prisoner. "I'm a serious professional. After the revolution, I will be at your disposal to torture whom you like." [14]

> "I don't use… violence outside the standard of my conscience as a human being. I'm a conscientious professional. I know what to do and when to do it."[15]

The above quotes appeal to the (commonly held) belief that acts committed by a professional in the course of carrying out professional duties have a moral status distinct from the status of those acts were they committed outside the realm of the profession. To put it more succinctly: when wearing the 'torturer's hat' one is acting as a professional and one is therefore not morally to blame. Under this view, torturing is simply the performance of an unpleasant but necessary job, one that should be done as efficiently and conscientiously as possible. However, if one performed the same actions outside the professional context, one would be committing a moral wrong.

B. Torture as a Profession

The appeal to professionalism is a relatively new (but very common) attitude toward torture. The prevalence of this framework is brought into sharp relief by a study undertaken by Martha Huggins. In "Legacies of authoritarianism: Brazilian Torturers' and Murderers' reformulation of memory," Huggins interviewed twenty-seven Brazilian ex-policemen and ex-military officers, fourteen of whom had participated in or witnessed torture and murder during the military dictatorship.[16] She classified the justifications offered by these men for their actions into four categories: they diffused responsibility, blamed individuals, cited a 'just cause', or justified their violence as part of a "worthy professionalism."[17]

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Of the fourteen men identified as torturers and/or murderers, eight assigned responsibility to other individuals or to the broad socio-political environment. Ten blamed other individuals - usually the victims.[18] Six referred to a just cause, for example that the country was in a 'state of siege'.[19] *All* interviewees cited "professional mandates and pressures as the causes of torture and/or murder" and two-thirds made *two* such arguments.[20]

This characterisation of torture as a profession has two primary functions. It enables the work of torture to be made routine, and it enables the act of torture to be seen as a professional duty rather than a morally loaded act of violence. The sociologist Herbert Kelman describes this phenomenon:

> Professionalizing the practice of torture clearly contributes to normalizing [the] work; it also contributes to ennobling [torturers'] efforts since it conveys the image of torture as a special profession dedicated to the service of the state. [21]

As evidenced from the quotes above, individual torturers consider themselves to be fulfilling an important professional role, a role that is an unpleasant but necessary extension of the role of soldier and which is justified and motivated by the same concerns as the soldier's - concerns for national security and peace. Torture is a profession that requires great self-control, inner strength, and discipline, and thus is one that attracts only the most elite men.[22] This view is further reinforced by the fact that units that practice torture are often the specialised "reconnaissance or intelligence" units that have a reputation for only taking the toughest, most courageous, and most intelligent personnel. Such units:

> … are elite units with exalted reputations within the military or police command structure. If their existence is known to the public, they are often highly respected and/or highly feared.[23]

For the newly assigned soldier, it can become a matter of professional pride to fulfil the high standards of such units.

The use of professional discourse is a powerful disinhibiting tool in and of itself. It allows the torturer to, in Stanley Milgram's phrase, "tune" their attention away from the moral implications of the act of torture, and from the distress of the victim, and allows them instead to focus their attention on performance of the professional task in front of them.[24]

The discourse of professionalism has two other features that

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enable torturers to see their work as a routine job. First, it allows them to accept justifications offered by the authorities - justifications that remove a sense of individual responsibility and that alter the moral framework of the act. Because torture is authorised by a legitimate authority, it is seen as a justified act necessary for national security, rather than a brutal violation of human rights. Second, professionalism encourages the torturer to construct a professional self that is distinct from the personal self, thus preserving important elements of self-identity, and allowing pride in the performance of one's professional duties.[25] Being a torturer is "nothing personal."

While use of the language and moral framework of professionalism contributes greatly to the routinisation of torture, there are two other very powerful disinhibiting processes crucial in preparing soldiers to be torturers: desensitisation and dehumanisation.[26]

It is the combination of these processes that enables soldiers to manage the psychological distress caused by torturing. The new torturer deals with the emotional and physical consequences of torturing by adopting the discourse of professionalism, by becoming desensitised to the suffering of others, and by dehumanising the victims.

Desensitisation and dehumanisation are largely achieved through the intense and often brutal training process that the soldiers selected for the units that use torture must undergo.

C. Desensitisation

Desensitisation enables the new torturer to react impassively to both the idea and the act of torturing another human being. Soldiers who are part of the units that engage in torture often have to endure extreme physical suffering themselves. Peter Maas in "A Bullet-proof Mind" interviewed Major Christopher Miller of the U.S. Special Forces about the training he underwent. Miller describes the process of "stress inoculation," an exercise that

> … places them [new officers] in a "resistance-training laboratory" that is, essentially, a prisoner-of war camp, with guard towers, barbed-wire fences, blindfolds, putrid food, irregular sleep intervals, abusive guards and brutal interrogations…..Special Forces officers told me that torture is not practiced, though they did not deny that physical pressure is applied.[27]

It is worth noting that the techniques of blindfolding, poor food, and sleep deprivation are commonly recognised torture techniques - they formed part of the "five techniques" used by the British in 1971 in Ireland.[28] [29]

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While the instructors might deny that such training constitutes torture, these techniques when applied to *others* clearly *do* constitute torture.[30]

Similarly, the training of the Greek torturers was *extremely* harsh. The trainees were brutalised both physically and psychologically, undergoing humiliating rituals as well as being beaten, forced to stand for days, and denied food.[31] Such brutality, combined with continuous dehumanisation of the enemy through the use of propaganda and derogatory nicknames, leads to a severe reduction in the soldier's empathetic reaction to physical suffering (his own and others). The desirability of such indifference is reinforced by the rewards and praise offered to those who excel at the training - they are the toughest, the strongest, and the best - the "guardians of the nation."[32]

In summary, the combination of physical desensitisation, dehumanisation, and professionalism plays a crucial role in developing the psychological dispositions that enable a soldier to become a torturer. The torturer is a highly trained, obedient soldier who has been taught to disconnect his[33] moral self and moral judgement from the acts he must commit. The fact that the justifications offered for the use of torture are identical to those given for everyday military activity, and appeal to the same ideals - the ideals of internal security and peace - gives added legitimacy to the use of torture.

It is clear that the character of the torturer seems far removed from that of the ideal soldier of military rhetoric. The ideal soldier would be highly unlikely to commit human rights abuses, or to obey blatantly immoral or illegal orders. The emphasis in military writings on integrity and honesty, and the clear requirement that only legal and moral orders be obeyed, would seem to provide a solid basis for soldiers to become strong and reflective moral agents in relation to their work. We would also expect the ideal military character not to be mere window-dressing, but to be actually reinforced in training and in combat, when the stress of war conditions or civil unrest might tempt some to abandon the hard work of maintaining integrity. The kinds of behaviour actually rewarded (through promotions, medals, commendations etc) and encouraged in reality should reflect and further bolster the importance of military ideals. Yet as demonstrated in the above discussion, it is ordinary soldiers who become torturers. What is going wrong? There is a clear discrepancy between rhetoric and reality. Is this discrepancy simply a case of human fallibility and weakness, or is something more serious at work? We must ask: what kind of character do soldiers *actually* develop?

3.   **Training in the Military**

The essential problem is this: routine killing and harming is an unavoidable part of war. Therefore training soldiers to deal with killing is absolutely necessary to achieve military goals. Even if one objects to the

particulars of modern training, the fact remains that soldiers *must* learn to kill, and it is through training that this process takes place. It is in basic that the new recruit learns the less tangible skills and psychological dispositions required to deal with the fact of killing and the pressures of operating in the intensely group-oriented and disciplined environment of the modern army. After all, war is "…essentially the business of killing."[34] How does the training process work?

A. Training the Modern Soldier

In response to evidence that traditional training methods were unable to overcome many soldiers' resistance to face-to-face killing,[35] new training methods were developed prior to the Vietnam War that aimed to overcome psychological resistance to killing. While the use of traditional repetitive drills remained, the new methods worked by recreating the experience of killing a real human being as closely as possible, in order to make the act of killing a routine, conditioned response. These methods were so successful that during the Vietnam War firing rates rose to between 85-95%.[36]

These training methods work by a combination of desensitisation, dehumanisation, and conditioning.[37] Initially soldiers become desensitized to the *idea* of killing. Slang and chants make the idea of killing the enemy part of the everyday barracks atmosphere and training environment. Such slang and barracks chants also dehumanise the enemy by referring to them by derogatory nicknames such as 'nips', 'krauts', and 'gooks', and by the depiction of them as either morally, racially, or physically inferior.[38] Through this process, soldiers rapidly become used to the idea of killing enemy combatants. This training experience is clearly described in the following quote from an American soldier:

> I yelled "kill, kill" 'till I was hoarse. We yelled it as we engaged in bayonet and hand-to-hand combat drills. And then we sang about it as we marched. "I want to be an airborne ranger... I want to kill the Viet Cong."... I had nothing against the Viet Cong. But by the end of basic training I was ready to kill them.[39]

The desensitization to killing is further reinforced by the use of human-shaped targets that the trainee 'engages' – a euphemism for 'kills' - on a mock-up of an actual battlefield. To further enhance the realism of the killing practice, some training grounds use devices such as balloon-filled uniforms and fake blood to make the conditioning even more effective[40]. One trainer for an anti-terrorist course described his methods as follows:

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> I changed the standard firing targets to full-size,
> anatomically correct figures because no Syrian runs
> around with a big white square on his chest with
> numbers on it. I put clothes on these targets and
> polyurethane heads. I cut up a cabbage and poured
> catsup into it and put it back together. I said, "When you
> look through that scope, I want you to see a head
> blowing up."[41]

This process of desensitisation and dehumanisation is combined
with the Operant Conditioning techniques developed by B.F Skinner
during his experiments on rats.[42] Operant Conditioning works by
combining constant repetition of the act of killing with the use of positive
reinforcements to reward correct behaviour until the soldiers, like
Skinner's rats, learn to respond instantly to the appropriate stimulus[43]- to
instantly fire upon the enemy when ordered to do so.

The end result of this training is ideally a soldier who, when the
appropriate stimuli are present (target seen, orders given), will
instantaneously shoot to kill.

David Grossman refers to the psychological mindset developed
through this training as the "bullet-proof mind."[44] Soldiers are trained to
be able to withstand not only the physical hardship of warfare, but also the
psychological trauma of killing and being witness to killing. As a result
the modern soldier is more lethal than ever before, and less likely to suffer
from psychological conditions such as Post Traumatic Stress Disorder.[45]

The attitude toward killing that this training creates is evident in
the experiences of the soldiers who fought in the 1993 Battle of
Mogadishu in Somalia (the focus of the book and later the film *Black
Hawk Down*). In this battle, fought between a few hundred American
troops against several thousand Somalis (both fighting with the same kinds
of weapons[46]), there were only 18 American casualties compared to 300-
1000 Somalian[47] -statistics that demonstrate the effectiveness of this
training in creating efficient killers. The experience of the American
soldiers during and after the battle can be seen from some of their
remarks:

> [Ranger Sergeant Scott] Galentine just pointed his M16
> at someone down the street, aimed at centre mass, and
> squeezed off rounds. The man would drop. Just like
> target practice, only cooler.[48]

> I just started picking them out as they were running
> across the intersection two blocks away, and it was
> weird because it was much easier than you would

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> think…it was so much like basic training, they were just
> targets out there, and I don't know if it was the training
> that we had ingrained in us, but it seemed to me   it   was
> like a moving target range, and you could just hit the
> target and watch it fall and hit the target and watch it
> fall, and it wasn't real.[49]

The soldiers who fought in Somalia were not members of elite or specially trained squads - they underwent the same training that all soldiers undergo. Therefore their experiences of how the training changed the way they perceived the act of killing would be shared by the majority of soldiers fighting in modern Western armies. These soldiers all referred to the act of killing as if it were a game - "target practice, only cooler."

The impact of this training on the psychological dispositions of soldiers should not be underestimated. The soldiers quoted above did not give the act of killing "a second thought," nor (at the time) did they see those they killed as human beings, but as "just targets out there." They do not speak of killing as if it needed serious moral consideration, but as if it were an arcade game. The moral understanding of these soldiers - their capacity to judge and reflect on the moral dimension of the killing - is absent. Modern soldiers must therefore be able to 'disconnect' their ordinary deliberative capacity for the purposes of killing. By teaching soldiers to view killing like this, as a conditioned response, the training acts to undermine the moral agency of military personnel. As Captain Pete Kilner discusses in "Military Leader's Obligation to Justify Killing in War":

> By conditioning combat soldiers to reflexively engage
> targets and by giving them leaders who issue fire
> commands, military leaders greatly reduce moral
> deliberation for the soldier in combat.[50]

Yet, as we saw earlier, the ideal soldier is supposed to maintain high personal moral standards, to maintain integrity and honour. To maintain moral integrity and the capacity for moral reflection in the face of the psychological conditioning soldiers receive would be extremely difficult. The training creates efficient and highly effective soldiers, but disables the capacity for moral judgment and reflection that soldiers need if they are to embody seriously the military virtues. To be an effective soldier (and to reap the rewards), one cannot embody the character traits of the ideal soldier. In fact, a comparison of the mindset of the torturer and the psychological dispositions and training processes of ordinary soldiers reveals that:

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> There is little difference between the training of soldiers
> in general, and the training of torturers in particular.
> More often than not, the second is a by-product of the
> first, with the act of torture becoming an integral part of
> one's duty; a duty that requires you to "be a man."[51]

Like the torturer, the soldier that the military aims to create and
rewards most highly is one who is obedient, who can kill without thinking,
who has learned to dehumanise the enemy, and who has become
desensitised to the use of physical violence on others. Yet the military also
claims that soldiers should possess the moral deliberation and moral
courage to disobey an order to perform torture, and should still be able to
reflect on the moral issues that are raised in situations in war. However, it
is clear that such moral integrity requires the very capacities that are
undermined by military training.

4.   Conclusion

The modern soldier is trained in such as way as to make moral
deliberation and reflection about the legitimacy of orders and the use of
violence extremely difficult. The training of the torturer is an extension of
the techniques used to train soldiers. Therefore the move from ordinary
soldier to torturer is not a leap but a gradual continuation of already
learned habits. The psychological dispositions that enable torture are an
exaggerated version of those of the good soldier. Like the soldier, the
torturer uses the moral framework of professionalism, is desensitised to
the act of harming, dehumanises the enemy - and is often in units that
appeal directly to the military virtues of courage and loyalty.

If we object to these aspects of the training of torturers, we have
good cause to object to them also in the training of soldiers. If we want
soldiers to be able to maintain moral reflection and moral agency, we must
question how they are trained. As long as soldiers and officers are
desensitised to killing and harming, accept the apparent justifications
offered by the framework of professionalism, and dehumanise the enemy,
there can be little guarantee that such soldiers will have the moral tools to
refuse the gradual move to torture.

Notes

1. Anthony Hartle, *Moral Issues in Military Decision Making*. (Kansas:
University Press of Kansas: 1989), 18-21.
2. Ibid, 18-21. See also Justin Oakley & Dean Cocking, *Virtue Ethics and*

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Professional Roles, (United Kingdom, Cambridge University Press: 2001), 75-94 for a detailed discussion of the requirement that a profession serve an important human need.

3. Consider, for example, the unscrupulous officer who decides to ignore the laws of war for the sake of efficiency.

4. This criterion comes from Oakley & Cocking, 75.

5. Hartle, 28-29.

6. Ibid, 46-54.

7. Cpt Marc Hedhal, "The Washington Post Test: Integrity's Last Stand" <www.usfa.af.mil/jscope02>

8. Hartle, 47.

9. A poor relationship between officers and men was cited as one of the contributing reasons to the high rate of cases of "fragging" in the Vietnam War. "Fragging" refers to cases where officers are killed or attempts are made to kill them by their subordinates, usually using hand grenades (Joanna Bourke. *An Intimate History of Killing*: *Face-to-Face Killing in Twentieth Century Warfare*, (London: Granta Books. 1999), 197). The US Defence Department later admitted to 788 confirmed fraggings, and a further 200-odd attempts involving other weapons. In total, "…over 1000 officers and NCOs were killed by their own men in Vietnam." (Bourke,198).

10. http://www.defence.gov.au/army/rmc/first_class.htm

11. Ervin Staub, "Torture: Psychological & Cultural Origins" in *The Politics of Pain: Torturers and Their Masters, Series on State Violence, State Terrorism, and Human Rights,* Crelinsten & Schmid (eds), (Colorado: Westview Press, 1995), 106.

12. John Conroy, *Unspeakable Acts, Ordinary People: The Dynamics of Torture.* (London: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000), 88.

13. Herbert Kelman, "The Social Context of Torture: Policy Process and Authority Structure" in Crelinsten & Schmid, 35, emphasis added.

14. Ronald D. Crelinsten, "In Their own Words" in Crelinsten & Schmid, 56.

15. Martha Huggins, "Legacies of Authoritarianism: Brazilian Torturers' and Murderers' Reformulation of Memory," *Latin American Perspectives*, 27(2), 2000, 57-78.

16. Ibid, 59.

17. Ibid, 58.

18. Ibid, 60.

19. Ibid, 60.

20. Ibid, 60.

21. Kelman, 30.

22. Ibid, 23.

23. Crelinsten, 45.

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24. Stanley Milgram, *Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View*, (London: Tavistock Publications. 1974), 144.
25. The torturers' quoted by Crelinsten and by Huggins often seem to have an element of pride. See Huggins, 27.
26. This terminology is borrowed from Kelman, 28.
27. Peter Maas, "A Bulletproof Mind", *The New York Times*, 10 November, 2002, p. 4.
28. Conroy, 6.
29. The other three techniques are noise bombardment, food deprivation, and forced standing. See Conroy, 6.
30. Detainees from the Guantanamo Bay military camp have claimed that while in detention they were "forcibly injected, denied sleep and forced to stand for hours in painful positions." (Tania Branigan, "Former terror detainees accuse US of ill-treatment", *The Age*, Wednesday, 20 August, 2003, 9).
31. Conroy, 94-95.
32. Ibid, 95.
33. The vast majority of military torturers are men.
34. S.L.A Marshall, quoted by Gwynne Dwyer in Grossman, 250.
35. This fact was established by S.L.A Marshall in the Second World War, and in studies by Gwynne Dyer and Ben Shalit. See Grossman, 29-36.
36. Grossman, 16. 'Firing rates' refers to the percentage of bullets fired to hits.
37. Ibid, 25.
38. Ibid, 161.
39. Ibid, 306.
40. Ibid, 254.
41. Ibid, 255.
42. Ibid, 253.
43. Ibid, 254.
44. Maas, 4.
45. Ibid, 2.
46. Captain Pete Kilner, "Military Leaders to Justify Killing in Warfare", presented to *The Joint Services Conference on Professional Ethics*, Washington, DC, January 27-28, 2000, <http://www.usafa.af.mil/jscope/JSCOPE00/Kilner00.html >
47. Ibid.
48. Mark Bowden, *Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War*, (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press. 1999), quoted in Kilner.
49.<http/www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ambush/rangers/moore.html>, in Kilner.
50. Ibid, 5.
51. Quoted in Crelinsten, 44.

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A Literature of Terror and Mourning

Kaiama L. Glover

Abstract
A developing nation known throughout the world for its seemingly never-ending social and political struggles, the Republic of Haiti was born of and has long been marked by violence. From the years preceding its seizing of independence from France in 1804 to the present day, Haiti's history can certainly be read as a narrative of bloodshed and brutality. Now having closed the bicentennial year of Haitian independence, it is of the utmost importance that we look at, beyond, and underneath the violence of this country's socio-political climate to discover the cultural response offered by its citizens - its writers in particular. In effect, an exploration of Haitian literary production reveals the presence of a courageous and persistent discourse that acknowledges, counters, and condemns the often unsettling realities of life in Haiti. Censored, threatened, imprisoned, and even tortured for their espousal of this discourse, Haiti's authors have committed to writing - often quite literally - under siege. These are the individuals whose works will be considered in this discussion. Whether on the island or in exile, Haiti's writers have been at the forefront of opposition to the country's successive authoritarian régimes. The Haitian novel is peppered with individuals and communities that are at once pitiable victims and unwavering survivors. I will attempt to elucidate here the manner in which certain Haitian writers have chosen to represent Haiti's endemic violence in their fiction, and what - if any - solutions they propose.

A developing nation known throughout the world for its seemingly never-ending social and political struggles, the Republic of Haiti was born of and has long been marked by violence. From the years preceding its seizing of independence from France in 1804 to the present day, Haiti's history can certainly be read as a narrative of bloodshed and brutality. Now having closed the bicentennial year of Haitian independence, however, it is of the utmost importance that we look at, beyond, and underneath the violence of this country's socio-political climate to

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discover the cultural response offered by its citizens - its writers in particular. In effect, an exploration of Haitian literary production reveals the presence of a courageous and persistent discourse that acknowledges, counters, and condemns the often unsettling realities of life in Haiti.

Censored, threatened, imprisoned, and even tortured for their espousal of this discourse, Haiti's authors have committed to writing - often quite literally - under siege. These are the individuals whose works will be considered in this discussion. Whether on the island or in exile, such writers as Jacques Roumain, René Depestre, Franketienne, Emile Ollivier, Jacques-Stephen Alexis, Jean-Claude Fignolé, and René Philoctète, to name but a few, have been at the forefront of opposition to the country's successive authoritarian régimes. The Haitian novel is peppered with individuals and communities that are at once pitiable victims and unwavering survivors - from the zombie, to the slave woman, to the proletarian revolutionary. I will attempt to elucidate here the manner in which certain Haitian writers have chosen to represent Haiti's endemic violence in their fiction, and what - if any - solutions they propose.

Before looking at the texts themselves, it is crucial to understand the space Haitian literature occupies - the space to which it has been relegated - in the context of Francophone Caribbean literary criticism. On the one hand, many theorists insist that a "Pan-Caribbean," "New World" commonality exists among the various islands of the Americas, particularly among those united by a common colonial language. While these theorists define themselves as scholars of Francophone Caribbean literature, they nonetheless focus almost exclusively on the production of Martinique, France's principal "overseas department." In effect, the European critical machine, and thus both the Academy and the general reading public, have had a tendency to pay far less attention to the Haitian contribution, despite the fact that the island's literary production is at least as consequential as that of the favored Martinique and even greater than that of Guadeloupe. This relative invisibility with respect to metropolitan France should be understood, at least in part, as a more or less direct consequence of (penalty for) Haiti's revolution. In addition, Haiti's cultural presence on the world stage has been affected by the high rate of illiteracy in the country, the absence of literary resources and a publishing infrastructure, and other realities of extreme poverty and devastating violence. Such factors have long made the publication and circulation of books by Haitian authors a challenge both in and outside of Haiti.

Thus continuing social and political marginalization have led to a relatively limited and limiting understanding of Haitian literature; a *mis*-understanding, in effect, that is largely bound up in critical discomfort with the literature's representation of and infusion with violence. Indeed, certain scholars claim that Haitian literature is preoccupied with tales of violence, and thus marked by an isolating pessimism relatively

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unconcerned with insertion into the global literary community. Reducing Haitian literary production to so many hallucinatory and sanguinary accounts of a strictly insular reality, eminent Francophonist Régis Antoine, for example, qualifies the works of such authors as Frankétienne and Émile Ollivier as a "literature of terror and mourning."[1] Antillean scholar Bernadette Cailler also suggests that, unlike the writers of Martinique and Guadeloupe, Haiti's writers have somehow failed to initiate or even envision a discourse that might propose an alternative to the European literary model, operating, as she puts it "within the limits of a straightjacket."[2] Such ghettoizing and ultimately dismissive characterizations of Haiti's literature ignore the "flip side" of the violence presented in these fictional works. For, indeed, while these stories often recount the tragic and the terrible of/in Haiti, they are equally concerned with portraying redemption and grace in the face of agonizing adversity.

For the purposes of this discussion, I will look closely at five twentieth century Haitian novels, analyzing the texts in accordance with the manner in which violence is incorporated into the form and/or the content of each tale. I will reflect, then, on Jean-Claude Fignolé's portrayal of violence and slavery in his 1988 novel *Aube tranquille*; on the insular politics of violence in Jacques-Stephen Alexis' *Les gouverneurs de la rosée* (1946) and René Depestre's *Festival of the Greasy Pole* (1979); and, finally, on the "scripturalization" of violence in René Philoctète's *Le peuple des terres mêlées* (1989) and Frankétienne's *Mûr à crever* (1968).

One of the most provocative statements written by Aimé Césaire in his *Discourse on Colonialism* (1955) is his assertion that colonization and, of course, slavery dehumanized and decivilized the colonizer-enslaver; that these phenomena worked to "*brutalize* him in the true sense of the word, to degrade him, to awaken him to buried instincts, to covetousness, violence, race hatred, and moral relativism."[3] I would argue that nowhere in Francophone literature is this notion more clearly - or perhaps more graphically - illustrated than in Jean-Claude Fignolé's *Aube tranquille*. The novel tells the story of sœur Thérèse, descendant of eighteenth century slave-owning Swiss planter Wolf von Schpeerbach and his wife Sonja Biemme de Valembrun Lebrun. Two other characters, the black wet-nurse Saintmilia and her son Salomon, are slaves owned by this couple. Acting in the twentieth century, sœur Thérèse lives in Haiti, having traveled there from France in the hopes of clearing up the mystery of her family's dodgy history. Working in a mission house for women in various states of madness, she finds herself increasingly at odds with one of the pensioners at the mission, an old black woman named Saintmilia. It soon becomes clear that this modern-day Saintmilia is actually none other than Wolf's slave "mother," back from the past to hold sœur Thérèse accountable for the horrors perpetrated by her ancestors. Riffing on the technique of relating a narrative within a narrative, Fignolé alternately

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interweaves and juxtaposes sœur Thérèse's present-day story with that of her ancestors Sonja and Wolf in order to quite effectively depict a society trapped in an unrelenting cycle of violence. The present-day relationship between the confused white nun and the accusing black madwoman is marked by a psychological and at times physical violence that parallels the conflicts played out in the past.

In effect, descriptions of the ancestor Sonja Biemme's extreme sadism dominate the novel. At once repulsed and fascinated by the slaves she possesses, Sonja indulges a myriad of perverse desires in a desperate attempt to engage intimately with her human property within - ironically - "socially acceptable" parameters. Fignolé's narrative makes the reader a firsthand observer of the atrocities committed by Sonja: like, for example, the scene in which Sonja has one of the house servants skinned alive for having hesitated before kissing the sole of her naked foot; or the one in which she has a young slave girl stripped and beaten nearly to death for having "seduced" (i.e. been raped by) her husband Wolf; or in any of the countless instances in which Sonja herself whips, beats, and mutilates the various men and women in her charge. Indeed, as much as she legally possesses these individuals, she is clearly quite possessed by - that is, obsessed with - them. Sonja's violent perversions culminate in her brutal slaying of Salomon, Saintmilia's son and Wolf's slave "brother." Unable to control or reconcile herself to her growing desire for her husband's black doppelganger, and ashamed of her increasingly sexualized fantasies of him, Sonja has Salomon tied up before her and plunges a knife into his belly. Using the century-hopping character of Saintmilia to insert these many scenes of past brutality into the space-time of sœur Thérèse's present, Fignolé makes the point that the past persists in and engages significantly with contemporary reality. He thus refuses to accept any potentially comfortable distance from violent and decidedly uncomfortable historical truths.

Where Fignolé's novel relates the well-known and widely denounced violence of Caribbean slave society - that is, violence imposed essentially from without - Jacques Roumain's *Les gouverneurs de la rosée* and René Depestre's first novel, *The Festival of the Greasy Pole*, expose the violence nourished within the Haitian community itself - violence directed by Haitians at Haitians. In effect, both texts acknowledge Haitian responsibility for the paralyzing violence that so drastically affects the quality of life on the island, and both point to the potential role of the individual in altering this unfortunate reality. In so doing, the two novels touch on notions of sacrifice and martyrdom in the postcolonial community.

Gouverneurs tells the story of a fictional Haitian village called Fonds-Rouge. At one time vibrant and healthy, the landscape has been devastated by irresponsible deforestation. Drought and famine have forced

many of the villagers to abandon their lands in the hopes of finding a
better life elsewhere. One of these former inhabitants, a young man named
Manuel, returns to Fonds-Rouge after a fifteen-year absence. He soon
becomes aware of the fact that his community has not only been ravaged
by the effects of extreme poverty and misfortune, but has also been
sharply divided by a violent feud between two rival clans. Indeed, several
years earlier, in the course of an argument over land, one family member
struck and killed another with a machete. As one of Manuel's family/clan
members makes clear, this single violent act effectively split the
community in two.

> "Blood was spilled….Before, we were all one family.
> That's finished now….There's us and there's the others.
> And between the two: blood. It is impossible to get over the
> blood." …Head bowed, Manuel listened. And thus a new
> enemy presented itself in the village and divided it as surely
> as with a barrier. It was hatred and its bitter brooding over a
> bloody past, its fratricidal intransigeance.[4]

Fresh from his experience as an agricultural laborer in Cuba where he
participated in numerous strikes against the unfair practices of landowners,
Manuel understands that solidarity is the only significant weapon of the
disenfranchised. He thus makes it his goal to reunify the people of Fonds-
Rouge for the specific task of bringing water from a source he has
discovered in the forested hills down to the parched plains, a task that
needs the literal strength of the community.

Manuel ultimately convinces the members of both clans to move
beyond the violence of the past in the interest of creating a viable present
and future. However, on his way home from a successful meeting with
Larivoire, the leader of the opposing clan, he is attacked with a machete
by a jealous rival from this clan. Though felled by the blows, Manuel does
not die immediately. Rather he makes his way to his parents' home,
bleeding from a wound in his side, and stumbling at several points along
the way in a scene that calls to mind Christ's Passion. When his mother
sees what has been done to him, she begs him to identify his attacker. Yet
Manuel refuses, for he knows that to do so would be to reignite the hatred
and violence of the past. He thus establishes his position as a martyr to a
cause that extends beyond himself, and offers an alternative value and
response to the violence that pervades his community. Manuel explains
exactly this to his mother from his deathbed:

> "If you warn [the police] it will be the same story all over
> again…Hatred, violence between the villagers. The water
> will be lost….What counts is the sacrifice of man. The

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blood of the *nègre*. Go find Larivoire. Go and tell him the
final word of this blood that's been spilled: reconciliation,
reconciliation so that life can begin anew, so that daylight
can break on the dew."[5]

Manuel is able to see the possibility for redemption implicit in this new
act of violence. Sacrificing himself for the benefit of Fonds-Rouge,
Manuel dies carrying the enormous burden of his community's collective
guilt. As such, he confirms his status as a very particular sort of hero, one
that has since appeared in numerous works of Haitian fiction: the Marxist
revolutionary. For the author Jacques Roumain, founder of the Haitian
Communist Party, Manuel is the epitome of the politically enlightened
individual. He is the one who accepts his duty to inspire and set an
example for the oppressed masses, the one who is willing to risk and even
lose his life in service to the revolution.

Similar thematic elements inform René Depestre's *Festival of the
Greasy Pole*. The novel was first published in Spanish in 1975 at a time
when Depestre was living as an exile in Cuba, having left Haiti under
threat of death. Its plot amounts to a rather thinly-veiled allegory of the
political situation in Haiti under the brutal dictatorship of François "Papa
Doc" Duvalier (1957-1971). Despite the inclusion of a disclaimer
preceding the actual story, which affirms that the "event and the characters
of the narrative…belong to the realm of pure fiction,"[6] Depestre himself
has stated (in an interview) that the novel can be read as "the fable of
Haitian tragedy, an allegory of the moral conscience confronted with the
violence of 'Papadocracy'."[7] It is, then, by no means difficult to identify a
number of allusions to the régime of Papa Doc and to Haiti's history in
general.

The novel tells the story of Henri Postel, victim of gradual
zombification by the dictator Zacharie Zoocrate - the "Great Electrifier of
Souls." A former Senator targeted by the government for supposedly
seditious activities (that is, disagreeing with Zoocrate's totalitarian
politics), Postel's entire family, including his pregnant wife, has been
tortured and killed in the most brutal fashion; his partisans have all been
massacred. Though these instances of violence are dramatic and terrifying,
they serve primarily as a foundation for the narrative - as the motivating
force that inspires an essential moment of social transformation. That is
not to say that Depestre shies away from recounting the vicious attacks on
Postel, his family, and his friends; nor does he avoid relating the
widespread instances of quotidian aggression perpetrated by Zoocrate's
henchmen. Nevertheless, the primary story being told is that of Postel's
efforts to reject the status of victim; of his refusal to be intimidated by the
constant threat of violence. Though middle-aged, out of shape, and
psychologically traumatized, Postel resists the temptation to flee Haiti, and

instead decides to participate in the government-sponsored greasy pole competition (which involves climbing to the top of a several meter high pole slathered with tar and oil, and rigged with various booby traps). This decision to take action qualifies Postel, like Roumain's Manuel, as Marxist hero *par excellence*. In effect, with the character of Henri Postel, Depestre takes recourse in Socialist ideology as a potentially viable solution to the violence and terror imposed by Haiti's own leaders.

As is the case with Manuel, Postel's actions are meant to inspire revolution or, at the very least, resistance among members of the less "conscious" peasant and popular classes. And, indeed, the ex-Senator succeeds in doing just that. After putting himself through a mentally, physically, and spiritually grueling training process, Postel manages to triumph over all the other younger, Zoocrate-planted competitors, thus providing an example for his community of what one individual might do to combat the forces of violence and terror that define existence under a dictatorship. But, of course, as a truly selfless hero, Postel is not destined to enjoy the fruits of his labors. Instead, he is shot to death by a government sniper at the very moment he ascends to the top of the pole. Here, as in *Les gouverneurs de la rosée*, the individual's willingness to sacrifice himself to the greater good is posited as the first step toward collective redemption and rebirth.

While Postel's death is certainly a confirmation of the pervasiveness of social violence in Haiti, the narrator informs us that "Henri Postel's exploit and the bloodbath that followed it had echoes around the world. For three days, the Great Zacharian Nation ceased being the half of the island furthest removed from the struggles taking place on earth."[8] It should be noted in passing that such a statement clearly contradicts the aforementioned theoretical generalizations regarding the exclusively inward-looking nature of Haitian fiction. On the contrary, Depestre's portrait of dictatorial violence, and his proposal of self-sacrifice as a response to such violence, offer a means of placing Haiti - that third of an island from which Depestre himself has long been exiled - in contact with the rest of the world.

Self-sacrifice and the potentially redemptive aspect of violence are also present in René Philoctète's *Le peuple des terres mêlées* and Frankétienne's *Mûr à crever*. Indeed, both novels feature individuals who lose their lives to violence, but whose blood is shed in furtherance of a greater social objective. While Philoctète and Frankétienne construct narratives that clearly resonate with the stories told in the novels discussed above, they offer yet another transcription of violence in their works. More precisely, each author explicitly allows the violence of his fictional content to motivate wholly original formal choices.

Le peuple des terres mêlées takes place in the town of Elias Piña, a small agricultural community situated on the Eastern side of the frontier

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separating the Dominican Republic from Haiti. The inhabitants of this region - the eponymous "peuple des terres mêlées"[9] - embody and reflect all the socio-political ambivalence inherent in the geographic boundary that so arbitrarily divides Haitians from Dominicans. The story is told against the backdrop of the dictator Rafael Trujillo's two-day massacre in 1937 of 20,000 Haitians living in the Dominican Republic. It focuses specifically on the couple formed by Pedro Brito, a Dominican factory worker, and his Haitian wife, Adèle Benjamin. Strong, handsome, and single-minded of purpose, Pedro has definite affinities with Roumain's Manuel. He openly denounces Trujillo's tyrannical politics, and is eventually killed by government soldiers for inciting his fellow workers to protest their condition. His wife meets a similar fate.

Perhaps more than any of the other novels addressed here, *Le peuple des terres mêlées* is primarily about violence - about two unredeemably, unfathomably bloody days in Haiti's history. What is interesting here, though, is the manner in which Philoctète transcribes and scripturalizes his violent subject matter, allowing it to almost organically produce the stylistics of the text. Placing form entirely in the service of content, Philoctète collapses mimesis and diegesis - showing and telling - into one and the same process. Thus while describing Pedro and Adèle's brutalization at the hands of Trujillo's machete-wielding henchman, Señor Perez Agustin de Cortoba (don Agustin), Philoctète infuses the language itself with violence. In effect, the most stylistically violent passages are those that describe, and seem almost to verbally exemplify, don Agustin's actions. Lazy and sweaty with an enormous potbelly, don Agustin is portrayed throughout the novel either chopping off the heads of innocent Haitians, indulging in violent masturbatory fantasies of his concubine Emmanuela, or doing both simultaneously, as in the following passage.

> Don Agustin is out of breath. Yellowish spittle dribbles from his mouth. Don Agustin hiccups, relaunches his attack….the machete cuts, slices, tears to pieces, fragments, pierces, decapitates. Intestines quiver at don Agustin's feet. A rapidly beating liver sticks to the skin of his belly. The machete accelerates the rhythm….And there and there!, the machete amputates, butchers. Don Agustin sings, screams, bellows, don Agustin howls in battle. Twisted nerves wrap themselves around his knees. And the machete snaps sharply, roars. And there and there!, skins, cuts to bits….Don Agustin sweats, chomps at the bit, runs here, runs there, plunges ahead, backs up, jumps, capers about. Each time he strikes, Emmanuela's legs, long and slender, circle his waist, hug, squeeze, purge his body, immense, beige. And the machete flits about, knocks things over. The

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machete pirouettes. And there and there!, trims, flattens, mutilates, cuts up. A bladder explodes….Don Agustin meows. Don Agustin drools. Don Perez Agustin de Cortoba y Blanco honks. A vagina foams, contracting in pain. Don Agustin rattles about noisily, dazed, his heart pounding in his chest, Emmanuela's legs scraping against his sides….Don Agustin sweats profusely, Emmanuela's legs, long, slender, moving up his body, moving down his body, rocking him, setting the rhythm.[10]

Plunging the reader into the mind-state of the sadistic, carnal brute that is don Agustin, Philoctète's text - its frenzied accumulation, its repetition, its incoherence - is the violence it relates. It is a violence made creative and productive; a violence assimilated into the very workings - wordings - of the novel.

Frankétienne, too, embraces a writing style that draws on the aesthetic possibilities offered by violent content. One of few writers (along with Fignolé and Philoctète, in fact) to have remained in Haiti under the rule of Duvalier *père* and *fils*, Frankétienne's prose is particularly marked by his personal observations of the daily tragedies of life on the island. His response, however, to the realities of pain and suffering he has encountered in Haiti is decidedly non-pessimistic. Rather, Frankétienne responds with an investment in the cry, or scream, as the most effective means of self-expression for the various characters of his novel and as a point of departure for his own stylistic adventure. This is not only the cry of anguish one might expect. It is (also) a cry of renewal. Generally destabilizing and uncontained, the cry offers a fundamental possibility of escape or refusal to Frankétienne. It is an immediate "no" to the violence that surrounds him and the individuals that people his novels.

In *Mûr à crever*, the character of Raynand - an unemployed, socially alienated student - spends his days walking without purpose through the dirty and dangerous streets of Port-au-Prince. He walks everywhere and at all times, desperately trying to make some sense of his existence, yet never progressing and never evolving. He essentially walks in place. In a crucial passage, however, Raynand, overwhelmed and frustrated after a beating inflicted on him by a group of bourgeois youth, gives himself over to the cry as his sole means of resisting the limits that keep him in a state of paralysis.

And Raynand, irritated with walking incessantly and inanely, becomes a mouth that speaks without stopping. The suffering flesh becomes Verb…Raynand speaks. Walks. He does not speak only through his mouth. His entire body describes the triumphant domain of the forbidden Word.

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> *Ostracism and communion in the suffocation of the Verb.*
> *He walks.*[11]

This visceral, unplanned seizing of voice provides Raynand with a necessary sense of freedom and release. Spontaneous and intense, the cry proposes no clearly articulated plan for liberation, nor does it provide any obvious shelter from acts of violence. Rather, it marks a dramatic and impulsive first step; a coming to language and selfhood. The most democratic form of discourse, it is accessible to all and devoid of intellectualism. It is, in and of itself, an action, as opposed to a plan of action. Its utterance heals.

Stylistically, the entirety of the scribal process underlying *Mûr à crever* must be understood as a direct product of the narrative cry. Greatly influencing the tone of the novel, the cry supports Frankétienne's extreme formal unconventionality and the multi-genre structure of the text. Composed of a succession of abrupt and disjointed sentence fragments, unusual language choices, and even blank spaces of silence, this novel resonates with the candor and explosiveness - the violence - that are characteristic of the cry. Moreover, the cry is not only a device that Frankétienne's fictional characters make use of in the narrative. The author-narrator, too, screams his text in gut-wrenching expressions of despair or power. In the passage cited below, the omniscient author-narrator experiences a moment of catharsis very similar to Raynand's personal revolution:

> *In my desire to speak, I have become nothing more than a*
> *screaming mouth. I'm not worried about what I'm writing.*
> *I just write. Because I have to. Because I am suffocating. It*
> *doesn't matter what I write. Or how. People can call it what*
> *they want: novel, essay, poem, autobiography, testimony,*
> *tale, memory exercise, or nothing at all…. I am suffocating.*
> *I write down everything that goes through my head. What's*
> *important to me is the exorcism. Liberation from something.*
> *From someone. Maybe even from myself. Deliverance.*
> *Catharsis. I am suffocating. I can't find the steering wheel.*
> *And I force the walls of my asphyxiation with the trumpet of*
> *words. If, despite everything, the walls do not open, a*
> *passerby may hear the anarchic clamor of my language, or*
> *the barbaric S.O.S. of my agony. I have done enough*
> *thinking. People around me think too much…. I stamp at the*
> *ground. I cry. I call out. I scream. Will my cries of danger*
> *succeed in moving someone?*[12]

Rather than succumbing to the "isolating pessimism" of which he and his contemporaries have been accused, Frankétienne meets physical brutality with verbal violence. Having described throughout his novel the threatening atmosphere that disempowers the collective and prevents it from assuming a voice, Frankétienne dramatically seizes his own voice and allows his characters to do the same.

