
<p>ARMY FIELD MANUAL VOLUME 1 COMBINED ARMS OPERATIONS</p>

PART 10

**COUNTER INSURGENCY
OPERATIONS
(STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL
GUIDELINES)**

<p>2001</p>

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If you wish for peace, understand war, particularly the
guerrilla and subversive forms of war.

B H Liddell Hart, 1961

PREFACE

1. *ADP Operations* insurgency and its characteristics are placed into the overall spectrum of conflict and are outlined in general terms. The requirements for a counter insurgency strategy are then described together with the appropriate guidelines and planning requirements for subsequent operations. This publication follows closely the thrust, direction and sequence of the outline given in *ADP Operations*, enlarging and developing the points made for application at the strategic and operational levels of conflict.
2. The first portion describes what insurgencies are, the historical development of revolutions and insurgencies into the twentieth century and some of their associated characteristics. It then analyses the conduct of an insurgency; how it functions and operates, and the sort of tactics that may be used to prosecute the aims of an insurgency. It concludes with an outline of the position of insurgency in society today.
3. The second portion deals with the issues of countering insurgency at the strategic and operational level. The first five chapters cover aspects of the law, the principles of counter insurgency, a concept of operations and the coordination of a plan of action by a government at the strategic level. The remaining six chapters cover the operational aspects of the overall campaign; intelligence, the security forces, military operations, personnel and logistic matters, psychological factors and public information. It concludes with a section on civil affairs.
4. In the past many terms have been used to describe those opposing the established authorities, terms such as guerrilla, revolutionary, terrorist, dissident, rebel, partisan, native and enemy all spring to mind. In order to keep consistency throughout this publication the term insurgent has been used to describe those taking part in any activity designed to undermine or to overthrow the established authorities.
5. To help the reader further, some definitions for various terms used in a counter insurgency context as well as a bibliography for the general reader are recorded at the end.

Acknowledgements

6. Acknowledgements are due to Professor B O'Neill for providing the feature of analytical research into insurgencies, to Doctor G Dyer for some aspects of the historical analysis of insurgencies post 1945, and to Dr R Clutterbuck for providing some information and material used in Part 1 taken from his book *Terrorism in an Unstable World*.

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PART A
INSURGENCY

CHAPTER I

THE CONCEPT OF INSURGENCY

SECTION 1 - THE DEFINITION OF INSURGENCY

Insurgency

1. Insurgency is, for the purposes of this manual, defined as the actions of a minority group within a state who are intent on forcing political change by means of a mixture of subversion, propaganda and military pressure, aiming to persuade or intimidate the broad mass of people to accept such a change.¹ It is an organized armed political struggle, the goals of which may be diverse. Some insurgencies aim for a straightforward seizure of power through complete revolutionary takeover, while others attempt to break away from state control and establish an autonomous state within traditional ethnic or religious bounds.¹
2. In some instances, an insurgency may strive to extract wide ranging political concessions which are unattainable through less violent means. Insurgencies tend to arise when state authorities are unable or unwilling to redress the demands of significant social groups. Insurgencies could therefore be coalitions of disparate forces sometimes united by a common enmity towards a government, and a willingness to use violence to challenge its legitimacy.
3. Until recently it would be true to say that only an insurgency which was capable of attracting widespread popular support posed a real threat to a state authority. Arms proliferation, and in particular the availability of weapons of mass destruction, together with the possibility of exaggeration through the media of an insurgents aspirations and prospects could necessitate a reassessment of the threat posed by insurgent groups in the future. While the overall authority of the state may not be at risk, a state's ability to handle the potential disruption imposed by these new issues could have a destabilising effect on any government.

SECTION 2 - ORIGINS AND CAUSES

4. ***The Seeds of Insurgency.*** The causes of insurgency lie in unfulfilled aspirations and what are perceived as legitimate grievances which may justify rebellion, or in less substantial complaints, which may be manipulated by insurgents who are generally working to a different agenda for their own reasons. The causes may include:
 - a. Nationalist, ethnic, tribal and cultural separatist movements based on strong feelings of identity which are antipathetic to the dominant majority in a state.
 - b. Religion, either as a manifestation of a separate identity or motivated by religious fundamentalism.

1. This definition of insurgency was provided by the War Studies Department of RMA Sandhurst.

- c. Neo-colonialism; the control of key sectors of the economy by foreign business interests, or the presence of allied troops and their bases under the terms of an unpopular treaty which offends national sentiment.
 - d. Maladministration, corruption, discrimination and repression.
 - e. Economic failure. Extremes of wealth and poverty, especially in countries where the upper and lower classes are of different ethnic origins.
 - f. Unfulfilled expectations, particularly amongst the middle class and the intelligentsia of the population. It is here that expectations of an improved way of life are usually greatest.
5. **Exploitation of Causes.** Any of the causes of insurgency may be fostered and exploited by:
- a. Party rivalries, which may revolve around domestic political, economic or religious issues, exacerbated by the competition of ambitious personalities for power.
 - b. Political theorists, for example, Old Guard Communists, Maoists, anarchists, and right wing irredentists.
 - c. Nationalist and separatist parties. Such parties may be motivated by extreme right or left wing ideologies or come from the middle, moderate portion of the political spectrum.
6. **Examples from History.** History shows that there are many examples of insurgency throughout the ages and in all habitable areas of the world. All will have lessons which continue to be relevant today, but these are too numerous to record here. In the first Annex to this Chapter certain well known and notable examples of insurgency from the seventeenth century onwards to the date of publication have been recorded or mentioned. In the second and subsequent Annexes there are brief summaries of the more important concepts and theories about revolution and insurgency that have been manifest since the start of the twentieth century. These give an insight into how insurgency has changed and developed during this time.

SECTION 3 - THE CHARACTERISTICS OF INSURGENCY

Characteristics

- 7. Each insurgency will be unique, although there may be similarities between them. Insurgencies are more likely to occur in states where there are inherent social divisions, based on racial, cultural, religious or ideological differences, leading to a lack of national cohesion. Insurgencies may thrive in states that are economically weak and lack efficient, stable or popular governments. Additional factors such as corruption and external agitation may help to create a climate in which politically inspired violence erupts.

8. Various models or patterns of insurgency have been postulated, but whichever model is examined, the key point to note is that the insurgents' aim is to force political change; any military action is secondary and subordinate - a means to an end. It is also worth stressing that few insurgencies fit neatly into any rigid classification. In the past, attempts have been made to categorise insurgencies according to particular characteristics; for example by their environment (rural or urban), or by ideological origin (Leninist or Maoist). As the Sandinistas showed in Nicaragua in the late 1970s, and as Sendero Luminoso demonstrated in Peru in the early 1990s, effective insurgents take those parts of previous campaigns which seem to have worked and adapt them to their own particular needs.
9. Examining the complete range of characteristics will enable the commander and his staff to build a more accurate picture of the insurgent and the thinking behind his overall campaign plan. Principles and techniques derived from previous experience may provide valuable guidance; however, the key to an appropriate response will be an objective military estimate. Such an examination will identify the root cause or causes of the insurgency; the extent to which it enjoys support, both internally and externally; the basis on which the insurgent will appeal to his target population; his motivation and the depth of commitment; the likely weapons and tactics he will use and the operational environment in which he will seek to initiate, and then develop, his campaign.
10. Analytical research² suggests that there are seven main forms of insurgency which can be used as the basis for further examination. These are recorded in the following paragraphs. The first four are revolutionary in nature because they seek to change completely the existing political system.

Anarchist

11. The most potentially dangerous form of insurrection is that of the anarchist group which sets out to eliminate all political structures and the social fabric associated with them. Various groups in Russia and elsewhere in Europe flourished at the turn of the twentieth century, but apart from assassination achieved little else. In more recent times cells such as the Black Cell and Black Help in Western Germany during the 1970s echoed this credo, but were not particularly significant. The purpose of an anarchist movement is to destroy the system. There are normally no plans to replace any form of government with any other system - hence the danger of this form of insurrection which could rapidly destabilise a nation state very quickly and leave a power vacuum.
12. Fortunately these normally very secretive and small groups do not have much public appeal and have not so far had any lasting success. Nevertheless their potential destructiveness to society cannot be overlooked. With the growing proliferation of

2. Acknowledgements to Professor B O'Neill Director of Studies at the US National War College. See also *'Insurgency and Terrorism' - Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare*. Also to the War Studies Dept at RMA Sandhurst and the Staff College for additional material.

all types of weapons and potential causes after 1989 these groupings cannot be underestimated or consigned to history. One or two spectacular and successful attacks by groups of this type could still have a profound political effect on a state or region far beyond their intrinsic worth.

Egalitarian

13. An egalitarian insurgency seeks to impose a new system based on centrally controlled structures and institutions to provide equality in the distribution of all state resources. By mobilising the people (masses) and radically transforming the social infrastructure, these insurgencies rely on gaining support for changes from within the state.
14. This type of insurgency has been regularly used in the post Second World War era, and is characterised by the Malayan Communist Party, the Viet Cong in South Vietnam, the Fedayeen-i-Khalq, in Iran, the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path or SL) in Peru, and several other communist style groupings.
15. A similar type of insurgency but not based on a Marxist Doctrine can be seen in the Ba'athist groups that seized power in Syria and Iraq.
16. As with all of these egalitarian insurgencies, those which achieved success normally established repressive regimes with authoritarian forms of political control in order to retain the power they had gained.

Traditionalist

17. Here the insurgency would seek to displace or overthrow the established system but revert back to national/original values that are rooted in the previous history of the region. This form of insurgency has always existed, but in recent years following the collapse of the Warsaw Pact large areas around the fringes of this former power bloc are now prone to such traditionalist forms of insurgency. Usually the insurgent group would attempt to establish a system centred on an autocratic rule supported by the army, religious leaders, and the traditional heirarchical system that prevailed in days gone by.
18. Recent insurgencies of this type can be seen in the Contra movement in Nicaragua, the mujahedin groups in Afghanistan and those who supported the return of the Imam to North Yemen in the 1960s.
19. A more extreme and violent form of traditionalist insurgency is manifest in those who seek to re-establish an older political system, based on values that are seen by many as feudal, and which run counter to the development of social norms of behaviour in the contemporary world. These can be defined as reactionary traditionalists; examples being the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, Islamic Jihad in Egypt, Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hezb-i-Islami (Party of Islam) in Afghanistan. These groupings would hope to establish Islamic political and social norms in accordance with either the Sunni or Shiite version of the muslim faith. The same can equally be applied to other religious groups. Christians, Jews, Hindus and Buddhists all have their militant extremists.

20. The dangerous potential for this type of insurgency is that if it succeeds in one area, as in Iran, it is likely to act as a spur to other insurgencies elsewhere. External aid to other groupings then becomes a very real threat to the affected status. Furthermore the religious bias of an insurgency can affect and influence the views of individuals and these can be used to manipulate more popular support. Here Western nations could also be at a potential disadvantage because of the contempt with which insurgents of this type have for non believers. See Annex G for details of Islamism.

Pluralist

21. The final characteristic of the revolutionary types of insurgencies is the pluralist form where the goal of such insurgencies would be to establish a system in which the values of personal freedom, liberty, moderation and compromise are emphasised. The history of Western civilisations is marked by a number of such changes, but not generally in the post Second World War era except in a diluted form in Poland (1980-82) and possibly the Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.
22. Many insurgencies may seem to be pluralist in tone, but these invariably mask a more authoritarian intention. It is possible that UNITA in Angola and the National Resistance movement in Uganda may develop on these lines but this remains to be seen.

Separatist

23. In a sense the aim of separatist insurgency is more total than that of the revolutionary types. The separatists would seek to remove themselves, and the area they live, completely from the control of the remainder of the state. The Confederacy in the American Civil War is a classic example of separatist activity, but in modern times the example of Angola and Nigeria are also useful illustrations of this category of insurgency. The aspirations of Kurds for a 'Kurdistan' and the enclave of Armenians in Nagorno-Karabach are oblique examples of separatist ambitions.
24. Now that the hegemony of large power blocs has lost its appeal many such movements are manifesting themselves more openly. However, Africa has been blighted by secessionist wars for many years following the ending of colonialism in many parts of that continent. In effect separatist activity around the world has been endemic since the early 1960s and most continents continue to have their share of this type of insurgency. The form of political system that would be adopted by the insurgents, if they succeeded, varies enormously from the more traditional to the outright socialist extreme. Nevertheless these insurgencies can be classed as separatist because this is the goal that they all seek, regardless of their size or whether they are motivated by regional, ethnic, social or religious reasons. Independence wars can be regarded as separatist in their form because the primary aim of the insurgents is independence. The Vietnamese and Algerian wars fall easily into this category, as does the insurgency in Dhofar during its early stages. The secessionist campaigns in Eritrea and Biafra are African examples. The Tamil separatist movement in Sri Lanka is another example in the Indian Sub Continent.

Reformist

25. This form of insurgency is a toned down version of the separatist type, in that insurgent groups would be fighting for political, economic or social reforms and possibly some form of autonomy for themselves, without altering the overall political *status quo*. The Kurds in Iran and Iraq are suitable examples, as is the smaller more recent example in Mexico during 1994 where Indians in the South of Mexico sought improvements to their way of life.

Preservationist

26. This final form of insurgency differs from the other six in that insurgents are orientated towards maintaining the political *status quo* in that nation because of the relative political, social and economic advantages that can be gained from it. These insurgents then take on the non ruling groups and the government where necessary, in order to frustrate any moves towards change.
27. Classic examples of this are the Afrikaner Resistance Movement in South Africa, and the para military groupings of protestant extraction in Northern Ireland. Right wing varieties of 'death squads' in a number of Latin American countries could also fall into this category.

SECTION 4 - IDENTIFYING AN AIM FOR INSURGENCY

28. **General.** It is not difficult to place the various forms of insurgency into the seven categories listed above - although care should be taken to avoid a too rigid approach to the analysis of an insurgency, particularly in the early stages of such a movement. This is because there can be many pitfalls to trap the unwary analyst in dealing with insurgents and their claims. A few are given in subsequent paragraphs.
29. **Developing Aims.** Some insurgency movements change their aims during the process of an insurgency. New leaders take over, original aims may be seen as either unambitious or overambitious and as the insurgency develops so may the aims change. What started out in Northern Ireland as an IRA requirement to defend Catholic areas turned quickly into an insurgency against the established authority and resulted in a split by a breakaway group (Provisionals) from the old IRA (Officials). The change in the Dhofar insurgency during the early 1970s from a separatist movement to an egalitarian one, resulted from a Marxist takeover in the leadership during the insurgency.
30. **Rival Aims.** The identification of the aim for an insurgency assumes a unity of leadership and control within the insurgents. More often this is not the case and it is not difficult to see why. Insurgents may vary in their outlook, background and intellectual capability; they probably work in secret or in conditions where open discussion is not always possible, and events can occur which affect significantly the role of individual insurgent leaders. Arrest and imprisonment can set back the course of the insurgents group. In these complicated circumstances it is easy for rival groups within the insurgency to have differing aims and priorities and it may

not be possible to identify immediately the overall aim of an insurgent group. Careful study of the group, any material it produces and its actions on the ground may help to define the main thrust of an insurgency.

31. ***Written Material and Rhetoric.*** Where an insurgency does produce material, or provide speakers whose views are reported, these can be analysed. However this is normally only appropriate when the insurgency is large and seeks a wider audience for its views. Smaller, more clandestine groupings, generally avoid this option, but are then probably less of a real threat to the established authorities. Furthermore such material if produced can often be misleading and obscure. N17 the small terrorist organisation operating in Greece since 1973 have published many articles in the newspapers after terrorist incidents attempting to justify their actions. Taken as a whole these publications show that the organisation seems to have a small middle class/intellectual support, very little appeal to any non committed group, and no particular programme to speak of. It has remained a small terrorist group outside the political arena, but yet an embarrassing left wing thorn in the side of any government which has to spend valuable resources to counter its terrorist activities.
32. ***The Implications of Analysis.*** While the roots of some insurgencies are more difficult to identify - partly because of their own internal arrangements, most insurgencies can be identified once their aims are reasonably clear and comprehensible. The process of identifying the basis of an insurgency can also lead to the implications that normally follow such analysis. These could be that:
 - a. Different aims put different demands on insurgents, - particularly with respect to resources. If an insurgents aim is not amenable to compromise then it normally results in much stiffer opposition from the established authorities. In turn this implies that insurgencies should go for greater support, more funding and a longer term commitment to have any chance of success. Those whose aims are not the collapse of the established authority, such as reformists and preservationist types of insurgency, may be able to convince the authorities that concession is possible without recourse to a protracted insurgency.
 - b. A clear analysis of an insurgency can also help to discover the roles of outside or external parties to the insurgency. In the 1960s the tendency of the United States to intervene in insurrections was in part the result of thinking to equate insurgency with the revolutionary aspirations of egalitarian movements and the connotation of external support from China or the USSR. Calculations about intervention that gloss over the ultimate aims of an insurgency can be ill-informed and costly.
33. To help such analysis Figure 1 describes in diagrammatic form how an insurgency could develop. From this it may be possible to work out the aims, objectives and courses of action for an insurgency.




Figure 1 An Example of How an Insurgency may Develop

SECTION 5 - INSURGENT STRATEGIES

General

34. It should be noted that more often than not insurgent leaders are well informed, astute and will probably study the lessons of previous campaigns of insurgency. They will often seek to emulate the most successful elements of an established model, which they hope will provide the 'means' to achieve their chosen 'ends'. Before looking at the strategies in more detail, it is worth remembering that insurgents make mistakes too: until the mid 1970s the Palestinian Popular Democratic Front set itself an end state that is not achievable (the destruction of Israel) and adopted a totally inappropriate Maoist strategy as their means to this end.
35. The most popular insurgent strategies continue to provide inspiration and guidance for diverse groups around the world. It should also be remembered that the originators of each believed that they had discovered a product that worked. An analysis of an insurgent's strategic approach has practical application, including, for example the production of a doctrinal overlay. The four broad types are briefly summarised in the subsequent paragraphs.

Conspiratorial Strategy

36. The oldest and least complicated of the strategies which was used by the Bolsheviks in 1917. It is designed to operate in an urban environment, ideally the capital city, which is seen as the decisive arena. Small cells of potential leaders attempt to release and channel the energy of a disaffected society, generating a 'spontaneous' uprising by means of bold armed action.
37. Typically, key points will be seized and a decapitating strike made against the governing regime. Modern exponents will seek both to seize control of, and exploit media coverage. The coup is generally organised by a relatively small group which may be a clique in the armed forces. The insurgents must be highly secretive, disciplined, and capable of quick assembly (or dispersion).

Protracted Popular War

38. The overall strategy was designed by Mao and has been adopted with varying degrees of success by numerous insurgent groups since. Mao envisaged three 'phases' - strategic defensive (organisation), strategic equilibrium (guerrilla warfare) and strategic offensive (open battle), leading to seizure of political power. Although it has often been linked with a Marxist ideology, the strategy is based upon the assumption that the cause will attract ever increasing numbers of supporters. It will involve a mix of political activity, terrorism and guerrilla tactics, but with the former always predominating.
39. The strategy is most applicable in rural, peasant-based environments in situations where government control is weak or non-existent, and where the insurgent can establish his base areas, build a parallel political and military structure and gradually expand the area of influence to challenge government authority. As the title suggests,

the strategy takes time to reach fruition. The requirement for favourable terrain (space in which to hide and trade for time) may restrict the use of this strategy in the future, although it may still prove effective in underdeveloped regions or states with poor armed forces. It could also be argued that city and urban 'sprawl' will provide the same sort of 'space' that is needed to foster an insurrection of this type.

Military Focus

40. Associated with the Cuban revolution, this alternative to Popular Protracted War puts political action second to military success. The strategic assumption is that the population will flock to the winning side. The insurgent group actively seeks battle with the Security Forces. It works when the government is weak, has been discredited, and lacks reliable, effective, armed forces.
41. However other types of insurgent groups may seek to use the military focus strategy - aiming to achieve a well publicised military success early so as to gain the popular support it may lack at the outset. Furthermore for the discredited state authorities, the fear of further losses may encourage them to negotiate fresh arrangements before popular support is further eroded.

Urban Insurgency

42. In its pure form this strategy involves the application of organised crime and terrorism in a systematic and ruthless manner. The intention, according to Carlos Marighela, one of its main proponents, is to force a repressive military response that in turn will alienate the volatile mass of the urban poor and move them to revolt. The media will be used to generate an air of panic. Violence is therefore a catalyst for political change. The strategy and tactics of this form of insurgency have been adopted by numerous groups.
43. The urban insurgent is no new phenomenon, but the very complexity of modern life and the ease with which it can be disrupted has undoubtedly encouraged the growth of urban guerrilla philosophies and tactics. Lenin developed the art of creating a revolutionary situation. He is appreciated the importance of destroying the credibility of the government's will and ability to govern, thus creating what has been aptly called a 'climate of collapse', where the people, faced with the real threat of a collapse of urban life and livelihood, will rally to whatever organization seems best able to restore order out of chaos.
44. The urban insurgent has adopted tactics designed to erode the morale of the politicians, the administrators and the judiciary, the police and the army, with the aim of inducing a climate of collapse. At this stage, the insurgency anticipates either that the government will capitulate or be provoked into adopting repressive measures and, above all, causing bloodshed. Against such repression, the urban insurgent, purposes to appear like a knight in shining armour as the peoples' protector.
45. The chief weapon of the urban insurgent is indiscriminate terror, by which he can induce the situation of general insecurity, nervousness and fear pictured above. He

has the advantage of surprise, and exploits this by concentrating on pinprick attacks like assassinations, ambushes, kidnapping, sabotage, and raids on banks, prisons and army and police installations. He has been pictured as:

"Familiar with the avenues, streets, alleys, the ins and outs of the urban centres, their paths and short-cuts, their empty lots, their underground passages, their pipes and sewers, the urban guerrilla crosses through irregular and difficult terrain unfamiliar to the police, where they can be surprised in a fatal ambush or trapped at any moment."

[*Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla* by Carlos Marighela].

46. The urban insurgent cannot, like his rural counterpart, establish bases and recruit armies. He is an individual, a member of a relatively small group, relying on the cover afforded by the teeming people of the city and on terror to avoid betrayal, but he relies above all on publicity to make his cause known and achieve a favourable public response. Good publicity is as vital to the insurgent as a hostile public reaction can be damaging.
47. Similarly, the deliberate promotion of adverse publicity against government agencies, including the security forces, if deployed, is essential and complementary. The opportunities for mass publicity have not only advertised and contributed to the growth of this type of insurgency they have also given it an international aspect. The growing trend towards the use of civil liberties and 'human rights' by political groups also tends to lower the tolerance of the general public for effective counter measures. This is shown not only by the way in which new techniques quickly become widely adopted, but also through the advent of the international travelling insurgent, usually well educated and often well-heeled, who may appear in any country and any setting where the circumstances seem to him - or her - ripe for exploitation.

Isolated Terrorism

48. No less dangerous or destabilizing for the government is the potential for isolated terrorism often committed by small groups of militant insurgents. Modern society is vulnerable to terrorist tactics not only because of its complexity, but also because of its high technology. Thus, while on the one hand whole modern cities can be reduced to chaos by lack of electrical power or the health hazards of untended sewers, on the other hand the terrorist can exploit the vulnerability of jet aircraft, fast trains and crowded motorways to make extravagant demands linked to the threat of causing spectacular disasters. With the sort of publicity which modern communication has made inevitable, one such act of terrorism can make an impact on the world at large.
49. Evidence from the 1970s and 1980s shows that terrorists know this - and experience also shows that no modern democratic and open society can protect itself completely against such a threat. With this in mind a small group who hold extremist views (of whatever type) can conduct isolated acts of terrorism or assassination in the hope that their demands can be met. This may not amount to full scale insurrection, or indeed anything approaching it, but it could easily result in the government becoming involved in large scale counter terrorist operations to find and neutralise the group or face the embarrassing consequences.

Conclusion

50. It should be stressed that these examples of strategies are not watertight categories into which new threats should be fitted. In practice insurgencies use similar tools, but in different proportions and with different results. The success of the individual strategy selected will be determined by six factors, all of which should be considered in any assessment of an insurgency. These are dealt with in more detail in Chapter 11. As Chapter 7 of ADP Vol 1 - *Operations* makes clear, the most effective and durable insurgent strategy is one which alters tactics and procedures to suit its own requirements.

SECTION 6 - THE BACKLASH AGAINST INSURGENCY

Violent Reaction by Communities

51. Once insurgency is established there is always the possibility of a violent reaction within the community, particularly in response to terrorist acts. This could also be provoked by insurgency movements, sometimes deliberately. It may be a simple gut reaction by one community against another believed to be harbouring terrorists or sympathetic towards them. On the other hand it may be a more premeditated attempt by an enraged section of society, which has been the particular target of terrorist outrages, to take the law into its own hands against the perpetrators because it has no confidence in the security forces' ability to bring them to justice.

Extremist Reactions and Death Squads

52. Reaction to such terrorism can also lead to anarchic and chaotic situations, which while providing useful, propaganda and cover for insurgents can also be the reason for 'death squads', extreme reaction and the chance of a coup d' état by disaffected groups within the state including the armed forces. Operations in Algeria, both in the 1950s and recently, are all classic examples of extremist reaction.
53. Furthermore this reaction can also lead to an anarchic situation which provides good propaganda for the insurgents, for example attempted coup by parts of the Army in Algeria, the operations of the OAS in Algeria and France, and closer to home, the Loyalist terrorist operations in Northern Ireland.

INSURGENCY - A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Background to the Twentieth Century

1. ***Nationalism and Repression.*** After the battle of Waterloo in 1815 when Napoleon was banished to St Helena, the concern of the victorious coalition powers, quickly joined by a France guided by Talleyrand's diplomacy, was to restore peace and stability to a continent torn by over two decades of conflict. This was achieved under their sponsorship at the Congress of Vienna. In a series of treaties signed in 1814 and 1815 Austrian influence was restored over much of Germany, Italy remained divided, some of it under Austrian and French rule, and the independence of Belgium and Poland was extinguished. Only Belgium succeeded in winning its freedom in 1830. The remaining nationalist revolutions came to grief in 1848 and 1849. For the next sixty years the breechloading rifle, the railway and the telegraph gave established governments the advantage over nationalist as well as socialist revolutionaries. New continental empires and states were created by war rather than revolution, although Garibaldi, as the inheritor of the enthusiasms of the French Revolution, mobilized popular armed support to help Mazzini, Cavour and Victor Emmanuel weld the Italian states into a single nation. French victories at Magenta at Solferino saw the end of Austrian influence in Italy. The new inventions, and the efficient machinery of the Prussian state and army, enabled von Bismarck and von Moltke to apply Napoleon's legacy of military proficiency to fight three short, sharp and successful wars to create the Second Reich.
2. ***Revolution and Repression.*** Despite the attractiveness of the theme *liberté, égalité et fraternité* as a motif for revolution, nationalism was to furnish a more potent stimulant than individual emancipation on the Continent during the latter half of the Nineteenth Century. While dissatisfied national minorities schemed to dismember the Austro-Hungarian Empire an ill-assorted collection of revolutionaries and idealists plotted to overthrow the Tsarist regime in Russia. In that instance they were unable to make much headway against the state secret police. In a France, humiliated by Prussia in the 1870-71 War, the Second Empire was overthrown, but the emergent Third Republic managed to defeat the Paris Commune, the first Marxist revolution, in a struggle which was far bloodier than the French Revolution eighty years earlier. The Commune was a rare example of revolutionaries fighting openly. The moderation they displayed, in refusing to seize the Bank of France for instance, was not reciprocated. The Commune was ruthlessly quelled. Similarly, a Tsarist government humbled by Japan was able to face down a widespread but uncoordinated revolt in 1905. The concessions yielded by the Tsar were virtually meaningless. As Trotsky put it, 'A constitution is given, but the autocracy remains'.¹ An even more disastrous defeat would be needed to provide the catalyst for a Communist revolution.
3. ***The British Experience.*** For the first six or seven years after Waterloo the Tory government which had won the war remained in power, impervious to the mounting

1. Lionel Kocham and Richard Abraham, *The Making of Modern Russia*, Macmillan, 1983.

social pressures of the agrarian and industrial revolutions, and to the demands for parliamentary reform. Violence there certainly was in those years but on a lesser scale than on the Continent. The dispersal of a crowd of 50,000 which had assembled at St Peter's Field outside Manchester to listen to 'Orator' Hunt by a yeomanry charge, dubbed 'Peterloo', in 1819, killing twelve and injuring hundreds, and the Cato Street Conspiracy, an unsuccessful plot hatched in that street to murder the entire cabinet at a dinner party in Grosvenor Square a year later, were exceptional events in a slow, intermittent but persevering progress towards reform. Apart from the Irish Home Rule crisis of 1914, soon to be swallowed up in the larger trauma of the First World War, the nearest the country came to revolution or civil war was when the Whig Reform Bill of 1832, with the limited aim of enfranchising the middle class, was defeated once in the Commons and twice by the Lords. It was passed however when Lord Grey suggested to William IV that it might be necessary to create enough peers to carry it to avert civil war. The voteless continued to press for democracy through the People's Charter but in contrast to the riots and revolutions of 1848 on the Continent, the Chartist march through London that year received scant support. Enthusiasm for empire building and a constant stream of emigrants to settle the temperate colonies, which were to achieve dominion status, eased the strain on the British Isles and provided a distraction from domestic social problems. Following the passage of the Reform Bill the last seven decades of the Nineteenth Century were to witness a steady extension of the vote and civil liberties, even to the extent of offering Marx and Engels an asylum where they could develop their revolutionary theories. In the closed society of the Tsarist police state the Bolsheviks, as well as anarchists and other extremists, learned to plot in secrecy and to develop a cellular party organization structure to spread their Marxist philosophy and other ideas underground.

The Twentieth Century until 1945

4. ***Marx, Lenin and Trotsky.*** The lesson that Karl Marx drew from the failure of the Commune, reinforced by the collapse of the 1905 Revolution, was that it was no use taking over an existing regime; it had to be destroyed and replaced by a revolutionary one. Lenin agreed but it was Trotsky who produced a strategy for revolutionary war, although he never claimed to be a military expert. He put his faith in arming and training a well indoctrinated urban proleteriariat able to strike a quick and mortal blow against regular forces which had been weakened by Marxist propaganda. He considered that a rustic rebellion would take too long to mobilize, would be hard to control and could be beaten by regulars loyal to the Tsar.
5. ***The Russian Revolution, 1917.*** Kerensky's weak liberal government was overturned, not by a popular uprising, but by Lenin and Trotsky's *coup d'état* of November 1917. It was the defeats, hardships and pressures of the First World War rather than Marxist theory which undermined the morale of the Imperial Army, the Tsar's bulwark against revolution. Much of it was induced to desert to the Bolshevik cause enabling Trotsky to win the Civil War by conventional military means. The Revolution was consolidated by making peace with Germany and giving land to the peasants. Foreign support for the White Russians from the war weary allies was only half-hearted. The Comintern was formed in 1919 following a meeting of the Third Communist International in Moscow to promote revolution abroad. See Annex B for a resume' of Lenin's Theory of International Revolution. However, the Cominterns activities were

temporarily shelved by Stalin in the late '20s to preserve 'socialism in one country'. Once that had been secured attention could be diverted to promoting subversive, proselytizing activities, based on indigenous communist parties, front organizations and the urban proletariat, to foster world revolution. These efforts were to be pursued as opportunity offered, until the collapse of the USSR and of the central role that the Communist Party played in the state. Just as Stalin was prepared to sacrifice Communist parties abroad, when it suited the interests of the USSR, so he imposed a ruthless dictatorship at home, which surpassed the most brutal excesses of any tsar with the murder of some 19 million people over the course of some 10 years. For all their protestations to the contrary, Communism and Fascism had much in common in terms of the tyrannies they created.

6. ***Mao Tse-tung and China.*** The two great Asian Communist leaders, Mao Tse-tung and Ho Chi Minh, based their revolution on the peasantry. Mao Tse-tung's policy was the opposite of the Russian version of Communist teaching, which had aimed to convert the urban proletariat to the revolutionary cause first, and then to secure the countryside. 'When he realized that the Marxist model of proletarian war did not apply to China, an agrarian society with a weak industrial sector, he turned away from the cities and workers to the countryside and the peasantry as the main support for revolution. Guerrillas, weaker than their enemy, could not be effective or even survive without strong, well-organized popular support. Mobilizing that support was a political rather than a military task, and the primacy of political over military concerns became a hallmark of Mao's theorizing about warfare. In this respect he diverged markedly from traditional Western military thought, with its fairly rigid distinctions between war and peace, and between political and military affairs'.² Faced with a formidable Kuomintang Army, Mao withdrew from south-east China by a circuitous westerly route to the caves of Yen-an in the north-western province of Shansi. Of perhaps 86,000 men who set out on the Long March in October 1934 only about 4,000 reached their destination a year later. A myth was carefully created to turn a severe defeat into a legendary triumph. However, starting from his remote base Mao was able to begin the process of wearing down the Kuomintang forces in a prolonged guerrilla war. Gradually he expanded the territory under his control by a combination of terror and persuasion, allowing him to raise and train an army capable of engaging his enemy in the field. Fifteen years after he set out for Yen-an he entered Peking. See Annex C for a resumé of the Maoist Theory of Protracted War.

Insurgency Since the Second World War³

7. After 1945 there is a new common factor discernible in all the armed conflicts since the Second World War, and especially in the majority of those conflicts that are irregular in nature. Military power has become less effective in achieving decisive politically satisfactory results at every level of conflict. This is as true for enemies fighting with conventional weapons as for the nuclear-armed super powers, and it is

2. John Shy and Thomas W Collier, *Revolutionary War, In, Makers of Modern Strategy*, edited by Peter Paret, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986, page 839.

3. Based on 'The Army, the State and the People: Power Confounded' by Dr Gwynne Dyer in his book 'War' published in 1985.

equally true for governments and for insurgents in "small wars" that now account for most of the world's suffering.

8. The principal technique which the insurgent groups have used to attack the state authorities in the past 50 years has been guerrilla warfare; for a time, in the 1950s and early 1960s, it seemed a virtually infallible technique for overthrowing governments. But like the first of the modern methods for seizing state power, the urban uprisings of nineteenth and early twentieth century Europe which drew their inspiration from the French revolution in 1789, guerrilla warfare proved to be a technique that only flourished in a specific environment.
9. Guerrilla warfare as a form of resistance to foreign occupation or an unpopular domestic government has been around since the beginning of history. But it was not generally regarded as a potentially decisive military technique even as late as World War II, when it was again widely employed against German and Japanese occupation forces, primarily because it lacked an adequate strategy for final victory.
10. So long as the guerrillas remained dispersed in the hills, forests, or swamps and indulged in only hit-and-run raiding against the government or the foreign occupiers, they could be tolerated, but they could never clear their opponents out of the urban centres of power. If they came down out of the hills and attempted to do so in open combat, they gave their opponents the target they had been hoping for, and the enemy's regular forces would smash them. Even the Yugoslavs, the most successful guerrilla fighters of World War II, could not have liberated their country unaided; the Germans finally pulled out mainly because the Red Army was sweeping through the Balkans toward them.
11. What changed after World War II was that the rural guerrilla technique spread into the European colonial empires, at a time when the imperial powers were in a gravely weakened economic condition. As in the occupied countries of Europe during the war, the insurgents in the European colonies after the war had no difficulty in mobilizing many of their newly nationalistic fellow countrymen against the foreign occupiers - and as in the occupied countries of Europe, they had virtually no prospect of winning a military victory against the well-equipped regular forces of the imperial power, though they could turn themselves into an expensive nuisance. What was different, was that European powers had no such stake in retaining control of their colonies and had lost the legitimacy for their presence.
12. If the insurgents could make it very expensive for the colonial power to stay, and could go on doing so indefinitely, they didn't have to worry about gaining a military victory. The colonial power would eventually decide to cut its losses and withdraw. This was a reality that had already been demonstrated by the Irish war of Independence in 1919-21 and the Turkish war of National Resistance against attempted partition by the victorious Entente powers in 1919-22 (the struggle for which the new Soviet Union coined the phrase "national liberation war"). The demonstration was repeated many times in the two decades after 1945, in Indonesia, Kenya, Malaya, Vietnam, South Yemen, and many other places. In a few cases like Malaya, the British handed over to the Malayan Authorities. In the case of Algeria the colonial power won the military confrontation but could not overcome the political imperative for change in France,

Algeria and elsewhere. In the majority of cases, the decolonization process was achieved without a guerrilla war, once the message of their own vulnerability to this technique had been absorbed.

13. At the time, the apparently irresistible spread of rural guerrilla wars caused some alarm in the major Western powers. There was also an ideological element, however, in that almost all of these postwar insurgencies espoused some variant of the same Marxist ideology propounded by the West's main international rival, the Soviet Union. The insurgents tended to attribute their successes to ideology rather than to the particular environment in which they were operating. This led to a belief in the West that it was Soviet and/or Chinese expansionism, and not simply local resentment of foreign rule, that lay behind these guerrilla wars, and so to the creation of special counterinsurgency forces, especially in the United States, and ultimately to the commitment of US troops to Vietnam during 1965.
14. The technique of rural insurgency only flourished as long as there were demoralized governments around to oppose. The world remains littered with rural guerrilla movements today, hanging on in the more rugged parts of dozens of Third World countries, but as the exponents of a minority ideology or the representatives of a minority ethnic group, they have very little prospect of success against local governments that can credibly invoke nationalism on their own side. The era of successful rural insurgency was already in decline when the United States became involved in Vietnam.
15. It is far harder to win a guerrilla campaign against one's own government, not only because there is not the natural antipathy against foreign rule to attract recruits to the cause, but also because a locally based government cannot simply cut its losses and go home if the cost of fighting a counter insurgency campaign gets too high. As a consequence, when fighting against their own government, rural insurgents do have to face the question of how to win final military victory in open battle against the government's regular armed forces - and only three have achieved it: China in 1949, Cuba in 1959, and Nicaragua in 1979.
16. The war in Vietnam between 1965-73 obscured an important development elsewhere, however this was precisely the period in which rural guerrilla warfare showed how ineffective it was outside the specific late colonial environment in which it had flourished. There was never any serious attempt to practice it in any industrialized country, but in the middle and late 1960s the Cubans made a concerted effort to extend the technique to the independent states of Latin America. Rural insurgencies sprang up in almost all the states of South America, Marxist in orientation and enjoying tacit or even open Cuban support. Without exception, they failed disastrously. The epitome of this failure was "Che" Guevara's tragicomic attempt to start such a movement in Bolivia, which ended in his own death in 1967. See Annex D to this chapter for details of Che Guevara's '*foco*' theory.
17. This is not to say that the technique can never work in independent underdeveloped countries, but it certainly does require that the target government be iniquitous, incompetent, and politically isolated (as in Nicaragua). In most Latin American states, the insurgents had been eliminated or reduced to a merely marginal nuisance by 1970.

The inescapable conclusion - which was accepted by most Latin American revolutionaries - was that rural guerrilla warfare was another insurgency technique that had failed.

18. This realization drove numbers of these disappointed insurgents into random terrorism (or rather, "urban guerrilla warfare", as it is now known). In effect, the strategy of the Latin American originators of this doctrine, most notably the Montoneros of Argentina, the Tupamaros of Uruguay, and Brazilian revolutionaries like Carlos Marighella, was aimed at driving the target regimes into extreme repression. See Annex E for a more detailed account of Carlos Marighella and his theories.
19. By assassinations, bank robberies, kidnappings, hijackings, and such activity, all calculated to attract maximum publicity in the media and to embarrass the government to the greatest possible extent, the insurgents sought to provoke the displacement of democratic governments by tough military regimes, or to drive existing military regimes into even stricter and more unpopular security measures. If the regime resorted to counter-terror, torture, "disappearances," and death squads, all the better, for the purpose was to discredit the government and alienate it from the population.
20. As with rural guerrilla warfare when it is attempted outside a colonial environment, the fatal flaw in any urban guerrilla strategy is that it lacks completeness. The theory is that when the guerrillas have succeeded in driving the government into a sufficiently repressive posture, the populace will rise up in righteous wrath and destroy its oppressors. But even if the population should decide that it is the government and not the guerrillas that is responsible for its growing misery, there is no plan of how to eliminate the government.
21. In a number of Latin American countries, the insurgents did accomplish the first phase of their strategy: the creation of thoroughly nasty and brutally repressive military governments dedicated to destroying them. But what then happened was that these governments proceeded to do precisely that. In every Latin American country where they attempted to use this strategy, the vast majority of the urban guerrillas are now dead, captured, or in exile. See Annex F for the example of Abimael Guzman and the Shining Path.
22. In the past few years another form of militant tendency has reappeared on the international scene; that of Islamic fundamentalism, or rather Islamism, to use its more correct appellation. Since communism has now collapsed, this form of militant opposition to secular governments and regimes has taken much of the limelight. Annex G provides some of the background to Islamism and some clues as to its strengths and weaknesses.
23. In summary, all the non governmental forms of organized violence which have emerged over the past couple of centuries do not change the basic reality. Insurgents of any political hue, no matter which specific techniques they use, are an inherently transient phenomenon. Their goal is to seize control of the state, not to destroy it, and they normally end up in government, in shallow graves or in exile.

LENIN'S THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL REVOLUTION

1. ***Orthodoxy and Pragmatism.*** The Bolshevik revolution in Russia had a profound effect on international Marxism. Since the formation of the Second International in Paris in 1889, Western Europe had been the centre of Marxism. There, its well organized communist parties had found a fertile recruiting ground amongst disaffected intellectuals and some sections of the working population, especially in Germany. However, in spite of the trouble some of these parties caused in Central Europe in the wake of the First World War none of them came within measurable distance of seizing and retaining power. Their failure placed Lenin in a strong position. He had become disenchanted with the Second International even before the war and now he seized the opportunity to form a Third International, or the Comintern, as it later came to be known, in Moscow in 1919.¹ Delegates from foreign communist parties were obliged to accept his notorious twenty-one points which were designed to enforce uniformity of doctrine and centralized control by the Executive Committee of the Comintern. The consequence of Moscow's domination and the failure to achieve revolutions elsewhere was factionalism. All parties have factions but the intensity of feeling and the bitterness of the dialectical argument between Leninists, Trotskyists and other revisionists was aggravated by a double illusion. On the one hand, high hopes of imminent world revolution were to be disappointed. On the other, expectations that small, dedicated vanguards of the party and the proletariat would provide the anarchists and engineers for further revolutions in the West were to be dashed. Unfulfilled expectations led to disillusion and disillusion to the hunt for scapegoats. Even within the Soviet Union, Stalin was to purge all his old Bolshevik comrades. Nevertheless, both in Russia and abroad, communist leaders had to adjust their policies to suit the circumstances and the environment but they usually took good care to justify their shifts in strategy and tactics with ample references to the tenets of Marxism.

2. ***Party Organization.*** Under the Bolshevik model the party aspired to be a small, tight, highly motivated and disciplined political organization which claimed to be 'the vanguard of the proletariat'. The party worked:
 - a. Overtly to gain power through elections, if the situation in a country was so chaotic that it considered its chances of success to be virtually certain.

 - b. Covertly to seize power by *coup d'état* or revolutionary war. Revolutionary parties were organized on the cellular system with 'cut-outs' to ensure their security. Every effort was made to infiltrate the civil service and key organizations such as the intelligence and security services, the police, the armed services, influential political groups and the media, which helped to form public opinion, both to undermine the government and to obtain intelligence.

1. The First International, or the International Working Men's Association, was founded by Karl Marx in London in 1864 but only lasted for eight years. Trotsky raised his Fourth International in exile in 1936 to promote his theory of permanent revolution.

3. **Monopoly of Power.** The purity of Marxist doctrine was a consideration as important as the purity of religious doctrine in Europe during the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries. There was to be no room for 'centrism' or gradual reform. Dissident factions and their leaders had to be eliminated. The most famous Russian dissident was Trotsky, who continued to promote the Marxist-Leninist view that revolutions should take place more or less simultaneously in all the industrially developed countries in the world to ensure that Marxism would survive after Stalin's shift to 'socialism in one country'. Trotsky was as correct in theory as Stalin was in practice. The former also inveighed against the stifling bureaucracy stemming, he averred, from the chronic shortages in the shops which led to queues which needed policemen to keep order. This he claimed was the starting point of the power of the Soviet bureaucracy². However, the quarrel was as much about power as about policy. Not content with exiling Trotsky in 1929 Stalin sent an assassin to silence him with an ice-pick in Mexico in 1940, indicating the lengths he and the NKVD would go to eliminate opposition to the cause.
4. **Popular Front.** Communists were encouraged to join with other parties in a common cause for as long as they could be of any use to them. A convenient alliance was formed to face fascism in 1934. The Comintern recruited International Brigades to fight for the Republican government in the Spanish Civil War from the left and left centre of the political spectrum.
5. **Economic Penetration.** Aid was to be given on apparently generous terms in return for influence and dependence upon the provider.
6. **Destabilization.** Economic weakness, ethnic and religious problems were all to be exploited to promote a revolutionary situation. Insecure regimes offered especially attractive targets. When Greece and Turkey were vulnerable after the Second World War the Soviet Union attempted to weaken their governments. However, subversion in Iran brought about an Islamic fundamentalist regime rather than a Marxist one. At the lower end of the scale evidence has come to light recently that the Soviet Union subsidized some British trade unions with the aim of destabilizing the Westminster government.
7. **Military Intervention.** The threat or the employment of military forces could be used against weaker neighbouring states to support an indigenous communist movement which would otherwise be too feeble to seize power. The Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe at the end of World War II permitted the imposition of communist governments on the satellites. However, an attempt to occupy Afghanistan was a costly failure.

2. The party's monopoly of power spawned a huge army of *aparatchiks* whose privileges were the envy of the man in the street. At the top, the leaders lived in a style of which Karl Marx would have disapproved. Popular criticism was epitomized by the story of the men who boarded a crowded Moscow bus. As he pushed against the passengers to get inside he kept repeating apologetically, 'Excuse me gentlemen', until the conductor interrupted with a sharp, 'You shouldn't say "gentlemen", you should say "comrades"! 'Oh no', rejoined the man, "comrades" don't take the buses, they ride around in big, black, shiny saloons'.

8. **Techniques.** The methods used by the leadership of an insurgency movement in an industrial society to communicate with subordinate commanders, cells and the supporting organization are similar in principle to those used in the Maoist method, at least in the early stages. Developments in communication technology proceed apace and they will be reflected in the methods insurgents use in future.

THE MAOIST THEORY OF PROTRACTED WAR

A CLASSIC COMMUNIST CONCEPT

1. **Background.** Revolutionary war was originally a communist term, and it is the communists who have thought most about it. Those revolutions which since 1945 have resulted in real change have all used techniques developed by Lenin, Trotsky, Mao Tse Tung and Ho Chi Minh whether or not the resulting regimes have been communist. An explanation of this concept has been included here, because even where revolutions and insurgencies have taken a different line they have drawn heavily on communist precepts. It is described in the barest outline without relation to any particular campaign so as to emphasize only the principles. The concept is described by phases for the sake of clarity, but these phases are in fact a continuous process merging one into another, when appropriate, and adapting readily to meet any particular situation.
2. **Protracted War.** The communists recognize that initially the balance of forces is likely to be in favour of the government they intend to overthrow. The process of changing this balance may be long and difficult and they expect no early success. They stress this by preparing their cadres for a protracted war, thus forestalling any disillusionment that may occur should there be no early victory.
3. **Co-ordination of Political and Military Action.** Revolutionary warfare is waged by the use of carefully co-ordinated political, economic, psychological and military measures. It is recognized that military action will succeed only when it is supported by the people. Mao Tse Tung illustrated the relationship that should exist when he wrote that revolutionaries must be able to move among the people as naturally as fish in water. To achieve this, the communists promote local political objectives which appeal to local aspirations, and they exploit local grievances; they use propaganda and economic pressures designed to mobilize popular support and direct it against the government. Thus revolutionary war is developed as a popular struggle under the closely co-ordinated direction of the local communist party.
4. **The Strategic Defensive Phase.** This first phase is designed to expand the party organization and establish the infrastructure on which the revolution can develop. Communists are infiltrated into key positions, party workers are recruited and trained, and support for the revolutionary movement is generated so that it progressively builds up momentum. The action is at first covert, and preparation may take years: limited force may, however, be used to intimidate and coerce the population with the aim of building up cadres of those actively supporting the struggle. At the right time, this violence expands and is directed more precisely at the government and national institutions, and then more open steps are taken to increase popular support for the revolutionary movement. This can lead to acts of terrorism against progressively more ambitious targets: for example isolated police posts may be attacked, and military stores raided to capture arms and explosives. The use of propaganda and

psychological warfare is intensified and a climate of dissent, civil disobedience and economic unrest is engineered. The main intentions are to increase popular support for the movement, to eliminate or neutralize all opposition, to embarrass and discredit the government and hopefully make it over-react, and to test, prepare and train the party organization for the next and more active phase.

5. ***The Strategic Equilibrium Phase.*** As the party gains in strength, its hold and influence grows over the people, and when a significant part of the population can be expected to provide active support, or at least acquiesce in the expansion of terrorism to guerrilla warfare, the insurgency phase begins. Bases are established, the tempo of recruiting is increased, and regular revolutionary fighting units are formed and trained for their role in the later limited war phase. Minor actions become widespread, and a pattern of conquest emerges with revolutionary domination of areas in which, as they are brought under control, a revolutionary administration is set up. It is at this stage that foreign support is most needed, to procure weapons and equipment, and to provide advisers. The aim throughout this phase is to consolidate popular support, enlarge the areas under control, discredit the government, dishearten its supporters, weaken its forces and demonstrate that the revolutionary movement is capable of providing an alternative and better government.
6. ***The Strategic Offensive Phase.*** The final phase starts when the balance has definitely swung in favour of the revolutionary forces, and the movement assumes the form of a people's war against the government. Mobile warfare begins in which regular fighting units and even formations of divisional size operate from communist controlled areas: this form of limited war still retains characteristics of guerrilla operations. The communists only embark on this final stage after very careful deliberation, and the need for it may not arise if the earlier phases have been successful. Even if beaten on the battlefield, the revolutionary force may prevail if it wins the psychological war.

A CRITIQUE OF CHE GUEVARA'S 'FOCO' THEORY

1. After their successes in the Sierra Maestra mountains of Cuba, Castro and the Cubans encouraged emulation of their achievements in other Latin American countries. Che Guevara offered a sort of blueprint for success based upon the three 'lessons' he had drawn from the Cuban revolutionary war.
2. The first of these so-called lessons was that the forces of the people could defeat the armed forces of the government, despite the fact that this had rarely happened in previous decades.
3. The second lesson was that the natural arena in which to conduct the armed struggle in an underdeveloped area like Latin America was the countryside.
4. The third lesson was that the insurgents did not have to wait until all the conditions for revolution existed, because the insurgents themselves could create revolutionary conditions.
5. Indeed, denying the need for a mass movement or vanguard party (and thus contradicting both Lenin and Mao Tse-tung), Guevara argued that a small, mobile and hard-hitting band of insurgents could act as the focus for the revolution, the '*foco insurreccional*,' or '*foco*', and go on to seize power.
6. That Guevara should have drawn such conclusions from the Cuban experience is perhaps not surprising, given that the insurgents had defeated a government army, had conducted their campaign in the countryside - from the Sierra Maestra mountains the cities appeared to be the graveyard of the insurgent - and had achieved their victory without the help of mass movements or political parties; even the Communist Party did not form an alliance with Castro until the closing stages of the conflict.
7. Understandable or not, the conclusions arrived at were based upon a dangerously selective view of the Cuban experience. Guevara's contention that insurgents could easily defeat government forces made no allowance for the fact that the Cuban insurgents had triumphed against an exceptionally weak government, one that had an incompetent army and had lost the support of its main foreign backer at a crucial moment; the assumption that circumstances would be the same on the mainland was highly questionable.
8. The emphasis Guevara placed upon rural operations grossly underestimated the extent to which Castro's victory had actually depended upon the contribution made by urban groups; the latter not only supplied the Rebel Army with recruits and arms but also prevented Batista from devoting his full resources to the campaign against the Sierra-Meastra based insurgents.

9. Finally, Guevara overlooked the fact that conditions for insurgency already existed in Cuba before the campaign started; the insurgents were not so much creating conditions for change as exploiting them.
10. In many ways, therefore, the 'lessons' projected by Guevara and Castro were a dangerously misleading blueprint for insurgency in the rest of Latin America. Indeed, the emotional and romantic strength of Guevara's doctrine and in particular of the '*foco*' concept were soon highlighted on the Latin American mainland, as insurgent movements influenced by events in Cuba took up arms in the late 1960s against the incumbent regimes. Numerous countries experienced insurgency, notably in Guatemala, Venezuela, Colombia and Bolivia. The weakness of the '*foco*' theory soon showed through and in all these countries the Guevara style revolutions never really got beyond the early stages. Che Guevara himself was killed in Bolivia during October 1967 after a carefully orchestrated confrontation with the Bolivian Security Forces.