       With *Aube tranquille*, *Les Gouverneurs de la rosée*, *The Festival of the Greasy Pole*, *Le peuple des terres mêlées*, and *Mûr à crever* I have chosen but a few among the scores of Haitian novels that make a point to come to terms with social, political, individual, collective, indigenous, and externally-imposed violence in Haiti. My point? Simply to affirm that these are not merely self-pitying lamentations or didactic denunciations of Haiti's climate of violence. For in these works of prose fiction, the violence is rarely gratuitous or absolute. It often serves to remind, to redeem, and even to inspire. Do these novels qualify as examples of a "literature of terror and mourning?" Perhaps. But they also exemplify a literature of resistance and aesthetic audacity. Haiti is a country where prominent writers have been and continue to be tortured, killed, and otherwise silenced. It is a nation where, as in the case of Depestre, a book of poems can land one in prison or in exile for life. It is a place where hunger and fear make writing a mode of combat. As such, it is truly amazing that through all this, despite all this - to spite all this - Haiti writes.

Notes

[1] "[l]ittérature de terreur et de deuil" (all translations of quotations in French are mine unless otherwise indicated). Régis Antoine, *La littérature franco-antillaise* (Paris: Karthala, 1992), 144.

[2] "dans [le contexte] du cercle-carcan." Bernadette Cailler, *Conquérants de la nuit nue: Edouard Glissant et l'H(h)istoire antillaise* (Tübingen: Gunter Narr Verlag, 1988), 53.

[3] Aimé Césaire, *Discourse on Colonialism* [Translated by Joan Pinkham] (New York: MR, 1972), 13.

[4] "'Le sang a coulé….Il y a nous et il y a les autres. Et entre les deux : le sang. On ne peut enjamber le sang.'…Tête basse, Manuel écoutait. Ainsi un nouvel ennemi se dressait dans le village et le divisait aussi sûrement que par une frontière. C'était la haine et son ruminement amer du passé sanglant, son intransigeance fratricide." Jacques Roumain, *Les gouverneurs de la rosée* (Fort-de-France: Editions Emile Désormeaux, 1977), 74-76.

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[5] Si tu préviens [les gendarmes], ce sera encore une fois la même histoire…La haine, la vengeance entre les habitants. L'eau sera perdue….[C]e qui compte, c'est le sacrifice de l'homme. C'est le sang du nègre. Va trouver Larivoire. Dis-lui la volonté du sang qui a coulé: la réconciliation, la réconciliation pour que la vie recommence, pour que le jour se lève sur la rosée." Roumain, 204.

[6] René Depestre, *The Festival of the Greasy Pole* [Published as *Le mât de cocagne* (1979)] (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1990), 3.

[7] Hal Wylie, "René Depestre Speaks of Negritude, Cuba, Socialistic Writers, Communist Eros, and His Most Recent Works," *Gar* 33 (1979): 2.

[8] Depestre, 133.

[9] "people of the mixed-up lands"

[10] "Don Agustin s'essouffle. Une bave jaunâtre lui coule de la bouche. Don Agustin hoquette, repart à l'attaque….La machette coupe, tranche, déchiquette, morcelle, taraude, décapite. Des tripes tressautent aux pieds de don Agustin. Un foie palpitant colle à la peau de son ventre. La machette accélère le rythme….Et là et là!, la machette ampute, charcute. Don Agustin chante, crie, beugle, don Agustin hurle dans la bataille. Des nerfs se tordant lui enveloppent les jarrets. Et claquette la machette, feule la machette. Et là et là !, dépiaute, dépèce….Don Agustin sue, piaffe, court-ci, court-là, fonce, recule, saute, cabriole. Chaque fois qu'il frappe, les jambes d'Emmanuela, longues, fines ceinturent, étreignent, serrent, purgent son corps immense, beige. Et la machette gambade, culbute. La machette pirouette. Et là et là!, rogne, fauche, mutile, découpe. Une vessie éclate….Don Agustin miaule. Don Agustin bave. Don Perez Agustin de Cortoba y Blanco cacarde. Un vagin contracté par la douleur écume. Don Agustin bringueballe, hébété, le cœur cognant dans la poitrine, les jambes d'Emmanuela lui rapant les côtes….Don Agustin transpire abondamment, les jambes d'Emmanuela longues, fines, le montant, le descendant, le soulevant, le balançant, le rythmant." René Philoctète, *Le peuple des terres mêlées* (Port-au-Prince: Imprimerie Henri Deschamps, 1989), 39-40.

[11] "*Et Raynand, irrité de marcher sans cesse et sans but, devient une bouche qui parle sans arrêt. La chair souffrante se fait verbe…Raynand parle. Marche. Il ne parle pas seulement de la bouche. Tout son corps décrit le lieu triomphant de la parole interdite. Ostracisme ou communion dans la suffocation du verbe. Il marche.*" [in italics in the original] Frankétienne, *Mûr à crever* (Haiti: Editions Mémoire, 1968), 163-4.

[12] "*A force de vouloir dire, je ne suis devenu qu'une bouche hurlante. Je ne m'inquiète point de savoir ce que j'écris. Tout simplement j'écris. Parce qu'il le faut. Parce que j'étouffe. J'écris n'importe quoi. N'importe comment. On l'appellera comme on voudra : roman, essai, poème,*

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autobiographie, témoignage, récit, exercice de mémoire, ou rien du tout….J'étouffe. J'écris tout ce qui me passe par la tête. L'important pour moi, c'est l'exorcisme. la libération de quelque chose. De quelqu'un. Peut-être de moi-même. La délivrance. La catharsis. J'étouffe. Je ne vois pas de soupirail. Et je force sur les parois de mon asphyxie avec le bélier des mots. Si, malgré tout, elles ne s'ouvrent pas, un passant entendra la ruée anarchique de mon langage, ou le S.O.S. barbare de mon agonie. J'ai assez réfléchi. On réfléchit trop dans mon entourage….Je suis fatigué. Maintenant je frappe aux portes closes. Je piaffe. Je crie. J'appelle. Je hurle. Mes cris d'alarme réussiront-ils à émouvoir quelqu'un ? A toucher une cible sensible?" Ibid, 17.

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Hurtling Toward Darkness
Faces of Violence in the Contemporary World

Susanne Chassay

Abstract

One afternoon, a patient who had been in three times weekly psychoanalytic psychotherapy with me left my office after her session, drove down to the train tracks half a mile from my office, and sat down facing an oncoming train. Her suicide occurred a little over a year after nineteen hijackers took over four passenger airplanes and flew two of them into the World Trade Centre, during the period of the massive build-up for a pre-emptive war with Iraq. This paper explores the very personal impact on the writer of these interlocking events of personal, political, and state-sponsored terrorism. Interweaving my patient's and my personal struggle with her overwhelming destructiveness and how it ultimately failed with the inability to stop the war despite the unprecedented mobilization of voices for peace across the world, it is a journey through the shattering impact of violence into the tentative discovery of a sustaining vision of hope. It explores the theme of terrorism, both personal and political, as a theatre of violence designed to create maximum impact, and how fantasies of redemption, fuelled and blinded by righteous certainty, can transmute into acts of breathtaking violence, finding justification in their own mad logic. Through the elaboration of my patient's story and its impact on me, I offer a very personal attempt to understand and come to terms with violence and destructiveness as manifested in these different forms, to understand how openings of hope and new creative possibility are often followed by a violent regressive backlash, and to find a way to survive them without losing heart for the work.

Key words: psychoanalysis, suicide, terrorism, state-sponsored violence.

One Monday afternoon, a patient who had been in three times weekly psychoanalytic psychotherapy with me for more than five years left my office after her session, drove down to the train tracks, and sat down facing an on-coming train.

A little over a year previously, nineteen hijackers took over four passenger airplanes and flew two of them into the world trade centre.

As I wrote this, the country that has the largest and most powerful military the world has ever known was preparing to attack a country already decimated by twelve years of sanctions, raining down a

greater quantity of missiles in two days on the capital than was dropped in the entire forty days of the previous Gulf War in a tactic known as "shock and awe," designed to stun the country into submission.

Three major acts of violence, each with their particular intent or rationale, each in their own way leaving me stunned, horrified, in awe of the shapes that human destructiveness can take. All three of them contain within their particular logic a fantasy of an act of transformative love, of redemption, of salvation even. Each of them trail, in the shadow of their fanatic intent, a wake of destruction that will keep reverberating out into the future, bearing unimaginable consequences.

Jergensmeyer[1] writes of terrorism as a kind of performance violence, violence as theatre designed to have maximum impact upon its audience. Who will ever be able to forget the images of those planes flying into the twin towers of the World Trade Centre, symbol of the greatest achievement of Western materialist culture, their spectacular crumbling, like a pair of venerated idols brought to their knees? Good theatre attempts to be unforgettable in its impact, and, for the hijackers, that was a masterpiece of terrorism as theatre, rendered both horrifically memorable and enduring. Its audience: firstly the American people, left with a feeling of safety shattered irrevocably, terror brought home to their own doorstep. Its secondary audience - the disenfranchised in the Arab world who become the recruits for Bin Laden and his ilk, treated to a modern day spectacle of David and Goliath. Its impact - a terrible hope; there is a way to stand up to the overwhelming military and economic force of the most powerful country the world has ever known, a way that is brutal, deadly, and - in its own manner - effective.

Likewise, the US Administration's plan for the war with Iraq, especially the tactic of "Shock and Awe," is the unfolding of a plan from a secret policy outlined by the Department of Defence entitled "Essentials of Post-Cold War Deterrence." It advocates that the US exploit its vast military resources in order to intentionally portray itself as "irrational and vindictive if its vital interests are attacked."[2] Also theatre. Overwhelm with the threat of massive force in order to terrorize others into compliance. Audience: any country that stands in the way of US interests. Impact - dread, leading to submission to US hegemony.

Overwhelming force: picture a young woman, in her early thirties walking out onto the train tracks in front of witnesses, sitting down, her long fine dark hair blowing across her face, her eyes ablaze, as the train hurtles toward her, to the moment of shattering impact. Literally. The police couldn't find enough of her body to take a fingerprint for identification. As in all good theatre, choice of setting is important, the right stage for the act that is to follow. Just in case the act itself were not unforgettable enough, one of the signatures of my office is the sound of

the trains less than half a mile away. They can be heard at least twenty times a day.

Audience: me. Impact - shock and awe. Followed by rage, guilt, grief, disbelief. Every detail of the act seems so over the top, a mind-numbing exaggeration. She had to face the train rather than have her back to it. As if in defiance, or to underscore the utter deliberation of the act, rendering it that much more unforgettable. To immortalize it, elevate it to an act of mythic theatre, up there with Iphigenia or Antigone. For a long time it was hard to stop trying to imagine her state of mind in that moment, those few seconds, with the train bearing down on her slender defiant body, big as a daisy-cutter, equally deadly. Was she thinking that the image of her facing down that on-coming train would burn itself into my soul forever, immortalized by the sound of the trains that I hear every day? Or had she in fact evacuated thought, as if going through the motions of some deadly, pre-ordained dance?

Given the backdrop of events playing out on the political stage, the continuing storm of the "war on terror," alternate voices attempting to speak for peace and negotiation going unheard, it seemed synchronous to think of her suicide as an act of terrorism, staged for maximum destructive impact. Even though she had a history of serious suicide attempts and hospitalizations dating back to when she was sixteen years old, none were as dramatic as this one. Nor, obviously, as final. Three years previously, after the last session before my vacation, she had gone home, e-mailed me a suicide letter, swallowed a bottle of pills, and put a bag over her head, as instructed in the book *Final Exit*.[3] For some unknown reason, very out of the norm for me, I checked my e-mail between patients, found her note, sent the police over, and she was found in time. It seemed uncanny - as if by some miracle I had saved her life. Such events cannot help but fuel omnipotence, the fantasy that somehow I would know if she was truly suicidal and be able to save her.

Salvation - and its refusal - was a major theme of the treatment, her longing to be saved, her rage at me for not being the mother that would save her, counterbalanced by the on-going struggle with her destructiveness. The intensity of her need was infused with hatred and desperation, and her constant suicidal ideation made it impossible to distinguish a true threat from a need to create impact. And create impact is what she did in the end, going out in a blaze of hatred, spreading waves of damage in her wake.

Yet, right alongside her dramas of destructiveness and shattering pain were threads of beauty that ultimately proved too tenuous to hold on to. There were pathways of deep recognition between us, ways that we had access to each other's interior that were both illuminating and blinding. Too much love in this work can put us on a dangerous edge, too raw and close to our own unconscious. Early on I had a feel for her

particular aesthetic; it showed itself in a shared love of language and metaphor and a compatibility of humour, a deep appreciation of a certain kind of intelligence and questioning. Yet, more fundamental than this, there was a way in which her soul's beauty was transparent to me, and my own resonance to it may have ultimately deceived me into believing that this beauty that I saw and cherished in her was what was most truly real about her, more than the storms of destructiveness that kept obscuring it. Or perhaps this is what kept her alive as long as it did. It is certainly what made the betrayal even more unfathomable.

In the first few weeks after her suicide her hatred of life became my hatred of her. My stomach burned with the impact of the violence of her death, as if I too had received a body blow. I was rendered mute by the enormity of this act of self-murder. I found myself groping for some diagnostic refuge to render it more digestible. Should I call it sociopathy? Malignant narcissism? Or simply pure hate? Whatever I called it did not quite explain it; I was too enmeshed in the theatre of it to drain the rawness of impact from my body. The essence of terrorism is to leave a residue of shock in the body that can never be fully eradicated. That's how it becomes immortalized.

Let me give a little history to put her story in context. Anne was a quintessential good girl, a suicidal good girl, a very depressed good girl. She felt that her mother hated her aliveness and her separateness, so that she learned how to play dead, how to exhibit the bare minimum of independent strivings. The passivity and leadenness of her body obscured the lively intelligence and fury that she held secret in her interior. In her story few words were said between her mother and her. An undertow of murderous silence formed the texture of their relationship, a kind of muted toxicity where a look could deliver a body blow. It was only much later in treatment that I began to form a picture of her mother as having been clinically depressed when Anne was a child. It is possible that Anne filled the absence of connection between her mother and her with a fantasy of her mother's hatred of her. Hatred is so much more substantial than indifference. At least it registers impact.

She made her first suicide attempt at 16, and was so debilitated by it that she spent much of the following year being home-schooled. She was a brilliant student, but all pleasure in her intelligence was wiped out by a ruthless perfectionism that could masterfully deconstruct meaning into lifeless pieces. She experienced her mother as encouraging her in this process, the murderous slash of her red pen as she went over her daughter's homework sacrificed her words on the altar of good grammar and perfect punctuation, so that what was left was contaminated by a hidden hatred that masked itself as a consuming insecurity. Nothing was ever good enough to please the god of perfection, who became enshrined in her psyche as an implacable tyrant who demanded total obedience. It

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was a pact with the devil - aliveness and creative excitement in exchange for absolute perfectionism, unassailable as a fortress.

At 19 she left home to get married. She converted to a fundamentalist religion, where she became a star student. She had found the perfect arena in which to be a perfect good girl, in which the rules for being good were absolutely clear and spelled out in writing. Such a relief after the rules of her internal mother whose primary injunction had to be left unspoken: thou shalt not separate, thou shalt not have a mind of thine own.

During the 10 years of her marriage she and her husband tried very hard to get pregnant, and went through several rounds of IVF, each of which failed. She made several suicide attempts during this period, and was found each time by her husband. She came to me for treatment part way through this process, soon after her fourth suicide attempt. A couple of years into treatment with me she left her husband, left what she came to call "the cult," took off to Nepal on a trek, and, miraculously, got pregnant. Three years later, she killed herself.

On the surface she seemed painfully shy, extremely fragile, watchful, yet there was a sense of bristly tension just beneath the surface that could make approaching her quite harrowing. Beneath her shy exterior, I was aware of a force to her being, a stubbornness, a wilfulness, and a ferocious intelligence. She had a compelling victim story - a toxic, barely articulated relationship with her mother; an absence of relationship with a wraith of a father who left her mother to her as if to say: I can't handle her, I hope you can do better; a recent abandonment by a therapist from whom she had craved mothering, who she felt had given it to her and then abandoned her; two failed cycles of IVF, and desperate feelings of loneliness, despair, and utter hopelessness.

Her fears of my abandoning her dominated the first phase of the treatment, along with her dread that she was damaged as a woman and couldn't be a mother. Desperation on both fronts escalated through a third IVF cycle and its subsequent failure, turbo-charged by massive hormone injections, and the urgency of it was so pressing that it took me a while to recognize the rage and hate that lay underneath. It had to first germinate in me, in a building irritation in reaction to my answering machine being filled with her lengthy messages, in the tension of her long silences in sessions that began to take on the deadly, oppressive quality of a power struggle, in her continuous demands for more that required me to be constantly saying no to her and then be punished by her silent accusatory devastation.

It was after her first suicide attempt while working with me, one year into the treatment, that hate and destructiveness began to fully enter our discourse. I began to understand how, in her lengthy oppressive silences where she proclaimed herself unable to think, she was actively

murdering thought. There would be a blaze of what I came to recognize as
hate in her left eye, while her right eye and the rest of her face was
wooden, mask-like, obdurate, as if she had vacated the premises. Longing
for suicide was her impenetrable mantra, desperately clinging to me was
her way of pushing me away, and the combination of both rendered me as
helpless and enraged as she felt.

        Over time I learned how to speak to that blaze in her left eye, and
slowly, painstakingly, we began to rework her language from the victim-
speak of "I can't" to the raging of "I won't." She had a fury toward life
and every element of it that would not accede to her demands, and during
the process of our discovering language for this fury she played it out with
full force against me. She hovered on the edge of suicide for months,
compelling both her mother and her husband to watch over her
continuously, at the mercy of her relentless death-wish.

        During this period we began to understand how she used
helplessness coercively to get others to take care of her. She caught
glimpses, beneath her paralysis and fear of doing new things, of a part of
her that she called evil, immoral, envious, that cared about nothing and no
one, that sought only the immediate gratification of her will. I imagined
this part of her as an unfolding of a long silenced enraged refusal, the no
she was never able to say to her mother while she lived out the decoy of
the good little girl. Only after her suicide did I recognize how I may have
avoided seeing the depth of the warp in her character, the malevolence that
lived alongside other, healthier parts of her that truly wanted to heal and to
love. From within the warp, she hated love - her own or mine - because it
would make her have to face her pain. So instead she gave herself over to
this damaged part of her, which seemed to possess a terrifying power, and
while she froze before it, others around her absorbed its impact and gave
in to it. Often I found myself having to backtrack out of a lethal
compliance with her insatiable demands and then face down her
murderous silent rage with the threat of her suicide or ending treatment
hanging over us.

        As we struggled with her hatred of life and the murderous mother
that lived inside of her, she began to write. She was a brilliant writer -
letters, essays, poetry. A richness of language and thought and imagery
burst forth out of the once evacuated black holes of her psyche, as if they
had been secretly composting in the density of compressed rage. The
power of it stunned us both. Surely the creative force must win out,
birthed as it was in the spaces of such agony, so much rage. It was easy to
be seduced by such creativity and brilliance, to see this emergence into the
power of her own mind as something of a miracle.

        When she left her husband and got pregnant scarcely a month
later in an affair with a sherpa while on a trek in Nepal - this woman who
could barely drag herself out of bed in the mornings, who suffered from

numerous chronic pain conditions, who was diagnosed as infertile, it seemed like a further miracle, a testament to the victory of the life force over her thrall to the compulsive undoing of death.

Her writing was prolific during her pregnancy. She wrote a book of poetry, took writing classes, learned how to live alone, and alongside all this new life growing we struggled with waves of destructiveness in response to any failing of mine, any frustration that life might deal her, any anxieties around her writing. The fantasy of suicide continued to be her refuge, but now we could speak of it as such, track its movements, decode its attempts at coercion and control, recognize it as a hatred of life that was her own, not just her mother's. At times it seemed an almost impossible coexistence, this relentless longing for death alongside all this new life bursting out everywhere. But it seemed that life was winning.

She gave birth to a healthy son who was by nature vigorous, curious, full of energy, so very different from how she had been as a child. Envy moved in the shadows, gathering force. She was happy that he was so much more alive than she had been at his age. She took this as proof that she had become a better mother than her own mother, and yet… He became a toddler; she could barely keep up with his energy. He demanded her constant attention. Then, she lost her apartment, and decided to move in with her parents for a while and save money while she prepared to go to graduate school. She was exhausted with being the sole caretaker for her son, and felt that she could really do with her parents' help for a while. We knew it would be high risk, exposing her to the seductive pull to regression and passivity that she associated with being around her mother.

The downward slide happened fast. Not even a combination of anti-depressants and anti-psychotic medications could slow the rip current. Seeds that had been present throughout the treatment but interwoven with other less damaged parts of her now sprouted and grew as if her parents' home provided some kind of monstrous fertilizer for the darkest part of her, while everything life-giving withered.

There was a dark flowering of her sense of entitlement, her conviction that her suffering so exceeded anyone else's that her demands for its rectification took on the force of absolute imperatives. Her personality began to congeal around a stance of refusal toward life, refusal of anything that would not conform to the force of her will. She began to insist on the truth of irrevocable, irremediable damage to which no goodness, nothing that we had done together, could possibly adhere. A vortex of negativity opened up in her that rendered null, annihilated, any good moment between us, any tendril of hope.

It was excruciating to allow that all the good work we had done together was an illusion that could be so swiftly dispelled, replaced by the deadly tango of homicidal mother and passive suicidal child that had been the template of her growing up years. I fought to impose meaning and

intentionality on the state she had surrendered herself to. I tried to show her how she strove to control her mother by her passivity and suffering, her needs converted into mute and deadly demands, the intensity of which rendered them non-negotiable and turned her mother into her slave. Between us, it was as if I was both the tyrant attempting to coerce her into life, sealing off her escape routes, and simultaneously the victim rendered powerless in the face of her deadly intent. It became hard to tell who was at the mercy of whom. Tyrant and victim were becoming indistinguishable from each other.

As we struggled with the implacable force of her negativity, I kept believing, hoping, that something in her as well as me wanted to be able to get traction against the inexorable downward pull that held her in its grip. And there were moments when that seemed to be so. But somewhere I began to sense that what she truly wanted was violent impact - on me, on her mother, even on her son. It was as if she wanted to break through the restrictive barrier of skin and implant herself in our blood and bones, enshrine herself centre stage in our very beings, immortalized, in the dark fury of her final assertion - here I am!

In the rapid descent of those last few weeks I started to feel something almost immoral, corrupt even, in the way she was using her sense of irrevocable damage, twisting it into a justification for any act of giving up, for the possibility of suicide. She was able to direct it with absolute precision to obliterate each piece of potential meaning or possibility for productive struggle that I could offer. Finally, it obliterated all contact between us. All that was left was the last look that she branded me with, that triumphal blaze of hatred in her eyes. She - or it - had won.

Bion[4] speaks of a force of destruction rolling on like a black wave into infinity, a vast impersonal force that swallows personality whole. I imagine a flash of pleasure in her at the end, surrendering herself to it in an orgasm of violent impact. What a triumphant, unforgettable last word. If life were a chess game, I could imagine bowing to her, such a checkmate did she pull off. The way she did it was so inexorably her.

Her suicide ushered in a deep crisis of faith for me. What is the value of this work when it comes to such a traumatic end? Is it truly rendered null, as she tried to have me believe? In the early days after her death I felt possessed by rage, the impact of her expression of rage, my rage at her, her rage at life. I was left with a feeling that she had won, that her last word trumped any small piece of faith that I might hold on to; faith that this work might have meaning no matter what the outcome. I could feel the force of destructiveness enfolding me, depression settling over me like ash, muffling me into silence. What could possibly be said to that last word of hers? It was as if I tried to say to her: you cannot kill creativity, life force, hope; you don't get to annihilate the good. Both are true. And she responded with - I'll show you. Watch me.

And I was stunned into agreement. Yes, it seemed, darkness wins. I was left feeling used, betrayed, violated, spat out. Perhaps she was right - all that creativity, the awakening of a new independent self in her, the seemingly miraculous birth of her child, was all an illusion, a thin veneer covering the terrible truth revealed by her final act. It was as if I was sliding down the precipice with her into a rigidly demarcated black and white world, I the one speaking for life and meaning and hope trumped by her darkness, her triumphant last word. In the world of the power struggle, whoever says no wins. So of course her "no" to life must win.

In that bleak view, the treatment ends with her suicide. Value is determined by outcome, just like in managed care - the checklist of symptoms successfully mastered is all that counts. By all objective measurements this treatment must be considered a failure. In parallel with this struggle the US gathered itself toward a pre-emptive war with Iraq in a sharp intensification of the movement toward world domination through use of force. The use of "limited" nuclear weapons as a viable option slides smoothly into the public discourse, as if it were an inevitable next step. North Korea and Iran race to defend themselves with nuclear weapons. Mad destructiveness seems to have replaced the possibility of negotiation and mutual self-control, in the world as well as in her.

With the grief of her suicide, of witnessing what appeared to me to be a destructive and suicidal impetus in the world at large, I needed to find a way to keep reaching for meaning and hope, both for my work with her and for our tortured and so terribly wounded world teetering on its own edge. I attended peace marches, political meetings; I wrote letters to senators and congress people, even while knowing that this war was fast becoming an inevitability. It was clear that the juggernaut of the US war machine could no longer be stopped, just as that train could not stop even after its driver had glimpsed her body sitting on the tracks, waiting for it, daring it to come on. Yet it felt meaningful to me to do everything I could for peace even in the face of the inevitability of war. The struggle for peace, for hope, must continue even in the face of the possibility of humanity's destruction, even if it is humanity's last breath. What else is there for us to do? My political activities during this time helped to render more bearable the terrible ending of my work with Anne, placing in a larger context the eternal human struggle for life in the face of immense and often incomprehensible forces of destruction.

I could not prevent Anne from killing herself, just as those of us who believed that this war with Iraq was wrong were unable to prevent it despite an unprecedented mobilization of voices for peace across the world. These felt like parallel processes to me - so much effort and hope marshalled in an attempt to stand against something so powerful and destructive, and then having to bear the painful and discouraging truth of

our defeat before it. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, there seemed to be an opening of extraordinary possibility. People converged worldwide to share in a collective grief in the face of terrible destructiveness, injustice, loss of innocence. For a short while it seemed possible that this tragedy could bring us to a new awareness of our shared humanity, our shared vulnerability, and the recognition that only collaborative solutions that consider the rights and well being of all peoples can shift the balance of our world. And then came war, gathering paranoia, eroding of civil rights, further building up of the war machine. Similarly, Anne's journey to Nepal, the miracle of her pregnancy, the flowering of her writing, seemed to usher in new worlds of creative possibility for her. And then, with her, with the unfolding of events on the political stage, the world polarized, and darkness seemed to gain ascendancy.

Being confronted with these simultaneous encounters with my helplessness in the face of such darkness, I strive to hold to a vision that human creativity is as boundless as its destructiveness, that they move in a series of oscillating waves, sometimes one in ascension while the other slides back, as if defeated, and then the balance reverses itself again. Perhaps we are called upon to bear witness to these vast movements – in history, in politics, in each of our individual struggles, holding with great compassion the knowledge that we walk always on a narrow trail of treacherous footing that runs between these two great forces. The Jewish mystics have called them the in-breath and out-breath of God. God breathes out and worlds are created. God breathes in, worlds are destroyed. Human acts of creation open up dizzying frontiers of possibility, and then comes the backlash – be it from fear, guilt, or any of the destructive impulses that we are heir to. This seems to be the very rhythm of life itself. There is an archetypal patterning to the proximity of creativity and destruction, how they reside a heartbeat away from each other, each infused with the seed of the other. The Hindu tradition gives us the image of Kali, wearing a necklace of skulls, in whose wild dance the world is both created and destroyed simultaneously. And Shiva, whose nature both transcends and includes the polarities of the world, the inextricability of its creative and destructive aspects. In a similar vein, in the Christian tradition the extreme suffering of the crucifixion is shown as the doorway to transfiguration and redemption.

These sacred traditions inspire me to hold these two aspects of her, of our world, in balance without allowing one to become obscured by the other. Holding open multiple meanings and interpretations can allow a counterbalance to the despair invoked both by her final act and by our mad rush into war without end. I think a part of her truly believed that she was too damaged to be a good mother to her son, and that removing herself from his life could be an act of love, a gesture of redemption toward him. Just as there are many who believed that the destruction of this war was

warranted to remove a vicious dictator who has done untold damage to his people. And those terrorists who brought down the World Trade Centre also believed that their violence was an act of love, destroying the symbol of global capitalism and Western materialism that has exploited and disrupted ancient sacred traditions and ways of life. Fantasies of redemption fuelled and blinded by righteous certainty can so easily mutate into acts of breathtaking violence, finding justification in their own mad logic. In the passion of that kind of vision, all sense of the extraordinary pain and injury inflicted on others in the theatre of violence is eradicated or deemed subservient to a "higher" cause.

As I think about my work with Anne and how love brings us face to face with our pain even as it is our possibility for healing, I can feel how my love for her opens up waves of grief - for the loss of her, and all the deaths in my life that stand behind her. As my rage softens, becomes tempered with time and acceptance and a gentler sorrow, I remember how I witnessed and was deeply moved by periods of such stretching and awakening in her, her awed discovery of her creativity, her capacity to drink in life, to recognize and take me in as other, to make genuine reparation for the blows of her hatred. I will not let her suicide render all those moments meaningless. That would leave me with the spoiling hopelessness that she was never able to break free of.

I want and need to hold her beauty and her destructiveness as equally real, even as I see the image of her head turning away, the swing of her hair, the movement of a sudden decision to turn into darkness. Alongside the sorrow I feel at that choice, I remember many very real moments of love and contact and growth that happened in her and between us - perhaps those moments can enter the gene pool of human possibility and hope that others may draw on who do not have such great liabilities to fight against.

The struggle to make sense of her choice will be an on-going one for me. Sometimes I think of her as coming on to the planet with a ferocious life force, a constitutional aggression that could have been harnessed toward so many things that would serve and articulate life. But she was met by a clinically depressed mother who could not provide a space to contain the force of that energy, so it turned inward with a ferocity of imploding rage, and she became the scorpion addicted to stinging herself to death over and over in silent and deadly accusation to the flattened constriction of a mother that could not hold her and help shape and channel that intensity of energy down creative pathways. Within the holding space of our relationship, she began to discover and explore new spaces of creativity and possibility, but the addictive pathways of destruction had been indelibly laid down in such a way that they ultimately proved more compelling than what I had to offer. And perhaps too, she could not tolerate her envy of her son; his having a

different possibility to shape what may have been a similar constitutional force to his being could have been more than she could bear. Was it too painful to allow that he might be received in a way that she wasn't, that he might have been able to separate from her in a way that she couldn't from her mother, that he could manifest an unconstricted hunger for life when she couldn't? So in the end she gave him the very experience that had destroyed her: the absence of a mother that could contain him, cherish his vitality and help channel it down life-giving pathways.

So much of her refusal of life was a refusal to tolerate uncertainty, things outside of her control. As I work with my self doubts, all the things I could have said or done that might have prevented her death, I am brought face to face with having to live with the unsettling nature of the uncertainty that she refused to bear. After her last suicide attempt on the day of my vacation, an act that was so clearly a statement of her rage at me for leaving her, I was so angry with her that I told her that I was not sure I would be willing to go through another attempt like that with her. And then my consultant said to me: if you're not willing to face the uncertainty of whether she is going to choose life or death, how can you expect her, who is much less well-equipped than you, to bear to face the uncertainties of life? He was right, and I took back my words.

Bearing the guilt of how my blind spots may have contributed to her choosing death in this way allows me to continue to learn from our work together. I am bloodied, humbled, and tentatively feel that there are mistakes now that I will not so easily make in similar clinical situations. Certainly my omnipotent belief in the power and possibility of redemption is tempered. The human capacity to destroy itself even when other possibilities are at hand is a hard truth to live with, but now I carry it in my bones, along with a current of sorrow that will perhaps never heal.

Guilt elaborates itself in many shapes as I strive to come to terms with her suicide, with destructiveness in both its personal and global manifestations. Guilt at not having saved her, guilt that she is dead and I am alive, guilt at the moments of freedom I feel in no longer having to sit on that torturous edge of suicide with her, guilt that I didn't live in Baghdad as the bombs began to fall. What reparations can be made to assuage any of these? None, of course. They must simply be borne. Can I bear them and still breathe deep of this fragrant spring air, the jasmine running amok on the hedge around my garden, its scent mingling with the sweetness of the soft purple wisteria that makes a welcoming bower over my front door? War goes on, suicides happen, and life is running riot in my front yard, uncontained in its exuberance. It can be hard at these times to bear so much life, and yet there it is, a beckoning.

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Notes

[1] Mark Jergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2001).

[2] Noam Chomsky, *Hegemony or Survival* (New York, Metropolitan Books, 2003), 218.

[3] Derek Humphrey, *Final Exit* (New York. Random House Inc., 2002).

[4] Wilfred R. Bion, *Attention and Interpretation* (London: Karnac Books Ltd., 1993).

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Part 2

**Violence Secret and Sanctioned:
Child Abuse, Apartheid, FGM**

Violence on the Screen:
Psychological Perspectives on Child Abuse in American Popular Film 1992-2001

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Abstract

Because the general public has limited exposure to the empirical literature on child maltreatment, representations of child abuse perpetrators, incidents, and victims put forth by the media and the film industry shape the public's perceptions of child maltreatment. These representations have serious implications for societal attitudes about violence against children: they shape perceptions about who is likely to be a perpetrator, about the harm abused children experience, and about the types of abuse that require intervention. Despite these implications, no previous studies have examined the depiction of child maltreatment in film. We conducted a collaborative study across three universities to probe the representations of violence in the form of child maltreatment in popular films released over the 10-year period from 1992 to 2001. Fifty top-grossing films (5 movies from each year) that depicted child physical abuse, sexual abuse, or neglect were selected from a comprehensive database. Three expert observers trained in a detailed child maltreatment coding system rated each film for characteristics of the maltreatment incidents, perpetrators, and victims. Data were analyzed and compared to the empirical literature on maltreatment characteristics. As predicted, the depiction of child maltreatment in film was inaccurate in multiple ways: Films greatly overrepresented the incidence of sexual abuse and underrepresented the incidence of neglect. Victims of maltreatment were commonly portrayed as highly pathological and violent (e.g., 17% of victims were murderers). Implications of the results for societal attitudes toward child maltreatment and public policy formation are discussed.

Key words: child maltreatment; child abuse; media; violence; film

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1.   Introduction

Violence against children by their caregivers is a serious problem. In the United States, current estimates suggest that four children are killed by their caretakers daily and that 140,000 new children experience child maltreatment each year.[1] Child maltreatment applies to children under the age of majority and can include physical abuse, sexual abuse, neglect, and/or psychological maltreatment.[2] Although the broadcast and print media has increased its coverage of child abuse and neglect in the last decade, the conclusions from child maltreatment research frequently are either not disseminated or are oversimplified.[3]

The majority of the US population does not have direct experience with child maltreatment, so impressions of perpetrators and child victims are developed, in part, from representations put forth by the media and film industry.[4] The factors that impact representations of violence such as child maltreatment in film are complex and include both social and economic pressures. Education of the public is not commonly considered a driving force in the development of popular film, and as a result, moviegoers learn about child maltreatment through sources that offer distorted representations. In her discussion of domestic violence in film, Frus emphasized that it is the ability of cinema to create an "illusion of reality" that makes it such an influential force in our creation of myths about family violence.[5] Ultimately, individuals charged with the responsibility of maintaining a safe environment for children (e.g., social workers, psychologists, paediatricians, school counsellors, teachers, and adults in the community) may hold erroneous beliefs regarding child abuse and neglect that are created or validated by popular film. This is especially problematic given that misperceptions about child maltreatment may influence decisions regarding treatment for abused children, social reactions to perpetrators or alleged perpetrators of abuse, and public policy regarding child foster care placement and family reunification.

Although several investigators and commentaries have addressed the role of the media in coverage of child maltreatment through newspaper articles, television news casts, television shows, and magazines[6,7,8,9], no large-scale, empirical review of cinematic depictions of child maltreatment has been conducted to date. A small review of several films depicting child sexual abuse exists.[10] However, this study was limited to movies dealing with male victims of sexual abuse. Wrye surveyed the manner in which four recent productions depicted family violence using the psychoanalytic theory of aggression to provide a narrative description of these films.[11] These reviews are incomplete, however, in that only a handful of movies were observed and child sexual abuse was the only subset of the child maltreatment field addressed. Additionally, these reviews have not taken an empirical approach to the analysis of these films

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or addressed variables consistent with the behavioural conceptualization of the child maltreatment literature.

This study fills the void, as films dealing with three subtypes of child maltreatment (physical abuse, sexual abuse, and neglect) were reviewed. It has been suggested that psychological abuse is embedded in all other forms of child maltreatment[12] and that psychological abuse is least likely to be reported to child protection services due to difficulties in identification and documentation. Given these identification difficulties, psychological abuse was not included in this review in order to increase reliability in identifying relevant films and in coding content.

As discussed by Slocum, violence is a complex phenomenon which can be defined on multiple dimensions (e.g., the agents responsible for causing harm, the targets of that harm, the cultural legitimization of the acts of harm).[13] Although child maltreatment, as one specific type of violence, defines the target of harm as the child, whether a behaviour is labelled as maltreatment varies depending on a number of variables -- the historical time period, the culture, and the agency doing the labelling, to name but a few. Slocum notes that acts which occur outside the public realm are often considered less serious offences. This reluctance to censure violence that occurs in the private realm may be one reason why child maltreatment has not previously been addressed empirically as a form of violence in cinema.

To begin a coherent discussion about cinematic depictions of child maltreatment, one must develop a definition that (1) facilitates the reliable identification of incidents of child maltreatment in film and (2) is consistent enough with definitions of actual child maltreatment to allow comparisons of representations in film with actual child maltreatment incidents. Thus, one important component of this study was the development of a coding system that used empirical psychological literature to inform the classifications of adult and child behaviours in movies.

The objectives of the proposed study were to review the top grossing films from the last decade depicting child maltreatment and to provide an accurate content analysis of the film representations of child maltreatment. The central hypothesis was that the depiction of child maltreatment in popular films is inconsistent with available research evidence. The immediate goal of this study was to indicate the degree to which cinematic portrayals of child maltreatment are reality-based and to consider policy and other practical implications associated with cinematic portrayals. The rationale for including top grossing films was that they are widely viewed and most likely to influence audience perceptions of child abuse and neglect.

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2.   Method

A. Film Selection

       To analyze the most widely viewed films that depict child maltreatment over a ten-year period, it was critical to have a comprehensive list of movies released in the US during that time (1992-2001). Generating the list of movies to be reviewed was a four-step process: First, the primary investigators provided 50 undergraduate students with definitions of physical abuse, neglect, and sexual abuse and asked them to list movies that depicted behaviours congruent with those definitions. Next, movie synopses from databases on the Internet and local video rental retailers (e.g., Box Office Guru Film Database, 2002; www.vland.myvideostore.com Database, 2001) were reviewed. Third, the primary investigators reviewed the titles of the 1686 movies released in the United States between 1992 and 2001[14] and identified movies potentially containing child maltreatment. Finally, the resultant lists of movies were cross-referenced and their revenue data was compared (all gross earning totals were adjusted for 2001 dollars). Movies were screened when it was unclear whether they depicted child maltreatment. This process resulted in a final list of 50 top grossing movies that portray maltreatment. To be able to examine representative samplings of film portrayals across time, five movies in each year from 1992 to 2001 were selected (see Table 1).

B. Coding Criteria

       A review of the current literature regarding definitions and characteristics of child maltreatment informed the development of a content coding system.[15] The coding system was created to capture behavioural characteristics and observable sequelae of child maltreatment incidents (e.g., beatings with hand, burning, failure to provide adequate food or shelter, fondling of child's body; bruises, broken bones) and behavioural and demographic characteristics of victims (e.g., engages in risky behaviour, cruelty to animals, self-mutilation) and perpetrators (e.g., low socioeconomic status, berates or belittles the child, uses alcohol). Observers watching the movies marked characteristics as present or absent. In order to capture depictions of change over time, victim characteristics were coded as improved or as remaining stable/deteriorating. Codes were also included to assess the type (sexual abuse, physical abuse, or neglect), frequency, and duration of the maltreatment.

C. Observers

       Three undergraduate research assistants and the three primary investigators (doctoral level psychologists with post-doctoral training in child maltreatment) served as observers for the 50 movies. Movies that contained child maltreatment but did not meet the total earnings criteria for study inclusion were used to train observers to use the coding system.

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Two criterion tapes were created by the investigators using the movies *A Time to Kill* and *Sleepers*. Each research assistant was required to demonstrate mastery of the coding system by achieving 80% agreement with the criterion tapes prior to beginning coding for the study.

Two primary observers independently watched and coded each film and submitted their codes to one of the primary investigators. The primary investigators independently coded each film and resolved any discrepancies between the two primary observers. Thus, three observers watched each of the 50 movies in this study.

3.   Results

Movies included in this review ranged widely in their box office earnings (range: $725,644 *Wild Orchid II* - $394,591,181 *Forrest Gump*; $SD = 78,118,292$), but overall they performed well (see Table 1). The mean total gross earnings for the 50 movies was $65,366,000 (median = $38,193,362), which indicates that these films were extensively viewed by the American public.

A. Interrater Reliability

To assess the reliability of the coding system, percent agreement was calculated between the two primary observers for each of the three major coding categories (i.e., incidents, victims, and perpetrators) prior to resolution by the third coder. Observers demonstrated 85% agreement for the characteristics of incidents, 83% agreement for the characteristics of victims, and 90% agreement for the characteristics of abusers. That is to say, 83% to 90% of all possible characteristics were coded identically by both observers. Observers agreed about the occurrence of maltreatment (e.g., was an incident of physical abuse depicted) 80% of the time.

B. Incidents

The 50 films depicted 107 incidents of child maltreatment. As predicted, child sexual abuse was the most frequently represented type of child maltreatment (n = 52; 49% of all incidents). Neglect was the second most frequently depicted (n = 29; 27% of all incidents), followed by physical abuse (n = 26; 24% of all incidents).

The most frequently depicted form of sexual abuse was "oral, vaginal, or anal penetration" (n = 29; 56% of the sexual abuse incidents) followed by "caressing with a sexual overtone" (n = 23; 44% of the sexual abuse incidents). Victims were most commonly depicted as "encouraging the abuse" (n = 16; 31%). Sexual abuse was most commonly depicted as occurring one time (n = 17; 47% of the sexual abuse incidents).

The most frequent representations of neglect were parental "failure to protect the victim from harm" and "failure to provide adequate supervision" (both ns = 20; 69% of the neglect incidents). Neglect was

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most commonly depicted as occurring daily (n = 12; 44% of the neglect cases).

The most common form of physical abuse depicted in the films was "beating the child with a hand or fist" (n = 12; 46% of the physical abuse incidents) followed by "beating the child with an object" (n = 8; 31% of the physical abuse incidents). The child's behaviour was depicted as an antecedent to the abuse for 12 (46%) of the physical abuse incidents.

C. Victims

Across the 50 films, 81 victims of child physical abuse, neglect, and/or sexual abuse were depicted. Fifty-nine percent (48) of the victims were female. The ethnic composition of the 81 victims was as follows: 86% were Caucasian, 4% were Hispanic, 2.5% were Asian, 2.5% were Native American, 2.5% were African American, and ethnicity was not specified for 2.5%. Most of the maltreated children were school-age (i.e., 5-12 years of age, 49%), with infants underrepresented (3.9%) and adolescents overrepresented (36.8%) compared to documented prevalence rates. The age at time of abuse could not be determined for 3.9% of the victims. Table 2 lists the victims' responses to the maltreatment either at the time of the abuse or following the abuse. Particularly notable are the high rates of violence by victims toward objects or other persons, which were depicted in 14% to 30% of cases. Seventeen percent of all victims were portrayed as murderers.

To investigate whether film representations of the impact of abuse differed based on victims' gender and age, symptom composites were created from the list of all victim symptoms. The Internalizing Composite included symptoms most consistent with depression and anxiety (e.g., suicidal ideation, socially avoidant), whereas the Externalizing Composite included symptoms most consistent with disruptive behaviour disorders and sociopathy (e.g., committing murders, violence toward people or objects, cruelty to animals). Significant relationships between gender and symptom expression were observed, such that boys were more likely to have high Externalizing Composite scores ($r[81] = .24$, $p < .05$). A significant relationship was also found between age and representations of symptom improvement, such that the externalizing symptoms of older children were more likely to be depicted as improving over time ($r[51] = .33$, $p < .01$).

D. Perpetrators

A total of 91 adult perpetrators of child abuse were depicted. The majority of the perpetrators were male (n = 61; 67%). All (100%) of the neglect perpetrators were biological parents (n = 29) and 77% of the physical abuse perpetrators depicted were biological parents (n = 20). As predicted, and contrary to actual prevalence rates, the most commonly depicted sexual abuse perpetrator was an adult acquaintance of the child

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who was not a step-parent (n = 22; 42% of all sexual abuse perpetrators) followed by an adult stranger (n = 10; 19% of all sexual abuse perpetrators). Table 3 lists the perpetrator characteristics that corresponded to the incidents of child maltreatment.

To look for patterns in the representations of perpetrators' psychopathology, the investigators created symptom composites similar to those created for victims. The Internalizing Composite included symptoms such as withdrawal and low self-esteem. The Externalizing Composite included symptoms consistent with antisocial behaviour and sociopathy (e.g., angry, cold and unresponsive, justifying the abuse). Gender was related to scores on both symptom composites, with men who were depicted as abusive more likely to have high Externalizing Composite scores ($r[91] = .23$, $p < .05$) and women who were depicted as abusive more likely to have high Internalizing Composite scores ($r[91] = -.18$, $p < .05$).

4.   Discussion

The 50 movies included in this study earned a total box-office revenue of 326 million dollars. Clearly, films depicting child maltreatment reach a large audience. The implications for the impact of misrepresentations of maltreatment on public attitude, professional decision-making, and policy formation are therefore large as well. In her review of depictions of domestic violence in film, Frus discussed the cultural myths that are validated by cinematic representations of family violence.[16] Frus' discussion focused on the phenomenon of wife battering. However, her structure is equally useful for consideration of cinematic validation of myths about child maltreatment. Four samples of myths that appear to be validated by film portrayals of child maltreatment follow.

A.   Myth 1: Sexual abuse is the most prevalent form of child maltreatment.

As predicted, the abuse incidents depicted by the films were disproportionately distributed across the three subtypes of child maltreatment relative to the actual distribution of maltreatment types, with sexual abuse and neglect being the most misrepresented. Prevalence studies consistently find neglect to be the most common form of child maltreatment (55%), followed by physical abuse (24%), and sexual abuse (12%).[17] Our study is consistent with previous findings that newspaper accounts and television newscasts provide more coverage for child sexual abuse than other forms of child maltreatment.[18] Child sexual abuse comprised 49% of the incidents of child maltreatment depicted in the films. Such misrepresentation may impact legislation, policy decisions about where to appropriate limited prevention and service funds (note, for example, the millions of dollars spent on sexual abuse prevention

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programs in schools annually), child protective services' decisions about which children are in need of treatment and types of services provided to victims and perpetrators of child maltreatment, and willingness of the public to acknowledge some types of maltreatment (e.g., neglect) as a significant social problem.

B.   Myth 2: Abused children are destined to become perpetrators of violence.

Children with maltreatment histories have been reported to be at particular risk for attachment difficulties, poor social skills, emotional dysregulation (e.g., depression, anger, a heightened state of arousal), and behavioural dysregulation (e.g., sleep problems, aggressive behaviour, inattentiveness, hyperactivity, sexualized behaviour).[19] Many of the sequelae depicted in film were consistent with these findings. However, film representations of victims proportionally overrepresented antisocial and extremely aggressive behaviour. Victims were frequently portrayed as physically violent toward objects (14%), children (including both peer aggression and aggression against children when the victims were adults; 15%), and adults (30%), as having uncontrollable rage (21%), and as frequently being homicidal (17%). One disturbing example of the violent victim is Charles Stagher in *The Cell*, who becomes a serial killer subsequent to the sadistic abuse perpetrated by his father. Another example is Sylvie Warden in *Silent Fall* who brutally murders both her parents and attempts to murder her therapist following her experiences of sexual abuse.

Although the development of aggressive, antisocial, and juvenile delinquent behaviour among some victims of childhood physical abuse and neglect has been well-documented,[20,21,22] this finding is less supported in the area of sexual abuse.[23] In addition, little evidence supports the notion that these children are at risk for problems that later manifest as homicidal behaviour.

The frequency with which victims of abuse were portrayed as perpetrators of violence serves to perpetuate the myth that abuse survivors are irreparably damaged and are ultimately a danger to society. Continuation of this myth may impact how victims are viewed by society and how they are treated within the systems designed to protect them. For example, young children who have experienced sexual abuse and have subsequently demonstrated sexualized behaviours toward other children have been labelled by child protection service workers, law enforcement, and treatment providers as "perpetrators" even when the term is a legal malapropism.[24] Labels such as these may impact children's developing self-concept[25], as well as impact the type of care and services children receive.

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C. Myth 3: Victims deserve or encourage maltreatment.

Children were represented in film as triggering the physical violence directed toward them in 46% of all physical abuse incidents. In response to sexual abuse, children were frequently represented as encouraging the abuse (31% of all sexual abuse incidents). These representations may perpetuate myths of victims' responsibility for the violence they experience. Research on parent-child relationships within abusive families reveals a complex cycle of interactions that involves both parent and child behaviours[26] and has only been addressed at the most superficial level by popular film.

D. Myth 4: Perpetrators of abuse are not like us.

The representation of adults who are violent toward children is consistent with Frus' findings regarding film representations of wife batterers.[27] In this study, 20% of the 91 perpetrators were depicted as "average, well-adjusted" adults who functioned adequately in most aspects of their lives. The most frequently depicted perpetrator characteristics included alcohol abuse, low socioeconomic status (SES), emotional coldness toward the victim, marital difficulties, justification of sexual activity with the child, and drug use. Although these characteristics are documented risk factors for child maltreatment, the strength of the relations between these risk factors and occurrences of child maltreatment varies with the type of child maltreatment being observed. In addition, multiple etiological factors are believed to contribute to child maltreatment. The film portrayals frequently presented perpetrators as having only one or two of the risk factors actually associated with each type of child maltreatment (ranging from 33.3% to 69% across the three types of maltreatment), thus providing oversimplified portrayals of perpetrators. In addition, other putative causal factors such as depression, stress, and social isolation, which are common risk factors for the occurrence of child abuse and neglect were less frequently depicted in the films.[28, 29, 30]

5.   Conclusions

This study is the first empirical attempt to describe the depiction of child maltreatment in American popular film. A comprehensive manual was developed with clearly-defined behavioural characteristics of child maltreatment incidents, victims, and perpetrators in order to facilitate a discussion about the representations of child maltreatment across a large number of movies released over an extended period of time. The reliability of the coding system was supported by the high interrater agreement obtained among primary observers. The subsequent content analysis of the movies illuminated areas of distortion and suggest that cinematic representations of child maltreatment play a role in validating current

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cultural myths about violence toward children. The next question to be explored, and one that has long been a part of the controversy regarding violence in film, is how distortions in cinematic depictions of child maltreatment impact social attitudes and individual decision-making. It is hoped that this study will provide the framework for future empirical investigation.

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Table 1. *Top Grossing Movies Depicting Child Maltreatment (1992-2001)*

Film	Year	Total Gross[a]
Home Alone 2	1992	$218,367,331
Final Analysis	1992	$36,150,037
Radioflyer	1992	$5,410,593
The Lover	1992	$5,272,548
Wild Orchid II	1992	$725,644
The Joy Luck Club	1993	$40,236,688
The Adventures of Huck Finn	1993	$29,288,423
The Crush	1993	$16,700,090
What's Eating Gilbert Grape?	1993	$11,252,770
This Boy's Life	1993	$5,037,199
Forrest Gump	1994	$394,591,182
The Client	1994	$110,166,122
Natural Born Killers	1994	$60,188,471
When a Man Loves a Woman	1994	$59,876,285
Silent Fall	1994	$3,786,926
Dead Man Walking	1995	$45,846,799
Just Cause	1995	$42,897,150
Dolores Claiborne	1995	$28,241,193
The Usual Suspects	1995	$26,956,742
To Die For	1995	$24,557,130
A Time to Kill	1996	$122,981,724
Primal Fear	1996	$63,402,457
Sleepers	1996	$60,279,069
Evita	1996	$56,554,062
Set It Off	1996	$40,772,941
Good Will Hunting	1997	$152,982,373
LA Confidential	1997	$71,421,104
Kiss the Girls	1997	$66,875,188
A Thousand Acres	1997	$8,597,820

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Smilla's Sense of Snow	1997	$2,471,792
Ever After	1998	$71,441,298
Wild Things	1998	$32,809,784
Smoke Signals	1998	$7,340,977
Affliction	1997	$6,858,634
The Opposite of Sex	1998	$6,398,392
The Sixth Sense	1999	$312,520,584
Big Daddy	1999	$174,073,286
The Green Mile	1999	$145,666,103
American Beauty	1999	$138,526,861
The Haunting	1999	$97,096,676
Traffic	2000	$127,855,522
The Cell	2000	$63,152,302
Where the Heart Is	2000	$34,791,063
Pay it Forward	2000	$34,531,921
Almost Famous	2000	$33,504,527
The Others	2001	$96,522,687
Joe Dirt	2001	$27,087,695
15 minutes	2001	$24,403,552
The Shipping News	2001	$11,405,825
Head Over Heels	2001	$10,424,470
Total		$326, 830,001

Note. [a]Total gross has been adjusted for inflation. 2001 US dollar equivalents are listed. Box Office Guru Film Database (2002)

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Table 2. *Depicted Sequelae for Victims of Child Maltreatment*

Characteristic	No. of Victims w/ characteristic	% with characteristic
Delinquent behaviour	28	34.6
Risky behaviour	25	30.9
Physically aggressive to adults	24	29.6
Verbally aggressive to adults	23	28.4
Alcohol use	23	28.4
Depressed	21	25.9
Relationship problems with family	18	22.2
Low self esteem	18	22.2
Uncontrollable rage	17	21.0
Relationship problems with partner	17	21.0
Disrespectful to authorities	15	18.5
Anxious	15	18.5
Murderer (single, multiple, or serial)	14	17.3
Relationship problems with peers	14	17.3
Physically aggressive to children	12	14.8
Sexual promiscuity	11	13.6
Physically violent towards objects	11	13.6
Poor personal hygiene	8	9.9
Violent romantic relationship	8	9.9
Interpersonal difficulties at work	6	7.4
Fire Setting	6	7.4
Physical disfigurement from the abuse	6	7.4
PTSD symptoms	5	6.2
Change in eating patterns	5	6.2
Socially inadequate	4	4.9
Sexual revictimization	4	4.9
Self-mutilation	4	4.9
Verbally aggressive to children	4	4.9
Lack of work success	3	3.7
Prostitution	3	3.7
Physically aggressive to their children	3	3.7
Repressed memories	3	3.7
Learning problems	2	2.5
Attention problems	2	2.5

Cruelty to animals	2	2.5
Hyperactivity problems	1	1.2
Socially avoidant	1	1.2
Psychotic	1	1.2
Attempting suicide	1	1.2
Bedwetting	1	1.2
Childhood sexual behaviour problems	0	0
Multiple personalities	0	0

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Table 3. *Depicted Characteristics of Child Maltreatment Perpetrators*

Characteristic	No. of Perpetrators w/ Characteristic	% w/ Characteristic
Alcohol use	33	36.3
Low SES	27	29.7
Emotionally cold to the victim	29	31.9
Experiencing marriage difficulties	25	27.5
Justifying Sexual Activity (Sexual abuser)	24	26.4
Drug use	20	22.0
Well functioning individual	18	19.8
Flirtatious	18	19.8
Physiologically aroused/angry	16	17.6
Berated the victim	16	17.6
Socially isolated	15	16.5
Emotionally cold to their spouse	12	13.2
Emotionally cold to others	12	13.2
Involved in a physically violent relationship w/ partner	12	13.2
Having a professional position	11	12.1
"Stressed out"	11	12.1
Depressed	10	11.0
Poor personal hygiene	10	11.0
Low self esteem	9	9.9
Unemployed	7	7.7
Spouse ignored perpetrator's abuse	7	7.7
Rigid personality	6	6.6
Financially burdened single mother	6	6.6
Withdrawn and passive	5	5.5
Having unrealistic expectations of the victim	4	4.4
Socially inept	4	4.4
Uneducated	3	3.3
Sexually deviant	3	3.3
Sexually abused as a child	2	2.2

Physically abused as a child	1	1.1
Neglected as a child	1	1.1
"Dirty old man" (Sexual abuser)	1	1.1
Psychotic	0	0
Mentally retarded	0	0
Childhood history of witnessing violence	0	0

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Creative Writing of FGM as an Act of Violence and Human Rights Abuse

Tobe Levin

Abstract

In campaigns to stop female genital mutilation (FGM), imaginative literature supplements apologetic anthropological, cultural relativist, or sensational media approaches. Two novels, *Possessing the Secret of Joy* (1992) by African-Amer-indian author Alice Walker, and *Rebelle* (1998) by Ivory Coast writer Fatou Keita challenge the custom directly without over-simplification. Walker pictures an African heroine, Tashi, voluntarily undergoing FGM as a (misplaced) patriotic gesture, the tragedy becoming clear once she emigrates. An injured activist, Tashi is joined in the script by characters who escape gender binaries, break with inherited sex roles, and redefine human possibility. Like Tashi, Keita's heroine also emigrates but exports the passion for feminist organizing she first nourished in her homeland. Each story documents a coming-to-consciousness regarding the operations' damage to health and dignity, suggesting that, despite being deeply rooted in the millennial soils of custom, women and girls can reclaim their physical integrity, thereby changing culture.

Keywords: FGM, Alice Walker, Fatou Keita, Ivory Coast, female circumcision, female genital cutting

> When a man is subject to violence it is called torture, but when a woman is subject to violence it is called culture.
> Nasim Karim quoted in Wikan, U (2002), *Generous Betrayal. Politics of Culture in the New Europe.* Chicago: U. of Chicago Press.

Dawn leaks into the room, taking the census of ordinary objects, couch, crib and mother who suddenly bolts upright. The baby is missing! In a shattered voice Bintou pleads into the phone, "Aminata. Are they with you? ... Adama and Issatou..." No, they aren't. "Where then?" she rasps. Desperate, Bintou sprints to encounter her sister in a northern arrondissement of Paris. They assault a door. It opens, cautiously. "No," the exciseuse replies, sucking her teeth, "no one has been here this morning." Cut to Bintou's key entering its lock and her husband Adama invading the frame. "Where is she?" shrieks Bintou, rushing to hold her

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tranquil daughter. "I've changed my mind," the father states. "She'll never be cut."[1]

These lines close activist attorney Linda Weil-Curiel's 1994 video *Bintou in Paris* produced for CAMS (Commission pour l'Abolition des Mutilations sexuelles). It features a young Malian from Bamako who decides, without consulting her husband, to spare her daughter from excision. Learning of this, Adama spurns his wife and, together with his mother, pressures her to have the surgery performed. Self-assured, the mother-in-law lifts the receiver, promising to solve this "one-time little problem..." Bintou, however, has the support of her sister Aminata who educates against FGM whenever she can, for instance at the check-out counter and the beauty parlour where the subtext is, of course, "il faut souffrir pour être belle." Nonetheless, salon progressives sit in judgment. Viewed as bad for health or as a dispensable ethnic marker - "Cut or not, we're still African," one woman proclaims -, in the last analysis, FGM is denounced by these immigrants in human rights terms, for why should violence be done to them? Why repress their sexuality? Why mistreat them because they are women?

Though fiction, this drama set within a West African community in Paris uncovers the complex motives sustaining a harmful traditional practice. Its happy ending, occasioned by Adama's learning from an imam that the Koran says nothing about female rites, sets a good example but diverges from reality. Yes, some campaigns have shown success, yet the practice persists not only in inhospitable environments such as most European countries, but in Africa where, among groups previously untouched by the phenomenon, it is actually spreading.

Now, change *is* possible. We know, for instance, that victims are growing younger and that rituals have, in many instances, fallen by the wayside. But these alterations move in the wrong direction. The question remains: why is this particular practice, clitoral ablation and/or infibulation, so intractable?

Gerry Mackie suggests an activist model inspired by abandonment of Chinese foot-binding that consists of public declarations, a critical mass within the marriage pool, and a movement.[2] This approach seems to be working in Senegalese villages. But FGM is also an urban phenomenon, an export recalcitrant to modernization. Where are complex strategies that neither trivialize nor remain outside practicing cultures? Where do we gain insight?

Imaginative literature supplements apologetic anthropological, cultural relativist, or sensational media approaches. Two novels, Alice Walker's *Possessing the Secret of Joy* (1992)[3] and Fatou Keita's *Rebelle* (1998),[4] reveal motives and document change.

For Walker, an African American, and Keita, from the Ivory Coast, fiction is a political tool. Yet each uses it differently. Inspired by

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Ngugi wa Thiong'o's *The River Between* (1955),[5] Walker pictures an
African heroine, Tashi, voluntarily undergoing FGM as a (misplaced)
patriotic gesture, the tragedy becoming clear once she emigrates. An
injured activist, Tashi is joined in the script by original characters who
escape gender binaries, break with inherited sex roles, and redefine human
possibility. Like Tashi, Keita's heroine also emigrates but exports the
passion for feminist organizing she first nourished in her homeland. *Bintou
in Paris*, while continuing the migratory theme, presents protagonists
unlikely to revolt because they represent those for whom cutting is self-
evident, wholly unremarkable, taken for granted. Yet an activist emerges
and a husband says, "No." Can innovative stories save girls from the
knife?

1.   On *Possessing the Secret of Joy*
        Although in Walker's 1982 best-seller *The Colour Purple*, the
Olinka perform "a bit of bloody cutting around puberty,"[6] the actual
excision remains muted. In *Possessing the Secret of Joy*, Walker revisits
Tashi who, spared by her Christian parents, decides to undergo infibulation
because her 'leader' (modelled on Jomo Kenyatta) sees it as the marker of
ethnicity. Incapacitated by the operation, Tashi soon understands how she,
as a woman, has been scapegoated for the cause, marries her missionary
boyfriend Adam and moves to the USA. Mental instability leads her to
seek psychotherapy in Switzerland with a physician resembling Karl Jung
under whose care Tashi approaches health after confronting the
unarticulated trauma occasioned by her having witnessed her deceased
sister Dura's excision. Once the supposedly accidental death is recognized
as murder, an agent emerges: the Tsunga (an invented term) or excisor.
Tashi's activism consists in returning to Africa and taking the excisor's
life. As a result, she is hanged.
        Now, these are potent ingredients of action and suspense, on the
one hand, symbolic terrorism intended to inspire (certainly milder but no
less resolute) forms of opposition; and on the other, "melodrama" that
veers toward "romanticism and escap[e]," [7] that is, away from effective
opposition. Where is the novel weak? M. Guilia Fabi argues that repeated
thematic references to death conflate Tashi's execution with suicide, and if
Tashi chooses to die, the tension between female strength and
victimization goes unresolved.[8]   In Fabi's view, Walker fails to
"reconcil[e] her call for social change with the resigned victimization of
her protagonist" because "Tashi is a martyr who permits herself to be a
martyr."[9] The largely symbolic but 'real' murder she commits --
suffocating the excisor -- inevitably entails the state's revenge. Indeed, the
novel ends with capital punishment and the words of Tashi's soul: "I am
no more. And satisfied."[10] That she has inspired a pride of followers who,
at the decisive instant, unfurl a banner in defiance of the regime --

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"RESISTANCE IS THE SECRET OF JOY!"[11] -- does not make Tashi less resigned, or more articulate. What seems not to transpire in *Possessing* is a change of heart on the broad scale of a social movement. That is, we find no democratic discussion, nor does assassination as public relations quite do the trick.

The issue raised then remains thorny. In the broadest sense FGM's self-directed violence can be understood as humdrum: individual women have internalized patriarchal power patterns inimical to group advancement. Atomized rebellion, contained by male-privileging social relations, becomes downright counter-productive if the aim is increasing female freedom. Walker addresses this in *Warrior Marks* (1993). "'How do you feel about the fact that genital mutilation is practiced by women on women and young girls? Mothers [on] daughters, ... grandmothers [on their offspring]?'" filmmaker Pratibha Parmar asks Alice, who replies, "'I feel terrible about it.... the mother's betrayal of the child is one of the cruelest aspects of it." [12]

Compare this talk of "cruelty" and "betrayal" with the pragmatic considerations of a Somali mother interviewed by Dr. Asili Barre-Dirie, FORWARD – Germany's executive director, in Ogaden, Ethiopia (August 2001). At times sedate and at others distressed, the refugee presents her two newly infibulated daughters and claims that - we should rest assured - she is not ignorant. Aware that elsewhere women remain intact and that the operation causes lifelong hardship, she sees no practical alternative to cutting. Of greatest concern are her children, subject to a policing collectivity, and their mental health. How would they cope with the taunts? The entire family would become "the clitoris clan" - outcast, vilified, unable to marry.[13] Maternal agency is thus 'coerced' to reinforce an institution weighted against female strength, and yet, undeniably, the mother acts to spare her daughters another kind of pain.

Here short-term strategy forecloses long-term benefits of non-conformity, and Walker's womanist aesthetic takes on this complicated issue. What infibulation does, in a sense, is to copyright a concept. If as a female, you have not been closed, you cannot partake of "femininity." You are excluded. Thus, by sustaining the act - excision - the women in authority paradoxically fracture the group called "women," individual members identifiable by possession of a clitoris to be ablated, but who, once baptized into silence, live by rigid social divisions that maintain themselves, as we have seen, by mockery and humiliation.

Punishment inflicted on the resulting "otherness" - that is, wholeness - governs any deviation from gender norms, the real underlying issue. Accounting for excision, Walker's androgynous Pierre concludes that "'men [must have] found it necessary to permanently lock people in the category of their obvious sex...'"[14] (Cases of inter-sexed or ambiguous genitalia, ipso facto subversive of the theory, are simply ignored.)

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Now, in *Gender Trouble*, Judith Butler explains how this insistence on gender difference actually (re)creates the distinction it purports merely to site: "the institution of a compulsory and naturalized heterosexuality requires and regulates gender as a binary relation in which the masculine term is differentiated from a feminine term ... through the practices of heterosexual desire. The act of differentiating the two oppositional moments of the binary results in a consolidation of each term, the respective internal coherence of sex, gender and desire."[15] If then institutionalized heterosexual acts precede rather than follow from gender, we understand why excision is "justified" as the precondition for wedlock, a relationship offering men female bodies on which to commit intercourse. The fact that matrimony is cited in virtually every attempt to justify FGM suggests that just such a violent inscription of gender distinction has been naturalized but should not therefore be taken for granted.

Public discussions of FGM tend to reach a certain level of theoretical sophistication and then stop. Unlike novelists who imagine degrees of withdrawal from masculine tutelage, including lesbianism, as a challenge to continued cutting, activists follow a strategy of deference to (people who identify as) men whose cooperation in ending excision is crucial. But in doing so, they risk reinforcing what needs to be dissolved. Walker takes a circuitous route to her radical vision that breaks with binaries and defies gender, spars with varieties of victimization and agency, only to retain a vision of solidarity among the powerless as a utopian ideal.

Remember the bumper sticker given a dedicatory page to itself? "When the axe came into the forest, the trees said the handle is one of us."[16] The category "woman" isn't seamless but divisive if not deadly, and ironically both most threatening and promising of shelter among lesbians or those engaging in solitary pleasure. As Butler notes, "the incest taboo and the prior taboo against homosexuality [are] the generative moments of gender identity,"[17] the Verboten challenged by Walker's Nyanda, a masturbating figurine "blissfully loving herself" with "confidence," "pride," "peace" and "self-possession."[18] She elicits Pierre's supposition that "man is jealous of woman's pleasure ... because she does not require him to achieve it." [19]

Now, we are, after all, "speaking of sex" (title of a work on the "denial of gender inequality"),[20] making it hard not to be explicit, for FGM, a violation of human rights, children's rights, and the right to health, also ravages the right to pleasure.

2.   On Fatou Keita's *Rebelle*

The right to fulfilment - and corollary freedom from genital assault - is claimed by Ivory Coast writer Fatou Keita in a feminist jewel. Malimouna, though spared FGM, suffers rape in a forced marriage at age

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14. She flees to France and then repatriates, moving back to Africa on "co-opération" with her live-in French partner. A kind and loving man, Philippe Blain, blind to exclusionary practices among his Landsmen abroad, moves in a racist circle that culminates in a taunt from his sister which the pregnant Malimouna overhears: "You wouldn't dream of imposing that nigger on the family and a bunch of little half breeds on top of it, would you? Maman would never forgive you." [21] Traumatized, Malimouna miscarries the child and separates from Philippe, only to fall in love with one of her own, Karim, who at first appears progressive, willing to overlook his bride's un-excised state, but who turns into your normal domestic tyrant soon enough, claiming all traditional male privileges. He demands that his wife not work outside the home, resign herself to his having a mistress, and passively receive his blows.

Now, Malimouna's feminist awareness - key to escape from this run-of-the-mill brutal union and into professional engagement on women's issues - had been planted in the Ivory Coast as she resists excision at age eight. It takes root, however, in Paris when the young bride in an arranged marriage is delivered, unannounced, to the doorstep of Malimouna's absent neighbour. A battered wife, Fanta, who, on arrival, had expressed her desire to study, is bound in dependency - one of many "prisonnières de leur condition féminine" [22] -, a state from which Malimouna would like to help her flee but can't.

In the Ivory Coast, however, Malimouna is elected president of l'Association d'Aide à la Femme en Difficulté (AAFD), her activism following the real-life script of Constance Yai, president of AIDF (Association Ivoirienne de Défense des Droits de la Femme),[23] an NGO which defends women's rights but mutes its rhetoric, arguing merely for "'un mieux-être'," [24] increased well-being, for women:

> Elles s'autocensuraient et ne parlaient jamais de "liberté" de la femme, pour ne pas être mises au pilori par de nombreux hommes.... Ce mot "liberté" était tabou ... un mot emprunté à l'idéologie occidentale. Comme si tous les autres mots de cette langue officielle qu'était le français, ne l'étaient pas, eux.... [25]

> [They censored themselves, never talking about "liberation" in order to avoid being pilloried by hordes of men ... The word "liberty" was taboo ... borrowed from Western ideology. As if all the other words in that official tongue weren't also French ...]

Although "liberté" remains a *non grata* term in Ivory Coast women's discourse, Keita understands the impotence of rational appeals

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when, as counsellor to immigrant women in France, she first tries to persuade Fanta, now many years later, not to permit excision of her daughter, Noura.

> Dis-moi Fanta, tu as toi-même été excisée, n'est-ce
> pas? En as-tu oublié la douleur? Est-ce cela que tu
> veux pour ta fille? Est-ce ainsi que tu lui prouves ton
> amour? [26]

> [Say, Fanta, you were cut, weren't you? Have you
> forgotten the pain? Is that what you want for your
> daughter? Is that how to prove your love?]

Ironically, Fanta had come to enlist Malimouna's aid in convincing her 11-year-old raised in France, determined not to be excised, to listen to 'reason': because "mon mari me tuera si ce n'est pas fait demain!" [My husband will kill me if she's not excised tomorrow.] [27] Should the surgery not take place, the mother will be repudiated; the girl will never find a husband; and "une femme non excisée n'est pas une femme digne de ce nom" [a non-excised woman is not worthy of the name]. [28] Because the adolescent admires Malimouna, Fanta believes she could evoke the required docility.

Malimouna, however, is against excision, and has been since, at age eight, she inadvertently gained a certain power over the village excisor that resulted in retention of the often cited "petit bout d' [elle-] même" [little piece of herself], the clitoris.[29] What had happened? In the forest, having taken refuge in a tree to escape terrifying, possibly animal sounds, Malimouna spies Dimikèla, Boritouni's excisor, and Seynou, a handsome hunter, naked and engaging in the act. "Malimouna then ... falls off [the branch] ... into an inextricable imbroglio around two jealously guarded taboos, i.e. sexuality and excision."[30] Afraid that Malimouna will reveal her secret, the excisor only pretends to cut her.

From the second chapter onward, Malimouna, who should have been excised, is contrasted with "[her friend] Sanita ... shielded from excision by her educated, urban parents, so that Keita posits [literacy] and sex education as instrumental in averting [FGM]." [31]

This is true, but pivotal moments in the plot present a sub-text, sometimes mounting to the surface, that recognizes the insufficiency of such approaches, replacing them with a rare honesty concerning the joys of loving intercourse and masturbation. Now, as we have seen, Malimouna's spontaneous response to Fanta's request stressed appeals to her experience of agony and affection: Don't you remember the pain, she asks Fanta. Is this the way to show your love? But framing the argument in these terms simply won't do. Preferred by too many cultural outsiders, it is hollow,

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sterile and, above all, unjust. Because not to excise would be a failure of parental duty, a miscarriage of love. And though certainly not a meaningful element in all mutilations, here the pain is valorized, the rite an "épreuve" [test]. The girls having reached the age of reason are therefore old enough to prove their mettle. "SA vérité, SA réalité" [her truth, her reality] [32] - speaking of Fanta - is governed by beliefs concerning non-excised women: that they cannot control their sexual urges and are therefore doomed to wreck and ruin. Malimouna, aware that Fanta 'knows' this, tries the argument she feels will have the most persuasive power, confessing, "Moi, je ne suis pas excisée..." [Look at me, I'm not cut] [33] and expects to elaborate on her good character, the fact that she has not for having been left intact become a prostitute or nymphomaniac.

But Fanta gives her no time to explain. So that's why you're a white man's whore! she shouts, slamming the door behind her ...

In an interview, Martine Camacho elicits Keita's intention to "enter the minds of FGM supporters." [34] Inspired by a Sabbatical year in Virginia,[35] Keita was certainly exposed to the brouhaha surrounding Walker and Parmar's *Warrior Marks*[36] and even alludes to the film in her text: "Malimouna se rappelait avoir vu à propos de l'excision, un film produit par une Noire américaine, écrivain de renommée mondiale. Dans ce documentaire l'auteur se demandait si les Africains aimaient leurs enfants ..." [Malimouna remembered having seen a film about excision produced by a Black American author of world renown in which she asked if Africans loved their children ...] Malimouna, "outraged" at the "over-simplified caricature" wished to present "toute l'ambiguïté ... du problème" [the problem in all its ambiguity]. [37]

Her endeavour, however, is fraught with paradox. An emotional issue, FGM continues for reasons that escape rational suasion. Truly relevant questions such as "pourquoi, après tout, avait-on peur de la sexualité féminine?" [why this overwhelming angst vis-à-vis female sexuality?] [38] beg for answers drawn from psychoanalysis and object-relations theory that divulge differences in gender development on an unconscious level. In other words, underlying clitoral excision and infibulation are the motors of misogyny which, though nearly universal, cannot usefully segue into any sort of masculine conspiracy theory (the principal problem, for instance, with pioneer Fran Hosken's diagnoses and cure.) Nor can the fear factor be dismissed: a social practice, FGM is maintained by the threat of expulsion from the collectivity.

So what strategies are available to activists? Rather than dwell on individual men's injustices toward women - which include, of course, a catalogue of violence in Walker and Keita - both authors privilege the pleasure women must re-conquer in affirming the beneficence of their natural endowment, the magic 'button'. After all, we *are* talking about sex, not an easily accessible subject in or outside of Africa. For instance,

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Walker's grandmother taught her girls to "Wash down as far as possible, then wash up as far as possible, then wash possible."[39] If simply naming the vulva is a challenge, how much more difficult to honour it!

Notes

1. Julie Pimsleur and Kirsten Johnson, *Bintou in Paris* (Paris: Commission pour l'Abolition des Mutilations sexuelles, 1994), videorecording.
2. Gerry Mackie, "Durchbruck im Senegal." Trans. Christa Geßele. In *Das Recht auf Weiblichkeit. Hoffnung im Kampf gegen die Genitalverstümmelung,* edited by Conny Hermann, 59-74. Bonn: Dietz, 2000.
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5. Ngugi wa Thiong'o, *The River Between* (London: Heinemann, 1965).
6. Alice Walker, *The Colour Purple* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1982), 237.
7. Olakunle George, "Alice Walker's Africa: Globalization and the Province of Fiction," *Comparative Literature* 53/4 (Fall 2001), 370.
8. M. Guilia Fabi, "Sexual Violence and the Black Atlantic. On Alice Walker's *Possessing the Secret of Joy*," in *Black Imagination and the Middle Passage,* edited by Maria Diedrich, Henry Louis Gates, Jr., and Carl Pedersen (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 228-239.
9. Ibid., 234.
10. *Possessing*, 279.
11. Ibid.
12. Alice Walker and Pratibha Parmar, *Warrior Marks. Female Genital Mutilation and the Sexual Blinding of Women* (New York: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1993), 273-274.
13. Asili Barre-Dirie, 2001, videorecording.
14. *Possessing*, 172.
15. Judith Butler, *Gender Trouble. Feminism and the Subversion of Identity* (New York: Routledge, 1990), 22-23.
16. *Possessing*, np.
17. Butler, 135.
18. *Possessing*, 229.
19. Ibid., 178.

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20. Deborah L. Rhode, *Speaking of Sex. The Denial of Gender Inequality* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1995).
21. Keita, 137. Translation mine.
22. Ibid., 105.
23. Chantal Zabus, "The Horned Beetle with the Double Pair of Wings," *Feminist Europa. Review of Books* 2/2 (2002): 32.
24. Keita, 179.
25. Ibid., 179-180.
26. Ibid., 124.
27. Ibid., 123.
28. Ibid., 124
29. Ibid., 33.
30. Zabus, 28.
31. Ibid.
32. Keita, 125.
33. Ibid.
34. Martine Camacho, "Profil: Fatou Keita, celle quie dérange," *Jeune Afrique* 1946 (1998): 87.
35. Elisabeth Bekers, *Dissecting Anthills of W/Human Insurrection: A Comparative Study of African Creative Writing on Female Genital Excision* (Doctoral dissertation. University of Antwerp, 2002): 365.
36. Parmar, Pratibha, and Alice Walker, *Warrior Marks* (New York: Our Daughters Have Mothers, 1993), videorecording.
37. Keita, 128.
38. Ibid., 219.
39. Alice Walker, "Coming in from the Cold: Welcoming the old, funny-talking ancient ones into the warm room of present consciousness, or, Natty Dread rides again!" In *Living by the Word. Selected Writings 1973-1987* (New York: Harcourt, Brace Jovanovich, 1988), 58.

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Re-Constructing South African Identity after 1994: Museums and Public History[1]

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Abstract
   Since the end of apartheid, public history in South Africa has been undergoing reconstruction. One important goal is creation of a cross-racial and -cultural civic identity as opposed to the pre-democratic premise of opposing, legally unequal ethnic communities. However, as borne out by research at public history museums in Gauteng, Northern Cape, Western Cape, Eastern Cape and KwaZulu Natal, there is little agreement as to what qualifies as an inclusive South African, rather than racially or culturally exclusive, history, and little co-ordination at the national or provincial level to encourage an over-arching philosophy of how to present South African history to the public. This is not surprising given the fractured character of South Africa's recent past and negotiated nature of its pacted transition. But, as a result, many post-1994 changes at public history museums are *ad hoc*, inconsistent and discretionary, lending themselves to a sense of irrelevance or even hostile partiality to varied sectors of the South African public. While inclusive "reconciliation" is the ideal principle of the new South Africa, museums have not been able to capitalize on this sentiment if one takes into account that, at almost all sites investigated, the vast majority of visitors are either not voluntary (children on school outings) or South African (foreign tourists). Given that most sites are not primarily accessed out of choice by the South African public, the potential of public history museums, along with the narratives they present, to enhance civic cohesion and cross-racial or –cultural understanding is severely limited.

Key Words: South Africa; museums; public history; heritage; apartheid; nation-building; reparation; reconciliation

1.   Introduction

> History is worn by a people like part of its national dress and where two people have shared a series of events, their respective versions are often startlingly different in cut, colour and pattern.   (Z.K. Matthews) [2]

Since the end of apartheid, the public history presented in museums and heritage sites of South Africa has undergone an uneven transformation. The 'new' South Africa officially began in May 1994 with the inauguration of President Nelson Mandela following the country's first democratic elections the previous month. Mandela and his administration preached reconciliation: there was no civil war, no Nuremberg-style trials and no mass action against the former oppressors. The remit of the much-awaited Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was to shed light on crimes by both the state and liberation movements[3] – a way not of equalizing the blame, but of publicly exposing the extent of human rights abuses without which meaningful reconciliation (and individual amnesty) would be impossible. Importantly, as well as financial compensation and institutional reform, the TRC argued for symbolic reparation,[4] a public acknowledgement of wrongdoing and restitution. It is in this capacity, as symbolic reparation, that public history in South Africa has a greater significance than simply the practicalities of refashioning outdated museums and replacing old monuments with new ones.

The creation of a truly public history, one which takes into account the memories and legacies of the South African public in all its sum parts, is not merely an exercise in heritage renovation and management. More importantly it is a form of negotiated public atonement for the past. However, as democratic governance is a recent development and the redressing of past injustices slow and tentative, so transformations in public history have also tended to be *ad hoc* and discretionary with no uniform approach across the myriad museums and heritage sites. As a result, the intended goal of contributing to the creation of a cross-racial and cross-cultural civic identity in this deeply divided society is stymied within the very sector whose remit it is to present an inclusive South African history.

A crucial role for public history in contemporary South Africa is to assist in bridging the entrenched perceptions that result in distrust, fear and prejudice between groups and encouraging a culture of democratic tolerance, something which in-depth attitudinal studies indicate as sorely lacking.[5] Despite the promising transition of the 1990s, a secure, durable and consolidated democracy would then have to "be characterized by absence of fear about difference."[6] This is in keeping with government policy to develop a "democratic and non-racial state" and "promote the growth of a single national identity and loyalty binding on all South Africans."[7] But given the country's deliberately and violently fractured past within recent memory, as well as the ongoing legacy of systemic social and economic inequality,[8] "what, then, is the new South African?"[9] Is there or can there be a South African national identity, and one which cross-cuts race, class and culture? Not surprisingly, studies are indicating that in post-apartheid South Africa identities are often stuck in the past and loyal in their perceptions and interests to pre-1994 categories.[10]

Symbolic acts have significance beyond what is immediately apparent,[11] and a case can be made for symbolic reparation as bloodless. It costs less than financially compensating as many individuals as possible, and exacts no price from the former oppressors in terms of money or prison time. Individuals are not asking for amnesty in return for confessing to torture or murder. Instead, symbolic reparation refashions the public domain to include the memories of the formerly oppressed without, in South Africa's case, completely erasing those of the oppressors who, after all, continue to live in the same country as their victims.

2.   Symbolic Reparation

In certain respects, symbolic reparation is underway with, for example, the Africanisation of some place-names. The important Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vaal (PWV) province became Gauteng, the Eastern Transvaal province was renamed Mpumalanga in 1995, the Orange Free State became simply the Free State and Natal was rechristened KwaZulu-Natal. The names of most major towns in South Africa's northernmost province, Limpopo (formerly the Northern Transvaal and then Northern Province), have been changed. Several major municipalities now carry the names of struggle leaders – the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Council (the Port Elizabeth metropolitan area) and the O.R. Tambo and Chris Hani Municipalities (both in the Eastern Cape province). The towns on the East Rand near Johannesburg have been grouped together in the Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Council. There is currently controversy over possibly renaming the city of Pretoria as Tshwane,[12] although the Pretoria Business Chamber has threatened a rates boycott if the change goes through.[13] A major road in Pretoria is now Nelson Mandela Drive, a similarly main road in Johannesburg Beyers Naudé Drive (after an anti-apartheid Dutch Reformed Church cleric). The western Johannesburg suburb of Triomf has reverted to the name Sophiatown, and Van der Bijl Square in central Johannesburg became Ghandi Square.[14] But there are limits to how the renaming process functions: the former mayor of Cape Town, Peter Marais, was exposed fixing a vote to rename two major streets after Mandela and F.W. de Klerk,[15] and so the old names remain.