CARLOS MARIGHELA AND THE BIBLE OF THE MODERN URBAN INSURGENT¹

1. During the 1960s there was a shift away from rural to urban forms of insurgency in Latin America, largely, but not exclusively, as a result of the failure of Ché Guevara's '*foco*' theories, his death, and the emphatic nature of these defeats. Defeated insurgents, forced back into the urban cities realised that the population explosion at the time, and the 'misery belts' spanned by large cities where unemployed youth were easy prey to new ideologies.
2. In this respect one name is all-important to fully understand this important shift of emphasis, - that of Carlos Marighela, a Brazilian communist who was the leader of the Acao Libertadora Nacional (ALN) movement in Brazil. This movement proved too short lived to be anything other than theoretical, mainly because Carlos Marighela was killed in the course of a bank raid at Sao Paulo in November 1969. Before this he had published what was to become 'the bible' of urban insurgency.
3. *The Minimanual of Urban Guerrilla Warfare* was to aspiring urban insurgents in the 1970s what Mao Tse-tung's *Protracted War* had been to earlier generations of rural revolutionaries, and for much the same reasons. Both provided a practical guide to military campaigning, and both set out in an easily understandable and coherent form the relationship between armed action and revolutionary strategy. Marighela's writings may have been marred by turgid polemics but there was never any disputing their impact.
4. Banned in such countries as France and with an immaculate pedigree provided by the author's 'martyrdom', *The Minimanual of Urban Guerrilla Warfare* was paid the supreme compliment of imitation throughout the world, to the extent that the very word 'minimanual' was incorporated into various emulative tracts, such as those prepared by the Official IRA.
5. *The Minimanual of Urban Guerrilla Warfare* has been a much-misunderstood thesis for some years. In part misunderstanding may have been induced by the very title, because *The Minimanual* was not concerned with urban guerrilla warfare *per se* but with the techniques of urban guerrilla warfare and the role it was to play in developing a wider revolutionary struggle in both town and country. Perhaps using Castro's campaign in Cuba as his model, Marighela set out a concept of warfare that embraced urban violence as the means of weakening the grip of the security forces throughout the Latin American countryside, preparatory to a revolutionary attempt to revive insurgency in rural areas. Marighela's concept of struggle was based on a fusion of rural and urban efforts, both being essential to revolutionary success since alone each would be destroyed by undivided security forces. Moreover, it was a concept that was more in tune with Guevara's '*foco*' concept than is often realized.

1. Acknowledgements to Dr J Pimlott, for background material on Carlos Marighela in his book '*Guerrilla Warfare*'.

6. Tired of the Moscow-directed leadership of the Brazilian Communist Party that stressed that the route to power lay through legal and mass methods, Marighela embraced insurrectionary ideas that were every bit as elitist as those that Guevara had propounded and which were intended to achieve exactly the same result: the polarization of society and a consequent collapse of state power as a direct result of sustained violence on the part of a revolutionary minority.

ABIMAEEL GUZMAN AND THE SHINING PATH¹

1. Sendero Luminoso or, to give its full title, 'The Communist Party of Peru by the Shining Path of Jose Carlos Maiategui and Marxism, Leninism, Maoism and the thoughts of Chairman GONZALO', was founded by Abimael Guzman ('Chairman Gonzalo') in 1970. Guzman, a lecturer and administrator at the University of San Cristobal de Huamanga in Ayacucho, to the south-east of Lima, is a self-confessed Maoist, believing that the Soviet pattern of communism is irrelevant to the needs of the Peruvian peasant class and urban poor.
2. He adopted a Maoist-style revolution, devoting considerable time to the organisation of the masses before creating a People's Guerrilla Army that would, he argued, undermine the authority of the existing government and, eventually, be transformed into a People's Liberation Army. The PLA would spearhead the takeover of political power by defeating Peru's security forces in overt military operations.
3. Guzman based his revolution on the dissatisfied and dispossessed elements of Peruvian society, principally the mestizos (mixed race) who felt alienated by the continuing domination of government by criollos (Spanish descendents), and more particularly the native Indians, traditionally excluded from political life. The Indians did not get the right to vote until 1969. Initially, revolutionary activity - spearheaded by Guzman's students, who went out from the University to live and work among the Indian peasants in Ayacucho province - was concentrated in the rural areas, but by the 1970s many Indians had been forced into the urban centres in a desperate attempt to find employment. Living in shanty towns around, for example, Lima, these rootless peasants provided an ideal revolutionary mass, particularly as the existing government was doing nothing to help them.
4. Thus, although Guzman still stresses Maoism, he has been forced by circumstances to adapt Mao's theories by moving into urban areas, where a mixture of subversion and terrorism, rather than traditional guerrilla warfare, has been developed. In the process, Shining Path has adopted a more cellular structure, creating small leadership cadres within the shanty towns that are not dissimilar to the Bolshevik approach to revolution in Russia before 1917 - ie; the establishment of 'cancer cells' within an urban society, spreading their subversion and preparing for the day of revolution, when they can emerge to offer leadership and direction.
5. This mixture of Maoism in the countryside, urban terrorism and Bolshevik-style subversion, makes Shining Path unique and suggests that such a 'pick-and-mix' approach is the only way that insurgency can hope to succeed in the modern age. Shining Path has the added refinement of an emphasis on Inca traditions in order to attract the Indians.

1. Details provided by Dept of War Studies RMA Sandhurst.

6. Guzman devoted about a decade to the organisation of his revolution, spreading the message via his students in Ayacucho and Apurimac provinces before deciding to initiate guerrilla warfare in May 1980. Since then, a total of five separate 'phases' have been organised - the 'Starting Plan' lasted from May 1980 until January 1981; the 'Plan to Develop the Guerrilla War' from January 1981 until early 1983; the 'Plan to Conquer Support Bases' from early 1983 until late 1986; the 'Plan to Develop the Support Bases' from late 1986 until August 1989; and the 'Plan to Develop Bases in order to Conquer Power' from August 1989 until September 1992. On 12 September 1992, Guzman and part of the Central Committee were captured by Peruvian security forces in Lima. Guzman was displayed, caged like an animal, by the authorities, and later sentenced to life imprisonment, but Shining Path is still active. It is likely to remain so, albeit at reduced levels of effectiveness.
7. The capture of Guzman was a sign of the increased emphasis on counter-insurgency among the Peruvian armed forces. Throughout the 1980s, the army was weak, lacking the finances and political direction needed to counter Shining Path. Corruption, incompetence and widespread abuse of civil rights often led to alienation of the 'middle ground' and doubtless helped Shining Path to spread its influence (not least into the Huallaga valley, with its production of cocoa and links with the drugs trade).
8. In April 1992, President Alberto Fujimori introduced what is known as a 'New Democracy' in Peru, principally by suspending the Constitution, dissolving Congress and giving the armed forces increased powers of arrest, detention and repression. As a result, Shining Path has been set back - most of its original leadership is now under arrest - and the 'middle ground' has veered towards the government, but this is not likely to be permanent. Peru's economy is weak, ordinary people are inevitably affected (and alienated) by the new repressive policies, and the army particularly is gaining too much independent power. It is a classic case of frustration leading a government to presume that strong-arm tactics are the answer to insurgency.

THE DANGERS OF ISLAMISM - REAL AND APPARENT¹

1. In recent years fundamentalist terrorism and subversion have become a growing and significant threat to a wider area of the world than at any time since the Iranian Revolution in 1978. This type of activity threatens stability in several North African states, around the rim of the former Soviet Union, and even some parts of South East Asia.
2. Islamism, more commonly referred to in the Western World as Islamic fundamentalism, is the ideologized and political version of Islam. One of its pervasive characteristics is the sharpness of its verbal criticism of Western secular practices which in the more recent past has been translated into terrorist action against states, institutions and individuals in the West. Beyond the religious distortions which Islamism has thrown up this recent turmoil is really about how people think and live - and not simply about boundaries or economic interests. This is why it affects a whole group of nation states in a swathe across the Middle East and North Africa and its consequences and implications will have global significance.
3. The blanket labelling of Islam as a fundamentalist threat is dangerous, because it plays into the purposes of the Islamists themselves. This is because, first, such stereotype thinking tacitly accepts the assertion of Islamists that they and their followers represent the true Islam, and second, it lends credence to the Islamist insistence that there is a kind of irreconcilable hostility between Islam and "the West" which inevitably makes them arch-enemies.
4. That is not really the case. The Islamists constitute only a small group within the Islamic world. Under some circumstances, however, they can mobilize a sizeable following, as was illustrated by the revolutionary years in Iran and the more recent elections in Algeria. Such circumstances usually involve dissatisfaction with a nation's regime and the political, economic and social conditions under its rule at that time. Such dissatisfaction may be more or less justified, but in almost every instance it is at least based on genuine problems or abuses. Whether an Islamist group, if they possessed power, could really govern better than any secular state is another question. All the current signs are that they could not retain power for long.
5. Despite its anti-Western rhetoric, in political practice Islamism is directed primarily against the existing state authorities which the fundamentalists hope to topple and supplant. The arguments they use to that end, however, are largely anti-Western in nature. Just as the late Shah of Iran was labelled a "lackey of the Americans," an existing secular government is stamped as a "Lackey of the West". As such, it is often characterized by Islamic extremists as not a truly Muslim government, but rather as a "jahiliya" regime.

1. Based loosely on an article in Swiss Review of World Affairs Sep 92 by Arnold Hottinger.

6. The term jahiliya - the "time of ignorance" - is used in Islam to designate the era before the appearance of the Prophet Mohammed. This is symptomatic of the Islamist tendency to see themselves as the only true Muslims and thus to claim that they represent the real Islam.
7. In doing so Muslims are articulating deep-seated resentments prevalent throughout the Third World today, especially among Europe's closest neighbours. These resentments are linked to the superimposition of Western power - military, economic, cultural, technological and ideological - which non-European peoples have experienced since the beginning of the 19th century and continue to experience today.
8. Many Muslims have found those Western influences acceptable as long as there was hope that they would ultimately bring their country prosperity and prestige. But doubts about this have steadily increased with the years: in the Arab world following the Six Day War (1967), and in Iran quite suddenly when the economic boom collapsed in 1978. It came to seem progressively more improbable that the path of Westernization, would really lift the societies of the Middle East to a level comparable to that of the West.
9. As long as such a discrepancy exists between the actual situation and the divinely given claim to superiority, there is bound to be a more or less diffuse malaise in the collective Muslim psyche, which intensifies when prospects for real change appear slight or non-existent.
10. The urgent desire for a change in existing conditions is thus motivated not only by the desire for a better life in this world, but also by the religiously based drive to make of the Muslim community once again the successful, divinely blessed community it once was, and should be according to the Muslims' own view of the world.
11. Such a doctrine presents a danger primarily to more or less Westernized Muslim governments and elites. It aims first and foremost at taking power domestically, in an internal arena which its advocates regard as corrupted by the West. It should also be recognized that Islamist ideology as a political opposition force makes promises it could hardly keep if its advocates were to come to power. The inadequacy, and hence exploitability, of the Muslim countries is caused by objective facts which have been present for many years and which cannot be altered merely by adopting an ideological dogma that purports to be the "true" Islam.
12. Fundamentalists insist that their doctrine will change people and that these altered individuals will then be able to approach the world around them differently. So far, alas there is little sign of such internal change in Iran or Sudan - or in Pakistan, where attempts are also being made to introduce a fundamentalist - style Islamic state.
13. It will no doubt remain difficult to bring about a genuine change in "the hearts and minds of men" as long as the Islamists insist on equating Islam with the body of religious laws known as the Shari'a, formulated by religious scholars in the Early Middle Ages in keeping with their understanding of Islamic texts and traditions. The attempt to live in accordance with this mediaeval code results in a strict formalism; that is, the formal

fulfilment of finely detailed religious prescriptions and proscriptions from a time long past - a mode of existence hardly likely to alter the hearts and behaviour of people as to make them better suited to meet the challenge of modern life.

14. As soon as Islamists come to power, the unconditional acceptance of the Shari'a as a legal guide turns into a weakness. In some cases they are forced to find formal excuses for circumventing religious law and merely fulfilling it *pro forma*. In other cases, religious law can constrain the life of individual families and entire societies, imprison their intellectual horizons in rigid structures, thereby making it impossible for the Islamists and the people they rule to create a modern state.
15. As internal tensions in Islamist-ruled countries grow, the danger increases of government-sponsored terrorism or of some rash military action. Such actions are more likely to occur in the area immediately around the country concerned - eg; the Gulf region for Iran and Egypt for Sudan. So far, these states lack the military means to become active over greater distances but this could change. Their leaders are aware of this limitation which is confirmed by the fact that Muslim and Islamist countries have failed to intervene in any significant way in the Bosnian conflict.
16. The fact that close to 12 million Muslim guest workers live - and will continue to live - in Europe and the United States, could also be a source of some danger. Only a very small percentage of these guest workers and immigrants are Islamists. But the number could increase rapidly if these workers are handled badly. Exposure to repeated injustice will drive them into the arms of the fundamentalists. In this sense, what applies to the Middle East also applies to Europe. The worse matters become for the Muslim population objectively, and the more hopeless their European existence seems to them subjectively, the more easily they will fall victim to the lure of Islamism. Most security services in the industrialized nations are not yet properly equipped to differentiate accurately between harmless foreign workers and members of potentially hostile islamic groups.
17. To the extent that Islamism constitutes a danger to any state, the best way to counter it is to understand the intellectual and organizational mechanisms in which the Islamists operate. Effective counter-measures must begin at that point because ideas - even those that distort reality - can only be fought by other ideas. Helping to eliminate the existing abuses and inequities is the price that has to be paid for deflecting the danger of Islamism.

CHAPTER 2

THE CONDUCT OF INSURGENCY

SECTION 1 - THE ABIDING FEATURES

1. **Basic Tenets.** All successful insurgents and those who have come near to success, have, consciously or not, subscribed to certain basic tenets. Like any other tenets, such as the principles of war, they should be applied rationally to suit the circumstances of the society and the political circumstances of the day. They are:
 - a. A cause.
 - b. Leadership.
 - c. Popular support.
 - d. Organization.

2. **Cause.** In the past the cause for which the leadership has normally persuaded its insurgents to risk their lives and the population to provide support, sometimes at risk to life, liberty and property, has been a valid one. It has usually been based on generally perceived grievances in the political, social and economic fields, and was sufficiently emotive to appeal to the imagination and fired supporters with enough enthusiasm to fight for this cause. Today the same situation prevails; if the cause appears to be reasonable and valid, then this could be the basis for an incipient insurgency to develop. However, with the growth of communications and information technology coupled with the growing disparity between rich and poor in many countries, there will be occasions when a small group of dissatisfied persons consider that they have nothing to lose by aggressive and violent action to publicise their desperate position. Sometimes this is cause enough to embarrass the authorities into remedial action or suppression and hence become the basis for a potential insurgency.

3. **Leadership.** The cause is best publicised and personified by a charismatic leader who can inspire his followers, convert the uncommitted and at least command the respect, and certainly the fear, of those who support the government. He or she must possess the sharpness of intellect to enable them to determine and define long term political and strategic aims and the nimbleness of wit and wisdom to adjust the immediate strategy and tactics to achieve them. This also requires considerable military skills. Mao Tse-tung, Ho Chi Minh and Tito all exercised fine judgement in when to attack and when to bide their time. An insurgent leader needs a hard and ruthless streak behind the facade of cheerful *bonhomie* he or she must wear for political and propaganda purposes. There will be rivalries for leadership which need to be dealt with firmly to survive and a leader must have the strength of character to impose decisions taken, especially when the insurgency is in its early stages. There have been instances where the leader of an insurgency does not appear to have the qualities of leadership normally associated with such individuals. This may be because the leader is not generally known within the country or because there is a lack of understanding of his or her motivations. As a rule of thumb the connection between cause and

leadership is a dynamic one. If the cause is sound, the leader need not be so charismatic, if the cause seems weak or divisive then the leader needs to be strong and effective. It should also be recognised that any analysis of cause could, by its nature be subjective, and perceived through 'western eyes'

4. **Popular Support.** The cause and the leader must appeal to as wide an audience as possible. The insurgent political wing will endeavour to enlist the support of as much of the population as possible irrespective of age, sex or class. Neutrals are neither recognized nor tolerated by insurgents. They must be persuaded or coerced to join the cause. Some may have to be murdered to persuade the waverers. Popular support is not only important from a political point of view but is essential to the provision of logistic support, to the development of an intelligence network and to the creation of a protective security screen around the insurgents' clandestine organization.
5. **Organization.** To be successful any insurgency must have some organization in order to be able to function properly - and to respond appropriately to the many aspects of an insurgency. At the outset of any insurgency organization may not be the first priority and with few hard core members there may be less need for detailed organizations. As the insurgency develops however, organization into groups/cells/companies etc; - will be vital, both to protect members and equipment and also to expand sufficiently to take more adherents to the cause. Once a sufficient level of popular support has been achieved, organization will be vital to coordinate all the various activities of an insurgency and to start the process of providing a credible alternative to the established authorities.

SECTION 2 - THE CONTEXT OF AN INSURGENCY

6. **Suiting the Strategy to the Circumstances.** Insurgency is essentially an empirical art. Existing experience is adapted to suit particular situations. Lenin, Mao Tse-tung and Ho Chi Minh propounded strategies based on Hegel and Marx which they applied with realistic flexibility and pragmatism to seize power in Russia, China and Vietnam. In Italy the Red Brigades were inspired by Marxist philosophy in their attempt to create a 'revolutionary proletariat' to overthrow the legitimate government. Since the Marxists took some trouble to rationalise their system of revolutionary war they are worth studying. Many insurgents copied their ideas, but few met with much success. In the latter part of this century these ideas have become less fashionable with the demise of communism although there is still much an insurgent can learn about the tactics of an insurgency by an examination of previous anti-imperialist campaigns. It is also relevant to understand why some insurgencies have failed in order to appreciate the art of suiting a strategy to the circumstances of the day.
7. **A Revolutionary Situation.** In the context of massive discontent and a weak and discredited government which cannot rely on the loyalty of its security forces a skilled insurgent leader who has prepared the way with a seemingly valid cause, a party with a cellular organization, and a capability to apply ruthless methods to put plans into effect may achieve results relatively quickly: Lenin in 1917 and Hitler in 1933 both seized power in putsches. On a smaller scale, King Farouk of Egypt's regime was ripe for General Neguib and Colonel Nassers' *coup d'etat* in the wake of the 'Black Saturday' riots in Cairo in early 1952.

8. **War of Attrition.** Against a government which commands a wide measure of support and can rely on the majority of its security forces the insurgent must look to a protracted war of attrition, perhaps on the communist model, appropriately modified to the political and geographical environment. Political policy and military action are closely coordinated to support each other. The aim of the attritional approach is gradually to erode the will of the government's supporters at home to continue the struggle and to persuade public opinion amongst its foreign allies that the cause is hopeless, and a waste of life and resources. Once such a mood sets in, artful propaganda and large scale anti-war demonstrations can be expected to force allied governments to weaken their support.
9. **Support for an Insurgency.** At the strategic and operational level, experience has shown that deception has often been a major weapon in the armoury of an insurgency - particularly those that emanate from a totalitarian base; this would include religious zealots in a wider interpretation of the term totalitarian. The capacity of a population in a modern democracy to support a counter insurgency for long is at best precarious. The mixture of propaganda and compulsion which a totalitarian form of insurgency can offer, in order to extract vital support, is normally not available to a democratic state. Thus when military operations, government controls, and restrictions drag on for long periods popular support is bound to decline. It has been quoted that "unless it is severely provoked, or unless the war succeeds fast, democracy cannot chose this method as an instrument of policy."
10. **Deception.** For a totalitarian regime conducting or supporting insurrection in other states, the ideological and propaganda effort required can be established easily in order to gain the sympathy and support of the outside world while at the same time deceiving others of the true nature of their involvement with insurgency. By the same token deception can be used to project a false picture of the origins and character of the insurrection and to create a myth of systematic war crimes by the state authorities. An example of this form of strategic deception is given in Annex A to this Chapter.

SECTION 3 - FACTORS AFFECTING AN INSURGENCY

11. **General.** The factors which affect an insurgency can be as important as the principles of the insurgency itself and will contribute significantly to the end results if carefully applied. The factors are:-
 - a. Protracted War.
 - b. Choice of Terrain.
 - c. Intelligence.
 - d. Establishment of an Alternative Society.
 - e. External Support.
 - f. Concurrent Activity.

12. **Protracted War.** Although a weak government may fall quite quickly to a well organized rebellion, or even overnight to a *coup d'état*, a strong government may only be defeated by a war of attrition. Time is on the side of the insurgent. Cadres must be indoctrinated to expect a long war and to display patience and endurance. The struggle will generally take place in two environments, the town and the countryside although insurgent activity will occur in both town and countryside once it has become firmly established. The emphasis to be placed on each will depend on the size and nature of the territory and where the insurgents' strength initially lies.
- a. *Rural.* The rural scene lends itself to the gradual occupation of a country, for example Mao Tse-tung in China and Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam. The insurgency leader must be prepared to play a long game, withdrawing when necessary to avoid an unnecessary defeat to keep his forces in being. He should have enough flexibility of mind to reconsider his immediate strategy while keeping his longer term aims constantly in mind.
 - b. *Urban.* The urban guerrilla's inability to occupy territory can be partially overcome by establishing 'no-go' areas in cities or in relatively safe zones domiciled by his fellow countrymen, co-religionists or other sympathizers. He relies more on war-weariness, economic privation and the inability of the government to suppress terrorism than on winning an overall military victory to achieve his aims.
13. **Choice of Terrain.** While insurgents can operate anywhere, either on their own account or in support of a protracted insurgency, a force which wishes to survive and perhaps burgeon into an army capable of formal conventional operations must make the best strategic use of space or of the cover provided by thick jungle or high mountains to force the security forces to fight as far away as possible from their bases. '..... without the ability to seize and hold territory or to win quick victory, space and time became weapons rather than goals'¹. Proximity to the border of a friendly country will offer the insurgents a source of supply and sanctuary. While Mao Tse-tung initially relied on the vast tracts of western China, Castro used the Sierra Maestra of south-eastern Cuba. In the smaller territories of Cyprus and Palestine; in the former, EOKA used the towns as well as the Troodos Mountains to hide in, and, in the latter, both Arab and Zionist guerrilla groups used the Judean and Samarian hills as well as the urban labyrinths of Jerusalem and the towns on the coastal plain.
14. **Space to Operate.** In another sense a terrorist may make use of the neutral or friendly support of an urban population to act as his 'space or cover' to carry out his operations; - a fish swimming in the friendly water to paraphrase Mao Tse Tung loosely. This form of activity may lead to the mobilization of the urban population in favour of the insurgency. It could in the short term lead to the creation of no go areas, however, these then tend to focus the attention of the authorities on to that particular area and in turn could limit the space and cover needed for terrorist activity.

1. John Shy and Thomas W Collier, *Revolutionary War, In, Makers of Modern Strategy*, edited by Peter Paret, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986.

15. **Intelligence.** The best source of insurgent intelligence is the sympathiser who works in some kind of government employment, especially in a job connected directly with the security forces. The police are a particular target for insurgent infiltration². Information from double agents provides not only good target intelligence but timely warning of security force counter-action. The media may also contribute to the insurgent's information gathering organization, either inadvertently, through naivety or intentionally.
16. **Establishment of an Alternative Society.** The insurgents will aim to impose an alternative society. Their motives may be:
- a. **Nationalist.** An emotive call to patriotism to replace a government which is not considered to be ruling in the country's best interests. The insurgents may wish to avoid a social upheaval. Equally, such a cause may disguise the insurgents' real aims of enforcing a change in social as well as in foreign policy once the rebels have seized power.
 - b. **Religious.** The remoulding of society in accordance with more fundamentalist, or as some authorities prefer, radical religious lines, for example, Ayatollah Khomeini's revolution in Iran. During the Seventeenth Century English Civil War extreme Puritans and Levellers within the Parliamentary ranks sought to impose a strict religious observance on this country.
 - c. **Political.** To utilise a philosophy diametrically opposed to that in use by existing government. This involves a clash between the left and right wings of the political spectrum. First, propaganda will be used to promote desirable changes and then society will be reconstituted in areas occupied by the insurgents. Government officials will be forced to flee or be subjected to the summary justice of 'people's courts'. Although Marxism still has its adherents, the eclipse of the Communist Party in the former USSR has detracted from its appeal. Communist governments have not only fallen in Eastern Europe but also in Central America, where the Sandinistas have been voted out of office. However Sendero Luminoso is still operating in Peru, even after the capture of its leader in September 1992³ and the Khymer Rouge are still at large in Cambodia.
 - d. **Power for it's Own Sake.** The acquisition of power and control within a region has historically been a motive for removing the existing state or regional authorities. Usually based on tribal groupings, an authority is toppled in order for that group to obtain power and then operate the levels of government to its own advantage. Saddam Hussein in Iraq is a modern example of this form of motive as are the current leaders in what remains of Rwanda. There are also many examples from the past; China in the days of the Warlords and Ethiopia, Somalia and Sierra Leone in modern day Africa.

2. During the Cyprus emergency EOKA gained useful information from Greek Cypriot policemen who either sympathised with Enosis or were pressured into cooperation with the threat of murder.

3. See Annex F to Chapter 1 for a brief account of Abimael Guzmán and the Shining Path.

- e. *Criminals and Mafias.* Criminality exist in all states, whether they are well governed or not. What differentiates some from others is the degree and extent of criminality. In some states the prevalence of crime, corruption and criminal groupings is so long standing that these can seriously destabilise the cohesion of the state. While the defeat of criminals and mafia style groups is, properly, the responsibility of the government and the police forces, this type of counter criminal activity may well form part of any future counter insurgency campaign and suitable plans may be needed to cater for this additional requirement.
17. **External Support.** Revolutions seldom succeed without the help of a sympathetic power in terms of diplomatic support, the supply of weapons and training assistance. There are some notable exceptions; for example, the Chinese Communist victory over the Kuomintang owed little or nothing to the USSR. An insurgent movement must appeal to popular sentiment abroad and try to raise sympathy for its cause in the forum of the United Nations and such regional organizations as the Arab League and the Organization of African States. Some foreign governments may be counted upon to give the insurgents open or clandestine support. Others, more hostile to the insurgents, must be constrained from helping the legitimate government by appealing over their heads to the people. Encouraging political parties, friendly trade unions and other pressure groups to organize demonstrations, strikes and petitions, and the media to promote the rebel cause are just some of the ways of applying pressure.
18. **Concurrent Activity.** The insurgent leadership will aim to wage insurgency on political, economic, propaganda and military fronts simultaneously. While foreign support is enlisted for the insurgency every effort is made to discredit the government at home and abroad. The military struggle will be conducted in the towns and the countryside. Isolated acts of terrorism will be used where the insurgency is weakest. All activity is designed to overturn and embarrass the state to the point where the collapse of authority and control occurs.

SECTION 4 - WEAK POINTS WITHIN AN INSURGENCY

General

19. There are usually many potential weak points within an insurgency that are vulnerable to some form of attack and disruption by those who plan to oppose them. These, of course, will vary from one insurrection to another, but some general pointers are given in the following paragraphs. These potential weaknesses are particularly apparent in the early days of any campaign.

Secrecy

20. Any group who plan to use force and violence to prosecute their aims requires to adopt a secretive and conspiratorial approach to their planning and actions. This, in the first instance, can give some form of glamour and attractiveness to those who may join, but it can soon become counter productive once an insurgency starts. Too much secrecy can affect the freedom of action, so necessary for an insurgency, lower confidence in other similar insurgent groups and could lead to serious misunderstanding within the organisation. There is a balance to be struck between a too secretive

and clandestine approach to insurgency actions, and the need to avoid undue attention by the authorities, or rival groups.

21. One of the ways to avoid the worst effects of this is to split the organisation into military and political groups, as in the case of Sinn Fein and the Provisional IRA. This could overcome the problems of the more public (political) aspects of an insurgency, and the more clandestine (military) aspects. Even this has potential disadvantages in propaganda terms, and there could easily be many more potential weak points which are described in subsequent paragraphs which would not stand public scrutiny or concerted pressure from a state authority. However excessive secrecy within an organisation can hinder the discussion of ideas, plans and projects.

Gaining Support

22. This follows from the adoption of the most appropriate cause on which to base the insurgency. If the cause is good and has appeal the insurgency should thrive, - if not it will wither rapidly. Various groupings within the country may have different views and outlooks requiring different techniques to gain their support - and indeed possible compromises on the overall aim. Indifference, sloth and neutral attitudes also have to be overcome, perhaps by use of the weapon of intimidation. In summary the actual business of gaining popular support, for the cause can be a difficult and sensitive period in the early life of an insurgency. Publicity, whether good or bad, can materially improve the prospect of gaining popular support.

Secure Operating Base

23. A serious difficulty can be experienced in the choice of a secure base from which to operate an insurgency. If the base is too far away from the centres of normal activity it is potentially secure, but out of touch with the people and vulnerable to isolation. Too close to the centres of activity make the insurgency open to observation and perhaps infiltration, and closer also to the machinery of state control.
24. Proximity to border regions can often prove useful in that a temporary, or perhaps permanent bases can be set up beyond the authority of the state, and yet safe enough to avoid the unwanted suspicious of neighbouring authority.
25. Timely resolute action to locate an insurgency base can cause serious disruption to an insurgency movement, even if this activity is not entirely successful.

Funding

26. All insurgencies require funding to a greater or lesser extent. Weapons, ammunition, and expertise have to be paid for and unless the insurgency is backed by a friendly nation or individuals who can provide support not a great deal will happen. Taking part in criminal activities, bank raids and protection could help and these could attract publicity albeit unwelcome, for, the cause; All these activities are generally intermittent in their application and effect.

27. Controlling the rackets and the transportation of drugs has proved a more enduring source of income but brings the movement into contact with unreliable and vulnerable groups who could attract undue attention from the authorities. Furthermore the big providers of funding may also have their political price which could distort and affect the overall aim of an insurgency.
28. Lack of sufficient funds could limit the scope of an insurgency and inhibit its prospects of success - a weakness that the state authorities could utilise to their advantage if it is recognised. Financial control and regulation to limit the movement and exchange of goods and funds could be applied - particularly if an insurgency is being funded from beyond the state borders.

The Problem of Changing Aims

29. This is not so much of a problem at the start of an insurgency but has a potentially damaging effect once an insurgency has been in operation for some time. Actions and events during the earlier part of an insurgency may change the outlook of some groups within the insurgency and cause some disquiet about the overall aim. A series of successes by the state authorities, or some errors made by insurgent groups, could cause some to question the cause or even challenge the leadership of the insurgency.
30. A seemingly generous compromise offered by the state to the insurgents could also cause division within an insurgency. At any event the insurgent leaders may have to apply ruthless measures to ensure that unity and secrecy are preserved. Changing aims, even as a result of a considered and agreed line of action can cause potential trouble for all insurgents. Here secrecy and lack of discussion can cause further misunderstanding and suspicion which could lead to defections, punishments and loss of confidence in the insurgency as a whole.

Setting the Pace

31. Given that insurgents, if they have planned properly, can control the start of operations, and have some measure of control over subsequent activity, it is surprising to note that in many insurgencies have failed to capitalise on opportunities, or have allowed the pace of events and scope of activities to be dictated by the state authorities. Momentum is lost, the strategic initiative returns to the state and the insurgent organisation exposed at a vulnerable and premature point. Sometimes an insurgency can overlook the fact that the state authorities can also recognise their own strengths and weaknesses and make moves to improve the position at the same time as the insurgency is starting. This can complicate insurgent planning. The control of the pace and timing of insurgency operations is vital to the success of any campaign. The difficulty for the insurgent is that he may not have the information needed, or the political/military capability to make the appropriate decisions at the right time as an insurgency escalates. All of this requires training and experience and the insurgent leadership may have to accept some reverses in the overall campaign before sufficient experience is gained to judge both the timing and pace of events to gain most advantage.

Informers⁴

32. While informers have sometimes been infiltrated into criminal or insurgent cells, it is far more common to achieve success by 'turning' someone who is already in the organization or is an auxiliary who has contact with them (eg; the couriers, cut-outs or suppliers, who are the links between clandestine cells and their accomplices among the public). 'Turning' is the intelligence term for persuading such a person to become an informer. This may be best achieved by spotting a participant whose heart is not in it or who, for personal or family reasons wants to 'get off the hook'. Pressure to turn may be exercised by arousing fear of prosecution or by offering rewards, perhaps large enough to enable informers to go far away, with their families, to start a new life with a new identity. An essential feature is that informers are made confident that they and their families will be protected against retribution. There is nothing more demoralizing to insurgents than the fear that people inside their movement or trusted supporters among the public are giving information to the state authorities. They will try to stifle it by ruthless exemplary punishments, but this could increase the desire of any waverers to get off the hook: to avoid being caught between state surveillance and insurgent reprisal. Informers and those who 'turn' have always been singularly dangerous to any insurgent movement.

4. *'Terrorism in an Unstable World'*. Dr R Clutterbuck.

STRATEGIC DECEPTION. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE MODEL 1964-72¹

1. Although only one factor among many, North Vietnamese deceptions made an important contribution to their eventual triumph. They included: the downplaying of the communist character of the North Vietnamese regime and its revolutionary goals and the promotion in its place of a nationalist liberation myth; the concealment of northern leadership and invasion; the creation of belief in a possible compromise settlement; the denial of communist atrocities and the propagation in their place of unfounded allegations of American genocide or systematic violations of the rules of war - 'guilt transfer' to American shoulders of all the blame for the horrors of conflict.
2. Unlike the experiences of more recent major examples, where deception operations have usually been aimed covertly at the opposing leader to distort his vision of reality and thus undermine his judgement, the North Vietnamese more often addressed deception overtly to mass audiences. In South Vietnam, the principal instrument as well as victim was the National Liberation Front. In the West, especially in America, deception began with the political left and quickly spread to the liberal establishment who, in due course, gained influence over mainstream opinion.
3. The choice of target illustrated how well the communists understood the vulnerabilities of a democracy engaged in a protracted conflict of apparent peripheral importance: the 'essential domino' - American public opinion - was recognised as the key to victory in the field because once this domino was knocked down, the United States Government was powerless to continue the fight.
4. The 'transmission belts' for these deceptive messages were ubiquitous, but the main ones were diplomatic, the global propaganda network controlled by the International Department, CPSU, the fronts set up in South Vietnam and in the West to promote North Vietnam's interests and, through them, and through professional agents of influence such as the international news media. The New York Times's acceptance of Indochina Resource Centre material was a classic, if relatively unimportant and routine, example of a transmission belt in action.
5. The character of counter-insurgency warfare, the 'imperialist' connotation of American involvement and the war's protracted and highly political nature, rather easily stimulated traditional liberal guilt over the use of force, particularly in the Third World. As the conflict wore on without prospect of early victory, this latent guilt may have created a susceptibility to the themes of American genocide and lawlessness. Certainly, once the anti-war movement was in motion, even activists who were not

1. Professor Guenter Lewy - University of Massachusetts. *Deception and Revolutionary Warfare in Vietnam*. The dates chosen are from the 'Tonkin Gulf Resolution in 1964 after which US Forces moved into Vietnam on a large scale; 1972 was the date in which the last US military units were withdrawn from Vietnam.

communist sympathisers, might have felt subconsciously that the greater good of ending the war justified the lesser evil of uncritical acceptance of horror stories of doubtful veracity which might nevertheless be politically effective.

6. Taken as a whole, Hanoi's deception operations were relatively easy because they delivered messages their intended victims wanted to hear. But the complex organisation and immense perseverance necessary to penetrate the targets were remarkable: the war may have been unique for the sheer scale of its deception.

CHAPTER 3

INSURGENT TACTICS

SECTION 1 - BACKGROUND

Introduction

1. **General.** The essentially violent and destructive nature of insurgencies has been described in preceding chapters. Any insurgency does, however, usually move on two concurrent complementary paths, one destructive and the other constructive. Destructive actions are clearly aimed at overthrowing the established order and creating a climate of collapse in the states' authority. The constructive effort, meanwhile, goes towards creating an organization which can replace the established order at a suitable moment. Even when the insurgency appears to renounce positive organization and formalised political structures there will usually be some political group with the foresight to anticipate the impending vacuum and make plans to fill it.
2. **Destructive Activity.** This type of insurgent activity splits into four main types:
 - a. Subversion.
 - b. Sabotage of the economic framework, where this suits the insurgency.
 - c. Terrorism and guerilla activity.
 - d. Large scale operations.
3. **Constructive Activity.** Where an insurgency is planned in the context of a protracted war, - or where, in the more classic case of total revolution in a large state, the whole apparatus of state control needs changing. An insurgency movement would seek to educate and improve the position of those in less well developed areas, both urban and rural, in order to show the practical benefits of joining the insurgency. There will also be a need to:
 - a. Create and develop areas for subversive activity.
 - b. Form cadres for training (of all types).
 - c. Organise alternative police and military units to take over in due course.
 - d. Create administrative machinery to supplant the bureaucracy of the state.

SECTION 2 - SUBVERSION

Background

4. Subversive activity is designed to undermine the political, economic and military strength of a state, short of the use of force. However, even non-violent activities may be exploited to the stage of provoking violent countermeasures which can be denounced as an over-reaction by the authorities, and used to discredit the government.
5. Subversion is more effective in an undemocratic country and in a society where there are genuine grievances, wide disparities between rich and poor, and where ethnic, cultural and religious divisions exist in an atmosphere of intolerance. A democratic society could have less to fear, although the propagandist may exploit its freedoms of speech and association, together with a flourishing uncensored mass media to gain the maximum publicity for his cause.

Subversive Activity

6. This can take many forms, some of which constitute legitimate political or industrial activity where the intention to undermine the strength of a state is not present. Examples of subversive activity include:
 - a. *Activity in the Political Field.* An insurgency may be expected to attempt to penetrate existing political parties and organizations at all levels, and to develop front organizations. Meetings, rallies or processions may be staged, the aims and nature of which may well be legal but which nevertheless can have the appearance of challenging and defying the authority of government. Tactics of this kind may be accompanied by pressure on the threatened government to reduce the use of its armed forces in counter-insurgency operations.
 - b. *Penetration of the Machinery of Government.* An insurgency will seek to win supporters from inside the organs of state control, in order to use them to either find out about future plans, or to wreck and hinder future planning. Examples of this are leaked correspondence, knowledge of ministerial movements, police and military organisations and plans, protective arrangements and any other economic and financial information. These are all useful for an insurgency to exploit as appropriate - particularly in the early days of an insurrection.
 - c. *Propaganda.* Publishing information or misinformation detrimental to the government or the security forces. Also originating and spreading rumours designed to undermine trust and confidence in the government, and possibly, with stores of atrocities, sowing the seeds of hate against the forces of law and order and capitalizing on security forces' errors.
 - d. *Passive Resistance.*
 - (1) Forcing or encouraging withdrawal of labour from public utilities and services.

- (2) Obstruction of the law.
- (3) Sit-ins in public places.
- (4) Fomenting dissatisfaction amongst workers, peasants and students, inciting them to demonstrate and strike.

Disruption

7. This sort of activity can involve:
 - a. The fomenting of riots to cause disruption in order to provoke the authorities into some form of overreaction.
 - b. The intimidation of local and provincial leaders, magistrates, civil and military personnel, businessmen and leaders of the local community.
 - c. Raising money by blackmail and intimidating methods involving the control of rackets, protection and associated illegal activity.

SECTION 3 - SABOTAGE

Categories of Sabotage

8. Sabotage is disruptive activity designed to further the interests of the insurgency. It may be active, in which case individuals and bodies of men place themselves outside the law, and set out to disrupt important services, functions or industrial processes by violent means: or it may be passive in which case damage is engineered by omission or neglect:
 - a. *Active Sabotage.* Targets may be selected at random for their political or economic impact, or they may fit into a wider tactical plan with the aim of increasing general confusion and tying down troops in the static defence of installations. In such circumstances, communications sites and stores depots are a favourite target, because they are generally widely dispersed and thus make large demands on manpower to guard them; because their disruption hampers the authorities, and because the results of the damage caused can be readily perceived by the public without causing exceptional hardship to themselves. Other suitable targets are bridges, roads, railways, telephone lines, military supply dumps, sewers, power lines, water supplies and transport. Targets whose destruction might cause mass unemployment and thereby lose the goodwill of the people are in general avoided.
 - b. *Passive Sabotage.* Passive sabotage is generally aimed at causing disorder and disruption by deliberate error, contrived accident, absenteeism or strikes. The target can be industry, public services, supplies or troops. Although isolated instances of passive sabotage can be effective, for example an important telephone exchange could be made inoperative, it is more usual for action to be planned on a wide scale through political front organizations.

- c. *Sabotage of Data.* Although not yet known to have been utilised before, the current prevalence of computers in business and the growing number of industrial systems controlled by computers (power stations, emergency services), has enhanced the potential for active or passive sabotage in this area. This can be easily done by the insertion of suitable computer viruses into a network to cause delay, loss of memory, amendment, and sometimes complete dysfunction. While this may require careful planning to work effectively, the destructive dividend for the insurgency of this potential has grown enormous in states where the computer has become part of every day life.

SECTION 4 - TERRORISM

9. **General.** Terrorism is a technique, - 'killing one to frighten ten thousand' - is used by revolutionaries, insurgents and by political activists of the left or right for their own purposes. Terrorism may be defined as 'the use of indiscriminate violence to intimidate the general majority of people in a state to accept the political changes advocated by the insurgents. Terror is one of the insurgents' main weapons to preserve their security by frightening individuals from passing information to the security forces. Religion may also be used to control individual behaviour through fear of ostracism or as an instrument of terror to justify murder in this world and eternal damnation in the next. Terror can be used tactically to provide publicity for the insurgent movement, induce or sense of insecurity and discredit the authorities. The last two aims may be achieved by over-stretching the security forces so that they are manifestly unable to provide effective protection for prominent citizens, the public and property, and by provoking the government and its security forces to over-react in response to some outrageous act of terrorism.
10. **Intimidation.** Intimidation, as a means of existing social and political pressure can take many forms but is normally used in one of three separate ways: to extort support from the uncommitted, to demoralize those who are loyal to the state authorities and to maintain discipline within the ranks of the insurgency movement.
11. **Terrorism Against Loyal and Uncommitted Citizens.** The target may be an individual or a group, and the victims are often citizens to whom the ordinary inhabitants of the state look for leadership and example, such as politicians, professional men, and industrial, commercial and union leaders. This terrorism may take the form of beatings, kidnappings, blackmail, mutilation, assassination, arson or bombing. Threats of terrorism may be used to coerce individuals into obeying insurgent instructions.
12. **Terrorism to Enforce Obedience and Discipline.** Absolute loyalty is an inflexible principle, and terror is used to ensure obedience. In the case of the individual, it is made clear that even though a person has been forcibly drafted into the movement, their defection is punishable by death or mutilation, and even if they should escape to an area free from insurgency control, retribution could be expected from their family. In areas which are under insurgency control, terrorism may be directed against sections of the population who, because of race, class, origins, wealth or employment, are judged to be pro-government. Insurgent leaders usually endeavour

to involve the local inhabitants in acts of terrorism, thus ensuring their association with the uprising.

13. ***Interfactional Strife.*** Terrorism used in interfactional strife is an extension of that already discussed, the aim being to drive members of an opposing faction out of a particular area, thus more closely identifying those who remain with the movement. This can be a double edged weapon in that it may result in a backlash from the opposing faction that could have a deleterious effect on the conduct of the insurgency at a time when more support is needed. It can also be exploited by the state authorities in propaganda terms. At any event the weapon of interfactional strife if carried too far can quickly result in the loss of control by an insurgency group and thus allow the authorities the opportunity to regain the initiative on the backs of an outraged community.
14. ***Proxy Operations.*** Countries wishing to press a cause but without incurring the risk of war use terrorist groups whose links with the government are difficult to prove. Iran and Syria back Hezbollah and Amal respectively. Some states use assassination squads to liquidate exiles opposed to their regimes who have fled abroad, for example from Libya.

SECTION 5 - FUND RAISING

General

15. ***Early Signs.*** An indicator of an incipient insurgency may be attempts to raise funds. In the early stages, this will probably be covert and criminal, e.g. armed or bank robbery. Subsequently, the political organization within the insurgency will take on the task of extracting aid from well intentioned, charitable and philanthropic organizations, and from sympathizers abroad. The more violent methods may continue, the extorting of ransom from individuals (kidnapping), or from governments (hijacking), and perhaps the enforced levying of taxes on intimidated sections of the population although this would run counter to the aim of constructive activity. See also Chapter 2 for aspects of fund raising which could give rise to weaknesses within the insurgency.
16. ***Politics and Organized Crime.*** There are some criminal organizations whose main aim is the control of a profitable, illegal trade, such as the narcotics traffic, for example, the Colombian Cali drug cartel¹. Use can be made of money laundered from terrorist sponsored rackets, 'front' firms and even stock markets to finance an insurrection in pursuit of their political ends. Some organizations may become so powerful politically that they may be in a position to threaten a weak government or at least to oblige it to tolerate its illegal activities. The Mafia appears to exercise a pervasive influence in Sicily and Southern Italy where politicians, judges and senior policemen who thwart its crimes and bring the Mafia members of 'Cosa Nostra' to justice are ruthlessly murdered or intimidated. The "Tongs" play a similar role with the overseas Chinese communities.

1. See the article 'Operations "CABBAGE FARM" and "GREENICE" against the Cali Drug Cartel and the Mafia' at Annex A to this Chapter.

SECTION 6 - WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT

17. **Weapons.** Insurgents tend to use basic weapons whose essentials have not changed very much since the 1940s. The features of compactness, lethality and simple operating procedures have attracted insurgents the world over. In recent times weapons and bombs have been miniaturised, explosives are harder to detect and more lethal in their composition and timing devices constructed to extent the range of potential targets. These are designed to defeat detection and aid insurgent security. Hand held missiles, small enough to conceal in a small space can be utilised to bring accurate fire on armoured vehicles aircraft and helicopters. The main categories are likely to be:
- a. *Personal Weapons.* Principally pistols, carbines, rifles and weapons with a high rate of fire. Sniper rifles utilising armour piercing ammunition are also very popular - particularly in rural areas. Significant developments are the use of the controlled burst - a setting between single shots and automatic fire where the weapon fires a short but controlled burst of ammunition before the 'kick' effect comes into action. Weapons made completely from non metallic material are being developed to avoid detection at airports etc:- although there are serious technical snags to overcome before production can start.
 - b. *Ammunition.* Most insurgent groups use 9mm ammunition for shorter range weapons and calibres around 7.62 mm for rifles and machine guns. However caseless ammunition, if developed, would aid the insurgent enormously, - a lighter weight and no evidence left for forensic teams to analyse.
 - c. *Sighting Devices.* Night vision equipment-infrared (IR), image intensification (IT) and thermal imagery (TI) will have an increasing influence on the number of weapons that can be used in defence or attack. The same applies for laser sights which could enable an insurgent to fire a weapon from a suitcase without appearing to be holding a gun.
 - d. *Mortars.* Improvised mortars are easy to make but are usually inaccurate and unreliable. Most require some form of 'flat bed' for transportation. Acquisition of military mortars and ammunition would significantly increase the range and lethality of such weapons.
 - e. *Anti-Armour Weapons.* Both recoilless weapons and armour piercing rifles may be used, and there is likely to be an increased emphasis on rockets, probably fired from non-metallic launchers.
 - f. *Portable Ground to Air Missiles.* The hand-held 'suitcase' type of air defence weapon with a heat-seeking or simple guidance system is particularly suitable for insurgency use. Even the acknowledged possession of air defence weapons by an insurgent group is likely to hinder and obstruct the full use of helicopters by the state authorities.
 - g. *Mines.* This term covers military mines, as opposed to home made devices which are covered in the next sub para. Military mines, both anti personnel and

anti tank mines, are frequently utilised by insurgent groups to destroy roads, bridges, railway lines and other suitable targets. Mines are easy to acquire, difficult to detect and sometimes difficult to dismantle. They can seriously hamper the efforts of the counter insurgency forces and terrify the local population. Once a campaign has ended the clearance of minefields becomes a priority target for any government.

- h. *Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)*. Explosive devices of many types, both commercial and improvised, are usually available to insurgency forces. Methods of initiation are nowadays highly varied. The effectiveness of these as instruments of terror is well known and expertise in their manufacture and handling is often of a high order, while complicated fuzing and anti-lifting devices are often available from international arms sources.
 - i. *Hoaxes*. These are used more widely than real IEDs to disrupt commercial and social life and to stretch army and police resources. The insurgent has merely to plant sufficient real IEDs in order to ensure that the security forces and the public cannot afford to ignore any warning.
 - j. *Lures*. Any incident, bomb or hoax can be used as a bait, particularly to kill security force EOD specialists.
18. **NBC Weapons**. In theory, a nuclear chemical or biological device could be made by a well financed insurgency group for delivery, perhaps by ship to a port with the threat of triggering the device if demands are not met by a particular deadline. However, in addition to the difficulty of manufacture and delivery of such a weapon, any resultant detonation, whether intended or not, could be so disastrous for an insurgent cause that many governments would find it difficult to believe the threat and act accordingly. Threats involving NBC weapons are also far less credible, and thus less effective, as a bargaining counter. Nevertheless, a modified form of NBC attack is a possibility. Further points are:
- a. *Nuclear*. Of increasing state concern is the deliberate or accidental, release of much lower quantities of radioactive material than would be produced by a military nuclear device in any incident. This could enhance the credibility given to an insurgent group if such a device were used, or threatened by them.
 - b. *Biological*. Biological weapons (BW) are becoming increasingly usable in military terms and have the potential for effect at the strategic level. Many of the less developed countries depend on mono cultures, such as rice, maize or wheat, as the main stay of the economy. These are potentially vulnerable to BW attack. BW could cause as many casualties as a nuclear explosion, while avoiding the latter's collateral damage. The very high toxicity of some biological agents lend themselves to covert use. A BW attack may also be extremely difficult for the targeted government to attribute.
 - c. *Chemical*. Chemical weapons (CW) are easier for an insurgent to acquire than nuclear and biological weapons but the scope for use of CW will be much smaller

in terms of the area affected but the casualties caused could be massive. CW may have considerable psychological effects, which may have a significant effect if the targeted government is sufficiently weak. CW generally offers more casualties-for-cost than does high explosive. The use of Sarin in Tokyo during 1995 has only served to highlight the potential use of such lethal chemical agents.

SECTION 7 - INSURGENT TACTICS IN A RURAL ENVIRONMENT

General

19. Since the dissolution of the USSR the opportunity for insurgency in rural and undeveloped areas has increased enormously, - and although the classic Maoist style of insurgency involving the peasants is not generally applicable, insurgencies in rural areas could easily flare up again. The allocation of land, water or other scarce mineral resources continues to provide a real or perceived grievance, particularly in areas where there is a burgeoning population.
20. While the political organization of an insurgency concentrates on mobilizing popular support for the cause, openly in areas distant from government control, more covertly in areas where the government still exercises effective authority, bases will be established in remote areas. From these, minor actions, which may be mistaken for banditry, are launched over as wide an area as possible to disperse police resources. Amongst other indications that a campaign is about to begin are:
 - a. The preparation of isolated villages for defence, including the discreet clearance of fields of fire, under the pretext of protection against banditry.
 - b. The hoarding of supplies and the preparation of caches outside villages for the future use of insurgents.
 - c. The training and arming of village 'self-defence' groups and small 'military style' units.
 - d. An increase in the scale and degree of local intimidation and coercion particularly in the production of goods and services.

Rural Tactics

21. **General.** In its early stages, a rural insurgency must rely on small bands of men assembling for a limited enterprise, probably of sabotage against some fairly remote and inadequately guarded bridge, pylon or railway line. As the movement grows to the stage where it can command significant support from the local population, so its objectives will become more ambitious and larger bodies of men will be necessary to achieve these. The relative strength of insurgent bands will always place them at a disadvantage vis-a-vis the security forces and they will seek to avoid a pitched battle; their tactics are therefore based on mobility and surprise, generally using ambushes and explosives.

22. **Mobility.** Mobility may be achieved on foot, by using cars, lorries and bicycles where these are inconspicuous, or by using animal transport in undeveloped countries etc. The principle is to assemble a force and its weapons, carry out an operation, and then disperse. The greater the scope of the operation and the consequent size of the force, the more thorough will be the preparation. Planning may need to cover such matters as the concentration of heavy weapons and munitions, liaison with other groups through whose area a force may have to move etc.
23. **Terrorism.** Rural populations are vulnerable to terrorism and intimidation - and very quickly a feeling of insecurity can spread around a region, which makes both individuals and communities feel isolated and cut off. Savage treatment given to a local government official, or his family, has a serious unsettling effect around the whole region. Recent experience suggests that this type of intimidation could be on the increase in many rural areas. Peru, Bosnia, Sudan, Somalia, Kashmir can be cited as examples of places where this type of terrorism is rampant.
24. **Surprise.** Some of the methods used to achieve surprise are:
- a. Diversionary action designed to attract security forces elsewhere.
 - b. Deception which may be initiated by feeding false information through sympathizers already infiltrated into the government intelligence machine: it would be sensible to support this by a diversionary tactic to protect the informant and give credence to the deception.
 - c. Attacks in areas thought to be safe by the authorities: probably mounted from a distance and relying on a swift approach march.
 - d. Insurgent bands may sometimes merge into the population in an area adjacent to a selected target, then assemble quickly, strike and disperse.
25. **Ambush.** The most widely used insurgent tactic, the ambush, is particularly effective against road movement, especially when the ground makes it difficult for the government forces to move off the road and take cover. Insurgents favour two main types of ambush:
- a. *Hit and Run Ambush.* Usually undertaken by locally based insurgents it relies on the devastating effect of a well directed opening volley and surprise to cause sufficient casualties and disorganization to delay the security force's response in order to cover the withdrawal. As the aim is confined to causing casualties, inducing a general sense of insecurity, damaging morale and grabbing any weapons which can be picked up without risk the insurgents do not usually deploy a rear stop. This type of ambush can be deployed anywhere in city, town, or countryside. Insurgent strengths can vary from two to three armed persons or up to fifteen or twenty persons depending on the circumstances.
 - b. *Annihilation Ambush.* Small scale annihilation ambushes may be sprung by the insurgents against medium sized security force targets and large scale am-

bushes against large formations as the insurgency gains strength. They may be mounted against even larger forces during any subsequent more conventional war phase. The latter ambush may cover a 1 to 5 kilometre stretch of road. The principles for both sizes of ambush are the same. The ambush force consists of front and rear blocking parties, an attack force deployed in appropriate positions on the road and a fire support group.