As for public history, there are new memorials and museums, such as those to Steve Biko in East London and King William's Town, to Hector Pietersen in Soweto,[16] and the District Six Museum in Cape Town. The new Apartheid Museum in Johannesburg was built by brothers Solly and Abe Krok who had made their fortune selling skin-lightening cream to black South Africans during the apartheid era. The museum shares a site with the Kroks' Gold Reef City casino and theme park, and is the social development component of their successful bid to develop the casino.[17] The museum is a form of reparation for their business interests that had so directly benefited from apartheid, even though it took a nudge from the Gaming Board to have the museum actually built once the casino license

had been secured.[18] The museum has attracted a certain amount of cynicism from some circles given the nature of the Kroks' background in business; one commentator called it "a sort of moral car wash and valet service to repenting honkies."[19] The statue of Hendrik Verwoerd[20] has been removed in Bloemfontein, and in Pretoria the giant bust of J.G. Strydom[21] fell through the roof of an underground car park.[22] However, the statue of Jan van Riebeeck[23] still graces Cape Town. Riebeeck's presence occasioned a protest from environmentalists who in 1996 hung a placard on the statue stating "No shit on our shore."[24] The statue of Paul Kruger[25] at the gates of the Kruger National Park may be dismantled "in line with the government's policy to remove apartheid-era monuments,"[26] but his likeness in Pretoria's Church Square remains.

3.   Inclusion and Public History in Apartheid South Africa

The great majority of heritage sites and museums prior to 1994 reflected the interests and identity of the politically dominant white minority, who on the eve of democracy constituted one-eighth of the total population.[27] The Union of South Africa had been established in 1910 as a compromise between Boers[28] and Britons who had recently fought two wars, and between whom animosity lingered. An almost exclusively whites-only franchise elected the Afrikaner-nationalist National Party (NP) to power in 1948, a position of political dominance maintained until the early 1990s, and instituted a definitive break with the British Commonwealth as the Republic of South Africa in 1961. Initial NP policy heavily favoured and promoted Afrikaner interests and identity in opposition not only to the black majority but also Anglo-South Africans, who held sway in business, commerce and the professions. It was also the NP government that officially instituted and entrenched the racial segregation of apartheid (literally translated as "apartness") in all spheres of political, economic and social policy and practice through incremental legislation passed from 1948 into the 1970s.

But by the 1960s, the Afrikaner-dominated government was making efforts to smooth distinctions between Afrikaners and Anglo-South Africans by enacting a policy of white reconciliation.[29] This was, in great part, an effort to shift regime emphasis away from Afrikaner exclusivity so as to define all white South Africans as "Europeans," and confect a single white "nation" larger in numbers than those for any other group in South Africa as determined on the bases of race and vernacular language. For example, in mid-1975, statistics indicate that, although officially there were significantly more whites than either coloureds (of mainly mixed race descent) or Asians (primarily of Indian origin),[30] the African population outnumbered whites by more than four-to-one.[31] However, this African majority was further broken down into ten sub-groupings, thereby rendering instead a series of smaller categories. Most Africans would be assigned citizenship of separate homelands and

therefore stripped of any vestigial citizenship claims as *South* Africans. This was especially important as two African groups, the Zulu and Xhosa,[32] were each more numerous than "the Europeans." Needless to say, the white "nation" would include all major cities and towns (but not most black townships), all prime agricultural and mining land, and all significant railway lines and roads, as well as almost every border crossing. "White" South Africa comprised 87 per cent of the country's land area.

Since most Africans would be non-citizens, the white "nation" was officially the biggest in South Africa. Defining all whites as "European" was a development of some significance. Not only did it unite the white population under one heading by claiming a European cultural identity and heritage, but was also part of defining apartheid as a policy originating in European thought. This then made apartheid a "problem of Europe"[33] as devolved from European traditions of political development. Importantly, this approach problematised white South Africans by cutting any intellectual link they may have claimed as belonging to Africa. It also lent a strained legitimacy to the pretence of South African democracy which, through incrementally denying citizenship to Africans, could then pay lip-service to representative government on behalf of (white) South Africans. This democratic façade was furthered by the trappings of democracy – a multiparty parliament, regular elections, a nominally free press and judiciary – as practiced in post-war Western Europe.

As a result of top-down white rapprochement, multiple monuments and heritage sites were built, as a matter of deliberate policy, to reflect the white population as descendents from the combined European heritage of not only the acknowledged Dutch forefathers of the Afrikaners but also other European settlers and migrants, something especially pertinent as the white population increased in numbers through immigration from Europe after 1945. There is a plethora of examples. In East London, the foundation stone for the German Settler Monument was laid in 1958 with completion in 1960. In 1962, the Post Office Tree in Mossel Bay was declared a national monument in memory of Portuguese explorers who, in the early sixteenth century, had used the location as the first "post office" in South Africa.[34] The 1820 Settlers' Memorial in Grahamstown, traditionally an English-dominated town, was erected in 1968, the same year as the Huguenot Memorial commemorating French Huguenots who arrived in the Cape in the late 17th century. The Italian POW church, built in 1943-4, in Pietermaritzburg was declared a national monument in 1977. In Johannesburg the Poswohl Synagogue was declared a national monument in 1981, with the establishment, in 1986, of the Jewish Pioneers Memorial Museum in Port Elizabeth.[35] All these initiatives were part of an effort to draw together a disparate white population with an emphasis on their inclusion in a white South Africa. This was aided, for example, by the Administrator of the Cape Province

declaring in 1968 that any (white) organization wanting to buy or restore a building to be used as a local museum would be eligible for assistance from public funds.[36]

In the 1980s some attempts were made to officially promote Indian heritage. The government was marketing South Africa abroad as "the world in one country" and the value of different heritage sites was "too obvious to ignore."[37] Mildly enhancing the status of Indian heritage was, however, also for the sake of political utility in order to lend legitimacy to the controversial tri-cameral parliament of 1984. This parliament was an attempt to co-opt coloured and Indian, but not African, sectors of the population through representation in separate legislative houses subordinate to the white House of Assembly.

4.   Inclusion and Public History in the New South Africa

The idea of inclusion remains important to post-1994 developments, although, with the dismantling of apartheid, the nature of this inclusion obviously had to change. Instead of attempting to aggregate the heritage and identity of all white South Africans as Europeans, the idea of inclusion is now in reference to all South Africans as constituents of a newly democratic state. This shifting from an ethno-cultural, which includes race as a flexible cultural construction,[38] to a civic identity, as well as the difference between them, is a profound one in terms of nation-building and one which has been extensively discussed elsewhere.[39] However and at odds with the prescriptive yet strictly circumscribed inclusion of Europeans and their descendents during the apartheid years, the idea of inclusion post-1994 is an open-ended concept applicable to "everyone," thereby echoing the 1996 Bill of Rights.[40]

But as well intentioned as this new inclusivity is, the lack of a prescriptive agenda is a problem when it comes to the renovation of public history as presented through museums and other heritage sites. Despite radical political changes, the South African heritage sector since 1994 has not been subjected to ironclad fiats handed down from the central government to be applied across the board. Instead there has been a remarkable lack of interference from government departments. The only official prescription apparently omnipresent, if we can go by interviews with museum professionals throughout the country, was that the presentation of public history had to be made more inclusive. Yet what "inclusive" meant was not defined and instead, in terms of implementation and content, left to the discretion, skills and budgetary constraints of various museum curators and their personnel.[41]

The subtlety required to become more inclusive is hampered by the multiple layers of significance for many sites. For example, in many cases historic buildings themselves are meaningful to different groups, but for dissonant reasons. The old Bantu Administration Building in Durban is a case in point. It is part of black heritage as the place where influx control

was administered and thousands of blacks went to apply for passes;[42] however, it is also part of white heritage in its architectural style and as part of the old white administration of the city. The building is now the KwaMuhle Museum, and synthesises these two opposing heritages well. One should include in this list Robben Island,[43] the old Victorian police station in Port Elizabeth[44] and the railway station in Pietermaritzburg.[45]

The result in terms of museum content and presentation is, therefore, varied. Reflecting the confusion over what exactly is meant by inclusivity, many museums have closed rooms and boarded up displays considered to be dated, offensive or at the very least unbecoming of the new South Africa. In almost every museum we visited there were signs announcing "closed for reconstruction," "display under construction," "this display is currently being renovated" or "we are improving our exhibition – please bear with us." Amusingly, the old display in the McGregor Museum, Kimberley, on "Belief in the Afterlife" was also "under construction." In many museums whole corridors, rooms or halls had been closed off awaiting renovation. As well as closing or removing some old displays, many museums have attempted to update by adding new "inclusive" displays on the end of old ones, something that can look like tokenism. For example, the McGregor Museum's display on famous Kimberley people added the Pan Africanist Congress leader Robert Sobukwe to a wall of white notables, while in an adjoining room there was a 1980s tableau on the South African Defence Force's 1st Commando's tactics for fighting "terrorists."[46]

Inclusivity has also been interpreted in different ways. For example, the Afrikaans Language Museum, Paarl, had new exhibits awaiting a room on the development of the Afrikaans language that included not only influences from Dutch, San[47] and Malay,[48] but also an acknowledgement that most Afrikaans speakers are, in fact, Coloured. This is part of an attempt to bolster the language, as some see it, in the face of official neglect of Afrikaans education by including those of its speakers who were until recently excluded from its official commemoration.[49] In Grahamstown the Albany Museum's attempt to mount an exhibition on the local Indian community fell foul of objections by Muslims on being portrayed in the same room as Hindus.[50]

Any discussion of inclusivity must also take into account those who are actually accessing these museums. In other words, what public is accessing the history on display and who is this history, in practice, accessible to? Museum staff and records, as well as primary observation, confirmed that at almost all sites, with a few notable exceptions, the majority of visitors are either children on school fieldtrips or overseas tourists, not the general South African public coming on a voluntary basis. There are a number of practical reasons for this. Many museums do not open on weekends or if so, only on Saturday mornings, thereby making them largely inaccessible to those working a five or six day week. Evening

opening hours were far from evident, and, given the fear of crime in most South African cities, would perhaps not be very appealing. The entrance fee for many museums, and despite some concessionary rates and occasional days of free admission, is a disincentive to low income earners and the unemployed. The required transport especially from distant townships needed to get to many museums is relatively costly, while some sites are located well away from public transport links. The issue of transport in reference to access is of particular note. While the problem of opening hours and fees can be rectified given sufficient staff and funds, that of sites' location and transport needed for access is a more difficult one and requires an integrated planning approach of museums with municipalities and commuter services. This would help rectify, if only to a small degree, a legacy of apartheid urban planning which mandated against easy and regular access for blacks, with the exception of domestic workers, to white areas. Furthermore and unsurprisingly given the inherited bias of most museums, there is generally not a tradition of museum-visiting among many South Africans; "black visitors have not been enthusiastic supporters and have tended to stay away."[51]

The task of attracting a broader spectrum is not easy, and often requires some lateral thinking. For instance, the Ladysmith Siege Museum in KwaZulu Natal found that adding signage and captions in Zulu in 1999 dramatically increased the number of black visitors.[52] Renovated or refurbished museums well placed in terms of proximity to the city centre and transport links do relatively well, especially if combined with a policy of free admission. For example, many visitors to the KwaMuhle and Local History Museums in Durban, as well as the Mandela Museum in Umtata, are people wandering in off the street to have a look.[53]

Conversely, in Durban the Campbell Collections, a museum of Zulu artefacts from a private collection donated to the University of Natal in 1965, does not advertise in the local Zulu press and makes no effort to reach out to Zulu speakers, although the Collections are concerned with protecting Zulu heritage. Much like ethnological collections elsewhere in South Africa,[54] the Collections exhibit a sense of urgency in the imminent "loss of tradition," especially as "the Zulus don't protect their own heritage" and so the Collections "keep it in trust."[55] Significantly, the Collections make little effort to include the people whose heritage they are supposedly protecting and, of the 400 to 500 visitors per month, the number of Zulus who access the museum is not known.[56] For its audience, the museum relies on a steady stream of overseas visitors[57] who telephone ahead of time as required to schedule viewing, pay the entrance fee and arrange for private transport or at least have a travel agent do so on their behalf.

Meanwhile the Robben Island Museum, best known for the prison where former President Mandela spent eighteen years and a very popular tourist destination,[58] makes access for many South Africans

difficult; the entrance fee of R150 (about US$26) per adult is exceptionally high by local standards, while the availability of the concessionary rate of R60, still a substantial fee for many, for 2003 was limited to the four winter months and for the day's first morning tour only. For "disadvantaged groups" additional concessions are available, but can only be obtained through prior application to the Marketing Department.[59]

5.   Creating the New – The Legacy Project

In public discourse at the national level, there is much talk of reconstructing South African heritage in order that the "transformation of the existing museums and cultural institutions … ensure that they become reflective of the country's overall cultural heritage" and therefore giving "content to our political democracy."[60] This is a conscious and direct effort to counter the bias inherited from the previous regime. State funding for various projects in South Africa since 1994 comes to around R1 billion (US$175m).[61] At the national government level, inclusion of the heritage of the formerly oppressed is running parallel to the preservation of that of the former oppressors.

The Department of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology (DACST) was split in two in 2001, and now heritage comes under the new Department of Arts and Culture (DAC). The DAC has a list of Declared Cultural Institutions (DCIs) according to the Cultural Institutions Act, 1998 (Act No. 119 of 1998).[62] They are corporate bodies - museums, heritage sites, other sites worthy of preservation - that receive an annual subsidy from DAC. The great majority is old museums that have retained state funding.[63] The DAC's list comprises some 24 museums and sites, mostly museums important to the old regime in Gauteng (grouped under Northern Flagship) and Cape Town (grouped under Iziko), as well as the Afrikaans Language Museum and Monument in Paarl, the Voortrekker Museum and Natal Museum (both in Pietermaritzburg), the National English Literary Museum (Grahamstown) and the National Museum (Bloemfontein). The only addition to this list since 1994 is the Robben Island Museum. The variety of sites in itself betrays the funding priorities of the apartheid regime.

That said, the DAC lacks resources and finds its mission to reconstruct the presentation of history stymied by its place at the bottom end of government priorities, since housing and service delivery are understandably given precedence when drawing from the government pot. At a provincial level, resources from public funds are limited, and local and provincial priorities mirror those of the national government.[64] Funding problems are compounded by a marked lack of qualified personnel to manage and spend the existent budgets.[65] Surprisingly, the DAC has no record of the *total* number of museums and heritage sites that are funded through public resources.[66] It is probable that in the future, public funding for older institutions established under apartheid may not

actually be withdrawn - to avoid controversy - but will be allowed to slip so that museums will have no option other than to seek some form of public/private partnership.

In order to recognize the histories of the previously marginalized, the DACST launched the flagship Legacy Project in 1996. This is a deliberate, highly visible move to build eight new monuments and sites relevant to the new South Africa and reflective of inclusiveness that the policy of reconciliation suggests and in line with the ANC's cultural policy to devote attention to the neglected and hidden histories of the majority.[67] Just as the DCIs mentioned above reflect the old South Africa, the Legacy Project reflects the new dispensation. Keeping the heritage institutions of the old and new South Africa administratively separate may appear counter to the rhetoric of developing a unified nation, but it is easier to redefine an inclusive heritage if a clean slate of new resources exists.[68] As the then DACST minister, Lionel Mtshali, said:

> The Legacy Project was established to acknowledge the previously neglected, marginalised and distorted South African heritage. The expression of the Country's history through monuments, museums and other forms to commemorate what is meaningful to all South Africans, has the potential to contribute to reconciliation and nation building in the Country.[69]

Important struggle sites were identified and funded by the DAC in the same way as the DCIs. These sites almost invariably draw on the anti-apartheid struggle, with the exception of the Anglo-Boer war site outside Vereeniging and the Blood River Commemoration/Ncome in KwaZulu Natal. Some have a practical use, such as the Old Fort in Johannesburg that now houses the Constitutional Court. Initially, the projects were slated for delivery in 1998 and 1999. Finance is, in the first instance, through DAC's own budget, while the Cabinet and Treasury will be involved in larger projects.[70] All these projects have either been completed, in the case of the Mandela Museum, or are in the process of being finished. By the end of 2008 the whole of the Legacy Project should be ready and open to the public. It is worth noting that some of the projects are relevant to black and white alike – the Battle of Blood River/Ncome was between Boers and Zulus, and can be commemorated by both, although the historical baggage is radically different for each. Likewise, the Anglo-Boer War memorial and the Old Fort have resonances, albeit dissonant, for different sectors of the population.

In effect, apartheid-era priorities for public history stressed division with a theme of inclusion for a minority offset by exclusion of the categorically fragmented majority. Heritage sites and museums were not to serve the whole population or the casual passer-by, but to draw white South Africans into a defensive space outside of which they would be

swamped by the black majority.[71] Since 1994 the rhetoric has moved away from this to encapsulate all sectors of South African society, and concrete action is being undertaken in, for example, the shape of the Legacy Project. Although symbolic reparation is being carried out, and well-publicised projects are being developed, the heritage sector cannot be transformed overnight, and the old lingers more readily than might be imagined.

6.   Refashioning the Old – The South African Museum[72]

The dissonance between new sites that stress an inclusive heritage and old sites that try to come to terms with political change is exemplified by the South African Museum (SAM) in Cape Town. The SAM is the closest South Africa has to a national museum, combining ethnography, natural history and a planetarium. Founded in 1825, it was moved to its present site in 1897. The SAM is in a historically important precinct of Cape Town, up the road from Parliament and St. George's Cathedral, close to the city centre, next door to the South African Library, and with many tree-lined avenues with a selection of statues of historic white figures. The area has an aura of faded civic grandeur with many of the markers of an historic city of government. The SAM attracts some 400,000 visitors per year, making it one of South Africa's foremost tourist attractions. Most of its visitors are overseas tourists or school groups (that do not pay the usual entry fee per head), which suggests that the SAM is not working as a national museum for voluntary domestic consumption. It also confirms the trend, already mentioned above, of many South African museums not being accessed primarily by the general South African public. Rather its primary audiences are foreigners, many of whom come to South Africa with expectations of finding remnants of a primitive Dark Continent (albeit one with freeways, shopping malls and wineries), and children on mandatory school outings.

Almost all the SAM's cultural and colonial history exhibits and collections were moved to the nearby South African Cultural History Museum (SACHM – the old Slave Lodge) in the 1960s, thereby leaving the SAM with a baseline of natural history collections, and so the museum also became known as the Natural History Museum. The remaining displays of human society are organized along taxonomic lines akin to those deployed for classifying different animals or plants as done elsewhere in the museum. Such a schema, when applied to *homo sapiens,* implies that there are not simply differences within humanity but instead different species of humanity. The implication clearly coalesces with the SAM's foundations in a South African anthropological tradition of interpreting ethnic differences as rigid and fixed, and cultures as monolithic and impermeable.[73] This is still evident in the displays that have not been changed or closed.[74] The process of removing and

redesigning displays that presented apartheid's classification of ethnic categories has been piecemeal.

The SAM's most famous exhibit was the San diorama made from casts taken of live subjects who were indigenous hunter-gatherers from the Cape Province. It is also extremely controversial, not least because it was housed in a museum ostensibly dominated by natural history. As a result the diorama in Room 2 was closed in March 2001, despite concern that this would lead to a drop in visitor numbers, as surveys over the past forty years show that the diorama was the most popular exhibition in the SAM. Importantly, similarly life-sized figures exhibited in the following room, such as those of Nama herders and also cast from live subjects,[75] have been left on display.

The diorama is considered controversial and offensive for several reasons. The first is that by leaving the diorama in the SAM when the other historical collections were moved to the SACHM, it situated the San as natural history artefacts - fauna of South Africa - rather than presenting them as human beings.[76] This approach to the San is not new, and they have frequently been described as the closest humans have come to living in harmony with nature, a picture that portrays them as innocents who are barely human in a child-like way. The San have been portrayed as an almost mystical "other" mirroring the corruption of modern human society and a glimpse into an Eden-like state, a kind of Orientalism[77] without the redemption of a "civilised" and sophisticated society. Such concepts have been peddled, at best naively, by the Denver Africa Expedition of 1925 and Laurens van der Post (along with Prince Charles) among others.[78]

The second is that the diorama is considered a prime example of apartheid-era anthropology, a field of "scientific" inquiry that helped legitimate the draconian codification of racial discrimination by linking the stereotyped physiognomy of different groups to placement on a scale from "primitive" to "civilized." This point of view gains currency when one considers that, although the casts of the San were made between 1908 and 1912, the actual diorama was not constructed until 1959, eleven years after the National Party came to government and at a time when apartheid legislation was drastically changing the shape of South African society.

Room 2, where most of the diorama was placed, is being reconstructed and the display cases boarded over. In order to try to redress the balance, Room 3 is now partly given over to wider exhibits on South African people and cultures. The museum officially encourages debate and feedback on its actions and new exhibits, such as through its dedicated website.[79]

However, problems persist. Nineteenth-century San artefacts are still placed next to Stone Age exhibits, prolonging the stereotype of primitivism. The implicit message is that the significance of San society is what it left behind in, as well as retained from, the pre-recorded past and an assumption that "authentic" San can not be part of modern society. This

issue is not simply one of academic observation but impacts on the San of South Africa today, especially when it comes to reclaiming land rights as part of restitution and reconciliation in South Africa, and in opposition to the interests of the tourist industry:

> Visitors come to see a national park in a natural pristine state - not to see other people living inside the park. They are talking in terms of cultural village which will be a bit of a window dressing exercise because the bushman are such - the San people - they walk around in everyday clothes like we do, and they just use their traditional dress on special occasions. A cultural village on the periphery of a national park having pure traditional clothing - nothing Western - might work.[80]

Thus the idea of San "authenticity" depends on the gaze of the outsider, particularly the tourist, whose tastes are catered for by visits to the SAM as much as to national parks through reinforcement of, rather than a challenge to, ossified stereotypes. Indeed the very scope within which some San are allowed to modernize in practice is curtailed for the sake of tourism; despite receiving 27,500 hectares within the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park as restitution, the San community are "not allowed to live or farm there, but may exploit it for tourism in accordance with conservation principles,"[81] or, in other words, through regulated, monitored and low-technology methods only.

Many of the newer exhibits in Room 3 of the SAM intended to offer a more up-to-date view of black South African life are contextually neutered and dated. For example, an exhibit captioned, in part, by the statement, "Many women started illegal shebeens,[82] which gave them financial independence," is clearly from the apartheid era and makes no mention that such enterprises were one of the very few ways black women could then earn a living in urban areas outside of domestic service. It also plays on a colourful stereotype of the "shebeen queen," a brassy, bossy proprietress whose occupation is certainly not representative of those undertaken by most black women.

Another exhibit's caption posits "the rise of informal township enterprises compensated for the lack of work elsewhere." Again, no mention is made as to why there was no work elsewhere, in this case - if one can go by the apparent apartheid-era timeframe of the indicated picture - due largely to restrictions on the free movement of black labour, an effective ban on an open labour market, and the paucity of educational and training opportunities for skills beyond that of menial and semi-skilled blue-collar employment. Meanwhile another caption explains how the word "Bantu" acquired derogatory connotations during apartheid while another near it states "Goodwill: a Bantu tradition."[83]

The many remaining figures in Room 3 are cheek-by-jowl with photos of modern urban life in South African townships, thereby drawing a direct line between aspects of traditional, pre-modern life and the modern age of cell-phones, now common accoutrements even among lower income groups as sometimes cheaper and more accessible than conventional telephones. While in contemporary South Africa aspects of pre-modern life still exist, and especially in the impoverished and scattered remnants of the former black homelands, some of these aspects - such as no running water, electricity or up-to-date medical services - are not the blessings of tradition but a curse of poverty and developmental neglect. Cultural interplay - between tradition and modernity - most certainly occurs in hybridized forms such as music, be it kwaito, bubblegum or South African jazz. But the relationship between the African past and present is not one of parallel yet dissonant stases, pre-modern versus modern, but manifests itself in syncretic forms, practices and customs. Hence today *lobola* (bride wealth) is usually paid in cash instead of cattle to a bride's family, while for the wedding the bride can wear an authentically African design of updated Ndebele or Zulu patterning on heavy silk - style copied from a picture in the glossy *African Bride* magazine - and high heels.

The SAM's reluctance or inability to substantively combine traditional and modern aspects of African life is evident throughout. Indeed it seems that that African authenticity needs to be flagged by easily recognized artefacts. For example, there is an unexplained scattering of Zulu beads and Ndebele blankets in front of an aerial picture of a modern township that again juxtaposes the old and new, as though the only way to identify the township as South African is if there are recognizably African objects in the display. Otherwise, the township might as well be in Brazil or Indonesia. Somehow the authentic black experience, even in modern South Africa, is implied to be grounded in pre-industrial artefacts and society. To further illustrate this point, the only photos showing black women at work involve washing, sewing and caring for infants, in other words activities which have carried through to modern times almost unchanged.

These authors noticed a vignette that encapsulates the way that, amid piecemeal efforts to modernize, the SAM has not quite made the leap from settler ethnography. An official museum guide was overheard explaining to overseas tourists how it is still unknown who built Great Zimbabwe,[84] and how this adds a romantic air of mystery. Yet the debate about who built Great Zimbabwe was settled decades ago; the "air of mystery" was only kept alive by white South Africans and Rhodesians who denied that black Africans could ever have built in stone, thereby denying Africans even a foothold in the modern era.

7.   Conclusion

The transformation of South Africa's public history is only in its early stages of implementation, and can be expected to be not only uneven, protracted and costly but also contentious. While some South Africans believe that the "new'" public history "allows us to share the transformation miracle with generations who did not experience it so that we are not doomed to repeat the past,"[85] there are others who do not share this view. Reflecting the apartheid past with its wilful denigration of such ideals as the public good and, in a literal sense, the common wealth, a zero-sum mentality as to historical ownership is still evident. "Blacks should recognise their white heritage," like Christianity and use of the written word, and therefore leave place names unchanged,[86] opines one irritated South African. For him and others of a similar persuasion, reparation even through pacific symbolic action is an affront to the civilizing legacy left to today's "native people."[87]

Given the contested nature of South Africa's heritage as increasingly narrating the history of all its citizens, "is a fundamental restructuring of museums… as 'preserver of national heritage' going to be required?"[88] The answer is certainly yes. How this is done and how effective it will be, however, are still in question, although "simple inclusions will not be sufficient to change the way in which museums are used."[89] The necessity of changing South African public history and, as importantly, making it accessible and relevant to the public are imperatives, not only as a moral issue of symbolic reparation, but as a political utility to encourage a civic identity based, not on race, culture or language, but an accepted belief in a common good for all its citizens. It is through striving for such an ideal that South Africa as plural society can eventually flourish.

While some argue that museums should not endeavour to foster national identities,[90] there is another perspective: "As keepers of collective memory, do museums not have a responsibility in defining national identity by providing the fullest picture possible, especially in South Africa where First and Third World rub shoulders with inevitable exchanges affecting the traditions of both groups?"[91] Industrialized, wealthy and information-rich societies have the luxury of contemplating if national identity should be promoted in their museums. Their social contracts with government are, in all likelihood, secure with the state overseeing, rather than having to institute, the delivery of basic services to millions. Despite globalization's effects on patterns of, for example, consumption, employment and increased formation of both trans- and sub-national identities, industrialized societies can take for granted that their state-aligned national identities are accepted, even if only tacitly, by a core majority of the populace and can be called upon as a rallying point in times of crisis.[92] Thus a good degree of basic social consensus, in identity and linked to perceptions of a common interest, can also be taken for

granted. The same cannot be said of South Africa, where poverty is more common than wealth, racism and communal antipathy still a regular feature in private daily discourse, and social consensus largely aligned with disparate group identities grounded in the apartheid past. Given these conditions it would be not only indolent for South African museums since 1994 to ignore the nation-building mission of forging a new civic identity for all South Africans, it would be a dereliction of duty.

Notes

[1] Primary research for this paper was undertaken over 18 months in 2002-3. Sites in five of South Africa's nine provinces were visited, and interviews conducted with museum directors, curators and other heritage professionals. The authors gratefully acknowledge the funding awarded by Monash University, Australia, which made this research possible. M.K. Flynn also acknowledges the conference funding provided by the Faculty of Humanities, Languages and Social Sciences, University of the West of England, Bristol, UK.

[2] Plaque in the McGregor Museum, Kimberley.

[3] See: Wilmot James and Linda van der Vijver, eds., *After the TRC: Reflections on Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa* (Athens OH: Ohio University Press, 2000); Antjie Krog, *Country of my Skull* (Johannesburg: Random House, 1998); and Robert I. Rotberg and Dennis Thompson, eds., *Truth v. Justice: The Morality of Truth Commissions* (Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press, 2000).

[4] Ciraj Rassool et. al., "Burying and Memorialising the Body of Truth: The TRC and National Heritage," in James and van der Vijver, 115-127.

[5] See: James L. Gibson and Amanda Gouws, *Overcoming Intolerance in South Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

[6] Abebe Zegeye, "Conclusion: Depoliticising Ethnicity in South Africa," in *Social Identities in the New South Africa: After Apartheid*, vol. 1, ed. Abebe Zegeye (Cape Town: Kwela Books and SA History Online, 2001), 334.

[7] Zegeye, 337.

[8] See: Sampie Terreblanche, *A History of Inequality in South Africa, 1652-2002* (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 2002).

[9] Paraphrasing J. Hector St. Jean de Crèvecoeur's question, "What, then, is the American, this new man?" written in the mid 18th century. See: Richard Ruland and Malcolm Bradbury, *From Puritanism to Postmodernism: A History of American Literature* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1992), 41.

[10] See: Scarlett Cornelissen and Steffan Horstmeier, "The Social and Political Construction of Identities in the New South Africa: An Analysis

of the Western Cape Province," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 40.1 (2002): 55-82; and Gibson and Gouws.

[11] Desmond Tutu, *No Future Without Forgiveness* (London: Random House, 1999), 227.

[12] The Greater Pretoria metropolitan area was named Tshwane in 2000, but the city itself retained its name. See: "Pretoria Name Change Canned," *News24*, 7 August 2003, (5 Decemeber 2004).
<http://www.news24.com/News24/South_Africa/News/0,,2-7-1442_1398961,00.html>.

The opposition Democratic Alliance's Gauteng spokesperson accused the ANC of "seeking to erase historical associations with the present name" and "putting reconciliation in our metro area at risk."
"Bid to Stop Name Change," *News24*, 6 August 2003, (5 December 2004).
<http://www.news24.com/News24/South_Africa/News/0,,2-7-1442_1398343,00.html>.

[13] Marida Fitzpatrick, "New Name for Pretoria," *News24*, 30 July 2003, (5 December 2004).
<http://www.landbou.com/News24/South_Africa/News/0,,2-7 1442_1394813,00.html>.

[14] Ghandi spent some twenty years practising law in South Africa in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. He formulated his philosophy of non-violent resistance while campaigning for better treatment of Indians in South Africa.

[15] F.W. de Klerk was South African President 1989-94. He unbanned the ANC and other liberation organizations, and released Nelson Mandela. He was joint winner with Mandela of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1993.

[16] Hector Pietersen was one of the first children killed by the security forces in the 1976 Soweto uprising.

[17] Michael Schmidt, "Businessman takes Krok Brothers to Court over 'Trademark' Name," *Sunday Times* (Johannesburg), Gauteng News section, 22 June 2003.

[18] Chris McGreal, "We have Children Here who Don't Believe Apartheid Happened," *The Guardian* (London), 12 December 2001, (30 October 2003). <http://www.guardian.co.uk/g2/story/0,,617231,00.html>.

[19] Robert Kirby, "Another Triumph for the Corporate Bully Boys," *Mail & Guardian* (Johannesburg), 25 April 2003, (24 July 2003). <http://archive.mg.co.za/>.

[20] Prime Minister, 1958-66; he is widely regarded as the "architect of apartheid."

[21] Prime Minister, 1953-58.

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[22] This happened on 31 May 2001, the 40th anniversary of South Africa's withdrawal from the Commonwealth. "Heading off to Hell's Groot Gat," *Independent Online*, 1 June 2001, (5 December 2004). <http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?set_id=1&click_id=1&art_id=iol991366 834132F613>.

[23] The first Dutch administrator of the Cape Colony in the 1650's.

[24] Rassool et. al., 121.

[25] President of the South African Republic during the Anglo-Boer War, 1899-1902.

[26] "Kruger's Bust to Stay in National Park 'For Now,'" *Mail & Guardian*, 30 July 2003, (24 July 2003) <http://archive.mg.co.za/>.
          Interestingly, the statue of Kruger at the park gates was only erected in 1975.

[27] South African Institute of Race Relations, *Race Relations Survey 1994/95* (Johannesburg: SAIRR, 1995), 5.

[28] Boers (literally "farmers" in Afrikaans) is a collective name for white Afrikaners.

[29] Hermann Giliomee, "The Leader and the Citizenry," in *Malan to De Klerk: Leadership in the Apartheid State*, ed. Robert Schrire (London: Hurst, 1994), 121.

[30] The authors here are using apartheid-era categories; in contemporary South Africa the term "black" is used to denote all those previously categorized as Coloured, Asian and African.

[31] South African Institute of Race Relations, *Race Relations Survey 1976* (Johannesburg: SAIRR, 1977), 31.

[32] The Zulu were assigned to the geographically fragmented homeland of KwaZulu, while the Xhosa were divided between the two homelands of the Transkei and Ciskei.

[33] Mark Sanders, *Complicities. The Intellectual and Apartheid* (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 2002), 57-60.

[34] See: "Post Office Tree," *Museums of the World*, n.d., (5 December 2004). <http://www.museum.com/jb/showdia?id=1897>

[35] It is worth noting that the official commemoration of some of these Jewish heritage sites coincided with deepening diplomatic and military relations between South Africa and Israel.

[36] J.H.O. du Plessis, "The Policy of the Cape Provincial Administration," in *The Preservation and Restoration of Historic Buildings in South Africa,* ed. R.F.M Immelman and G.D. Quinn (Cape Town: A.A. Balkema, 1968), 1-7.

[37] J.E. Tunbridge and G.J. Ashworth, *Dissonant Heritage: The Management of the Past as a Resource in Conflict* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1996), 228.

[38] See: Martin Bulmer and John Solomos, eds., *Racism* (Oxford, University Press, 1999), pt I.

[39] Differences between ethnic or cultural and civic identity are a staple for theories of nationalism and national identity. While relevant works are far too numerous to indicate here, some useful works are: John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith, eds., *Nationalism* (Oxford: University Press, 1994); James C. Kellas, *The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity*, 2nd ed. (London: Macmillan, 1998); and Anthony D. Smith. *National Identity* (London: Penguin, 1991).

[40] Republic of South Africa, *The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa* (Pretoria: Government Printer, 1996), ch. 2.

[41] Interview, Fleur Way-Jones (Curator, Albany History Museum, Grahamstown), 26 February 2002.

[42] The passbook that every African over 16 had to carry at all times was the most direct method of internal migration control and police harassment under apartheid, and one of the most high-profile grievances blacks had with the system. The pass contained personal information, tax receipts and indicated whether or not the holder had the right to live and work in "white" areas. The Sharpeville Massacre in 1960 took place during a pass protest. The pass system was dropped in 1986 as part of tentative reforms. See: Philip Frankel, *Sharpeville and its Massacre* (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2001); Ahmed Jooma, *Migrancy after Influx Control* (Johannesburg: SAIRR, 1991); and Deborah Posel, *The Making of Apartheid 1948-1961* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1991).

[43] Robben Island, off the coast of Cape Town, was the most famous political prison in South Africa.

[44] The police station is a heritage shared for different reasons by whites, for whom there is an internal Anglo-Afrikaner dissonance as the place where future president John Vorster was imprisoned for pro-Nazi agitation during World War II, and by blacks where many trade unionists were incarcerated. Tunbridge and Ashworth, 229.

[45] It is often said that Ghandi conceived of the idea of non-violent protest during a cold night at the station where he had been ejected from a train by a white conductor. Paul Tichman, *Ghandi Sites in Durban* (Durban: Local History Museums, n.d.), 9.

[46] Authors' own notes from visit to McGregor Museum, 8 February 2002.

[47] The San (formerly known as bushmen) are the indigenous inhabitants of the Cape region.

[48] The "Cape Malay" population is descended from Malay slaves brought by the Dutch in the 17th and 18th centuries.

[49] Interview, Dr. Jack Louw (Director, Afrikaans Language Museum, Paarl), 19 February 2002.

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[50] Interview, Fleur Way-Jones (Curator, Albany History Museum, Grahamstown), 26 February 2002.

[51] Janet Hall, "Museums, Myths and Missionaries: Redressing the Past in the New South Africa," in *Museum, Media, Message*, ed. Eileen Hooper-Greenhill (London: Routledge, 1995), 180.

[52] Interview, Fifi Meyer (Assistant Curator, Ladysmith Siege Museum), 4 March 2002.

[53] Interview, Lorelle Royepenn (Acting Director, Local History Museums, Durban), 26 August 2002; authors' visit to Mandela Museum, 2 March 2002.

[54] Martin Legassick and Ciraj Rassool, *Skeletons in the Cupboard. South African Museums and the Trade in Human Remains 1907-1917* (Cape Town: South African Museum & Kimberley: McGregor Museum, 2000), 3.

[55] Interview, guide, (Campbell Collections, Durban), 27 Aug 2002.

[56] Ibid

[57] Ibid

[58] It has also been classified as World Heritage Site.

[59] "Ticket Sales," *Robben Island Museum*, n.d., (5 December 2004). <http://www.robben-island.org.za/tickets.asp>.

[60] "Summary of Speech by the Deputy Minister of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology, Mrs Brigitte Mabandla: Coert Steynberg Museum: Pretoria," *SA Communication Servcie*, 18 May 1996, (10 August 2003). http://www.anc.org.za/anc/newsbrief/1996/news0518.

[61] André Odendaal, "Heritage and the Arrival of Post-Colonial History in South Africa," Paper presented to the African Studies Association annual conference, Washington DC, 5-8 December 2002, (19 March 2003). <http://www2.h-net.msu.edu/asa/odendaal.pdf>, 9. (Permission to quote from this paper is gratefully acknowledged.)

[62] A list can be found at: "Declared Cultural Institutions," *Department of Arts and Culture*, n.d., (5 December 2004). <http://www.dac.gov.za/about_us/cd_heritage/declared_cultural_institutio ns/declaredcultural_inst.htm>.

[63] No sites or museums have lost their state funding since 1994.

[64] South Africa is a unitary state with nine provinces. The central government has virtually all fund-raising authority in the country, while most administrative functions are delegated to the provincial and municipal levels. Provinces and municipalities have very limited income-generating powers, and their budgets are almost completely provided by the national government. In other words, the national government is responsible for raising money, and provinces and municipalities are responsible for spending it.

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[65] South Africa inherited a bloated, under-skilled civil service from the apartheid regime, whose transformation is slow and expensive and, to date, incomplete. Howard Barrell, "SA still has too Many Bureaucrats" *Mail & Guardian*, 6 August 1999, (5 December 2003). <http://archive.mg.co.za>

[66] Harriet Deacon, Sephai Mngqolo and Sandra Prosalendis, *Protecting our Cultural Capital: a Research Plan for the Heritage Sector* (Cape Town: HSRC Publishers, 2003).

[67] Tunbridge and Ashworth, 259.

[68] Ibid, 247.

[69] "Statement by Minister Mtshali on Legacy Projects," *Ministry of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology*, n.d., (4 December 2004).
 <http:// www.polity.org.za/html/govdocs/pr/1998/pr0615a.html>

[70] see: "Draft Document on the National Legacy Project," *Department of Arts and Culture*, n.d., (4 December 2004). <http://www.dac.gov.za/about_us/cd_heritage/legacy_project/legacy_project.htm>

[71] David Bunn, "Whited Sepulchers: On the Reluctance of Monuments," in *Blank_Architecture, Apartheid and After*, eds. Hilton Judin and Ivan Vladsević (Rotterdam: NAi, 1999), ch. C4 (no pagination).

[72] Observations are based on a working trip to the museum in Feb. 2002, and Mar. 2003. This section is based on an expanded re-working of a piece written for the School of Historical Studies, Monash University, for on-line teaching delivery.

[73] W.D. Hammond-Tooke, *Imperfect Interpreters: South Africa's Anthropologists 1920-1990* (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1997), 109-118; and Patricia Davison and Gerald Klinghardt, "Museum Practice, Material Culture and the Politics of Identity," in *Culture and the Commonplace. Anthropological Essays in Honour of David Hammond-Tooke*, ed. Patrick McAllister (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1997), 181-194.

[74] Interview, Dr. Patricia Davison (Director of Social History, Iziko), 15 February 2002.

[75] Davison and Klinghardt, 185.

[76] This is conceptually analogous to the legal status of Aborigines in Australia as "fauna" and not citizens until 1967.

[77] For full discussion of the implications of this term, see: Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (London: Penguin, 1978).

[78] Robert J. Gordon, *Picturing Bushmen: The Denver Africa Expedition of 1925* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1997); and J.D.F Jones, *Storyteller: The Many Lives of Laurens van der Post* (London: Scribner, 2001), esp. chs. 19-21.

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[79] See: "Debating the Diorama," *Iziko Museums of Cape Town*, n.d., (4 December 2004).
<http://www.museums.org.za/sam/resource/arch/bushdebate.htm>.
[80] "Regopstaan's Dream – Transcript," *Lifeonline*, n.d., (4 December 2004). <http://www.tve.org/lifeonline/index.cfm?aid=1239.>
[81] "My Grandchildren will Speak 'Die Taal' Again says San Leader," *Mail and Guardian*, 15 Aug., 2003, (24 July 2003). <http://archive.mg.co.za>
[82] A shebeen is a bar in a black township.
[83] Authors' notes from visit to the SAM, 11 February 2002.
[84] Monumental pre-colonial ruins of the Munhumutapa Empire in what is now modern Zimbabwe.
[85] *Mail and Guardian*, 22 August, 2003, letters page, (22 August 2003). <http://archive.mg.co.za>
[86] W. Schmitt, "Blacks Should Recognise Their White Heritage," *The Star* (Johannesburg), 22 Aug., 2003, letters page, (22 August 2003). <http://www.thestar.co.za/index.php?fSectionId=225&fArticleId=21308>.
[87] Ibid.
[88] Aron Mazel and Gaby Ritchie, "Museums and their Message: The Display of Pre- and Early Colonial Past in the Museums of South Africa, Botswana and Zimbabwe," in *The Presented Past: Heritage, Museums and Education,* eds. Peter G. Stone and Brian L. Molyneaux (London: Routledge, 1994), 234.
[89] Ibid
[90] James Bradburne, "The Poverty of Nations: Should Museums Create Identity?" in *Heritage and Museums: Shaping National Identity*, ed. J.M. Fladmark (Shaftesbury: Donhead, 2000).
[91] Hall, 179.
[92] A case in point was the very obvious swell in public patriotism in the United States after the destruction of the World Trade Centre in New York.