SECTION 8 - INSURGENT TACTICS IN AN URBAN ENVIRONMENT

The Urban Environment

26. In the last two decades of this century there have been many examples of insurgency in urban environments. The long running insurgency of the PIRA in the reasonably small but populated area of Northern Ireland is a sufficient example to show that insurgency tactics in urban areas can thrive.
27. A state may either be too small or lack sufficiently inaccessible terrain such as mountains, forests and swamps to sustain an insurgency on a large enough scale to defeat the government. However, urban civilization in Western Europe, parts of Asia and South America is sufficiently vulnerable to provide relatively small insurgent forces with the opportunity to create an atmosphere of serious alarm and insecurity sufficient to discredit the government. Urban insurgents do not normally plan to occupy and control territory although they may seize small areas for a limited time to establish a presence. It is frequently possible to control an area without occupying it. Nevertheless, insurgents could well receive support from these enclaves where their political supporters form a majority of the population.
28. Lacking the ability to occupy territory on a significant scale insurgents will aim to make the government's position untenable. They will rely on engendering a state of war-weariness, frustration and anger against government emergency measures to bring about a climate of collapse so that people will rally to any organization or strong man who offers stability. Action may include:
 - a. Disrupting city life.
 - b. Damaging the economy and obliging the government to pay compensation on a scale it cannot afford.
 - c. Discrediting the security forces by alienating the public and provoking the police and Army into over-reacting.
 - d. Undermining the morale of politicians, civil service, judiciary and the security forces.
 - e. Eliminating informers.
 - f. Assassinating public figures.

- g. Establishing temporary 'no-go' areas to demonstrate the government's impotence, such as those established by PIRA during 1972 in Belfast and Londonderry.
- h. Persuading sympathetic foreign states to bring pressure to bear on the government.

Urban Tactics

- 29. Cities and towns provide great scope for insurgencies. The concentration of a large number of people in a relatively small area provides cover for the insurgents (Mao's fish). Moreover, the needs of a great city, related to the complexity of urban living whereby interruption of power supplies, non-collection of rubbish, cutting off water etc. can soon bring a community almost to its knees. However, the insurgent may only find support in certain areas of the towns or cities.
- 30. The urban insurgent therefore, lives in a community which is friendly to him, or at the least is too frightened to withhold its support, close to his leaders and fellow insurgents, and with the tools of terrorism at hand. A communication system can be engineered fairly easily and women and children can be used both to operate this and to provide cover for other activities.
- 31. The urban insurgent can operate more boldly than his rural counterpart for these reasons, and his tactics reflect this. The sniper complements the more conventional ambush and often replaces it, and explosive devices can be used in a wide variety of ways either as instruments of communal terror or more selectively against individuals or groups. There is ample scope for the propaganda ambush whereby incidents, marches, protests, sniping etc are deliberately staged to achieve propaganda objectives detrimental to the security forces.
- 32. The concentration of population in the city is important for two further reasons:
 - a. The ready availability of large numbers of people means that a crowd can be assembled and demonstrations engineered, with comparative ease; these can then be manipulated. The presence of women and children will normally be an embarrassment to the security forces, particularly if the demonstration is stage managed to cause over reaction by the security forces against such group. It could be argued that the presence of women and children allows for the peaceful democratic process to operate.
 - b. Publicity is easily achieved in a city as no major incident can be concealed even if it is not widely reported on television and in the press. Terrorist successes can therefore be readily exploited both to increase the impact of terror and to discredit the security forces, their methods and the quality of the protection which they can provide.
- 33. Within an urban environment an insurgent can plan and execute a large variety of tasks designed to publicise the cause and embarrass the state authorities. Hostage

taking became fashionable in Beirut during the '80's. Kidnapping of civic and local leaders is another ploy carried out by Hezbollah against the Israeli authorities and which has been countered by abductions and arrest of leaders or clerks associated with the insurgents.

Ethnic Cleansing

34. Ethnic Cleansing is an insidious form of terror which has been operated in various forms over many centuries. Both in Europe and the Middle East there are many examples of this type of activity throughout history when a majority of the surrounding population wish to frighten and intimidate people into leaving their homes and territory and moving elsewhere. In terms of creating human misery, ethnic cleansing is one of the most loathsome of all forms of terrorism and is normally the basis for future unrest and potential insurgency in the area. The roots of the Civil War in Greece and the growth of communism in the region grew out of the deliberate shift of populations between Greece and Turkey in the aftermath of the First World War and the lack of any subsequent administration to provide long term accommodation and work for the uprooted refugees. Palestinian refugees fall into the same category.

SECTION 9 - INSURGENT COMMUNICATIONS

Passing Information

35. **General.** In some states the security forces can readily gain control of most public communications systems such as radio stations, telephone exchanges and post and telegraph offices, and thus an insurgency organization may have considerable problems in disseminating information and issuing orders, particularly as a movement initially depends on only a few trained leaders whose identity and whereabouts would be kept secret. Two ways of overcoming the problem are the cell system and dead letter boxes.
36. **The Cell System.** An insurgency is often split up into numerous cells, each with a leader and containing only a few, say three to five, members know only each other and their own leader, while the leader knows only one person outside the cell, who in turn knows only one member of the district or regional organization and so on up the scale. There is virtually no lateral communication in this organization. Variations of the cell system may be devised for greater security by using couriers and dead letter boxes: for example a 'cut out' courier may be used to collect from one dead letter box and deliver to another. Thus messages can be carried over a risky link in the system by a man or woman who has no information except that they collect a sealed package from one place and leave it in another.
37. **Dead Letter Boxes.** A dead letter box is simply a hiding place for letters deposited by one person and collected by another. Some general principles which govern selection of such places, and at the same time are a guide to the security forces when they search for them are:
 - a. The dead letter box is usually sited in an area where a courier has good reason to go.

- b. It must be possible to deposit or retrieve messages quickly.
- c. The location must be simple to described, accessible and easy to find.
- d. There must be a simple but effective system for indicating that there is a message to be collected.

Utilising Political Literature

38. Political manifestos, magazines, posters and circulars may be used to convey instructions to cells. At first sight these documents may appear to be no more than vague aims without dates or times. However, an analysis of incidents in insurgent campaigns shows that they can provide an indication of trends and intentions since in some respects they equate to operation orders issued by the central organization. Insurgent and terrorist activities depend more upon opportunity than timing, and therefore there is no programme. Such literature can list targets, allocate resources, and lay down the period in which certain aims are to be achieved. The importance of such documents when captured should not be underrated.

Media

39. **Radio.** Radio is increasingly used both for communication and as a means of passing information or propaganda; examples are:
- a. *Communication*
 - (1) 'Pirate' radio stations for propaganda.
 - (2) Liaison between insurgent movements, sometimes internationally.
 - (3) Monitoring of security forces' radio nets.
 - b. *Control*
 - (1) Crowds and demonstrations.
 - (2) Steering gunmen on to a target from an OP.
 - (3) Remote detonation of explosives.
40. **Television.** Almost every insurgent group has used television directly to promote their cause, or indirectly by means of ensuring that incidents are newsworthy enough to ensure that they are reported on television. It is no coincidence that the steep rise in terrorist and insurgent action has taken place at the same time as the growth in television. The distribution of video tapes can also enormously enhance an insurgent cause, particularly when television channels are closely controlled or even censored.

41. **The Press.** Coded messages may be included in advertisements or articles in newspapers and magazines or on posters or circulars to convey instructions to cells, perhaps in conjunction with the dead letter box system. Such messages may be used to pass information when time is not essential for the execution of an operation or to inform an insurgent of the time and date a preplanned attack or incident is to be staged.

OPERATIONS 'CABBAGE FARM' AND 'GREEN ICE' AGAINST THE CALI DRUG CARTEL AND THE MAFIA

1. Significant successes were scored against the Cali drug cartel and the Mafia when over 150 arrests were made and more than \$44 millions' worth of cash and cocaine were seized in seven countries between 26 and 28 September, 1992. The triumph was the result of nineteen months of painstaking investigation and international cooperation between police forces, inland revenue services and other agencies.
2. The enquiry began in Chicago when FBI Operation CABBAGE FARM was focused on a Colombian-born man, Antonio Unez, and his financial dealings. Unez led an international enterprise which laundered money from Colombian drug organizations in Chicago, Los Angeles, New York, Miami and Houston.
3. With the assistance of the Drug Enforcement Administration and the Inland Revenue Service, FBI agents made contact with couriers working for Unez and netted \$36 million during the operation. As the investigation proceeded connections between the Cali drug cartel and the Mafia were uncovered by a parallel Operation GREEN ICE led by the FBI and the Italian police. Further information led to the discovery of the cartel's activities in other countries.
4. Finally, at the end of September, the police swooped on the organization in seven countries. In Colombia, police and troops raided the Cali offices of the cartel's chief, Rodriguez Orwella, to seize account books and computer discs. In Chicago, Unez was arrested. Seven key financial managers for the cartel were lured abroad by agents with the promise of meetings to discuss the movement of money. Two were arrested in San Diego, four in Costa Rica and one in Rome. The latter was Rodrigo Polonia Gonzalez Camorgan, a banker who represented Columbia on the international Drugs Commission. In simultaneous operations a further Cartel leader was arrested in Rome, providing some compensation for the murder of two investigating magistrates in Palermo by the Mafia.
5. At a Victoria flat in London, two US citizens were picked up together with £1,750,000 in cash and 90 lbs of cocaine with a street value of £7 million. Four suspected money launderers and \$330,000 in cash were seized in Spain. In Canada, a further \$1.6 million from drug sales was recovered.
6. The successes were an example of the type of operation which may be launched on an international basis against the support organization of an insurgency. The availability of such international means of passing money and drugs to pay for weapons and equipment will not be lost on future insurgents when planning external support for their operations.

CHAPTER 4

CONTEMPORARY INSURGENCY

SECTION 1 - DEVELOPMENTS

1. A quick review of the international scene on any given day will confirm that while many states are not at war they are also not at peace. Yet so familiar is the shadow of political violence that most people are only shocked from complacency by a particularly dramatic, and thus newsworthy, outrage. At a time of swingeing defence cuts in the West, insurgency is on the increase. A host of groups and states are using it to alter the political landscape. Over the last two decades the number of international terrorist incidents has risen from 200 per year to over 800. Insurgency, which has traditionally posed a degree of threat to most established governments, seems likely to remain the most prevalent form of conflict and source of human suffering for some while to come.
2. In the UK the view of insurgency and COIN has been shaped by British perceptions of the post-war international system. Throughout the 1950s and '60s many Third World 'wars of national liberation' sought to alter the generally artificial relationships and boundaries which European colonialism had imposed. They were motivated by broadly similar aspirations. Many were led by communists or profited from the support of communist states. In most but not all cases (EOKA in Cyprus being one exception), Marxism in its various forms provided a revolutionary ideology, organisational focus and operational strategy. During the early days of the Cold War the West seemed to be threatened by a tide of communist revolution; hence the importance attached to lessons learnt in a relatively few successful COIN campaigns, which include Malaya, (1948-60) and Dhofar (1965-75).
3. The policy of containment reached its zenith during the Kennedy era and assumed the nature of an anti-communist crusade. Subsequently, throughout the ideological stalemate of the 1970s and 80s, insurgent movements continued to be encouraged and sustained by one or other superpower or their clients in many parts of the globe, such as in Angola, Nicaragua and Afghanistan.
4. Insurgency has also been a potent force in international relations during this period. In addition to supporting insurgencies, both Superpowers have suffered defeat at the hands of insurgents; not decisive military defeat on the battlefield, but eventual humiliation because the political and economic costs were too high to sustain further involvement. The potential of insurgency - the classic style of warfare used by the weak against the strong - has been clearly demonstrated. History shows that in certain circumstances it can be a remarkably successful means of achieving change. Several insurgent leaders have become internationally respected Statesmen. Arafat, who addressed the UN General Assembly and now leads a mini-state in Gaza is but one example, and the ANC's successes in South Africa under Mandela's leadership is another.
5. Yet, despite the continuing utility of insurgent tactics and well documented successes, by the mid 1980s the sense of impotence in the West generated by failures in Vietnam

and elsewhere had waned. Marxism was in retreat and domestic terrorism in more liberal states, whilst proving surprisingly resilient, was largely under control. Governments and people were reaching the pragmatic conclusion that insurgents, like the poor, would always be with them, but that they posed little real direct danger to well established democratic governments. Indeed, some have been tempted to suggest that the study of 'Counter Revolutionary Warfare' (as it was previously labelled) belonged to a bygone era and was largely irrelevant, although recognising that insurgent tactics have been changing over the last decade, and that society has become more prone and vulnerably to these changes.

SECTION 2 - SOCIETY AND INSURGENCY

6. In society the technological revolution continues unabated and by the end of the century only some 20% of workers will be actively involved in production processes whilst the remainder will be involved in service industries of one sort or another and working much shorter hours. The river of information which presently invades every house and workplace will become a flood. Access to television, cable programmes, and satellites mostly in pictorial form will provide greater chances for individuals and groups to manipulate the emotions of the public at large. The opportunities for propaganda by official sources, commercial interests and determined minority groups will be almost unbounded.
7. The large networks of electronic data-processing and communications are already shaping the future of this new society, and already these interdependent service industries, are vulnerable to attack from hackers, fraudsters and extortionists. Computer centres could become objects of sabotage or attack; software is open to disruption, manipulation or espionage, and the complete duplication of assets is often prohibitively expensive. Cable and radio communication can be intercepted and although there are antidotes for this, such as the use of codes transmissions and fibre optic cables, the risk of losing security can still be high.
8. Electronic transfer of cash is now common place and there will be less money being held or disbursed around the market place. Opportunities for theft and robbery will probably decline, to be replaced by computer fraud and extortion by threat of kidnap, murder and destruction of software or computer components. Disposal of funds by laundering them through legitimate deposits, or by purchasing drugs or arms is an expanding business.
9. In recent years there has been a spate of car bombs placed by terrorists within city centres or at well known institutions with the direct aim of disrupting financial and commercial centres of business. These activities are usually at the weekend to avoid large scale casualties. Arrests and convictions are the best deterrent to this new extension of terrorist activity but the publicity surrounding bomb attacks, and the growing use of an economic form of insurgency to achieve quick political results, (attacking tourism in Egypt and killing foreigners in Algeria) is bound to be attractive to insurgents world wide. In addition the use of people by insurgents for the purpose of a hijack, hostage taking, or kidnap for intimidation in a world of instant communication can radically alter the propaganda prospects of a minority group seeking attention for their cause.

SECTION 3 - RECENT TRENDS

10. Contemporary events may yet conspire to make nation states more aware of this growing problem. The end of the Cold War may have removed the threat of global nuclear war, but it has created a security environment in which the risks of insurgent conflict are potentially greater and more diverse than ever. Prior to 1989 the international order was ideologically divided, but stable. It was an order which allowed competition on the fringes, but gave little or no scope for manoeuvre at the centre. Europe, the potential battleground if the Cold War had turned hot, with its colonial empires gone, experienced a period of peace unprecedented in modern history. But despite the misplaced optimism of the early 1990s no viable 'New World Order' has yet emerged. Instead, new causes, methods, opportunities and sponsors for politically inspired violence abound, both in Europe and elsewhere.
11. In parallel, technological advances and the lowering of national barriers have created many more vulnerabilities which the insurgent can exploit as has been shown in Section 2. Developing communications mean that the media (even those elements of it which are potentially 'friendly' to the state authorities) can bring the impact of insurgency into homes worldwide and live, providing the insurgent with a free international public platform. Insurgency has become dramatic entertainment. Because viewers rapidly become jaded, insurgents are driven to seek ever greater 'spectacular' success to make news: Lockerbie, the Brighton bombing and the World Trade Centre atrocities are cases in point. As a result, both civil and military policymakers can be subjected to enormous pressures from national and international public opinion, whose knowledge is inevitably based only on the circumstantial evidence that the media bestows.
12. Although America and Russia have reduced their sponsorship of insurgent 'clients', there are numerous other sources of support. Some governments conduct campaigns of undeclared proxy warfare as a deliberate arm of foreign policy; the Libyan and Iranian examples spring to mind. Putting political motives to one side, there is a commercial aspect: a thriving international arms market provides certain states with lucrative profits and much needed hard currency (the export of SEMTEX explosive is a case in point). The easy availability of modern weapons has increased the range, accuracy and lethality of insurgent attacks.
13. It is a relatively cheap form of warfare and also one which can be lucrative for those involved. Under the cover of terrorism, protection rackets and smuggling have become shadow industries in Northern Ireland. Organised crime in Russia and its potential links with the illegal export of nuclear material to terrorist groups poses the greatest single threat to the security of other states. The drugs industry in Latin America has formed a complex triangular relationship with both government forces and insurgents in Peru and Bolivia. Over a protracted period of time the contesting sides in an insurgency may even form a bizarre adversarial partnership; insurgent leaders get rich or achieve a status which would otherwise be denied them as common criminals, whilst counter insurgency commanders see their own organisations grow in size, importance and influence within the state. Narcotics clearly pose a threat to British national interests and those of weaker friendly states. The Government are

already involved in this undeclared war in many ways and narco-diplomacy could well involve the greater use of the Armed Forces in the future.

14. Perhaps of more immediate concern, the break-up of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union and the disintegration of its sphere of influence has led to the release of long - suppressed ethnic and religious tensions. In the Balkans nationalism has erupted into civil war, the brutality of which has shocked the liberal democracies. To the south, the spread of radical fundamentalism into Algeria, Turkey and Egypt contributes to regional instability and adds to a potential tide of exiles and refugees; the dispossessed hordes from the east and south who, some predict, are about to envelop and engulf Europe.
15. The shadowy links between certain terrorist groups could indicate some kind of international form of insurgency, fought by those who do not necessarily share cultural perceptions of rationality and 'fair play'. Compounding the problem, the spectre of mass migration has already contributed to a political resurgence of the racist Right. Vigilantes and death squads, long a hazardous feature of political life in other regions, have reappeared in parts of Europe. Arms proliferation, the potential availability of PGMs, and in particular weapons of mass destruction, necessitate a close and continuous assessment of the risk posed by insurgents.

SECTION 4 - CONCLUSIONS

16. In the past, and in the appropriate circumstances, the UK government would probably wish to have its Armed Forces available for use in the international arena. This could clearly lead to involvement in different types of conflict and probably contact with a variety of disparate groups of protagonists. Such contact may not necessarily involve direct confrontation, but could occur whilst operating under international mandates in regions where insurgency and civil disorder are rife. The Army, in conjunction with the other two Services and even allies, might be called upon to provide advice, support or overt assistance to a friendly state threatened by some form of insurgency.
17. In other situations some of the principles and tactics of counter insurgency may be applicable. For instance, in a period of fragile peace after a war (when the civil administration in a defeated or liberated country has broken down), or in a peace support operation (when armed factions interrupt humanitarian relief or attack peacekeepers), troops may need to employ selectively the relevant COIN tactics and techniques. Whilst this is a sensitive area, it is a practical aspect of modern soldering that merits objective consideration. In the field, neat doctrinal distinctions and definitions may well become blurred. To be ready to confront insurgency and its impact in any and all of its diverse forms at short notice and in a wide variety of environments, demands a clear understanding of the problem. Only by watching events and carefully analysing possible new trends will commanders and staff officers be able to direct their thought and training to meet the likely demands of any future crisis.

PART B

COUNTER INSURGENCY

STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS

CHAPTER 1

ASPECTS OF THE LAW

SECTION 1 - THE LEGAL BACKGROUND


Introduction

1. The four Parts of this publication deal with insurgency and countering insurgency in generic military terms. The principles, operational practices and tactical procedures covered in these four Parts could apply to any situation involved with counter insurgency, whether it occurs in the UK or abroad.
2. However the legal framework in which these military operations could take place could differ significantly from place to place, and commanders at all levels will have to be aware of the precise legal conditions that pertain for any military operations contemplated. The position is this:
 - a. In whatever capacity troops are employed they must always operate within the law.
 - b. If the conflict is international then the international law of armed conflict¹ must be observed.
 - c. If the operations fall short of international armed conflict, then the domestic (ie: internal) law of the state in which the operations occur, together with any provisions of international law² that bind any parties to that operation, must be followed.
 - d. Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, adopted in 1977 and ratified in 1995 is intended to apply to internal armed conflicts but its application is specifically excluded in situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and acts of a similar nature.
3. The full range of operations in which troops could be involved is shown below which has been extracted from Volume II of the Manual of Military Law (with slight amendment), to illustrate these important and salient features of the law and its application in conflict.

1. The international Law of War on Land is dealt with in M.M.L. Part III. That volume is due to be replaced by a new tri-Service Manual. "Law of Armed Conflict".

2. International treaties aimed at protecting human rights and Article 3 which is common to all four Geneva Conventions of 1949.

Spectrum of Military Operations and the Law



4. In all Parts of *Counter Insurgency Operations* military principles, operational procedures practices and techniques are explained, but it has to be clearly understood that some or all of these techniques and practices may not be legally available for use in any particular situation, this depends entirely on the legal status of the troops involved and the overall rules and constraints under which they are operating. It would be plainly illegal for troops when responding to a domestic riot at the request of the local police to establish ambush positions with a view to killing those attempting to leave the area. An ambush of this type would be feasible and legally supportable in a situation of international armed conflict.

SECTION 2 - RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

Guidance for Commanders

5. It is thus vital for a commander to know what law applies in a given set of circumstances and what it is that triggers any changes in the law to be applied. The answer to this type of question relates directly to the sort of Rules of Engagement (ROE) that would be issued by the Ministry of Defence.
6. JSP398 is the Joint Service Manual which provide the ground rules and procedures for the incorporation and application of particular ROE to suit the prevailing circumstances.
7. UK Government ministers provide political direction and guidance to commanders by means of ROE which govern the application of force. It follows that such rules which are approved by ministers may only be changed by ministerial authority. Commanders will in turn wish to issue ROE to their subordinates. These ROE will be cast within the discretion allowed by the rules approved by Ministers.

8. ROE define the degree and manner in which force may be applied and are designed to ensure that such application of force is carefully controlled; ROE are not intended to be used to assign specific tasks or as a means of issuing tactical instructions. In passing orders to subordinates a commander at any level must always act within the ROE received but is not bound to use the full extent of the permission granted.
9. ROE are usually written in the form of prohibitions or permissions. When they are issued as prohibitions, they will be orders to commanders not to take certain designated actions: when they are issued as permissions, they will be guidance to commanders that certain designated actions may be taken if the commanders judge them necessary to desirable in order to carry out their assigned tasks. The ROE are thus issued as a set of parameters to inform commanders of the limits of constraint imposed or of freedom permitted when carrying out their assigned tasks. The conformity of any action with any set of ROE in force does not guarantee its lawfulness, and it remains the commander's responsibility to use only that degree of force which is necessary, reasonable and lawful in the circumstances.

Political Policy Indicators (PPI)

10. **Political Policy.** ROE authorising messages from the MOD will contain guidance on Government policy to assist commanders to plan and react responsibly as a situation develops. This guidance will comprise a Political Policy Indicator (PPI) and an amplifying narrative which would describe Government intentions. The three PPIs are as follows:
 - a. *ALFA*. De-escalation. (Play down the issue as much as possible).
 - b. *BRAVO*. Maintenance of the Status Quo.
 - c. *CHARLIE*. Risk of escalation acceptable. (Take the initiative within the rules in force even if this involves escalating the level of confrontation).
11. **Procedures.** There are rules and procedures concerning the application of ROE as a situation develops. These are listed in JSP 398. ROE are applied to all arms of the three Services and to all environments (air, land, sea and subsurface). When UK forces are called upon to operate in conjunction with forces of other nations operating under different ROE, MOD would attempt to harmonize the different sets of rules. Subject to ministerial approval, national forces under command or control of UN or other international or multinational agencies may operate under ROE issued by that agency. In some circumstances national amplifying instructions may be issued. Otherwise UK national ROE will apply.

Theatre of Operations

12. Every theatre in which UK forces operate will have a particular ROE profile. However, within a large theatre it may be necessary to issue different profiles, covering smaller areas, to forces that are operating under significantly different circumstances. It may also be necessary to issue different ROE profiles to forces carrying out different roles.

Nevertheless, in any given area of operation UK forces having a similar role would normally operate under identical ROE.

SECTION 3 - THE STATUS OF FORCES

Legal Expressions

13. **General.** This Section does not attempt to define all the better known legal expressions that may be encountered during a counter insurgency campaign. There are, however, legal expressions that are fundamental to any military understanding of the legal circumstances in which troops are deployed.
14. **Jurisdiction.** This term determines who has the legal power to try an individual in any particular circumstances. Where soldiers are employed abroad, this fundamental questions should be resolved by a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) or a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between governments or possibly by an Exchange of Letters between governments. In the unlikely situation where there is an absence of any of agreement of this type, the local civil and criminal courts would have exclusive jurisdiction. The implications of this could be far reaching, particularly for British troops in areas where the rule of law has collapsed, or cannot be properly implemented.
15. **Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).** In amplification of para 14, a SOFA covers the terms of employment for troops overseas, their legal status, operational aims, use of weapons and other agreements or restraints upon their use. The document is usually endorsed at government level and its contents should be passed to the military commander as soon as it has been agreed - preferably before any troops reach the area of operations. MOU's or an Exchange of Letters are other lesser forms of the same document, and consequently are less legally binding in courts of law. It should be noted that any agreement by a state to allow British troops to be tried under their own legal codes does not automatically authorise British commanders to try soldiers in that state under English law (and hence the MML). This has to be agreed specifically.
16. **United Nations Operations.** The legal status of forces operating in support of the United Nations should be secured by a legal instrument with the host government. The type of agreement depends on the degree of accord between the states in dispute and with the United Nations. Contributing states also negotiate agreements with the United Nations. Secretariat covering such subjects as the role planned for the troops, disciplinary and financial arrangements.
17. **Other Legal References.** Chapter 5 of MML Vol II covers many other terms that would have legal validity in any counter insurgency situations in UK. It also cites suitable examples from case law to indicate to commanders and staff officers the authority and binding nature of the law and of its restraints and qualifications. Vol III of the MML provides similar expressions, definitions, and examples from case law of the legal position for troops abroad.

Summary

18. The five preceding paragraphs are sufficient to show that it would be prudent for legal advice to be available to a commander and staff officers on a full time basis once operations to counter insurgency are set in hand. The law differs from state to state, the law changes to reflect developments in society, and the implications of international treaty obligations, human rights law and conventions on the use of some weapons all indicate that a clear understanding of the current legal position and recent legal developments is necessary.
19. Provided a commander is aware of the legal background and basis for any planned military operations, is aware of the contents of the SOFA, clear ROE for those under his command and has rapid access to legal advice, the complexities of the law in regard to countering insurgency can be tackled effectively and integrated into the overall pattern of military operations.

CHAPTER 2

THE APPLICATION OF MILITARY DOCTRINE TO COUNTER INSURGENCY (COIN) OPERATIONS

SECTION 1 - BRITISH EXPERIENCE

1. The experience of numerous 'small wars' has provided the British Army with a unique insight into this demanding form of conflict. Service in Northern Ireland provides the present generation of officers with its main first-hand source of basic experience at tactical level but also tends to constrain military thinking on the subject because of its national context. The procedures for dealing with Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA) are not dealt with further in this publication. There are of course many lessons to be learnt because of the similarities between the MACA campaign in Northern Ireland and those COIN campaigns which may be conducted elsewhere. But there are also significant differences. Tactics, which from the perspective of Northern Ireland seem to be relics of a colonial past, such as jungle patrolling and convoy anti-ambush drills, may be very relevant in a different operational setting.
2. The British have not developed a general antidote to the problem of insurgency. There have long been alternative, effective approaches; the French in Algeria during the 1840s produced novel tactics based on highly mobile columns, and in Indo-China a military-led community relations campaign predated Templer's 'Hearts and Minds' theories by several decades. Not only is the threat changing, but so too is the environment in which an insurgent must be confronted. For example, in any future COIN operation, military action will be conducted under the critical scrutiny of the law, the media, human rights organisations and other international bodies such as the European Court. Thus whilst military planning should draw upon the lessons of the past, doctrine must evolve if it is to remain relevant.

SECTION 2 - THE ATTRITION THEORY

3. A straight forward attritional approach is one option. Such strategies have been adopted and some have worked. Absolute repression was used by the Germans in response to guerrilla attacks during the Second World War. Saddam Hussein's use of chemical weapons against the Kurds and his campaign against the Marsh Arabs in Southern Iraq are contemporary examples of the use of attrition. In Uruguay the Tupamaros' campaign was crushed by a vicious right wing backlash, that not only destroyed the insurgency, but in the process led to the replacement of a vibrant civil democratic government by a military dictatorship. None of the attritional 'solutions' described above is appropriate in a liberal democracy and it is considered that a 'gloves off' approach to any insurgency problem has a strictly limited role to play in modern COIN operations.
4. Furthermore, the record of success for attrition in COIN operations is generally a poor one. Undue focus on military action clouds the key political realities, which can result in a military-dominated campaign plan that misses the real focus of an insurgency. An inability to match the insurgent's concept with an appropriate government one-likened

by Thompson to trying to play chess whilst the enemy is actually playing poker - is conceptually flawed and will not achieve success. Having deployed conventionally trained troops and large amounts of firepower, the attritionalist commander generally feels compelled to use them. The head of the US Mission to South Vietnam, General Harkins, claimed in September 1962 that what was required to defeat the Viet Cong within 3 years were "Three Ms"- men, money and materiel. The result of this approach, (normally to the delight of an insurgent) is an escalating and indiscriminate use of military firepower. The wider consequences of this approach, seen both in South Vietnam and elsewhere will often be an upward spiral of civilian alienation.

5. It would be wrong to deduce that any application of attrition is necessarily counter-productive: in Malaya the British were able to achieve a force ratio of 20:1, and used their military superiority in numbers and firepower as a means to drive Chin Peng's communists into remote parts of the country, where they were then hunted down remorselessly. The important point to note in this example is the close political control which was exercised over military power throughout that campaign.
6. It is necessary to appreciate that although, at times, military forces and a policy of attrition of insurgents may have a crucial role to play in restoring and maintaining government control, military force is not an end in itself, but always a means to achieve a wider political purpose. This implies that the military commander will have a far from free hand, and indeed, in a well orchestrated COIN strategy, is unlikely to direct the overall campaign. Acceptance of this fact has deep implications for the part that military forces will be given (and should seek) to play in COIN, and of any doctrinal approach to the situation.

SECTION 3 - THE MANOEUVRIST APPROACH

Background

7. Insurgency can be seen as an ancient form of manoeuvre warfare. In Vietnam for example, it was being practised against foreign invaders 2000 years before Ho Chi Minh and Giap turned their attention to the French, Japanese and then the Americans. The insurgent uses politico-military skills to turn the government's apparent strengths against itself. This can involve a relatively low level of military activity, such as the Malaya campaign, or one which is virtually indistinguishable from war, as the French discovered at Dien Bien Phu. It would therefore be an error to conclude that military operations in an insurgency are 'low intensity', hence the phrase is no longer used.

Applicability to COIN Operations

8. ADP Vol 1 *Operations*. Operations explains that, 'some elements of conventional warfighting wisdom may become irrelevant in COIN' and acknowledges that Operations Other Than War will be governed by tight political control. Nevertheless, because COIN involves using a degree of military force, its conduct has some parallels with combat in general war. The Army has an approach to operations which, with careful reflection and imagination, can be readily adapted. It places due emphasis on the intellectual and psychological aspects of operations, not simply the material. It

emphasises the focus on people and ideas, not only on ground. Insurgent cohesion is identified and attacked by applying concentrated yet discrete force against critical weaknesses some of which have been described in Part 1 of this manual. Surprise, tempo and simultaneity are used to overwhelm and unhinge the insurgent, bringing about a complete collapse of will, and ultimately help to create the conditions for his political defeat. As in warfighting, force is applied selectively, and its use is carefully measured and controlled: destruction is a means not an end. The doctrine eschews accepting battle for battle's sake and aims to create the conditions for government success with less force, more quickly, and at less cost. All of this is directly applicable in COIN: a subtle approach to a subtle problem. Because the theory of manoeuvrist approach shares a common ancestry with some of the most successful insurgent strategies, the military planner steeped in this ethos is more likely to cope with the inherent complexities of COIN.

Level of Conflict

9. There are, however, differences of emphasis and interpretation. First, COIN operations do not readily lend themselves to neat division into discrete levels of conflict. An action at the lowest tactical level can have far reaching operational and even strategic consequences. Indeed, if the test of whether there is a political dimension is rigidly applied, every patrol is potentially conducted at the 'operational' level because the conduct of an individual soldier, amplified by the media, can become an international issue.
10. In warfighting soldiers tend to expect that once broad political parameters have been established they will be left to decide the best way to achieve tactical goals: this is not necessarily the case in COIN and this has important implications. Whilst being prepared to work and offer advice at the highest levels, military commanders are unlikely to enjoy even tactical autonomy over matters that in peace or war would be considered a Service preserve. This is due to the relationship between 'success' and the centre of gravity in COIN operations.

Defining Success

11. Success is defined by the state of affairs which needs to be achieved by the end of a campaign. Since insurgency is principally a political struggle, it may be that the desired aim of the government falls short of victory in a strictly military context and setting. This is not to say that tactical defeats are acceptable, merely to acknowledge that there may be significant restrictions on the degree of military success which is both achievable and compatible with the overall political aim. In COIN 'success' may equate to handing over an internal security problem to the civil police, or simply not losing.

Duration of Campaign

12. If, for example, the intention of committing troops is to buy time in which to address particular grievances (which need not necessarily mean making concessions), then dramatic tactical military success may in fact be counter-productive. Nor may it be

possible to predict how long involvement may last, so the campaign may not be planned in the decisive, coherent fashion to which military commanders aspire. COIN operations are often protracted and as the nature of the task may evolve or even radically change long after troops are deployed, the political aim may likewise change over time. It is thus vital that politicians and commanders seek to identify where in the overall spectrum of government activity the military contribution lies, what its relationship to the other aspects of policy is, and its relative importance at any particular stage of the COIN campaign. This will vary over time and even in different geographical areas at the same time. Troops must be aware of the military role and commanders should select accurate measures against which to judge the effectiveness of military tactics; ground 'captured' has even less significance in COIN than it does in warfighting.

Centre of Gravity

13. In an insurgency the strategic centre of gravity will be the support of the mass of the people. Clearly, this is not open to 'attack' in the conventional sense (although insurgent strategies often incorporate the use of coercive force). The insurgency is an attempt to force political change, therefore it logically follows that the centre of gravity can only be reached by political action. The government response to an insurgency should take as its fundamental assumption that the true nature of the threat lies in the insurgent's political potential rather than his military power, although the latter may appear the more worrying in the short term. In Malaya, the centre of gravity was targeted not by jungle patrolling, but by the political decision to grant independence: the military contribution was invaluable, but not of itself decisive. The military campaign will focus upon the insurgents, but is only one part of a wider solution.

Decisive Points within a COIN Campaign

14. The military plan should form one strand in a coordinated 'attack' upon the overall aims of the insurgents. This should be established by a strategic appreciation conducted by a government taking military and other advice. From this will flow further operational and tactical estimates and plans. Whilst military forces may have a critical role to play at certain stages in the campaign, overall its contribution will be secondary and should be kept in perspective. Depending upon the level of insurgent activity, for most soldiers it is likely to be an unglamorous, rather unsatisfactory environment in which to serve. At times there may be opportunities for flair and to instigate decisive action against insurgent groups, but at others troops will be confined to acting in a stabilising, holding role with the bulk of their effort going into strategically 'fixing' the insurgency. This does not imply a passive or reactive posture, but an understanding of these realities and the reasons for them at all levels should help to prepare the soldier for occasional policy decisions which at first sight may defy military logic, as well as giving units involved in COIN a realistic expectation of 'success'.
15. The aim should never be a spectacular, isolated success for one arm of government, but a sequence of successes that combine to work in complementary ways toward a single strategic goal. There will be multiple lines of operation (economic, legal, military etc), working through a series of decisive points, but they should all

complement the campaign main effort-the primary line of operation - which must be political. The military commander will identify his military decisive points, which are then arranged onto lines of operation to achieve the desired military aim. The military plan will be based upon a number of operational objectives, understood and refined at each level, which assist the destruction of the insurgency by marginalisation and focused selective strikes, and also provide assistance to the work of other agencies. Decisive points might include restoring public order, controlling routes, or clearing 'no go' areas. Resources, (the means to achieve the specified ends) should be allocated accordingly.

16. The strategic campaign plan should be directed in such a way as to sequence and coordinate the various agencies' individual lines of operation according to the overall strategic requirements at the time. The intent is to overlap the operational plans of each with the others. These concepts translate directly to COIN, but contrary to the military aim in warfighting, the overall campaign director has a far more complex range of events and options to weave into a coherent plan: a 'campaign' in the broadest sense.

Summary

17. To illustrate the concept, assume that during a COIN campaign an inter-governmental initiative has succeeded in improving cross-border security cooperation (a decisive point on the dominant political line of operation); the military commander concludes that he can best exploit this advantage by reducing the flow of arms and munitions into a particular area (a military decisive point). This entails a shift of main effort, and tactical success in the border zone leads to a fall in the level of terrorist violence in the hinterland. This in turn creates a brief opportunity for a change in police tactics (a police decisive point), which improves relationships with the local community, and so forth. An example of this measured use of military power was offensive cross-border operations during the confrontation with Indonesia. Decisions regarding individual company ambushes were taken at a high level and closely controlled to complement the prevailing political tempo. In contrast, although French operations in Algeria were undertaken in accordance with a sound analysis of where the military decisive points lay, they were never properly harmonised and integrated with an effective overall strategy, and therefore missed the centre of gravity. See Annex A for further details.

SECTION 4 - SUCCESS IN OPERATIONS

Destroying the Insurgents

18. In COIN physical destruction of the enemy still has an important role to play. A degree of attrition will be necessary, but the number of insurgents killed should be no more than is absolutely necessary to achieve the success. Commanders should seek 'soft' methods of destroying the enemy; by arrest, physical isolation or subversion for example. Minimum necessary force is a well proven COIN lesson. In an era of intense media intrusiveness and one in which legality (both domestically and in the international arena) will become ever more important, sound judgement and close control will need to be exercised over the degree of physical destruction which it is possible,

necessary, or desirable to inflict. For example, the killing of a teenage gunman could be justifiable in military terms but its possible impact on his community could jeopardise a potentially far more significant though less spectacular Hearts and Minds operation.

19. Success does not necessarily go to the side which possesses the best weapons or even uses them most effectively. Seeking to destroy the enemy by physical attrition will also expose members of the government force to greater risk of casualties, and as the Tet offensive in Vietnam during 1968 demonstrated, COIN campaigns can be lost despite military success. In that instance the American strategic centre of gravity, public opinion in the USA, became vulnerable once the perceived costs of involvement escalated. This does not mean that risk should be avoided or the tactical initiative handed to the enemy, merely that the wider implications of any course of action should be carefully weighed.

Attacking the Insurgents' Will

20. Attacking the insurgent's will, the strength from which he draws his cohesion, is likely to be more productive, particularly in the early stages of a COIN campaign before the insurgency has consolidated. A sophisticated attack on the adversary's will strikes at the centre of an insurgent's philosophy. This should be undertaken as part of a deliberate 'Hearts and Minds' campaign. This is a somewhat dated term but encapsulates what is needed. It should incorporate G5 action, psychological operations, effective use of the media, and Troop Information. These are separate functions, but they have a common theme and are best utilised in a complementary manner. In practice the scope for such action will depend upon the way in which a particular campaign is orchestrated at the highest level and the freedom of action which is delegated to military commanders. Given the political authority an approach that attacks the enemy's will demands imagination, and a responsive decision making organisation which has the ability to seize fleeting opportunities. See Annex B to this Chapter for more details of how this can be done.

Attacking Cohesion

21. Manoeuvre warfare theory would indicate that it is preferable to shatter the enemy's moral and physical cohesion rather than seek his wholesale destruction. The means of attacking cohesion in COIN are readily adapted from warfighting: firepower (which in the warfighting context is severely constrained, but in COIN can be broadened to include evidence gathering, arrest and legal action); surprise (achieved for example through developing information gathering technology which is exploited by either covert action or rapid concentration of overt force into a given area).

Tempo

22. It has been said that low tempo appears to be a characteristic of many COIN campaigns. This is to misunderstand tempo, which is judged not by the 'pace' of operations, but the speed of action and reaction relative to the insurgent. It is true that slow pace is a direct result of the protracted nature of some, though not all, forms of

insurgent strategy (the 'Foco' theory being an exception). However, even in a Maoist campaign where the insurgent may not be able to move beyond low level guerrilla activity for a considerable time, the situation can still change radically. Diplomatic agreement to curtail external support for example, will test the ability to achieve high tempo. Commanders must be ready and able to adapt quickly to sudden developments, some of which may be outside their control. Certainly the accomplished insurgent commander will rely on an ability to exploit tempo; moving up where possible, and down when necessary, the classic revolutionary phases of an insurgency at such a speed as to make the security force's responses inappropriate and counter productive.

23. At the tactical level tempo is just as applicable. Here a commander can seek to establish his own tempo to seize the initiative in the local area of operations and force an insurgent group into a reactive role. An incident which in conventional war would pass almost unremarked, such as the death of a civilian in cross fire, will attract considerable media attention. Troops and commanders at all levels should have the mental agility to adapt to rapid, even inexplicable changes, in the mood of the population for example, quicker than the insurgent. High tempo can be enhanced through physical mobility, timely and accurate contact intelligence, coordinated C3, and a flexible CS and CSS system.

Simultaneity

24. All effective insurgent strategies emphasise simultaneity by creating parallel political and social challenges as well as military ones. In Vietnam Giap's regular and guerrilla troops worked with political cadres in a complementary fashion to exploit the fragile nature of the Saigon government. If the use of simultaneity is productive for the insurgent, then it is equally applicable for the government side. Tactically it can be achieved through the restrained and carefully considered use of a mix of agencies, and by grouping for independent action, such as joint military-police patrols with compatible communications working to a single headquarters. Operationally it is achieved through the development of a harmonised campaign plan along multiple lines of operation, as described above.

Mission Command

25. It has been argued that Mission Command cannot be applied in COIN but this is misunderstanding of what mission command involves. Clearly, political considerations will permeate down to the lowest tactical level. This will inevitably constrain the freedom of action of junior military commanders, which could have the effect of restricting initiative at the lower levels. But paradoxically this makes mission command even more important.
26. Certain matters will need to be laid down in great detail. Relationships between agencies must be spelled out, demarcation lines established and precise SOPs written, particularly in joint operations with other agencies or allies. Sensitive relationships with the media, the Security Forces of neighbouring states and the public must be carefully defined. However, because contact with the insurgent will be rare

it is essential to seize fleeting opportunities. In certain operational environments there may also be considerable freedom of action, for example in remote areas junior commanders will have no option but to use their initiative.

27. But fundamentally the spirit of mission command does apply in COIN because in a politically charged atmosphere it is even more important that soldiers understand both their task and the purpose behind it. Subordinates well versed in mission command are able to work within constraints, and thus avoid the many pitfalls which await the unwary. It will be important for directives and orders to express the concept of operations in such a way that everyone understands not just the aim, but the atmosphere which is to be created.
28. COIN places heavy demands and calls for particular skills and professional qualities, both in commanders at all levels and the troops they lead. It requires the ability to adapt and utilise an unconventional yet highly disciplined approach to soldering. One of the keys to mission command working in COIN lies in the selection and education of commanders and preparing troops prior to and throughout operations. Relevant and realistic training should focus not simply upon military skills, but upon those aspects which troops will find most demanding or fruitful, including legal rights and obligations, languages, media awareness and cultural orientation. In COIN simply being able to hold a polite conversation with a civilian is a military 'skill' that may need to be developed in training.
29. There are clearly risks in employing delegated decision making. Troops need clear and comprehensive orders, orders which link the commander's intent with SOPs. This approach adds an extra safeguard to minimise the risk of a commander jeopardising the political aim. Most junior commanders and soldiers will not need to know the details of how the strategy is constructed, but through Mission Command they will have a feel for what is expected of the Army, what the constraints are and why.

SECTION 5 - THE CORE FUNCTIONS

30. Doctrine is intended to guide, and thus help to view the overall government campaign and the military element of it through the prism of the core functions; find, fix and strike. The role of various agencies and the part they are to play will be expressed in the overall campaign director's concept of operations. The intelligence services, elements of the Army (both covert and overt) and other government agencies 'find' the enemy by gathering all available information on him. The uniformed services, the Police and the spending departments of government - combined with diplomatic efforts and an active Hearts and Minds campaign (including P INFO) - 'fix' the insurgent. Locally raised forces can also help to 'fix' and have been employed in numerous COIN campaigns to good effect. Special Forces overt military and police units PSYOPS and the legal system spearhead the government's campaign to 'strike', which is also carried on through socio-economic 'operations', such as reorganising local government, creating jobs and improving social services.

SECTION 6 - INFORMATION OPERATIONS

General

31. In COIN the strategic application of Information Operations is primarily concerned with gaining the command advantage at national level, and the preparation and implementation of a strategic information plan. In the former case, this would involve the protection of government and alliance command centres and the disruption of the equivalent command centres within any insurgent organisation; in the latter case, the implementation of the strategic information plan covers the acquisition and control of the information available to an insurgent organisation by all national means. The targets of this information war may include political, financial, commercial and public media sources as well as military resources.

Command and Control Warfare (C2W)

32. The military part of Information Operations is C2W which is defined as the integrated use of all military capabilities including Operations Security (OPSEC), Psychological Operations (PSY OPS), Deception, Electronic Warfare (EW) and Physical Destruction, supported by All Source Intelligence and Communications and Information Systems (CIS), to deny information to, influence, degrade or destroy an adversary's C2 capabilities, while protecting friendly C2 capabilities against similar actions.

Application of C2W

33. These five disciplines listed in para 32 can stand alone, but are most effective when integrated to form an over-arching C2W strategy. Any C2W cell should be within the G3/J3 operations structure, but its function involves a complex inter-relation of all staff areas. There is potential for mutual interference between the different components of C2W operations: this underscores the need for close coordination at all levels.
34. The use of EW and the destruction of C2 sites may not be so applicable in COIN operations, although this will depend on the nature of the insurgency and the way insurgents operate.

Preparing a Strategic Information Plan

35. It is recognised that different counter insurgency campaigns will have differing calls on the use of Information Operations and C2W as the campaign progresses. However, experience shows that little attention has previously been given to the preparation of an overall strategic information plan in counter insurgency situations; Suez in 1956 being the most glaring example.
36. Despite the potential difficulties and frustrations involved, a commander could reap handsome military dividends if a sound and properly supported strategic information plan is prepared and subsequent C2W planning is conducted as an integral part of the operational and tactical plans that would be necessary in any counter insurgency campaign. This could equally apply to other OOTW campaigns.

37. An illustrative diagram that describes the functions that operate within the scope of Information Operations, both in peace and war, is shown at Annex D.

SECTION 7 - INTEGRATING OPERATIONS

Deep Operations

38. In COIN just as in warfighting, the core functions will be executed within the now familiar operational framework. But in COIN the concept needs a broader interpretation. Deep operations at the strategic and operational levels will often tend to be political, diplomatic and psychological in nature. Military involvement may be through covert action by special units. At a tactical level, overt deep operations, such as cross border cooperation and surveillance of areas where known insurgents live and work, will contribute to fixing. Militarily, deep operations will be decisive at the strategic and operational level, but rarely so at the tactical level. Until the insurgent is found he has the initiative and it is impossible to conduct any further deep or subsequent close operations against him. The finding function is a prerequisite to starting any subsequent operations - despite it being often very difficult to identify an insurgent when he can blend himself into society. This prerequisite should also endure throughout the campaign - once lost the insurgent has the initiative back again. A police or military unit (covert or overt) tasked with conducting deep operations may be given a variety of surveillance tasks and/or disruptive tasks, such as infiltrating the financial dealings of an insurgency, or conducting overt checks to break up or expose an insurgents' patterns of behaviour and lines of communications.

Close Operations

39. Close operations normally take place at the tactical level in counter insurgency operations. Those operations involving fixing tasks should normally be aimed to reassure the general public and foster improved community relations. Where it involves striking against the insurgency, it is essential that the deep operation has already found and fixed the insurgent group and thus initiative is ensured. However often close operations are reactive to an insurgent groups' activities and there is no time for a pre-planned deep operation. On these occasions the fixing has to be carried out as part of the close operation - the key to success is to wrest the initiative from the insurgent as quickly as possible in order that the force can manoeuvre to a position from which it can then strike.

Rear Operations

40. Rear operations in COIN will attract a higher priority than they generally do in offensive operations in war, and may need a commensurately greater priority in terms of operational planning, staff effort and resources. The aim is not simply physical protection of the force, but also securing political and public support, from which all government freedom of action flows. The insurgent commander may have identified non-military targets, such as VIPs or economic assets as government vulnerabilities and have selected them as decisive points in his campaign. That being the case, government forces are likely to become more heavily committed to protective duties

than they would wish. Whilst the aim will always be to secure and hold the initiative by means of aggressive action, significant numbers of troops are likely to be needed until locally recruited militias can be organised to take their place and technological aids put in place. This has important implications for training, force structuring and the timing of offensive operations in the military campaign plan. Counter insurgency campaigns are often long, protracted affairs and the establishment of secure operating bases, lines of communication, maintaining public support and recruiting local militia are carried out to enable the security forces to sustain a long operation. Hence the value of rear operations to the overall campaign plan. An example of the use of an operational framework for the media in a COIN campaign is given at Annex C to this Chapter.

Summary

41. Over and above the integration of deep close and rear operations there is a discrete and undefined balance between the application of deterrence reassurance and attrition. Maintaining a firm and clear political and military deterrent to insurgents and their activities helps to reassure public opinion and local support for government policies and plans, while attrition, when properly focused and directed, can remove hard core activists and reduce the ability of insurgents to act coherently.

DOCTRINAL DYSFUNCTION IN ALGERIA 1957-60

THE ACTIONS OF GENERALS MASSAU AND CHALLE

General Massu and the Battle of Algiers

1. In February 1957, General Jacques Massu took his 10th Parachute Division into Algiers to clear the ALN (Armée de Libération Nationale, the military wing of the FLN, Front de Libération Nationale) and the OPA (Organisation Politico-Administrative, its logistic, financial support and recruiting wing) out of the Casbah. Militarily, the operation was most effective. Using informers, hidden under blankets, to identify urban guerrillas, turncoat terrorists to hunt down their former comrades and the 'ilot' (islet) system, whereby heads of households were made responsible for their families and others for streets and neighbourhoods, the FLN was soon rooted out. By the end of the month the FLN leadership had fled to neighbouring Tunisia and by November both the ALN and the OPA had been reduced to impotence.
2. However, allegations were made that torture had been used to extract information from reluctant detainees and thus did not help the French Governments efforts to control Algerian insurgency. The Secretary General of the Algiers Prefecture Maitre Teitgen's comment that "All right Massau won the battle of Algiers, but this meant losing the war", indicated that there was a severe dysfunction between the government and the military authorities about how the counter insurgency should be waged, and how it should be won.

The Challe Plan

3. Two years later, Maurice Challe, a charismatic, rugger-playing Air Force general, was appointed CinC, Algeria. He brought a breath of fresh air to the scene. Reducing the number of troops deployed in penny packets on the *quadrillage* framework system to strengthen the mobile reserve, he used the latter to attack and disrupt the *katibas* once they had been identified and pinned down, or 'marked', in the General's rugby parlance, by the Commandos de Chasse and the Muslim *harki* tracker units. Operations 'Courroie' (Strap) and 'Jumelles' (Binoculars) were very successful in clearing the open, rolling hills of the Onarsenis Mountains, and even the rougher Kabylie and Hodna ranges, of ALN guerrillas.
4. The methods, which like other counter insurgencies, included the forcible removal of large sections of the population to regroupment centres to isolate the *moudjahiddine* from the population and to interdict the ALN's supply lines with Tunisia. The operation added thousands to the large numbers already living in degrading conditions of the regroupment centres and also to the bolder spirits who escaped to swell the discontented urban population and join the ALN later. When the sordid details of a centre near Philippeville were published in *Le Figaro* in June 1959 the scandal became such a political embarrassment that the regroupment scheme had to be wound down.

Stories of torture inflicted to obtain information to prosecute the Challe Plan, in spite of the de Gaulle government's determined efforts to stop the malpractice, added further fuel to the propaganda fire.

Summary

5. The military successes of Massu and Challe were followed by others but all to no avail. The Algerian determination to be free of French rule and *colon* domination survived defeat after defeat in the field. Too much bad blood had occurred already between all parties to the insurgency in spite of all the good aid and resettlement work done by the devoted and popular *kepis bleus* of the Sections Administratives Spécialisées out in the *bled*. The French had lost the Algerians' hearts and minds.

THE APPLICATION OF DOCTRINE IN COIN

ATTACKING THE INSURGENTS WILL


1. **General.** There are many ways in which it is possible to attack and seize the initiative from an insurgent group. Experience has shown that a combination of activities simultaneously applied has the best chance of success. These can be categorised in three ways which are covered in the next three paragraphs.
2. **Preemption.** The aim here, as in war, is to identify and exploit the fleeting opportunity in order to maximise surprise. Faced with an elusive insurgent, considerable emphasis should be placed upon preemption. He or she must be constantly destabilised by a proactive political and information campaign to deny the points and potential points of grievance: for example, the announcement of a timetable for independence robbed the Malayan Communist Party of its main political plank. Military success in preemptive operations will depend on a responsive intelligence system, linked with a rapid decision making process in such a way that the detection of an opportunity can be translated into a successful contact. A surveillance capability, perhaps along the lines developed in Northern Ireland, will help facilitate successful preemptive operations. In COIN it is frequently the case that one success leads to opportunities for another: an arrest may lead to the discovery of an arms cache and so on. Special Forces and Quick Reaction Forces must be available, properly positioned and able to exploit unplanned opportunities to strike at the insurgency. There should be scope to develop new tactics, such as the novel use of parachute troops by the Rhodesian Army during their counter insurgency campaign in the 1970s. The degree of preemptive action attempted by the security forces will in part be governed by an assessment of its overall impact, and is therefore likely to be controlled at a relatively high level. The potential to achieve spectacular military successes, like the American operation to capture the Achille Lauro hijackers or Israeli air strikes against guerrilla bases for example, will need to be balanced against political (including media and legal) implications.
3. **Dislocation.** The emphasis here is on denying the insurgents the opportunity to make best use of his resources. It will include deterrence and security measures designed to protect vulnerable targets; search operations; overt surveillance of potential mounting areas for insurgent attacks or meeting places; and a proactive Public Information (P INFO) stance. Effective rear operations, although frustrating and unpopular with troops, deny the insurgent the spectacular success on which his political appeal often rests. The results of a determined effort to dislocate the insurgent may not be spectacular and may not even be apparent to troops on the ground, but over time will rob the insurgent of the initiative. Both imagination, to design new tactics, and a high degree of discipline, in order to remain unpredictable, are required.

4. ***Disruption.*** The intention is to attack the insurgent selectively, targeting his most important assets and so throwing him into confusion. Well executed overt military operations will help to disrupt the insurgent by threatening his deployment and escape routes, locating his arms caches and restricting his movements. Even the threat of aggressive covert operations can be effective. Disruption calls for tactical awareness and cunning. Troops should also appreciate that rare opportunities may be better exploited by other agencies (a minor arms find for example could, if left undisturbed, become a fruitful ambush site for Special Forces). Speed and alertness will be essential to get inside the insurgent's decision cycle. Reserves must be available and the commander must have the ability to shift the main effort rapidly. Mission command clearly has a key role to play. At the lowest tactical level thorough training and briefing must ensure that everyone - helicopter crews or drivers of ration trucks as much as soldiers on guard duty - recognise, report and where necessary act on combat indicators. Contingency plans, based on thorough preparation and assessment, will allow the security forces to exploit advantages, such as relatively greater mobility and better communications, once the insurgent shows his hand.

THE APPLICATION OF DOCTRINE IN COIN - AN EXAMPLE OF THE MEDIA IN AN OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK

1. The application of doctrine and how it can help to organise the examination of a complex problem can be illustrated by looking at the media in terms of the operational framework. The example takes the case of a British force deployed to assist a foreign government threatened by a sophisticated insurgency. The illustration interprets the insurgents exploitation of the media in terms of deep, close and rear operations. The insurgent will attempt to capitalise on local issues, such as alleged assaults on 'innocent' people by the security forces (his 'close and rear' battle), national issues such as the presence of a foreign 'colonial power' (his 'close and deep' battle) and international media opportunities such as allegations of torture and similar breaches of international law (his 'deep' battle). The insurgent may not be constrained by a top heavy bureaucracy or a requirement to tell the truth. Because he initiates many of the contacts, he can also prepare his PR plan in advance to exploit surprise and stay inside the government decision/action cycle. Indeed, his operations may be deliberately designed as 'PR ambushes'.
2. To win this aspect of the Hearts and Minds battle requires freedom of action, a coherent (which very often means simple) and truthful message which must be presented to the deep, close and rear audiences simultaneously, with the right tempo (old news is no news), and by credible spokesmen, often the junior commanders involved in a particular incident. Putting them in front of the camera entails an element of risk, but acknowledges that the more senior the spokesman, the less believable the message generally becomes.
3. When dealing with the media, the relationship between military forces and local police and auxiliary forces should be clearly defined and agreements reached on who leads when dealing with the media and in what circumstances. Procedures for liaison and consultation should be routinely established so that the relationship between the various parts of the security forces remains dynamic and positive.
4. In their 'close' media operation, the Security Forces attempt to wrest the PR initiative from the insurgent by appealing directly to the local population. If the population are hostile or intimidated, access to the media becomes a 'gap', a means of outflanking the insurgent and 'attacking' his most vulnerable area. This also entails acceptance of risk - not all interviews will go well, despite specialised training. But over time a willingness to address local concerns will create and reinforce a public perception of fairness, balance and accountability. Criticism of the Army in local newspapers, typically over inconvenience caused by delays at VCPs or allegations of harassment, are best answered by the CO of the unit responsible. If allowed, he may actively seek opportunities to reach the broad mass of the people through local radio, television or public meetings. This technique has been adopted with spectacular results by UNTAC in a different setting.

5. When the UN operation in Cambodia was threatened by insurgent interference and propaganda the UN set up its own radio station to support the electoral process and reassure the population. The authorities' 'deep' media operation is aimed at the will of the insurgent by casting doubt upon his prospects for success and attacking his political ideology. It also targets his sources of external support via international media opportunities. The government 'rear' media campaign is conducted in the UK to reinforce public support for British troops (an important morale factor) and in theatre, perhaps to reassure the population in a 'pacified' area that by supporting the government they have made the correct decision.



Illustrative Diagram of the Components that Contribute to Information Operations

CHAPTER 3

THE PRINCIPLES OF COUNTER INSURGENCY OPERATIONS

'The first thing that must be apparent when contemplating the sort of action which a government facing insurgency should take, is that there can be no such thing as a purely military solution because insurgency is not primarily a military activity. At the same time there is no such thing as a wholly political solution either, short of surrender, because the very fact that a state of insurgency exists implies that violence is involved which will have to be countered to some extent at least by the use of force.'

General Sir Frank Kitson

SECTION 1 - PRINCIPLES

A Matter of Balance

1. There has never been a purely military solution to revolution; political, social, economic and military measures all have a part to play in restoring the authority of a legitimate government. The security forces act in support of the civil authority in a milieu in which there is less certainty than in conventional war. The problem is that, working on insufficient information, at least in the early stages, decisions have to be made affecting every aspect of political, economic and social life in the country. These decisions have repercussions for the nation far beyond its borders, both in the diplomatic field and in the all important sphere of public opinion.
2. Theories, strategies and tactics come and go depending upon circumstances or merely intellectual fashion (the five main British COIN manuals published since 1949 have included several different lists of principles). What remains a constant is the fact that insurgency and counter insurgency are essentially about the battle to win and hold popular support, both at home and in the theatre of operations. If the strategic focal point is public opinion, both domestic and international, most initial military tactical efforts will be focused on breaking the link between the insurgent and the people. If the insurgent can be isolated, it is then theoretically a relatively simple matter to eliminate him and his cause.
3. Unfortunately, governments and armies have often been wrongfooted at the outbreak of insurgency. Meanwhile the broad mass of the people may hesitate to see which side appears to have the best prospects. That which can organise first, developing a tailor made strategy which is both effective and attractive will be at a significant advantage. Hence the value of principles upon which a successful government strategy can be based. Their practical application is much more difficult, and the key, is an objective and thorough appreciation. Taking two dramatically different outcomes of the same concept illustrates the dangers of trying to 'template' particular ideas and theories without taking due account of the operational environment. In Malaya the strategic hamlets policy worked well, because in addition to separating the Chinese

squatter population from the insurgents, it also satisfied one of the 'squatters' basic demands, namely their own land - which in turn gave them a stake in the future of the country. In Vietnam the same tactic, insensitively applied due to cultural misperception, simply alienated the peasants and drove them into the arms of the Viet Cong. The Vietnamese owned family farms, and many were Animists, in that they worshipped the very land that they were being taken from. The policy backfired, increasing the regime's unpopularity and boosting support for the Viet Cong.

4. Principles offer the civil leadership and the heads of all agencies, including the military commander, both a startpoint and useful signposts. They also help guard against panic-driven or flawed attempts to initiate a military 'solution'. The French made the mistake of creating a rigid plan based upon their experience in Indo-China, the *guerre revolutionnaire*, and tried to apply it in Algeria. ADP Vol 1 *Operations* lists three general guidelines derived from experience and the work of General Kitson and Sir Robert Thompson. Whilst the relative weight given to each will vary from case to case, British doctrine adheres strictly to the additional mandatory guidelines of minimum necessary force and legitimacy. Note therefore that some of the techniques which were successfully applied in previous campaigns, such as certain interrogation methods, or the relative ease with which the legal system was adapted, are simply no longer viable: they would be unacceptable either domestically or internationally.

The Principles

5. The six COIN principles are arranged into a logical sequence which provides a government with a general pattern on which to base and review its COIN strategy. Like all principles they should be applied pragmatically and with common sense to suit the circumstances peculiar to each campaign. It may not be possible, or appropriate to apply all the principles, - and in some situations it may be observed that the detailed application of these principles may overlap, or even temporarily run counter to the overall aim of the campaign. The principles¹ are:
 - a. Political Primacy and Political Aim.
 - b. Coordinated Government Machinery.
 - c. Intelligence and Information.
 - d. Separating the Insurgent from his Support.
 - e. Neutralising the Insurgent.
 - f. Longer Term Post-Insurgency Planning.

SECTION 2 - POLITICAL PRIMACY AND POLITICAL AIM

Formulating the Aim

6. **General.** Once it has been assessed that an insurgency has or could be developed, the government should move rapidly to provide an analysis of the type of insurgency it faces and its subsequent implications; then it should decide how to stop, neutralise or reverse the consequences of such an insurgency. At the same time the government and its agencies have to respond positively to the violence and intimidation generated by the insurgency. It is in the latter response that a force commander can play an effective part by advising the government of the role, scope and potential of the military forces available in any counter insurgency planning, - and how this potential can be matched to the governments own political, legislative and economic aims. The government should therefore formulate long-term political aims which will be backed by political and economic programmes. These in turn will be supported by a counter-insurgency plan involving the police, the armed forces and any locally raised militias, home guards and other auxiliary units.
7. **Intergovernmental Agreement on Aims.** The overall plan of campaign will be a function of government. Before HMG agrees to support an ally in a counter-insurgency campaign the two governments would need to agree on the overall aims, the role British forces will play and whether there are any constraints on their employment.
8. **A British Force Commander's Position vis-à-vis an Ally.** A British commander of a force invited by an allied government will only be able to advise his ally. If he needs further guidance in what will probably be a complex situation, or if his advice is ignored he will be able to consult or have recourse to appeal through the senior British political representative, probably the Ambassador or High Commissioner. If there is still disagreement on an important matter of principle the question would be referred to HMG for decision. In an extreme case, if no agreement can be reached, this might lead to the withdrawal of forces.
9. **Suiting the Plan to the Circumstances.** The overall plan will differ from country to country taking account of local circumstances and the analysis of the type of insurgency faced. Previous experience and the appropriate use of the principles outlined in para 5 should be used to set any plan of campaign into an overall political context. Once this has been settled, then a clear and achievable government aim can be agreed, and should, in the right circumstances, be given as much publicity as possible.

SECTION 3 - COORDINATED GOVERNMENT MACHINERY

Control and Coordination

10. **Functions to be Coordinated.** Given the complexity and potential for friction within any large organisation, unity of effort is a prerequisite for success. It is a fact that different agencies will approach the strategic goal from different directions and with

different philosophies. The ideal is for the government to give one person overall responsibility for the direction of the government campaign allowing differences of opinion between agencies to be resolved by an impartial Director. This could be a soldier, but is more likely to be a politician or civil servant; in any case he will be working to strict government guidelines and overall control. What should be achieved is a joint command and control structure.

11. **The Single Command System.** In the single command system the chairman is the commander, usually a soldier, and the senior civil service, police and military commanders his advisers. While the advisers have liaison links with their equivalents at the levels above and below them, all policy and executive authority is vested in the military commanders throughout the chain. To be successful, the single command system requires an outstandingly able commander and a relatively uncomplicated insurgency threat with no serious internal complications, apart from the insurgency itself, and no major external threat. This system may appear to run counter to the approach that military forces are in support of the civil authorities, particularly if the chairman is a soldier. However the chairman would be acting on behalf of the government, would have military and civilian advisers and could easily be the only suitable person who has sufficient knowledge and experience of government machinery and military matters to cope with the insurgency. This point becomes more relevant if the insurgency has been allowed to develop unchecked or if radical measures are necessary retrieve the situation.
12. **The Committee System.** Under the committee system, initiated by Lieutenant-General Briggs when appointed Director of Operations in Malaya in 1950 and subsequently much favoured by the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth, the civil administration provides the chairman while the police and the armed forces find the members in the shape of the police and military commanders at each level in the administrative hierarchy. Decisions are taken jointly and implemented by the chairman and members through their own civil service, police and military command structures. The members will be advised and assisted in the implementation of policy by officials responsible for the functioning of the civil service, intelligence and psychological operations. Each of the members has the right of appeal to his superior in his own service, who will usually represent that service on the committee at the next highest level. This description of the committee system may need to be altered to suit the circumstances of the time. It worked well in Malaya but was not suitable elsewhere. The structure of committees can be applied flexibly, and the command arrangements at government level adjusted to suit the circumstances of the day.
13. **Personalities.** Both the Single Command and the Committee System will depend almost exclusively on the personalities of the individuals involved. In a serious situation which involves emergencies and counter insurgency action many different opinions and views will emerge and these will have to be clearly reconciled.. The examination of several historical examples shows that there is invariably a dominant personality involved in the business of a successful counter insurgency. Any system of control and coordination should be capable of adaption to suit the personalities of those involved. These two types of system should be used as the basis for further adaption to suit local circumstances.

14. **Assistance to Allies.** If the British Army provides military assistance to a friendly foreign state any forces assigned would necessarily be subordinate to its government in order to preserve the host nation's sovereignty and the government's credibility in the eyes of its people. The forces would be obliged to adopt the coordination system of the host nation but the existence of a satisfactory arrangement would probably be a condition for British support. It is possible that advice may be sought on the subject. In so far as policy is concerned this advice would probably be offered at government level but the British contingent commander may be able to make a valuable contribution tactfully at his own level.

Government Planning

15. **Initial Shortages.** However rich or poor the country, the government will be beset by a wide variety of problems. There will always be a lack of all resources in a poor country, and a lack of forces and trained manpower in many developed countries to meet a serious threat.
16. **Appreciating the Situation.** When the government is making its appreciation as to which of its objectives can best be attained with the help of the armed forces, the latter's professional, military advisers will be able to explain their forces' capabilities and limitations in the context of the particular emergency. An analysis of the situation should reveal the areas in which the government and the insurgents are most vulnerable. These vulnerabilities are likely to be spread over the entire political, economic, cultural and security spectrum. A diagrammatic 'net assessment is given at Annex A to this Chapter which provides a useful illustration of the scope necessary to combat insurgency effectively. The aim will be to identify those government vulnerabilities which are best suited to military defensive action and those of the insurgents which are most susceptible to offensive military action.
17. **Allocating Priorities.** The coordinated national plan which would emerge from the above appreciation should cover the entire political, economic, administrative, operational and intelligence fields. Based on the analysis of the type of insurgency faced two priorities stand out , - where do the insurgents obtain their most support, and what actions by the government will achieve meaningful results quickly. An urban insurgency will require different priorities to a rural based insurgency. It may be necessary to close borders as a preliminary to actions elsewhere. The priorities would need to be addressed at this stage of the planning process. In addition other allocations of tasks and resources will follow once the major priorities are established such as:
 - a. Roles and responsibilities between government departments to avoid a duplication of effort and muddle, and to close loopholes.
 - b. Priority of action between the main fields of government activity: economic, social, military and administration. Some careful planning and coordination is required to ensure that when areas are brought under military control they can be administered and supported economically in order to avoid them falling back into insurgent control again.

- c. Priorities within each field of activity. It is necessary to apportion the intelligence, operational and logistic effort between protecting the base area, rooting out the subversive infrastructure and destroying the insurgent forces. The dilemma is particularly acute where the insurgents are pursuing a different types of activity in different parts of the country simultaneously. This kind of assessment should lead to a decision on, the geographical and demographic priorities for dealing with the insurgency. Some distant areas may have to be abandoned for the time being in order to secure a base and expand control into nearer and more important areas.
18. **Government Campaign Plans.** The government should plan a campaign which would force the insurgents on to the defensive on the political and military fronts and to oblige them to react to the government's initiatives. Protecting the population will usually have priority in the initial stages to rally support behind the government, to provide firm bases for the expansion of government controlled areas and to begin the process of wearing down and eventually eliminating the insurgent threat. It takes time to lay the foundations of a plan to beat a determined and well organized insurgency. If support for the government can be maintained there will be a temptation to go for a quick fix. This should be discarded in favour of longer term planning for what is essentially a war of attrition waged with the indispensable aid of good intelligence.

Military Planning

19. The military commander will adopt a similar approach to making his Campaign Estimate for a COIN campaign as he would for a more conventional war. The process should, ideally start with the issue of a Strategic Directive by CDS. In a perfect world it would spell out precisely the government's strategic goals and desired national aims. However, in practice the government may be unable or unwilling to be so specific. Defining the political aims for the campaign might entail revealing the concessions which it is prepared to make, or what the 'acceptable' level of violence might be. Even the characterisation of events as an insurgency may be unpalatable. These are sensitive issues, ones which politicians may not wish to address. So defining what is meant by military success when the overall government position is not clear may be difficult. In practice this may mean that the military commander is forced to make some general assumptions about the eventual goals of the campaign, and base his detailed planning upon the short and medium term security requirements. Such a vacuum highlights the usefulness of general principles to guide and organise planning. In the climate of crisis which the emergence of an insurgency can generate, the deceptive lure of the 'quick fix' may be enticing.
20. Planning on the basis of the government aims will lead to a more precise estimate of the type of forces required and how they might best be used. The roles of the armed forces can then be broken down into phases and objectives to be achieved in an agreed order of priority. Again, these objectives will determine the training programme for the units committed to the theatre.
21. As the situation develops it will be necessary to review and alter detailed lines of operation as conditions evolve, decisive points are reached, or set-backs occur.

Because military commanders are unlikely to control the campaign, they may frequently have to adapt their plans to accord with the higher priorities of other agencies. Similarly, it may be necessary to impose an operational pause on military operations, perhaps during a ceasefire or to allow peace talks to take place.

The Military Aim

22. It follows that in COIN the military aim is not identical to the political aim, but it and the tactics employed to achieve it must be complementary. In Malaya for example, the Briggs Plan, was directed at separating the insurgent from the population, hunting down and destroying the isolated communist terrorists. The military aim provides a focus for all operations and because the insurgency may be widespread, determines the allocation of scarce resources. A commander may express his aim in a number of ways; the elimination of a specific guerrilla band, control of all road movement in a given sector, or the protection of key points and local officials for example. The aim can be achieved using all of the conventional methods: narrowing of boundaries, grouping, CS and CSS allocation etc. To these can be added specific COIN aspects like reorganisation and redistribution of staff effort; the allocation of intelligence and covert agencies; raising specialised COIN units; active P Info; PSYOPS; and allocating G5 community relations resources. The commander will utilise manoeuvre resources to concentrate force against the insurgent, unhinging him by means of surprise, speed and firepower. Superior technology will, if used judiciously, provide the commander with the means to make the least use of manoeuvre to enable him to shift his main point of attack faster than the insurgent.

SECTION 4 - INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION

23. ***The Overriding Importance of Intelligence.*** Those involved with insurgency work amongst the population in secret, especially in the early phases of any campaign, and only emerge as overt organizations in those parts of the country which they occupy as base areas during later stages. They still work covertly in areas where the government is still contesting control. Their bases in friendly neighbouring countries and their command, propaganda, recruiting and logistic organizations in sympathetic states operate under the protection of those states. Good intelligence is perhaps the greatest asset for a government combating an insurgency. Without it the security forces work in the dark and random offensive operations on this basis produce nothing positive and much negative reaction amongst the population involved in the theatre and from within the international forum as a whole.
24. ***Local Knowledge.*** Knowledge of the country, its ethnic composition, culture, religions and schisms, the political scene and party leaders, the clandestine political organizations and their undercover armed groups, the influence of neighbouring states and the economy takes time to build up. Such background information is essential because intelligence relies on an ability to discern patterns of change in behaviour. An ability to speak the local languages is essential to understanding of cultural attitudes as well as to obtain information but the number of people who can speak the languages of a country which might invite our help may be small. The host nation police and its special branch should be the prime agencies for providing information and intelligence, and the best source is a member of the insurgency itself.

25. **The Organization Problem.** In normal times a small, centralized and secure system provides a relatively small amount of precise information on potential major threats for the head of government and a small number of ministers. Ideally, the intelligence organization should start expanding to match the threat as the insurgents develop the preparatory stage of their campaign. However, in the early stages it is difficult to assess the nature of the threat and to anticipate the extent to which it might develop. Financial constraints and an understandable political reluctance to expand, and possibly compromise, a secure organization are further inhibiting factors. Consequently, the enlargement of the service to provide the volume of detailed low level information down the chains of administrative and military command may not be put in hand soon enough. In the interests of liaison and cooperation it is necessary to produce an intelligence organization which parallels the machinery of command and coordination from the highest to the lowest levels. To provide reliable information for commanders and staffs at formation and unit level the principle of decentralization must be accepted and applied. Inevitably, there will be an embarrassing interval before the expanded organization becomes effective. Intelligence is dealt with in detail in Chapter 6.

SECTION 5 - SEPARATING THE INSURGENT FROM HIS SUPPORT

26. **General.** The aim here is to deny the insurgents information, logistics, recruits, safe bases and popular support. This is achieved both through physical separation, but equally important is a coordinated attempt to win the psychological battle for 'Hearts and Minds', closely linked to the need for the government side to retain legitimacy.
27. **Firm Base.** In this the first requirement is to secure the base areas essential to the survival of the government and, state, its capital, the points of entry, key installations and those areas which are loyal to the government. The provision of security in those vital areas encourages their inhabitants to rally to the government.
28. **Oil Slick Method of Expanding Secured Areas.** Initially it may have to be accepted that the insurgents might control the remote areas in the hinterland, inaccessible jungle and mountain country and territory adjoining the borders of a state friendly to the insurgents. Success could lie in applying a long term, methodical, oil slick policy.¹ As each area is consolidated, loyal local forces would be raised to secure the area to release mobile regular troops to secure the next area while the host state's civil administration and police reestablished themselves in the recently liberated territory. This is a well tried approach to combating an insurgency.
29. **Eliminating of the Insurgent Subversive Support System.** The rooting out of the insurgents' subversive and support organizations is more important than, and an essential prerequisite to, defeating any active insurgent groups because:
- a. The subversive organization controls the population of the towns and villages, denies government popular support and prevents witnesses from volunteering information on dissidents and giving evidence in court.

1. From the French tache d'ouille strategy in Algeria during the 1950's and has been utilised again by the FIS in fighting the Algerian government in the last two years (1993-95).

- b. Insurgent groups will continue to receive food supplies, recruits and information on the security forces from the population as long as their support organization remains intact.
 - c. Once the subversive organization is destroyed the insurgents are unable to swim like Mao Tse-tung's fish in a friendly sea of the people.² They are forced to approach the people direct to obtain money, food and information, exposing themselves to ambush and arrest by the security forces.
 - d. The subversive elements arrested are the best informants on the illegal organization. They require careful handling by expert staff.
30. **Separation Methods.** A skilful combination of methods is needed to separate the insurgents from their subversive and supporting organizations:
- a. Intelligence to identify subversive cells, usually a police special branch responsibility. In remote parts of the country where there is virtually no police presence special forces may establish bases, make friends with the villagers and eventually win their confidence to obtain identifications of the cell members.
 - b. Security force protection for residents and informers. This is easier said than done because political, subversive cells use subtle, and not so subtle, means of coercion.
 - c. The gradual spread of government control by the oil slick method.
 - d. Curfews and the searching of persons leaving their houses for work and returning in the evening to prevent the smuggling of food, weapons, explosives, messages, etc.
 - e. Patrols, ambushes and vehicle checks.
 - f. Interdiction campaigns against the entry of external supplies: It should be noted that the variation in methods to achieve this, they are not always successful, - indeed it is very often impossible to achieve a complete success. Examples of this are:
 - (1) Diplomatic; agreements with neighbouring or more distant countries to limit supplies of arms, ammunition, explosives and other items useful to the insurgents.
 - (2) Air interdiction campaign where appropriate, such as the US Air Force effort directed against the Ho Chi Minh Trail during the Vietnam campaign.

2. For the full quotation see Mao Tse-tung, *On Guerrilla Warfare*, translated by Samuel B Griffith III, Anchor Press, Doubleday, New York, 1978, page 83. 'Many people think it impossible for guerrillas to exist for long in the enemy's rear. Such a belief reveals lack of comprehension of the relationship that should exist between the people and the troops. The former may be likened to water and the latter to the fish who inhabit it. How may it be said that these two cannot exist together?'

- (3) Physical barriers, for instance, the successful application of the 'Morice Barrage' on the Tunisian border during the French Algerian campaign and the construction of the Leopard, Hornbeam and Hammer Lines between Dhofar and South Yemen during the Omani Campaign.
 - (4) Resettlement of vulnerable elements in protected areas, eg, the Chinese squatters in Malaya.
31. **Gaining International Support.** Winning the support of foreign governments and the sympathy of the majority of their people, or at least their benevolent neutrality, and obtaining a favourable attitude in the United Nations makes the task of dealing with an insurgency much easier. It may make all the difference between success and failure. Success in applying principles with a moral content, observance of the law, restraint in the use of force, gaining popular support and the benefits bestowed by the social and economic aspects of the national plan all help to produce a favourable international climate.
32. **Diplomacy.** Careful diplomacy will aim to:
- a. Confirm the government's credibility and standing as the legal government.
 - b. Discredit the insurgency movement as unrepresentative and criminal.
 - c. Convince the international community that the government's political aims are legitimate and that its methods are legal, moral and respectful of human rights.
 - d. Gain the support of allies in providing economic investment, advice, training and, if required, an advisory mission and a military contribution. The latter may be in the form of a military contingent, naval anti-gun-running patrols, air reconnaissance, troop lift, etc.
 - e. Deny the insurgents external support, including the use of cross-border sanctuaries.

SECTION 6 - NEUTRALISING THE INSURGENT

33. **Neutralisation.** The selective destruction of insurgents is an area in which the overt security forces of the government will have their most obvious impact and is fully addressed in later Chapters. Organisations and tactics must be adapted to suit the particular threat. Military operations can be conducted on a relatively large scale; often battalion or above.
34. **Patrolling.** But the basis of much successful COIN action is the junior commander leading a small patrol into the terrain the insurgent sees as his own. This is the area in which an army can function at its best and should be the focus for COIN training. The aim should be to defeat the insurgent on his ground using enough but no more force than is absolutely necessary.

SECTION 7 - LONGER TERM POST-INSURGENCY PLANNING

35. ***The Application of Government Plans.*** This last principle probably holds the key to the effective application of all the other five principles. Merely providing for the military, defeat of insurgents does not in any way end the government requirement to make suitable longer term plans to enhance the economic and social aspects of its population and to ensure that the political causes of the insurgency have been eliminated and overcome by effective planning. In the Dhofar campaign the end of insurgent activity occurred in December 1975, but the authorities had to work and plan hard for several more years to achieve continued support from the population before the causes of the insurgency had been fully rectified.
36. ***Publication of Longer Term Plans.*** The announcement of bold government initiatives to be started after the insurgency has been defeated can have a real and significant effect on winning the hearts and minds of the population during any campaign. Hence the need to formulate these initiatives at the same time as plans are prepared to defeat the insurgency. The timing of any statement about longer term plans could be of crucial importance and should be handled in a sensitive and controlled manner by the state authorities.

SECTION 8 - FACTORS BEARING ON THE PRINCIPLES FOR COIN

Popular Support

37. ***Insurgent Aims.*** An insurgency aims to discredit the government and its policy. It will have spent much time preparing the ground for insurgency with propaganda, using real and contrived discontents. When it considers that the government has been sufficiently undermined and that a significant part of the population has been alienated from authority it will use coercion and terror to reinforce its propaganda campaign. A few determined men using systematic terror can exact support from exposed sections of population.
38. ***Hearts and Minds.*** In a democracy, popular support is an essential prerequisite for success in a counter-insurgency campaign. Even the more traditional governments rely to some extent on the consent of the governed. A government must be able to convince its population that it can offer a better solution, better government and a better life than the opposing insurgents in order to win the hearts and minds of its people. There can be exceptions to this general argument. The black population in South Africa were in many ways better off economically than many other black populations in Southern and Central Africa during the last thirty years, - and yet were wholeheartedly behind the ANC in their efforts to change the whites only governments during this period. The regime of apartheid cut across all other political and economic factors.
39. ***The Competition for Loyalty.*** Just as an insurgency needs the sympathy or the acquiescence of a sizeable percentage of the population to survive and to overthrow the government, so the government needs the people's support to appear legitimate in its eyes and to obtain information leading to the arrest or capture of the terrorists.

Violence, or the threat of it, is aimed at the citizen's fears for his family and freedom to earn a wage to feed them. Whoever can guarantee a citizen's security can often command their allegiance. An insurgency is a competition between government and insurgent for the individual's loyalty. Unless the government can offer reasonable protection, individuals are unlikely to risk their own or their families' lives by volunteering information. The security forces will meet an invisible barrier of passive resistance in addition to the active resistance of the insurgents.

40. **Government Protection.** Protection involves irksome restrictions on the liberty of the individual. For example, to safeguard a community either in cities, urban areas or in countryside it may be necessary to establish guarded areas and to impose restrictions on movement, night curfews, identity checks, searches and controls to deny the insurgents their contacts. The insurgents will seek to misrepresent necessary inconveniences as harsh and oppressive. Consequently, the government and its security forces must anticipate a possible hostile public reaction to its security measures and prepare arguments to rebut insurgent propaganda in order to keep the initiative in the battle for the hearts and minds of the people.
41. **Involving the Population in the Campaign against Insurgents** Initially, when local areas are organized for defence, they should be allocated sufficient police or soldiers to provide protection. As soon as possible, however, communities should be encouraged to raise their own local defence forces from reliable elements. This is not just a matter of releasing the security force garrisons for more offensive operations. It is a question of mutual trust. The trust the community initially place in their protectors is repaid by the trust the government shows in them by allowing them to bear arms in a common cause.
42. **Countering Propaganda.** Insurgent propaganda must be monitored and answered convincingly using every possible outlet, such as newspapers, leaflets, radio and television. Depending on the circumstances in the host nation the media may either be government controlled or persuaded by briefing journalists and private television concerns. Specialist advice will be necessary. Possible sources of sound advice are sympathetic expatriates and friendly government advisers. In running a counter-insurgency propaganda campaign there is a risk of criticism on the grounds of eroding public freedom but the government and its security forces cannot afford to opt out. The insurgents will use propaganda, particularly to attack those government policies and security force operations which are damaging their popular support, infrastructure and insurgent forces. This is only to be expected but hostile propaganda will be much harder to answer if the security forces act outside the law. In short the government needs to be active in its use of propaganda, but it cannot afford to lie, to tell half truths, or to say things that turn out subsequently to be wrong. This is a difficult position which has to be overcome. See also Chapter 6 for further details of countering insurgent propaganda.

Political Awareness

43. **Sensitivity.** Just as the government must be sensitive to public reactions to its policy and the measures used to implement it so commanders at all levels and individual

soldiers must be aware of the consequences of any action they may take. This is especially important should an unexpected opportunity present itself or in a sudden emergency when there is no time to seek advice or direction from higher authority. Those with a knowledge of the political scene are better able to assess the likely effect of their actions on public opinion and to make a sensible decision. The psychological dimension is considered in Chapter 9.


44. **Briefing the Soldier.** All ranks must be briefed on government aims, insurgency aims and propaganda, and how the government plans to counter the latter. An understanding of the issues at stake ensures that soldiers know how to reinforce the government effort. The British soldier's flair for getting on with people at grass roots level should be exploited. Care should be taken not to express controversial opinions, still less become involved in the political life of the country.

The Law

45. **Legal Environment.** The legal framework within which the Army works generally is outlined in Chapter 1 and elsewhere. Because observance of the law and the use of only the minimum necessary force are of sufficient importance to merit consideration alongside the principles of COIN it is useful to expand on those essential elements in Chapter 1 which contribute to a better understanding of these important issues.
46. **Acting within the Law.** Although terrorists and insurgents use lawless and violent methods, maintaining that the end justifies the means, the security forces cannot operate outside the law without discrediting themselves, the government they are supporting and providing the dissident political machine with damaging propaganda material. If the government and its security forces lose the high moral ground the people have no incentive to back them. The police and the army must act within the law of the state within which they are operating and be seen to be doing so. Appropriate emergency powers can be introduced to meet particular threats posed by insurgents in the circumstances peculiar to a particular campaign. While changes to the law can always be made to meet a new insurgent ploy or threat, the security forces must always act within the law as it stands and not anticipate a change until it becomes legally enforceable.
47. **Clarifying the Legal Position.** The soldier must be in no doubt as to his position in relation to the law. Apart from the need to brief all ranks on the law as it affects powers of search, the use of force, arrest, evidence, and other pertinent matters on arrival in a new theatre, everyone must be kept up to date with the important aspects of any emergency regulations and subsequent amendments. Any new concept of operations at the higher level and new techniques, such as searching people and premises at the lower level, must be checked for legality. The Army Legal Service will provide both advice and a link with the host nation's legal system. Ease of application should be borne in mind when drafting emergency regulations in order to avoid misunderstandings and ambiguities which the insurgents will undoubtedly exploit.

Minimum Necessary Force

48. ***What Constitutes Minimum Necessary Force?*** No more force may be used than is necessary to achieve a legal aim. The amount used must be reasonable and it must not be punitive. Directly the aim is achieved no more force may be used.
49. ***Deterrent Show of Force.*** The need to use minimum force is not to be confused with deploying the minimum number of troops. The appearance of a force large enough to contain a situation at the right psychological moment may convince insurgents and other dissidents that the authorities are so well prepared and determined to prevent trouble that none occurs.
50. ***Unnecessary Provocation.*** On other occasions the display of force either prematurely or without sufficient justification may provoke the very confrontation the authorities wish to avoid. Whether to keep in the background or to deploy is a question of judgement and assessing the situation correctly. A military commander should be as wary of being committed to the unnecessary use of force by an excitable acting magistrate as of using more force than necessary.
51. ***Illegal Use of Force.*** Everyone must be aware of the constraints of the law. Failure to observe the law, to use force without justification or to employ an excessive amount of force may result in:
 - a. Prosecution.
 - b. Civil action for damages.
 - c. Discrediting the government, the alienation of those already critical of the government, as well as waverers, and the loss of government supporters.
52. ***Rules of Engagement (ROE).*** Whatever the circumstances of any military intervention or deployment in counter insurgency operations, agreed Rules of Engagement for all servicemen will be prepared prior to the start of any operations. These should take account of host nation requirements and British government obligations with regard to both national and international law. All troops involved in the area of operations should be issued with an aide memoire, or a coloured card to be carried at all times on duty. This card would give clear instruction on the rules governing the use of weapons and opening fire in certain circumstances.



Illustrative Net Assessment of an Insurgency

CHAPTER 4

A GOVERNMENT CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

SECTION 1 - THE PATTERN OF A COUNTER-INSURGENCY CAMPAIGN

Threat and Response

1. Insurgency movements grow slowly, methodically and work within the society they scheme to overthrow and replace. Initially, they work secretly and when they launch their overt campaign of speeches, demonstrations, strikes, marches and riots the clandestine organizational cells remain well hidden. So, the seriousness of the threat may not become apparent until the insurgents have exploited contentious issues to produce a situation which a democratic, pluralist society is ill-prepared to meet. Even then, a government is sometimes reluctant to recognize an incipient threat until it has developed into a serious challenge to its authority because of its aversion to abandoning the habitual routines of everyday life and administration.
2. Reaction to such a situation is too often belated and inadequate so that the initial government and security force response could easily be ill coordinated and ineffective. The establishment of an integrated intelligence service, a vital element in counter-insurgency operations, is apt to be tardy because of personal and interdepartmental rivalries and the lack of trained staff officers with sufficient local knowledge. If British forces are called in to support an ally the situation will almost certainly have deteriorated to a dangerous degree. While the host government will be anxious to obtain our help it will be necessary for the terms on which it is given to be agreed at inter-government level before British troops are committed. Amongst other things this will include an agreed aim for the plan of campaign and a joint command structure.
3. If the government's response is not to threaten the society and the institutions it wishes to protect, so giving the insurgents gratuitous ammunition for their campaign, its response should be measured and carefully graduated to meet the rising threat. On the strategic level action has to be coordinated across the whole spectrum of government activities. Within country measures to tackle the root cause of the problem may include the maintenance of law and order, the redress of grievances, legislation to enable the law to work effectively and economic initiatives to improve conditions. Abroad, diplomacy will aim to win support for the government's case and to discourage support for the insurgents.
4. A state of emergency is likely to be declared, particularly if the threat persists and becomes an attritional struggle. However, the need to deploy troops in support of the civil power in a law enforcement role in this country has been reduced by increasing the capacity of the police to deal with all but an armed challenge from insurgents.
5. In normal circumstances the British Armed Forces would only operate in support of the authorised civil power. It is not considered that a purely military solution to an insurgency is a feasible proposition because the political and social causes can only be remedied by political action. The armed forces contribution becomes more delicate and complicated as societies become more developed, sophisticated and complex.

Government Involvement

6. For convenience the government's response to a serious internal threat may be divided into three phases:
 - a. *The Threshold Circumstances.* This is the period when the threat is evolving and developing, when the government attempts to deal with it entirely by civil measures.
 - b. *Military Commitment.* During this phase the armed forces take an active part in supporting the government, the police and the host nation's military forces in helping to defeat the insurgents and restore law and order. Again, as force by itself cannot defeat an insurgency, its role in providing security and in eliminating insurgents should be seen in the context of furthering the government's long term political and economic aims. At the strategic level the government has to have a clear idea as to how the insurgency is to be defeated. It must give the armed forces a precise aim and a directive defining the objectives to be achieved. When operating in support of an ally the Senior British Officer's position in the chain of command, his responsibilities towards HMG, either directly or through a High Commissioner or Ambassador, should be the subject of a directive. Similarly, the British contingent's relationship with the ally on legal and other matters should be defined in a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).
 - c. *Withdrawal.* As its name implies this is the phase of military disengagement. In the event of an internal, and perhaps an international settlement, troops may be withdrawn quickly. Such a settlement might represent a compromise consummated by a government in the host state. In the worst case it could follow a government defeat, an insurgent seizure of power and an ignominious evacuation. However, on the assumption that, with allied support, the host nation wins, the government would retain the initiative to arrange an agreed programme for the withdrawal of the allied forces. In the case of a prolonged struggle of attrition in which the government regains control of its disaffected territory area by area and the insurgent infrastructure is gradually eroded the withdrawal phase may last some time.
7. The various phases may not be as clearcut as described in the last paragraph and, as indicated in sub-paragraph 6c, different parts of a country may be in different phases of the insurrectionary and recovery processes at any one time. Indeed, this is the most likely scenario. In addition, there is seldom a precise moment when one phase turns into another. Usually, the boundaries will be blurred. Military intelligence and planners must keep abreast of a developing situation, stay in touch with the civil authorities and police and be prepared to contribute suggestions through the system of ministerial control throughout the phases of an insurgency.
8. The involvement of British forces in another nation's internal affairs is a sensitive matter. The benefits of overt support would have to be weighed against the host nation's vulnerability to criticisms of inviting neo-colonialism. Much would depend on the nature and source of the threat to British interests and how much political capital

the government could gain or lose from any involvement. If a neighbouring state was clearly using and exacerbating a domestic problem to further its interests and ambitions or if the internal challenge was of such a nature as to attract a wide measure of condemnation in the international forum a British offer of substantial military help for a beleaguered government may well receive sufficient international support or at least acquiescence. In more marginal cases military assistance may be confined to advisory missions and training teams.

SECTION 2 - THRESHOLD CIRCUMSTANCES

Indicators

9. In a deteriorating situation, the government and civil authorities will be trying to detect the sources of subversion and to take such action as is within their power to remove the causes of unrest. They will be looking at indicators which, in the context of the political situation, will furnish circumstantial evidence as to the nature and extent of the threat. Individually, they may be unremarkable and innocuous but when seen in relation to each other they may reveal a particular tendency in a chain of events. Indicators may be provided by a wide range of seemingly unconnected occurrences such as strikes with a political motive in key industries, demonstrations in which a pattern of subversive political activity becomes apparent, rumours which discredit government ministers, local officials and the police, thefts of arms and explosives, bank robberies, seditious leaflets, propaganda from hostile countries and open or covert support from the embassies of unfriendly countries for extreme elements. Harder and firmer evidence of an organized campaign of violence will be the use or discovery of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), timing devices and heavy weapons of a military nature.
10. The security services in the country concerned may be able to interpret these events, taking into account local circumstances, and advise their senior officials and ministers accordingly. This appreciation is most important, since many of these incidents already occur with no subversive intent in normal times in democratic states. Assessing the significance of attitudes, issues and trends, and the appropriate level of response, calls for fine judgment at a time when central and local government is likely to be under severe pressure.

The Strain on Democracy.

11. Insurgents exploit the fertile ground democracies provide for terrorist initiatives but which are not so readily available in authoritarian regimes. The rights of free speech and freedom of movement can be exploited to promote their own cause. Should the government place restrictions on either to limit their activities, the insurgent propaganda machine will have ready-made issues with which to attack the authorities. While the insurgents will make the most of any security force infraction of the law, they will deliberately flout the legal system themselves, often justifying their actions by claiming that they should not be bound by a hostile code which they aim to discredit and destroy. The security forces are obliged to work within the law of the land while the insurgents can engineer compromising situations to entrap them. If the security forces were to

throw off their legal constraints and operate outside the law they would merely play into the insurgents' hands, destroying their reputation and tarnishing the image of the government.

12. All restrictive measures, whether of free expression, or in an extreme case, detention without trial, place a strain on democracy, and any decision to introduce them will not be taken lightly. Any measures chosen should be enforceable to avoid becoming counter productive. The insurgents who created the situation will be poised to exploit public disquiet and will find ways to evade restrictions. For example, censorship can be rendered at least partially nugatory if neighbouring countries provide a platform for revolutionary speakers and make their broadcasting services available to hostile propagandists. Underground newspapers have a way of surviving and flourishing notwithstanding restrictions.
13. A insurgent incident often brings a public demand for more extreme measures and governments will be under popular pressure to over-react. Indeed, provoking an ill-considered response is a classic insurgent tactic. Unnecessarily harsh and vexatious measures merely further the insurgents' aims of alienating moderate and sympathetic opinion within and outside the country. Some curbs on the publication of information and freedom of expression may be essential in the interests of security. They should be the minimum appropriate and the case for them carefully explained so that the insurgents are handed no unnecessary ammunition for a propaganda campaign to present the restrictions as oppressive infringements of constitutional liberties.
14. The government may conclude that a combination of selective legislation and small scale but precisely directed operations by the security forces would stand a good chance of nipping the insurgency in the bud. In practice, taking such a decision is never easy. An incipient insurgency situation presents a confused picture and it may be difficult to assess its seriousness and the possible extent of the threat. In such ambivalent circumstances it is hard to convince the local population that irritating initiatives are necessary, even when timely action on a modest scale may obviate the need for sterner measures later. Furthermore, sensitivity to potential repercussions on the domestic and international political scenes firmly incline a government towards the deferment of painful decisions. A sovereign state may be particularly anxious to avoid the political embarrassment of calling on a friendly government for help before an insurgency gains a dangerous foothold. Nevertheless, the penalty for pusillanimity and procrastination may be as disastrous for democracy as an ill-considered over-reaction. A prudent government will try to steer a deft course between the two.¹

Government Planning

15. ***Initial Planning.*** After several decades of international terrorist activity most governments have prepared contingency plans to deal with strikes in essential utilities and services, major demonstrations, public disorder and the occasional terrorist

1. The quandaries facing a government in determining the amount of force to be used and the opportunities for and the perils of negotiations in order to separate moderates from extremists are well illustrated by the attempts of successive Indian administrations to deal with the militant Sikh bid for independence.

atrocities, although they may not all have anticipated the need to deal with an insurgency. However, as the situation begins to deteriorate a government should review its plans and start preparing measures to meet an escalating threat. Out of the review should emerge a recognition of the causes of the threat, and thus the aims and objectives of the insurgency. From that, a master plan couched at strategic level can be prepared which sets out government's policy in the political, legislative, economic and security fields supported by a cogent persuasive and truthful public information campaign. The plan is likely to develop gradually as the gravity of the threat unfolds. Initially, the subjects of especial concern to the security forces may include:

- a. The formulation of the long term political aim.
- b. Reviewing the machinery for information and for countering propaganda.
- c. Overhauling security measures related to identifying and interpreting indicators.
- d. Integrating and expanding as necessary the intelligence and security services.
- e. Drafting emergency legislation.
- f. Reviewing the organization of the police and the armed forces, including the embodiment of military and police reserves, special constables and the possible need for locally raised forces.
- g. Making arrangements for the centralized control of operations. In the field of explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) these plans are likely to be implemented at an early stage, including close civil/police/military cooperation on EOD intelligence, research and development.
- h. Establishing a framework for joint civil/police and military control of security operations.
- i. Revising or drawing up lists of key points.
- j. Joint planning of those operations which may require civil, police and military cooperation, eg:
 - (1) Control measures² designed to isolate insurgent elements from the rest of the population, which may need extensive civil and legal measures to back up police or military moves.

2. The use of "lines" such as in Dhofar or Algeria, or "black grey and white" areas" as in Malaya may have little relevance in an urban environment, although here lines such as the Green line in Nicosia can help to keep communities separated.

- (2) Maintaining public services, which may make considerable demands on military units.
 - (3) Control of explosive substances and fire arms.
 - (4) Measures to maintain essential services.
 - (5) Protection of government officials and others at particular risk to terrorist intimidation and attack.
- k. Protection of government communications.
 - l. Inter-governmental liaison with a particular view to ensuring sympathetic reception of subsequent measures, including military intervention should this become necessary, and monitoring and restricting the cross-border activities of subversive elements and insurgents.
 - m. Informing the general public of the situation and preparing them for any more drastic measures which may be necessary, particularly the intervention of the armed forces.
 - n. Close police/military liaison on intelligence, operational planning and training.
16. **Further Planning.** Should the situation continue to deteriorate, further steps may be necessary:
- a. Joint training between key British military and local civilian personnel.
 - b. Improving the scope and frequency of intelligence and security activities.
 - c. Introduction of British military intelligence officers into the existing intelligence organization.
 - d. Improving information and counter-propaganda activities.
 - e. The introduction of warden schemes, where appropriate.
 - f. Reassessment of the research and development programmes for weapons and equipment.
17. **Training.** Troops earmarked for deployment to the theatre should begin a comprehensive initial training or refresher programme on the tactics and skills used in counter-insurgency operations with especial reference to any new lessons and techniques emerging from previous or current conflicts.³

3. See Parts 3 and 4 of this Volume.

18. **Police.** Much will depend on the size, equipment, standard of training and morale of the police force. The efficiency of its special branch in the gaining of information and the production of intelligence will be as important as the ability of the uniformed branch to deal with the initial stages of an insurgency. If the insurgency prospers the special branch may initially lose control of the situation in some areas and be hard pressed to near breaking point in others, hence the need for military support. The organisation and role of police forces are discussed in Chapter 7.

SECTION 3 - MILITARY COMMITMENT

Direction and Control

19. Adequate preparation during the threshold phase will ease the way for the commitment of British armed forces. The earlier that liaison is established between the British services and the local forces and the closer the consultation and planning that has taken place beforehand, the smoother will be the deployment of the military contingent. However, it is seldom that all the necessary measures will have been provided for in advance and some may have to be taken retrospectively. Nevertheless, one essential measure is that no military operations should ever be undertaken until all the relevant commanders have been properly briefed by the host government and the civil, military and police authorities concerned. This briefing, which should be accompanied by a formal directive, is the basis for planning at the operational level.
20. Military assistance will only be requested when the local forces are no longer able to deal with an existing or developing threat. It follows that the aim of military intervention is to restore the situation to the point where the police once again are in a position to maintain law and order. Experience has shown that it is easier to commit the Army than to extract it. There is a danger of over-involving the military so that they replace, rather than supplement, the local forces. This situation must be avoided in all but the direst circumstances, as much in the interests of maintaining the proper relationship between government, police and the armed forces as of preserving the morale of the police and its standing with the population it will have to serve after the emergency is over.
21. The police and local forces should retain responsibility for the direction of operations, the command of their forces and as much operational commitment and control as is practicable. The British forces command their own troops and have responsibility for specific operations or parts of operations. Every effort should be made to scale down and remove the armed forces as soon as the police or the local forces are in a position to assume full responsibility.
22. When operating in support of a friendly government, British forces must, as in the United Kingdom, be seen to operate clearly in support of the civil power and not in isolation from it. Lack of direction and firm control may result in operations that are successful in the short term but eventually prove counter-productive. To achieve a sound framework in which British military forces can support the civil authorities to good purpose the following conditions must be met:

- a. The existence of a national strategic policy acceptable to HMG, which can be clearly interpreted by military commanders and readily understood by the population.
- b. The proper coordination of civil and military action at the operational level, particularly the incorporation of local security forces into military planning whenever possible.
- c. The implementation by the local civil government of those aspects and measures of policy, planning and control which closely affect military operations.

Responsibilities

- 23. **Coordination.** Chapter 3 emphasised the need for a well integrated counter-insurgency plan and Chapter 8 describes how the machinery for coordinating the activities of civil administration, police and the military could work. The following two paragraphs show, in outline, the broad division of responsibilities between the civil administration, including the police, and the armed forces.
- 24. **Civil Responsibilities.** Those with a military significance are:
 - a. The formulation of the political aim and the long term planning covering the whole duration of military commitment and its aftermath.
 - b. Defining policy and, in particular:
 - (1) Deciding at which levels of the government and security force hierarchy decisions on policy matters of varying degrees of importance are to be taken.
 - (2) The limits to be imposed upon security force planning and operations, both overt and covert.
 - (3) The policy for intelligence, its direction and coordination.
 - (4) The information and counter-propaganda policy.
 - c. Establishing the civil machinery for liaison with the security forces on all planning and operational matters.
 - d. Drafting and promulgating legislation, including emergency powers.
 - e. The provision of civil intelligence.
 - f. Maintenance of stocks of essential commodities.
 - g. Maintenance of essential services.

25. **Military Responsibilities.** In addition to purely military tasks which are covered in Chapter 8 at the operational level, the military commander may be required to supplement the civil effort in certain fields, such as:
- a. Advice on the overall direction of security force operations.
 - b. The military contribution to joint action in:
 - (1) Planning.
 - (2) Intelligence and security.
 - (3) Information and counter-propaganda policy.
 - c. Assistance in the provision of secure communications.
 - d. Advice on:
 - (1) Training.
 - (2) Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD). For further details see Part 3 of this Volume).
 - (3) Equipment and weapon development.
 - e. Assistance with helicopters, small boats and engineer resources.

Community Relations Projects

26. Community relations projects, sometimes called 'hearts and minds' schemes, are defined as, activities aimed at improving the relationship between the armed forces and the local population in order to create attitudes favourable to the achievement of political and military objectives.
27. The armed forces initiate community relations projects and run them free of charge. Projects should meet the following criteria:
- a. Benefit a wide cross-section of the community in as many areas as is practicable.
 - b. Meet a genuine need.
 - c. Be planned jointly with the local authorities.
 - d. Avoid overlapping, competing with or discouraging similar activities which other units may be sponsoring.
 - e. Be completed within a reasonable time within the resources available.

- f. Must not deprive civilians of their jobs, particularly in areas of high unemployment. Local government employees and trade unions must be consulted if there is any risk of doing so.
 - g. Reflect credit on the Services.
28. Projects involving local people, especially when they are consulted at the outset and take part in the initial planning, stand the best chance of success. While the Service's reputation stands to gain from helping to originate and participating in a useful and successful scheme, the servicemen should avoid hogging the limelight in a transparent effort to gain credit. Service participation may often be limited to providing expertise and acting as a catalyst to help people to help themselves. People's needs vary from place to place and local commanders should be allowed ample discretion in choosing projects appropriate to their neighbourhood.