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Speaking of Contested Sites: Narrative and Praxis of Spatial Competition in Belfast, Northern Ireland

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Abstract

The debates and disagreements which have characterized the Northern Irish 'peace process' have often been dramatized in violent form at those boundary zones where Roman Catholic and Protestant populations meet. In fact, the physical and symbolic contestation of space in Northern Ireland tends more often to be of micro-boundaries which border urban residential communities of differing religious/national/ethnic identification than of the contested rural border which separates Northern Ireland from the Republic of Ireland. As a result, these divisions represent important prisms through which to view the conflict more generally. By exploring both praxis and narrative on a single unstable boundary between two working-class residential communities, one Catholic and one Protestant, this paper shall illuminate the spatial anchoring of the dominant group myth into the local landscape by both Loyalists and Nationalists in their relationship to local contested sites. In order to illuminate these dominant cultural values the paper shall adopt an approach which utilizes an historical perspective on the development of a segregated landscape, together with a strong descriptive emphasis on the exact nature of the contested sites and their usage, while drawing on a multilocal/multivocal approach to narrative.

Key Words: Ireland, parity of esteem, Roman Catholic, Protestant, Belfast, interface communities, contested space, shifting boundaries, territorialisation, multilocal/multivocal emphasis

1.   Introduction

Since the mid 1990s Northern Ireland has been engaged in a protracted and problematic process aimed at achieving a lasting 'peace' settlement. The years of political talks have included the negotiation of many controversial themes aimed at finding a resolution in which the two populations can have 'parity of esteem' politically, economically and culturally. Cultural rights have proven particularly contentious, with the right to march, fly flags and display emblems proving difficult topics. The debates and disagreements about such subjects have on many occasions been played out in dramatic and often violent form at boundary zones

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where Roman Catholic and Protestant populations meet. Given that the physical and symbolic contestation of space in Northern Ireland tends more often to be of micro-boundaries which border local urban residential communities of differing religious/national/ethnic identification than of the rural border which separates Northern Ireland from the Republic of Ireland, these divisions represent important prisms through which to view the conflict more generally. By exploring both praxis and narrative on a single unstable boundary between two working-class residential communities, one Catholic and one Protestant, this paper shall illuminate several of the key symbolic themes which are utilised by Loyalists and Nationalists in their discussion of contested space. The ethnographic fieldwork on which this paper is based was carried out between March 2000 and August 2001, and included both participant observation and interviews with over eighty residents of Belfast's interface communities (1).

2.   Illuminating Dominant Cultural Themes in Contested Space

As editors of a special edition of *Political Geography* exploring the theme of 'place' in Northern Ireland, Douglas and Shirlow argue that the nature and role of geographical place in conflict remains an under-examined theme in the general literature and in Northern Ireland in particular (2). Drawing upon the earlier work of Thrift and Forbes, they point out that conflicts always take place in a "determinate spatial setting which over time shapes and forms the conflict and the people involved in it" (3). Implicit to this analysis is the understanding that places are not viewed merely as geometric space, but rather as sites of often divergent meaning and by extension, contestation. Though all places are by their nature open to divergent interpretation, contested space in this instance is taken to be those specific sites which "reveal broader social struggles over deeply held collective myths" (4), or where group myths have been spatially anchored to a local landscape (5). Low and Lawrence-Zuniga define contested sites as spaces which

> … give material expression to and act as loci for creating and promulgating, countering and negotiating dominant cultural themes that find expression in myriad aspects of social life. Spaces are contested precisely because they concretise the fundamental and recurring, but otherwise unexamined, ideological, and social frameworks that structure practice. (6)

In an important study of politically contested sites, Hilda Kuper also draws upon the ideational characteristics of space, arguing that it is possible to identify a "condensation of values" (7) in particular sites and

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transactions that constitute the "totality of social life" (8). She views such sites as verbally and spatially identified, and implicit within her description of political events is an understanding that values are "embodied in words through which they influence behaviour" (9). She notes that "the past is written into sites not because land is fixed and permanent and distinct from movable property, but because new sites can be established both to replicate and to develop relationships" (10). She provides a framework through which the condensed values embedded in contested sites can be uncovered; through an examination of the actual sites as they are spatially constituted, together with the words used to describe them. One key text which focuses explicitly upon the words used to describe place is Keith Basso's work on the Western Apache where he also concurs with the view that sense of place is "inseparable from the ideas that inform it… [it is] locked within the mental horizons of those who give it life" (11).

Margaret Rodman (12), however, warns that an over reliance on verbal communication could lead to important aspects of place being overlooked. She advocates twinning a narrative approach with an equal emphasis upon the praxis found in these spaces. Stressing this point ensures that narratives are not accepted uncritically and recreated in the analyst's model, despite the existence of forms of praxis that tell a different story, tacit and unspoken understandings, or indeed other voices which remain unheard by the researcher. Furthermore, Rodman advocates an approach that is both multivocal and multilocal in method. For her, places and voices are local and multiple: "a single landscape can be multilocal in the sense that it shapes and expresses polysemic meanings of place for different users… multilocality conveys the idea that a single place may be experienced quite differently" (13). Therefore, it is necessary to hear different voices in different locations, or indeed different voices in the same location when they express different perspectives on the same place. Such an approach can help to bridge the divide between the particular and the general, a bringing of the "local, national and global into mutual alignment" (14) or, to quote Low and Lawrence-Zuniga, it can "eliminate the micro-macro distinction, for region and village are points on a sliding scale. Both are 'social landscapes', albeit seen in different degrees of detail" (15).

An appreciation of "'social landscape'" for both Rodman and Low and Lawrence-Zuniga holds that these landscapes are at least partly structured by previous social groups, which implies that an awareness of the historicity of the local landscape is crucial. It is an awareness of the interconnectedness of both different times, but also different locations which marks their approach, an appreciation of "the interacting presence of different places and different voices in various geographical, anthropological (cultural), and historical contexts" (16).

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        In order to adopt an approach which incorporates an emphasis upon narrative, praxis, multilocality/multivocality and an awareness of the historical shaping of place, the paper shall move from a broader historical treatment toward an appreciation of the highly local contested site and the multiple voices heard at this location, before drawing out the links made by local voices to other locations and to wider group myths. In a sense this approach borrows from, though reverses that of Barbara Bender when she notes that "the familiar topography gives way to the unfamiliar, one landscape rests within another like Chinese boxes – except that the boxes are permeable" (17). To capture and identify these spatially anchored myths or "visions of the world" (18) in those spaces where "Unionists and Nationalists remain locked into zero-sum thinking on the exclusivity of territoriality" (19) could prove particularly enlightening.

3.   Belfast: City of Shifting Boundaries

        Belfast has long displayed the contours of a highly segregated urban space, with separate residential areas for working-class Roman Catholics and Protestants typifying the demographic character of the city over several centuries. The origins of the settlement explain something of this patterning, as the town saw its first significant expansion in the 17th century when it developed as a market town and small port for the settler population arriving from Scotland, Wales and England to the north-east of Ireland as part of the plantation of Ulster and through subsequent waves of emigration. The early settlement was predominantly Protestant, reflecting the religious background of the majority of these settlers, with few native Irish Roman Catholics resident in the new town in its early years. Tension between the Roman Catholic and Protestant working classes in the central areas of Belfast has a history which mirrors the significant increase in Catholic numbers in the city from the mid nineteenth century, with tensions erupting over both employment matters and political questions. Political crises over issues such as Home Rule for Ireland saw tension between working-class Protestants and Catholics in the city escalate and violence erupt between neighbouring districts of differing religious affiliation. This tension often took the form of riotous stone throwing and street violence on the boundary zones between residential communities (20).

        The violent conflict of 1969-1994 was thus merely the latest violent episode in a relationship between these two population groups characterised by recurrent acts of bloodshed and mutual mistrust. At its most dramatic, the early 1970s witnessed a large-scale population displacement that saw between 30,000 and 60,000 people displaced from their homes in the Greater Belfast area, which is roughly between 6.6 per cent and 11.8 per cent of the population (21). While this population displacement was due in part to the physical intimidation of minority

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populations in residential districts, it was also the result of nervousness by many who moved out of fear of possible future intimidation or through the decision that it is ultimately safer to live in a community of co-religionists (22). As a result, the years of the 'troubles' witnessed an increase in the degree of residential segregation and a hardening of these boundaries with the erection of physical and largely impenetrable barriers between residential districts, which have been euphemistically called 'peace lines', and more recently 'interfaces'. In their earliest form these permanent barriers were constructed from large sheets of heavy corrugated iron, standing approximately twenty feet in height and running the length of a street, or across a road or along a back alleyway between houses. Their location differs according to the nature of the boundary between the residential areas. In the mid to late nineteen nineties many of these structures have been replaced by more permanent constructions of a more aesthetically pleasing nature. In keeping with the largely red brick character of the city, many of the corrugated iron barriers have been replaced with high red brick walls with small areas of enclosed landscaping of trees and shrubbery acting as a buffer zone between residential communities. This has normalised these structures and helped them to disappear into the landscape, while they still serve as a largely impenetrable barrier. These barriers prove of mixed benefit, however, with many merely acting as a new flashpoint location attracting youths from a wider hinterland to gather and posture, throw stones and drink alcohol.

It is through these fragile boundaries that much of the violence of the conflict has been channelled. Feldman speaks of the institutionalisation of "the interface as the prescribed place of violence" in the city of Belfast (23). This territorialisation of violence ensures that these locations are used as the principal sites for inter-community rioting, but also as a means to target vulnerable victims for assassination, beatings or intimidation. While most assassinations in these boundary zones have ceased with the military cessations by paramilitary organisations, the contestation of these sites has not abated. Instead, the post-ceasefire years have witnessed a continued, and it is possible to argue, heightened contestation of these highly local boundaries. The years of protracted peace negotiations in Northern Ireland have seen increased tension around these volatile spaces on questions as varied as the right of groups to march and display the cultural emblems of their respective groups in both boundary and mixed spaces of the city, plus the continued pressure to maintain and extend territorial dominance.

Some of these boundaries have shifted with demographic movement within the city, but these "tensioned landscapes-in-movement" (24) are in contrast to other boundaries that have proven quite immobile and permanent. The boundaries which lie between the small Catholic enclave of Slatersville and the Protestant district of Oaksdeane have long

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been sites of conflict and contestation, and the points of division have remained relatively fixed over an extended period of time (25). There has been little residential boundary crossing by Catholics in the area, and the land occupied by an overcrowded Catholic population has not increased in size, despite large-scale relocation of much of the neighbouring Protestant population of the surrounding Oaksdeane district. To understand this situation, it is necessary to explore in more detail the exact nature of this contested site and of the narratives that seek to describe it.

4.   High Walls Make Good Neighbours: Slatersville/Oaksdeane Districts

The edges of the small Protestant community of Oaksdeane mark the boundary of a much wider Protestant population bloc, where it meets the small Catholic enclave of Slatersville. The Protestant district of which Oaksdeane is an element is internally marked by small micro-communities, or urban villages, localities that hold distinct identities often paraded in oppositional forms to neighbouring districts through various forms of exclusivity. Such internal differentiation could be linked to the association of the residential areas in question to historical connection with particular workplaces with strong occupational identities, to extended kinship networks, to the ascription of putative 'roughness' in contrast to supposed 'respectability', of class as well as status distinctions with middle-class housing bordering working-class estates, or of long-term links with one or other of the leading Loyalist paramilitary groups who tend to demonstrate a hostile and competitive stance toward one another.

While these divisions are highly important facets of life in these small micro-Protestant districts, the division between Protestant and Catholic districts proves an opposition that takes on different emphases and about which a different type of language is utilised. These boundaries prove denser than the fluidity of the inter-Protestant divisions, which are permeated in many instances for the purpose of schooling, employment, allocation of public housing and through inter-marriage. The boundary between Protestant and Catholic working-class communities in Belfast is a space where rumour plays as important a role as fact, where motivations are ascribed on the basis of guess work, where limited contact occurs and where schooling is separate and inter-marriage practically non-existent. The nature of the boundary-crossings which occur on any such division are necessarily dictated by what lies on the other side of the boundary in question. In the case of the division separating Oaksdeane from Slatersville, the flow of movements is of the Catholic population exiting the local district in order to access shops, services, schooling and employment outside of their micro-community. In such situations, there is little reason for the majority population of any given area to enter a residential enclave, as there are few shops or services available in these

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spaces, thereby making boundary crossing a minority activity. Though this situation can be reversed in other areas of the city, where the residents of small Protestant enclaves cross their community boundaries in order to access services on the main thoroughfares lying in supposed Catholic 'territory', these movements prove fraught with difficulty, based upon a set of tacitly agreed rules and sanctions, and given to sudden change with shifts in the wider political atmosphere or in local relations.

Life within the confines of the small Catholic enclave of Slatersville is therefore largely played out within highly defined spatial parameters. The community is predominantly comprised of residential housing, with several small shops, a few community and voluntary premises, take away food outlets, a public bar and a social club the only services available locally. The community comprises less than 3000 inhabitants living in a space clearly bounded on all sides by physical interfaces (26). While it holds boundaries on three sides with working-class Protestant residential communities, its final boundary is with a brown field site where one of the old large industrial employers of the city previously stood. Despite its location beside this Catholic residential enclave, historically the workforce of this factory was nearly exclusively Protestant in make-up. The district is therefore ringed by spaces that are historically and symbolically Protestant in association.

Despite this fact, however, the Catholic population has not been depleted by out-migration. Instead, the district suffers from overcrowding, a young and growing population with long waiting lists for public housing. With a finite amount of space, the possibilities for addressing these demands are limited. Attempts to secure land for housing on the adjacent brown field site have been rejected by the local Protestant districts who view such a territorial expansion as transferring a previously enclosed population across a major thoroughfare onto a site destined for urban regeneration for the area more generally. They view such a planning decision as ensuring that the area would become one, which was described by some local representatives, as 'cold' for Protestants who would feel unsafe to venture into the other developments planned for the area, whether these be places of employment or of recreation.

The issue was not the creation of residential homes *per se*, as there were no objections to plans for middle-class apartment blocks by these same community representatives. Rather their objection was to what they viewed as a territorial expansion of the working-class Catholic community of Slatersville and an expansion of sectarianised space into a potentially mixed-use site. With the thoroughfare in question also an important Orange Order (fraternal Protestant social and religious organisation) marching route, any attempt to bridge this thoroughfare was viewed as an attempt to transform the thoroughfare itself into Catholic territory where objections could then be raised about the right of

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Protestant groups to parade 'through' a Catholic community as opposed to marching outside a clearly walled and separate residential district.

This sense of the demarcation between 'Catholic' and 'Protestant' space was re-emphasised by the hanging of flags on the perimeter of Slatersville during the period of the research in 2000 and 2001. The Loyalist paramilitary organisations, the Ulster Volunteer Force and the Ulster Defence Association, were involved in a violent feud at the time, and one symbolic form their conflict took was the competitive hanging of their paramilitary flag colours from the street lighting of working-class Protestant areas of the city. In places where one group held clear control their flags were the only flag in evidence, while in areas where control was contested both group aggressively hung their flags, employing crane lifts to erect their group colours above that of their competitors. The hanging of both organisations' flags on the Slatersville perimeter, and the lack of attempts by Slatersville residents to remove them, show that the space outside the ringed fence is seen clearly as Protestant controlled space, and not as 'no-man's territory'.

The geographic area incorporating both Slatersville and Oaksdeane traditionally displayed a housing stock that sat in long straight terraces emerging onto wide thoroughfares. The combined effects of the violent conflict, the deindustrialisation of Belfast's key industries with the associated suburbanisation of a proportion of the Protestant working-class and the need to clear poorly constructed 19th century housing saw considerable change in the layout of the two adjacent districts. An attempt was made through the redevelopment process to create both physical distance and dividing barriers between the Catholic enclave and the Protestant community in an attempt to reduce opportunities for violent confrontation, while also introducing more effective security force surveillance and control over communities which had built up illegal paramilitary groups within their bounds for the purpose of both offensive and defensive action.

One boundary district of Protestant housing was largely cleared and replaced by small manufacturing outlets with the immediate area heavily planted with shrubbery, while the housing stock of Slatersville was designed in such a way that the long open streets were removed in favour of an enclosed spatial layout. The perimeter of the district was entirely surrounded by high iron fencing, which unlike the corrugated iron version was predominantly open and relatively decorative, augmented by landscape planning which saw large shrubberies and treed areas introduced onto these boundaries. Thus, the housing was visible, though only from behind. The houses all faced into the community, gathered on closes and *cul de sacs* with few through roads available to enter and exit the district. Between houses in a number of locations walkways allowed pedestrian access out of the district, but movement through these spaces

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necessitated a considerable amount of local knowledge, as turning one direction or another could lead down a blind alley which merely ended at a row of rubbish bins. This spatial pattern was designed with security precautions in mind, both to limit the possibilities for hostile gunmen entering the vulnerable enclave with few escape routes and relatively confusing internal layout, but also limiting the possible escape routes internally for those engaged in illegal actions trying to escape the pursuit of the security forces.

5.   The Contested Site at Clarence Road

Clarence Road is one of several rows of tightly packed red-brick terraced housing, the remnants of accommodation built in the late 19th and early 20th century to house an industrial working-class. It marks the most intimate meeting point of the Protestant residential district of Oaksdeane as it borders the Catholic enclave of Slatersville. Given that Clarence Road is a street which holds both Protestant and Catholic terraced housing, the residents of these two districts live side by side in a way that has largely been redeveloped out of existence elsewhere in the area and indeed in the city. It is one of the few open streets that allow access out of the Catholic enclave onto the thoroughfare which holds the majority of the local service providers. Though the exact point where Catholic and Protestant housing meet on Clarence Street remains open, this point of entry/exit is only the narrow width of the residential street, beyond which the communities are entirely divided by a high wall running the entire length of the connecting street of Ballygiblin Avenue.

The exact nature of the high wall at this location differs from the barriers that mark the boundaries visible to a wider public where Slatersville borders major city thoroughfares on the other end of the district. Here, the boundary is slightly more dated in style, less decorative, has less shrubbery and is more distinctly barrier-like. It consists of a high brick wall standing approximately sixteen feet high and topped by an iron spiked fence, with the spikes positioned in the direction of the community of Slatersville. On the Catholic side of this division, the long street of Ballygiblin Avenue runs the length of the wall with newly developed red brick housing standing facing across the street toward the wall and the Protestant housing beyond. At the exact point where the two districts meet, the high wall comes to an end in a slightly paint spattered fashion, showing evidence of earlier scuffles involving paint bombs. On the Catholic side of this open point, public housing runs up to the dividing line with only two Catholic properties empty, both located directly on the boundary. One of these buildings is a former community facility, which has been replaced in recent years by a new centre for the Slatersville district. Many of the Catholic homes display window grills in the immediate vicinity of the interface. On the Protestant side, relatively new

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public housing sits behind the Ballygiblin Avenue wall near the corner with Clarence Road in a small housing development called Oakvale. Many of the windows of these houses, however, are boarded up and their previous occupants departed. Those not boarded up have iron grills over their windows to lessen the problem of windows being broken by stone wielding youths.

At the immediate interface on Clarence Road, this new Protestant housing development is set back slightly from Clarence Road, with many of the houses visible from the interface boarded up and empty. On the other side of the street a row of nineteenth century terraced housing also reveals a largely abandoned landscape, with many of the properties empty and boarded up, with only five houses occupied out of approximately twelve. Some of the houses still occupied on both sides of the immediate boundary have large cage-like structures constructed over their backyards in order to protect these homes from paint bombs, stones or other missiles thrown in their direction during episodes of inter-community conflict.

This narrow opening on Clarence Road has long been a site of struggle, mostly taking the form of regular displays of street violence by young boys or teenage youths entering into recreational combat with their equivalents in the 'other' community. While Clarence Road is a highly local boundary, it attracts the attention of a much wider hinterland. As a point at which the two communities live 'cheek by jowl' to quote one respondent, it marks the place at which the Catholic and Protestant communities border one another most intimately in this part of the city. For this reason youths from a much wider Protestant area might travel on summer evenings to this boundary or those surrounding Slatersville to engage in recreational stone throwing with other teenage gangs. While Protestant youths travel to the interface on summer evenings and during school holidays, the Catholic youth are more likely to be found in the vicinity of the interface on a more continuous basis, given their close residential proximity to the contested site. Indeed, such is the semi-organised nature of the rioting that residents of the interface note that they overhear shouted taunts between rival groups of arrangements for follow-up contests at the same location.

Should arrangements be made for an evening of stone throwing, young men from the locality may phone school friends from the hinterland to join them for an evening of posturing and performing on the interface. Moreover, politically disenchanted adults protesting some supposed political dispensation for the Catholic community or some heavy-handedness against the Protestant could travel from relatively distant parts of the Protestant district to express their frustration at this contested site. In an effort to support a seemingly besieged and highly symbolic Catholic district, working-class Catholics from other areas of the city might travel to Slatersville in order to assist the locals with the defence of their district.

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          The result is that a percentage at least of those gathering on the
Clarence Road interface represent a wider group presence than the
immediate neighbourhoods. This was the case with the controversy over
the banning of an annual Orange Order march at Drumcree in a rural area
thirty miles from the city of Belfast. This march was forbidden as it passed
alongside Catholic residential housing estates and the residents
successfully objected to the march on the basis that they found it sectarian
and intimidating. The result was wide scale disorder for approximately a
week in early July from the mid-1990s through to the early 2000s. Streets
were blockaded by Loyalists, or on some occasions in the Oaksdeane
locality by a few women, children and a pram. Angry crowds gathered
annually at this time to mark their protest on the interfaces surrounding
Slatersville, which led to a heavy police and army presence in the area. In
fact, at one stage in the summer of 2000 the perimeter of the Catholic
district was entirely ringed by army vehicles in order to provide a wedge
between the two groups.
          Indeed, the summer of 2000 was marked by a series of violent
incidents, many of which were mere skirmishes between children and
youths, but others escalated into wider inter-community hostilities, the
longest of which lasted a week with a daily resumption of boundary
hostility. The incident that sparked the week of violence was a relatively
innocuous occurrence, with children from the Catholic community
releasing emergency water hydrants in the heat of a summer afternoon.
The resulting excitement drew youths from the Protestant district to
investigate the cause of the commotion. The result was the beginning of an
altercation between the youths involved, which quickly spiralled out of
control as parents entered the situation in order to protect their respective
children. Another serious incident which occurred in these summer weeks
of 2000 was the death of an elderly male resident who died of cardiac
arrest sustained while chasing a group of Catholic children who were
tormenting him by continuous attacks on his home with stones and bottles.
This incident caused considerable anger for local Protestant residents and
their political representatives. In August, there was another escalation in
street violence on Clarence Street, which saw at its most extreme a
Protestant crowd of approximately one hundred entering the street
wielding iron bars and other weapons and proceeding to break the
windows of houses, the now closed community building and cars on the
Catholic end of the street. The incident lasted literally minutes, but left
residents of both sides of the street frightened and anxious. For the
predominantly elderly residents of the Protestant side of the street a
sleepless night followed while they awaited possible retaliation.
          The key elements that appear to be relevant from an examination
of praxis issues in this particular boundary area differ slightly for Catholic
and Protestant populations given their respective relationships to their

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community boundary. While for the Catholic district spatial freedoms appear to be heavily circumscribed, their home community is a highly defined and enclosed space where a relatively small population appears to sit in a vulnerable location alongside a large Protestant district. Their community boundaries are the site of protest for any Loyalist grievance against the Catholic population or indeed often against the British government or security forces. For the Protestant population there is no necessity to enter the small Catholic enclave in order to access services, though it is necessary to pass alongside the perimeters when travelling to and from the city centre on foot. While both sides of the interface have problems of chronic youth street disorder on the boundary, this problem seems to be particularly difficult for those on the Protestant side of the divide. For the Protestant community there has been a significant loss of residents on the interface with people choosing to move back off these chronically fraught boundaries into empty properties further away from the interface or indeed relocate out to suburban housing estates. The result is that the Protestant community have an unsightly landscape of boarded up, abandoned housing and a loss of their demographic strength on the boundary site.

6.   Narratives of Contested Space

Local representation of violent incidents varies, with actions being alternatively depicted as those of outsiders venting their political frustration at a location where, unlike the residents, they do not have to remain to suffer the consequences of any retaliation, or indeed as merely the antics of bored youths with little understanding of the implications of their behaviour. The standpoint from which the individual comes is crucial to their reading of the motivation behind the same developments. An example of such divergent interpretations is provided by the voices of two individuals resident in the vicinity of the contested interface. The first voice is that of Kate, a Catholic woman in her late thirties resident in Slatersville. She is married with a family and is involved in the community development sector within the district. She remarks that "I don't think they [the population of Slatersville] ever felt that [the walls] was protecting them… There definitely is claustrophobia here, any of these wire spikes that you see around the interface, the spikes are into us, they're not out the ways. So they're actually in, to keep us in." A radically different interpretation of the walls is provided by Jack, a Protestant in his mid-forties who is also heavily involved in community activism and Loyalist politics in his district when he notes "I mean you only have to look at the shape of the outer… edges of Slatersville to see… the defensive way in which they've [the people of Slatersville] told the Housing Executive to design their houses… I mean there's literally an iron fence and brick walls right round the edge of it."

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While those standing at any particular vantage point looking at the interface provide necessarily divergent interpretations of what takes place at this contested site, the intention of this paper is not that of providing a balanced treatment of the 'reality' of what occurs on the boundary, but instead, of how narratives of this space illuminate deeply embedded cultural themes within both Loyalism and Nationalism and their particular relationship to contested territory. The following two extended narratives are chosen as being quite representative of a myriad of voices heard in both the locality in question, but also as articulated by many Nationalists and Loyalists across the city and beyond. The themes they draw upon relate to not merely local incidents of stones thrown at pensioners' homes at three o' clock in the morning, but also of the relationship both groups perceive to exist between themselves, their protagonists and the wider institutions of power in society, whether the British government, security planners, policing or local city managers.

The first voice is that of a young Catholic man, Alan, who is in his twenties and single. He is living at home with his parents and siblings directly on the interface between Oaksdeane and Slatersville. His father has been active within the Republican movement, and Alan is himself active within Sinn Fein and community work in the district. Alan has been employed in a variety of low wage jobs in hotels and call centres in both the city centre and in the newly regenerated area of the Laganside.

> They were just coming to attack houses. Now as I say, there is an interface problem… people in Upper Clarence Road, Oakvale, you can see in that area there's a lot of places boarded up. Now that's for the reason that they have been intimidated by kids from our side, right, and obviously they are going to complain to their community workers and their paramilitaries or whatever and that's putting pressure on them and obviously they saw the summer as a time to retaliate. "We'll go down and wreck a few houses." That's when a crowd came down and literally the old community centre was absolutely wrecked, like. The windows were smashed. There was a couple of houses along Clarence Road, there was a couple of cars and that smashed up. By the time local people came round the crowd was just massive like… it's mob mentality. If one goes, they all come down and so "we'll beat the Fenians" [historical term for Irish Republicans used in a derogatory fashion by some Loyalists to describe Irish Roman Catholics], that type of thing. There was a few houses that were actually badly damaged and then local people came out

and fought them back and what have you… It's
probably, you know, you're brought up as a Loyalist and
you have this in the back of your head that 'Fenian's do
this' and 'Fenian's do that' or 'Catholic community',
'we don't like Republicans'. 'They've done this to us'
and 'we've done that' and Drumcree [marching
controversy] is going to raise all those tensions. And as I
say mob mentality takes over, once a couple go down
the rest all come down after them. Well, in that instance,
the RUC [the now renamed and restructured police
force, the Royal Ulster Constabulary] were fully aware
that they were coming down to the area because they
didn't actually run. Witnesses at the time said they just
all came dandering down with whatever they had, iron
bars, done whatever damage. Now on Clarence Road
there's an RUC station probably two hundred yards
down the street where this all happened. Their argument
might have been that they were stretched all over
Oaksdeane and never had resources but in saying that,
ten to fifteen minutes later they were on the scene and
you know forcing the crowd back and whatever. The
usual, turning round and facing the Nationalist crowd to
try and push them back, who were only out to defend
their homes. But that's the general rule for the
Nationalist community. I mean nobody in this area has
faith in the RUC … For the size of the district, two
thousand people and having a highly fortified base. The
sole reason for that RUC station being there now… it's
been there for years upon years… I mean, I don't know
its history, but it hasn't just came in 1970, it was there
before that, but the sole reason for it was because this is
the only Nationalist area [in this district] and they had to
keep an eye on the Nationalist community. But in saying
that, they haven't prevented any attacks in the past.
When there's crowds gathering, I mean you've had
people [Protestants] blocking Blacks Road. You've had
people blocking the corner there [the intersection of
Slatersville and the main thoroughfare of Hyde Road] or
the bottom of Hyde Road. I mean from our point of
view, as Nationalists, if we went to block the Hyde Road
we would be beaten off the street and back into
Slatersville. There wouldn't be a chance of you getting
anywhere near the Hyde Road. But whereby they
[Protestant mob] can come down through our front here,

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> or whatever you want to call it, they can do so at their
> free will and they [the police] stand by watching.

The second voice is that of Oliver, a Protestant man in his late forties. An active member of the local residents association on the Oaksdeane side of Clarence Road, he is involved in Loyalist politics within the Progressive Unionist Party, which is linked to the Loyalist paramilitary group, the Ulster Volunteer Force. He grew up in the locality and has lived his entire life on the Oaksdeane/Slatersville interface. He is employed locally as a community development worker, and is married with teenage children.

> Oaksdeane used to have a close, close interface with the
> Slatersville Nationalist area. The [Protestant] areas now
> have been pushed back… You don't come across a
> Unionist or a Loyalist house until you're about fifty or
> sixty yards [up the road]. It's like a no-man's land
> within the area. When they started to regenerate the
> whole area… the way it was done, it was not done in a
> sense to help Unionism or Loyalism, it was done in a
> sense to help Nationalism. In Slatersville the
> Nationalists have only x amount of houses in the area.
> They have always had a certain amount of houses.
> They've been trying to expand over the last thirty odd
> years. They can't expand because of the way the area
> itself is. So with the security forces' help, there may
> well be a set plan to push unionism back. There's a
> church there… [but] there's mostly businesses all the
> way up the road. Whereas in my day, there were all
> houses from the bottom end of the road, and just across
> the road was Slatersville. It has all completely
> changed… But with the redevelopment and things like
> that, they started to push our areas back and started to
> build no man's lands… A plan was put to me about a
> year ago – I'll not say by what bodies – we have a wee
> area down there called Clarence Road and we have
> thirty-seven houses vacant and people won't live in
> them because of the intimidation and the problems
> they're having. One of the suggestions was that we turn
> it into an industrial park. And I says "Oh yes, another
> one!" So that at the end of the day all right around
> Slatersville there's industrial parks, open spaces and all
> the rest of it, and whether we're losing houses close to
> us, it doesn't really matter. So we're rejecting it. We just

told them "No, we're not interested in it"… "No, I think you've taken enough houses off our community." And the interfaces, I said, "I think it's high time the interfaces were accepted for what they are, and people need to live in peace." I see it more as a security strategy than a political strategy. I see that as them [planners and security advisers] saying to themselves "If we move these houses back, we're not going to get trouble here. We'll do this and we'll do that." It's all geared around what's needed security-wise. We've been asking for gates and walls down there for the last five years, and we've been totally ignored. At one stage there was eighteen houses empty but now there's about thirty-seven in that area… you see, the way it was, it was methodical. First of all in Oakvale itself, it's relatively new, it's about ten or eleven years old, and every house at the corner was occupied. They continually bombarded the first two houses. They ended up being the first two empty. The other houses on the far side of the street started to get it, and then they moved up that way and then it started coming right into Oakvale. And methodically they came down and put windows in, and windows in, and windows in, until the people couldn't take it no more because they had young families. And it's got to the point now where you have about nine houses right down on one side, and then coming across this way you have houses empty. The intention is… that the Slatersville community would like to take over that area and be re-housed and that takes you up to Bow Avenue and that creates all sorts of problems [with marching routes]. That's what we visualise was a lot of their aim. But since our residents' group formed, they realise… it will not happen. They were told that we knew what they were at, and it will not happen.

When examining narratives of contested sites in light of praxis at these spaces, it is as interesting to note what is ignored, played down or trivialised as it is to see what is emphasised or indeed exaggerated. While both narratives do refer to local events and local places, both simultaneously reveal a qualitatively different reading of the contested site. In fact, both display a clear orientation that not merely underpins, but in fact dominates their respective narratives. Given the highly circumscribed nature of Catholic spaces and associated spatial freedom, Nationalist narratives do not in fact emphasise this point, and indeed treat

this as merely part of the ebbs and flows of life in such districts. It is treated as unproblematic, with individuals merely taking the 'normal' precautions, and adopting the 'ordinary' routines. In fact, an issue that would be expected to be a dominant theme is rarely mentioned except through direct questioning. It is routinised and normalised in a way that practically disappears from the narration. Another area played down in the Catholic narration of Clarence Road, as seen clearly in the excerpt from Alan's interview, is the trivialisation of the boundary violence of children and youths. While Alan acknowledges that local Catholic children have indeed been guilty of "intimidating" local Protestant residents, he clearly limits this to children acting alone and does not acknowledge any paramilitary or political orchestration of these events. In contrast, he points out that the result of the actions of these children is to draw both the retaliation of Loyalist paramilitaries and Protestant "mobs" upon the Catholic district. For Alan, and other Nationalists, the group myth which is embedded in the local sites of the Slatersville/Oaksdeane boundary is one which views Protestant "mobs" as engaged in actions which are approved of, or indeed to which a "blind eye" is turned by both the security forces and the political establishment. They view these mobs as acting as a tool of political agendas ranged against the Catholic population, whether these emanate from Northern Irish Unionist or British political circles. They see a wider agenda which is designed to limit the space available for Catholic housing in an effort to control voting numbers; they see slow police response times and aggressive policing of residents defending their homes, and the allowance of streets to be blocked by women, children and a few prams as evidence of the active or passive collusion of the security forces with Loyalist agenda and sentiment. In contrast, Nationalists feel that the policing of any street protest by their own group is dealt with immediately and aggressively. The narratives of local nationalists therefore reveal an underpinning myth which sees the existence of widespread institutionalised sectarianism directed against the Catholic, Nationalist population and enforced by the passive collusion of the security forces with Loyalist mob violence. It is a belief that sees an unwillingness for Protestants and the British establishment to allow Nationalists 'parity of esteem', or indeed of ultimately being willing to enter into a fully operational power sharing system.

In contrast, the morally imbued story of this site provided by Oliver offers an equally politicised reading. Oliver provides an interpretation of the local situation that appears at odds to the actual size of the Slatersville population, which is dwarfed by the Protestant district it borders. Instead, a reading is provided which sees the population of Slatersville as highly strategic and politically focused in their expansion plans. In addition to seeing the violence of Catholic children and youth as orchestrated, intentional and methodical, in line with other local Loyalists

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he views government and security strategies as benefiting the Catholic district. In fact, the strategies of these agents are not merely credited with coinciding with those of the population of Slatersville, but indeed as actively pursuing a strategy aimed at the mollification of Nationalists. This perspective views the expansion of empty spaces around the perimeter of Slatersville as a short term situation, which will result in the eventual construction of Catholic housing on these vacant sites with all the implications this brings for the cultural expression of Protestantism in the area. In addition, these voices point out that the security forces are afraid to efficiently police these politically "disloyal" Catholic districts, for fear of creating difficulties in wider dealings with local Nationalists, while they police "loyal" Protestant districts with more vigour, regularly arresting local Protestant youths for their involvement in street violence. The pushing back of Protestants from the perimeter of Slatersville by both Nationalists and Government planners is seen as an example of the wider situation of Protestants in Northern Ireland, who feel that they have been continuously pushed back politically, culturally and geographically to give more and more ground, and by extension power, to Nationalists. They cannot envisage the end point of this expansionism as anywhere other than in a United Ireland, where they fear they will become a small, powerless minority population.

7.   Conclusion

An examination of the historical construction of contested sites in Belfast, together with an examination of the exact nature of these physical locations and the praxis found thereon provides a complex picture of two populations confronted by a myriad of difficulties caused by living in such intimate relation in highly politicised and contested territory. The addition of narratives that draw upon a multilocal/multivocal emphasis provides a reading of these spaces that often diverges from possible expectations given the contextual information. While issues that appear to be critical are entirely overlooked, depoliticised and normalised, others are given an orientation that clearly echoes wider group ideology. Whether it is slow police response times or local incidents of children breaking windows, these respondents read, alternatively, institutionalised anti-Catholic sectarianism or British Government compromise and mollification of Nationalists. While there is an awareness of the particular local context, whether of intimidated elderly Protestant residents, or indeed extremely small Catholic numbers in a highly circumscribed physical space, there is ultimately a political reading that overshadows local circumstance. These respondents are, to paraphrase Miriam Kahn, highly efficiently spatially anchoring their group myth into the local physical landscape and circumstance of Clarence Road (27).

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We speak of the need for the analyst to recognise the interconnectedness of locations and events across time and space, but the individual respondents in these examples are themselves making these very links in their local anchoring of the group myth. They are actively making the links between locations to augment their argument, linking the local to the regional, the particular to the general. In addition, they are drawing upon time in illuminating similar events in other locations, locating incidents within an historical framework to justify what is happening as part of a pattern inherited from the past, from similar lessons hard-learned on the streets of the locality, of previous betrayals, of lessons learned from hindsight. The particular lesson is, therefore, never merely a local lesson. It is always the same lesson learnt in multiple contested locations across Belfast and beyond, which draw upon and in turn reinforce the wider group ideology.

Notes

1. The work in this paper was undertaken as part of an Economic and Social Research Council funded project on "Mapping the spaces of fear: the socio-spatial processes of violence in Northern Ireland," award no. L133251007.
2. Neville Douglas and Peter Shirlow, "People in Conflict in Place: the case of Northern Ireland," *Political Geography* 17 (1998): 125-128.
3. Thrift and Forbes 1998: 125 in Neville Douglas and Peter Shirlow, "People in Conflict in Place: the case of Northern Ireland," *Political Geography* 17 (1998): 125-128.
4. Low and Lawrence-Zuniga 2003: 18 in Setha Low and Denise Lawrence-Zuniga. "Locating culture," in *The Anthropology of Space and Place: Locating Culture,* ed. Setha Low and Denise Lawrence-Zuniga. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003) 1-48.
5. Kahn, Miriam 1990 Kahn, Miriam. "Stone-faced Ancestors: the Spatial Anchoring of Myth in Wamira, Papua New Guniea." *Ethnology* 29 (1990): 51-66.
6. Low and Lawrence-Zuniga 2003: 18
7. Kuper 2003: 258 Kuper, Hilda. "The language of sites in the politics of space." In *The Anthropology of Space and Place: Locating Culture, e*dited by Setha Low and Denise Lawrence-Zuniga, 247-63. Oxford: Blackwell, 2003.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid., 259.
10. Ibid., 261.
11. Basso, Keith 1996: 84 Basso, Keith. "Wisdom Sits in Places: Notes on a Western Apache Landscape". In *Senses of Place*, edited by Steven Feld

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and Keith Basso: 53-90. Santa Fe, New Mexico: School of American Research Press, 1996.

12. Rodman, Margaret 2003 Rodman, Margaret. "Empowering place: multilocality and multivocality". In *The Anthropology of Space and Place: Locating Culture,* edited by Setha Low and Denise Lawrence-Zuniga, 204-23. Oxford: Blackwell, 2003.

13. Ibid., 212

14. Stewart and Strathern 2003: 2 Stewart, Pamela and Andrew Strathern. "Introduction". In *Landscape, Memory and History: Anthropological Perspectives,* edited by Pamela Stewart and Andrew Strathern, 1-15. London: Pluto, 2003.

15. Low and Lawrence-Zuniga 2003: 217

16. Rodman 2003: 212.

17. Bender, Barbara 2001: 6 Bender, Barbara. "Introduction." In *Contested Landscapes: Movement, Exile and Place*, edited by Barbara Bender and Margot Winer, 1-18. Oxford: Berg, 2001.

18. Graham 1997: 4 Graham, Brian. (ed.) *In Search of Ireland: A Cultural Geography*. London: Routledge, 1997.

19. Ibid., 199.

20. John Darby records that "between 1835 and 1935 there were eight periods of serious rioting in Belfast – in 1835, 1857, 1864, 1872, 1886, 1898, 1920-22 and 1935" (1986: 10).

21. Darby and Morris 1974 Darby, John. and G. Morris. *Intimidation in Housing.* Belfast, The Northern Ireland Community Relations Commission, 1974.

22. Darby 1986: 53 Darby, John. *Intimidation and the control of conflict in Northern Ireland.* Dublin, Gill and Macmillan, 1986.

23. Feldman 1991: 37 Douglas, Neville and Peter Shirlow. "People in Conflict in Place: the case of Northern Ireland." *Political Geography* 17 (1998): 125-128.

24. Bender 2001: 5

25. All the names of both locations and interviewees have been changed to protect the anonymity of those involved in the research process.

26. 1991 Census data for the area shows a population for Slatersville of under just 3000 people, of whom 95% are Catholic, an unemployment rate of nearly 50%, approximately 30% of the population are aged between 0-15 years of age, 13% are old aged pensioners and nearly 80% of households are without a car, while Oaksdeane has a population of over 7000, 0.1% of whom are Catholic, an unemployment rate of 35%, approximately 20% of the population is aged 0-15, 23% are old aged pensioners, and nearly 80% have no household car.