Scenarios for Military Involvement

29. **A Framework.** The form and scope of military commitment will depend upon the circumstances and the seriousness of the situation as assessed by HMG in conjunction with the host nation government. To provide a framework for the study of the conduct of operations certain scenarios have been devised. They may not necessarily represent the sequence of events, nor is any situation in a future emergency likely to fit neatly into any one scenario. As explained in Part 1 of this Volume an insurgency could develop at different speeds in different parts of a country. A commander arriving in a host state is likely to be faced with a spectrum of conflict covering two or more scenarios in neighbouring regions, each demanding an apt and suitable response at the appropriate level.
30. **Isolated Insurgent Incidents.** Occasionally, insurgent incidents occur for which the police have neither the training nor the equipment to provide a complete range of workable responses. Amongst the possibilities are hostage taking, the hijacking of aircraft and the seizure of ships by heavily armed, skilful, dedicated and determined terrorists. In such circumstances the police may request military assistance either to provide an offensive capability to restore the situation or to enhance security when there is a possibility that a terrorist attack might occur. The police retain full control of the incident until the decision is taken to commit troops. At this stage responsibility for the conduct of the military option is formally passed to the military commander on the spot within strict geographical and legal limits. The use of military forces as a way of extending the capability of the police in carefully defined and controlled circumstances in countries which do not maintain armed paramilitary organizations to support the police is now generally acknowledged. This scenario can occur out of the context of an insurgency or at any phase in the development of an insurgency.
31. **Administrative and Logistic Support during Police Public Order Operations.** This kind of support might be useful at an early stage when the insurgent political cells organize rallies, marches and acts of civil disobedience in conjunction with a propaganda campaign designed to promote popular causes and to bid for mass support by persuasion and coercion. An atmosphere of dissent will promote a growth

in petty crime and similar occurrences which, together with the political activity, will place an undue burden on the local security forces. Clandestine training and arms smuggling will provide further indications of the political extremists' violent intentions. As the government becomes aware of the threat it will, hopefully, take timely steps to initiate the measures necessary during the threshold circumstances. Military involvement may take place with little warning. It may be just a temporary expedient to enable the local forces to adjust to an unexpected turn of events or it may develop into a prolonged commitment. In any event, military intervention will probably be confined to providing administrative and logistic support away from disturbed areas in order to release members of the local security forces for active duty where they are most needed. The police and local authorities would retain full responsibility for the situation and military forces would be in an entirely subordinate capacity. In such circumstances:

- a. Servicemen should be employed in areas where there is unlikely to be a risk of confrontation with turbulent elements of the local population.
- b. Their tasks should be as unprovocative as possible.
- c. If there is a risk of confrontation, servicemen must be briefed carefully on how they should behave, what they should do and to whom they should apply for assistance.
- d. Uniform will normally be worn but arms will not usually be carried. In a situation where only a few specifically selected and trained policemen are bearing arms it would be inappropriate for military forces engaged in tasks away from the scene of confrontation to do so.
- e. The normal military command structure will be preserved, with suitable arrangements for the injection of political guidance at national and regional levels, and with appropriate liaison machinery established with the local civil and police authorities at every level.
- f. If the military are required to assist in the information and counter-propaganda fields a civil director may be appointed as a coordinator.
- g. A host nation might request the help of specialist training teams for both its police and army.
- h. If military operations are to take place within this scenario they would probably be limited in scope. Tasks needing trained disciplined manpower using specialist skills may be the most appropriate. These tasks may or may not require emergency legislation. If they do, any draft legislation, which may have been drawn up previously as a contingency measure, should be reviewed.
- i. If contingency plans do not already exist for issuing warnings of terrorist attacks, especially bomb attacks, and for dealing with unexploded devices and explosions, preparations should be put in hand.

- j. Helicopters might usefully provide surveillance and help with liaison and transport support but, at this stage, they should be kept well away from direct involvement in disturbances.

32. **Coordinated Widespread Disorder.** When it becomes apparent that there is a coordinating force behind a series of incidents and when these occur on a scale which is beyond the unassisted capabilities of the police to contain, the country may be entering the early, incipient stages of an insurgency. Then, the government will be obliged to consider a limited commitment of troops to assist the civil authorities on operational, as opposed to administrative tasks. While the troops remain under military command, operations continue to be planned and directed by the police. Possible tasks might be:

- a. Guarding key points and manning vehicle check points in disturbed areas in order to relieve local police forces and perhaps military forces as well, for more active and high profile duties such as riot control.
- b. At this stage British servicemen are likely to become involved with the public and must be properly briefed.
- c. Selected men may be discreetly armed, especially if terrorist attacks are believed to be imminent and, if they are, they will be subject to the rules of engagement in force at the time. Otherwise, British troops are likely to be armed only with non-lethal anti-riot weapons until they are required to perform anti-terrorist tasks for which lethal weapons are necessary. It is possible that assistance may not be requested by a friendly host nation until the situation has deteriorated to the extent that it will be necessary to carry firearms from the moment our troops are committed.
- d. The extent of the threat and the need to introduce British forces may not at first be apparent to the local population. The information service must take account of this and plans to explain the situation and to justify the deployment of troops must be worked out in conjunction with the host government.
- e. The normal military command structure should be adequate provided that suitable arrangements are made for political, civil and police liaison.
- f. Contingency plans for prolonged operations and arrangements for a closer integration of the security forces in a deteriorating situation should be prepared.
- g. Emergency legislation may be required at this stage, if not earlier.

33. **Insurgency.** The situation deteriorates to widespread political or intercommunal violence which the police, with low key military support, can no longer contain without substantial military assistance. At this stage a party in revolt, which has been preparing the scene for escalation, might exploit the situation to launch a well planned and prepared insurgency. Alternatively, an overt or clandestine political organization may seize the opportunity provided by a general breakdown of order to launch a deliberate guerrilla campaign. In these circumstances:

- a. Roles may include both those normal police duties which the police can no longer undertake and also those counter-insurgency tasks which require levels of force beyond the capability of the police or even of any paramilitary forces which the host state may have.
 - b. Heavy infantry weapons and artillery may be required against specific insurgent targets when there is no risk to the civilian population.
 - c. Information and counter-propaganda policy should be coordinated in the theatre by a civilian director.
 - d. The British military contingent and the local or host nation police and armed forces will become one operational entity, known as the 'security forces', and will be controlled accordingly. Although in this situation joint arrangements for command and control are essential, British military forces must take care not to swamp the police and the local forces and so effectively assume control of operations. Everything possible should be done to ensure that the police and local forces retain primacy in the planning and control of operations. If this principle is ignored it may lead to unnecessary resentment and friction in the joint coordinating machinery with the host nation and make it more difficult to re-establish the normal machinery of administration when the threat recedes.
 - e. As an insurgency develops, British military assistance may be required from all three Services, for example, to provide additional fire support in remote insurgent held areas where there is no risk to civilians and to prevent the smuggling of arms and supplies across shore lines which cannot be controlled from the land side.
34. ***Loss of Control in Some Areas.*** Where an insurgency has succeeded to the extent that guerrilla forces have taken over control of parts of the country, they have consolidated their position sufficiently to impose their administration to levy taxes, enforce their own system of law and order and recruit sizeable numbers of recruits. If the insurgents win control of sufficient territory they may raise a regular army. In the second war, masses of regular forces and supplies were moved from North Vietnam to support the rebellion in the South. In both these conflicts the struggle reached the conventional war stage. While the insurgency continued in the diminishing territory left to the government, the Communist conventional war effort, in conjunction with diplomacy and war weariness on the part of the defenders, eventually triumphed. In this kind of scenario:
- a. British military assistance may involve all three Services in a near conventional war role in addition to the Army led counter-insurgency tasks against an urban and rural insurgency movement.
 - b. Additional powers may be required to cover the consequences of an escalating conflict.
 - c. The principle of minimum force would still apply to the counter-insurgency aspects of the campaign. For the conflict with insurgent regular forces and

formed guerrilla units the normal laws of war, such as the Geneva Convention, may be more appropriate, although the rebels may not recognize them.

- d. Civil affairs would play a significant part both within the areas of contention between the security forces and the guerrillas, and in the areas reclaimed from insurgent control.
- e. The country would be on a war footing and the campaign would very likely be directed at the strategic level by a war cabinet and a defence committee, or its equivalent, run by the host state's prime minister or president in conjunction with his chiefs of staff. If the British contribution were to be a significant one the United Kingdom's interests would be represented at a suitably high level.

SECTION 4 - ASPECTS OF C2W AS APPLIED TO COIN OPERATIONS

- 35. **General.** In General War command and control systems are fundamentally dependent upon their component parts of personnel, equipment and procedures. Each provide vulnerable points which can be attacked or, conversely, which must be protected. By countering hostile command systems, the adversary's ability to make and promulgate timely and appropriate decisions is destroyed whilst, at the same time, our own command and control process is preserved. C2W, therefore, serves to increase the 'friction' sustained by an adversary through both mental and physical attack by slowing his tempo and reducing the availability of information to him. This is accomplished by attacking the adversary's will, increasing the commander's sense of stress, creating an atmosphere of uncertainty and chaos that will undermine his will and capability to fight, and degrading his ability to make and disseminate decisions. His overall cohesion will thus be disrupted and specific parts of his force destroyed in detail. See Annex B of Chapter 2 for more details of how this can be achieved and Annex D of Chapter 2 for a diagram showing the component parts that contribute to Information Warfare.
- 36. **Definition.** C2W is defined as the integrated use of all military capabilities including physical destruction, electronic warfare (EW), deception, psychological operations (PSYOPS) and operations security (OPSEC), supported by all source intelligence and US to deny information to, exploit, influence, degrade, confuse or destroy an adversary's C2 capabilities and to protect friendly C2, assets against such actions (AJP-1). Thus, the purpose of C2W is to open, maintain or widen the gap in C2 effectiveness in favour of friendly forces, and thereby make a contribution to operational effectiveness.

Application of C2W

- 37. The application of C2W is a command function. It can be applied at each level of command (strategic, operational and tactical) and at all levels in the spectrum of conflict. To be an effective instrument of warfare, overall command and control of C2W must be retained at the level to which the C2W plan applies; there is little scope for delegating C2 downwards. It is equally true that tactical C2W assets can be employed to support strategic, operational plans as well as tactical C2W plans.

C2W Functions

38. The five core military C2W functions described in Section 6 of Chapter 2 are:
- a. *OPSEC*. OPSEC seeks to reduce or deny to an adversary information concerning friendly dispositions, capabilities and intentions both on training and operations. OPSEC encompasses elements of military security (Physical, Personnel and Field Security - on exercise and operations), as well as Communications Security (COMSEC), Computer Security (COMPUSEC) and Emission Control (EMCON). The OPSEC plan will often incorporate PSYOPS or Deception to direct an adversary's attention away from major C2 assets. Further aspects of OPSEC are covered Section 4 of Chapter 8.
 - b. *EW*. EW is military action to exploit the electromagnetic (EM) spectrum and encompasses the interception, identification, analysis and, where possible, the understanding of an adversary's EM emissions; the employment of EM energy, including directed energy, to reduce or prevent hostile use of the EM spectrum and, finally, actions to ensure its effective use by friendly forces. EW is covered in further detail in Section 5 of Chapter 8.
 - c. *Deception*. Deception is likely to be the C2W activity which gives the highest return on effort and resources expended. Deception aims to present a deliberately false picture to the insurgent. Deception is a highly complex function, and in particular those aspects that seek to exploit insurgent command and control arrangements. More details are given in Section 6 of Chapter 8.
 - d. *PSYOPS*. The purpose of PSYOPS is to "influence attitudes and behaviour thereby enhancing the achievement of one's own political and military objectives. Specifically, PSYOPS seeks to undermine an insurgent's will to fight, strengthen the support of the loyal and gain the support of the uncommitted" (ADP *Operations*). PSYOPS is applicable at all levels of war though it will be aimed at different target audiences within each level. PSYOPS within C2W is directed at both the Command and Control functions of an insurgent's capabilities. Against insurgent leaders, PSYOPS seek either to induce a specific course of action, probably in support of an ongoing, larger deception plan, or to deter against a specific course of action. Against subordinate insurgents, PSYOPS seeks to undermine their natural trust and reliance upon their leaders, to question the worthiness of the task and their ability to win. PSYOPS can also be used to direct other C2W activities, such as deception, into areas where they are most likely to succeed. PSYOPS is discussed in much more detail in Chapter 10.
 - e. *Physical Destruction*. Destruction of insurgent organisation and command centres will be effective only for a relatively short period; given time and resources they will recover. It is important, therefore, to use destruction as a C2W tool before an operation to deny the insurgent time to reconstitute. To degrade an insurgent commander's capabilities effectively, C2W should focus on his HQ and the associated communication facilities. Destruction can be

achieved through the use of attack helicopters, indirect fire, SF and air forces. Use can also be made of non lethal means such as ECM. Protection of command systems against destruction by insurgents is also an important consideration and will require both electronic and physical means to protect vulnerable points and links.

39. The inter relationship of functions within C2W operations is shown in Annex A to this Chapter.

SECTION 5 - WITHDRAWAL OF MILITARY FORCES

40. ***The Control of Law and Order Passes Back to the Local Forces.*** In the final, successful phase of operations British military forces would be withdrawn as the local security forces reassume full responsibility. The factor governing the timing of the handover is the ability of the local forces to control the security situation on their own. This condition may be fulfilled before the last remnants of insurrection are extinguished. The timing will require fine judgment and impartial, expert military advice will be needed for what is primarily a political decision. Understandably, the host nation will be anxious to be seen to be able to cope unaided with its internal affairs at the first opportunity and there will be pressures both within the host nation and in this country to withdraw the troops and to conclude an expensive commitment. The withdrawal plan should be sufficiently flexible to allow for a delay to meet an unexpected resurgence of insurgency.
41. ***Timing.*** Premature withdrawal can be as disastrous militarily as outstaying one's welcome can be harmful to relations with the host country politically. A prolonged military commitment inevitably produces some strain between the friendliest of allies and a reluctance to remove troops when it is safe to do so may alienate moderate opinion and embarrass the civil authorities who are the final inheritors of the situation. The revocation of a state of emergency must go hand in hand with the programme of returning the country to a state of normality and the withdrawal of the military.
42. ***Methods of Withdrawal.*** The method and timing of the withdrawal will depend upon the speed with which the insurgency is defeated in various parts of the country. In broad terms there are three options:
- a. ***Rapid.*** A single phase operation at the end of a sudden, small localised crisis at the lower end of the scale of scenarios discussed earlier. The withdrawal of the brigade from British Guyana after the brief outburst of communal violence in Georgetown in 1962 is an example. The police were soon back in full control and the civil administration had never been upset. Full independence was granted to Guyana in 1966 and the small garrison of British troops left soon after.
 - b. ***Gradual.*** A determined and protracted insurgency is defeated gradually, area by area. As the rebels and their supporting political and supply organizations are methodically rooted out the military presence is scaled down and the civil police resume full responsibility for law and order. The hand over to the police and civil authorities can be phased on a geographical or a functional basis, or a

combination of the two when roles and tasks are passed back to the police one at a time in each area as it is cleared. A gradual, phased hand over in the latter manner is the more usual because it ensures that the police gain a thorough grasp of each function within an area to consolidate the security force's successes.

- c. *Partial.* This is accomplished, in principle, by changing the role of the military forces from direct aid to the civil power to indirect aid to the civil authorities, thus replacing the image of force with one of peaceful assistance. In practice, it usually means withdrawing armed troops to positions out of sight of the public where they are readily available if needed, while employing small numbers overtly on tasks in aid of the civil community.

THE INTER RELATIONSHIP OF FUNCTIONS WITHIN C2W

SUPPORTING FACTORS

		← SUPPORTING FACTORS →				
		OP SEC	DECEPTION	PSYOPS	EW	DESTRUCTION
CONSTRAINING FACTORS	OPSEC	X	Degrading general situation information to enhance deception effect. Providing information to fill gaps created by friendly OPSEC.	Degrading general situation information to enhance effect of PSYOPS.	Concealing EW units systems to deny information on extent of EW capabilities.	Concealing dedicated systems for C2W to deny information on extent of C2W destruction capabilities.
	DECEPTION	OPSEC requirements may limit information that can be revealed to enhance credibility of deception story. Deception may also inhibit OPSEC.	X	Providing information compatible with PSYOPS theme. Reinforcing PSYOPS theme in context of deception plan/information.	Influencing adversary to defend wrong C2 systems from friendly EA/ES.	Influencing adversary to defend wrong C2 elements/systems from friendly RSTA and destruction.
	PSYOPS	OPSEC requirements may limit information that can be revealed to develop PSYOPS themes PSYOPS themes may also cut across needs of OPSEC.	Deception story may limit selection of PSYOPS themes. Deception story may limit information that could be revealed to develop PSYOPS themes.	X		Causing population to the targeted areas, reducing collateral damage limitations.
	EW		Deception that utilises EM spectrum may limit EW targeting of hostile CIS infrastructure.	PSYOPS that utilises EM spectrum may limit EW targeting of hostile C2 assets. EW plans may also limit PSYOPS activity.	X	
	DESTRUCTION		Deception Operations may limit destructive targeting of hostile C2 infrastructure.	PSYOPS activity may limit destructive targeting of C2 assets.		X

CHAPTER 5

COORDINATION

‘To summarize..... the first requirement for the successful conduct of a counter-insurgency campaign is for the government to set up a sound framework within which it can take place. This should consist of co-ordinating machinery at every level for the direction of the campaign, arrangements for ensuring that the insurgents do not win the war for the minds of the people, an intelligence organization suited to the circumstances, and a legal system adequate to the needs of the moment’

General Sir Frank Kitson¹

SECTION 1 - THE SYSTEM OF COORDINATION

Purpose

1. ***Suiting the Circumstances.*** As indicated in Chapter 4, to execute the British or a host government’s national plan in all its aspects, political, economic, security, reconstruction and information policy, an organisation must be set up to coordinate the activities of the civil administration and the security forces. From the latter’s point of view it provides the forum for the discussion and reconciliation of operational and intelligence issues, and priorities, with the aim of formulating a consistent policy which the civil authorities, the police and the army can implement, each in its own sphere but in the closest cooperation. Army officers who may be involved in helping to create this coordinating machinery must appreciate that the host country’s culture, customs and political traditions are bound to be reflected in the manner in which they run their affairs. Although the principles governing the conduct of counter-insurgency operations have a general relevance throughout the world, their application, particularly in the setting up of a joint, allied planning and liaison organization, must take account of local circumstances, especially the constitution and legal system, and how they mould the method and means of government.
2. ***Roles.*** The organization will normally provide, in general terms, for:
 - a. Establishment of priorities.
 - b. Coordination of intelligence and security.
 - c. Coordination between operational and civil affairs activities.
 - d. Joint consultation and, as far as security permits, joint planning.
 - e. Joint direction of operations.

1. *Bunch of Five*, 1977. Frank Kitson

- f. Arrangements for public safety and protection of public installations. Review of the key point/vulnerable point list.
 - g. Direction of the psychological and counter-propaganda policy.
 - h. Scientific advice and operational research effort.
3. **Representation at All Levels.** Committees should be established at each level of civil government where the civil administration and the security forces meet to formulate policy at the higher levels and implement it at the lower levels. Those representing the administration and the security forces must be those who have the authority to make decisions jointly and have the power to implement them in their respective spheres. The names of the committees and their detailed *modus operandi* will vary but the structure described below may serve as a model.

National Level

4. **National Defence Council.** An allied host government will probably already have established a national defence council, or some similar body to ensure that the aims and priorities of the national plan are applied by all government agencies within their fields of responsibility. Additional points are that:
- a. The chair will normally be taken by the head of government and its permanent members will be the ministers in charge of the main departments of state. The British Ambassador or High Commissioner would probably attend the council in an advisory capacity and to watch over British interests.
 - b. The chiefs of police and the armed forces will be in attendance for consultation but are unlikely to participate in the decision-making process of what is essentially a civil council for the determination, implementation and coordination of government policy. The senior British officer may possibly attend in an advisory capacity or give his advice direct to the host nation's chiefs of staff outside the council.
 - c. Council decisions which are purely civil are implemented by the appropriate civil ministries. Decisions with operational implications are the responsibility of the defence council's national operations committee.
5. **National Operations Committee.** This is the executive instrument of the National Defence Council, implementing its policy in the security forces' sphere in that:
- a. The committee should include representatives of the ministries of home and foreign affairs, of the police and the armed forces.
 - b. Allies contributing forces will be represented on this committee by their Ambassadors, or High Commissioners in the case of Commonwealth nations,

if they do not attend the National Defence Council. The allied contingent commanders will normally attend.

- c. The chairman may be the head of the host's government in his capacity as supreme commander of the armed forces or, more usually, someone appointed by him, such as the chief of the host nation's defence staff. If the latter, he may be formally appointed Director of Operations.
6. ***The Director of Operations.*** He will be appointed by the head of government, unless the latter retains the post himself. The choice of the Director of Operations depends on the nature of the government, personalities and on the current security situation and how it may develop. If not the head of government the Director of Operations may not necessarily be the chief of the armed services or of the police but he will be linked to the overall command of the security forces whose composition and balance may influence the choice.² The Director of Operations is normally the chairman of the National Operations Committee, unless the post is held by the head of government.

Lower Levels

7. ***Regional, Provincial, and District Committees.*** Fully integrated coordinating committees are necessary at each subordinate level based on civil administration and local government boundaries in regions, provinces, counties and/or districts or whatever their local equivalents may be. Additional features are that:
- a. The lower level coordinating bodies are usually referred to as operations or action committees.
 - b. The chairman is usually the senior officer of the local civil administration in whose support the security forces are operating. Depending on the size of the area, he could be a minister appointed for the purpose, a provincial governor, the chairman of a county council or his chief executive officer.
 - c. The local police and military commanders and the intelligence and security organization representatives will form the membership. Local civilian experts may either be full members or 'in attendance', as the occasion demands. British formation commanders of the appropriate level would normally attend the appropriate host country's committees.
 - d. Sometimes representatives of employers' organizations and trades unions are coopted.
8. ***Town, Ward and Village Level.*** Smaller, less formal committees are needed to coordinate civil, police, military and intelligence operations at the lower levels without jeopardizing security or creating a cumbersome bureaucracy. This is the level at which

2. In Malaya, during the Indonesian confrontation and in Northern Ireland the Director of Operations until 1977 was a senior army officer.

the National Plan is implemented and must be seen to succeed to retain the loyalty and support of the people. It is important that local interests are represented and that the people are identified with government policy. Failure at this level spells defeat. The insurgents can be expected to exploit any shortcomings. The chairman is normally the head of the civil administration, perhaps the mayor, the town clerk or the rural council chairman. The membership reflects the police, military and other interests already discussed in paragraph 7 above. The military representative may be a battalion or company commander, depending on the scale of the emergency. In the context of an allied operation the British representative at the appropriate level of command would probably attend this committee.

SECTION 2 - THE APPLICATION OF PRINCIPLES

The Difficulties

9. ***The Human Factor.*** The application of the principles for COIN operations and the related decisions may be difficult to accept and implement - particularly for those who live in the affected areas. It should be remembered that:
 - a. Principles are easier to affirm than to apply.
 - b. In underdeveloped countries there could be a shortage of trained administrators which would hamper the development of the National Plan, to the insurgents' advantage.
 - c. Established organizations and influential people may fear losing power and prestige. Legal complications, inter-departmental rivalries and dislike of change may frustrate necessary reforms.
 - d. There will be a need for tact, understanding and compromise as individuals and organizations are persuaded to give up some of their power and influence in the interests of greater efficiency and closer cooperation. However, should tact and reason fail to dispel personal and inter-departmental rivalries a more ruthless approach may be needed to quell or remove uncooperative elements, at least in an all-British operation. In an allied operation disagreements which cannot be resolved locally would have to be referred up the chain of command through national channels for resolution at a higher, and perhaps, political level.
 - e. Everyone responsible for implementing government policy should be thoroughly educated in the overall philosophy of the government's plan of campaign and kept briefed on current and planned operations so that their reactions to a sudden crisis will promote the long term aims as well as solve the immediate problem.
 - f. Insurgent commanders and their staffs usually remain in the same posts and in the same areas for considerable periods to build up a wealth of background knowledge. Even though the police provide long term continuity within the security forces the Army should aim for as much stability as possible, especially

in important posts, as is consistent with career planning and the length of tours in operational theatres.

- g. There are specific areas in which changes must be approached in an atmosphere of ready compromise and cooperation:
 - (1) Administrative reorganization.
 - (2) Boundaries.
 - (3) Location of headquarters.

10. **Administrative Reorganization.** In a counter-insurgency situation there could be opportunities to alter the administrative control of areas and regions, but these need to be carefully thought out to avoid further social pitfalls. The following points need to be borne in mind:

- a. Limit the number of new administrative organizations to be set up because they are costly in manpower and money and take time to shake down. Make the maximum use of existing structures and avoid cutting across existing soundly based organizations.
- b. Make use of the existing administrative machinery and staffs as far as possible and adjusting them only where necessary in the interests of greater efficiency will ensure continuity, minimise institutional resistance and save scarce resources. Changes in organization and procedures should be limited to achieving better coordination, quicker decisions and a closer supervision of execution.
- c. Joint secretariats, with British representation when working with an ally, are needed at each level of civil government and security forces' control to cope with the extra work in order to ensure that decisions are implemented swiftly and with the least risk of compromise. They are also useful for ensuring that everyone who needs to be informed is kept in the picture, for keeping a check on progress and to enable problems to be identified early enough to take timely remedial action.
- d. Secretariats must be kept small in the interests of efficiency. In a large secretariat much time is wasted in coordinating business within it. Those who work in secretariats must take care not to usurp the functions of the staffs of the civil administration, police and armed forces.
- e. The civil ministries, police and armed forces must remain responsible for carrying out the work of their own organizations, in cooperation with each other and not in competition to avoid the confusion of overlapping functions.

11. **Boundaries.** Civil administration, police and armed forces boundaries should be the same in the interests of liaison, planning and coordination, and to avoid operational and intelligence muddles and accidents. Police boundaries usually coincide with those

of the Civil Administration. In cases of disagreement military boundaries should conform to the civil/police ones because the latter are well established and will remain when the army withdraws. Occasionally, it may be expedient to adjust boundaries in order to bring a known insurgent organization within the area of responsibility of one commander. However, the case for sticking to established boundaries whenever possible is a strong one and is discussed further in paragraph 13.

12. ***Location of Headquarters and the Joint Operations Centre.*** The joint operations centre at each level of command provides the focal point for the collection of information. It also provides a secure meeting place for the civil authorities, police and military commanders and the staff machinery for disseminating decisions for implementation by all the various forces and organizations within the local boundary. Further points are that:
 - a. The joint operations centre should be located at the police headquarters, a well established organization with easy access to police information and intelligence and which has its own communications plus outlets on to the civil network.
 - b. The associated military headquarters (formation or unit) should be set up next door with ready access to the joint operations centre. If this is not feasible the military headquarters should be set up as near as possible and secure communications established between them.
 - c. Military and police commanders, or their deputies, should spend a significant part of their time in the joint operations centre. All operations should be planned there but both military and police forces must retain their own headquarters for the issue of orders, day to day routine, administration and logistic support.
 - d. Counter-insurgency operations require the cooperation of many agencies which have their own communications systems, not all of which are compatible. With so many organizations and agencies involved there are bound to be increased security risks and the problems of overcrowded accommodation. It is essential to restrict the size of the staffs in the joint operations centre to manageable proportions particularly in the operations room which controls the minute by minute activity on the ground, in order to keep the noise level down, to avoid congestion and to lessen the chance of inadvertently giving information away.

The Chain of Command

13. ***Regional Character of Counter-Insurgency Operations.*** The system of making civil administration, police and military boundaries and the regional character of counter-insurgency operations limit the scope for redeployment. In an allied country this is a matter for the host government but if British advice was requested it may be proffered on the following lines:
 - a. With the possible exception of the scenario mentioned in paragraph 11, rather than alter boundaries to meet possibly fleeting operational needs it is better to reinforce a formation area with extra units.

- b. Should a significantly larger force be required in a region it may be necessary to upgrade the level of command, with comparable upgrading of lower levels of command. This ensures continuity of liaison, intelligence work and operations between the civil authorities, the police and the military.
14. **Direction.** In the circumstances of a static framework, commanders exercise control by:
- a. Written directives laying down overall policy and detailing broad tasks within unit areas,
 - b. Frequent conferences and visits to keep in touch with the situation and to give specific orders for important operations, for example, those mounted to extend the area under government control or perhaps to exploit a windfall of good intelligence to ambush or capture a key insurgent figure or group, or to seize supplies of food and arms.
15. **Framework for Directives and Conferences.** The following is a suggested framework for directives and routine meetings:
- a. *Director of Operation's Policy Directive.* Issued initially and reviewed periodically, perhaps quarterly, unless a major political decision requires quick revision.
 - b. *Formation Commander's Directives.* Based on the Director of Operation's policy directive and issued in conjunction with it to implement that part of the overall plan appropriate to the formation area. It may need more frequent revision to take account of new tasks, changes in force levels, boundaries and other factors which affect the local situation.
 - c. *Daily Staff Conferences.* Aimed to keep formation commanders abreast of developments. They are usually attended by police and civil administration representatives.
 - d. *Daily Operational Meetings.* Held in conjunction with the staff conferences or separately to discuss intelligence developments and to issue orders for special operations, for example, to arrange a night operation.
16. **Routine Committee Meetings.** The decisions of regional or district meetings can be implemented either by issuing a directive or at the daily conference or operational meeting at the appropriate level.
17. **Command and Control.** Much emphasis has been laid on the need for centralized direction and decision making. However, the function of the committee system is essentially to provide a forum for planning and coordination. The command function remains the prerogative and responsibility of each military and police commander or civil department head. These officers and officials will be expected to consult one another before taking any initiatives or making any changes to previously agreed policy or plans. Honest and wholehearted cooperation remains essential to:

- a. Maintain mutual confidence between the three arms of the executive, the civil administration, the police and military forces. The latter includes the host nation's allies.
 - b. Prevent disputes and accidental engagements between the security forces. This is especially important in the context of operations conducted with allies.
 - c. Ensure that all the available civil, police and military resources are available to implement the overall plan.
 - d. Avoid jeopardizing the security of intelligence or intelligence sources.
18. **Rapid Command Reaction.** There will be occasions when a quick decision is needed, perhaps to exploit a fleeting opportunity or to foil an unexpected insurgent initiative. If there is no time for a military commander to consult his superior or his committee members he will have to take a timely decision and act upon it. Provided that a good understanding exists amongst the members of the local committee and within the chain of command, and that some thought has been given on how to react to foreseeable contingencies, the commander's decision should be a sensible one. Military commanders must feel that they can act quickly and decisively in an emergency without having to waste valuable time in consultations. A commander who tells his superior, the police officer and, if necessary, the chairman of his committee what he has done and why he has done it can expect rapid support in terms of reinforcement and cooperation to turn the situation to good account. Incidents invariably attract the attention of the media. Commanders and their public information staffs must prepare a brief quickly to explain the event accurately to forestall hostile propaganda.

OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

CHAPTER 6

INTELLIGENCE

SECTION 1 - THE PRE-EMINENCE OF INTELLIGENCE

Introduction

1. ***The Need for Intelligence.*** Good intelligence is vital in any phase of war. In counter-insurgency operations it will be in constant and continuous demand. Operations require steady success, built up over time, which will wear down the insurgent movement, restricting its capability and reducing its morale. Accurate intelligence will permit commanders to conduct operations with precision, reducing the detrimental effect on the local population and minimising casualties among friendly forces. The combined effect will be to secure and maintain the morale among the security forces and raise their standing with the civilian population. Effective and precise use of force will earn respect; vital in the campaign for hearts and minds. Ill-directed and indiscriminate use of force will serve merely to alienate any local population. It may be appreciated, therefore, that sound intelligence is a precursor to all counter-insurgency operations; it must be built up quickly and sustained efficiently from the start of a campaign. To help the reader a glossary of abbreviations used in this Chapter are at Annex A.
2. ***Intelligence Support to Operations.*** Thorough knowledge of the extent of the insurgency and the political and military aims, command structures and logistic network of the insurgents should allow the state government to develop a long-term overall strategy and sensible military policies to defeat it. At all levels intelligence will permit commanders to put the strategy and policies into practice by the defeat in detail of the insurgents by killing, capturing or arresting individuals and depriving them of targets, intelligence, the means of command and communication, weapons, ammunition, food and other supplies. Attrition of all these elements will reduce the insurgents' ability to maintain the campaign. Guidelines on Intelligence Support for C2W are given in Annexes B and C.
3. ***Intelligence in Counter-Insurgency Operations.*** There is nothing radical in the application of the fundamentals of intelligence to a counter-insurgency campaign. There are, however, three aspects which will carry greater emphasis than might be the case in general war:
 - a. The dominance of human intelligence (HUMINT), in low-level conflict.
 - b. The influence of the civilian authority on counter-insurgency operations and the consequent constraints and complications on intelligence gathering.
 - c. The appearance that, at times, operations are in support of intelligence rather than the reverse.

4. ***The Importance of HUMINT.*** The purpose of intelligence, in any phase of war, is to determine the enemy threat; to assess his capability and his intentions, so that the commander may develop a plan to bring about its defeat. In counter-insurgency operations, this is equally the case; the insurgent must be defeated, militarily or politically, and this can be done only if commanders are given sufficient knowledge of him by the intelligence staff. Where the insurgent lives among the population, perhaps without uniform or a recognisable military structure, his capabilities and intentions are likely to be determined only from information provided by the population and those individuals able to move in close proximity to him. Sophisticated intelligence sensors, crucial in general war, normally cannot match the HUMINT agent, informer, informant¹, surveillance or the reports from routine police or army patrols. Time-consuming collation of detail and painstaking analysis may then prove the key to unravelling important aspects of the insurgent's activity.
5. ***Civilian Control.*** Intelligence gathering in a counter-insurgency campaign will, in all probability, lack the freedom that may be enjoyed in general war. The primacy of civilian political control, the balance between effort aimed at defeating the insurgency and that expended on crime prevention and resolution, the rule of law and the need for admissible evidence for prosecution, will all constrain the gathering of intelligence. Military intelligence staffs may well find themselves in unfamiliar circumstances, subordinated to civilian control and methods of operating which may have conflicting aims and priorities.
6. ***Patrolling.*** At times, it may well appear to the soldier fighting insurgency, that more of his efforts are being expended on gathering information than in actually combatting the insurgents. This may well be the case for, in operations where the reliance on HUMINT is paramount, the foot-soldier becomes the eyes and ears of an intelligence organisation. The value of extensive patrolling and subsequent de-briefing may not readily be apparent to him when, for example, the aim might be to develop a picture of patterns of insurgent behaviour against a background of normality over a protracted period, rather than short-term reconnaissance for immediate offensive action. The need to win the hearts and minds of the population in order to weaken sympathy with insurgents and increase the potential flow of information, may also be a burden on the soldier's patience and morale as he finds himself adopting a less aggressive stance than he might otherwise have chosen.
7. ***Principles of Intelligence.*** The Principles of Intelligence, are summarised below. Their application, in combination with the four stages of the Intelligence Cycle: Direction, Collection, Processing and Dissemination, provides the structure within which the intelligence organisation operates. This chapter follows this structure, examining all intelligence aspects of counter-insurgency operations as they occur within it. The eight principles of intelligence are:

1. In HUMINT terms, an agent is a person specifically recruited and trained, placed in a hostile organisation and who is tasked with information gathering on the organisation of which he is part - a controlled source. An informer is a person who, perhaps uninvited, passes information to an opponent about his organisation - an uncontrolled source. An informant is one who gives information - a casual source.

- a. Centralised Control.
 - b. Responsiveness.
 - c. Objectivity.
 - d. Systematic Exploitation.
 - e. Security.
 - f. Accessibility.
 - g. Timeliness.
 - h. Continuous Review.
8. The reader should also refer to other Army level publications for further information on the application of intelligence during these types of operation.

SECTION 2 - DIRECTION

Intelligence Architecture and the Organisation of Intelligence

9. ***Design of an Intelligence Architecture.*** Early in a counter-insurgency campaign, it will be necessary to establish a chain of operational command which reflects the political and military requirements of the state and any allies, committed to the campaign. When this has been established, there will be a need for a supporting structure of intelligence staffs placed at appropriate levels in order to provide timely, responsive intelligence for commanders. It is inevitable that the intelligence structure will develop with the campaign. The architecture must anticipate this and deploy progressive phases of capability which are readily linked together. In parallel with these staffs, a communications network which will permit the rapid, efficient passage of intelligence data of different types, upwards, downwards and sideways throughout the intelligence community must be constructed. It will need to cross national, military/civilian and service boundaries so that it can link staffs and agencies at every level. Unlike the military chain of command, which is purely hierarchical, this network should be constructed on the principle of providing intelligence from wherever it is available to wherever it is required. This may result in it bypassing some levels of command in order for it to reach the appropriate user. This “skip-echelon” working will be aided by information being available on the “pull”, rather than the “push” principle at whatever level of command may need it. The intelligence architecture is not simply a communications network; it includes the allocation of Areas of Intelligence Responsibility (AIR), to each level of command. It specifies precisely where authority to task individual collection assets is to lie and it allocates the reporting authority, ie, who is responsible for the provision of fused intelligence reports² based on information from collectors. The intelligence architecture should form an annex to the operational directive under the title of “the intelligence plan”.

2. See para 39 for details of fusion.

10. **Constraints.** There will be constraints on this free flow of data caused by the necessity to apply the “need to know” principle; vital where HUMINT source-protection is of such paramount importance as is likely to be the case in counter-insurgency operations. Some intelligence, perhaps that provided from strategic sources, may not be made available to all intelligence staffs at every level. For example, material with the “UK Eyes Only” caveat may be made available from the UK exclusively for its own national commanders. There will be a need for special handling procedures for this, and other, material. In such circumstances a National Intelligence Cell (NIC) may be established, within which there may be a HUMINT Support Group (HSG), a Cryptological Support Group (CSG), providing SIGINT, or an IMINT Support Group (ISG). If specialist intelligence segregated compartments are necessary, then they must be deployed, but their use should always be kept under close review when operating with allies as they can encourage exclusivity and reduce the mutual trust so necessary for effective cooperation.
11. **Straining Communications Networks.** Inevitably, extensive intelligence data networks will place a large burden on the communications available. This should be borne in mind when designing the intelligence architecture with as much use being made of existing systems as possible. In a COIN campaign the usage, by intelligence organisations, of available bandwidth will outstrip that of all other users due to the need for access to national databases, imagery products and the output of national agencies. This is particularly the case when satellite communications are established in the theatre once forces from the United Kingdom have been deployed.

Centralised Control

12. **The Need for Centralised Control.** Intelligence assets are normally centralised at the highest appropriate level of command in order to be available across the widest possible area of operations. In counter-insurgency operations there are further imperatives for centralised control. Where several intelligence organisations are working against a common target, there is the danger of overlap. Some duplication is always necessary in order to improve the evaluation of information by its being confirmed from more than a single source. The danger lies in there being a single source exploited by more than one agency each in ignorance of one-another. This can lead to false confirmation and, in turn, gives the source greater credibility than may be its worth. There is also the undesirability of wastage of effort and resources.
13. **The Director of Intelligence.** In designing the intelligence organisation, a decision must be made to coordinate all intelligence staffs, military and civilian, local and allied, centrally. Ideally a single Director of Intelligence³ should be established at national level with similar posts at each lower level of command, perhaps those of civilian administrative authority or military command depending upon the circumstances.


3. See also para 39 of Chapter 7 which emphasises the same point .

Integration - The Committee System

14. **Establishing an Intelligence Committee.** The Director of Intelligence at national level should, ideally, chair an intelligence committee. Subordinate intelligence committees would then meet at each lower level. Each committee would owe allegiance to the next higher level which in turn would be responsible for the effectiveness and coordination of the intelligence efforts of those below them. Committees should meet regularly if there is to be a useful exchange and discussion of intelligence and a good working relationship between civil authorities, police and military intelligence staffs established.
15. **Membership of the Intelligence Committee.** Membership of the intelligence committee should be arranged mutually between the local intelligence services, civilian and military, and those of British and other allied intelligence staffs.
16. **Coordination.** The intelligence committees should ensure that:
 - a. Civil, police and army boundaries are the same and accord with the civil authority and security force command system. This may not always be possible.
 - b. Information and intelligence flow downwards as well as upwards and sideways to neighbouring committees where appropriate.
 - c. Representatives of government departments and local experts are co-opted for special advice, with due regard for security. They might come from customs services and coastguards, such fields as the highways department, rail services, inland water transport, civil engineering, telecommunications, power and water suppliers and from a wider circle of the local community which might include farmers, businessmen and other traders.

The Committee System

17. **Illustration.** Figure 1 illustrates the kind of committee system which might be developed in a theatre of operations.
18. **Functions of an Intelligence Committee.** The functions of intelligence committees are as follows:
 - a. At the national level, to keep the government, the civil and military commanders, or chiefs of staff, and operations staffs informed of all aspects of intelligence and security operations and to facilitate the exchange and provision of the intelligence necessary for the prosecution of a strategic campaign.
 - b. At subordinate levels, to keep their parallel operations committees and the next higher intelligence committees fully informed with relevant intelligence for operational planning.
 - c. To advise operational staffs on security and protective measures.



1. Co-opted as required.
2. Dependent on military deployment.
3. The composition of the committees at the various levels will usually be the same.
4. Usually Int Corps HUMINT Rep.

Figure 1 - The Committee System

- d. To develop the collection plan against which the collection agencies will be tasked.
 - e. Through the intelligence staffs, to direct the collection agencies, allocating tasks and priorities and time within which the information must be obtained.
 - f. Where possible, to establish common procedures for all local and allied intelligence and security organisations.
 - g. To provide an appropriate dissemination service to commanders.
19. **Central Intelligence Staffs.** Subordinate to the committees there should be a centralised, integrated staff capable of performing Collection Coordination and Intelligence Requirements Management (CCIRM), database management and fusion functions on behalf of all the intelligence staffs at that particular level. At the outset, as part of the intelligence plan, clear orders should be given on the level at which responsibility for maintenance of a master database will be performed. It is essential to prevent every level of intelligence staff running databases in parallel. Although it will never be possible to avoid some duplication of record-keeping, there should be a minimum with a single, probably the highest local, level maintaining the master database with subordinate, and other levels submitting changes to it in the form of data-change requests. Maintenance of a single database is facilitated by the “pull” rather than the “push” method of information retrieval and by close cooperation between all collectors and analytical staffs.
20. **Command and Control.** While intelligence committees give general direction, laying down policy and allotting general aims, collection tasks and priorities, they do not exercise command. Command and control remains the prerogative of the commanders, civilian and military, over both their respective intelligence staffs and their collection agencies.

Factors Affecting Integration.

21. Although a single, centrally controlled, integrated intelligence organization answering to a Director of Intelligence is the ideal, the circumstances prevailing in a state may not be conducive to such a system, particularly if a British contingent is part of an international, allied force in which the senior British officer may have limited influence. Where it cannot be achieved, a compromise solution must be brokered between the interested parties. The establishment of a centralized system may be affected by any or all of the following factors:
- a. The effectiveness and reliability of the state's security forces and its intelligence and security organization.
 - b. Willingness by all parties to cooperate, to share information and details of, perhaps sensitive, local sources, other intelligence details and, particularly at the higher levels, matters of political sensitivity.

- c. The different points of view and doctrine of the security forces, local and allied. Because the state's security forces, in particular the police, must continue to live and work among the population after the eventual departure of the allies, they will be subject to greater internal pressures and constraints.
- d. The degree of authority delegated to officials at each level of the command structure, national, provincial, regional and district.
- e. The integrity of, particularly local, intelligence officers and the vulnerability of intelligence services to corruption, infiltration, subversion and apathy.
- f. The sensitivity of military commanders towards the local police forces which may resent the military view of their area of operations as being their "patch" in which they alone hold sway. This can cause friction with local police whose continued operations in the area, perhaps in isolation and with no consultation can, in turn, irritate the military. It is important that intelligence staffs overcome this problem as failure to integrate will seriously impede the intelligence effort.

22. **Joint Intelligence Cell.** Whether or not an intelligence committee is established, the normal focus for intelligence for British forces will be the Joint Intelligence Cell (JIC), which will be located alongside the Joint Operations Cell (JOC), forming the hub of any Joint Forces Headquarters (JFHQ). Within the JIC will be the senior intelligence officer and his staff, This will include CCIRM and the All Sources Cell (ASC), in which fusion and bulk of the analysis will be conducted. Representatives of the agencies, for example HSG, CSG and ISG, will be located in the ASC. In some cases it will be necessary for these elements to be afforded their own segregated area with more stringent access controls than pertain in the rest of the ASC (See paragraph 10 above.) Similar constraints may apply if a NIC, (colloquially, an UKNIC), is deployed.

Factors Affecting Organization

23. **General.** Whatever the design of the intelligence architecture, the organisation and the sources and agencies deployed, there are a number of factors which will be common. These must be considered at the outset and plans made for their inclusion in the structure.

- a. *Continuity.* Units should be kept in the same area of responsibility (AOR) for as long as possible. This ensures that they become familiar with the local inhabitants, the other security forces, such as the police, and the terrain and infrastructure. They are better able to get the measure of their opponents and they acquire the ability to develop information into intelligence. In short, they get a feel for what is normal as a background against which to observe the abnormal. Regrettably, operational and roulement moves are inevitable. During the period when units change over, Intelligence Corps continuity NCOs (CONCOs) can provide the essential element of continuity. CONCOs, who remain in a single AOR throughout an extended tour in the theatre, should acquire an intimate knowledge of the local situation in their area which they can then pass on to the intelligence officers and the commanders of incoming units.

- b. *Flexibility.* Just as an intelligence organization is designed to meet a specific situation, so it must be receptive to the adjustments needed when the insurgent threat develops in new directions, themes, strategies and tactics, or the situation changes in some other way. Such changes in the situation may make fresh demands upon specialist services, such as imagery interpretation and interrogation. Commanders, and their intelligence staffs, must be able to respond quickly to new needs by redeploying resources and, where necessary, adjusting the functions they fulfil.
- c. *Information Handling.* The intelligence system, whatever its shape, must be able to cope with an increasing amount of information as units, with growing experience, become more productive and better focused. With time, it is to be hoped, the population becomes sufficiently confident to pass more information to the security forces. As this happens, sufficient intelligence-trained personnel must be made available to collate the additional information, analyse and integrate it, interpret its meaning and disseminate the resulting intelligence in time for it to be used operationally.
- d. *Specialists.* The training of analysts, source handlers, surveillance operators, imagery interpreters, linguists, interrogators and other intelligence specialists must be developed as early as possible if the inevitable shortage of such skilled personnel, which exists at the beginning of any campaign, is to be overcome. The careful husbandry of scarce skills is necessary throughout a campaign, but particularly essential at the beginning until more trained specialists become available. In addition to the normal complement of intelligence staffs, there will be a requirement for some augmentation with specialists whose task will be liaison with local intelligence organisations. Such personnel are likely to deploy into the country at the very beginning of, or even before, the campaign. These, vital, posts must be filled with well-trained experts capable of acting with a high degree of initiative and away from a normal military structure. They will include:
 - (1) *Military Intelligence Liaison Officers, (MILO).* MILOs are military officers on the establishment of the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) controlled through DI (Commitments). In peacetime they maintain a watching brief on developments in their particular geographical area of interest and are capable of deploying quickly with the minimum of support. Ideally, a MILO might be deployed in advance of the arrival of any deployed British force in order to establish liaison with local authorities, primarily for intelligence purposes, but also to ensure the smooth passage of troops into the theatre. The MILO should be equipped with a United Kingdom Military Intelligence Support Terminal (UKMIST), which will give him access to Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS), and other data, including imagery, and the means to transmit reports. UKMIST provides, at minimum, core intelligence production capability and its own communications. On arrival of the main body of troops a MILO will assist a commander by developing liaison links. Later the MILO will hand over his responsibilities to the formation intelligence staff and withdraw.

- (2) *Local Agency Liaison Personnel.* Military liaison personnel will usually be deployed to the local security services, and police special branch, or its equivalent, with the principal task of preparing for the expansion of the intelligence organization in the theatre. Others will be deployed on covert passive surveillance (CPS) or covert information and intelligence-gathering tasks. These personnel will be provided by Intelligence Corps field security units and defence HUMINT organisations, such as the Specialist Intelligence Wing (SIW) of the Defence Intelligence and Security Centre (DISC). Such personnel may carry titles such as Military Intelligence Officer (MIO) or Force Intelligence NCO (FINCO). All are likely to be both linguists and HUMINT specialists. Like MILOs, they should also be deployed early. The intelligence product of such liaison and covert intelligence specialists will be passed to the intelligence staffs through a HSG which will also be the focus for tasking from CCIRM.
- e. *Liaison.* If the intelligence organization is to work effectively and efficiently, good liaison between all intelligence organisations and agencies, local, allied, civilian and military, is paramount. The specialists referred to above, are vital elements in establishing effective liaison with local intelligence agencies. The sensitivities of such intelligence liaison duties require the liaison officer to have wide experience of military capabilities and knowledge of intelligence.
- f. *Security.* The need for security, especially source protection, must be fully understood within the intelligence organisation and among those to whom it is disseminated. The “need to know” principle has to be enforced and clear guidelines given on dissemination, particularly to local, civilian authorities.

Composition of an Intelligence Organization

24. ***Intelligence Staff Organisation.*** There is no fixed establishment for an intelligence organisation, nor is there any pre-determined scale on which to base its composition. Its size will be determined by the extent and nature of the threat, the commander’s requirements, the architecture necessary to support operations and the intelligence collection agencies which can be made available. As no two campaigns are ever fought in quite the same circumstances it follows that the intelligence organization for each new commitment should be custom-designed, although past campaigns will provide guidance where there are useful parallels. The size of any British contribution to a counter insurgency campaign will have to be designed by consultation between the senior intelligence officer and the intelligence staff of the state concerned. Almost certainly, the size of intelligence staffs will grow and will be considerably bigger as the campaign develops than was the case at the outset. This likely expansion should, if possible, be allowed for when allocating working space and other resources. The probable functions it would be necessary to maintain within an intelligence staff for a counter-insurgency deployment are shown diagrammatically in Figure 2.
25. ***Intelligence Support Organization.*** The kind of specialist support that the intelligence staff would need was covered in paragraph 21 above. A diagram showing a possible intelligence support organization is shown in Figure 3.




Figure 2 - Possible Structure of Intelligence Staff within a JFHQ


Tasking

26. **A Commanders' Intelligence Requirements.** Direction will begin with a determination of the commander's intelligence requirements. These will be the product of his mission analysis (see ADP Vol 2, *Command*), and should be discussed with the senior intelligence officer who will be able to ensure that they are accurately focused. It may not be possible, in the early stages of a campaign, to state clearly the commander's intelligence requirements as insufficient operational information may be available on which to plan. Where this is the case, the intelligence staffs have the responsibility of giving guidance to commanders on the kind of intelligence that they will require. This may be done by means of an intelligence estimate. An intelligence estimate takes the commander's plan, no matter how broadly stated, and compares it with existing intelligence on the insurgency. Concurrent with the intelligence estimate, the staff should apply Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB).⁴ The intelligence estimate and IPB together will give the intelligence staff a good idea of the gaps in their knowledge of the insurgency and these can form the basis of the initial collection plan. It is likely that, particularly in the initial stages, there will be a shortfall of intelligence. The probability is that there will be more basic intelligence available than current intelligence. The preparation of an initial collection plan will also give some indication of the necessary collection assets, and intelligence architecture that will be needed for the campaign.
27. **Direction to the Collectors.** Even when an intelligence organization has been established, information does not flow automatically into the hands of the intelligence staff, and thence to the commander. If direction is poor, the intelligence organisation may be in danger of collecting large quantities of irrelevant information. A commander must give his intelligence staff clear direction and a firm indication of the priorities to be allotted to his intelligence requirements. On receipt of the commander's intelligence requirements, the intelligence staff will first, with the aid of the intelligence estimate and IPB, identify gaps in the intelligence already held. These gaps should be filled by asking collection agencies to collect against them. The questions put to the collectors are known as Information Requirements (IR) and their collection is planned carefully by the senior intelligence officer in conjunction with his CCIRM staff who will coordinate the collection plan and IRs and manage the intelligence requirements. The resultant collection plan must, in turn, be approved by the commander prior to collectors receiving their direction from the intelligence staffs. The collection plan will normally be maintained on a collection worksheet which will show the allocation of tasks, in order of priority, to individual collection agencies and the time, and form in which information is to be reported.

SECTION 3 - COLLECTION

28. **Aspects of Collection.** There are two aspects of collection: exploitation, by intelligence staffs of their sources and agencies and the timely delivery of collected information to intelligence staffs for subsequent processing into intelligence, or, when

5. See AFM Vol 1 Pt 8 *Command and Staff Procedures* for further details on IPB.



1. Jointly manned. Responsible for the production of all air photography and imagery support.
2. Provides Specialist support including ATOs for JFHQ and Intelligence Staffs.
3. Electronic Warfare Support Measures (ESM) Unit provides SIGINT support for JFHQ.
4. Provides and administers HUMINT support eg: Agent Handlers, Surveillance personnel. Joint Forward Interrogation Teams (JFIT) Country Liaison Teams (CLT) including de-briefers, Military Intelligence Liaison Officers (MILO) Field Intelligence NCOs (FINCO) etc.
5. Provides intelligence and Field Security Staff for JFHQ and sections and de-tachments at subordinate level, continuity NCOs CONCOs at Unit level.

Figure 3 Intelligence Support Organisation

appropriate, directly to weapon systems. Collection will be based on the collection plan drawn up by the intelligence staffs, under the direction of commanders and the intelligence committees during the Direction phase. Collection will be managed by CCIRM staff.

Sources and Agencies

29. **HUMINT.** As outlined above, the most effective source of intelligence will be that derived from the direct questioning of persons. This is likely to include the following:
- a. *British and Allied Military Sources.* This will include all ranks of the security forces especially those whose duties require them to move among the local population, on patrols, on collection of locally-produced supplies, on liaison with local authorities, dockers, airport workers, aid workers and the like. It is vital that all such personnel are thoroughly briefed on the gaps in intelligence which their duties might enable them to fill. They should be made “intelligence aware” so that they are always prepared to report information which may appear trivial but which, when added to other pieces, may be important.
 - b. *Local Military Forces.* This will include military, paramilitary, auxiliaries and reserves. They will be of value both on duty and when on leave. Like their British and Allied counterparts, they should be encouraged to become intelligence aware. Attempts should be made systematically to brief those going on leave locally and debrief them on return.
 - c. *Military Surveillance.* All the usual general war HUMINT sources of Observation Posts, (OP), mounted and dismounted patrols, reconnaissance units, air reconnaissance, and troops supplemented by specialist surveillance equipment, are equally useful in counter-insurgency operations. They must be tasked and briefed with great care because insurgents operate more covertly than an enemy in conventional warfare and can be harder to detect. Units will frequently be tasked to mount operations specifically to obtain information or to give cover to other intelligence-gathering operations, for example, the insertion or retrieval of covert OPs.
 - d. *Covert Surveillance.* SIW will provide specialist personnel for CPS. In addition, Special Forces (SF) have a long history of success in the role of static covert surveillance and the exploitation of the information which they obtain. The use of SF for intelligence-gathering and offensive operations must be carefully coordinated with G3. When SF are deployed, it will be normal for there to be SF liaison officers in the HQ of the formation to which they are assigned.
 - e. *Irregular Forces.* Units may also be raised locally from the police, the host nation’s army and from friendly sections of the civilian population for the purpose of defensive, or offensive operations against insurgents. Defensive operations include the guarding of key points and storage areas. In the Malayan Emergency local irregulars were used to defend “new villages” in which squatters from the jungle fringes were re-housed in order to isolate them from the influence of the insurgents. Irregular forces may also be formed from ex-insurgents; deserters,

or those who have been captured or have surrendered and who can be persuaded to serve the government. They have a role, both in intelligence-gathering and in offensive operations. Again in Malaya, such irregulars were used to infiltrate the insurgents' command structure by completely replacing a group in one particular area. They then operated to unravel the chain of command from the inside. In Kenya, during the Mau Mau campaign of the early 1950s, "pseudo-gangs" were used to attack insurgents in their own territory. Such use of irregular troops is, however, relatively sophisticated and these operations can be developed only over a protracted period in an environment which is very well understood by the intelligence organisation.