27. Kahn, Miriam 1990: 51.

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Racism and Violence : Anti-Racist Strategies in Intercultural Contact Zones

Eleonore Wildburger

Abstract
      This chapter investigates processes of intercultural encounters as to their interrelationship between knowledge, socio-political power strategies and representations of the "Other." The author argues that constructions of a stereotyped "Other" are produced in political acts that shape socio-political realities. Stereotypes form imaginative concepts of the "Other," thereby producing conditions that cause conflicts that, in turn, are rationalized by these non-differentiated concepts. In this context language is an essential, discriminatory tool. The chapter argues that racism must be made unacceptable as a standard on all levels of human encounter. As a consequence, the essay elaborates on contact zones as interculturally appropriate venues where participants re-assess their concepts of the "Other/s" in intersubjective learning processes. The author concludes that education and knowledge generated in interculturally sensitive encounters encourage participants to articulate their racial/cultural identity as an innate feature of transparent diversity. Mutual respect and understanding ensue.

Key Words. Stereotypes, the "Other," difference and diversity, racist discourse, intercultural contact zones.

      Concepts of "difference" and the "Other" account for "race" and racism, so I am asking, with Homi Bhabha, "How can the human world live its difference? How can a human being live Other-wise"?[1] On a similar note, back in 1903, W.E.B. Du Bois predicted that "the problem of the 20th century [would be] the problem of the colour line."[2] Both Du Bois' prediction and Bhabha's concern with the "Other" resonate in Stuart Hall, who argued a few years ago that "the capacity to *live with difference* is, in my view, the coming question of the twenty-first century."[3] In this context, I will focus on the continuing significance and changing meaning of "race" in complex contemporary societies, drawing attention to racist discourse as intrinsically interwoven with colonial discourse. As a consequence, I will contextualise race within (post)colonial and anti-colonial discourse.

      Concepts of "race" and racism have been rapidly transformed in recent times. While scholars have largely accepted the view that "race" is

socially constructed, the complex processes of its formation and representation are still widely discussed. It is well understood that the idea of "race" appeared in the English language in the 17th century and began to be used as a biologically determined factor in scientific writing in the late 18th century.[4] Confirmed by research and reports of colonial "explorers,"[5] concepts of "race" were based on mental concepts of the biologically determined "Other." By mid-nineteenth century it was commonly held that

> race was a "thing," [sic] an ineffaceable quantity, which irresistibly determined the shape and contour of thought and feeling as surely as it did the shape and contour of human anatomy.[6]

Consequently, colonial discourse was determined by Manichean sets such as civilization/savagery, black/white, culture/nature. Ever since the era of colonial encounters, belief in the supremacy of the "white race" as holder of the top position in the Chain of Being has been well established and justified by putative scientific evidence.

There is little doubt that socio-political representations of "Otherness" are grounded in scientific authority whose mental constructs transform mainstream *realpolitik*. Abdul R. JanMohamed contends that the perception of racial difference is influenced by both hegemonic and economic motives; dominant power patterns in colonial society are sustained by the "Manichean opposition" [sic] between the putative superiority of the coloniser and the supposed inferiority of the colonised, and he explains:

> This axis in turn provides the central feature of the colonialist cognitive framework and colonialist literary representation: the Manichean [sic] allegory - a field of diverse yet interchangeable opposition between white and black, good and evil, superiority and inferiority, civilization and savagery, intelligence and emotion, rationality and sensuality, self and Other, subject and object.[7]

Furthermore, JanMohamed emphasises that colonialist discourse "commodifies" the dominated subject as a stereotyped object and sustains the dominating subject position of the colonisers. Minority discourse is, in the first instance, a product of "damage...inflicted on cultures produced as minorities by the dominant culture," as JanMohamed and Lloyd put it.[8] In my view, this also relates to racist discourse and the damage inflicted on human beings who are produced as the "Other" race.

Also Homi K. Bhabha focuses on power structures in colonial discourse, arguing that

> The objective of colonial discourse is to construe the colonized as a population of degenerate types on the basis of racial origin, in order to justify conquest and to establish systems of administration and instruction.[9]

On a similar note, Andrew Lattas holds that constructions of the colonial "Other" must be seen within colonial power relations where lack is deliberately created as a function of the market economy of the dominating class. He concludes,

> The secret truth is delivered to us through a hermeneutic process, controlled by certain privileged groups of intellectuals who appropriate the construction of our identities in the process of asking us to confess the secrets they read into our existence. It is time for us to stop treating the artist, the writer, the historian, the priest and the explorer as outside of the power structures of our society. … It is time to recognize that these figures ... are authorising certain images of ourselves.[10]

To phrase it differently, language creates "truth" which justifies imagined models of this very "truth." Having said this, let me confirm my view that (post)colonial discourse must also address ongoing contemporary mental and factual colonisation in its multi-layered complexity. Therefore, it is important to foreground the historical, socio-political and economic relevance of minority discourse (and racist discourse) in order to recognize the common political basis of a minority struggle, which takes place in opposition to economic and social domination.

To my view, colonialist mindsets go a long way. Despite today's commonly held social constructionist idea of "race," ongoing academic debates confirm that some scientists continue to see "race" as an objective term of classification. It bears emphasising, however, that even though genetic variance and racial categories do not correspond to allegedly homogeneous racial groups, people do conceive of "race" as something real, mostly rooted in visible differences, residing in physical traits. This "physical evidence" dismisses the fact that concepts of "race," deeply rooted in culture, show considerable variation across time and space. Obviously, concepts of racial distinction, based on visible differences, construct genetic "proof" of evidence "as if the existence of racial categories across cultures could only be possible if race transcends culture."[11] On the other hand, within popular liberal discourse "race" is

dismissed as a conceptually flawed category whose abandonment is considered a victory for reason and as scientific proof that "race" is a lie. Yet if racial consciousness is seen as the problem in place of "racialised *effects* of social and economic inequality,"[12] "race" is mistakenly ignored "as a source of imaginative energy and as a secret focus of social identity."[13] No doubt, "race" still matters considerably.

On a similar note, Stuart Hall points to "scientific racism" and the connection between "visual discourse and the production of (racialized) knowledge."[14] Visible differences, foremost of which is the colour of the skin, provide putative evidence for the naturalization of racial difference. Thus,

> representation of "difference" through the body became the discursive site through which much of this "racialized knowledge" was produced and circulated.[15]

Hall points to the "white"[16] logic behind naturalizing racial "difference." His essay "Old and new identities, old and new ethnicities" features racial identification processes observed in his own life, assuring that skin colour awareness is a subjective factor indeed. With regard to his Jamaican home country, he reports:

> But the word "Black" was never uttered. Why? No Black people around? Lots of them, thousands and thousands of them. Black is not a question of pigmentation. The Black I am talking about is a historical category, a political category, a cultural category. In our language, at certain historical moments, we have to use the signifier. We have to create an equivalence between how people look and what their histories are. Their histories are in the past, inscribed in their skins. *But it is not because of their skins that they are Black in their heads*.[17]

The socio-political relevance of racial discourse is evident. Whereas cultural difference is open to change and modification, natural difference is fixed and secure forever. Consequently, representations of "Blacks" were stereotyped, which means in Hall's words that they were "reduced to a few essentials, fixed in Nature by a few, simplified characteristics"; and Hall adds that "stereotyping reduces, essentializes and fixes "difference'."[18] Furthermore, Hall argues that stereotyping operates according to Foucault´s concepts of power and knowledge, and excludes everything that is different and does not fit: it sets up a symbolic frontier between the "normal" and the "deviant," and always disadvantages

subordinated groups. It establishes norms of classification and constructs the "Other" outside these norms. On a similar note, Homi Bhabha argues that

> the stereotype requires, for its successful signification, a continual and repetitive chain of other stereotypes. ... [T]he *same old* stories of the Negro's animality ... *must* be told (compulsively) again and afresh, and are differently gratifying and terrifying each time.[19]

The socio-political effect of stereotyped racial discourse is discrimination, which consequently calls for anti-colonial strategies to articulate knowledges that acknowledge differences. Yet there is little doubt that concepts of "race," coded in terms of "difference" and "culture," will stay beyond any unitary or simplistic sets of definition.

Consequently, I contend that the research agenda governing studies of "race" and racism needs to be reformulated. So far I have gestured toward racial discourse in a variety of contexts which serve selectively as scientific proof for basically contradictory views that define race either as biologically determined or socially constructed. Therefore racism must be contextualised and overcome in light of the time-and-space conditions of its enunciation.[20]

A collection of essays on Australian *Race Matters* offers substantial points of view that have also much relevance beyond their geographical setting.[21] Even though racial discrimination is generally abhorred as immoral, there are still clearly disparate life conditions between Indigenous people and non-Indigenous people in Australia. Consequently, racialized effects of inequality generate racism in new forms.[22]

Barry Morris argues that Indigenous Australian people are still represented as historically invariant, as victims of the social conditions of their existence, that is, as a broad range of welfare recipients, and he adds that public institutions and bureaucratic processes are the site of racist discourse.[23] This racist discourse tends to justify its practices as based on conventional mainstream experiences: alleged "transgressions" of mainstream patterns are applied to the minority as a group. For Morris, the issue is no longer the genesis of racism, but the question as to what makes racism acceptable and legitimate. He points to the social and cultural milieu of Indigenous people as the site of racist discourse and names three conditions that sustain inferiorising representations of Indigenous people:

> i)   A racially divided society maintains its social and physical distance through stereotyped circulations of inferiorising representations.

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ii)   A comparatively high percentage of Indigenous
        people are dependent upon welfare services.
iii)   Aboriginal dependency upon welfare services
        is seen as an inherent essence of Aboriginality.

Yet assertions of Aboriginal inferiority have shifted from the public
domain to private, personal discourse, and the "knowledge" of Aboriginal
inferiority is also constructed within private domains. Asking herself
"Where is racism?" Morris' co-editor Gillian Cowlishaw argues that it
can flourish as a hidden discourse behind assertions of a putative cultural
homogeneity in the nation. She points out that

> Systematic cultural difference may be celebrated in
> literary or artistic contexts, and romanticised by the
> multicultural myth-makers, but in the search for the true
> essence of Australianness there is little room for the
> legitimation of group differences. *Overt vilification of*
> *racial or cultural difference takes place in private sites*
> *separate from liberal discourse and can be considered a*
> *matter of personal opinion or aberrant attitudes.*[24]

It is my firm conviction that racism as a complex phenomenon can only be
overcome through a multi-faceted strategy aiming at well-balanced living
conditions, and, above all, at a different concept of "Otherness." Uri
Themal calls for an "anti-vilification legislation" against any expression of
racism, and he advocates intercultural education to promote mutual
acceptance of differences. He says,

> It is essential to make racism unacceptable as a standard
> - as a philosophical standard, as a political standard and
> as a behavioural standard - by groups and individuals.[25]

There is little doubt that racist discourse implies violence in a variety of
formations. In my view, language that authors racist representations of the
"Other" involves violence as such.
      The Indigenous Australian anthropologist Marcia Langton,
professor at the University of Melbourne, calls for a commitment to the
consequences of representation, drawing attention to the fact that
representation shapes reality. "Trying to move boundaries and undo
restrictions which make it so difficult for any of us to speak,"[26] she doubts
if Australian institutions can ever be decolonised, but is hopeful that "we
can … find ways to undermine … colonial hegemony."[27] Langton sees a
"need to develop a body of knowledge on representation of Indigenous
people and their concerns in art film, television and other media" and calls

for "a critical perspective to do with aesthetics and politics, drawing from Indigenous world views, from Western traditions and from history."[28] Langton asks why so many Australian institutions remain racist after years of anti-racism education programs and legislation. Analysing the ground from which prejudiced discourse springs, she argues that all representations are derived from historical symbols of "Aboriginality" within the colonial discourse of Otherness. Because both Indigenous and non-Indigenous people "fail to admit the intersubjectivity of black/white relations,"[29] stereotypes and prejudiced representations remain in the absence of adequate intercultural communication processes. For Langton, "the failure of non-Aboriginals to comprehend us Aboriginal people, or to find grounds for *an* understanding" is the central problem in white/black relations,[30] and she adds that each policy has been a way of avoiding understanding. She draws attention to the fact that Aboriginal reality is transformed by representations of Indigenous people by non-Indigenous people, and she adds that these representational and aesthetic statements are *accounts*. Whenever Aboriginal "reality" is constructed by non-Indigenous people, it [not the result, but the whole process] is an act of creative authority, even if Indigenous people are involved in the production.[31] Consequently Langton argues that Aboriginal people must make their own self-representations "to create culturally useful meaning,"[32] adding that non-Aboriginal people must engage in dialogues to work out models of intercultural encounters:

> In these intersubjective exchanges, the Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal individuals involved test imagined models of the other, repeatedly adjusting the models as responses are processed to find some satisfactory way of comprehending the other. It is in these dialogues that working models of "Aboriginality" are constructed as ways of seeing Aboriginal people. Both the Aboriginal subject and the non-Aboriginal subject are participating. The results of this self-conscious dialogue are meanings and analyses which, ideally, do not mystify "race" and other ideological concepts.[33]

Encounters with the "Other" initiate processes of identification or exclusion according to fundamentally similar patterns of behaviour. This phenomenon accounts for the fact that culture studies and, by the same token, intercultural research fulfil an important task, or in the words of American film expert E. Ann Kaplan:

> ...we must address other cultures, since we increasingly live in a world where we will rely on one another, where

not to know will be dangerous. We need to contribute to the decentering of Western culture, and it helps for us to focus on other cultures. Our own paradigms are further opened up, changed in beneficial ways, through the challenges that other cultures offer. Yet we can only enter from where we stand, unless we want simply to mimic those we aim to know about. Mimicry ... is not knowledge. Knowledge can only happen as we enter into a dialogue with the other culture, as we dare to look at it within frameworks we bring with us rather than trying to get inside "their" frameworks, and losing ourselves in the process.[34]

To conclude, "race" is a socio-political phenomenon that accounts for racism in a variety of forms. I am convinced that racism is unacceptable in any form and at any stage. This means that there is an urgent need to move from ongoing mental colonisation to a committed anti-colonial perspective and to rigorously contextualise representations of the "Other." If we engage in ongoing intercultural dialogues where we acknowledge and respect diversity in interculturally adequate, intersubjective contact zones,[35] we pave the ground for a mindset where anti-colonial, anti-racist knowledge is generated and transformed. Such dialogues constitute encounters where identity concepts that relate to paradigms like "race" will be no longer mystified. Unbalanced power positions within these dialogues will be transformed if all participants, aware of their own identification paradigms, are ready to question their concepts in intersubjective processes. Thus intercultural borderlines become transparent and reveal stereotypes as imagined constructions. As a consequence, the "Other" is recognised as an equal member of a transparent diversity, which overcomes prejudiced stereotypes in epistemological processes of mutual acknowledgement and respect. Or to phrase it differently, the "Other" will be the "Other" no more.

Notes

1. Bhabha, 1986, xxv.
2. Du Bois, 1903, xx.
3. Hall, 1993, 361.
4. Miles, 2000, 125.
5. Current terminology distinguishes between the "Western" term "explorer" and the anti-colonial term "invader."

6.   Gates, 1985, 3.
7.   JanMohamed, 1985, 82.
8.   JanMohamed, 1990, 1.
9.   Bhabha, 1994, 70.
10. Lattas, 1997, 255.
11. Kolko, et. al, 2000, 3.
12. Morris and Cowlishaw, 1997, 1; original emphasis.
13. Morris and Cowlishaw, 1997, 5.
14. Hall, 1997, 24.
15. Hall, 1997, 244.
16. I am wary about using both terms "white" and "Black" in a generalizing way. Yet the given frame of this chapter accounts for my decision to refrain from a more detailed clarification of terminology.
17. Hall, 2000, 149; emphasis added.
18. Hall, 1997, 258.
19. Bhabha, 1994, 77; original emphasis
20. Solomos and Les Back, 2000, 23.
21. Gillian Cowlishaw and Barry Morris, 1997.
22. Morris & Cowlishaw, 1997.
23. Morris, 1997.
24. Cowlishaw, 1997, 179; emphasis added.
25. Themal, 1998, 64.
26. Langton, 1993, 7.
27. Langton, 1993, 8.
28. Langton, 1993, 28.
29. Langton, 1993, 38.
30. Ibid.
31. Langton, 1993, 23-40.
32. Langton, 1993, 85.
33. Langton, 1993, 83.
34. Kaplan, 1989, 13.
35. Langton, 1993. Wildburger, 2003.

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Part 3

Violence and Institutions:
Butchery, Execution, Riots

The Enemy Within:
Earthquake, Rumours and Massacre in the Japanese Empire[*]

Jin-hee Lee

Abstract

The experience of violence has powerful consequences in the transformation of history. The 1923 Great Kantō Earthquake marked a moment of unprecedented material destruction and cultural rupture in the Japanese empire. The disaster soon became subject to human interpretation and political manipulation, for the trauma of the earth tremors and subsequent fire produced not only physical chaos, but also rumours and violence against the colonized in the metropolitan area. Such violence manifested itself in the massacre of Koreans immediately following the earthquake—triggered by rumours of arson, murder, and riots by Koreans in the Tokyo-Yokohama area. Despite the shock of rumours and mayhem, the lack of critical evidence and the contradictions in testimony have rendered the incident an historical enigma in modern Japanese and Korean history. Interestingly, precisely because of this unsettled nature of the violence - which thus defies any singular narrative that satisfactorily explains the incident empirically - the event illuminates the development of subjective narratives on collective violence. In an attempt to explore the relationships that weave together disaster, rumours, massacre, and narrative-making in the culture of empire, this paper explores collective violence through the lens of rumours and vigilante trial discourse in the context of imperial Japan.

Keywords: The Great Kantō Earthquake, the 1923 Massacre of Koreans, Rumours, the Japanese Empire, Vigilante, Collective Violence

> *Too many experts on Rwanda have shied away from this troubling fact, the "popular" agency in the genocide, by casting the genocide as a state project and not also as a social project.… It is this fact that needs confronting, not because of what it can tell us of Rwanda and Rwandans, but because of what it can tell us about ourselves as political beings—as agents with a capacity to tap both the destructive and the creative potential in politics.*[1]

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The experience of violence has powerful consequences in the transformation of history and culture. The 1923 Great Kantō Earthquake marked a moment of unprecedented material destruction as well as cultural rupture in modern Japanese history. As the natural disaster soon became subject to human interpretation and political manipulation, the traumatic experience of earth tremors and the subsequent fire brought not only rumours and chaos but also vigilante violence against colonized people in imperial Japan. Such social violence and cultural contestation manifested itself in the massacre of six thousand Koreans involving thousands of ordinary citizens in the Tokyo-Yokohama metropolitan area, triggered by rumours of arson, murder and rebellious riots by the colonized people immediately following the earthquake. Despite the shock and memories of rumours and mass murder, lack of critical evidence and contradictions in existing documents have often rendered the incident as an "historical enigma,"[2] if not "panic-driven aberration"[3] or "imperialist conspiracy,"[4] in modern Japanese and Korean history.

Interestingly, precisely because of the controversial and obfuscated nature of the violence - which thus defies any singular master narrative that satisfactorily explains the incident empirically - the massacre of Koreans effectively sheds light on *subjective* narratives of collective violence, arising in response to the earthquake, rumours, massacre and the aftermath. The multiple responses and patterns of choice over the course of the event provide an excellent lens to explore the webs of relationships among disaster, rumour, violence and narrative-making, while revealing dynamic aspects of the human spirit under such extreme circumstances. In particular, two powerful social phenomena, the rise and spread of rumours against Koreans and the controversy over legal prosecution of the vigilantes, opened up an unusual space for the development of subjective narratives concerning the massacre while stimulating debate on the meaning of the "Japanese public" to be protected and promoted in the midst of turmoil. In an attempt to understand the complicated context and broader implications of the violent incident, this paper explores the politics of rumour and competing narratives in trial discourses following the massacre of Koreans in the multiethnic Japanese empire. By examining these *cultural* terrains and the *social* impact of the experience of violence, I call attention not only to the dynamic presence of the colonized in the metropolis but also to *the power of human imagination* in producing and interpreting violence, thus the potential for both resisting and recovering from it.

1.   Earthquake, Rumours and Massacre

As the hot air of the fire became unbearable in all directions, the refugees increasingly gathered in the

centre of the square. Some were carrying suitcases, moneybags, books or musical instruments. Others were holding food in fear of starvation. But, as the open space decreased rapidly making it hard to remain standing, people began to yell at one another, "What good are all your possessions?" Eventually, the things would be fed to the fire, piece by piece. When it was time for the refugees to turn themselves to the flame, they cried out to gods and Buddhas….
From an earthquake survivor's memoir[5]

On September 1, 1923, the earth began to shake two minutes before noon causing the largest natural disaster in twentieth-century Japan. Violent wind and great fire followed, attacking the densely populated Tokyo metropolitan area and six other adjacent prefectures in the eastern part of Japan (*Kantō*). The calamity, resulting in 140,000 dead and missing, destroyed most homes in the city of Yokohama and over half of the homes in Tokyo.[6] Like other great disasters, the earthquake brought out dramatic human stories of those caught up in it. The crisis effectively revealed people's priorities. To many faithful families, servants and friends, it was time to rescue and help one another. To the politically ambitious, it was an opportunity for advancement by appearing before the imperial family inquiring about their safety before others. Han, an earthquake survivor and young student from Korea - a colony of Japan since 1910 - was delivering newspapers, as he had done for the past three years to pay his tuition. On that Saturday afternoon, the newspaper distribution manager asked him to circulate the special issue on the outbreak of the earthquake in the midst of the falling flames and all-consuming blaze. It did not take long for Han to stop and escape from the fire sweeping through the street where he was standing.[7] Most newspapers in the capital area burned over that weekend, leaving the two million Tokyoites deprived of reliable sources of news in the midst of the catastrophe.

Even more frightening to many earthquake survivors - and to Han and other Koreans for a different reason - were the rumours of arson, rape, poisoning, and organized attack by Koreans immediately following the quake. As rumours reached villages, many inhabitants organized *jikeidan* ("self-defense associations" or vigilante groups) arming themselves for public security and self-protection.[8] Their activities resulted in the violent lynching of Koreans that was most severe during the first week following the quake while exercising their authority in strict social surveillance. The townsmen expressed their fear of an impending attack by the colonized subjects, and many appreciated the vigilantes in a time of insufficient security after the breakdown of most public offices. At the same time,

spectators of vigilante violence were intimidated by their own local men. Armed, they targeted passers-by, threatening or mistakenly mistreating them as Koreans.

Numerous survivors witnessed and testified to the rumours and subsequent massacre of Koreans throughout the Kantō region. Observing the vigilantes' merciless hunting and persecution of Koreans, including women and children, some expressed mixed feelings of anger and sympathy toward the murdered Koreans. In fact, rumours against Koreans and the subsequent manmade disaster were so traumatic that many children top-listed the rumours among things that scared and frustrated them most.[9] Fear of rumours as well as their experience of violence prevailed in their writings and paintings when the schools reopened after the earthquake. Remembering the first few nights she spent outdoors while watching the vigilantes running around, an elementary school child wrote that she would "die rather than endure the fear of attack by Koreans" once she thought she had survived the disaster.[10] Mysteriously, however, it is not clear where the rumours began, nor do we know the names or the exact numbers of the victims of the massacre. Various reports by government, military, police, and individuals were either not able to provide the appropriate explanations or contradicted each other in their accounts of the event. As a result, responsibility was blurred, thus leaving many important questions about the incident unanswered.

When beginning my research, I anticipated critical findings that could fill the gap in my understanding of this strange incident where ordinary people massacred other ordinary men and women. However, further close analysis of existing primary sources revealed a lack of critical documentation and too much room for arbitrary interpretation. Indeed, as many of the textbook descriptions of the event and the surviving massacre memorial inscriptions reveal, the incident remains a social taboo or has often been dismissed in an overly simplified manner as an aberrational and panic-driven accident in the midst of chaos.[11] Thus, although the fact of the massacre remained with tens of thousands of participants and witnesses of the violence, its social and cultural impacts have not been fully considered in the historical formation and transformation of modern Japan. What I found on examining historical documents and testimonies was that, precisely because of these sustaining yet discursive memories, and due to the lack of tangible empirical evidence to establish the case with an authoritative singular narrative, the event opened up an unusual space for various subjective, competing narratives to develop thereafter. Existing documents reflect that different people acted in different ways, not only going through each of the developmental stages of the event - such as hearing the rumours, witnessing the massacre, and facing the trials - but also interpreting and remembering the moment of collective violence.

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In the following, in an attempt to understand mechanisms of producing competing narratives of collective violence in the context of Japanese empire, I examine the mayhem through the lens of rumours and the vigilante trials. The exclusionary rumours reproduced prevalent colonial representations of colonized subjects while reflecting subjective beliefs about the perceived reality based on colonial relations among members of the post-quake metropolis. The following violence and trials set up an effective stage where multiple narratives of the violent moment emerged in public discourse. Through contextualization of the controversies in massacre discourse from the rise of rumours to the vigilante trials, I argue that rumour-mongering and violent outbreaks among citizens in the metropolis reveal *social* participation and popular agency in the practice and interpretation of the mass violence in the culture of empire. Simultaneously, I contend that the discourse of natural disaster and succeeding violence against colonized Koreans constituted and stimulated debate on the boundary of the "Japanese public" that was to be perceived and promoted in dealing with the destruction and reconstruction of the imperial centre of the empire. Thus, the 1923 massacre of Koreans provides an excellent lens through which the impact of the presence of the colonized in the metropolis can be explored. As the lived and narrated experiences of the massacre conflicted in their subjective understandings of the shared moment of violence within the structure of colonialism and imperialism, the incident and subsequent social discourse can be best located in this process of producing narratives of colonial violence and coping with the reality of a multiethnic Japanese empire. Now let me turn to the "beginning" of the tragic incident in early twentieth-century Japanese and Korean history.

2.   The Metropolis between Rumours and Reality

> … no information is passed on unidirectionally. All concerned parties converse with each other, the rumour being the final consensus of their collective deliberations seeking out a convincing, encompassing explanation…. rumours entail a subjective construction of reality… The dividing line between information and rumour is subjective, resulting from our own conviction…. Once a rumour is qualified as a "rumour" by the public, it stops spreading…. What is at stake here is an altogether subjective value judgment.[12]

The prevalence of rumours in the midst of immense social destruction is not unique to Japan. Although the detailed contexts may vary, there have been similar kinds of rumours against ethnic, racial, or

religious minorities at times of natural and social disasters throughout human history.[13] Nor were the rumours against Koreans the only kinds of rumours following the outbreak of the earthquake in the Japanese empire. The power of human imagination manifested itself in various kinds of rumours that followed the capital area's massive destruction.[14] For example, there were rumours of forthcoming natural disasters, such as impending aftershock, tidal waves and firestorms, as well as false information and exaggeration of the damage created by the catastrophe. Other rumours included those concerning imminent riots by liberated prisoners, socialists, and religious cult groups. Apocalyptic interpretations appeared as well, implying that survivors speculated on the causality and meaning of the catastrophe: it was seen as divine retribution from the heavens (*tenbatsu* or *tenkenron*). Some argued that Japan was being punished because of its great gains in Asia despite nominal participation in World War I, without having paid enough in costs for the war.[15] Others argued that the earthquake was sent by heaven to punish the arrogant people of Tokyo for their increasingly materialistic and lavish life style.[16] These rumours aggravated social unrest while further rumours even suggested the capital would be moved from Tokyo to another part of the nation. Still others took it as an opportunity to express their disillusionment with modern science and technology. They criticized a rapidly Westernizing Japan, arguing to revive values predating the nation's modernization era.[17]

Nevertheless, not all rumours survived or had any significant impact. Yet, despite the absence of usual means of communication and media, rumours against the colonized Koreans spread throughout eastern Japan conspicuously and with surprising rapidity. The violent earth tremors stopped and the great winds and firestorms began to die down, but people were still terrified, not by the natural disaster but by the imagined impending attacks of arson, rape, poisoning, and organized riots by the colonized people in the centre of the empire. Various records, including police officer reports from various locations, government documents, and individual testimonies and memoirs, indicate that the rumours began to prevail in various parts of the Tokyo-Yokohama area as early as the first night following the earthquake and spread to every town in the region after the second day of the disaster.[18] There was a cry in the streets that Koreans were armed and had set fire to the city. Such rumours continued to spread by word of mouth in neighbourhoods. They warned against poisoned drinking water and the anticipated explosion of buildings and houses that Koreans had supposedly marked with unusual symbols. Handwritten posters and public announcements also spread the rumours, and the few available newspapers began to print what was going around as soon as they secured the means and facilities to do so.[19] Until then, alarm had been

chiefly about surviving the earthquake and escaping the fires, but now people's only concern was to counter the alleged invasion of Koreans.

Those Koreans persecuted during post-quake turmoil were often labelled "malcontent" or "rebellious" (*futei senjin*), a politically charged pejorative term for those colonized subjects that appeared frequently in newspapers, magazines, and official documents. Various forms of Korea's independence movement were critical in shaping such negative images of Koreans in the urban centre, given colonial relations between Koreans and Japanese in the empire.[20] The criteria for judging "malcontent" or "rebellious" Koreans were rooted in those Koreans' desires and efforts to restore their national sovereignty from Japan, especially after the March First Independence Movement in colonial Korea in 1919.[21] Yet the origin or spread of rumours was not publicly queried until a month or so later, once the vigilante trials had begun. How rumours registered in people's minds was also discussed in relation to the public's evaluation of violence at the trials to follow.

3.   The Vigilante Trials: Contestation and Complicity

Official policy and procedure for prosecuting vigilantes began to take shape on September 9 when top government officials formed a special judiciary council to deal with the post-earthquake violence within the Emergency Earthquake Relief Bureau.[22] On September 18, newspapers reported policy on the arrest and trial of vigilantes, and the arrests began toward the end of the month followed by actual trials begun in late October and November.[23] The number of officially prosecuted vigilante violence cases reached 139, involving 735 accused individuals across the Kantō area.[24] The total number of vigilante groups at the time of the earthquake is not clearly known, especially considering the arbitrary ways in which criteria were established to label a defence group an "organization." There were vigilantes attacking Koreans following the spread of rumours not only in the Kantō area but also across the nation. As of mid-September, there were at least 1,145 vigilante groups within the Tokyo metropolitan prefecture alone, which increased to 1,593 by the end of October. The total number of vigilante organizations reached at least 3,689 throughout the earthquake-stricken area, close to half of them in Tokyo.[25]

The activities of vigilantes, illegally armed with guns, swords or skewers, included setting checkpoints to single out Koreans among the passers-by, either by asking for Japanese pronunciation difficult for Korean speakers, demanding the lyrics of *Kimigayo* (a praise song for the emperor; the national anthem), or observing physical features such as the shape of the back of the head or the cheekbones, hair, and relatively tall height. Then the vigilante groups either brought the Koreans to the police, military, or internment camps,[26] or killed them on the spot, thus making

vigilante activities not "defence" of themselves but an offence against *the imagined enemy within*.[27] In some cases, the local populace attacked not only the police stations where Koreans were either temporarily interned or had sought refuge,[28] but also some Chinese and Japanese mistaken for Koreans.[29] These violent deeds were the crimes of which the alleged vigilantes were accused at their trials. Nevertheless, the Kantō Vigilantes' Association and sympathizers vigorously protested the arrest and trial of vigilantes.[30] What were the issues at stake in the trials? What were the discourses on the in/excusability of the violence in this legal process? How did various participants in the event see themselves and narrate the moment of violence against the colonized? Above all, what does it tell us about the human imagination and historical agency in practicing, representing, and narrating collective violence in the empire?

Looking at the trials as a moment of public judgment of mass murder, the first controversy at court concerned the cause, focusing on the origin of rumours against colonized Koreans: Where did they begin, and how were they spread? Various records, including police files, government documents, and individual memoirs and testimonies, indicate that the rumours had begun to prevail in various parts of the Tokyo-Yokohama area as early as the first night of earthquake and spread to each town in the region after the second day of the disaster. The rumours moved quickly throughout the metropolitan area as waves of refugees escaped to the outskirts of the city along major roads. As many earthquake survivors testified, they learned about the rumours not only by word of mouth, but also through official and non-official channels such as posters and megaphones, as well as from newspapers.[31] The origin of the rumours, however, remained vague, and the official record and other testimony were often confusing, if not contradictory. Discrepancies appeared; records named different sources in various reports. Many official police and military documents and the memoirs of political authorities cited different and obscure sources for the origin of the rumours.[32] Furthermore, the authorities justified proclaiming Martial Law on the second day of the earthquake - in force until November 15 - as serving the interests of "public security" in response to rumours about Koreans. Many police files and Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department records recorded simultaneous and sporadic reports of crimes by Koreans in various parts of Tokyo and Yokohama, all of which were found baseless, thus implying the difficulty in locating the rumours' exact origin in any logical manner. Nevertheless, this data suggests that the rumours began and spread naturally, and that they generally spread from Yokohama to Tokyo along the major routes that many refugees took. But these facts were never corroborated by clear evidence, nor was confession made by suspects who might have spread rumours in Yokohama in the first place.[33]

In the midst of this confusion and turmoil concerning the

beginning of the massacre, the trial in Saitama prefecture revealed an important fact concerning the origin and spread of the rumours. As early as the day after the earthquake, a government telegram had ordered appropriate measures and urged local officials in each town to organize vigilantes against rebellious Koreans. It indicated a potential source of the rumours within the government, and also its significant role in spreading the rumours to each town in the prefecture. Many survivors remembered the warning against armed rebellion of Koreans delivered by police and military officers as well as local leaders in their towns.[34] Consequently, tremendous controversy attached to the involvement of political authorities in the origin and spread of the rumours.[35]

Questions and heated debate concerning the origin of the rumours were not limited to the metropolitan areas. As contemporary newspaper reports indicated, news about the controversial post-quake rumours and massacre had already spread throughout the entire country from Hokkaidō to Kyūshū as well as to the colony and some other parts of the world - however limited and inaccurate the news might be - by the time the actual prosecution and vigilante trials took place. Thus, controversy and debate about causality continued in parliamentary inquiries later that year, but without producing any satisfactory answers. In fact, the enigma remains today.[36] Nonetheless, what became clear was that, in a way, the government itself had been an influential purveyor of rumour among the people, including the vigilantes, and was perhaps responsible for producing it.[37]

Those who protested the trials and supported the vigilantes did not miss this point, leading to the second contentious issue: responsibility for violence against Koreans. They pointed out that, in fact, many of the vigilante groups had been organized and encouraged to participate in maintaining social order under police control when there was insufficient police force in the post-quake turmoil.[38] In addition, from the very first day of the earthquake, the military had already been mobilized in Tokyo by the Superintendent-General of the Metropolitan Police, and often worked with vigilantes in town to maintain public security. In fact, the massacre took place under Martial Law that had begun the day following the tremors and lasted for the next two and a half months; the scope of military mobilization under martial law reached to a force of 52,000 soldiers and 9,700 horses.[39] The trials made it clear that some military and police officers as well as local government officials had encouraged or condoned armed vigilante organizations as well as their lynching of the alleged malcontent Koreans, especially during the first several days following the quake. Indeed, the contradictory and confusing policies of government and military in the early days were manifest in prohibitions to the press not to report rumours while they were circulating emergency telegrams against Koreans to local governments across the nation as well

as to the colonies of Korea and Taiwan.[40] Furthermore, political authorities circulated posters and announcements about the rumours *before* making an appropriate investigation, and never publicly denounced them as false and groundless when it was soon discovered. To many townsmen, the dispatch of the military and their warning against the potential danger to local communities posed by the rumours seemed not only to verify the credibility of charges against the colonized minorities, but also to condone the killing of alleged "rebels" against their nation.[41]

The trials ended, however, without presenting key government or military officials as witnesses, neither national nor local. And although army involvement in the massacre as well as in distributing weapons to the vigilantes became clear from evidence introduced in the trials, their actions were deemed "appropriate." Furthermore, when over twenty thousand Koreans had been interned in police stations beginning on September 3 - and in various intern camps across the country two days later, with imprisonment lasting for over a month in the name of "protection"[42] - the internment often functioned as precaution against or persecution of the "rebellious Koreans" while forbidding them to go back to Korea.[43] Overall, only the vigilantes were officially accused and had to defend their actions by exposing to public view the government's or military's link to the violence through the trials.[44] This contestation raised the question of responsibility for the massacre among the military, police, cabinet, right-wingers, local village leaders, socialists, Koreans, as well as the vigilantes and townsmen themselves within the complicated political, economic and social context of the Japanese empire in the early 1920s, aggravating the tension between, as well as within the state and society. As a result, unintentionally, the trials attributed responsibility for the massacre not only to the vigilantes but also to various other parties in society while presenting an open challenge to public authority concerning the government's involvement in rumour mongering and the massacre.

4.   For the Sake of the *Japanese Public*

One of the most interesting and conspicuous idioms that appeared in these controversial trial debates was "the spirit of *kō*" (the public) or *kōkyōshin* ("public-spirited mindset"). The vigilantes claimed that their activities were based on their "public-minded" and "patriotic" motives in an attempt to protect their communities and the nation at a "time of crisis" (*hijōji*). One of the earliest uses of this rhetoric came in a September 13 public announcement from the Superintendent-General of the Metropolitan Police, in an appeal to the people facing increasing vigilante violence. The message showed appreciation for vigilante activities that stemmed from a "patriotic spirit" (*aikokuteki seishin*) as well as from public-mindedness (*kōkyōshin*).[45] The rationale behind their rhetoric was that their actions were "for the sake of everyone" (*minna no tame*) or "on

behalf of the town" (*mura no tame*).[46] Because they took up arms against Koreans out of zeal to protect their communities, the vigilantes on trial were "victims" on behalf of their community, town, and the "Japanese public." According to contemporary newspaper reports and testimony of earthquake survivors, not only the accused but also their townsmen appealed for pardons based on this reasoning. Financial support was provided for the vigilantes from the town's budgets as well as personal care for their families during the trials.[47] Indeed, Yoshikawa indicates that thousands of people were either watching or participating in many of the vigilante crime sites.[48] Thus, their loyalty to the "public" should be valued and rewarded instead of being punished. In fact, one of the vigilantes in the Chiba trials said that he could not tolerate the impending riots by the ungrateful colonized subjects when even the Honorable Crown Prince (later Emperor Hirohito) was suffering eating low quality rice for his meal for the sake of the empire.[49] Some vigilantes, in fact, had simply strolled into the police station after committing murder, claiming an award from the authorities for loyalty to the nation.[50]

Eventually, cases concerning crime and damage against the police as well as some accidental murder cases with Japanese victims were solved through investigation and resulted in actual prison sentences. But there was no official effort at systematic investigation of or adequate punishment for the deaths of colonized subjects.[51] While the rumours and massacre had primarily and specifically targeted Koreans, thus leaving them victims of mass murder, the scope and identities of the Korean victims or their families and the location of their corpses did not appear in most trial cases.[52] The dead could not speak: They appeared only as *senjin*, a pejorative term for Koreans in the trial records.[53] The discrepancy in verdicts between killing Japanese and Koreans clearly demarcated the boundary of the community to be imagined and promoted. Vigilante aggression was justified by a clear double standard. With this publicly shared logic behind the trial discourse, there ensued not only an official pardon of vigilantes' violence on the occasion of the subsequent Crown Prince's marriage the following winter but also positive evaluation of vigilantes' sacrifice during the post-quake social turmoil. The killers were praised for their "public spirit" at such a critical time for the nation.

Originally, the pre-determined purpose and rationale for the arrest of vigilantes were two-fold: First, official arrest and trials were aimed at avoiding international criticism for the massacre. Second, they were designed to promote smooth rule over Korea as well as to strengthen government authority within the Japanese empire. On September 11, as chief prosecutor Yamashita reports on official policy toward vigilante prosecution, the authority wished to appeal for "their innocence since they did not have any evil intention. [But since] it is impossible to bend the law, it[s] policy [would be to] seek extremely light penal servitude for the

accused [in light of] extenuating circumstances."[54] In other words, the incident could not be overlooked due to the great degree of public brutality, but considering the "excusable" circumstances, the scope of arrest and prosecution would be limited to absolutely unavoidable cases with clear evidence of crime while postponing trials until more favourable times. While the *special* circumstance in the public announcement referred to the natural disaster, policy and discourse at the trials revealed the *need* for an agreeable general consensus to pardon violence against colonized subjects, and promote and solidify the meaning of a collective Japanese community delineated by an ethnic boundary.[55] Indeed, not coincidentally, when the actual trials took place, a reporter in the courtroom described the atmosphere as exhibiting no seriousness at the site: The judge and accused were laughing and smiling throughout the proceedings.[56] The incident's development thus reveals a series of choices made along multi-layered fears of the subjugated people and the crowds, as well as political rivalries between the state and society within the structure of Japanese imperialism. Above all, regardless of the original intentions of the vigilante trials, trial discourse reflected wide-ranging public and private efforts to both obfuscate and reveal the nature of the event. In the process, post-earthquake trial discourse effectively served to establish the excusability of the massacre while testifying to the powerful rhetoric of "for the sake of the Japanese public" in the multiethnic Japanese empire.