- f. *Interrogation.* Prisoners can be an important source of information. Interrogation in a counter-insurgency campaign can, however, be a sensitive matter politically and is likely to be subject to rigorous oversight, both officially, from the local government and, unofficially, from the media. It is important to be fully aware of the legal basis under which interrogation takes place. Systematic interrogation of captured insurgents can have excellent results, particularly in building a picture of command structures, communications and other aspects of the insurgents' infrastructure. In low-level conflict, interrogation is less likely to produce intelligence of immediate tactical value, simply because insurgent methods of operating, normally involve a very restricted circle within which future plans are discussed. In general terms, but not always so, interrogation should be capable of producing evidence which will be acceptable in court. It is vital, therefore, that it is conducted, strictly in accordance with rules laid down by the host-nation's judiciary. Where necessary, the Joint Services Interrogation Organisation (JSIO) can provide both advice and interrogation teams.⁵
- g. *De-briefing.* JSIO will also provide a Defence De-briefing Team (DDT); personnel skilled in de-briefing willing subjects. These will normally include British subjects with recent knowledge of the host-country and events within. Such people might include travellers, airline crews, expatriate workers and members of British diplomatic missions. If the crisis has resulted in an exodus of such people from the country, then a DDT will be established in the United Kingdom. If such people have remained in the country then a de-briefing team, often called a Country Liaison Team (CLT), may deploy for de-briefing operations in the host-state. Later in the campaign de-briefing may be extended to foreign nationals in the UK with recent appropriate experiences.
- h. *HUMINT Support.* Both interrogation and de-briefing require close steerage and extensive intelligence support if they are to be effective. Liaison representatives will be established at appropriate JICs and will need extensive analytical and research support.

5. An amalgamation of SIW and JSIO to form the Defence HUMINT organisation is likely to take place in the late 1990s. When formed, it will provide a single point of contact for the provision of personnel, training and advice on interrogation, de-briefing, CPS and agent-handling.

- i. *Captured Documents, Equipment and Stores.* These are valuable sources. Troops must be trained to realise their worth and encouraged to make them available to intelligence staffs at the earliest opportunity. Documents found on suspects may assist in the questioning of prisoners by providing interrogators with information which they can exploit during interview.
- j. *Local Police Forces.* Local Police are an excellent source of information but they must be handled with great sensitivity. Care must be taken not to duplicate the information collection from police officers being undertaken by their own intelligence staff. Police Special Branch equivalents are very likely to be handling their own sources among the population. It is probable that there will be a strong reluctance to disclose these sources to intelligence staffs, but their tasking, and the information they provide, should be coordinated and fused by the centralised intelligence machinery.
- k. *Local Population.* Undoubtedly, the local population will, if systematically exploited, be the best source of HUMINT. Great care must be taken in developing the local population as sources and close coordination with local intelligence agencies, the Police Special Branch in particular, must be arranged if difficulties are to be avoided. The insurgents may use bogus informants to plant false information or uncover the source-handling network. Local informants should be given the opportunity to contact the security forces confidentially. This can be done by making confidential telephone lines or Post Office Box numbers available and by keeping routine military patrols in close proximity to the population. Doing so will permit a budding informant to pass information without unduly drawing attention to himself. All military patrols must be trained to talk to local people as a matter of course. If possible, and where necessary, troops should be encouraged to obtain at least some knowledge of the local language. Informers, however, may still be afraid that their voices may be recognized by telephone operators or their writing identified by postmen. People who have good cause to fear reprisals should be given the opportunity to contact the security force with information, for example, at road blocks or on cordon and search operations, where their interviews can be concealed under the guise of interrogation. The intelligence organisation will be capable of developing a system for making contact with, or being contacted by, sympathisers.
- l. *Informers and Agents.* Much of the useful information which reaches the intelligence staff will come from informers and agents. A small number of well-placed and reliable agents, fostered or infiltrated into an insurgent movement in peacetime, can provide information of value well beyond their cost, particularly if at the pivotal points in the insurgents' command. If it is possible to expand sufficiently the agent network at the top level of the insurgents' command, information may be provided on the development of the command structure and organization, the identification of important leaders, the system of liaison between the military wing and the insurgent political leadership and the methods of acquiring funds, food and arms. At lower echelons, informers are useful for providing information on, for example, personalities, tactical plans, weapon and food hides. At these levels, if continuity is to be maintained, it is important that the agent network expands at a similar rate to that of the insurgent movement,

otherwise their relative value will diminish. The problem with acting on information supplied by an individual is source-protection. In an insurgent organisation the circle of knowledge is kept small. If an informer reports the move of a weapon to a new hide, for example, perhaps only three insurgents have been made aware, the courier, the commander and the quartermaster. A subsequent, immediate operation by the security forces to recover the weapon might raise suspicions which would be on just three people. This could seriously jeopardise the security of the source. Care must, therefore, be exercised in such matters and the advice of the HSG sought when planning operations.

30. **Coordination.** Whenever HUMINT sources are to be exploited it is imperative that all HUMINT collection agencies operating in the theatre effect liaison closely with each other. This liaison is vital to ensure:
- a. *De-confliction.* No source should ever be run by more than a single agency. If a single source works for more than one agency, it is possible that his reports can, unwittingly, confirm themselves. This false confirmation, sometimes called false collateral, as well as being a danger to the intelligence process, can cause the source to gain greater credence than his worth. Furthermore, if the situation becomes known to the insurgents, they can exploit the false collateral at the expense of the security forces.
 - b. *Veracity.* There is always the risk of a source, if not properly handled, producing information which is unreliable, or even acting as a double agent. Tasking must be rigidly controlled to reduce the likelihood of this happening. Reliability of sources must always be evaluated with great care and records maintained by the HUMINT agency.
 - c. *Security.* The smaller the circle of people knowing the identity of a source, the safer can he operate. If sources are to be maintained, and confidence spread, source-protection must be effective, and be seen to be effective.
31. **Open Source Intelligence.** Intelligence derived from open sources (OSINT) is playing an increasingly important role in all phases of war. Nowhere, however, will the role of the media be more important than in counter-insurgency. Not only will the actions of the security forces be scrutinised closely, it will be pored over at length by press and current affairs television and radio programmes the world over and will play a major part in forming public opinion. Relations with the media are not the direct responsibility of the intelligence staff. They should remember, however, that reporters can get access where security forces often cannot. Furthermore, press teams are often out and about for protracted periods. A warm relationship, built up between intelligence staffs and individual members of the press corps can reap dividends in the form of low-level information. Many British journalists will cover the campaign for an extended period, visiting the country for, perhaps six weeks at a time before returning to Britain for one or two months. If an intelligence staff develops a sufficient relationship with individual members of a media team, information might be forthcoming in return for, perhaps, a sanitised update, or a security brief on their return to the theatre of operations. Intelligence staffs should not forget, however, that the media

do not collect intelligence, merely information and media reports should always be regarded with caution. They are likely to include a bias to some particular purpose rather than be a straight reporting of unabridged or unelaborated facts. Commanders may have seen the morning television news coverage of the campaign immediately prior to being briefed by the staff. This can, inevitably, lead to staffs having to respond to press reports rather than leading on subjects of their choosing with unfortunate results. Intelligence officers should take steps to avoid briefings developing in this way. Local media in particular will have a vital role to play in the hearts and minds campaign and intelligence staff can expect to play a part in this with Operations and PSYOPS staff.

32. ***Open-Source Publications.*** In addition to the current reporting of news teams in theatre, there is likely to be considerable open-source material produced prior to the campaign which will go some way to meeting intelligence staffs' requirements for basic intelligence. This can include atlases, encyclopedias, travel books, statistical summaries and a host of other reference books produced by the specialist-interest press covering the armed forces, the political, economic, geographical situations inside the country and much of value.
33. ***Insurgent Use of the Media.*** It must be remembered that the insurgent movement will also attempt to make use of the media to spread its own views and discredit those of the government and the security forces. Intelligence staffs should attempt to catalogue insurgent publications; they can sometimes reveal aspects of the insurgent otherwise unknown.

Imagery Intelligence

34. ***Imagery intelligence as a Source.*** Intelligence derived from imagery, (IMINT), will play an important role in counter-insurgency operations. Coverage will include imagery, ranging from map-quality prints from airborne platforms, both satellite and aircraft, some of very high resolution, to thermal imagery (TI), and Infra-red (IR), pictures. TI imagery is excellent at detecting bodies which are warmer than their surroundings, such as people concealed in dense foliage, or a warm vehicle engine. IR imagery is capable of detecting disturbed soil; valuable for detecting buried arms caches, command wires for booby traps and other insurgent devices. Collection platforms will include satellites, strategic aircraft, tactical air reconnaissance (TAR), aircraft, helicopters and Unattended Airborne Vehicles (UAV), such as Phoenix. OPs and other reconnaissance troops can expect to be equipped with hand-held cameras, video recorders, TI equipment and Image intensifiers (II). Coordination of IMINT is the task of an ISG, normally found from within the resources of the Joint Air Reconnaissance Intelligence Centre (JARIC). Where RAF aircraft with a reconnaissance role are deployed, so too will a Reconnaissance Intelligence Cell, (RIC). It is at the RIC that the first-line analysis of the results of reconnaissance sorties will be performed. There will be a constant demand for photographic coverage of areas of operations. The ISG will be able to provide intelligence derived from the analysis of all kinds of imagery. Much analysis will be done, however, not on "wet film", that is photographic negative or print, but on "soft copy", images on a computer screen. Although prints of images can be made available, care should be taken to ensure that

they are demanded only when necessary, for example as briefing aids. Prints should not be demanded as proof of intelligence reports as a matter of course. The time taken to interpret results of an IMINT task is considerably lengthened when prints of the imagery are required.

Signals Intelligence

35. Signals intelligence, SIGINT, plays a vital role in the higher phases of war. In low-level conflict the immediate value of SIGINT may be less apparent. Insurgent groups will, however, have a need to communicate and when they do via any electronic medium they are vulnerable to intercept. Besides deriving intelligence from communications (COMINT), SIGINT analysts will exploit emissions from radars and other electronic emitters. This electronic intelligence (ELINT), can enable the detection of, for example, radio-control devices and missile control, guidance and target-seeking radars. Where SIGINT collection is envisaged, a CSG will be available to coordinate its collection and to interpret the results within the ASC.

SECTION 4 - PROCESSING

36. ***Processing as a Discipline.*** The processing stage of the intelligence cycle incorporates the work of the intelligence staff in collation, analysis, integration, or synthesis, and interpretation of information.
37. ***Processing Staff.*** The processing staff will normally be trained intelligence operators, often from all three services, supported by specialists in the collection disciplines. Where appropriate, specialists from other arms and services will join the analytical staff, for example, engineer intelligence operators, with their specialist knowledge of, particularly, terrain, mine warfare and search. Ammunition technicians with their training in explosives, firing devices and weapon inspection are able to develop weapons intelligence in conjunction with the police forensic scientists. This discipline, based on such items as weapon matching, will be able to trace weapons to their sources of supply, to rounds they have fired, explosives and detonators to their origin and so on.
38. ***The Intelligence Office.*** The best results will be obtained from those intelligence organisations which are fully integrated, work to a centrally-agreed collection plan, employ effective CCIRM personnel, fusion and database managers, analysts and other intelligence specialists and approach their task in a structured, objective and systematic way.
39. ***Fusion.*** One of the critical tasks performed in the ASC is that of fusion. This is the collation of reports and information from the separate, single-source agencies, HUMINT, SIGINT and IMINT, into a single assessment. Each agency produces its own view of an event or activity and reports it to the intelligence staff. This is known as “single-source picture compilation”. The fused assessment, that is, the assessment made by the comparison of more than one single-source report, becomes the “recognised tactical ground, (or maritime, or air), picture”. The recognised picture will be produced at the level with responsibility for reporting, usually the level maintaining

the database as it is there that the broadest view will be. This then becomes the authoritative view which forms the basis for assessments by all subordinate intelligence staff and will be disseminated upwards, downwards and to the flanks in the form of intelligence summaries (INTSUMs), which are often pictorial.

40. **Databases.** One of the fundamentals of effective processing is the maintenance of an efficient database. In a counter insurgency campaign there will be a plethora of small, apparently insignificant and unconnected data. Only effective collation and cross-referencing will enable analysts to assess the significance of individual pieces and make best use of them. Nowadays, it is likely that the database will be held in electronic form on computer. Ideally, this will be available throughout the user community, to all the analysts, the specialists and, if possible, to subordinate intelligence staffs. It should be decided at the very start at which level responsibility for maintaining all the records will lie. All other levels should have some, preferably direct, read-only, or limited write access, ideally on the "pull" principle. The database itself should be constructed, and maintained, with care. It must be accessible to from as wide a community as possible, thus centralisation is critical. It will be worth some effort to ensure that the initial design is right, that the software can meet the requirement or, if this cannot be done, that it can be amended, or updated, effectively as experience in its use grows. To hope to transfer records from a redundant system to a new one in mid-campaign is not realistic; records will be lost, or become corrupted, and efficiency will suffer. Provision must also be made for interrogating national databases and those of collection agencies. All this will require detailed consideration, careful planning, stringent security regimes and a heavy reliance on an extensive communications network. Intelligence databases are vulnerable. They have to be well protected against fluctuations and cuts in the power supply and against viruses and unauthorised importation of software. Information must be backed up regularly and the back-up tapes stored separately, under secure, and fireproof, conditions. The database manager should be selected with care. He, the users and technicians, must be allowed access only in a controlled and monitored environment.

SECTION 5 - DISSEMINATION

41. **Responsibility.** Dissemination of intelligence to subordinate commanders is the responsibility of the Director of Intelligence at the highest level and of chief intelligence officers at subordinate levels. Where intelligence committees are established, individual intelligence chiefs of the separate services represented will accept responsibility for briefing their own commanders.
42. **Use of Intelligence Architecture.** It should be emphasised that intelligence should flow, not necessarily in a hierarchical manner, as is the case with orders along an operational chain of command, but quickly and efficiently, from whomever holds it to whomever needs it. This will mean that, on occasion, it will bypass some levels of command. This principle is easier to effect if information can be "pulled" from the user rather than be "pushed" by the holder. Where appropriate, graphical dissemination, for example Pictorial Intelligence Summaries (PICINTSUMs), should be used as these are the most readily assimilated. This is greatly aided by the use of information technology. INTSUMs should be disseminated at regular intervals. These can be

supplemented by detailed reports on specific topics, for example, insurgent ORBATs or incidents, as required. Often these too can be disseminated regularly, perhaps weekly. As with intelligence reporting in any phase of war, care must be taken to avoid “circular reporting” in which parts of a summary from one intelligence staff are plagiarised in another and return to the originator as apparent confirmation of the original. This problem is particularly acute in combined operations where the different national authorities include reports from third parties in their own summaries. The best defence against this is clear orders for reporting authority and a thorough knowledge, on the part of intelligence officers, of the sources and agencies available to all the intelligence staffs providing reports for the theatre.

43. **Security.** While intelligence is of use only in the hands of operational decision-makers, its dissemination should be closely controlled. Source-protection must always be in the front of the intelligence officer’s mind. If a source is at risk, intelligence should be sanitised or disguised in such a way as to conceal its source. Access to intelligence in such circumstances should be restricted to those with a real need to know. Security of intelligence must always be balanced against the value to be gained from its dissemination. Agencies generally have strict guidelines for dissemination of intelligence in an emergency, perhaps when lives are at risk. Intelligence officers need to acquaint themselves with these “action on” procedures so that emergency dissemination can take place with the minimum of delay.

SECTION 6 - TRAINING

44. **Pre-Deployment Training.** All personnel involved in the Direction, Collection, Processing and Dissemination of intelligence should deploy to the theatre having made thorough preparation. They must be clear on their role in the intelligence organisation and have had the opportunity to rehearse the issues with which they will be dealing, with those to whom they will be working. Chief intelligence officers, in particular, should take the time to examine the forthcoming operation against the fundamentals of intelligence, which are the same for any phase of war, and attempt to order their thoughts on architectures and intelligence support in such a way that they can see clearly what infrastructure will be necessary to meet their aim of supporting the commander’s plan. Those personnel with a role which will require them to effect liaison with other authorities in the United Kingdom should have had the opportunity to make contact with them, to discuss the issues and, particularly, agree on the means with which they will communicate. Ideally, they should have the opportunity to exercise using similar communications systems before departure.
45. **Background Intelligence.** Military staff should be as thoroughly briefed as possible on the situation in the theatre of operations prior to deployment. Local MI companies will be able to assist with individual and unit training on intelligence matters, current affairs and other aspects of the insurgency.
46. **Specialist Skills.** Military staff with specialist skills should ensure that as much training as possible is done prior to arrival in theatre. Problems are much easier to solve, particularly those involving technical equipment, in a benign environment where extensive support facilities exist than after arrival. This will apply also to those

members of an intelligence organisation who will be required to use computers and other types of information technology (IT). There are a multitude of different systems, with varying functionality and connectivity; thorough knowledge of them on the part of users markedly increases their value.

47. **Intelligence at Unit Level.** Further aspects of unit intelligence and security training are covered in other Parts of the Army Field Manual.

SECTION 7 - DIFFICULTIES FACING AN INTELLIGENCE ORGANISATION

48. **Non-Operational Requirement.** Although the immediate requirement at the start of an emergency will be for the existing intelligence organisation to expand and produce intelligence to support commanders for military and police operations, it will have to continue to provide other strategic, political and economic intelligence. The intelligence organisation will be severely stretched in the expansion phase and the recruitment of additional staff may give the insurgents an opportunity to infiltrate their agents.
49. **Security of the Expanded Organization.** Finding, and vetting, suitable personnel and preventing insurgent penetration of a rapidly enlarging intelligence system will present difficulties and risks. The difficulties may be overcome by effort and cooperation. The risks have to be accepted with open eyes and minimized by good security.
50. **Political Direction.** Political direction of intelligence is a sensitive matter in a democracy because the system of checks and balances demands that it is not abused to promote personal, party or factional interests. In a more authoritarian regime the government's control of intelligence is closely guarded to ensure that it retains a monopoly of power. In either case direction is usually exercised by a senior member of the government. The decentralization necessary to counter an insurgency erodes control in three respects.
- a. **Dissemination of Intelligence.** The number of people who have access to sensitive issues will increase, thus centralised control of the intelligence is more difficult. There will be created opportunities for subordinates, newly in receipt of intelligence to take advantage of it or to be suborned
 - b. **Collection Methods.** Methods used to collect information can no longer be controlled rigidly from central government. HUMINT must be handled at the lowest level. Agent handlers require the kind of local knowledge which demands that they live in close proximity to those with whom they work.
 - c. **Decisions on the Threat.** More importantly, there is the increase in an individual's opportunities to exercise value judgements as to which people and what groups are to be considered a threat to the state and who should or should not be targeted. Often there is not only a legal dividing line between a proscribed insurgent organization and its legitimate political party but also between the insurgents and those who sympathise with them.

51. ***Increase in Military Influence.*** A further difficulty, which insurgent propagandists exploit, is that the dilution of high-level political control is exacerbated by the increased influence exercised over the intelligence system by the security forces. The charge, however unjustified, that the security forces are, thereby, involved in politics can be a damaging one. The obvious retort, that the Army is already involved to the extent that it supports a legitimate government against lawless insurgents, will not convince all. The relationship between the government, the judiciary, the security forces and intelligence should be indivisible. A situation in which the intelligence organisation and the security forces are answerable to separate authorities; government, regional, allied or factional, has to be avoided.
52. ***Influence of Foreign Allies.*** In combined operations, the charge may be made, and exploited by the insurgents, that the government is under the control of foreigners. The resultant sensitivity may cause the government to place greater restrictions on the freedom of action by the allies than might otherwise be the case. This might include restrictions on intelligence-gathering, particularly sensitive collection in the HUMINT and SIGINT fields.

GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS USED

All	Area of Intelligence Interest
AIO	Assistant Intelligence Officer
AIR	Area of Intelligence Responsibility
AOR	Area of Responsibility
ASC	All Sources Cell
ATO	Ammunition Technical Officer
CCIRM	Collection Coordination and Intelligence Requirements Management
CB	Citizens' Band (radio)
CLT	Country Liaison Team
CNR	Combat Net Radio
CONCO	Continuity NCO
CPS	Covert Passive Surveillance
CSG	Cryptological Support Group
DDT	Defence De-briefing Team
DIS	Defence Intelligence Staff
DISC	Defence Intelligence & Security School
ESM	Electronic Warfare Support Measures
FINCO	Field Intelligence NCO
FS	Field Security
HCI	Human-Computer Interface
HSG	HUMINT Support Group
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
IDB	Integrated Database
II	Image Intensification
IMINT	Imagery Intelligence
IO	Intelligence Officer
IR	Infra-Red/Information Requirement
IRLS	Infra-red Linescan
ISG	IMINT Support Group
JFHQ	Joint Forces Headquarters
JFIT	Joint Forward Interrogation Team
JIC	Joint Intelligence Cell
JOC	Joint Operations Cell
JSIO	Joint Services Interrogation Organisation
LAN	Local Area Network
MI	Military Intelligence
MILO	Military Intelligence Liaison Officer
MIO	Military Intelligence Officer
MSTAR	Manportable Surveillance and Target Acquisition Radar
NIC	National Intelligence Cell
NIST	National Intelligence Support Team
OSINT	Open-Source Intelligence

PIR	Priority Intelligence Requirement
PW	Prisoner of War
RFI	Request For Information
RIC	Reconnaissance Intelligence Cell
SAM	Surface-to-Air Missile
SITS	Secondary Image Transmission System
SF	Special Forces
SIGINT	Signals Intelligence
SIW	Specialist Intelligence Wing
TAR	Tactical Air Reconnaissance
TI	Thermal Imagery
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UGS	Unattended Ground Sensors
UKMIST	United Kingdom Military Intelligence Support Terminal
WIS	Weapons Intelligence Staff

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FOR C2W IN A COIN CAMPAIGN

Introduction

1. The components of Command and Control (C2) are the Commander and his staff, including his supporting intelligence organisation, communications and information systems. All elements of the C2 process are important, largely inseparable and contribute to the successful outcome of the Commander's plan; they are also vulnerable to attack. By preventing an insurgent commander from effectively controlling his organisation contributes directly to the COIN principle of separating the insurgent from his support.
2. The nature and extent of all source intelligence required for the planning and execution of C2W operations is shown in the subsequent paragraphs.

Intelligence to Support OPSEC.

3. Intelligence support for OPSEC planning must focus on the capabilities and limitations of the insurgents intelligence gathering system, in order to reduce the vulnerability of friendly C2 assets and installations to attack. Counter-intelligence resources will be concentrated on the security threat. Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) and Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) are important to assess the effectiveness of the OPSEC plan.
4. Key information/intelligence requirements to support OPSEC are at Annex C.

Intelligence to Support PSYOPS

5. A PSYOPS team should work very closely with the All Source Intelligence Cell to plan PSYOPS and to integrate these with the other C2W functions. As part of PSYOPS it may be necessary to conceal aspects of friendly dispositions, capabilities and intentions. OPSEC may therefore be essential to the PSYOPS plan. Equally, it may be desirable in support of PSYOPS to reveal certain aspects of friendly dispositions, capabilities and intentions. PSYOPS can also be used to support Deception.
6. Basic psychological intelligence - on the cultural, religious, social and economic aspects of the target country/population and its government/leadership, communications and media - is produced during peacetime in the form of Basic Psychological Studies (BPS). During operations the BPS are supplemented by current psychological intelligence, which is provided by PSYOPS analysts working in a G2/J2 cell.
7. The resultant psychological assessments are different from intelligence assessments because they use information and intelligence to identify target audiences within the opposing force, and those factors that are most likely to influence their attitudes and behaviour in favour of the Commander's mission. The conditions and attitudes of

target groups are likely to change as the situation develops. Current All Source Intelligence, in particular HUMINT and SIGINT, is therefore vital, both in the planning phase, and then throughout the execution of PSYOPS, to assess the effectiveness of current campaigns, to reinforce success and to re-allocate limited resources, if the desired effect is not being achieved.

8. Key information/intelligence requirements - both for planning and executing PSYOPS and for ensuring that the insurgent's psychological operations are ineffective - are at Annex C.

Intelligence to Support Deception

9. Deception aims to present a deliberately false picture to those in an insurgency. Deception is highly complex, in particular those aspects which seek to exploit insurgent C2 assets, and it demands security at the highest level. OPSEC is essential to Deception in order to conceal those aspects and indicators that would allow the insurgent to determine the reality behind the Deception.
10. EW plays an important role in support of Deception both by targeting hostile communications and by identifying those Electronic Support Measures (ESM) elements - the ability to intercept and analyse our own communications - which it may be essential to leave intact as the conduit for electronic deception.
11. Intelligence supports deception planners by analysing an insurgent's reconnaissance capabilities and identifying his perception of the 'battlefield', including his own deception doctrine, tactics/procedures, capabilities and intentions. This requires an insight into an insurgent commander's way of thinking, including the estimate process.
12. During the execution of deception operations, All Source Intelligence, particularly on insurgent movement/deployments, is required to monitor the insurgents response and to determine whether the deception operation is achieving its aim. In analysing this intelligence, attention must also be paid to possible insurgent deception plans to protect his own operations.
13. Key information/intelligence requirements to plan/execute deception operations and to reduce the effects of insurgent deception actions against friendly C2 assets are at Annex C.

Intelligence to Support EW.

14. EW has applications in providing early warning of insurgent action, in self-protection, in locating and identifying hostile emitters and in exploitation. It depends on timely, directed All Source Intelligence, but Communications Intelligence (COMINT) and Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) and IMINT are especially useful to C2W planners to locate an insurgents C2 means, to identify any communications architecture, including offensive EW capability, and to highlight any critical/vulnerable C2 systems.

15. It is essential to establish target acquisition priorities, based on a commander's concept for future operations. The decision to target insurgent C2 assets must be based on an assessment of the balance between destruction/neutralisation and exploitation, and between hard-kill and soft-kill methods. It may, for example, be necessary to ensure that certain hostile ESM systems are protected from attack, in support of the electronic deception plan. Such key decisions must be made at the highest level and should be included in any Commander's Directive. Decisions on targeting will also have to be coordinated with allies, where this is appropriate.
16. Key information/intelligence requirements to support EW - both to degrade an insurgent commander's C2 cycle and to nullify the effects of hostile EW actions against friendly C2 assets are at Annex C.

Intelligence to Support Physical Destruction

17. The physical destruction, or at least neutralisation, of hostile C2 and counter-C2 assets is a central objective in any C2W operations.
18. Intelligence for physical destruction is focused on supporting the targeting process. There is a requirement for close integration with national targeting priorities. An assessment must also be made, with G2/J2 advice, on the balance of advantage of destruction against exploitation, including the possible development of a No-Strike (both passive and active measures) targeting list.
19. As C2 systems can be reconstituted, it is essential that timely Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) - based primarily on IMINT and SIGINT - is available.
20. Key information/intelligence requirements to support targeting/Physical Destruction and to reduce the vulnerability of friendly C2 assets and installations to attack are at Annex C.

KEY INFORMATION/INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS FOR C2W

OPSEC

1. Capabilities of insurgents to collect/process/analyse intelligence.
2. Intelligence (in particular SIGINT, HUMINT) on insurgent intelligence objectives and achievements.
3. Factors, such as cultural bias, that could influence the insurgent's interpretation of intelligence gained.
4. Assessment of hostile counter-C2 capabilities to allow C2W planners to make priorities for targeting/C2-protection measures.
5. Counter-intelligence on the security threat posed by agents of foreign intelligence services.
6. HUMINT (from counterintelligence, the interrogation of prisoners or captured insurgents) and SIGINT on the effectiveness of OPSEC.

PSYOPS

7. Detailed information on cultural, religious, social, economic and political peculiarities of the country and region.
8. Insurgent C2 architecture. (possibly linked with hostile forces outside the country/theatre).
9. Background information on popular radio/TV programmes and personalities, periodicals and cartoons, and important holidays, historical dates and religious anniversaries.
10. Assessment of the systems, especially communications and broadcast systems, used by the insurgent to elicit support from the populace, and mechanisms for political control.
11. HUMINT is frequently the key to successful PSYOPS, focusing on the target group's attitudes, alliances, and behaviour to identify:
 - a. Vulnerabilities and susceptibilities.
 - b. The leadership structure, key communicators and their relationship with the target group.

- c. Psychological profiles of key political and military leaders. Much of this can be obtained in peacetime by FCO/Defence Attaches.
 - d. All agencies suitable for conveying messages to selected audiences and bringing maximum psychological pressure to bear.
 - e. Impact on unintended audiences.
 - f. Hostile propaganda, analysing it for counter-propaganda and defensive PSYOPS.
 - g. Ascertain the reaction of the insurgent to friendly PSYOPS.
12. Assessment of any insurgent PSYOPS doctrine/capability and propaganda/public information techniques.

Deception

- 13. Assessment of the capabilities and limitations of the insurgent intelligence collection/analysis system.
- 14. Profiles of key leaders/military commanders, including analysis of their decision-making processes and identification of biases/preconceived perceptions.
- 15. Assessment of the hostile deception doctrine, tactics/procedures and capability.
- 16. Current intelligence on the insurgent's ORBAT, force dispositions and any changes/redeployment as a result of deception operations (to gauge success of the deception).

EW

- 17. Identify critical communications and non-communications C2 nodes for exploitation (ESM) or electronic attack - jamming/Directed Energy Weapons (DEW).
- 18. Identify any hostile electronic air defence systems (that are crucial to the success of air/aviation operations) for electronic attack (jamming/DEW).
- 19. Identify hostile ESM systems that are exploitable in support of the deception plan.

Physical Destruction

- 20. Identification of hostile C2 systems (in particular intelligence collection assets), the communications architecture of those systems and the facilities that house them. This should include an assessment of the degree of redundancy.
- 21. Assessment of the vulnerability of hostile C2 systems including the role they play in supporting the leadership and military capabilities, in order to identify critical/vulnerable systems as potential targets.

22. Identification and location of the defensive means used to protect hostile C2 systems
23. Intelligence (in particular IMINT or SIGINT) to assist in any battlefield damage assessment of insurgent C2 targets once they have been subjected to attack.
24. Intelligence on any insurgent offensive capability and targeting priorities.

Defensive C2W

25. Intelligence on any insurgent C2W organisation, doctrine/operating procedures, capabilities and potential vulnerabilities during different stages of military operations (both in peace and war).
26. Counter-intelligence on foreign intelligence services.
27. Targeting intelligence on hostile offensive C2W assets.
28. HUMINT on insurgent C2W intentions.

CHAPTER 7

THE SECURITY FORCES

SECTION 1 - POLICE FORCES

The Police as a Reflection of Society

1. **An Acceptable Use of Force.** The role of the police and the level of force which is customarily considered permissible, as well as legal, by the public depends on the culture and prevailing attitudes of each country. In a democracy, where the police are accountable to elected bodies, public opinion will be a determining factor in whether the authorities arm their policemen on the beat, whether there should be some sort of riot element and whether there should be a paramilitary force armed with heavy equipment. Policing by consent with unarmed constables preserves a moderate image and creates an empathy between the police and the majority of a country's law-abiding citizens. Provided that such a force has sufficient manpower and is held in general respect it is able to deal with low level violence, such as mass demonstrations which get out of hand. Helped by the arrangements to arm small numbers of specially trained policemen, and perhaps some Army EOD support, a force can even cope with terrorist bombing campaigns.
2. **Size.** However, the size of a police force is related mainly to the resources necessary to prevent and deal with crime and to preserve public order in circumstances where the rule of law is generally respected. On state occasions, where the problem is mainly crowd and traffic control, or at major sporting events which can be accompanied by some disorder, the police resources are stretched and the local constabulary may have to ask for extra manpower. In the face of widespread, organized disturbances, such as may be expected in an organised insurgency which produce the unsettled circumstances in which crime and general lawlessness thrive, the police may be unable to cope unassisted. If, in addition, the police force is below strength in the first place and subjected to a well planned campaign of intimidation and assassination, a considerable amount of outside assistance may be needed.
3. **Paramilitary Police.** Some countries maintain paramilitary police forces, either on a permanent basis or as a reserve. They can be feared and sometimes hated in countries where they have demonstrated little regard for the rule of law and the principle of using the minimum of force. Nevertheless, in states where such forces have come to be accepted they may provide an important relief to the police during the tense early stages, allowing the latter to concentrate on the prevention of crime. If they act with due moderation they may have a useful stabilising effect, encouraging moderate opinion to rally to the government. However, the intervention of untrained reserves as riot squads in a situation where force has to be used normally has quite the opposite effect, damaging the reputations of police and government, and alienating public opinion to the advantage of the insurgents cause.

Authority and Accountability

4. A significant variation between the police forces of different countries lies in the system of control. In the British model the police are organized on a territorial basis, each local force being largely autonomous. Abroad, many national forces are controlled centrally with overall responsibility resting in the hands of a minister of the interior or of home affairs.

Organization

5. **A General Model.** Because each country's police force is organized in a manner best suited to meet the national requirement there is no one model which can be cited as typical. It will be necessary for units despatched overseas at the request of a friendly government to become acquainted with the host nation's methods of police control and organization so that they can fit readily into the local machinery of coordination. However, as many constabularies are organized on British lines, especially within the Commonwealth, an outline knowledge of the system used in Great Britain could provide a useful starting point. If the host country's police force is organized differently an acquaintance with the British system will provide a basis for the comparison of significant dissimilarities and so help to prevent unnecessary misunderstandings.
6. **Command Structure.** A police force usually consists of a number of divisions, each under a senior police officer and sub-divisions under a more junior police officer. Within sub-divisions the police force normally organizes their policeman into 'reliefs' for routine duty over a fixed period, usually eight hours.
7. **Other Police Forces.** Large public authorities and ministries such as the Ministry of Defence have their own uniformed police force. On deployment overseas it will be necessary to find out what other police forces the Army may have to work with. In an emergency, all these additional forces may be brought within the ambit of the security forces for ease of coordination.
8. **Branch Organization.** Police forces are usually divided into a number of branches:
 - a. **Uniformed Branch.** The majority of a force falls within this category which includes policemen on the beat, mobile patrols, traffic control, river and marine sections, underwater search, dog handlers and mounted police.
 - b. **Criminal Investigation Department (CID).** Responsible for the orthodox investigation of crime; normally wears plain clothes.
 - c. **Special Branch (SB).** The intelligence branch of a police force which is concerned with matters connected with aliens, the protection of VIPs, subversion and politically motivated crime. It has a particular responsibility for the investigation of terrorist and insurgent organizations. Most foreign police forces have their equivalents of the SB although some may incorporate their duties within their counterparts of the CID.

- d. *Special Police Forces and Reserves.* Most police forces have some form of special policeman made up of volunteers who, like their British equivalents, perform unpaid police duties in their spare time. They act as auxiliaries to the regular force when extra manpower is required. Their effectiveness and numbers vary considerably from force to force.
- e. *Traffic Wardens.* Their role makes them useful extra eyes and ears for spotting stolen vehicles, which may have been hijacked and suspicious packages which may turn out to be bombs. They are controlled by their own offices.
- f. *Civilian Staff.* Police forces normally employ civilians on administrative and office duties to release as many policemen as possible for operational duties.

Equipment and Specialization

9. **Communications.** All forces possess standard types of UHF and VHF radio equipment. With slight modification the radios may be used throughout the country.
10. **Computers.** Some police forces may be equipped with computers to hold criminal and vehicle records and to provide an additional means of communication between various divisions of the police force.
11. **Firearms.** Some police forces may be armed as a matter of routine. If not then weapons would be available for issue under careful controls when armed resistance is anticipated. Types and quantities of weapons and anti-riot equipment vary from force to force. Some police forces maintain a small number of highly trained firearms officers who can operate as a skilled team for certain situations.
12. **Transport.** Apart from patrol cars and motor cycles most police forces maintain a limited lift capacity of 12-14 men vans and buses. The majority of police forces can lift their reserves from within their own resources but will need to hire transport to meet major commitments. Some overseas police forces equip their paramilitary forces with lightly armoured vehicles and trucks which are designed to reduce the effect of mines and booby traps.
13. **Common Services.** Central government departments provide a number of common services to supplement the resources of the police forces. These services could include training, forensic science, telecommunications and regional crime squads.

Other Factors

14. It is possible that the police forces of a state are not organised or controlled on the lines of the first 13 paragraphs. There are many instances when police forces have been poorly organised, ill equipped, or decidedly hostile to any form of cooperation with the Armed Forces (or a combination of all three factors). Due account of these factors have to be made by the government when planning the overall campaign and the appropriate actions put in hand to either resolve any weaknesses or overcome them in other ways.

SECTION 2 - AUXILIARY FORCES

15. **Categories.** In most nations there may be all or some of the following additional forces with whom our military contingent may be integrated or work alongside in a less formal framework:
 - a. Local armed forces.
 - b. Border guards.
 - c. Indigenous counter-insurgency units.
 - d. Home guards and wardens.
 - e. Customs and Immigration units.
 - f. Coastguards.
 - g. Frontier police.
 - h. Air traffic control.
16. **Local Auxiliary Forces.** By the time British or allied forces appear on the scene the local auxiliary forces may be under considerable pressure and discouraged by insurgent successes. They will need support and encouragement as well as the opportunity to play a useful and constructive role in operations alongside these forces. As areas are successively brought back under government control they will be handed over to the local administration together with its police and armed forces. Local paramilitary forces may have also been embodied. Those recruited and deployed on a territorial basis near their homes should be useful sources of information on the current scene and make competent guides and, perhaps, provide interpreters.
17. **Border Guards.** Armies have always employed people living on a border as scouts and auxiliaries. Working on an informal basis, men such as Jim Bridger who scouted for the US Army in the Old West, or on a more formal basis, such as the Seven Years' War ranger units under Stark and Rogers, these frontier scouts provided an expertise in reconnaissance and a knowledge of the local inhabitants that were invaluable to a regular army. Later, units raised on a temporary basis were taken on to the establishment, like the Khyber Rifles, the South Waziristan Scouts and the Tochi Scouts to police areas on the North-West Frontier, where they kept their fingers on the pulse in the tribal areas and took the initial brunt of minor internal security operations so that the intervention of the Army could be kept in reserve for the most serious outbreaks of trouble. Other local forces, such as the Aden Protectorate Levies, later called the Federal Regular Army, and the Hadrami Bedouin Legion, played a similar role in the former Aden Protectorate. Not all these forces assumed a military aspect. The Border Scouts raised in Borneo during the Confrontation, 1963-1966, and trained initially by the SAS, discarded their uniforms, boots and carbines for loin cloths, bare feet and shotguns to work more effectively singly and in pairs as

the 'eyes and ears' and guides for SAS and other security force patrols. Further details on indigenous and irregular auxiliary forces may be found in Annex A to this Chapter.¹

18. **Indigenous Counter-Insurgent Units.** Some of the most effective anti-insurgent forces have been recruited from the populations of remote areas where the insurgents have their bases. The Senoi Praak were raised from the aborigines of Central Malaya and the French, and later the American Army Special Forces, had some success in Vietnam. Such forces require a high standard of training and take time to form. Persuading captured insurgents to switch their allegiance to the government is an old tactic used in many situations. Frank Kitson's countergangs in Kenya recruited from ex-Mau Mau terrorists, the Rhodesian Selous Scouts and the Malayan Special Operational Volunteer Force were all successful. To induce a prisoner to join such an organization it is necessary to treat surrendered insurgents personnel well, to hold them forward, close to the place where they were captured and to segregate them from other captured insurgents. They should not be sent back to the detention camps where they will be subjected to the influence and unofficial discipline of the other prisoners. Once recruited they are unlikely to renege for fear of certain death at the hands of their former comrades.
19. **Home Guards and Wardens.** If they have not already been established it may be most advantageous to set up local home guard and warden schemes in town wards and villages. Finding a useful role for citizens and farmers to play gives them a sense of responsibility, a feeling that their services are appreciated and that they are trusted, as well as providing some basic security at the lowest level where it most concerns the individual. By enrolling people into a home guard or warden organization the government steers loyal subjects away from forming illegal private armies for self-defence with all the implications for aggravated communal conflict, loss of control of arms and anarchy. As the most isolated and exposed elements of the security forces, home guardsmen and wardens are the most vulnerable to attack and subversion. The frequent presence of army and police patrols, an alarm system to call for reinforcements and a good intelligence organization all help to give the home guard encouragement and a sense of security. The home guard scheme may be extended to create small mobile reserves in each village which can be mobilized quickly to go to the help of a neighbouring village under terrorist attack. There is a risk in raising such forces but the benefits in terms of rallying support for the government, making the insurgent's efforts to contact the population more dangerous and providing extra eyes and ears for the security forces usually outweigh the hazards.
20. **Customs, Immigration, Frontier Police and Coastguards.** All these services are designed to control movement across frontiers and coastlines and prevent smuggling. While they tend to concentrate their efforts at officially designated crossing points on the borders and observation posts they also incorporate a mobile element for patrolling unwatched sectors. Coastguards are becoming increasingly reliant on a combination of radar surveillance and fast patrol boats to intercept suspicious sightings. These services are usually well acquainted with the identities, habits and routes used

1. Although the SAS are now included with other SF within the generic term United Kingdom Special Forces (UKSF), they were referred to as the SAS at the time.

by smugglers and illegal border crossers which a revolutionary organization will use to move men, arms and equipment into the threatened state. Insurgents may also try to bribe or subvert officials. With the formation of large international political and economic communities many of these services are being reduced as internal frontier restrictions are dismantled. Where they exist they should be brought within the ambit of the security forces as early as possible in an emergency.

21. **Air Traffic Control.** Air traffic control organizations should be alerted to watch for suspicious flights. In underdeveloped countries it may be necessary to install air force radar stations to watch gaps in the civil aviation radar coverage. The question of using fighters to intercept illegal aircraft intrusions or even surface to air missiles is a subject which should be discussed with the host government on whose shoulders the responsibility for arriving at a decision on policy rests. Even with the help of air traffic control authorities it is still very difficult to intercept/interdict this sort of illicit traffic.

SECTION 3 - ARMED FORCES

22. **General.** Armed Forces around the world function on much the same general basis, the main differences between the armed forces of states is their size, quality of serviceman and equipment. Control of the armed forces does however differ quite markedly in some states. British forces operating in another state at the invitation of the government would have to recognise and take account of the host nations armed forces and their overall role in an counter insurgency situation. The predominant Service in counter insurgency is the Army although the Air Forces have always had a strong supporting role. This relationship may change as new technology and operating methods occur. This theme is developed further in Chapter 8.
23. **The Army's Role.** The Army and the police bear the main role in counter-insurgency operations. Unless the insurgents are joined by an outside power with significant naval and air forces, the conflict will still be primarily a ground force responsibility with the other two Services acting largely in its support. The different ways in which the armed forces can be utilised in any counter insurgency campaign is shown by reference to the British Army in the following paragraphs. More detailed tactics techniques and procedures for COIN operations are covered in Part 3 and Part 4 of this Volume.
24. **Armour.** During an insurgency there will be little scope for the tank and its high velocity gun, except on the rare occasions when an insurgent has been isolated, surrounded or pinned down in a defensive position or when the insurgents begin to commit trained units to battle in areas where the insurgency phase could be developing into conventional war. If, in the former case, the insurgents hold a strong position, determined to die rather than surrender, there may be a case for using tanks, in conjunction with artillery and offensive air support, in order to keep our own and allied casualties to a minimum. A major factor in a decision to use armour would be the safety of the civilian population. Appreciating the security force's legal constraints on the use of force and aware of the emotive propaganda value of the deployment of tanks, an insurgent group may contrive an incident in order to reap the last ounce from the adverse propaganda of using such weapons of war.

25. **Armoured Reconnaissance.** While armoured reconnaissance vehicles, MICVs and tracked APCs may be useful in strictly controlled operations in certain circumstances they are likely to be described as tanks in sensational journalism, with the implication that the security forces are over-reacting. However, reconnaissance vehicles have an essential role to play in patrolling, including border security operations, convoy and VIP protection, and for establishing a cordon quickly. Wheeled APCs are useful for carrying sections and, on occasions for resupply, in areas where stoning, small arms fire, bombs and grenades may be used. If there is a serious mining threat, specially constructed APC hulls may be needed to deflect blast. As in conventional war, armour can be vulnerable to close range attack in built-up areas and close country unless supported.
26. **Artillery.** The observation, surveillance and target acquisition facilities of artillery units are useful in any phase of an insurgency. At the lower end of the spectrum of an insurgency artillery units may be deployed as infantry. Their high proportion of officers, NCOs and medium range radios make them readily adaptable for tasks involving small, dispersed detachments. As the tempo of operations grows with the development of an insurgency artillery units will be used increasingly in their normal role until it becomes their sole preoccupation if and when an insurgency moves towards a conventional war.
27. **Engineers.** In the early stages of an insurgency engineer assistance may be required on MACM tasks, such as the maintenance of power and water services, dock, railway repairs and extensions, the construction of airstrips and the clearance of helicopter landing areas. As the insurgency develops field engineers will be needed to carry out more of their normal operational tasks ranging from obstacle clearing to bridge building. Their resources are likely to become badly over-stretched requiring firm control and a constant review of priorities.
28. **Signals.** Owing to the vulnerability and insecurity of land lines and the civil telephone network the Army may need to provide its own secure communications system. In addition, it may have to provide secure links with the police and other elements of the security forces unless the host government accepts the responsibility. In less developed territories the Army may have to contribute to the communications networks of the host government's security forces. As an extension of communications security, particular attention will have to be paid to electronic countermeasures.
29. **Provost.** Military police may have a useful role to play assisting the civil police as the latter became overstretched during the latter stages of any preparatory phase of insurgency and throughout the insurgency. Because of their daily contact with the civilian population the military police role is a high profile one and the firm, fair and friendly manner in which they conduct their duties will make a major contribution to the Army's reputation. The provost will have an equally important part to play during the withdrawal of troops when armed military patrols are replaced successively by military police patrols, mixed military and civil police patrols and finally civil police patrols. When military police perform civil tasks they usually work under the command of the chief police officer or his equivalent.
30. **Special Forces.** United Kingdom Special Forces (UKSF) and similar host nation forces are trained in individual skills which enable them to operate in small parties with the

minimum of administrative support. They are especially suitable for surveillance and other intelligence gathering operations, and for reconnaissance patrolling in particularly arduous circumstances, such as the Jebel Akhdar operation in Oman in 1958-1959. With a knowledge of local languages and good communications they are able to infiltrate into and remain hidden within rebel held areas as sources of information and intelligence. They may also be given the task of organizing and training local defence among the loyal communities in high risk areas, such as along the frontier of a state helping the insurgents.² This is a role which can be combined with border surveillance and the acquisition of intelligence. Offensive roles will generally be concentrated against difficult targets when a high degree of precision and expertise is called for, such as the Iranian Embassy operation, and the final attack on the Omani dissident stronghold on the Jebel Akhdar. Further details on special forces in counter insurgency operations are at Annex B to this Chapter.

31. **Services.** The RLC can provide:

- a. A special contribution in the EOD field.
- b. Assistance to the host state in the provision of rail and water transportation.
- c. The coordination of non-operational movement.
- d. The usual CSS roles described in Chapter 9.

Air Support

32. **General.** All three Services provide a wide range of air support. Coordination at theatre level ensures that tasks are apportioned to the Service which can provide them with the optimum speed and economy of effort.

33. **Army Aviation.** Aviation can provide both fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft. While aviation has obvious roles for troop carrying, surveillance and liaison it should also be fully incorporated into the overall concept of operations in a similar way to other combat arms. Aviation can be used in many roles similar to those given to armoured reconnaissance regiments. Aviation can conduct surveillance, screens, guards, route recce, photography for route clearance, convoy protection (both of air and ground movements). During the more advanced stages of an insurgency, aviation could be used for anti-armour operations, to provide fire support to infantry or armoured operations and for the direction of fire. Aviation can be used to carry out the following specific tasks:

- a. *Fixed Wing.*
 - (1) Surveillance (visual and electronic).
 - (2) Airborne command post/rebroadcast facilities.

2. The Borneo Scouts in the 1963-1966 Confrontation, for example.

- (3) Reconnaissance (optical/TI).
 - (4) Photographic/Specialist imagery (in conjunction with Air Force intelligence).
 - (5) Insertion of Security Forces (Parachute/short field landings).
 - (6) Communication and liaison tasks.
- b. *Rotary Wing.*
- (1) Anti-armour and anti-bunker operations.
 - (2) Armed protection (guard/flank protection operations).
 - (3) Airborne screen/guards against insurgent sniper operations.
 - (4) Surveillance, particularly when incorporated into a directed intelligence collection plan. The Lynx/CHANCELLOR television camera provides both along range surveillance capability and a live down-link into command posts during incident control. The Gazelle/FINCH thermal imagery camera can provide night/reduced visibility surveillance.
 - (5) Tactical lift of troops, particularly an Airborne Quick Reaction Force.
 - (6) Forward Air Control for both fixed wing, artillery and mortar fire.
 - (7) Liaison tasks.
34. ***Air Forces.*** For counter-insurgency operations air forces can provide the same types of support as it does for conventional operations, scaled down to meet the special and particular requirements of combating an insurgency. For the UK the RAF can support COIN operations in the following way:
- a. Strategic trooplift to the theatre and urgent resupply.
 - b. Medium and short-range troop lift, resupply and casualty evacuation using fixed wing or rotary wing aircraft as appropriate.
 - c. Tactical lift of assault troops by helicopter.
 - d. Tactical lift and air support for parachute operations.
 - e. Photographic, electronic and visual reconnaissance, including the provision of IRLS and radar images.
 - f. Command post and control operations.

- g. Psychological operations: 'sky shouting' aircraft, and leaflet dropping activities.
- h. Close air support, usually against such targets as insurgent camps, defensive positions and, in the advanced stages of an insurgency there may be calls for close air support missions against troop concentrations.
- i. Interdiction, when worthwhile targets can be found along an insurgent's well dispersed lines of communication. The higher the level of conflict, when the insurgent's logistic system must meet heavier demands for replenishment, the more effective a well directed and targeted interdiction campaign is likely to be. However, unless the insurgent lines of communication and replenishment system has been plotted and thoroughly analysed an interdiction campaign could be a total waste of effort. Sir Robert Thompson observed, with reference to South Vietnam, 'It was never understood that the amount of infiltration will depend on the capacity of the insurgent movement within a country to receive and absorb it. If an insurgency expands, effective infiltration will increase whatever measures may be taken to reduce it (including massive bombing interdiction)'.³
- j. Only if the insurgency escalates to conventional will air superiority operations become necessary. However, as an insurgency develops the air forces may expect to be increasingly opposed by a modern surface-to-air defence weapons and possibly air defence zones.
- k. Close protection of air bases is usually provided from within the air forces.

Naval Support

35. Naval support may include any of the following:

- a. *A Naval Presence.* Naval ships may be close enough to provide a timely, high profile appearance to demonstrate support for a threatened ally. Alternatively, given sufficient warning, a task force including a carrier and an amphibious group may be deployed to the threatened area, and Royal Marines may be the first troops to be deployed ashore. A further asset of naval forces is their ability to hover over the horizon for prolonged periods, providing a warning to hostile elements with the minimum of provocation. The use of secure strategic communications from the theatre to the UK base HQ, available in most RN ships, can be an enormous aid to overall command and control of operations - particularly in the early stages of any UK presence in the theatre.
- b. *Amphibious Forces.* Amphibious shipping and craft provide not only a rapid intervention capability, provided there has been sufficient warning to position them in time, but also a useful means of tactical and logistic mobility once intervention has been requested by a host government. The Royal Marine Commando helicopter airlift furnishes a further mobility asset.

3. Sir Robert Thompson, *Foreword* in Richard Clutterbuck, *The Long Long War*, Cassell, 1966.

- c. *Royal Marine Commandos.* These units are available for deployment ashore in an air-portable infantry battalion role or for the conduct of amphibious operations. Royal Marines may also crew inland water patrol boats and the SBS may be used for special operations.
 - d. *Minesweepers and Patrol Craft.* Such vessels may be used to reinforce the host nation's coastal patrol and customs vessels to arrest, sink or deter insurgent supply or raiding vessels.
 - e. *Naval Aviation.* Carrier based aircraft may be employed on reconnaissance and offensive support missions. While a carrier has immense strategic flexibility in terms of deployment, the need to turn into wind to launch and recover aircraft, and heavy weather, may impose some restrictions on tactical flexibility. However, as operations in the Adriatic off Bosnia have shown, carriers are less susceptible to poor flying weather than static air bases. They can move to an area free of poor weather in order to operate, or if this is not feasible, can, with skilful sailing, minimise the effects of poor flying weather.
 - f. *Helicopter Support.* RN and RM utility helicopters may provide any kind of support from troop lift to fire support, reconnaissance, leaflet dropping and sky-shouting.
36. The major immediate advantage of Naval forces with troops embarked and available for COIN operations is that the 'base area' is secure and cost effective. There is no need to guard the barracks, the exit points are not overlooked, and the insurgent cannot mount any effective surveillance of troop activity and movement. They are thus less vulnerable and more flexible than troops located in static bases. This was a regular feature of the Borneo insurgency campaign where the commander had troops available to operate anywhere in theatre at short notice.