5.   Conclusion: Practice of Violence, Choice of Interpretation

The trials played a significant role in bringing controversy to the surface of public discussion in the Japanese empire. Intentionally or unintentionally, the courtroom rhetoric revealed crucial aspects of the incident which would never have been exposed had there not been such a public outcry, reflecting: one, the recondite nature of the event itself, thus followed by controversial debate on the cause of and responsibility for the violence[57]; two, a clearly differentiated treatment of the victims based on ethnicity; three, extremely light sentences for such a massive scale of killing the innocent; four, compromise of the criteria for moral and legal judgment of mass murder cases, thus, making arbitrarily relative social justice and the value of human lives[58]; last, and most important, the emergence of a general consensus on vigilante crimes as *sacrifice* out of loyalty to *the Japanese public* which was clearly demarcated by an exclusionary ethnic boundary against colonized subjects. The trials also shed light on the dynamic forces at work in creating such an intertwined relationship among the various actors and spectators of the event, especially reflecting the tension and contestation between and within the state and society.[59] Simultaneously, debates to justify the massacre revealed a shared mode of rhetoric called *public* good as a powerful excuse for violence, defining what the *public* meant and whom it should

include. Interestingly, by condoning aggression against the colonized, government propaganda for assimilation policy was strengthened in the empire, but only ironically and as a dilemma, not only within the municipal government but also in the Governor-General's Office and in the lives of colonial subjects.[60] And such competing narratives and shared rhetoric of "public" space demarcated by an ethnic boundary continued into wartime as well as the postwar era in Japanese society. [61]

In this paper, I focused on controversy in vigilante trials following the rumours and the ensuing violence against colonized Koreans in the post-quake Japanese empire. Competing narratives and the process of justifying collective violence have revealed how the colonized were imagined and utilized while the socially transformative categories of "Korean-ness" and the "Japanese public" were constructed. In my larger project, I examine the context, competing narratives, commemorative activities and controversial production of historical knowledge concerning the colonial violence in the Japanese empire.[62] The continuous narrative-making process reveals that different responses and multiple choices prevailed over the course of the event's unfolding from the moment of hearing rumours, practicing and witnessing violence, to interpreting and remembering the episode. In the process, individuals responded to circumstances in different ways by constantly choosing to practice culture and history, and their choices collectively constructed and solidified the boundaries of identity. Consensus centred this identity in an ethnically exclusive *Japanese public.* At each stage in this developing history and historical knowledge of the moment of collective violence, these multiple choices and responses testified to the power of human imagination, which ultimately produced competing narratives. The case of the 1923 massacre of Koreans in the Japanese empire therefore challenges us to reconsider broader issues of historical agency and social choice in the practices of culture and history. We can see in these *cultural* terrains and *social* impacts not only the dynamic effect of the colonized in the metropolis, but also the power of human imagination to produce and interpret violence, along with the potential for both resisting and recovering from it.

Notes

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research in Japan. Throughout the text, Japanese and Korean names appear in the order of last name followed by first name. Except for well-known places and personal names, all Korean and Japanese words appear following the McCune-Reischauer and the Hepburn styles for transliteration, respectively. All translations are mine unless specified otherwise.

[1] Mahmood Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2001), 18.

[2] Eguchi Kan, *Kikaina nanatsu no monogatari* (Kyoto, Japan: Sanichi shobō, 1956); Yamada Shōji, "Kantōdaishinsai: chōsenjin bōdōsetsu ha doko kara detaka," in *Hyakumon hyakutō nihon no rekishi,* ed. Rekishi kyōikusha kyōgikai (Tokyo, Japan: Kawade shobō, 1988).

[3] Yoshikawa Mitsusada, *Kantōdaishinsai no chian kaiko* (Tokyo, Japan: Hōmubu tokubetsu shinsakyoku, 1949).

[4] Kang Tōk-sang, *Kantô daishinsai* (Tokyo, Japan: Chûôkôronsha, 1975); Kang Tōk-sang and Kŭm Pyŏng-dong, eds. *Gendaishi shiryō* v. 6 *Kantōdaishinsai to Chōsenjin* (Tokyo, Japan: Misuzu shobō, 1963).

[5] Ch'ae P'il-gŭn, "Gwandong taejinjae tangshi rŭl chŭnggŏham," *Sasanggye* (May 1964): 160-163.

[6] For further information on the scope of the material damage by the earthquake, see various reports on the calamity, including Kaizōsha, ed. *Taishō daishinkasairoku* (Tokyo, Japan: Kaizōsha, 1924); Keishichō [The Metropolitan Police Department], *Taishō daishinkasaishi* (Tokyo, Japan: Keishichō, 1925); Naimushō shakaikyoku [Ministry of Home Affairs. Bureau of Social Affairs], *Taishō shinsaishi* (Tokyo, Japan: Naimushō, 1926); Nihon sekijūjisha [The International Red Cross Society of Japan], ed. *Taishō jūni nen kantōdaishinsai nihon sekijūjisha kyūgoshi* (Tokyo, Japan: Nihon sekijūjisha, 1925); Tōkyōfu [Tokyo Metropolitan Prefecture Office], ed. *Tōkyōfu teashop shinsai shi* (Tokyo, Japan: Tōkyōfu, 1925); Tōkyōshi [Tokyo Municipal Office], ed. *Tōkyō shinsai roku* (Tokyo, Japan: Tōkyōshi, 1926-1927).

[7] Han Sŭng-in, *Tonggyŏng jinjae hanin tae haksal: T'alch'ulgi (*New York: Gallilli mungo, 1983), 35-37.

[8] The history and context of forming vigilante organizations in Japan around the time of the earthquake vary depending on the conditions in each town and region. However, many of them took concrete shape as an organization under local leadership, often encouraged or sponsored by the police and the government, sharing the members of Young Men's Associations (*seinendan)*, Fire Brigades (*shōbōdan*), and War-veterans

and Reservists Associations (*zaigō gunjinkai*) in each town. For further discussion on different origins and types of vigilante organizations in 1920s Japan, see Gendaishi no kai, ed. *Kikan gendaishi* 9 *Nihon gunkokushugi no soshiki teki kiban: zaigō gunjinkai to seinendan* (Tokyo, Japan: Gendaishi no kai, 1978); Higuchi Yūichi, "Jikeidan setsuritsu to zainichi chōsenjin: Kanagawa ken chihō o chūshin ni," *Zainichi chōsenjin shi kenkyū* 14 (1984): 34-48; Obinata Sumio, "Keisatsu to minshū: daishinsai o meguru keisatsu to minshū," *Hōgaku semina* 379 (1986): 134-137; Yamada Shōji, *Kantōdaishinsai ji no chōsenjin gyakusatsu : sono kokako seining to minshū sekinin* (Tokyo, Japan: Sōshisha, 2003).

[9] For example, see the students' survey result of March 1924, concerning their earthquake experiences in Tokyo Nihonbashi Higher Elementary School. Rumours about the alleged armed attacks by Koreans were among the top in the list of the sources of their fear along with the earthquake and fire. See Tōkyō shiyakusho and Yorozu chōhōsha eds., *Shinsai kinen jūichi ji gojū hachi fun* (Tokyo, Japan: Yorozu chōhōsha, 1924).

[10] Quoted from a student writing in Kyōbashi Higher Elementary School in Tokyo, reprinted in Kŭm Pyŏng-dong, ed. *Kantō daishinsai Chōsenjin gyakusatsu mondai kankei shiryō* 1 *Chōsenjin gyakusatsu kanren jidō shōgen shiryō* (Tokyo, Japan: Ryokuin shobō, 1989), 393. Various children's accounts on the earthquake and the massacre in their writings and paintings testify to their traumatic experiences of the violence. While many of them expressed their shock of the natural disaster, they also revealed the mixed feeling of fear, anger, and sympathy toward Koreans in their description of the rumours and the violence that followed in their neighbourhoods or refuge shelters.

[11] Although the event itself entered most public school history textbooks in Japan since the late 1970s, the descriptions are often found in a marginal "column" section, and not in the main text. They also lack concrete and coherent explanations providing no clear accounts of the cause, process, and consequences, thus blurring the issue of responsibility. Likewise, most of the existing massacre-related memorials in the Kantō area refrain from mentioning the identities of the perpetrators or the victims, often dismissing the incident as an unfortunate "accident."

[12] Jean-Noël Kapferer, *Rumors: Uses, Interpretations, and Images,* trans. Bruce Fink (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 1990), 5 and 12.

[13] For example, Rome, New York, Chicago, San Francisco, and London, to mention a few, also had similar kinds of rumours against minorities after great fires or natural disasters. However, the particular kinds of rumours that survived and worked in particular societies demand further contextualized and interdisciplinary analysis in order to understand the

implications, shared social values, and concerns at the time of mass social destruction.

[14] Various records of rumours in post-quake Tokyo can be found in Keishichō, 1925.

[15] Ch'ae, 165.

[16] A contemporary Christian leader Uchimura Kanzō, an entrepreneur Shibusawa Eiji, and a novelist Kōda Rohan as well as many other writers, religious leaders, and public figures took such a view. For example, see Ham Sŏk-hŏn, *Chugŭlttae kkaji I gŏrŭmŭro* (Seoul, Korea: Hangilsa, 1996).

[17] Many writers, artists, politicians, activists and religious leaders interpreted the meanings of the disaster through numerous written accounts of their earthquake experiences in various popular magazines, journals, and special collections on the earthquake experiences, especially when the publication industry became ever more vigorous and competitive in the process of post-quake reconstruction of the metropolis.

[18] For example, see Keishichō, 1925.

[19] Ch'ae, 163.

[20] The Korean independence movements were manifested in the establishment of the Interim Government of Korea in Shanghai, attempts to assassinate the colonial ruling authorities, and armed struggles in the colony and the national border area such as Manchuria. For examples of the colonial authorities' prevalent use of the term *futei senjin* in the late 1910s and 1920s, see Kim Chōng-ju, *Chōsen tōchi shiryō series* 8 *Futei senjin* (Tokyo, Japan: Kankoku shiryō kenkyūjo, 1971).

[21] It was a large-scale peaceful independence movement that was violently crushed by the police and the military authorities resulting in six to seven thousand deaths of Koreans.

[22] For the records of the official security policy and the legal procedure in prosecuting the vigilantes, see Yoshikawa, 1949. Most of the important vigilante trial records, including those of Tokyo and Yokohama, and many crucial documents in preparation for the trials are not available today since they were either destroyed or burnt during the Asian-Pacific War (1931-1945). In this regard, this confidential document, prepared for the purpose of future reference for post-disaster security issues for internal circulation within the Ministry of Justice, provides crucial information concerning official policy and procedures of the vigilante prosecution based on various original documents from the pre-trial investigation to the arrest of the vigilantes. Nevertheless, it does not provide information on the actual trials or the following discussions and results of the trials. The document ends with the initial arrest procedure. Also note that this record presents a

Ministry insider's point of view, rendering the scope and attributing responsibility for the incident exclusively to the people rather than the government or military. Yoshikawa, 32-33.

[23] *Yomiuri shinbun* reported on the first public trial on November 6, 1923.

[24] The statistics appear in Yoshikawa, 225-228. The trial transcripts that I was able to obtain thus far include the records of seven vigilante trials from the Prosecutor's Offices in Saitama and Gunma prefectures, which took place between November 1923 and June 1924. There are also a limited number of newspaper reports and a few available official documents concerning the trials, which often summarized the atmosphere and courtroom outcomes. I would like to thank Professor Yamada Shōji and Kŭm Pyŏng-dong for their help in obtaining these valuable trial records.

[25] Yoshikawa, 43; Gendaishi no kai, 274.

[26] Yoshikawa records 3,412 for the number of Koreans whom the vigilantes handed over to either military or police. Yoshikawa, 52.

[27] For detailed accounts of the vigilante activities, see various earthquake reports published by different organizations in note 6 as well as newspaper reports during the first several months after the disaster, especially after October 20 when the official publication censorship was lifted following the Japanese government's public announcement concerning the post-quake violence related to Koreans.

[28] Fujioka and Yorii cases are the examples. On the conflict between police and the crowd in provoking the violence, see *Tōkyō asahi shinbun* October 17, 1923.

[29] For example, Fukudamura case.

[30] On the basis and rationale for the Vigilante Association's protest to the Ministries of Law and Home Affairs, see *Tōkyō nichinichi shinbun* October 22, 1923.

[31] For the vigilantes' criticism of the role of the police during the turmoil, see *Hōchi shinbun* October 29, 1923. Also, for expression of the prevalent sentiment of strong objection to the arrest policy for the vigilantes, see a letter submitted by an anonymous "scholar of law" in *Tōkyō nichinichi shinbun* October 21, 1923 (evening edition).

[32] For the detailed initial reports on the rumours in various parts of the metropolitan area, see Kaizōsha, 1924; Kanagawaken keisatsubu [Kanagawa Prefecture Police Department], ed. *Taishō daishinkasaishi* (Yokohama, Japan: Kanagawaken keisatsubu, 1926); Keishichō, 1925; Naimushō, 1926; Tōkyōshi, 1926-1927 and other reports on the 1923 earthquake. For the political and military authorities' accounts of their initial reactions to the disaster and rumours, see their memoirs in Kang and Kŭm, 1963 and Kŭm, 1991.

[33] For example, Kaizōsha recorded some liberated inmates' violence in Yokohama as the origin of the rumours while Naimushō reports showed a similar view but added another element of social unrest caused by socialists and Koreans. While the top police and government officials did not specify the source of the rumours, the Tōkyōshi and Kanagawa-ken keisatsubu versions attributed it to the misunderstandings of various trivial crimes in the area under the exceptional social circumstance after the quake. However, these speculations on the true beginning of the rumours were never clearly verified by concrete evidence.

[34] For example, see *Tōkyō nichinichi shinbun* November 8, 1923. Also, the transcripts of the vigilante trials in Jinbohara and Yorii in Saitama clearly indicate such warnings against Koreans and orders for self-defense from officials. See Urawa District Court records, November 26, 1923.

[35] For the reports of the telegram warning, see *Tōkyō nichinichi shimbuin* October 19 and November 8, 1923.

[36] See congressman Nagai Ryūtarō's inquiry in the 48th Diet session in Kŭm, 1991. Also, see Jiyū hōsōdan, ed. *Jiyū hōsōdan monogatari senzen hen* (Tokyo, Japan: Nihon hyōronsha, 1976) for criticism of the lack of appropriate investigation by government offices made by contemporary lawyers, Yamazaki Kesaya and Fuse Tatsuji's, the points of which still remain unresolved today.

[37] There were continuing debates on this point in postwar Japan as well. For example, see the debates between Kang and Matsuo in *Rekishi hyōron* in October 1973. While many Korean and Korean descendent (*zainichi*) scholars of Japan highlight the government officials' hatred toward Koreans, and thus, their conspiracy in creating and spreading the rumours against Koreans for the purpose of their political manoeuvring, Matsuo emphasizes the responsibility of the general populace, pointing to the lack of critical evidence that supports this "conspiracy theory" of government officials' involvement in creating the rumours.

[38] Many local history publications, police departments' records and newspaper articles indicate that the actual history of many of the *jikeidan* can be found in the national and local governments' promotion of such self-defence organizations in each town even before the earthquake as well as during the event. See Higuchi, 1984; Obinata Sumio, "Keisatsu to minshū: daishinsai o meguru keisatsu to minshū," *Hōgaku semina* 379 (1986): 134-137.

[39] For example, a navy officer in Funabashi in Chiba prefecture confessed that he asked for the vigilantes' help to defend the local military facility and gave them "permission" to kill Koreans when necessary. Cited in Yoshikawa's record on the preliminary examination report concerning the

navy officer's prosecution in Yoshikawa, 72-73. Also, see the case of a local government official's condoning in Saitama prefecture in Ibid, 74. Naimushō, 392.

[40] For relevant government and military documents, see Kŭm, 1991.

[41] For example, see *Tōkyō nichinichi shinbun* November 13, 1923.

[42] The official record on the number of Korean internees reached 23,715 all over Japan, including a thousand in a distant region such as Hiroshima. For further statistical information on Korean internees, see Yoshikawa, 182-184.

[43] A recently discovered military police officer's diary in Narashino indicates that the military was keeping a close eye on the Korean internees for fear of a possible riot or rebellion, and dispatched Korean-speaking military spies into the camps. On the discovery of the document in Nagoya with an excerpt from the original diary, see Matsuo Takayoshi, "Kantōdaishinsai to kenpeitai," *Ronza* (November 2003): 172-187. The *Kubono* Diary also testifies to military involvement in the massacre in Narashino. See Pae So, *Shashin hōkoku kantōdaishinsai chōsenjin gyakusatsu* (Tokyo, Japan: Kage shobō, 1988). Note that the government and the army employed special security measures for close surveillance on Koreans and other non-conformist dissenters on the government blacklist (*yōchūi'nin*), immediately after the outbreak of the earthquake.

[44] In fact, there were reports on a frustrated vigilante and a Korean who committed suicide in relation to the post-earthquake persecution of Koreans. *Tōkyō nichinichi shinbun* October 25, 1923 (evening edition); *Fukuoka nichinichi shinbun* September 21, 1923.

[45] Reported in *Yomiuri shinbun* September 15, 1923.

[46] For support for the vigilantes' appeal and their claim of innocence, see *Tōkyō nichinichi shinbun* October 21, 1923. For the rhetoric of "the victim of the community" and "for the sake of the town," see *Tōkyō nichinichi shinbun* October 22, 1923 and November 13, 1923.

[47] For instance, vigilante violence was largely excused in Saitama with the prefectural government officials' remarks on the occasion that justified their crimes with their motive in "the spirit for the public" (*kōkyō no seishin*). See the speech of the former governor of Saitama in Kŭm, 1991.

[48] Yoshikawa, 56-57.

[49] *Tōkyō nichinichi shinbun* November 29, 1923.

[50] In the special edition of October 20, 1923, *Ōsaka mainichi shinbun*reported that the vigilantes visited Ōmiya police station on September 4 after their murder of Koreans, and told the officers what they had done expressing their wish to be rewarded for their contribution to public security. This information came out in the process of investigating the case for the prosecution of the vigilantes a month after the crime.

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[51] For example, note the discrepancy in various investigation results concerning the number of the massacred: the Ministry of Justice (275), the newsletter of the Interim Government of Korea *Tongnip shinmun* [*Independence*](6,661), Tokyo Imperial University professor Yoshino Sakuzō (2,613), combined newspaper reports (1,464), and Kokuryūkai (722, Tokyo only). Cited in Kang Tŏk-sang, *Seikyū bunka sōsho series* 9 *Kantōdaishinsai gyakusatsu no kioku* (Tokyo, Japan: Seikyū bunkasha, 2003), 288-293.

[52] Newspaper reports often indicated that the names and identities of the massacred Koreans were not known, as in the special edition of *Ōsaka mainichi* October 20 and 21, 1923. It is extremely difficult to track down the exact Korean population in the Kantō area at the time of the disaster. Most informed and widely accepted speculation among historians indicates approximately 20,000 Koreans living in the area as of the fall of 1923 out of 60,000 in total across Japan. The number of the massacre victims is known to be close to 6,000 considering the estimated total population of Koreans in the area, the number of internees as well as returnees to Korea. Since the time when Korea became an official colony of Japan in 1910, the material and human resources in Korea filled needs of the rapidly industrializing and increasingly militarizing Japanese empire. Many victims of the massacre were manual labourers responding to the labour shortage while suppressing the wage level in the metropolis.

[53] Nevertheless, concerning commemorative activities for massacre victims in the empire across the metropolis and the colony, "the dead" were powerful enough to evoke various responses and memories, which often opened space for political projections onto the present participants and the audience, and still resonate discursively constituting historical narratives of the event in Korea and Japan to this day. For example, see Lee Jin-hee, "Jinken o kangaeru madoguchi to shite no zainichi Korian no rekishi to kūkan," *Sai* 48 (2003b): 12-16.

[54] *Tōkyō nichinichi shinbun* November 2, 1923.

[55] In his response to the earthquake and the massacre on September 23, the Governor-General of Korea Saitō Makoto expressed his primary concern with any detrimental effect of the event on Japan's rule over Korea with no mention of relief policy for the Korean disaster refugees in the metropolis. His writing also indicated that he did not understand the scope of the incident nor the general number of Korean population in the area (his speculation on the Korean population in the disaster-affected area was not even close to the number of Korean internees in a single camp.) See Saitō Makoto, "Daishinsai to ryūgen," *Chōsen chihō gyōsei* 2:10 (1923): 2-3.

[56] *Tōkyō nichinichi shinbun* November 13, 1923.

[57] After October 20 when the official publication censorship was lifted, newspapers were filled with reports concerning the post-quake vigilante *and* Korean violence across the country. However, most of the names and identities of those Korean suspects appeared as "unknown *senjin* [Koreans]." For example, see *Tōkyō nichinichi shinbun* October 21, 1923.

[58] For example, the vigilantes' challenge to the political authorities and their murder of Japanese were treated more seriously than the cases of mass murder of Koreans. Whereas the rates of getting actual prison sentence for killing Japanese or attacking police officers were over or close to 50 per cent, it was only 16.5 per cent for killing Koreans. See Yamada, 2003, 100-107.

[59] It is important to note that, despite the general consensus on excusing vigilante violence, there were efforts to record vigilante aggression and to express oppositional voices against the double standard against Koreans *both* by Koreans and Japanese. For example, see the protests following the massacre by Koreans in *Tang-a ilbo* September 9 and December 28, 1923; *Chosōn ilbo* September 24, 1923; *Tongnip shinmun* December 5, 10, and 11, 1923, and, by Japanese in Jiyū hōsōdan, 1976 and Lee Jin-hee, *The Massacre of Koreans through Paintings* (Tokyo, Japan: Korai hakubutsukan, 2003a). These non-conformist voices testified to the social contestation as well as the internal subjugation within the structure of imperialism and colonialism not only in the colony but also in the metropolis.

[60] Various post-earthquake policies indicate the efforts of the Governor-General's Office to effect a greater degree of assimilation of Korea to imperial Japan, which include giving compassionate allowance to the bereaved families of the Korean victims, and making a propaganda film on the Japanese government's generous treatment of the disaster refugees in the intern camps. See *Tōkyō nichinichi shinbun* October 15, 1923; *Ōsaka asahi* October 26, 1923; *Ōsaka mainichi* November 7, 1923. The Metropolitan Government increased its social surveillance also under the Emergency Imperial Ordinance No. 403 since September 7, which was to continue as the *chian iji hō* (Peace Reservation Law) within next two years for the sake of "public order."

[61] For continuation of an ethnically bounded sense of "public good" and fear of *futei senjin* in imperial Japan, see the resurgence of similar kinds of rumours against Koreans in Japan in *Kyūshū nippō* August 18, 1924; *Chūgoku shinbun* and *Keijō nippō* September 2, 1928; *Ōsaka asahi* September 3, 1928. Nevertheless, critique of the justification of the incident also survived and continued into the postwar era as well. For example, see the appeal that the Japanese Lawyers' Association submitted

to the Prime Minister Koizumi Junichirō concerning the violation of human rights in the massacre. See Nihon bengoshi rengōkai, 2003; *Asahi shinbun* August 25, 2003 (evening edition).

[62] I take the politics of rumour as a window on the complicated context and meanings of the massacre, for rumour proved a powerful social phenomenon, both motivating and justifying the collective violence. Thus, I take the rumours against Koreans as an important site to examine the layers of fear within the social body against the colonized, the crowd and political authority in imperial Japan. Commemorative activities also manifest this complicated structure of fears and multiple meanings of the massacre in the discursive construction of collective identities and massacre memories in the post-quake Japanese empire. These sites of analysis allow me to contemplate the meaning of the violent event beyond the limits of colonial archives in modern Japanese and Korean history.

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When Saviour Becomes Serpent:
The Psychology of Police Violence

William Vlach

Abstract

This paper is a psycho-ethenography of a culture of violence. It is an exploration of the historical sources, the socio-cultural factors, and psychological dynamics involved in police violence. The results are informed by literature review and highlighted by case studies. Prevention strategies are presented in the light of resilience theory and law enforcement professionalism. The author is a clinical psychologist who has worked with urban law enforcement personnel for over twenty years. This work has included psychotherapy, critical incident debriefing, consultation, and training police personnel.

Key Words
Police Psychology, Violence, Psychotherapy, Prevention, Police Culture

1.   Introduction

One of the more difficult issues in a democratic society is violence practiced by those entrusted with the protection of society. In these societies demonstrations against government policy, globalisation, and war are held as a right. When the police misbehave, the very basis of a free society comes into question. If an officer harms individuals of a less powerful group (ethnic minority, children, women, the poor, lower class), the defenceless suffer needlessly. This suffering may also spark mass disorder and further violence. Police violence practiced in obscurity creates an environment of fear and oppression. The violence may also work to destroy the police family or the police officer him or herself.

The thesis of this paper is that, though by definition police are a culture of violence, there are specific methods whereby this violence can be mitigated. This will be demonstrated by presenting the historical themes of police work, delineating types of police violence, and demonstrating examples of mitigating variables. The paper also takes the position that as long as there is violence in a given society, police work is a tragic profession.

The author is a clinical psychologist who has worked with urban law enforcement personnel for over twenty years. This work has included psychotherapy, critical incident debriefing, consultation, and training

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police personnel. The cases presented are both from the author's clinical experience and from popularly reported police stories. Because of the intense media and political scrutiny regarding the police, the ethical and legal stipulations on confidentiality, as well as the police culture's intense sanctions against betrayal, several of the cases are derived from the popular media.   Each of the latter cases closely matches the psychotherapy case material dynamics as seen by the author. Each has also been vetted by an experienced police officer for their match to the "way things really work."

I have chosen the symbols of serpent and saviour as a conceptual framework to examine police violence. These two images demonstrate the mythic power of police work and its mercurial gestalt. Mythologically the serpent attacks the fair maiden, who is defended by the saviour. An example is St George who slays the dragon. Yet these are but two sides of the same melodrama- one can shift from one to the other in this paradigm. The police are here to protect and to serve, this is the saviour; at times they use inappropriate violence, this is the serpent. This paper is an examination of that process. At the conclusion of the paper I will propose an alternative paradigm to the serpent/saviour complex.

2.   Becoming Saviour, Becoming Serpent: Origins of Western Law Enforcement

The earliest history of police in the Western context arises out of Mesopotamia and Egypt. The police were charged with maintaining order and resolving community disputes.[1] These roles became more delineated during the Roman Empire. The *vigiles*, night watchers, created in 14 BCE were a fire fighting unit. But their tasks also included making arrests for theft and burglary, guarding public bathhouses, and alerting the public to impending dangers. They would also chase down runaway slaves .[2]

The beginning of "official" policing came about when Augustus created the *Praefectus Urbi* in 27 BCE. The Praetorian Guard's purpose was to guard the emperor and to maintain public order.[3] Being responsible solely to the emperor, one would think, would weaken their sense of fair play.

Around 100 BCE, the *frumentarii,* the first criminal investigation unit, was created.   They would re-enact crime scenes, conduct interrogations of suspects, compare witness statements, and offer immunity to some criminals in exchange for incriminating evidence against others.[4] *Frumentarii* hence *Law and Order* and *CSI Miami.*

These three groups illustrate themes of contemporary policing: the vigiles prevention and community policing, the Praetorian maintenance of order, and the frumentarii investigations. Each were responsible to different forces: the emperor, the public, the police themselves.

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During the time of the Norman Conquest, England was divided into shires. The chief law enforcement officer in each shire was the reeve, thus from this shire-reeve, today we have *sheriff*. These agents of the King would negotiate community disputes, collect taxes, and generally maintain order.[5] These sheriffs can be seen as a merging of the community involved vigiles and the top down authority of the Praetorian Guard.

The origins of informal American policing were the early American "watches" whose function, similar to the vigiles was to watch for trouble.[6] The *Slave Patrols* of 1740s and 1750s began official American policing. The Southern states established and regulated these patrols. Their powers included entering plantations, breaking into slave domiciles, and whipping runaway slaves.[7]

From the mid 1830s there were a series of disastrous anti-abolition, anti-Catholic, and anti-draft urban riots. In response to a fearful populace's need for riot prevention and crowd control, formal organizations of police began in the United States in 1838 in Boston, New York City in 1844, and many other cities during the 1850s and 1860s.[8]

Continuing the ancient police task of maintaining order, the history of police in the U.S. indicates that this effort was used to preserve inherently immoral social institutions such as slavery. But it also shows the necessity of citizens being able to carry on their work and lives with some sense of security. It also shows the various, if sometimes incompatible roles of police: preserving order, investigating illegal activities, prevention of criminal activity, and settling disputes. Underlying all these roles however, is question of police accountability: who are police responsible to?

3.   The Saviour Persecuted: Violent Attacks on the Police

Police violence must be seen in context. The saviour comes onto the scene to rescue, to save the innocent from some wrenching fate. To protect and to serve. What happens when the protector/saviour is attacked?

Police violence is related not simply to historical function, lines of authority and responsibilities but also to fear. Their experience includes being targets of violence, both individual and in large numbers. Seventy-one officers died in the 9/11 attacks in New York City. They had rushed to the World Trade Centre to rescue trapped occupants and to provide a safe evacuation. This was a unique attack of destruction. But also in normal times their daily life is faced with hazard. There is incomplete data available as to trends on attacks on police. However, reports are that from 1980 to now there were 50 officers killed in England and Wales[9]; in the United States there are an average of 79 per year.[10] Violence to the officer can happen capriciously, without warning, as seen in this report:

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> Two police inspectors drove to the home of a man
> suspected of shooting a pellet gun from his taxi cab. As
> the female officers stepped out of their car in front of his
> house, the man rushed them with a butcher knife. He
> stabbed them both. One officer was able to shoot at him.
> Later he was found in his bedroom, hiding underneath
> his sheets. Inspector Correa went into surgery with the
> two wounds and a collapsed lung.[11]

The most damaging aspect of violence exerted on law
enforcement is on the officer's family. The following therapy case
example illustrates the cumulative effect:

> Gerald was eleven when his police officer father was
> slain by a terrorist bombing at a police station. At the
> funeral there was an assassination attempt on the mayor
> and city officials. Years later Gerald became a police
> officer. He is weighted by his father's violent death, the
> assassination trauma, as well as the on-going police
> work. He continues to have difficulties with intimacy,
> anxiety, and anger.

The police have memorials to those slain in the line of duty,
every officer knows who in the department has died while on the job, the
chords of "Amazing Grace" are played with great sorrow at the funeral.
Police from surrounding regions dressed in their best come to the funeral
to support the police family. Because of the close nature of the work and
the power of the police culture, each death is experienced as a loss of a
family member. All of this also reinforces the idea of the police culture
under siege and can create an atmosphere where the police want to "circle
the wagons," further isolating them from the community.
        Police are notorious for "second guessing" any calamity that may
befall another officer. This helps an officer think through strategies so that
they will not end up in the same situation. It also serves to protect the self
from intense feelings of vulnerability. Death on the job is the ultimate loss
of control. If the officer survives an attack the result is frequently shame,
shame that there was the loss of control.

4.   The Serpent Strikes: Types of Police Violence
        Some serpents possess venom, others not. This venom can kill,
but also may be a preventative to heart attacks and strokes. A snake bite is
a complicated thing. Likewise, manifestations of police violence are
diverse. Violence enacted by the police ranges from the public to the
private, the licit to the illegal, group behaviour to an individual attacking

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the self. The purpose of the violence is to defend others, protect property, vent rage and revenge, express racism, gain control of a sexual partner, and/or destroy the self. Types of police violence include licit community approved legal force as well as premeditated torture, the use of deadly force, violence within the family context, and suicide.

A. Torture

Torture is "The act of inflicting excruciating pain, as punishment or revenge, as a means of getting a confession or information, or for sheer cruelty."[12] This level of violence is conscious, premeditated and goes against the basic tenets of a free society. Police torture is reported in Russia, India, Mexico, and Israel.[13] Torture by police also occurs in the United States. The incidence rates of these occurrences are difficult to come by. The Louima case created a national uproar:

> NYPD Officer Justin Volpe mistakenly believed that Abner Louima had punched him in the head during a street brawl. Louima is black and Haitian-American, Volpe is White. For three and a half hours Louima was held in the station house where he was handcuffed, kicked in the groin and tortured. One of the officers held him down while Officer Volpe thrust a broom stick into Louima's rectum and then his mouth. Louima was warned that if he ever told anyone he would be killed. Later, when the matter came to light, Volpe and his lawyer claimed Louima's injuries came from a homosexual encounter. Officer Volpe was sentenced to 30 years.[14]

Torture, next to genocide, is the most cruel of violent acts. Its aim is not simply physical pain. It is consciously geared for the victim to experience shame and humiliation. The premeditation is such that the torturer is conscious of the act and the intent. It requires more from the perpetuator than the other forms of violence. The torturer must have dehumanised the self to the point where atrocities may be committed. Other acts of police violence may without exception be defended as acts of self defence, over zealousness, poor police management, problems with rage, alcohol or depression. Though in post 9/11 America there have been challenges to the tradition, in Western societies, torture can have no defence. Key questions regarding torture include the role of the police culture in inhibiting or facilitating the practice: are there torture-prone personalities that can be screened out before entrance into police work; does police work itself help induce a dehumanised potential torturer?

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B. Deadly Force

The use of deadly force is permitted in certain prescribed situations. In the 1985 Tennessee v. Garner case, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that deadly force was not acceptable in cases where the suspect's alleged law-breaking did not warrant the death penalty. Deadly force can now be applied only in situations where the fleeing suspect poses a threat to the life of the officers and/or if he or she poses a threat to the lives of others.[15] While statistics on officer-induced homicides are hard to come by, the rate for felons is clear. In 1998, two hundred twenty-five white felons and one hundred twenty-seven black felons were killed by police in what the U.S. Department of Justice calls "justifiable homicides by police."[16] In an interview with the author, this officer discussed her experience:

> Jill and her partner received a case reported by a Latin boy saying he had been sodomized and beaten up by a cop. This was not a cop. The suspect was a man who had recently been released after fifteen years in jail. He targeted adolescent street boys, usually Asian and Latin immigrants. They would not report him because they were afraid of deportation. When they attempted to arrest him, the suspect grabbed her partner's weapon, then aimed it at her face. She thought of her partner, "He's got three little girls. He needs to be able to go home. This guy is going to kill us. We are out of options." She shot and killed the man.

In her mind, this was an act of self defence. She acted to protect herself and her partner. Quite telling is her comment, "He's got three little girls." She was protecting his girls, she would not allow them to become vulnerable to a life without a father. At the same time, her training was such that she was able to get her gun, aim, and shoot. In a violent situation, like described above, one can only respect those that have the skills to consider their options and make the best judgement call possible based on their values and training.

C. Large Scale Community Violence Sparked by Police Action

At times police action has evoked incendiary reactions in the community. In the last half century these have included full scale deadly riots subsequent to police behaviour: Watts, Harlem, San Francisco, Los Angeles. The responses to the verdict in the Rodney King beating included thirty-eight deaths and a half billion dollars of damage in Los Angeles.

In the usual response to the violence, a variety of governmental commissions investigated: the McCone Commission after the 1965 Watts

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riots found that the rioters were involved in "a rage of destruction"; the Kerner Report after the 1968 Civil Disorders found that the violence was "precipitated by arrests of Negroes by white police for minor offences"; and the Christopher Report after the 1991 Rodney King riots focused on violence-prone individual cops and the failure of the department to control those individuals. The effects of these reports has generally been positive: increasing community policing approaches, diversity in police departments, and the provision of psychological services for police officers.[17] Nevertheless, the damage done to these communities was horrific and the question remains as to whether the societal conditions that created the potential for chaos remain.

D. Crowd/Riot Control

        During the civil rights demonstrations in the South, police used dogs and water hoses against people peacefully demonstrating for their rights. Images from the media circulated the globe from Alabama and Georgia. The police actions during the Chicago Democratic Convention of 1968 brought about international attention. Subsequently, the Walker Report declared that the chaos "was unrestrained and indiscriminate police violence." The report called the turmoil a "police riot."[18] There continues to be concern about police behaviour in the face of citizen demonstrations against the damaging the environment, war, and globalisation.

        The ability of the officer to control a crowd is connected to the ability to control oneself which is again connected to the ability of the police organization to provide positive management and discipline. There can be a tremendous pressure experienced during crowd control: spitting, name calling, throwing rocks, and taunts. Sometimes the crowd pushes into the line of officers. The officer may not respond in kind. It is democracy that allows protest. This is the standard. To face this level of intense provocation an officer must have a reasonably healthy personality, team support, strong training, and good supervision. The loss of any one of these can allow contained violence to spin out of control with national and international consequences.

E. Family Violence

        Rates of police officers reporting having performed at least one act of physical aggression against their spouse within the preceding year range from 24% to 40%. Severe violence (choking, threats of knife and gun, beating up a spouse) is reported from 5% to 8%.[19] Of course, this form of violence is particularly dangerous because of the lethality potential within the home. Cops have guns. Likewise, the helplessness of the victim is increased in that he/she may have difficulties addressing the issue with the legal authorities when the perpetuator of the violence is a member of the that legal authority. The law enforcement family partner is

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the most vulnerable of all domestic violence victims. The cop has access, power, knows the legal system. In other words, "She can't go to the police; he is the police."[20] Even with psychological support fatal domestic violence can happen:

> The Police Chief of Tacoma, Washington sought counselling because of the difficulties of his divorce. Both had accused each other of violent behaviour. He accused her of scratching, bruising, and pushing him. He said she was emotionally unstable. She accused him of being excessively controlling. She said he had pointed his gun at her, choked her, and said he "could snap my neck if he wanted to." He and his wife, Crystal, met at a parking lot. The chief put their two children in his car, went back to his wife's car where they argued. He shot her, then himself.[21]

As stated above, a prime consideration for an officer is control. Any out of control situation on the street may lead to mayhem and death. When this value and personal strategy is carried home, it inevitably backfires. The wife and kids are generally not prone to take orders, they didn't sign up for that. If the officer can not "change channels" into a more negotiation stance there will be trouble, and, as seen in this case study, potential disaster.

Many officers complain that they are in a double jeopardy situation. If they get into a "beef" with their wife or lover, they must face both legal and departmental sanctions. Most departments have certain assignments for those who have been charged, but not convicted, of domestic violence. Their guns have been taken and they are sent to the "rubber gun squad" which could be the record room or some other equally delightful job site. Here they rot until the slow moving legal system and internal affairs unit complete their missions. But then, would the chief and his wife still be alive if these procedures had taken place?

These are complicated issues that are unfolding as the standards for police behaviour at home is changing; much more work needs to be done. In any case, the horrible vulnerability of the cop wife is now being addressed.

F. Suicide

There is controversy surrounding the suicide rates of police officers. Some report that police suicide rate is 3 times the national.[22] Others argue that contrary to police culture mythology, the police have a similar suicide rate as that of the civilian population.[23] It is generally

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agreed though that at least twice as many officers take their own lives as are killed in the line of duty. The predictors for suicide include access to a firearm, substance abuse, loss of social support, and having a diagnosable mental disorder.[24] As described below this officer fulfilled the categories for risk:

> Joe was a respected inspector having been in the police department for over twenty years. During a routine check, child pornography was found in a hidden file in his computer. He was relieved of his gun and suspended, pending further investigation. His unit was ordered not to talk to him. The next morning he was found in front of the police station, dead, having shot himself in the chest.[25]

Joe's child pornography was diagnosable as a mental disorder, police frequently have extra firearms, and he was at risk due to the sudden isolation. The prevention services outlined at the end of this paper were brought in to aid this officer to no avail.

And yet again, control becomes a central issue in the life of the cop, the trigger to switch from saviour to serpent. To be a viable cop, one must present command authority, to be in control. And if one's family, sex life, reputation is out of control, if one can not even control ones urges and impulses, then all that is left is chaos and shame. I doubt if the best prevention services available could have stopped this suicide.

G. Conclusions

There are other types of police violence such as the molestation of an arrested suspect, rape of a prostitute, death by the accidental discharge of a weapon, and the injury or death of a passer-by when the police are in an automobile pursuit of a suspect. The data on these is difficult to come by; further research should be done in these areas.

The themes as seen in the types of violence point to control as a crucial factor in the operations of a successful police officer. Without this ability to gain control of a situation, an officer is rendered useless, thereby at risk. Therein lies the fear of loss of control. This fear fuels the skills to avoid both actual and psychological vulnerability.

5.   The Lives of Saviours and Serpents: Antecedents of Violence
A. Police Culture

For many historical, social, and political reasons, the police culture tends to be isolated from the mainstream culture. This isolation serves to protect its members and to produce strong values which members live by. *Loyalty* is the most crucial of all police cultural values.

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This is seen in the on-the-street need for 'back up' as well as in the more publicized cops protecting cops stories. The police use of *black humour* is a cultural value that enables the police officer to suffer through gruesome experiences as well as a way to express indirect anger at police management. The officer must value her/his ability to take charge of a chaotic situation leading to the importance of *control.* Likewise, there must the continual recognition of the potential of any situation to threaten officer safety leading to *hyper vigilance.*[26] This case heard in therapy is an example of the how police culture can disregard the obvious needs of an officer:

> Bob was known as a cop's cop, always ready to confront the "bad guys," courageous, wonderful sense of humour. After several alcohol-related problems, he was called in front of the police chief. The chief suspended him. His friends took the suspended officer out to the local cop bar and got him drunk.

These cultural values, especially loyalty, may save a cop in danger. Tied to a code of silence, it may also serve to prevent fellow cops from restraining an out of control police officer, hide acts of brutality, and provide a sanctuary for misbehaviour. A culture or subculture with extreme boundaries, such as a cult, the isolation may lead to strongly divergent ideas and behaviour. Jonestown is the obvious example. But, also, if the boundaries are overly porous, the identity and group loyalty of the member may be diffuse with a resultant loss of loyalty. The police culture is needed, but needed to function in balance with the needs of the society, the local community, the law, as well as member of the "blue culture."

In the womb of the police culture, the officer may transform from saviour to serpent and feel protected in this transformation, both to the officer's and to the community's detriment.

B. The Police Organization

Large bureaucratic police departments make good breeding grounds for police violence. Highly politicised department's administrators tend to be courting politicians rather than tending to the detailed and subtle intricacies of their department.[27] Police describe many a department as a "dysfunctional family." Internal politics is filled with gossip, jealousies, back stabbing, and conspiracies. The chief kow tows to the politicians. The command staff "kiss the ass" of the chief. The middle management is either concerned about their prospects for promotion or spend the day planning their retirement party. An officer comes to the surface when "bad" behaviour becomes public. Then they are punished. In

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any difficult crowd control situation, there must be attentive, professional leadership. When this is absent, and given the heat of the moment, officers may transgress their legal boundaries. This case, seen in therapy, is an example of how the loss of professional leadership can create a disaster:

> Abel had been in the department for three years. His sergeant complained that he was about as smart as a board. But he was diligent and thoughtful in his daily work. During a huge political demonstration, he shattered the face of a demonstrator with his baton. He protested that his sergeant and fellow officers had abandoned him in the face of a frightening situation. Videotapes of the demonstration showed the lackadaisical behaviour of his superiors immediately prior to and during the incident.

In every case of police misbehaviour, the question of the professional standards of the department should be called into question. On the face of it, the case may look simply as if it were an out of control officer who drank too much, or an incident that is the result of an adrenaline fuelled high speed chase. Nevertheless, upon further study, the question of the department's complicity may seen- is there an employee assistance program that helps officers with alcohol problems; has there been significant training in dealing with the stress of police work, particularly high speed chases; is there sufficient training in matters of race?

C. The Violent-Prone Individual
After the devastating Los Angeles riots of 1992, the Christopher Report concluded that violence prone individual cops and the failure of the department to control those individuals strongly contributed to the resultant civil disorder.[28] Undesirable traits of a potential police officer include those officers who wish to be a "tough cop." They are cynical, see policing as purely in terms of serious crime control, assume there is intense hostility toward the police, and strongly identify with the police culture. This is in contrast to the problem-solver approach to policing.[29]
There are problems with this "screening out" approach. Behaviour does not necessarily follow attitude. After one becomes a cop, the organization, police culture, and traumatization experiences affects personality and behaviour. The personality is not immutable. Both the Stanford Prison Experiment[30] as well as the Milgrim studies[31] demonstrate the potential power of the situation over the individual's proclivities.
Because the very nature of police work involves guns, power, and control, violent-prone individuals will be attracted to the profession. The

violent-prone cop is already a serpent; aggression and violence are but a small step away at any given time. The inhibitors to this violence are the screeners, clear standards and control from the police organization, community sanctions, and mental health support services. Without each of these, a police department is courting disaster.

D. Developmental Stages of Police Work

There are underlying patterns and themes in a police career. The entrance involves intense socialization into the police culture. At the onset the officer follows the heroic image. There is idealism regarding protection, helping, and serving. Quickly the officer, for his or her own survival, must differentiate between harmless civilians and dangerous suspects. In this adrenaline-inflamed atmosphere, right and wrong lose gradations- life becomes black or white. Violent acts rise from good guy/bad guy ways of seeing the world. Violence for this cop may also be in the heroic effort to save someone while de-emphasizing the danger to the self. This example, drawn from a recent police death, demonstrates this dynamic:

> A rookie, Jon Cook, had the opportunity to take the night off. There had been a scheduling mix-up. He requested to take the shift, saying, "I want to go catch some bad guys. I want to fight crime." He and his partner sped off, Code 4, to where a suspect had been spotted. The suspect was an escaped felon, accused of gouging out his girlfriend's eye. His car collided with another squad car as it sped to the same spot. Jon was the first openly gay officer killed in the line of duty in San Francisco.[32]

After a few years on the street, the idealism of the officer is challenged. The police administration is found not to be protective, promotions seem capricious, crooks captured after a fight are quickly released, victims are found to be "frequent flyers" of victimization, and the press plays up every possible negative of policing while ignoring the daily positive work. Cynicism ensues. The cops who were the most idealistic are disgusted, particularly after the sacrifices made. Many become the butt of jokes of other officers for their lack of taking initiative. They are "Desk Jockies." The violence of the cynical cop is derived from despair. Nothing matters, all are selfish.

Finally, with the passage of time and experience a sense of resilience may develop wherein police work is balanced with other experiences and values, e.g., family, spiritual, community, political. The shift for some is from "living for work" to "working for a living."[33] This

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resilience includes the ability to stay connected with one's community, taking care of oneself, getting away from the daily traumas, and maintaining a positive view of the self. The idea of balance becomes crucial. The involvement in one's life meaning is the priority. The resilient cop is the cop who respects the tragic.

E. Scapegoating

A scapegoat is a goat that departs. This goat has taken on the sins of the community and is thereby relieved of guilt and shame.[34] One could argue acts of genocide, racism, sexism as well as the cruel minutiae of everyday life serve this function. In this psychotherapy case example, an officer unconsciously acts out this sort of behaviour:

> Bob did not want to play politics to rise above street cop. He had seen his academy contemporaries rise to sergeant, lieutenant and higher. He detested the goings-on down at Headquarters. He was devoted to his job and had lost two marriages because of the shift work, long hours, placing a higher value on his work than on his daily family life. His third wife left him and he faced retirement. A "young punk" jaywalked right in front of him. In a rage he beat the boy, then came into therapy to try and understand how he could have done something that he did not believe in, thought he was incapable of.

Something was projected on to this "young punk." Many images are also projected onto the police, including saviour and serpent. This is particularly complicated when the projection is racial and comes from one's own police culture placing the officer in a cultural conflict situation:

> After a long career in the San Francisco Police Department, the African-American Chief of Police resigned. He told stories of his entrance into the department years before. White officers showed him bullets. They called them "nigger stoppers."[35]

The concept of projection is crucial in understanding police violence. Wearing a blue uniform embodies the symbol of authority. Daily the police receive the projections of a populace who detests authority or, conversely, yearns to be saved by a powerful other. Likewise, the police may project onto an injured homeless man the dehumanised image of a "frequent flyer" who manipulates the police and ambulance to get "two hots and a cot." The weakness inside that is despised because of the shame of vulnerability and masked by hunk and control is projected onto some

vulnerable drunk, an African-American, or a young man wearing tattoos and orange hair. The saviour becomes a serpent in order to not experience his or her own vulnerability, and the rage is expressed outward instead of to the self.

F. Helplessness

Police are taught to take a decisive command stance during their work. In a crisis or in confusion, the police are expected to take a leadership role. Hamlet would have received a poor rookie evaluation. This why the need for control is a value in the police culture. Many cops have nightmares of being attacked, aiming their gun, and it not firing. The loss of control is traumatic as seen in this therapy case example:

> As he approached retirement George came into therapy because of fears about leaving the department. He felt he was not quite finished. He talked about the shootings he had been in. Finally, he told of an incident where he chased an assault suspect into a dark street. The suspect jumped him and took his gun. After an exhausting fight he recaptured it. The suspect escaped. Ashamed, he never told his sergeant about the incident.

What is the trigger that switches the officer from saviour to serpent? In examining George's story it is evident that shame and helplessness were the emotional sequelae of loss of control he experienced on that dark street long ago. The police loath the possibility of becoming a victim. A victim has passively accepted his or her victimization. Some police react to this sense of helplessness by aggression. This then is the psychological "smoking gun." The trigger: helplessness. The attempt to move from impotence via omnipotence is a way to get back in control.

G. Alcohol and Drugs

For many departments it has been only during the last few years that it was expressly forbidden to drink on duty. It used be a hazing, a ritualistic entry into the police culture to get "bombed" with fellow officers. Before the use of modern radios, street cops had a bottle stashed in "call boxes" located on street corners. Whatever the police organization and culture dynamics may be, however the individual officer's psychology could be problematic, alcohol *will* make the situation worse. Recently, in San Francisco, a case of an off duty street fight related to drinking shook the city's political organization to its core:

> After a party the Assistant Chief of Police's son and two other officers went out for a drink. His son was a rookie

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cop, still on probation. A bartender walking home carrying some cold fajitas home ran into the three cops. Allegedly, the off duty cops were standing on a corner drinking beer. According to the bartender, one of the cops said, "Give me your food." A fight ensued with the bartender ending up with a broken nose, cuts, abrasions, and a concussion. Charges of a cover up led to indictments of the Chief, the Assistant Chief, and much of the command staff. Ultimately the charges against the command staff were dropped. The rookie son was let go because of a technicality. The incident became known as "Fajitagate."[36]

It was a common practice until a few years ago that when an officer went through a particularly difficult time, the officers would get him drunk. After the shooting death of one's partner, the captain would have a bottle of whisky in his top drawer for the surviving cop. This is the best possible method to insure Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. This is also a culturally sanctioned method for an officer to let go of control.

H. Trauma/Vicarious Traumatization

By its nature, police work involves trauma. This trauma has the potential to lead to Post Traumatic Stress Disorders (PTSD) and vicarious traumatization. The symptoms of PTSD include the traumatic event being persistently re-experienced, e.g. "flashbacks," persistent avoidance of the event, e.g., "psychic numbing," and increased arousal, e.g., "hypervigilance."[37]One who has been vicariously traumatized may become anxious, depressed, cynical, and increasingly sensitive to violence. This process occurs via empathy for the victim.[38]

Much of police work has to do with the trauma of victims. The police arrive after the fact, and there is a dead child, killed by an enraged father, here is a crying rape victim, over there is a SIDS death baby. Often this pain is relieved by police black humour. A cop gets in trouble for insensitivity when he goes to a suicide by hanging, and before cutting down the corpse the cop hits the corpse in the head with a stick and says, "looks dead to me." Horrible for the family members, but the cop has protected himself. There are jokes about "three cigar" houses when entering a site where someone has been dead for several days. The humour and camaraderie help with psychological survival. But at times these strategies falter. It may be one too many innocents being injured or killed. It may be a tragedy that strikes a chord from the officer's own childhood. His or her own experience of being abused, or more likely, helplessly witnessing the damage to a loved parent or sibling sets up the need to protect. The failure to protect brings forth the old feelings of helplessness.

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        The suspect brings to the scene his or her own traumas. Prior negative experiences with cops, family history of police brutality, a sense of social, cultural, and personal powerlessness or the intensity of an interaction with the powerful "other" creates a rush of "flight or fight" adrenaline.[39] The cop brings his or her own triggers and pain which then leads to the possibility of a violent encounter.

6   Restraining The Serpent: Prevention Strategies
A. Professionalization of the Police

        The evolution of policing in the United States has led to increased clarity and responsibility for standards of behaviour. The Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) sets minimum selection and training standards for California law enforcement. The FBI's Behavioural Science Unit provides research and training in the areas of criminal psychology, stress management, and community policing. Also, the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) Police Psychological Services Section's goal is to promote efforts in the implementation of effective police psychological services. This section has set up guidelines for fitness for duty, officer-involved shooting, peer support, and pre-employment psychological evaluations.

B. Legal Sanctions

        Police Departments have internal control mechanisms to monitor and provide consequences to misbehaving police. Typically these are derided by police personnel as being intrusive and "political." Many communities have citizen review boards. This concept of civilian oversight of the police is also seen as political, unfair to police, and works to diffuse authority. In the flux of society, the citizen review board power comes and goes.

        In the area of domestic violence by police, the strongest federal legislation to date is the Lauteberg Amendment. This 1997 law amends the Gun Control Act to the extent that it prohibits any person convicted of domestic violence (child, elder, spouse, or partner abuse) from ever owning firearms or ammunition. The law covers all United States law enforcement personnel. Any officer convicted of a misdemeanour crime of domestic violence is prohibited from the possession of a firearm. In other words, they will lose their job.

C. Psychological Services

        Many large departments today have a psychological services section. The work in these groups may include psychological screening of police candidates. Police psychologists have devised strategies to screen out those with a high potential for inappropriate behaviour.[40] By 1998, the International Association of Chiefs of Police, Psychological Services

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Section had adopted pre-employment psychological evaluation guidelines. Other psychological services include   training to prevent domestic violence,[41] critical incident response teams, peer support training, referral to alcohol and drug treatment programs, as well as the development of a cadre of trained psychological services providers. Generally it is better if the psychological service providers are independent so that the officer's confidentiality can better be maintained. The various psychological services offer possible remedies to problems related to the police culture and organization, inappropriate aggression, police identity, the need to scapegoat, negative reactions to trauma and helplessness, and substance abuse. Importantly one can learn ways to "switch gears" from high control to moderate control.

D. Increased Diversity of the Police

        In the last twenty five years strong efforts have been made to integrate the police departments. The inclusion of African-Americans, Asian-American, Latino, women, gay officers has significantly changed the face of the police. A minority officer may understand the cultural nuances of a victim or suspect that one from the majority culture may miss. Racist remarks, anti-women comments, homophobic jokes are less acceptable when the target is also a fellow officer that must be relied on in time of duress. It is less easy to scapegoat your partner and your partner's group when your partner loves and protects you.

7.   Neither Saviour Nor Serpent: Conclusions

        The violence of the police, as with all violence, is multifactorial. History, societies' inequities, dysfunctional organizations, cultural norms and values, individual psychopathology all contribute.

        Democracy is messy. In a free society change is constant: classes struggle against each other, cultural and racial issues surface as immigrants flee despotic regimes and poverty; labour struggles with corporations; some see the human as guardian of the earth, others see the earth a site to be exploited. Through these competing interests, the role of the police is not as simple as in the days of the shire reeve's obeisance to the king. Responsibility is dispersed, power shifts like the seasons. A cop in chaotic democratic societies is doomed to fail: all the crooks will not be caught; all the victims will not be avenged; the victims are a bit evil, the crook a bit good; laws are fair, laws are unfair; the bad go unpunished, the good suffer. Yet the cop must catch the crook, protect the citizen, nurture the victim.

        The saviour and serpent are embedded in a melodrama: good guys and bad guys; protection from evil and serving the good. In a tragic paradigm things are not so clear. As Camus said, "Tragedy is ambiguous

and drama simple-minded. In the former, each force is at the same time both good and bad. In the latter one is good and the other evil."[42] In a tragedy the sense of loss of control and helplessness is not a trigger to "heroic" action. It is the human condition. It gives us humility, inhibits hubris. In this framework, empathy is allowed for both the "good guys" and the "bad guys." Wounds do not have to be avenged as much as nurtured so that they can heal with the knowledge that, ultimately, they do not disappear. They remain in abeyance until the next assault. Likewise, for the police to have this premise, we as citizens, to whom they are responsible, can bring the same attitude toward them. This does not mean we lower our standards for conduct; it means that we do not make them heroes or villains, for they are neither saviours nor serpents. They, like us, are struggling in the face of a chaotic, democratic, and changing society.

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"Equality in Life Presumes Equality in Death": Gender and Execution in Sunbelt America

Vivien Miller

Abstract

Since the controversial Supreme Court decisions on the constitutionality of the death penalty in the 1970s, two-thirds of all executions in the US have taken place in just five southern states: Texas, Florida, Virginia, Louisiana and Georgia. Only two of these states have executed women in the post-*Furman* period. In February 1998, 38-year-old Karla Faye Tucker became the first woman to be executed by the State of Texas since 1863. In March 1998, 54-year-old Judias Buenoano became the first woman to be executed by the State of Florida since 1845. Every execution is of significance but those of Tucker and Buenoano were particularly momentous events in that the condemned were female, white, and the first women to be legally executed in their respective states for over a century. They were also the first women to be executed in the US since 1984. These executions were important political and legal markers, not least because they provided significant and symbolic breaks with a paternalistic view of female murderers, that was historically and culturally constructed within the southern region. As one BBC journalist observed in 1998, 'to the majority of Texans who support the death penalty, the case of Karla Faye Tucker was no different to the 144 death row inmates executed in the Lone Star state in the past two decades. In their view, she got what she deserved'. Texas and Florida arguably constitute the most dynamic of the Sunbelt states. Both have undergone far-reaching political, economic, demographic and cultural transformations in the past fifty years that have impacted on the states' penal practices and death penalty politics. As a result the cases of Tucker and Buenoano provide excellent historical and contemporary case studies for considering questions on the legitimization of state violence against female murderers, gender equality and capital punishment, and representations of capital female defendants. This chapter therefore looks at these particular aspects of violence in the public domain.

Key Words: Women on death row, homicide, gender and capital punishment, "Death Belt," Karla Faye Tucker, Judias Buenoano

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In 2003, thirty-eight of the fifty US states retain capital punishment for criminal homicide, but the majority of executions take place in the so-called "Death Belt." Hugo Adam Bedau, respected legal scholar and leading commentator on capital punishment, divides the contemporary United States into three death penalty regions: "a northern tier from Maine to Alaska where capital punishment has been either abolished or plays a minor political role; a middle tier from Pennsylvania to California where there are large numbers on death rows but executions are infrequent and opposition vigorous; a lower tier from Virginia to Arizona where capital punishment thrives. By May 1996 two thirds of all executions carried out since the controversial Supreme Court decisions on the constitutionality of the death penalty in the 1970s, had taken place in just five southern states: Texas, Florida, Virginia, Louisiana, and Georgia."[1] When Texas executed thirty-seven inmates (responsible for forty-nine murders) in 1997, the same number as all the other death penalty states together, it seemed to confirm the image of a backward state in a backward region dealing inadequately with a high crime rate.[2]

The continued dominance of "the South" in numbers of death row prisoners and executions performed is always the subject of comment.[3] The authors of a recent history of capital punishment in Texas attribute this to "a cultural tradition of exclusion" stretching back to the days of slavery and illegal lynchings, in effect rehashing the old southern "subculture of violence" thesis.[4] Frequent recourse to notions of southern exceptionalism, however, is not without problems. In a nation as diverse as the United States, the persistence of regional differences in patterns of death sentences and executions is to be expected. Further, the old Confederate states are at the heart of a new Sunbelt America anchored in the most populous states of California, Texas and Florida, the three states with the largest death row populations. According to the "Sunbelt thesis," the 1960s onwards saw dramatic shifts in social, economic and political power away from the Northeast and Midwest, to a Southern tier stretching from California to the Carolinas. Enterprising Sunbelt states such as Texas and Florida have large multicultural populations (including Latinos, African Americans and northern whites), all with divergent views on the efficacy of capital punishment. Thus the continuities, changes and dynamics of "southern" attitudes and practices appear more complex and nuanced than many scholars would allow. Further, while Texas and Florida were one-party Democrat-controlled states for much of the century, since the 1970s they have been at the heart of far-reaching political realignments, which have brought pro-death penalty Republicans to the fore. Texas and Florida therefore offer excellent historical and contemporary case studies for considering the legitimization of state violence against female murderers, gender equality and capital punishment, and representations of female capital defendants.

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Capital punishment, as both historical problem and contemporary judicio-political subject, is one of the most extensively studied and written about topics, but death sentences are rare for both sexes. Only two percent of those convicted for murder or non-negligent manslaughter is capitally sentenced. There are numerous examinations of racial bias in the administration of the death penalty in the United States but despite two recent book-length studies, little work has been done on women who have been executed or on the gender politics surrounding capital punishment.[5] Forty-five women were executed in US jurisdictions between 1900 and 2000, out of a total number of 8,010 executions, thus less than one percent. The 143 death sentences imposed on women since 1973 account for less than two percent of the total number of death sentences issued in US jurisdictions.[6]

American death rows currently house female serial killers, cop killers, poisoners, child killers and women who killed their husbands for insurance payouts. Legal scholar Elizabeth Rapaport identifies three broad categories of murder that are stigmatised as "death eligible" in state statutes: predatory murder for economic or sexual gain; murder of law enforcement officers; and murder which evinces excessive violence or brutality, usually involving the use of torture, explosives or poison. Women tend to commit domestic homicide, which is not usually death eligible unless it involves one of the aforementioned factors.[7] Rapaport argues further that women are "protected from capital punishment" by the life histories they present to prosecutors and juries, and the recognition of domestic violence in the late twentieth century as both an aggravating and mitigating factor.[8]

In January 1992, a *Miami Herald* staff writer reported that female defendants were in effect a privileged group by noting, "Experts say a woman's crime must be especially vicious to get a death sentence." A Florida public defender was also quoted, "This is one of the few areas of female stereotype where women come out ahead."[9] Sociologist Kathryn Ann Farr challenges the notion that women routinely escape death sentences because of their gender. She cites several studies "that have shown that women viewed by criminal courts as 'manly' or as having committed 'masculine' offenses, and as having violated norms of white, middle class femininity, are treated more harshly."[10] By the 1990s many politicians, attorneys and members of the judiciary, particularly in jurisdictions with the death penalty, had come to view female execution as a necessary and appropriate demonstration of equality before the law. Therefore, those women who had committed premeditated or first-degree murder of such a heinous nature could and should not expect any demonstration of chivalry or paternalism on the part of the courts or the executive.

One of the curious features of the twentieth century southeastern region was that states with the highest execution rates appeared reluctant to

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impose death sentences on women and execute them. Every execution is
notable, but those of Karla Faye Tucker in Huntsville prison, Texas, in
February 1998 and of Judias Buenoano six weeks later at the Florida State
Prison in March 1998 were particularly momentous events in that the
condemned were female, white, and the first women to be legally executed
in their respective states for over a century. These executions were
important political and legal milestones, not least because they provided
significant and symbolic breaks with a paternalistic view of female
murderers that was historically and culturally constructed within the
southern region. As one BBC journalist observed, "to the majority of
Texans who support the death penalty, the case of Karla Faye Tucker was
no different to the 144 death row inmates executed in the Lone Star state in
the past two decades. In their view, she got what she deserved."[11]

Described in the *Houston Chronicle* as a "drug-abusing,
motorcycle-riding, hot-headed prostitute," 23-year-old Karla Faye Griffith
as she was in June 1983, and 38-year-old Daniel Ryan Garrett, went with
Jimmy Leibrant to the apartment of 27-year-old Jerry Lynn Dean, the
husband of Griffith's best friend. They were high on speed and planned to
steal Dean's motorcycle to raise money for more drugs. Garrett had taken
his shotgun with him. They found Dean asleep in his apartment, Griffith
and Dean became involved in a fight, and Garrett repeatedly hit Dean over
the head with a hammer. Griffith then finished him off with a pickaxe that
had been leaning against the wall in Dean's apartment. Then they noticed
another person under the covers on the mattress. Tucker struck 32-year-old
Deborah Thornton with the pickaxe in her shoulder. (Thornton had met
Dean for the first time that evening at a pool party and just happened to be
in the wrong place and the wrong time). Garrett administered further
pickaxe blows, leaving the tool embedded in Thornton's chest for the
police to find there the next day. In his recent work on the press and female
execution, Marlin Shipman observes that the pickaxe killings attracted
little interest in Houston newspapers, "probably because murders are
unremarkable in many cities, and in this case the man and the woman
murderers were not well known." He quotes from the *Houston Chronicle,*
which stated the deaths of Dean and Thornton accounted for "just two of
the 556 homicides in 1983."[12] Eight months later family members reported
Tucker and Garrett to the police. Both went to trial in 1984 and received
death sentences. (Inmates convicted of robbery-homicide constitute the
largest group on Texas's death row).[13] Garrett died of liver disease while in
prison in 1993.[14]

Fourteen years later when Tucker's execution date of February 3
was set, a storm of national and international protest erupted for several
reasons: she was the first woman to be legally executed in Texas since
1863 and the first woman to be executed in the US since Velma Barfield in
North Carolina in 1984. She drew support from religious leaders and

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celebrities. And the murder method was contested. Further, during the trial it was alleged that Griffith had told police "she experienced an orgasm every time the pickaxe landed, even after the victims were dead."[15] While Tucker claimed later she said this only for effect, it was often repeated in articles and television news reports in 1997 and 1998. Tucker's physical appearance, death row personal life, and religious conversion also drew considerable comment. She was a born-again Christian who in 1995 had married Dana Brown, a prison ministry worker, with whom she had no physical contact. Further, this attractive dark-haired 38-year-old woman clearly did not conform to the stereotype of the double-murderer. Arrest data demonstrates that the typical perpetrator of a capital homicide is male, aged 15-24 years, and non-white. The typical death row prisoner is Southern, black, poor and male, and his victim white and female.[16] One television critic wondered if Tucker would "have received all that [media attention] had she not been young, attractive, and white?"[17]

Commentators devoted much time, energy and ink asserting that gender should not be a factor in the Tucker case. Even so, the enduring "Texas Mystique" of paternalistic, chauvinistic, aggressive, enterprising, independent, and masculine ideals, evident in politics, literature and celebrity, and embodied by Lyndon B. Johnson and J. R. Ewing, was under attack. But female challengers such as former governor, Ann Richards, had been making inroads into the macho business and political cultures of Texas since the 1970s.[18] Robyn Blumner, a columnist for the *St. Petersburg (Fla.) Times*, and former ACLU executive director, argued that Texas should not spare Tucker just because of her sex: "Equality in life presumes equality in death." Drawing parallels with women in military combat roles, she argued that true gender equality would remain elusive unless society overcame its "faux Victorian notions" of defenceless, morally innocent, and innately passive women. Noting that women were as capable of committing violent offences as men, Blumner concluded, "The categorical grouping of females as defenceless and in need of extra protection by men is probably the last vestige of institutionalized sexism that needs to be rubbed out. Ironically, as Texans will soon discover, gal murderers may be perfect for the task."[19]

Described by one network television producer as a "media darling," Tucker carefully crafted her public image by emphasizing she was "a new person, content to spend her life in prison doing God's work and being an example for young people."[20] As Tucker had found God on death row, the execution split the religious community, particularly the Southern Baptists (the largest denomination in Texas) over the issues of redemption and retribution; between those who viewed her faith as a compelling reason for clemency, and those who viewed her religious conversion with suspicion. Tucker was interviewed on Pat Robertson's show *The 700 Club* asking conservative Christians to acknowledge "There should always be a place

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for mercy." Robertson urged his viewers to pray for her survival. For him, the execution was "a state act of vengeance against a different person to the one whom [sic] had committed the crimes in 1983," but one whom the jury had determined was a threat to society and should pay for her crimes with her death.[21]

Dianne Clements, president of Justice For All, a Houston-based victims' advocacy group asked, "if Karla Faye had converted to Buddhism or to Judaism or to Mohammed, would we as a Christian nation have these same feelings toward her? Simply because someone converts to the politically correct religion does not absolve her from her punishment."[22] While crediting Tucker with putting "a face on death row" in the midst of a "silent graveyard of anonymity," Ellen Goodman of the *Boston Globe* found herself uncomfortable with these "sudden friends of mercy." She didn't doubt that Tucker's "whiteness, her femaleness, her photogenic Christian-ness made her the exception," because "[t]hose who 'fit' the image of people on death row are, after all, disproportionately black and almost entirely male."[23] A waitress at the Café Texan in Huntsville hoped Tucker's religious conversion was genuine but felt the separation of law and religion as prescribed in the US Constitution needed to be preserved.[24]

When Tucker wrote to Governor Bush asking for commutation, she acknowledged the brutality of her crimes, taking full responsibility for her actions, and was willing to accept her execution as "the final act that can fulfil the demand for retribution and justice."[25] Despite strong pressure from a coalition of women's groups and evangelical church organizations, as well as individual appeals from Pat Robertson and Pope John Paul II, the then Governor of Texas, George W. Bush, refused to intercede to prevent the lethal injection. At the same time, a Texas governor has limited opportunity to intervene in the clemency process, which is the preserve of the eighteen-member Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles. A governor can only commute a death sentence if at least ten of the Board members vote in favour, and their decisions cannot be overridden, or issue a one-time thirty day reprieve.

Political historian Michael Lind characterizes Texas politics as an ongoing civil war between conservative and modernist traditions; between supporters of "a society with a primitive economy based on agriculture, livestock, petroleum and mining, with a poorly educated population of workers lacking health care protection and job safety," and those advocating "a high-tech state capitalist economy" with a meritocratic society, fuelled by investment in education and a growing entrepreneurial middle class. He places George W. Bush squarely within the conservative tradition. But Bush also became a born-again Christian at age 40 in 1986. He was reported as beginning each day kneeling in prayer and attended daily Bible study. In 1993, he told an Austin news reporter that only people who accepted Jesus Christ as their saviour could go to heaven.[26] So

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why did this born-again Christian fail to save a fellow convert? The simple and cynical answer is that commutation would have been politically damaging. Bush also refused to concede that Tucker's sex was an issue. He announced: "The gender of the murderer did not make any difference to the victims," and in many ways utilised a liberal feminist concept that so long as the death penalty is imposed, it should be imposed equally on men and women. Governor Bush also invoked God in his decision not to grant a thirty-day reprieve. He announced to a news conference that he had "sought guidance through prayer," and "I have concluded judgements about the heart and soul of an individual on death row are best left to a higher authority."[27]

At the same time, growing support for the retributive principles, that criminals should be paid back for their crimes, and the punishment should fit the crime, provided the context for judicial and public reactions to the cases of Tucker and Judias Buenoano. On March 30, 1998, 55-year-old Judias Buenoano was executed in Florida's electric chair to little fanfare and lukewarm media interest. One reporter observed, "She doesn't have Karla Faye Tucker's coy smile, and the pope hasn't intervened on her behalf."[28] Buenoano had been sentenced to death in November 1985 after a Santa Rosa County jury found her guilty of the arsenic poisoning of her husband, James E. Goodyear, in September 1971. Goodyear was a 37-year-old US Air Force technical sergeant with nineteen years of military service who had returned from a tour of duty in South Vietnam in June 1971. When Goodyear's body was exhumed in March 1984 it contained significant amounts of arsenic. His wife had collected over $90,000 in life insurance payouts. The jury deliberated for over ten hours before pronouncing her guilty of capital murder.[29]

Sociologist and anti-death penalty author Michael Radelet had argued against the imposition of the death penalty in 1983 on three grounds: Buenoano's sex as women accounted for less than ten percent of all arrests for crimes of violence; those convicted of killing family members had "a lower probability of future dangerousness"; and the likelihood of rearrest or future violent behaviour was reduced substantially after the defendant had been in controlled incarceration.[30] But if the jury had recommended mercy for Buenoano and a life sentence had been imposed, she would have the expectation of future release, as LWOP was not introduced in Florida until 1994. Similarly, if Tucker's sentence had been commuted to life imprisonment, she would have become eligible for parole in July 2003, as she was convicted before Texas introduced LWOP.[31]

Further, when she received her death sentence in November 1985, Buenoano was already serving aggregate prison terms of sixty-two years, including a life sentence without parole for twenty-five years for the drowning murder of her 19-year-old son, Michael. She collected $100,000

from insurance policies on which she had forged her son's signature.[32] Buenoano was also linked to the murder of former lover Bobby Joe Morris in Trinidad, Colorado, in January 1978 (and insured for $78,000),[33] and the attempted murder of her lover John Wesley Gentry with paraformaldehyde between October 1982 and January 1983. Gentry's life was insured for $500,000.[34] Buenoano was subsequently convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment for the attempted car bombing murder of Gentry in January 1983. It was this attempt on Gentry's life that triggered four criminal prosecutions of this so-called "Black Widow" in Florida between 1983 and 1985. Buenoano, a grandmother and born-again Christian while on death row, always claimed she was innocent of the murders and was convicted on dubious circumstantial evidence.

The state supreme court automatically reviews every death sentence in Florida.[35] In June 1988 the court upheld Buenoano's conviction and capital sentence, as the justices unanimously rejected her attorney's argument that her crime was not severe enough to warrant the death penalty.[36] Florida's Executive Clemency Board rejected an appeal for clemency, for commutation to life imprisonment, in April 1989. Death warrants were issued in 1989 and 1990 by Governor Bob Martinez, the first Hispanic governor of Florida, and a Republican advocating a tough stance on crime and drug issues.[37] In June 1990, Buenoano received a temporary stay just four hours before she was due to be executed.[38] In March 1997 evidence of technical problems with Florida's aging electric chair led Buenoano's lawyers to argue that electrocuting a woman was especially cruel "because research shows women have a lower pain threshold than men."[39] The Florida Supreme Court 4-3 upheld the legality of the electric chair in October 1997, but called on state officials to consider alternative methods, which they did but not before the Buenoano execution on March 30, 1998. Governor Lawton Chiles, a beleaguered Democrat in a Republican and judicially conservative state, and who needed to appear to be tough on crime, signed the final death warrant for Buenoano in December 1997.[40] She was one of four inmates executed in a nine-day period in March and April 1998.

For most of the twentieth century, death rows and execution chambers were male domains, and they will remain predominately so in the twenty-first century United States. Most of the fifty women currently on America's death rows are incarcerated in remote and isolated institutions, often in the southern states, and hidden from public gaze. Ten women (nine white and one African American) have been executed in the United States, all in the Southeastern region, since the re-enactment of state capital punishment statutes in the mid-1970s. This included the February 2000 execution in Texas of 63-year-old Betty Lou Beets, convicted of the shooting death of her fifth husband, Dallas firefighter, Jimmy Don Beets, to collect $500,000 in life insurance benefits. Judy

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Buenoano and Betty Lou Beets had several things in common but Beets's execution attracted more national attention than Buenoano's, largely because of the "Texas factor."[41] In October 2002, Florida executed 46-year-old Aileen Wuornos, the "nation's first lesbian serial killer," characterized at her 1991 trial as an alcoholic and drug-addicted prostitute, who murdered and robbed seven unsuspecting white middle-aged men over the course of thirteen months in 1988 and 1989.[42]

In April 1998 the editor of the *St. Petersburg Times* observed, "the death penalty will occupy our lives and the lives of our children as long as we continue to sanction it. There are still 368 prisoners on Florida's death row, many of whom have nearly exhausted their appeals. No doubt, new records for putting people to death are waiting to be broken, and many Florida lawmakers are dreaming of new ways to exploit executions to come." But, he also asked, "Do we want executions to become so frequent and mundane that they attract public notice only when we kill someone with unique qualities, like Judy Buenoano?"[43] Female execution is still a novel event in contemporary US society and contains many of the hallmarks of "spectacle." In February 1998, over two hundred reporters from national and international television stations, newspapers and magazines camped outside the prison at Huntsville in Texas, anticipating the news of a last minute reprieve for Karla Faye Tucker or of her death. Shipman termed it "A multimedia execution for the 1990s."[44] The media spectacle of the Tucker execution prompted Sam Howe Verhovek of the *New York Times* to question whether Tucker's death had "done anything to change the dynamics of the nation's continuing debate over the death penalty."[45]

In another editorial in the *St. Petersburg Times*, it was acknowledged that Karla Faye Tucker had "put a human face on capital punishment" while her execution had given the United States "a collective shudder," largely because people found it hard, in spite of the details of her crime, "to cast her in the role of fiendish monster that most men on death row so easily fit."[46] Such observations were not exclusive to this newspaper in Central Florida. Further, the chivalric rush to defend one pretty and pious female Texas inmate underlines that there are troubling dynamics amid contemporary debates over the death penalty. Leading legal scholar on women and the death penalty, Victor Streib noted in January 1998 that US society valued women's lives more than men's, but the Tucker and Buenoano cases also underline that the lives of telegenic, charming, and youthful women are of greater value that those of reclusive, older and less attractive women, thus state violence against the former is cast as unacceptable but against the latter it passes with relatively little comment.[47] Further, is executing women on the same terms as men and in the same proportion, really the best way to ensure gender equality in life as well as death?

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Notes

[1] Hugo Adam Bedau, "Introduction," in *The Death Penalty in America: Current Controversies,* ed. Hugo Adam Bedau (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 21-23.

[2] Steve Ray, "Huntsville debates merits of Tucker death penalty as well," *Abilene Reporter-News*, 1 February 1998; "Executions: Dead Men Walking Out," *The Economist*, 10 June 2000, 25-28.

[3] Stuart Banner, *The Death Penalty: An American History* (Cambridge, Mass and London: Harvard University Press, 2002), 279.

[4] James W. Marquart, Sheldon Ekland-Olson, Jonathan R. Sorensen, *The Rope, The Chair, & The Needle: Capital Punishment in Texas, 1923-1990* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1994), 17.

[5] Kathleen A. O'Shea, *Women and the Death Penalty in the United States, 1900-1998* (Westport, CN and London: Praeger Books, 1999) and L. Kay Gillespie, *Dancehall Ladies: Executed Women of the 20th Century* (New York: University Press of America, 2000).

[6] Victor L. Streib, "Death Penalty for Female Offenders, January 1, 1973, Through December 31, 2002." January 2003, (1 June 2003) <http://www.law.onu.edu/faculty/streib>.

[7] Elizabeth Rapaport, "The Death Penalty and Gender Discrimination," *Law and Society Review* 25 (1991): 367-383.

[8] Elizabeth Rapaport, "Some Questions About Gender and the Death Penalty," *Golden Gate University Law Review* 20 (1990): 480-565.

[9] "Florida's Death Row Home To Four Women," *Miami Herald*, 1 February 1992, (1 June 2003) <http://miami.com/mld/miamiherald>.

[10] See Kathryn Ann Farr, "Defeminizing and Dehumanizing Female Murderers: Depictions of Lesbians on Death Row," *Women and Criminal Justice* 11 (2000): 54.

[11] "America's cheers and prayers greet Tucker's death," BBC News Online, 4 February 1998 (24 February 1999). <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news>.

[12] Marlin Shipman, *"The Penalty is Death": US Newspaper Coverage of Women's Executions,* (Columbia and London: University of Missouri Press, 2002): 285.

[13] Marquart et al, *The Rope, The Chair, & The Needle,* 136.

[14] "Tucker Dies After Apologizing," *Houston Chronicle,* 4 February 1998.

[15] "A Crime That Shocked America," and "Portrait of a Repentant Killer," BBC News Online, 23 January 1998, (24 February 1999). <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news>.

[16] Criminal homicide is a highly gendered activity. Men commit ninety percent of criminal homicides. Victims are also predominately male. The majority of criminal homicides are intraracial, but killers of whites are more likely to be sentenced to death. See Bedau, ed. *The Death Penalty in America*, 28-29.

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[17] Shipman, "*The Penalty is Death,*" 289; Gillespie, *Dancehall Ladies*, 97. Tucker was the first woman to be legally executed since 1863 when Chipita Rodriguez was hanged for killing a horse trader.

[18] Richard Murray and Gregory R. Weiher, "Texas: Ann Richards, Taking on the Challenge," in Kent L. Tedin, Donald S. Lutz, Edward P. Fuchs, eds. *Perspectives on Texas and American Politics* 3rd edition, (Iowa: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Co, 1992), 227-237; David G. McComb, *Texas: A Modern History* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1989), 147.

[19] Robyn E. Blumner, "Even in death chamber sexism is alive and well," *St. Petersburg Times,* 16 January 1998, (1 June 2003). <http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/sptimes>.

[20] Michael Gracyzk, "Tuckers execution raises debate about clemency, gender," *Abilene Reporter-News*, 25 January 1998 (1 June 2003). <http://www.reporternews.com>.

[21] Michael Gracyzk, "Texas executes Karla Faye Tucker for4 1983 pickax slaying," *Abilene Reporter-News,* 4 February 1998.

[22] Quoted in Steve Ray, "Texas' record-breaking execution pace sign of citizens' fears," *Abilene Reporter-News*, 1 February 1998.

[23] Ellen Goodman, "Tucker made allies of polar extremes," *Abilene Reporter-News*, 10 February 1998.

[24] Steve Ray, "Huntsville debates merits of Tucker death penalty as well," *Abilene Reporter-News*, 1 February 1998.

[25] Steve Ray, "Texas's record breaking execution pace sign of citizens' fears," *Abilene Reporter-News*, 1 February 1998.

[26] Michael Lind, *Made in Texas: George W. Bush and the Southern Takeover of American Politics* (New York: Basic Books, 2003), 108-109, 113-114, 160-161.

[27] Quoted in Michael Graczyk, "Texas executes Karla Faye Tucker for 1983 pickax slaying," *Abilene Reporter-News,* 4 February 1998.

[28] Julie Hauserman, "State's will to execute women is put to test," *St. Petersburg Times,* 28 March 1998.

[29] Chris Anderson and Sharon McGehee, *Bodies of Evidence: The True Story of Judias Buenoano, Florida's Serial Murderess,* (New York: St. Martin's Paperbacks, 1991), 327-329, 337-349, 354-355.

[30] Anderson and McGehee, *Bodies of Evidence,* 356.

[31] Michael Holmes, "Karla Faye Tucker asks for clemency," *Abilene Reporter-News*, 23 January 1998.

[32] Anderson and McGehee, *Bodies of Evidence*, 76-77, 97, 112-113, 215.

[33] Ibid., 64-67, 125, 210.

[34] Ibid., 29-31, 292; Julie Hauserman, "Florida woman is put to death," *St. Petersburg Times,* 31 March 1998.

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[35] Roger Handberg and Mark Lawhorn, "The Courts: Powerful but Obscure," in Robert J. Huckshorn, ed. *Government and Politics in Florida,* 2nd edition (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1998), 155.

[36] "Black Widow's conviction, death sentence are upheld," *St. Petersburg Times*, 24 June 1988.

[37] "New Trial Asked for Buenoano," *Orlando Sentinel,* 21 February 1990; "3 Jolts Used to Execute Killer; Flames, Smoke Spew from Beneath Mask," *Miami Herald*, 5 May 1990; Sydney P. Freedberg, "Davis execution photos shown," *St. Petersburg Times*, 28 July 1999.

[38] Judy Garnatz, "'Black Widow' was within hours of execution," *St. Petersburg Times*, 15 August 1991.

[39] O'Shea, *Women and the Death Penalty*, 117; Shipman, *"The Penalty is Death,"* 294; "Lawyers: Old Sparky Too Painful for Women," *Orlando Sentinel,* 20 March 1998.

[40] O'Shea, *Women and the Death Penalty*, 112-113. Chiles signed 31 warrants during his gubernatorial term. Terry Sims became the first Florida prisoner to be executed by lethal injection on February 23, 2002. He had been convicted in 1977 for killing a volunteer deputy sheriff during a robbery. "Florida has executed 52 inmates since 1976," *Miami Herald*, 9 October 2002. In 1994 veteran Florida politician Lawton Chiles defeated Miami real estate developer and presidential son, Jeb Bush in the race for governor. See Stephen C. Craig, "Elections and Partisan Change," in *Government and Politics in Florida,* 2nd edn, ed. Robert J. Huckshorn (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 1998), 50. Chiles was elected to two terms but died before completing the second.

[41] Shipman, *"The Penalty is Death,"* 292.

[42] "Order Damsel of Death Executed, Jury Advises Judge," *Miami Herald,* 31 January 1992; "Serial killer Wuornos awaits execution today," *St. Petersburg Times,* 9 October 2002; O'Shea, *Women and the Death Penalty,* 129; Farr, "Defeminizing and Dehumanizing Female Murderers," 60-61; Victor L. Streib, "Death Penalty for Lesbians," *National Journal of Sexual Orientation Law* 1 (1994): 113.

[43] Editorial, "A morbid fascination," *St. Petersburg Times,* 6 April 1998.

[44] Shipman, *"The Penalty is Death,"* 285.

[45] "Karla Tucker Is Now Gone, But Several Debates Linger On," *New York Times,* 5 February 1998 (6 February 1998).
<http://www.nytimes.com>.

[46] Editorial, "Facing execution," *St. Petersburg Times,* 5 February 1998.

[47] Craig Pittman, "Interest points to death row's lack of equality," *St. Petersburg Times,* 18 January 1998.

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