SECTION 4 - GOVERNMENT INTELLIGENCE SERVICES

37. Most modern states make use of security services in one way or another to protect their own interests within and outside their own country. The Russians employ the newly formed SVR which took over the foreign intelligence service from the KGB and the Border Guard Service for internal security; the Americans use the FBI for domestic security and the CIA for protecting American interests abroad. In the UK, the Security Service (MI5) the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) together with the Government Communications Headquarters perform similar respective functions and both would have a substantial role to play if the UK is involved in counter insurgency operations.
38. Much of the work of these intelligence services is beyond the scope of this manual, but it is necessary for commanders and G2 staffs to be aware of these types of government agencies and their roles and duties.
39. Experience has shown that the activities of government intelligence agencies in a counter insurgency campaign must be closely coordinated in order to avoid misunderstanding, duplication and counter-productive work. From the early stages of any campaign an overall intelligence coordinator should therefore be appointed from one

of the agencies involved in the operation to provide this essential centralised control and direction of effort. He would be able to coopt representatives from the military forces and, if appropriate, from local organisations to ensure cooperation and coordination between all intelligence and security agencies involved in the campaign.

INDIGENOUS AND IRREGULAR AUXILIARY FORCES

Introduction

1. In almost all COIN campaigns governments have attempted to mobilise the local population in their support by forming auxiliary forces. When soundly based, sensibly organized and properly coordinated with other units these forces have proved indispensable and indeed, on occasions, the key to successful campaigns. However, particular problems are associated with the raising and directing of such forces, particularly those that employ ex-guerrillas who have returned to the government side. These problems need to be considered.
2. It is not unusual for regular soldiers to be scathing about the appearance, operational efficiency, fighting potential and loyalty of auxiliary forces. This attitude, usually stemming from an ignorance of the characteristics of auxiliary forces and a misunderstanding of their motivation, together with a lack of appreciation of the wider issues at stake in a COIN campaign, may have unfortunate consequences. It can hinder the proper development of auxiliary forces and their integration into the overall operational plan. Auxiliary forces are an essential part of a successful counter-revolutionary warfare campaign. Although the nature of these forces may differ between campaigns, commanders and staff officers need to understand the characteristics of these forces and the requirements and problems associated with their raising.

The Need for Auxiliary Forces

3. In the early stages of an insurgency the very need for auxiliary forces is sometimes questioned. The raising and equipping of non-regular units is frequently seen by the regular establishment as an unacceptable diversion of scarce resources, trained manpower, equipment and money. Those given the task of raising auxiliary units do not always appreciate the importance of their task. Auxiliary forces are essential for four reasons:
 - a. *Commitment.* The government campaign to defeat the revolutionary movement will only succeed if it wins the loyalty and support of the population. The acid test of loyalty is whether the people will give their active support in the campaign against the insurgents, since this will inevitably involve them in some risk. Just as the insurgent organizes the population through his infrastructure, and involves them in his struggle, so must the government organize the people and involve them in its campaign. Providing the overall concept of the campaign is sound, the formation of auxiliary forces encourages the neutral population to commit itself to the government cause. Once people have assumed the responsibilities associated with membership of an auxiliary force, especially when the government trusts them with weapons for the defence of their own village, they are more likely than not to keep faith. Of course, the government must honour this loyalty through its policies and the provision of the necessary military and civil support.

- b. *Manpower.* COIN is expensive in manpower. Most successful campaigns have involved the security forces fielding at least ten men for every insurgent. In several campaigns the ratio has been 20:1. It is seldom practicable for governments to recruit, pay and equip such large numbers of regular troops and police. Auxiliary forces are formed to help meet the manpower requirement. They are particularly useful for defensive operations, releasing the more mobile, better trained regular troops and police for offensive operations.
- c. *Intelligence.* Properly organized auxiliary forces have a thorough knowledge of their local area and its people. They are a fund of background information and, if properly tasked, may well also produce contact intelligence. They are more likely to pick up information from the network of informal contacts that link villagers with both government and insurgent forces than are regular troops who are not native to the area. Where the auxiliary forces include returnees from the guerrillas, these are a prime source of intelligence initially leading directly to the killing or capture of their former colleagues and subsequently providing a fund of useful background information about insurgent personalities, tactics, habits, routes, RVs and safe areas.
- d. *Fighting Skills.* Some auxiliary forces have fighting skills which are superior to and complement those of the regular forces. Upbringing and knowledge of a particular environment and their local enemy often make indigenous auxiliaries superb counter-guerrillas. While they have neither the training nor equipment to operate like regular soldiers, in certain skills such as tracking, patrolling, observation, the use of ground, and communicating with the local population, properly directed auxiliaries can be most effective.

Characteristics of Auxiliary Forces

- 4. ***Recruited and Employed Locally.*** Auxiliary forces are usually most effective if they are raised, trained and employed in their own village or local area. In this way they capitalise on their knowledge of the ground and their close links with the population. Even more important, their actions have a direct effect on their own families and friends. If they are brave and successful they are feted. If they behave badly this becomes known in their community, and the consequences of failure are visited upon the village. Regular Army commanders sometimes decide to 'redeploy' successful auxiliary forces from their local area, which has been pacified, to an area of greater threat, in the same way that a regular battalion might be moved. This happened in both Vietnam and Dhofar; at best the result was a disorientated and unenthusiastic auxiliary fighting in an unknown area and so forfeiting his main advantages; at worst it led to tribal disputes and in-fighting, to individual desertions and even mutiny. These auxiliaries, not unreasonably, considered employment beyond their own areas as outside their contract.
- 5. ***Motivation.*** People join auxiliary forces for a wide variety of reasons, by no means all of which are the same as for those joining a regular unit. It is important for those working with auxiliary forces to identify the sources of motivation for individuals and groups, and to recognise the limits of that motivation. It frequently happens that the

aims of auxiliary units coincide with those of the government in certain areas but diverge in others. Providing they are given tasks involving common interests, auxiliary units work well. The wise commander avoids activities in which the interests of the government or regular troops and the auxiliaries diverge. Failure to recognise this problem lay behind some of the difficulties that occurred with the Montagnard Civilian Regular Defence Groups (CIDG) in Vietnam and with the Firqat in Dhofar. Individual and group motivation may include patriotism, tribal loyalty, religion, the search for political advantage and personal power, money, revenge, fear and dislike of the insurgents or simply a tradition of and affinity for fighting. Some may become involved, in ignorance of the issues, simply because friends and family become involved. Whatever the motivation, those responsible for directing auxiliaries must be aware of and sensitive to the question of motivation if they are to gain the most from the people in question and not stretch their loyalty too far.

6. **Costs and Funding.** Auxiliary forces tend to be much less expensive than regular troops. They require fewer heavy weapons and equipment and less transport. Living in their home area they have less need of the regular army infrastructure of barracks, accommodation and welfare facilities. In Vietnam the auxiliary forces achieved 30% of all enemy casualties (and sustained 60% of all allied casualties) with 4% of the overall assistance effort. However, they cannot be raised and operated for nothing. If they are to operate effectively, auxiliaries need to be paid, properly equipped and assured of support. Because they are based in their home area this support may well have to extend to their families and villages. While this may seem an avoidable additional burden to the regular soldier, such aid should in fact complement the overall government programme for development. The unconventional nature of some of the needs of auxiliary forces, especially those deeply involved with the intelligence organization, may make it necessary to fund them separately from the forces. In Vietnam, the CIDG was funded by the CIA. Such separate funding gives invaluable flexibility, but can involve problems of control and administration and may lead to jealousy and antagonism within the security forces.
7. **Logistics.** Auxiliary forces, notwithstanding their lack of heavy equipment and infrastructure, still need some logistic support to provide ammunition, weapons, rations, a few vehicles and possibly building materials. When auxiliary forces are established the emphasis tends to be placed on training support and the importance of a logistic support organization is sometimes overlooked. Logistic support for auxiliary forces does not need to be elaborate but it must be effective.

Types of Auxiliary Forces

8. A wide variety of organizations and units can be described as 'auxiliary forces' and there are no stereotyped categories. Each COIN environment must be studied on its merits to decide the need and potential for auxiliary forces to supplement the other security forces. As a guide to potential employment a number of types of auxiliary forces are examined with examples of their use in particular campaigns.

Border Scouts

9. Throughout history armies have employed local civilians as scouts for their regular forces. These have sometimes been employed as individuals and sometimes formed

into loose units for organizational purposes. They have often been used in rugged border areas where their knowledge of the ground and ability to wander both sides of the border has been invaluable in providing warning and obtaining information.

10. The British developed a highly effective border scout organization in Borneo during Confrontation, 1963-66. The potential scouts, drawn from the indigenous tribes of Borneo were given uniforms and training in weapon handling. However it was soon learned that they would be more effective if they were not treated like soldiers. Uniforms were discarded and carbines were replaced with local shotguns. The scouts operated on their own, as individuals or in pairs, reporting back to security force patrols. Sometimes they also worked with patrols for particular tasks.

Home Guards

11. The problem of protecting loyal and neutral people from intimidation by insurgents, and important installations from sabotage, has already been identified in the preceding chapters. The best solution to this problem, which also involves the population and commits them to the government programme, is the formation of village home guards. This was done most successfully in Malaya (Home Guard), Kenya (The Kikuyu Guard) and Algeria (Harkis) and with some success in Vietnam (CIDG), and the Popular Force (PF) element of the Territorial Forces (TF).¹
12. These home guards were recruited by the police or village head from the more reliable villagers. Some were part time, others full time, and were paid accordingly. They were issued with some form of simple uniform and, with light weapons for self protection, given the simplest basic training. The scale of equipment and training inevitably reflected the availability of weapons, equipment and instructors as well as the scale of the enemy threat.
13. In Malaya the function of home guard units were described as the provision of a part time force composed of all races, to form a yet closer link between the people and the Government in the fight against the Communist Terrorists. This involved:
 - a. Creating security by protecting their own homes and the immediate area in which they live and by denying the enemy access thereto.
 - b. Full cooperation with the Security Forces in passing information of the movements of Communist Terrorists and of their agents and in assuring that no food reaches Communist Terrorists from their area.
 - c. With the operational sections, active assistance to the Security Forces in offensive operations.

1. F J West, *The Village*, University of Wisconsin Press, 1985, is an excellent account of a successful detachment of the Popular Force. Other books quoted in the bibliography give a useful factual account of auxiliary forces in Vietnam.

Self-Defence Force Mobile Units

14. The Home Guard concept leads logically to the development of more mobile groups of local volunteers. Villages cannot be properly protected unless the surrounding area is dominated by patrols and a reaction force is available to go to the aid of a village that is attacked. In Malaya 'operational sections' of the Home Guard, who volunteered to take part in operations away from their homes, were formed to operate in up to platoon strength. In Algeria the Harkis were formed into 'light companies' and proved highly effective against FLN guerrilla bands. In Vietnam the reaction force element was of company strength provided in the Montagnard CIDGs by a 'Strike Force' and in the lowlands by the 'Regional Forces' (RF) element of the Territorial Force (TF). These forces operated in a tribal area or a province. In Dhofar the Firqat carried out operations in up to company strength on their own or in conjunction with the army throughout their tribal area and sometimes beyond.
15. The key to the success of these more mobile self defence units was that they operated sufficiently close to home to know the area and the people and to consider themselves accountable to their own families and villages. They were the government's equivalent of the insurgent's Regional Troops. Problems usually arose when commanders failed to appreciate their territorial limits and deployed them inappropriately.

Indigenous Counter-Guerrilla Units

16. A variation on the theme of mobile self defence units is the raising of indigenous auxiliaries to operate as guerrillas in the insurgent's own base areas and on their lines of communication. This policy was conducted with considerable success by both the French Army and the United States Special Forces in Indo-China. In Malaya, the British raised the Senoi Praak from the aborigines of Central Malaya. A population of potentially aggressive tribesmen in the appropriate geographical location is essential for success and attempts at this type of operation in sparsely populated parts of the highlands of Indo-China failed. Operations of this kind require a higher level of training, equipment, advice and support than purely Home Defence units.

Reformed Insurgents

17. The most ambitious, but potentially the most effective use of auxiliaries involves the employment of reformed terrorists. The technique was developed with great success towards the end of the campaign in Malaya and employed in various forms in Kenya, Algeria, Vietnam, Dhofar and Rhodesia. It has also been applied in urban insurgencies.
18. The recruiting of reformed insurgents is usually the responsibility of the intelligence staff who obviously retain a close interest in their employment and operation. In Malaya, and initially in Rhodesia, the operations of turned terrorists were controlled by the Special Branch rather than the army. However, there is obviously a requirement for regular soldiers or policemen in these activities to provide training and skills complementary to those of the reformed insurgents on operations. This usually leads to the formation of special units with a mixture of reformed insurgents and

regular soldiers or policemen. The regular army element is often provided by Special Forces, who are particularly suitable for this task. The best known examples of this type of unit are the Special Operational Volunteer Force (SOVF) in Malaya and the Rhodesian Selous Scouts.

19. The establishment of this type of organization is frequently opposed by more conventional elements within the security forces, partly through a reluctance to offer amnesty to those who have been involved in terrorist activities and partly through a reluctance to trust them. Yet in most COIN operations reformed insurgents have proved both reliable and highly effective, and often the most feared by the insurgents. In many ways the man who has left an insurgent organization to support the government has far more to lose than a regular member of the security forces. In the past those turned terrorists who have been handled sensitively and effectively have generally worked with loyalty, devotion and often great gallantry for the security forces.
20. General Kitson summarises his views on the way in which members of the insurgent organization should be treated on capture as follows: 'In this connection four separate and sometimes contradictory requirements have to be met and it is important that the law should take account of them. The first requirement is that the captured insurgent should be prevented from doing further damage to the government's cause. The second is that he should be given every encouragement to change sides. The third is that maximum advantage should be taken of his ability to help the government, either through giving information or in other ways. The fourth is that his treatment should be such as to influence others to return to their proper allegiance. The key to the whole business lies in persuading the prisoner to change sides and all of his treatment, including his interrogation, should be carried out with this in mind. There must be no brutality and the best results are usually achieved by holding prisoners in well-segregated compounds in small camps close to where they have been operating. This enables interrogation to be carried out by people in close touch with the operational situation, and it avoids the control which hard-core prisoners are likely to exercise over their fellows in large prisoner-of-war-type camps. This system is however expensive in terms of manpower and facilities and is likely to attract every sort of inhibiting propaganda assault from the insurgents who well realize the danger which it poses to their cause.
21. The way reformed insurgents are employed has varied according to the situation and conditions in different campaigns. In Malaya turned terrorists provided intelligence and sometimes led patrols back to attack their former comrades. In Kenya and Rhodesia 'pseudo-gangs' were formed, operating as insurgent groups to gain information about the guerrilla infrastructure and armed units. Sometimes this information was acted upon by conventional units and sometimes exploited by the pseudo-gangs themselves to kill, capture or convert other guerrillas. Good accounts of the operations, potential and difficulties of pseudo-gangs in Kenya and Rhodesia are to be found in the Bibliography. In Dhofar, the Firqat, who initially were largely composed of guerrillas who had rallied to the Sultan, were employed as light infantry and skirmishers. However, they were also most effective in developing the psychological campaign and persuading former colleagues to change sides.

Guidelines

22. A number of guidelines can be deduced from a study of the use of auxiliaries in a variety of COIN campaigns:
- a. *Political Direction.* The formation of auxiliary units invariably has political implications. The arming of relatively large numbers of the population may affect the balance of power within the state, particularly if indigenous minorities are involved who may be potentially hostile to the central government. On the other hand auxiliary forces may have the function of politicising the population to support a particular party. The government must have a clear idea as to how their auxiliary forces are to be raised, controlled and function. They should also have a plan for their demobilisation or for a long term role in the state.
 - b. *Command and Control.* Because of the political aspects of auxiliary forces, and bureaucratic rivalries between the armed forces, the intelligence organizations and the police, auxiliary forces may have their own chain of command. This may have some advantages in ensuring that they do not become neglected in the allocation of resources and in maintaining sensitive political control. However, such an arrangement can lead to very great operational problems. If auxiliary forces are not under command of the army or police it is essential that they are represented on the operational committees at all levels, that close liaison is maintained between auxiliary units and all other elements of the security forces, and that all operations are carefully coordinated.
 - c. *Local Recruitment, and Employment.* Auxiliary Forces are most effective politically, psychologically and militarily if they are recruited and employed in their home areas. This way they are most likely to maintain a good relationship with the local population, exercise a positive influence upon them and gain intelligence from them. Local knowledge will benefit their military operations. Drafting in auxiliaries from outside the area or employing local auxiliary units away from their own area is almost invariably counter productive.
 - d. *Screening.* Care must be taken in recruiting auxiliary forces. Recruits must be largely volunteers and their motivation should be carefully examined. They should meet basic standards of medical and physical fitness. A system of screening by the Special Branch or its equivalent must be established to try and sift out insurgent hard-core infiltrators. Recruits should be positively identified and properly documented to assist with the issue of pay and arms. Potential leaders should be identified.
 - e. *Training, Supervision and Logistic Support.* Auxiliary forces cannot simply be recruited and issued with weapons. Their effectiveness will be in direct proportion to the allocation of security force assets to train, supervise and administer them. The training and administrative support should be appropriate to the forces involved. It is a mistake to attempt to train and provide logistic support for auxiliary units up to Regular Army standards. Training must concentrate on essential operational requirements and should exploit the natural

skills of the recruits rather than attempt to teach alien habits. Allowances must be made for local customs, religion and character. Once training is complete a system must exist to monitor the performance of auxiliaries and to meet their relatively simply logistic needs.

- f. *Conditions of Service.* The conditions of service of auxiliaries must be clearly defined and respected. The extent of their duties and rates of pay must be laid down. Rates of pay must be adequate to make service in the auxiliaries reasonably attractive and compensate the volunteer for the time he cannot devote to earning his living. In a primitive rural community this is of fundamental importance.
- g. *Identification and Appointment of Leaders.* If at all possible, auxiliary forces should be encouraged to appoint their own leaders. Almost all communities have a natural hierarchy. Although those concerned may not show all the characteristics of regular military NCOs or officers, provided that they are respected and effective within the community it is often better to work with these local leaders than to impose leaders from without. Guidance, supervision and specialist skills can be provided by advisors from the security forces.
- h. *Limitations.* Auxiliary forces are not regular troops and should not be used as such. They have different characteristics which complement those of the regular forces. When sensibly coordinated they make a powerful combination. However, the limitations of auxiliary forces, which reflect different motivation, recruitment contracts, training and equipment must be respected if auxiliaries are not to suffer disproportionate casualties, and a loss of confidence within the units and in their own capabilities.
- i. *Operational Support.* The security force plan needs to provide for appropriate regular security force support for auxiliary units in an emergency. This may take the form of supporting fire and a reaction force to defeat a heavy insurgent attack on a protected village, or to exploit information obtained by a pseudo-gang. It is unacceptable to create and deploy auxiliary forces and then leave them to fend for themselves. The insurgents view locally recruited auxiliaries as a major threat to their infrastructure and hold over the population. They will do all they can to discredit, undermine and destroy auxiliary units. If they are allowed to do so, through lack of appropriate regular security force support, the battle for the hearts and minds of the population will suffer a major setback. This need for operational support emphasises the importance of incorporating the auxiliary forces into a properly coordinated command and control system.

23. Where auxiliary forces have proved ineffective one usually finds that one or other of the guidelines above have been breached.

Conclusions

24. Auxiliary forces are an important part of any COIN campaign. They can make a valuable contribution to intelligence gathering and military operations. Equally

important, they provide a way of organizing the population to support the government and getting them to commit themselves to the government cause. They work in direct competition with the revolutionaries who are simultaneously attempting to develop their own infrastructure and control of the population. Success in recruiting auxiliaries, their morale, effectiveness and the respect in which they are held within their communities are important indicators of whether the government or the insurgents are winning the battle for the hearts and minds of the population.

SPECIAL FORCES IN COUNTER INSURGENCY OPERATIONS

'We are the pilgrims master. We shall go always a little further. It may be beyond that last blue mountain, bar'ed with snow, across that angry, or that glimmer sea'. James Elroy Flecker's '*Hassan*'.

Introduction

1. The organisation of special forces units, the high quality, versatility and comprehensive training of special forces troops, and their capacity to work equally well as individuals or in small groups make them particularly suitable for counter-insurgency. Most countries possess special forces units, many of which are specially trained for counter-revolutionary warfare operations in addition to their tasks in general and limited war. They will play an important part in any future counter-insurgency campaign, frequently making a contribution out of all proportion to their small numbers. Possible ways of employing them should be considered at all stages of planning and developing counter-insurgency operations. However, they should be used to complement rather than replace conventional units. Further general details are contained in JSP 439 *Special Forces Operations*.

Tasks

2. **General.** One of the main characteristics of most special forces is their capacity to carry out a very wide spectrum of tasks ranging from discreet, advisory visits of a few days through to a prolonged campaign involving complete special forces units. Some possible tasks are outlined below. More details on the employment of British Special Forces (UKSF) in these roles can be found in the bibliography at the end of Part 2.
3. **Training Teams.** Their wide range of skills and language qualifications make special forces troops particularly suitable for military assistance programmes.
4. **Raising and Training Indigenous Forces.** The raising and training of local forces is a traditional and effective task for special forces troops. US Special Forces made a significant contribution to the Vietnam War in this role while the SAS carried out a similar task with the Firqat in Oman. When involved in this task special forces troops are often involved in leading or advising the indigenous forces on operations, but on other occasions, for political reasons, they may be debarred from combat.
5. **Deep Penetration Patrolling and Surveillance.** Skills developed for operations in limited and general war can be applied most effectively in those counter-revolutionary campaigns where large areas have fallen under the control of revolutionaries. The SAS operations on the Jebel Akhdar in 1959, in the Radfan in 1965-7, in Borneo in 1962-66 and the US Special Forces operations against the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Indo-China are all examples of this activity.

6. **Counter-Insurgency Teams.** Special forces are sometimes called upon to provide specially trained teams to support the Civil Power in UK for incidents involving armed terrorists, such as the siege of the Iranian Embassy in London in 1980.
7. **Plain Clothes Operations.** Special forces may be called upon to conduct operations in plain clothes in a counter-revolutionary campaign. The quality of the individual and his high level of basic training make the special forces soldier especially suitable for this task. Additional training will normally be necessary for such specialised and sophisticated operations. Before special forces are involved in this activity, either on internal operations or on operations abroad in support of allies, the legal aspects and the wider political and security implications must be carefully considered.

Constraints

8. The main constraints on special forces operations are:
 - a. **Manpower.** Special forces are usually few in number. Casualties cannot be easily or quickly replaced because of the long selection and training process.
 - b. **Reaction Time.** Although in a strategic sense special forces can react promptly and with notable flexibility, tactically there can be some constraint. The reason is that, in spite of the high level of training of the special forces soldier, the precision demanded of delicate counter insurgency tasks requires time for careful planning and preparation. Moreover, once deployed in the field their tactical mobility will be limited. Because communications are usually conducted on schedules for operational reasons, and because movement on foot in hostile territory and difficult terrain is inevitably slow, retasking and redeployment take many hours and sometimes days. However these constraints need not be too serious - particularly for COIN operations within the designated theatre.
 - c. **Endurance.** Once deployed the endurance of special forces is limited by what they can carry on their backs unless resupply is guaranteed. In hostile environments such as the desert or mountains the provision of water can present a major problem. This should not be a serious constraint within the theatre of operations in-country during a counter insurgency campaign.

Principles of Employment

9. **High Value Operations.** Special forces are a precious but numerically limited asset unable to absorb large casualties due to misemployment. To get the most out of them, they need to be used precisely for they can achieve results out of all proportion to their size.
10. **Command.** Special forces should be regarded as strategic or operational assets and be kept under the theatre commander's hand. Tactical control should be delegated for specific operations to the appropriate level. There is sometimes a tendency for special forces to proliferate in COIN. Centralised command at the highest level helps to prevent unnecessary duplication of effort and lack of coordination. However a

careful synchronization of special forces and main force activity is essential to avoid misunderstandings.

11. **Access to Intelligence.** The nature of special forces' tasks makes it essential for them to have access to all available relevant intelligence if operations are to stand a chance of success.
12. **Mission Command.** The employment of special forces must be tied in with the overall plan for the campaign and their commanders must be given a clear directive specifying what is required and stating any limitations on methods of execution. Special forces must be commanded by their own officers and it is these officers who should work out and execute the detailed plan, providing regular progress reports to the overall commander.
13. **Security.** Success so often depends upon surprise and surprise depends upon good security. The inherently discreet nature of special forces makes them the ideal military arm to exploit intelligence from sensitive sources. The compromise of such sources not only entails a serious loss of capability, but may raise acute political difficulties. The media can pose a particular threat to security in counter-revolutionary operations and it is essential to work out a sound public information plan with the public information staff.

Liaison

14. **Within the Security Forces.** It is most important that special forces establish and maintain close liaison with all other security force units and formations with responsibilities in the same area. It is likely that special forces liaison officers or NCOs will be attached to the appropriate headquarters and units.
15. **On Behalf of the Authorities.** There may be occasions when the state authorities will wish to contact third parties or perhaps those acting for the insurgents. This unusual form of liaison may involve special forces for this role. Such tasks would require the full consent of the appropriate UK military authorities before such duties were undertaken.

Legal Issues

16. There is a widespread misconception that special forces are, or should be exempt from the legal constraints which bind armed forces. This is a misguided and dangerous notion. The legal constraints covered in Chapter 1 apply to special forces operations just as they do to the more conventional type of operation. Flouting the law is invariably counter-productive both in the short and long term. Once members of any special forces have been discredited in the courts and the media it is difficult to justify their continued employment and the insurgents will then have removed a major obstacle to the achievement of their aims. Successful special operations have to be mounted within the law and any temptation to ignore legal constraints must be resisted.

17. Each member of the British Special Forces is held responsible for his actions under British military and civil law in exactly the same way as are other soldiers and policemen. It is therefore incumbent on those planning special forces operations to be aware of, and to think through carefully, the legal implications of any intended action. In any case where a point of law might arise legal advice should be sought in the planning stage.

Conclusion

18. Special forces are a valuable asset in any counter insurgency campaign. However, they can only be effective if those directing the campaign appreciate their potential, their limitations and the the principles governing their employment.

CHAPTER 8

MILITARY OPERATIONS

SECTION 1 - A CONCEPT OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

Scope

1. This chapter starts with a consideration of the operational aspects of a government's overall strategic concept. It goes on to discuss defensive and offensive tactical methods in outline in order to provide a link with and an introduction to Part 3 of this manual which deals with tactics, in more detail. The government's strategic concept establishes the political aim and provides guidance to the military on its roles and tasks. It also gives broad direction for the intelligence effort and determines the thrust, themes and emphasis of the psychological and public information campaigns.
2. Essentially, the aim and concept of military operations is to help the government to re-establish control throughout the country so that the civil administration can exercise its proper function. The military commander's task is unlikely to be as straightforward as an operation of general war. His estimate must take account of a wide range of political, economic and local interests. These limitations are reflected in the way in which operations are subject to the approval of the civil administration and other elements of the security forces, notably the host nation's police and armed forces through the joint committee system. A key factor in the appraisal of a commander's mission analysis is his estimate of the purpose of the operations he is to carry out, whether they are designed primarily to provide physical support for an existing government structure in areas which are at least nominally under its control or to restore areas under hostile control to the government's authority. His conclusion will determine whether the nature of that particular phase of the campaign is to be mainly defensive or offensive. The former case will be more likely to apply at the outset of a campaign when the control of vital areas may be essential to the government's survival. However, unless the government can go over to the offensive to recover insurgent held areas its authority may collapse to the extent that it is obliged to grant independence or autonomy to an insurgent dominated enclave or cede it to a hostile neighbour.

Principles

3. The six principles identified for the successful conduct of COIN operations have been detailed in Chapter 3. The physical implementation of the military aspects of any national plan will depend on many factors, but usually begin with the securing of a firm base from which to operate. Once this is established military forces should then seize the initiative in any campaign by separating the insurgent from his support and then neutralizing him and his cause. All this has been described in previous Chapters. However it is necessary to detail in military terms the more precise methods by which this concept can be implemented.

Campaign Estimates

4. Estimates are a prerequisite for success in COIN. At the highest level the focus will be far broader than in tactical, military Estimates, but all should be based upon a thorough understanding of the entirety of the problem, not merely its most obvious features.
5. As in warfighting, before producing a military campaign plan, the commander should use the full Estimate process to analyze his strategic guidance and interpret it into operational and ultimately tactical plans. The balance between military and other factors will be determined by the extent of the initial government concept for the campaign (though it may neither be termed as such nor in reality will it necessarily be extensive, and in a crisis may amount to a cry for help) and in particular the role defined for the Army. Subsequently, the same discipline is required at all subordinate headquarters throughout the theatre to ensure that detailed tactical plans are appropriate at local level and accord with the overall purpose. A comprehensive analysis can offer important clues in the absence of hard information, and should enable high level contingency planning to proceed on the basis of broad assumptions. Essentially this study reduces the chance of undertaking 'unwinnable' COIN campaigns, and increases the chances of developing an appropriate operational role once involved.

Mission Analysis

6. If it has not been made clear to him, in his initial briefings the commander will need to establish the precise nature of the military contribution to the overall campaign in the light of political direction, for example, which agency has primacy. He will then need to determine the extent of his freedom of action, and more pressingly, the restrictions and constraints that apply. Matters such as states of command (especially if working in support of a foreign government); legal powers (status of forces, authority to impose curfews, restrict movement, arrest and search for example); the use of force; and access to and control of the media will require clarification. There may be restrictions on the use of certain equipment such as AFVs, and in the case of a coalition operation, the lack of a common doctrine will need immediate attention (as was recently proven by the friction between American and Italian commanders in Somalia). Not all of the answers will be forthcoming - this is a facet of the operational environment that commanders at all levels must learn to live with - but COIN demands a delicate touch and sound political judgement. For instance, the line between legality and guile will need careful consideration, and options such as booby trapping arms caches, entrapping intelligence sources and the like will require a commander to weigh the potential risks and gains.
7. This analysis will provide the commander and his staff with sufficient planning guidance to launch the campaign. The operational commander will seek novel ways to apply and maximise the resources he has available. For instance, raising local militias and recruiting civilian guards to release regular troops for more offensive action. Staff branches and other staff functions will need to be reorganised G2, C2W, PSYOPS, P Info and G5 (which should be regarded as the military overt

contribution to the Hearts and Minds campaign) will assume far greater importance, whilst some units whose function in war is mainly concerned with firepower may be retasked.

8. Having established the role which the military forces are to conduct and having analyzed his mission, the commander would issue a Statement of Intent that starts the process of operations. Before doing so he would be wise to discuss his thoughts with whoever has been appointed as the overall Director of the government campaign to ensure that the broad thrust of his approach is developing in harmony with those of other agencies. Bearing in mind that in an emergency, troops could be deployed to the theatre before a full Estimate and plan have been made, the early issue of an Initiating Directive will be important. It should further focus staff effort and if possible give clear, albeit limited, tasks such as securing key points, VIP protection and reassurance patrolling.

Implementing the Campaign Estimate

9. **Phases.** Implementing the Campaign Estimate may conveniently be divided into a number of phases. As explained earlier, an insurgency develops unevenly across an afflicted country. The national strategic plan will lay down priorities for the prosecution of the campaign, probably concentrating on just one or a selected few areas in turn. At the operational level the phases in any one area are not mutually exclusive and will tend to progress from one phase to the other. The police are organized on a regional basis corresponding with the boundaries of the civil administration, which implies that, unless there are other compelling reasons, the incoming military formations and units should be deployed on the same geographical basis.
10. **Securing a Base Area.** Hopefully, the host government will have firm control over sufficient of its territory to provide a secure base where reinforcing allied contingents can build up, acclimatize and establish their essential logistic units and installations. However, it is possible that the host government may have allowed the situation to deteriorate to the extent that no area is safe from terrorist activity before calling for assistance. In this instance it may be necessary to hold some logistic stocks and assets afloat while the first reinforcing troops to be committed secure the base area. In the worst case it may be necessary to ask a friendly neighbouring country for facilities.
11. **Establishment of a Firm Forward Operational Base (FOB).** It may be feasible to establish a forward operational base at a suitable provincial capital which has become isolated from the area still loyal to the government. Preferably the area selected should be one with traditional loyalties to the government where the population will readily rally back to its old allegiance once it feels secure from an insurgent offensive and serious terrorist attack. An airhead may be seized by an airborne operation initially and then reinforced so that it can be expanded to secure the airfield from indirect fire weapons. The risk of this type of operation is that if it is undertaken in an area where insurgency has developed into conventional war the cost of maintaining it against an overwhelming insurgent concentration may be too great. The French disaster at Dien Bien Phu in 1953 and 1954, when an airhead was established in hostile territory too

far from the Red River Delta base area for proper support provided an unfortunate example. The area selected must be one that can be consolidated quickly and used as a base for further operations designed to link up with the main base and extend government control to other areas. Only allied troops invited by the host government may possess the resources to launch an operation to secure a forward operational base. Later, political factors may call for a higher profile host government effort in the recovery of its own territory and a correspondingly lower profile role for the allied forces. When it is considered safe to do so the allied troops may concentrate on securing the forward operating base and other base areas in order to release the host nation security forces for a more active role. The occupation and security of a forward operational base are considered in detail in Annex B to this Chapter.

12. ***Securing a Controlled Area.*** Framework operations, carefully planned and designed to clear, secure and pacify the next area to be bought under government control, are launched from a forward operational base or from the base area itself. The immediate aim of a framework, or 'oil slick' operation as it is sometimes called, is to separate the insurgents from their supporters, food suppliers and sources of information in the designated area. These operations are essentially offensive in nature as they aim to wrest territory, and more importantly the people who live in it, from insurgent control. The offensive element is provided by cordon and search, and search and destroy operations against known fixed bases, which force the insurgents to react or surrender the initiative. Well planned and organized ambushes destroy the enemy as he reacts. When the opportunity offers, fix and destroy operations may be used to attack known and vulnerable insurgent camps and base positions but, to succeed, the intelligence must be very good. Special force operations may concentrate on more distant areas and valuable targets, again on good intelligence. It cannot be over-emphasized that success in offensive operations is not won by launching masses of troops into an area on the off-chance of finding and destroying insurgents. Only operations based on good information and sound planning produce results. Until the insurgents start operating in large units and formations in a more conventional manner, when they provide larger targets will better results be obtained than from smaller scale operations which are well set up and based on reliable intelligence. The less spectacular framework operations aimed at separating the insurgent from his support and providing security for the population of a newly won controlled area are the ones which achieve lasting results.
13. ***Consolidation of the Controlled Areas.*** As areas of the hostile territory are cleared of insurgents the civil administration will be re-established. It is possible that many of the area's former civil servants, magistrates and police may have escaped the initial insurgent take over and would be able to put their local knowledge to good use on their return. However, they and the civil police will undoubtedly need the backing of suitable military forces for some time and certainly until the neighbouring regions have been brought back under government control. The army may be asked to help to train local auxiliary forces which will support the police on their own when eventually the military withdraw.
14. ***Continued Extension of Controlled Areas.*** The freshly consolidated controlled areas provide the firm bases for the extension of framework operations until gradually

the entire country is restored to government control. The same steady methods described in paragraph 7 continue to be applied. The process is slow but sure.

15. **Surveillance.** Surveillance provides accurate information regarding insurgent related activity, which contributes directly to the effectiveness of operations (overt and covert). Within the overall campaign plan a correctly focused, coherent surveillance plan, which uses limited manpower and equipment resources to maximum effect is essential. The plan should be both flexible and dynamic to take account of changing operational circumstances. Commanders should take adequate steps to integrate surveillance plans into existing and future operations. This will require a systematic approach to the task which should seek to improve the quality and scope of the surveillance results. Information gathered by surveillance is only of value when it is passed rapidly to a location where it can be analysed properly and where subsequent action taken if this is appropriate.
16. **Operations in Depth.** Long-range raids and penetrations designed to destroy specific targets, such as insurgent concentrations, leaders, key individuals and dumps, or to interfere with communications and depress insurgent morale are essentially precise surgical operations only launched when there is sufficiently reliable and detailed intelligence to make success certain. It may be necessary to use an existing forward operational base or to establish one temporarily, if the latter can be achieved without arousing the enemy's suspicions. Such operations are usually conducted by special forces.

Relationship between Defensive and Offensive Operations

17. Counter-insurgency operations may be grouped into two categories, defensive and offensive. General Kitson describes these categories and the relationship between them as follows:

'Firstly there are defensive operations, which are those designed to prevent insurgents from disrupting the government's programme. Secondly there are offensive operations, which are those designed to root out the insurgents themselves. Before discussing each in turn it is worth noticing how important it is to strike a balance between them. If too little emphasis is placed on defensive measures in order to concentrate resources on the offensive, the insurgents are offered an opportunity to achieve easy successes, which they can use to embarrass the government and thereby undermine its support. If, on the other hand, too little emphasis is placed on offensive operations, the insurgent organization gets bigger and bigger and an ever-increasing proportion of the country's resources has to be devoted to the Security Forces for defensive countermeasures, so that eventually the insurgents achieve their aim by making it appear that the price of further resistance is too high.'

'It is perhaps worth highlighting the ways in which political considerations affect the achievement of a good balance between defensive and offensive operations. There is almost always political pressure on Security Force commanders to devote more resources towards defensive operations because of the short-term

difficulties which the government faces after every spectacular insurgent success. Furthermore, if the operational commander is insensitive to this political pressure, he stands to find himself suddenly confronted by an unnecessarily large number of specific political demands for defensive measures designed to restore confidence among the population. Those demands might easily be big enough to disrupt the offensive plan altogether and thereby upset the balance in the opposite direction. Undoubtedly the insurgent leadership will do all in its power to ensure that the balance of the Security Force's plan is upset, both by planning their own operations with this in mind, and by the use of propaganda designed to inhibit offensive action on the part of the government's forces.'

'It is particularly important to understand the extent to which insurgents use propaganda when defending themselves against government offensive action. Anyone at home or abroad who can be persuaded to write, or broadcast or otherwise influence public opinion will be pressed into service. The aim is usually to try and get debilitating restraints imposed on the Security Forces, and a particularly effective line is to say that offensive Security Force action is driving uncommitted people into supporting the insurgents. Like all good propaganda this line is likely to contain at least an element of truth. What the insurgent propagandist naturally fails to point out, and what the writer or broadcaster often does not understand, is that the offensive action may be the lesser of two evils, in that failure to take it will result in a far greater increase of support for the insurgents as their organization grows unchecked and their power to coerce and persuade correspondingly increases. Of course the right level of offensive action depends on prevailing circumstances. The point which has to be understood is that a good balance between offensive and defensive action is difficult to achieve because of all the pressures which operate against it.'¹

18. **Operational and Tactical Levels of Control.** The relationship between the operational and tactical level of control during COIN operations will differ for each situation, - and is not as clear cut as is the case in general war. A tactless move or over reaction at section or platoon level can easily have enormous operational and possibly political significance. In the following sections defensive and offensive tactics are covered in general terms only to give the flavour of COIN operations most of which are conducted at a tactical level. Parts 3 and 4 of this Volume covers tactics, techniques and procedures in much more detail.

The Use of Non Lethal Weapons (NLW)

19. There is an intellectual argument that force can and should be used with few casualties and little collateral damage; this argument is enhanced by the increasing capability of modern high-technology weapon systems. Not only can these systems deliver a high destructive capability at long range and with great precision, but there is now also the ability to deny a potential enemy his goals without the use of such destructive force.

1. Frank Kitson, *Bunch of Five*, Faber and Faber, 1977.

These latter systems, known generically as non-lethal weapons (NLW), are designed to temporarily immobilise an enemy or render his equipment useless for the task it was designed to do.

20. The use of NLW is not new. Weapons such as batons, water canon, rubber bullets, stun grenades and electronic warfare (EW) have been used by police and armed forces throughout the world for a number of years in situations where the use of more lethal weapons would be inappropriate. What is new and has enhanced the importance of NLW is the prevailing security climate in which the use of force, especially for UN operations, has become almost common place. Until now troops on peacekeeping operations have been authorized to use lethal weapons only in self-defence. If forced to open fire, they shoot to kill. Public concern for losses among the belligerents and civilian population and the associated requirement for the minimal use of force have increased interest in the potential for NLW, especially in peacekeeping and counter insurgency operations.
21. NLW should not be thought of as a separate unique capability, nor do these weapons invite a different form of warfare. NLW represent additional capabilities for use in a military commanders' graduated use of force to deter, defend or attack an opponent. Research and development of a whole range of techniques in the use of NLW indicates that this will become a major factor in future counter insurgency campaigns. Further details of the issues surrounding the use of such weapons are given at Annex C to this Chapter.

SECTION 2 - DEFENSIVE TACTICS

Categories

22. The main defensive operations are:
 - a. Protective measures.
 - b. Defensive C2W.
 - c. Control of movement.
 - d. Crowd dispersal.

Protective Measures

23. ***The Threat.*** Until an insurgency reaches the conventional war phase there is no front line. No area can be assumed to be safe. Even in a cleared and consolidated area the insurgents may still have a few operational cells which can launch bomb attacks or carry out assassinations. They may, as a matter of policy, attempt to reintroduce insurgent cells to launch terrorist attacks both for their propaganda value and in an attempt to force a redeployment of police and troops to take the pressure off their forces elsewhere. Protective measures will still be required in the most secure base areas, although the tasks may have been handed back to the civil police or auxiliaries.

24. **Balance.** Protective measures in high risk areas are manpower intensive. Many of the tasks are routine and boring, and soldiers tend to lose their vigilance after long periods without an incident. If possible, troops on such duties should be rotated with those on more active operations and every effort must be made to keep a training programme going.
25. **Tasks.** Protective measures include:
- a. Personal protection for VIPs and troops, both on and off duty.
 - b. Small convoys.
 - c. Large road movements.
 - d. Picketing routes.
 - e. Guarding installations.
 - f. Rail movement.

Defensive C2W

26. Defensive C2W is used to deny, negate, diminish or turn to friendly advantage, enemy efforts to destroy, disrupt, exploit, deceive and/or deny information to friendly command systems, including its supporting communications, information and intelligence activities. Safeguarding friendly command systems is a fundamental consideration as failure to do so is likely to result in loss of freedom of action and initiative, mis-direction of effort, or failure of the operation. The primary objectives of Defensive C2W are, therefore, to:
- a. Reduce the vulnerability of command support assets, procedures and installations to attack.
 - b. Reduce the effects of enemy deception actions against friendly command systems.
 - c. Nullify the effects of enemy EW actions against friendly command systems.
 - d. Deny the enemy the ability to exploit friendly command systems.
 - e. Ensure that the enemy's PSYOPS are ineffective.
 - f. Briefing troops on PSYOPS topics, both to inoculate them from the effects of hostile propaganda, and to ensure that they are fully informed about the facts and developments within a counter insurgency campaign.

Control of Movement

27. **Explaining the Necessity for Movement Restrictions.** Prohibitions and restrictions are always annoying and distasteful to the public. There must be a clear need for them, they must be fairly applied within the law and the necessity for them must be explained to the public. The civil authorities are responsible for imposing collective measures and the security forces for enforcing them. Before they are imposed the measures must be discussed between the civil authorities, the police and the military authorities to make sure that enforcement is a practical proposition and that the necessary police and soldiers are available to put them into effect. The principal methods are:
- a. Road blocks and check points.
 - b. Control points.
 - c. Curfews.
28. **Aims.** Controlling movement may have any of the following aims:
- a. To make it easier for the security forces to enforce the law, thus increasing public confidence in the government's ability to protect them. With the fear of retribution removed, individuals who have information are more likely to divulge it.
 - b. To disrupt insurgent groups and plans by making movement difficult. Unable to contact their subordinates quickly and easily, the insurgent district leaders are obliged to exercise command by directive, instructing their sub-units and cells to carry out a quota of ambushes, assassinations and sabotage over a specific period. Consequently, the latter's attacks, while annoying, are insufficiently well coordinated to produce effective results.
 - c. To dominate an area to prevent crowds from gathering and to deter hostile action.
 - d. To control the movement of crowds which do form and prevent their reinforcement.
 - e. To discourage the illegal movement of arms, explosives, medical supplies and food. Sometimes, the setting up of road blocks in a random pattern may surprise a courier or net a vehicle carrying explosives or supplies. This will add to a feeling of insecurity amongst the insurgent's communications and logistic organizations.
 - f. To seal off an area to prevent the introduction of weapons, explosives and subversive propaganda material.
 - g. To arrest wanted persons.

- h. To record movement to detect patterns and obtain information.
 - i. To facilitate the movement and operations of the security forces.
29. **Control of Movement.** Control measures must be applied firmly. They must be continued no longer than is strictly necessary. The lifting of controls in one area may act as an incentive to the population of another to expose or help to drive out insurgents.
30. **Planning the Control of Movement.** Likely public reaction must be taken into account during the planning stage. Agitators will be quick to exploit any adverse reaction and the need for any unavoidable irksome restrictions should be anticipated and explained to weaken hostile propaganda. Ill conceived measures which lead to the collapse of public services causing unnecessary public discontent must be avoided. The committee system exists to discuss plans and their likely consequences and a sound plan must be based on good intelligence, which involves close liaison with the police special branch. The plan should cover:
- a. Allocation of forces, including those for joint army/police patrolling.
 - b. Allocation of central and localised reserves.
 - c. Establishing channels for requesting military assistance.
 - d. The siting and control of surveillance devices.
 - e. The reception, accommodation and feeding of troops.
 - f. The preparation of any special stores and equipment, eg, movable barriers for crowd control, knife rest barricades, oil drums and sand to fill them.
 - g. The distribution of photographs and descriptions of wanted people.
 - h. Rehearsing control measures and testing communications. If a sudden movement restriction is to be imposed on a particular area to effect surprise the security aspects of a rehearsal must be taken into account.
 - i. Measures for keeping the public informed.

Crowd Dispersal

31. In spite of measures to prevent it, unlawful crowds may assemble. The civil police may be unable to cope with the situation and military assistance may be required. The size of a crowd is no indication of its attitude. A large one containing many curious onlookers may be docile, until agitators get to work on it. A small crowd may be peaceful or it may be a concentration of those with extreme views. The military commander on the spot must use his own judgment as to how to deal with any particular situation.

32. The role of the police varies in accordance with its strength, organization and employment policy with regard to the use of force. An armed police force with a strong paramilitary capability is likely to be well trained and prepared to deal with a riot, and the threshold of violence to warrant calling in the military will be correspondingly high. If military forces are called in the situation is likely to be very serious. Other more conventionally equipped police forces may be forced to seek military assistance at a comparatively early stage.
33. Riot and crowd control are essentially urban operations, although they may also occur in large villages. A military commander should appreciate the situation carefully to see if a crowd can be contained and allowed to disperse of its own accord through boredom. The unnecessary use of force to disperse a crowd often leads to increased antagonism and resentment, a heightened degree of violence and a more intractable and serious situation. As with counter-insurgency situations, the long term effects are the important ones.
34. In an urban setting, particularly at the beginning of an emergency, it may pay to deploy a screen of joint civil and military police patrols, perhaps backed by helicopters, as soon as the special branch scent serious trouble. Their sighting reports will provide the joint operations room with early warning of the assembly points, size, demeanour and movement of crowds and perhaps the identity of ring leaders who are inciting violence. If the demonstrators do not prove amenable to the normal police methods of crowd control the civil police riot squads will be committed first. They will probably use CS smoke or baton charges, or both, to break up the mobs into smaller and more manageable groups, which are easier to disperse, while snatch squads arrest the ring leaders. Initially, the Army will be kept in the background, partly as a reserve of final resort and partly, perhaps, to help the police form an outer cordon to prevent unruly mobs from one area reinforcing crowds in another. Should the situation deteriorate to the stage when the police are no longer able to cope, military forces will be called upon to intervene, either with riot squads or firearms. Wherever troops or police are committed it may be necessary to picket the roofs of buildings, block side streets and watch subway exits to secure their flanks and rear.
35. The government decision as to when the Army should be committed to the streets is a matter of fine judgement. While premature intervention invites the charge of over-reaction and the illegal use of force, undue delay and hesitation may also have serious consequences, and not just in terms of casualties and damage. If the situation is allowed to deteriorate to the point where the police are manifestly beaten their confidence may be shaken and their standing in the public eye badly damaged. Such an obvious defeat may restrict their usefulness for a time and delay the eventual disengagement of the Army. There is also the risk that an early spectacular success for the extremists may encourage an escalation in the level and the extent of violence. The worse and the more widespread the violence the greater may be the need for military reinforcements and, perhaps, the degree of force deemed necessary to restore peace on the streets.

SECTION 3 - GAINING THE INITIATIVE

Categories

36. Tactics which can gain the initiative include the following:
 - a. C2W Operations.
 - b. Patrolling.
 - c. Rapid Reaction Forces.
 - d. Ambushes.
 - e. Search Operations.
 - f. Larger Scale Operations. To destroy, or at least dislocate and disrupt, insurgent units and formations.

C2W Operations

37. C2W is used to deny insurgent commanders effective command of their forces through destruction, disruption, exploitation, deception, influence or denial of all or part of their command system, including its supporting communications, information and intelligence activities. C2W is a particularly effective, and often the most economical, way of reducing an insurgents combat effectiveness. It is applicable at all levels of command. The primary objectives of C2W directed against insurgent combat potential are to:
 - a. Slow down his tempo in relation to that of the Security Forces.
 - b. Disrupt his activities.
 - c. Degrade the insurgent commander's ability to command.
 - d. Disrupt his ability to generate and sustain offensive action.

Patrolling

38. **General.** The types of patrol and their purpose are the same for counter-insurgency operations as for conventional warfare with suitable modifications. While both reconnaissance and standing patrols have an important part to play offensive patrolling must be executed with discretion. Like their counterparts in conventional war fighting patrols rely on good information and they are even more vulnerable to ambush. A type of patrol peculiar to counter-insurgency operations is the framework patrol system, a method of patrolling specifically designed for this kind of warfare. The system is described in paragraph 41.

39. **Reconnaissance Patrols.** The presence of patrols generally has a steadying effect on the population of those neighbourhoods which are loyal to the government. Sending weak patrols into areas hostile to the government is an act of folly. The patrol may be forced into a hasty and undignified retreat to avoid injury or death from ill-disposed crowds pelting them with stones. The loss of face, and possibly weapons, merely encourages the insurgents and depresses the morale of the loyal population as well as the security forces. However, well planned patrolling taking into account the nature of the threat can achieve useful results in an urban or rural setting. Tasks may include:
- a. Gathering information by observation and contact with the civilian population.
 - b. Harassing insurgent movements by carrying out snap checks and searches.
 - c. Dealing with such minor incidents as are within the capabilities of the patrol.
40. **Standing Patrols.** After the initial deployment of the military forces the establishment of a network of overt and covert standing patrols occupying key positions provides an important means of acquiring information and furnishing a security force presence which can help in dominating an area. Their tasks might include:
- a. Obtaining general information on activity and noting any significant patterns.
 - b. Observing the movement and activity of terrorists, curfew breakers and crowds.
 - c. Identifying ring-leaders and law-breakers.
 - d. Directing patrols, police, reserve units or helicopters to incidents.
 - e. Giving covering fire to vehicle and foot patrols should they come under a level of attack which necessitates the use of firearms.
 - f. Assisting in the dispersal of unlawful assemblies and riots by passing information to elements of the security forces involved in crowd dispersal.
 - g. Engaging snipers who open fire in their vicinity and dominating areas to prevent snipers from taking up fire positions.
41. **Framework Patrols.** Framework patrols provide a mixture of information, protection and a security force presence. They operate on a team multiple system which varies in accordance with the environment, urban or rural, the threat, their task and the involvement of other security force elements. The patrols work from firm bases and, where possible, within the ambit of standing patrols. They may be mounted or move on foot. Their aim is to deter an insurgent attack or sniping operation by saturating an area and threatening the escape route of a bomber or sniper. In broad terms their tasks are to:

- a. Provide local protection for security force bases.
 - b. Inhibit insurgents' freedom of movement by random deployment at different times in different areas. Framework patrolling should avoid creating a pattern of predictable habits.
 - c. Increase the chance of intercepting a gunman.
 - d. Provide an instantly available detection and reaction force on the ground.
 - e. Provide a regular update of local information.
42. ***Disruptive Patrolling.*** As in other forms of warfare success cannot be obtained by defensive measures alone. The aim is to bring troops into contact with the insurgents on favourable terms. The essential prerequisite is good information, which may be obtained from a variety of sources; the coordinated efforts of special branch and military intelligence building up a painstaking picture, the cultivation of local inhabitants, reconnaissance, standing and framework patrols, tracking and, sometimes, a lucky contact. Small patrols operating discreetly may overhear voices or the clatter of cooking pots in camps where the enemy believes himself to be secure. Even the smell of bad sanitation may betray a position.² In jungle country, where it is seldom possible to deploy and close a cordon successfully, an offensive patrol has a better chance of scoring a success. If the sentry can be stalked and shot and the insurgent base rushed, effective fire can be opened by the leading members of the patrol. Because only a few weapons can be brought to bear effectively the patrol does not have to be strong in numbers. Taken unawares, the shock of surprise on insurgents is normally so great that they turn and run. As mentioned above, disruptive patrolling must be used with judgment to avoid falling into ambushes. Used judiciously it is an excellent way of keeping small groups of enemy on the move, inducing a sense of insecurity and dislocating insurgent plans.

Rapid Reaction Forces

43. Isolated police and home guard forces must feel confident that they will be supported quickly and effectively if they come under attack. Should a number of posts be overrun, many others will be intimidated into either deserting their posts, entering into a cooperative arrangement with the insurgents while outwardly remaining loyal to the government or even going over to what they regard as the winning side.
44. Part of the plan to support such isolated posts is the defensive framework of military garrisons. However, the maintenance of a successful defence and control over an area depends on the ability to take quick offensive counteraction. Reserves must be held in readiness to go to the aid of threatened detachments. Routes, and when they exist, alternative routes must be reconnoitred to avoid the risk of ambush because an insurgent attack on an isolated post may have the additional aim of destroying the

2. There were occasions in Malaya when talking and cooking gave away communist terrorist positions and on the Jebel Akhdar in the late 1950s the smell of bad guerrilla sanitation provided a timely warning of the enemy's proximity for our approaching patrols.

relieving force. APCs provide protection against small arms fire but are vulnerable to handheld anti-armour weapons and should not be used blindly in a relief operation. Helicopters provide a rapid means of transporting a mobile reserve, or part of it, but again their vulnerability, especially on landing, must be considered.

45. Reserves kept at short notice provide a useful rapid reaction force to take advantage of a situation provided by an unexpected contact or an intelligence windfall. When appropriate, such reserves should have tracker dogs, and heavy weapons, including armed helicopters, should be on call.

Ambushes

46. An ambush is a surprise attack made by a force lying in wait, relying on shock action. Ambushes are usually deliberate but drills must be developed to enable a section or patrol to move rapidly and quietly into an ambush position when its scouts spot an insurgent patrol moving towards it before the insurgents see the scouts. The latter type, designed to take advantage of an unexpected opportunity to exploit surprise and gain the initiative, is called an immediate ambush. Encounters are usually brief and at close range, the quarry either being destroyed by a combination of killing zone and cut-off tactics, or escaping from a badly sprung ambush, perhaps to turn the tables on the ambushers. In the perfect ambush in the most favourable circumstances, where the entire insurgent force is caught exposed in the open, it may be possible to call on them to surrender, in which case some valuable prisoners will be gained for interrogation. Ambushes may be laid with any combination of the following aims :
 - a. The destruction of an insurgent force.
 - b. The capture or killing of a wanted insurgent.
 - c. The capture or destruction of weapons and equipment.
 - d. The gaining of intelligence.
 - e. Deterring the insurgent from using an area.
 - f. Preventing the insurgents from approaching friendly positions.
 - g. Acting as a diversion to draw attention away from another area or operations.
47. Like framework patrols, ambushes are sometimes deployed on an area basis with the object of increasing the chances of trapping an entire enemy force.

Search Operations

48. The aim of this type of operation is to isolate a selected area by deploying a cordon, either by stealth or at such speed that the intended quarry has no chance to escape, and then searching it thoroughly. Such operations are usually carried out jointly by the police and the military with the purpose of:

- a. Capturing wanted persons, arms, radio transmitters, supplies, explosives or documents.
 - b. Disrupting enemy activities.
 - c. Eliminating insurgent activity in a specific locality, particularly with a view to expanding a controlled area.
 - d. Gaining evidence to support prosecutions, where this is appropriate.
 - e. Information to support future operations.
49. The establishment of the cordon and the search are two separate activities but are mounted as one operation. Because the search part of the operation is usually a lengthy affair which disrupts the life of a locality while the people are confined to their homes, cordons and searches should only be mounted on reliable information. A series of fruitless operations merely alienates the population from the government and provides the insurgent with unnecessary propaganda.
50. However, cordon and search operations are not easy to execute, because of the difficulty of closing the cordon so quickly that the insurgents have no chance to escape. It is easier to position a cordon in open country with a good road network and with the help of helicopters when the security forces have the advantages of mobility and observation is good. In close jungle country it is virtually impossible to position and link up a cordon because movement in the forest is slow and noisy, and observation restricted to a few metres. In such an environment the kind of raids by fighting patrols stand a far better chance of success.

Larger Scale Operations

51. In cases where an insurgency controls large areas of the countryside the rebels may raise and deploy a sizeable force consisting of several formations. Such a situation is most likely to occur where they have access to a friendly neighbouring country which they use as a haven to assemble, train and equip a field army undisturbed.
52. Ideally, such forces should be engaged and destroyed in battle while they are relatively small and before they pose a major threat. This may not be feasible for a number of reasons. The threat is likely to develop in a remote area while the host government has its hands full securing vital areas close to the capital, the main towns and their surrounding well-populated and economically important rural areas. If the government is to survive it must consolidate its control over the vital areas initially and then extend its authority to neighbouring inhabited regions because a counter-insurgency is essentially a battle for the loyalty and control of its subjects. The host nation may have neither the troops available nor the means of projecting force over a considerable distance into a remote and possibly mountainous, jungle region. A premature effort resulting in defeat may demoralize waverers in some of the vital secure or marginally controlled areas sufficiently to tip the balance against the government. There may also be a risk that operations on the border of a stronger, hostile neighbour may

provoke an unwanted intervention on the pretext that the neighbouring country's borders have been violated or its security threatened.

53. Before the host government can go over to the offensive it may have to await the build-up of its own forces and the arrival of allied forces in sufficient strength. Some of the additional troops may help to form a central mobile reserve, while others release experienced troops from framework operations to go into reserve. Whether a newly arrived British contingent is allotted straight to the mobile reserve or whether it spends a preliminary period on framework operations to acclimatize, familiarize its troops with the physical and human environment and acquire some experience in local minor tactics will be a matter of judgment in the light of circumstances.
54. If the British contingent is to form part of the central mobile reserve it will be a matter for inter-governmental agreement, based on Service advice, as to the composition of the force. The kind of support the host government may need cannot be predicted in advance. It will depend on the size and nature of the threat, the adequacy of the host nation's resources and the terrain. The requirement may vary from infantry with an air mobility capability at the lower end of the scale to a balanced force of all arms backed by offensive air and transport support at the other. If the host nation has a long coastline vulnerable to the infiltration of insurgent supplies, maritime air reconnaissance forces, naval forces, with perhaps, some amphibious capability, may be needed. Special forces will almost certainly be useful. If the British contribution is to be part of a major allied effort the governments concerned, in conjunction with the host authorities, will agree on an apportionment of types of forces and tasks in accordance with the long term plans of campaign.
55. When the moment is right for an offensive against the insurgent's regular units and formations, usually once the host government has established control over its vital cities, towns and populated rural areas, it will be necessary to decide on the aim and purpose of large scale operations. The goal of the annihilation of the insurgents regular forces represents the perfect solution. In practice it may be difficult to achieve because once the insurgents realize that they face an overwhelming threat their tactic is to leave small parties to delay the government forces while the main bodies split up into small parties to exfiltrate the encircling troops. An insurgent leadership is normally quite prepared to leave their delaying elements to their fate.
56. While destruction of the insurgent main forces may legitimately be the security forces aim, a lesser result may lack perfection but be nearly as useful. If their main forces can be compelled to abandon a hitherto secure area, broken up with the loss of heavy casualties, useful prisoners seized, logistic stockpiles destroyed, communications disrupted and the links with their supporting political and supply organization severed, the enemy will need time to recover, even across a friendly border. The time bought may be used by the government and its security forces to deny the former enemy base to insurgent reinfiltration, to consolidate the administration's control over formerly marginal areas and extend the 'oil slick' process to new areas. A significant insurgent defeat will have a heartening effect on the population and will encourage waverers to support the government.

57. There are a number of pre-requisites for the success of a large scale operation:
- a. *Good Intelligence.* A blind blow in the dark seldom achieves anything. The locations of units, headquarters and key leaders is as important as knowledge of the enemy's positions and security screen. Equally important is good intelligence on the insurgent's supporting political and logistic organization. Special forces may be given the task of seizing or killing those key leaders whose whereabouts are accurately known. Their demise will also help to disrupt the enemy command organization at the moment when the rebel forces and their supporting organization need quick decisions and orders.
 - b. *Isolation.* The area chosen for the operation must be isolated as far as possible to prevent insurgent reinforcement or exfiltration. If the escape of small parties cannot be stopped, the enemy should not be able to evacuate formed units. Enemy escape routes should, as far as possible, be blocked.
 - c. *Surprise and Deception.* Obtaining surprise presents the greatest problem. Preparations and preliminary moves which cannot be hidden must be disguised. Patrolling to obtain information should be carried out in as many areas as possible, with no obvious emphasis on the selected area. Rumours of possible operations planned to take place elsewhere may be fed into the insurgent intelligence organization through channels which the insurgents are known to trust. Feints may be launched in such a manner as not to arouse suspicions as to the location of the real operation, its aims and its objectives.
58. The execution of such an operation requires rapid deployment to encircle the main enemy forces, including the delivery of troops to isolated locations by helicopter. Insurgent forces should not just be surrounded by a cordon, which is likely to prove porous in the best circumstances, but located and pinned down. The latter requirement may best be achieved by special forces. Once surrounded, disorganized and broken up, the insurgents must be pursued relentlessly. Against large enemy formations, conventional, limited war, or medium intensity conflict operations will be needed, but care must be taken to choose the scene, to fight the battle on our terms and to keep the initiative. Reserves must be held ready for committal to reinforce hard pressed units, to exploit success or to block enemy escape routes.
59. Finally, success must be followed up by rooting out the insurgent political and logistic support organization and replacing it with the host government's administration. The people in the area must be protected from future covert rebel infiltration by its political cells and a new terrorist network as well as another occupation by insurgent main forces. Consolidation of the government's authority will depend as much on a constructive and imaginative rehabilitation campaign as on protection backed by the establishment of a good intelligence service. Mass regroupment of the population should be avoided although it may be necessary to resettle exposed isolated communities, which are vulnerable to a resumption of insurgent initiatives, in securely guarded villages, preferably as close to their fields as possible.

SECTION 4 - OPSEC IN COIN OPERATIONS

General

60. OPSEC gives an operation the desired overall degree of security. It is defined as the process which gives a military operation or exercise appropriate security, using passive or active means, to deny the adversary knowledge of the dispositions, capabilities and intentions of friendly forces [AAP-6].

The Aim and Scope of OPSEC

61. The aim of OPSEC is to deny to the adversary the information he needs to be able to identify dispositions and capabilities, and the intelligence to assess friendly intentions. OPSEC is a force-wide process which addresses the overall security of the whole operation or exercise, in the light of the adversary's known or suspected Reconnaissance, Intelligence, Surveillance and Target Acquisition (RISTA) capabilities. It is not intended to provide blanket security: the adversary may know that friendly forces are in the area of operations; or that further operations are planned. The intention is to conceal from the adversary those indicators from which he could deduce vital elements of our plans, to:
- a. Increase the element of surprise and reduce the adversary's capability to interfere with friendly operations.
 - b. To increase security and thus prevent the adversary obtaining information that would assist in his offensive planning process.
 - c. To analyse continuously the intelligence likely to be available to an adversary, thus allowing friendly force plans to be reviewed in the light of probable adversary knowledge.

The Use of OPSEC in COIN

62. Surprise is one of the most important factors in counter insurgency operations. The insurgents are frequently dispersed over a wide area, using the local population as both cover and to provide themselves with information and supplies. Insurgents will often have an excellent intelligence "net" which will keep them informed on all activities in the area and, where appropriate, allow them to disperse or hide whenever they are threatened.
63. While it will not be possible to conceal all activities involved in a major security force operation, OPSEC must be applied to conceal such details as: the scale of the operation, timings, target areas for searches, routes in/out of the area of operations, drop-off points, specialised equipment and other details from which an insurgent could deduce the operation's objectives, specific targets and timescale.

Responsibility for OPSEC

64. OPSEC is a commander's responsibility. It is a G3 function. A staff element within G3 Operations should be responsible for the specific coordination, implementation and monitoring of any OPSEC plan.

Media Security Policy

65. A media security policy should be formulated at an early stage, certainly prior to deployment, after consultation between Intelligence, Operations, Military Public Information/Relations and Legal staffs. This policy should be coordinated at the highest appropriate level to prevent inadvertent disclosures outside the operational area. A media security policy in the area of operations should be directed by the commander, in consultation with the MOD, and in accordance with his overall OPSEC policy.

Relationship between OPSEC and Deception

66. The aim of OPSEC is to deny the adversary knowledge of friendly forces, whereas deception aims to present a deliberately false picture. Deception is thus not necessarily a part of OPSEC, but OPSEC is essential to deception - in presenting a false picture; it is vital to this conceal those indicators that would reveal the true nature of events. At the operational/strategic level, however, major movements or preparations may be necessary which cannot easily be concealed. At this level, the OPSEC plan may therefore need to incorporate elements of any deception plan.

SECTION 5 - EW IN COIN OPERATIONS

67. **General.** EW is another of the five primary functions of C2W together with OPSEC, PSYOPS, Deception and Destruction. The other functions are dealt with individually in different Chapters of Part 2.
68. **The Electromagnetic Environment.** Due to the wide variety of potential counter insurgency campaigns and contrasting Electromagnetic (EM) environments, operations conducted in the EM environment will be different for each deployment. During any COIN campaign the EM environment will also be influenced by both military and civilian systems. The priority at the start of operations, will be the production of a detailed plan of the operational EM environment. It will be important to identify and note the electromagnetic signatures of each active element of the EM spectrum, in order to produce the EW ORBAT.
69. **EM Spectrum Threat.** When considering the threat posed by the EM spectrum, the following factors should be addressed:
 - a. The protection of friendly communications, and target acquisition systems against exploitation and attack.

- b. The most appropriate way of defending against EM guided and homing weapons.
 - c. The gaining of information about a potentially complex EM target array.
 - d. The most appropriate method to attack such a complex EM target array.
70. ***Current Trends for the EM Spectrum.*** There is widespread and growing use of the EM spectrum by military and civilian organisations. Combat Net Radio and trunk communications are essential to the effective command and control of armies. Paramilitary organisations also have easy access to EM systems that are mobile and operate throughout the EM spectrum. Modern communication and radar equipments are characterised by an increasing use of digital signal processing, providing a low probability of intercept and anti-jam techniques (such as frequency hopping, direct sequence spread spectrum (DSSS) and burst transmissions). The use of digital encryption devices are also becoming commonplace. In addition to communications, military technology uses the EM spectrum to aim weapons, guide smart munitions, collect information and disseminate the resultant information, conduct night operations, counter command and control facilities and to protect soldiers, communications systems and their facilities. Radars are increasingly used for navigation, surveillance and in fire control systems. In countering units any EW threat can expect to a mix of Former Soviet Union (FSU), Western and commercial radio and radar equipments, in addition to guided and homing weapon systems.³
71. ***Future Technologies.*** There will be a significant shift away from insecure voice at tactical levels of command, as data entry devices, encryption and the use of low probability of intercept techniques become more widespread. At higher levels of command an increased use of secure single channel and multi-channel systems is likely. Operations in the future could involve the use of radio frequency weapons (capable of disrupting or destroying EM systems and weapon guidance systems), mobile telephones and similar systems that operate above the 500 MHz frequency level. The pace of introduction of advanced communications equipment is likely to increase as the cost of technology declines. For example, hand held, battery powered, DSSS transceivers, and man-portable, direct access satellite systems are both available commercially. If EW is to make a realistic contribution to the Commander's surveillance and military information requirements, it will be essential to identify, at the earliest opportunity, what use the adversary is making of the EM spectrum. To achieve this, light rapid response EW detachments are required to be deployed at the earliest opportunity. After this the required EW resources can be deployed and allocated tasks accordingly.

Military Information Requirements

72. Although EW equipment and the principles of EW support apply equally to General War and COIN, the military information needs of the Commander in COIN may often

3. To provide the Commander with effective electronic surveillance and defence, the force must be equipped to exploit, attack and defend against all modern comms and non-comms systems.

vary in emphasis from those in General War. These requirements will often focus on non military topics such as politics, economics, demographics, religion and ethnic distribution. In COIN, understanding the population and its culture will be a significant factor. With the application of advanced communication information systems, (CIS) together with sound planning, Electronic Support Measures (ESM) can provide immediate threat warnings, targeting data, from which military information can be gained to are surveillance, reconnaissance and Electronic Counter Measures (ECM).

73. Effective reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition combined with military information plays an important role in COIN operations. Full use should be made of the entire range of surveillance techniques and equipments available including observation, monitoring, patrols, and attended and unattended electronic, optical and acoustic surveillance devices. As a key component of surveillance, ESM has the potential to make a major contribution to a commander's military information requirements.
74. Informing large numbers of the population about the current situation and influencing public opinion (PSYOPS) could in certain situations, be essential to the successful conduct of an operation. This capability is of particularly relevance during COIN operations in those states, where the population relies almost totally on radio and possibly television for their access to information. The ability to transmit relevant accurate and timely information on unused commercial radio and television bands could also be an important asset in preventing an escalation of hostile activity.

The Role of EW in COIN Operations

75. **General.** A detailed plan, combined with the identification of all detectable emissions will be essential in order to determine whether the emissions belong to friendly, neutral or potentially hostile EM systems. To achieve this and to ensure that the correct EW assets are deployed to meet the threat, a capable ESM recce system, supported by a comms and non-comms parametric data base, will need to be in-theatre of the earliest possible moment. As EM emissions are not restricted by national or regional boundaries the physical extent of the operational EM environment is not directly related to the geographical Theatre of Operations. Thus, advantage must be made of all available national and international "stand off" military information systems, in addition to the military information product from those formations deployed. Any friendly system radiating in the EM spectrum can be exploited by hostile EW systems to disrupt or compromise PSO. The coordination of EW and military information could be an important factor in the success or otherwise of any operations.
76. **Application of EW.** EW has long been recognized as an essential feature of warfare and is a key component of Command and Control Warfare (C2W), which has equal utility in war and OOTW. EW in COIN operations will provide the Commander with a flexible, non-intrusive surveillance system and ECM can be used to counter homing and guided weapon systems, to protect key military and civilian installations, such as hospitals, airports and densely populated areas. ECM used in this way could provide a minimum force defence, against sophisticated homing devices which would be difficult, if not impossible, to identify the source of this type of electronic attack. EW

used in this manner would also reduce the risk of, or reason for, retaliatory action being taken by insurgents, which in turn could lead to a reduction in the level of violence. However, successful EW operations will depend on information collection, smart jamming, data fusion and the rapid dissemination of information.

77. **ESM.** The presence, or indeed the perceived presence, of widespread and impartial electronic surveillance in the theatre of operations can help to deter hostile activity by insurgents. Electronic surveillance will remove the element of surprise from actions that insurgents might take, especially if it is known that the information arising from that surveillance is shared with others. The loss of surprise will greatly improve the opportunity for the security force to anticipate offensive action by the insurgents. This could well degrade the effectiveness of the aggression and could make such action seem less worthwhile. Effective electronic surveillance can also assist a commander to identify suspects. In each case, the likelihood of aggression being rewarded is reduced, the risk of the insurgent being publicly exposed to the community is increased and the threat of anticipatory responses by security forces is heightened. ESM can be used to cue other surveillance systems and ECM (offensive jamming). ESM will also have a role to play in the development of friendly Electronic Protect Measures (EPM), which will in turn reduce the jamming threat to friendly users of the EM spectrum. These combined EW disciplines will have a major contribution to make to the overall operational security (OPSEC) plan. A list of circumstances whereby ESM can assist a commander in fulfilling his military information requirements is at Annex D.
78. **ECM.** The Rules of Engagement (ROE) will dictate whether ECM can be used as a minimum force non-lethal weapon system by forces engaged in COIN operations. In a situation where the involvement and likely proximity of the local population makes the principles of minimum force and the use of non-lethal weapons particularly important, a communications and non-communications jamming capability should be considered as essential. Electronic Defensive Aid Suits (DAS) should become a standard fit, to vehicles employed on convoy escort duties. As the effects of jamming are difficult to attribute, there may be situations where ECM action can be taken with minimal risk to friendly forces and with little chance of aggravating the situation. Circumstances where a commander may choose to use ECM are at Annex E.
79. **EPM.** EPM is that division of EW which involves actions and measures taken to ensure friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum despite enemy use of EW. EPM are equally significant in COIN operations. Electronic equipment forms the basis of tactical comms electronic surveillance and weapon systems for all modern security forces. EPM are also required to maintain OPSEC and protect CIS during military deployments. To improve OPSEC, it will be essential to have the capability to identify those areas of the EM spectrum, that are seen as a direct threat to the security of all deployed friendly forces.

Coordination

80. **General.** The need for EM spectrum planning and coordination, during operations increases as security forces and insurgent groups throughout the world continue to

develop the use of advanced electronic systems. EW planning will be the responsibility of the Commander in coordination with any Host Nation. To assist the Commander, an EW Coordination Centre (EWCC) should be formed, which needs to be located alongside the G2/J2 and G3/J3 branches. The staffing level within this organisation will vary in size and will be dependent on the scale of EW assets deployed. As a minimum requirements an EW Liaison of Officer (EWLO) from each Service providing EW assets to the security forces should be assigned to the EWCC. The role of the EWLO within the EWCC would be to assist in the control of resources and to advise on national equipment capabilities. If no EWCC is formed, then an EWLO should be assigned to the Operations (G3/J3) staff at the highest appropriate military headquarters.

81. **EWCC.** The EWCC will be the staff agency established in a force HQ to coordinate EW operations and to liaise closely with the G2, G3 and G6 branches. EWCC staff will be required to identify and resolve EW planning contradictions in the early phase of any operation. This will be achieved through a detailed knowledge of EW capabilities, limitations and the concept of operations for the deployed forces. Efficient coordination and full employment of the EW assets available, together with timely adjustment of priorities, are also critical to the success of any EW operation. To achieve effective coordination, control and tasking the EWCC staff will also require a clear understanding of a commander's military information requirements, the collection plan and the potential target array.
82. **Organisation.** The composition of the EWCC/EWLO team will be determined by several factors, which include the theatre of operations, the overall structure of the force and the level of EW operations to be conducted. The EWCC staff will provide a direct link to the EW planners of their respective service staffs. The staff will require a fully integrated CIS, with the following minimum capability.
 - a. **Communications.** The EW CIS requirement will depend on the level of EW participation in counter insurgency operations. However provision should be made for secure voice, high data rate comms, and in some instances telegraph. The EWCC must be able to communicate with all supporting EW units, authorities and agencies.
 - b. **Automatic Data Processing (ADP).** EWCC requires ADP support, in the form of low radiation computers, accredited for the storage of sensitive material. Database software designed to handle the Electronic Warfare Mutual Support (EWMS) data, EW reports and on line analysis support.
83. **Data Exchange.** The requirement could be to establish procedures within a multinational HQ that will allow the timely exchange of communications and non-communications ESM information and parametric data. This will enhance contingency planning, military information assessments and the execution of operations. The exchange of information is designed to assist the coordination of EW activities, improve EW knowledge and support the operational plan. The information requirements exchange should include:

- a. Friendly force data which should be exchanged as a matter of routine during peace and PSO.
- b. Threat information derived from EW.
- c. Coordination of military information derived from all other sources.

SECTION 6 - DECEPTION

General

84. Deception is a double edged weapon - if used in the wrong place at the wrong time, and needs careful handling. It can be applied by either side in any campaign and across the strategic, operational and tactical spectrum of conflict. It can also be used profitably in psychological operations, public information and in state planning to sow doubt and division in the opponents camp. The North Vietnamese use of strategic deception in their war against the Americans and South Vietnamese is a classic example of the adroit manipulation of the international press and media. See Chapter 2 of Part 1 for details.
85. Deception is defined as those measures designed to mislead the opponent by manipulation, distortion or falsification of evidence to induce him to react in a manner that is prejudicial to his interests.

The Aims of Deception

86. The aims of deception are to:
 - a. To gain surprise.
 - b. To maintain security.
 - c. To give a commander freedom of action to carry out his mission by deluding an opponent as to his actions.
 - d. To mislead the opponent and thus persuade him to adopt a course of action which is to his disadvantage and which can be exploited.
 - e. To save lives of own troops and minimise expenditure of time and resources, thus economizing on effort.

The Categories of Deception

87. All types of deception aim to implant a false idea in the opponents mind and all deception presupposes effective counter surveillance and OPSEC to prevent the enemy from observing genuine activity. Deception measures are categorized as offensive or defensive:

- a. *Offensive Deception Measures.* Offensive measures are used for the active dissemination of false evidence to the opponent in order to mislead him about future intentions. The prime purpose of offensive deception is to achieve surprise.
- b. *Defensive Deception Measures.* Defensive measures offer false evidence to an opponent who holds the initiative. Credible substitutes are used to divert his attention and effort away from genuine dispositions and targets. The prime purpose of defensive deception is to improve security.

The Use of Deception in Counter Insurgency Operations

88. Deception can, if applied correctly, be a force multiplier and its use at operational and tactical levels in any counter insurgency campaign can pay dividends and materially assist the governments overall campaign plan. It should be noted that, for the military commander, deception measures should be applied to defeating or neutralising insurgents more effectively. Measures to influence the general public should remain under the control of the state authorities.

SECTION 7 - AIR POWER IN SUPPORT OF COUNTER INSURGENCY OPERATIONS

Background.

89. Before the Second World War it was normal practice for both Italy and the UK to utilise air forces to dominate large areas of their colonial empires. The reasoning behind this was that the technological gap between the imperial powers and the locals population was so large as to render effective opposition impractical. Since the Second World War, this reasoning rapidly became invalid.
90. The use of air forces in the Vietnam War and more recently in the Gulf War have shown the enormous potential of advanced technology for surveillance, target acquisition and attack of targets for those air forces that possess the technology. These major improvements have also been achieved with few casualties and little collateral damage to infrastructure near the target area. Linked with the possibilities inherent in the use of non lethal weapons by aircraft, it seems possible to reintroduce an era where air power could again have a major role in future counter insurgency operations.

The Present Position.

91. Recent experience in peace support operations point also to the inherently flexible application of air power in covering, not only counter insurgency campaigns, but other more generalised conflicts where the technological gap between the various belligerents could be large. The use of air power to deter and neutralise the effectiveness of ground forces in Yugoslavia and the use of suppressive air power by the Israeli Air Force against their Arab opponents over the years to counter terrorism highlights the use that could be made of this technological gap. An insight in to the contrasting use of air power during a counter insurgency campaign in the 1950s and recently is described in Annex F.

92. The use of air power, which includes helicopters, airships light aircraft and air transport resources, in any counter insurgency campaign will no doubt be constrained by the overall political aims for the campaign, but, within these constraints, the growing number of possibilities for the use of the improved capabilities of air power could well provide a military commander with a wider range of military options for his campaign estimate.

SIR ROBERT THOMPSON'S VIEWS ON MALAYA AND VIETNAM

1. Sir Robert Thompson entered the Malayan Civil Service in 1938. Serving with the RAF during the Second World War, he escaped from Hong Kong through China to serve on both the Chindit expeditions in Burma. Returning to the Malayan Civil Service after the war he was successively Deputy Secretary and Secretary for Defence in the Federation during the emergency. From 1961 to 1965 he headed the British Advisory Mission to South Vietnam. There, he supported the strategic hamlet scheme to see it ruined by Ngo Dinh Nhu, Ngo Dinh Diem's brother, who, to spread the brothers' political influence in a hurry rather than consolidate each area before moving on, built the stockaded villages as fast as possible, many in unsuitable areas. As Sir Robert Thompson put it, 'No attention was paid to their purpose. Their creation became the purpose in itself'.
2. Of the latter war Sir Robert Thompson wrote, 'I am now convinced that the counter-measures developed and proved in Malaya..... would have succeeded in the early stages in Vietnam if they had been suitably adapted and consistently and intelligently applied.
3. 'To start with, the modus operandi of the Communists terrorists in Malaya and of the Vietcong was identical. Even their manifestos and the basis of their cause was very similar in pattern. Surprising as it may seem so were their strengths and their support. In Malaya in 1948 the armed strength of the terrorists was about 4,500 and the number of their supporters at the most 50,000. In Vietnam in 1959 the corresponding figures for the Vietcong were approximately 5,000 and 100,000 in a country twice the size. In both cases this represented less than 1% of the population and the strategy for extending control and support, by methods of subversion, terror and guerrilla action, was identical'.
4. Sir Robert Thompson was quick to recognise the different circumstances pertaining to Malaya and South Vietnam. In two major respects he considered that the British and Malays had the advantage over the Americans and the South Vietnamese. The first was that whereas the Malayan rebels received no outside support the Vietcong could count on increasing levels of support from North Vietnam leading to the introduction of North Vietnamese regular formations. The second was that while the British had been on the Malayan scene for more than a century and were still constitutionally in control, the Americans were new to South Vietnam and enjoyed no such advantages. There were two further factors, ethnic and logistic. The Malayan terrorists were mainly 'overseas' Chinese, disliked by the Malays, while Vietnamese peasants and guerrillas were indistinguishable from each other. Whereas Malaya was short of rice, making it easier to starve the terrorists into surrender, South Vietnam produced food aplenty.

FORWARD OPERATIONAL BASES

General Requirements

1. A forward operational base may be defined as an area providing a firm base from which aggressive action against the insurgents can be developed. Its establishment will be undertaken as a joint operation.
2. The normal requirements and characteristics of a forward operational base are:
 - a. It should be a formation base, established at a seat of local government. If this is not possible easy access to the centre of local administration is essential.
 - b. It should be located in an area from which operations can be successfully developed throughout the formation area. Projected pacification operations and operations in depth must be within convenient helicopter range.
 - c. It must contain a suitable airfield site. In some circumstances a Tac T(SR) airfield may have to suffice initially, but it must be capable of quick development for use by Tac T(MR) aircraft for which it may be necessary to bring in or to air drop large quantities of engineer plant or stores.
 - d. The immediate vicinity of the base should be at least temporarily free from insurgent interference.
 - e. It should be easily defensible. If it is surrounded by natural obstacles so much the better; if not, the ground of tactical significance that lies outside the immediate perimeter should be controlled.
 - f. The area of the base must be large enough to accommodate the logistic units and dumps necessary to support the force being deployed, but as small as possible to facilitate its defence.
 - g. The base should be accessible by road or track so that tracked vehicles and heavy plant can be brought in, probably by a one time road convoy. This requirement is not always possible to achieve, and more extensive use of air transport may have to be made to bring in vehicles and plant. It will probably be impossible to establish a secure land line of communication.

Occupation

3. The occupation of a forward operational base may be entirely peaceful but if it has to be undertaken in the face of some opposition, careful consideration must be given to the method of approach. If a combined air and land approach is employed, it is important to plan the correct balance and to co-ordinate the timing of the arrival of the

two forces. As an example, it may be necessary for the airfield site to be secured initially by parachute troops, followed by a rapid build up with some forces air landed and some moving by road. Whatever the precise circumstances, the following factors must be considered:

- a. There can be no question of seizing a forward operational base in the face of strong opposition. This would be an operation of quite a different nature and would in any case be contrary to the tactical concept. Whether or not parachute troops are employed, the close defence of the airfield should be established as soon as possible.
- b. It is likely that insurgent sabotage, stay-behind and reconnaissance parties will begin to operate against the base within a short space of time.
- c. In planning the build up, careful consideration must be given to possible threats. Infantry supported by armour and/or artillery are likely to be the first requirement but if there is an air threat some priority may have to be given to air defence. Engineer plant and stores may also be needed early to develop the airstrip rapidly.
- d. Both the air and land approach operations will need to be carefully planned and executed.
- e. It is possible that civil demonstrations against the appearance of foreign troops may take place during the occupation of the base.

Defence and Sequence of Build Up

4. **General.** The measures outlined below envisage defence against insurgent sabotage raids or attacks of up to battalion strength, supported by mortars. The defence commitment of the base will be reduced as the surrounding countryside is cleared of insurgents and as the controlled area is enlarged by pacification operations. When planning the defence, full use must be made of any available RN/Army/RAF and administrative units. Every man capable of bearing arms must be incorporated into the defence organization, and must be fit and trained for combat duties, including patrolling within the base.
5. **All Round Defence.** Every unit or staff of an administrative installation must be given a sector to defend with arcs of fire, weapon pits, obstacles and patrol areas. Installations must be protected from sabotage and insurgent attacks, special attention being given to items particularly attractive to the insurgent, eg, weapons, ammunition, explosives and parked aircraft. The maximum use must be made of wire, mines, booby traps, alarm systems, illumination, surveillance devices and guard dogs, together with improvised devices such as caltrops. All main and isolated positions must be organized for all round defence. Guard posts and detachments in isolated positions covering approaches to the base must be dug in, with overhead cover, be protected by wire, mines and improvised obstacles, and have reserves of ammunition, supplies and water. A duplicated system of communication between all posts in the

base must be established. The use of booby traps can be a two edged weapon. In a hot humid climate is essential that early warning devices are checked regularly to ensure they are in working order, and the danger of our own troops initiating booby traps during these checks must be appreciated and provided for by briefing them from carefully kept minefield records.

6. **Command.** If the formation commander assumes personal command of the forward operational base, he and his staff tend to become immersed in detail and are unable to pay as much attention as they should to operations in depth. Someone else is needed to command the base area, as every component of the force or its echelons will be located there and the co-ordination of the defence and detailed command is a large task. To nominate the headquarters of an infantry battalion detracts from the unit's offensive capabilities. The same disadvantage applies to the headquarters of a field regiment, although perhaps not to the same extent. There is little doubt that the appointment of a deputy force commander provides the best solution; a specific commander and headquarters must be nominated for the control of the forward operational base.
7. **Sequence of Build Up.** The build up of the base may take weeks depending on the distances involved and the resources available. The sequence for land forces might be:
 - a. An air assault by parachute troops and its reinforcement by an infantry battalion group, if possible by surface route rather than by air.
 - b. The assumption of overall control of the defence by the assault battalion group.
 - c. A key plan which directs the deployment of units and installations to selected areas.
 - d. Reception arrangements by the assault battalion group for the follow-up echelons arriving by air.
 - e. Offensive patrolling by the assault battalion in areas close to the base.
 - f. The hand over of sectors of the perimeter to follow-up battalion groups.
 - g. Frequent clearance searches of the base area and adjacent country.
 - h. The reception of a one time road convoy.
 - i. Follow-up battalions patrol offensively in their TAOR.
 - j. The opening up of an airstrip.
 - k. The assault battalion group may still be primarily concerned with the defence of the base and the provision of the counter-attack force.

- l. The establishment of a limited controlled area.
 - m. The expansion of the controlled area.
 - n. The introduction of local military and paramilitary forces to assist in the defence of the base, the patrolling of the controlled area and the establishment of defended villages etc.
 - o. Operations in depth start concurrently with the establishment of the controlled area.
 - p. The progressive reduction of the number of infantry required to ensure the security of the base. Initially the infantry commitment is likely to be high, but as soon as the domination of the immediate surrounding area is successful the numbers can be reduced.
8. **Defence Problems.** The ideal defensive plan should ensure that no insurgent small arms, rockets or mortar fire can damage anything in the base. This will seldom, if ever, be practicable because of the size of the problem. For example, if it is assumed that the forward operational base covers an area of approximately 2000 metres by 2000 metres, with one side totally protected by the sea, and the insurgents only have mortars with ranges of up to 6000 metres, this still leaves an area of approximately 100 kilometre map squares from which insurgent mortars could be fired and achieve a hit on a part of the base. This illustrates the size of the area around the base that must be converted into a controlled area as quickly as possible. Insurgent rockets may present an additional problem because they have considerably longer ranges than mortars, but due to their inaccuracy they are mainly a harassing threat. Every effort must be made to prevent insurgent small arms from engaging aircraft approaching and leaving the airfield.
9. **Patrolling.** While the area of the base itself should be patrolled by any units located in the base the infantry battalions should be used for offensive patrolling in the TAOR in the following ways:
- a. In general, offensive patrolling should extend from the perimeter of the base out to the limit of the range of enemy mortars and rockets. This patrolling must of course be tied in with, or be part of, the controlled area patrol programme. A comprehensive and detailed random patrol plan will be needed, and the maximum use must be made of listening devices, detectors and surveillance equipment.
 - b. Patrols must operate within the range of artillery support and be adept at laying ambushes.
10. **Security Measures.** In addition to normal security precautions the following require special consideration in connection with the defence of the base:
- a. The declaring of prohibited and restricted areas for civilian movement.

- b. Under some circumstances it may be necessary to stop all movement except patrolling within the base after dark
 - c. Local labour, which always constitutes a major security risk, must either be carefully screened and supervised or escorted.
 - d. The timings and methods of patrolling, changing guards and detachments, and other routine matters must be varied.
 - e. Guards and patrols might be supported by tracker and guard dogs.
 - f. Depending upon the nature of the threat, full use must be made of all forms of illumination, including floodlights, searchlights if available, and illumination provided by mortars, artillery or aircraft.
 - g. The provision of earthwork protection for vulnerable equipment and stores.
 - h. Harassing fire can be used to disrupt the insurgents' routine and to inhibit their use of particular areas.
11. **Reserves.** In addition to the mobile reserve, which is held ready for use within the controlled area as a whole, a small central reserve for the defence of the forward operational base is essential. Tasks for this reserve must be planned and rehearsed and must include a well co-ordinated fire plan. The infantry reserve might use helicopters or MICVs/APCs. Helicopters are particularly vulnerable if there is an opportunity to get behind the insurgents to cut off their withdrawal. Helicopter landing sites are vulnerable to ambush but the risk can be reduced by a short period of prophylactic fire from artillery or armed helicopters immediately before landing.
12. **Armour.** CVRs provide valuable fire support whilst the base is being established. Their presence alone often acts as a deterrent. Thereafter, they are likely to be required for both defensive and offensive tasks.
13. **Artillery and Mortars.** The defence of a forward operational base depends very much on fire support. All artillery and mortars in the base must be co-ordinated through the senior artillery officer to ensure that the best use is made of the available fire power. There will usually be an urgent requirement to fly in, or to move in by road, artillery and mortars. Locating equipment will also be needed if the insurgents have mortars. The following points should be borne in mind:
- a. Artillery is invaluable for breaking up insurgent concentrations and for counter-battery fire. In addition to air-portable field artillery some medium guns are useful to provide a destructive effect and to attack insurgent morale.
 - b. When close support defensive fire is required on or near the perimeter of the forward operational base it will be provided by a combination of field artillery, firing over open sights when necessary, infantry mortars, armed helicopters and offensive air support.

- c. If the size of the base is small it may be necessary to establish some fire support sub-units away from the base but within range.
14. **Air Defence.** In counter-insurgency operations the enemy is unlikely to have any air power, but the possibility of sneak air attacks, perhaps from a neighbouring state sympathetic to the insurgents, has to be considered.
15. **Engineers.** Engineer considerations are likely to be critical both for the selection of the site for the forward operational base and for the rate of development of the operation, particularly the opening of the Tac T(MR) airhead. Engineer tasks in the base may include:
- a. The construction and maintenance of the Tac T(MR) airhead together with the necessary bulk fuel installations, maintenance facilities and protective defences.
 - b. The forward Tac T(SR) airstrip.
 - c. VSTOL sites.
 - d. The improvement of port or beach exit facilities.
 - e. Combat engineer support.
 - f. Clearance of mines/boobytraps. Improving/maintenance of routes.
16. **Control of Air Space.** In the initial stages, apart from insurgent action, hazards to low flying aircraft in the area of the forward operational base arise from collision and from friendly artillery and mortar fire. Because of the nature of the insurgent threat and the fact that, at least initially, the forward operational base must expect attack from any direction, the close co-ordination and control of weapons and aircraft is most important. This is the task of the fire support co-ordination centre (FSCC) and the air support operations centre (ASOC).

NON LETHAL WEAPONS (NLW)

1. The use of NLW is not new. Weapons such as batons, water canon, rubber bullets, CS gas, stun grenades and electronic warfare (EW) have been used by police and armed forces throughout the world for a number of years in situations where the use of more lethal weapons would be inappropriate. What is new and has enhanced the importance of NLW, is not only the increasing number of military operations, but also the high visibility of such operations, including counter insurgency, where satellite technology makes it possible for the public to see in minute detail how the operations proceed. Such public scrutiny has high-lighted the inability of armed forces to respond to situations with anything other than lethal force, which in many circumstances, especially those associated with peacekeeping, have proved to be inappropriate.
2. The public concern for casualties among the combatants and civilian population has increased interest in the potential for NLW in the expectation that they can provide armed forces with a more appropriate but less than lethal response when required. The public expectation has been fuelled by the increasingly high profile, some might say exotic, non-lethal technologies considered in the media.
3. Counter insurgency operations may involve non-lethal or lethal weapons or both, and no one situation can be limited to a specific level of lethality. NLW contribute to the application of military force in pursuit of military/political aims and objectives and are already a part of an existing spectrum of force. It is therefore wrong to talk about NLW in isolation and consequently, terms such as "non-lethal warfare", and "conventional warfare" become unspecific and contentious.

The Categories of NLW

4. **General.** The categorisation of NLW can be difficult, depending upon which definition is used and the interpretation given to it. However, despite the rather unspecific meaning of the phrase, NLW can be broadly categorized into those that are designed to impair or immobilise:
 - a. *Persons.* Systems targeted against personnel include:
 - (1) *Psychological Operations (PSYOPS).* PSYOPS uses information warfare and the media to reduce the morale and combat efficiency of enemy troops or to influence the emotions of the populace in order to persuade them to or dissuade them from taking a specific action.
 - (2) *Acoustics.* Noise, whether it be audible or inaudible (infra- and ultra-sound) can be used to immobilize individuals or disperse crowds by causing discomfort, disorientation and nausea.

- (3) *Calmativ e Agents and Irritants*. These systems are used to calm or disperse riotous crowds or individuals and will include current agents such as CS gas.
 - (4) *Visual Stimulus and Illusion (VSI)*. VSI uses high intensity strobe lighting and holography to cause temporary vertigo, disorientation and nausea.
 - (5) *Lasers and Incapacitants*. Low energy (dazzle) lasers and incapacitants (ie stun grenades) are used to temporarily blind, dazzle or immobilise individuals.
5. **Equipment and Material**. Systems targeted against equipment and material include those designed to impair or prevent mobility, neutralize weapons, exploit or disrupt communications or degrade the infrastructure. Such systems include:
- a. *Anti-Traction Agents*. Combustion alteration technologies to impair or immobilise equipments.
 - b. *Sensor Damage Lasers*. Targeted against vehicle optics to prevent mobility and target acquisition.
 - c. *Metal Embrittlement*. Polymer & super adhesive agents to disable mechanical linkages and alter material properties causing general equipment and weapon failure.
 - d. *Radio Frequency Weapons (RFW)*. To cause electronic failure in ignition systems, communications, radars, computers and navigation aids.
 - e. *Conductive Ribbons*. To short circuit power lines, fuel additives to contaminate fuel supplies and the introduction of computer viruses to disrupt communication and economic centres.

The Advantages and Disadvantages of Using NLW

6. **Advantages**. The principal advantages of NLW are that:
- a. They can be deployed to reinforce deterrence and military credibility by providing the commander with a graduated response over a wider range of military activities.
 - b. They can reduce the risk of rapid escalation, especially in Operations Other Than War by offering a progressive incremental increase in lethality. Equally, in specific situations, they can provide the opportunity for de-escalation.
 - c. They can provide a public and politically acceptable alternative means of conducting operations in that they enable force to be used with the likelihood of fewer casualties and less collateral and environmental damage.

- d. They can prolong the situation at a low casualty rate in order to buy time for negotiation.
- e. They can have positive implications for use at the strategic level for relatively little cost in terms of expense, resources and national commitment.
- f. They can enhance the capability of forces in a wider variety of tasks that otherwise may have been too costly in terms of manpower and resources, too sensitive politically or publically unacceptable.
- g. They can be used covertly to create uncertainty, fear and low morale amongst insurgents.
- h. They can reduce the cost of rebuilding the infrastructure and economy.

7. **Disadvantages.** The main disadvantages of NHW are that:

- a. With the prospect of few casualties and little collateral damage, the use of armed forces could become more acceptable and thus a more frequently employed instrument of Government policy.
- b. The use of some NLW would be restricted due to international treaties, conventions and laws. Others would receive bad publicity if used against an unsuitable target or had lethal consequences.
- c. The need for reliable information in the employment of NLW is paramount, not only to portray their non-lethality to insurgents but also to assess the vulnerability of the target and to verify their effectiveness after a strike. Verification could be difficult but is essential if counter-allegations are to be avoided.
- d. They do not destroy insurgents although they may adversely influence their cohesion and will to fight. Their use may be perceived as lacking decisive action.
- e. The damage caused by some NLW may be difficult to control, for example the use of computer viruses and RFW. Similarly, the effect of many NLW can be difficult to assess.
- f. Some NLW are omnidirectional or have poor or no target acquisition systems. There is therefore a danger of friendly or non-combatant casualties unless strict command and control arrangements are made and Rules of Engagement (ROE) followed.
- g. The long term after-effects on individuals is not known.
- h. The use of NLW may heighten the resolve of the insurgent in that he responds with lethal force. Thus the use of NLW should always be backed up with the ability to use lethal force if necessary.

- i. Additional protection may be required for those deploying some NLW.

Guidance in the Use of NLW

- 8. In the absence of any practical experience to base firm and clear principles, the following guidelines would be appropriate for the potential use of NLW in future:
 - a. Win the information war and seek the support of the media.
 - b. NLW can either be used alone, provided they are backed up with the ability to use lethal force, or, as a compliment to lethal force. Their use should be controlled by ROE and should not be allowed to jeopardise the right of soldiers to defend themselves with lethal force.
 - c. The employment of NLW should be consistent with extant Treaties, Conventions, International and national Laws. Their use should also be morally and ethically justifiable.
 - d. NLW should be used proportionately (the least destructive way of defeating insurgents) and discriminately (the protection of non-combatants from direct intentional attack).
 - e. In planning the employment of NLW, the operational response to all possible reactions should be fully rehearsed.
 - f. Responses from the medical, legal, civil and public affairs authorities as a consequence of unintended results and side effects caused by the use of NLW should be fully prepared.
 - g. NLW should be fully integrated with lethal weapons in order to provide a graduated response to a situation based upon the use of minimum force and perception of the threat.
 - h. NLW should not be deployed without consideration to countermeasures.
 - i. NLW should not be deployed without consideration to any political-military instructions that may be given.
 - j. NLW should be employed in such a manner so as to minimize fratricide.

EW AND SURVEILLANCE

1. A fully equipped EW unit can provide a low profile surveillance system, to meet a commander's military information requirements, as follows:
 - a. A flexible surveillance capability, that can be used in a mobile, static or non incursive "stand off role" from airborne platforms.
 - b. Early warning of an outbreak or escalation of violence, thus buying time for a range of preventative government and (or) military actions to be effected.
 - c. The production of military information reports, that can assist a commander to construct impartial and accurate reports.
 - d. Monitoring cease-fires, troop withdrawals and any demilitarized zones.
 - e. Monitoring the movement or build up of insurgent forces.
 - f. Production of the threat assessment.
 - g. A non-hostile immediate threat warning capability.
 - h. If required, provide a high profile surveillance capability.
 - i. De-conflicting claims and counter claims of aggression or over reaction by security forces or insurgents.
 - j. Identify potential insurgent intelligence collection capabilities.
 - k. Assess friendly vulnerabilities from a hostile perspective.
 - l. Enable the commander to plan for both passive and active OPSEC measures.
 - m. Determining the morale and motivation of the insurgents and the general population.
 - n. Surveillance of trade routes and the movement of goods in support any enforced sanctions.
2. All these measures can be adopted at any stage of an insurgency or could supplement those that are already in place.

ECM

1. ECM can provide a commander with an effective non-destructive and non-lethal electronic defence system. Arrange of equipment capable of providing the following (in order of priority) is required:
 - a. Disrupt or black-out an insurgents communications and information systems in the event of an escalation towards armed conflict, in order to prevent or stall an offensive.
 - b. Defensive aid suites for convoy escort vehicle.
 - c. The disruption or blacking out of inflammatory propaganda broadcasts on radio or television.
 - d. A method of transmitting community information broadcasts over commercial systems, to include television and radio.
 - e. Defensive jamming to counter the potential enemy's intelligence collection capabilities.
 - f. Protective (Screening) jamming to deny the potential enemy access to friendly critical communication nodes.

2. If the insurgency has access to more sophisticated surveillance equipment and is providing a severe military threat to the security forces then ECM could help to provide for:
 - a. The disruption or blacking out of an insurgents surveillance and fire control radars, to protect the movement of friendly aircraft, shipping and convoys.
 - b. The disruption or blacking out of an insurgents surveillance and fire control radar to prevent an escalation in hostilities.

THE USE OF AIR POWER IN COIN OPERATIONS¹

CONTRASTING AIR OPERATIONS IN KENYA (1952-56) WITH MODERN TIMES

1. Air support for military and civil authorities during the Mau Mau insurrection consisted of light observation aircraft from the Kenya Police Air Wing, a squadron of RAF Lincoln bombers which dropped 1000 lb bombs, and four RAF Harvard trainers which were fitted with one machine-gun and dropped 19lb bombs.
2. The major difficulties with offensive air operations in Kenya were poor air-to-ground communications, inaccurate aircraft navigation, difficulty in identifying targets, inaccurate (and therefore futile) bombing raids, and aircraft noise warning guerrillas of the probable presence of government surface forces. None of those issues is relevant today. Light-weight communications equipments now permit instantaneous, trans-continental information transfers. Cheap, miniaturised navigation systems like the Global Positioning system (GPS) can give both ground and air forces continuous positional information accurate to within metres. Further, those kinds of technologies can be used in combination in many circumstances to facilitate rapid, unexpected and powerful air strikes.
3. The concept of 'Precision Air support' (PAS) has been developed by the Royal Australian Air Force to utilise the advanced capabilities of aircraft like the F-111 and F/A-18 against tactical targets, but without the traditional difficulties of Close Air Support (namely, target identification and inaccurate weapon delivery) evident in Kenya. PAS is conducted essentially with aircraft operating from a safe distance and altitude using advanced sensors and weapons to make precise strikes.
4. Two constraints on PAS as it is currently applied are weather and jungle, as infrared detection systems can be impaired by moisture and heavy foliage. One solution to both problems would be the use of Special Forces, to detect insurgents and then call in a PAS, with the air and ground units both using technologies like GPS for targeting information. Continuing research and development into ultra-wide-band synthetic aperture radar which will define and classify small targets regardless of weather offers another potential solution.
5. One further aspect of the Mau Mau insurgency which warrants comment concerns the mile-wide 'no-go' zone which was established by security forces between the edge of the forests on Mount Kenya - the insurgents' stronghold - and the African and European farming areas below. Airpower was considered to have no role to play in the 'mile strip' as the zone was known; neither resupply nor bombing was conducted within its confines to any extent.

1. Acknowledgements to Alan Stephens 'The Transformation of Low Intensity Conflict' an article published in Small Wars and Insurgencies Vol 5 No 1 (Spring 1994)

6. In the 1990s, technological progress would indicate that exactly the opposite is now the case. A cleared defensive area can be dominated by modern airborne surveillance, targeting and precision weapons capabilities, 24-hours a day, at little, if any, risk to friendly ground forces. Perhaps it is for that reason that 'no fly' or quarantined areas enforced by aircraft have become a feature of current United Nations military actions.

CHAPTER 9

PERSONNEL AND LOGISTICS

SECTION 1 - PERSONNEL.

Morale

1. ***The Soldier and his Family.*** Troops will often be operating in small groups for long periods in trying conditions. If accompanied they may be concerned for the safety of their families in the theatre if their married quarters and shopping centres are targets for terrorist attack. On the other hand, when the families are separated but safe, soldier's families may be worried by radio, television and press coverage of action and casualties in the areas where the soldier is stationed. When a campaign lasts for a considerable time lack of progress may discourage soldiers and their families. The insurgents may try to aggravate a discouraging situation with a propaganda campaign. With or without hostile propaganda, rumours spread and may be difficult to dispel or refute when troops are deployed in small detachments over a wide area.
2. ***Promoting Good Morale.*** While motivating soldiers with good and sound reasons for the Army's intervention in an emergency and the need for continued, patient commitment is the duty of the commander and a function of leadership at all levels, certain other measures can be taken to help to maintain morale by providing:
 - a. Reliable information services; UK national and local newspapers, and Service news sheets.
 - b. A quick and frequent mail service to and from home.
 - c. Welfare telephones at reasonable cheap rates.
 - d. Television receivers and video tape recorders.
 - e. Welfare services.
 - f. Gymnasium equipment in protected areas where outdoor recreation is not feasible.
 - g. Local leave centres in secure and attractive surroundings, if possible in a temperate climate, and periodic home leave.
 - h. A rapid and efficient system for notifying relatives of deaths and casualties as they occur.

Medical

3. ***Small Detachments and Wide Deployment.*** Providing medical support for small and widely scattered detachments places a strain on the medical services. The problem can be alleviated by:

- a. Refresher training for all ranks in first aid to ITD 5 standards.
 - b. Providing sufficient combat medical technicians for each isolated detachment.
 - c. Provision for quick casualty evacuation on all operations, including armoured ambulances or ambulances with armoured protection, especially in urban areas or on routes subject to sniping.
 - d. Using helicopters and light aircraft to evacuate casualties direct to hospital or to fly forward doctors and medical teams.
 - e. Aeromedical evacuation to the UK for definitive treatment as required.
 - f. Ensuring that all ranks receive a comprehensive health briefing before deployment.
4. **Acclimatization.** Units despatched on operations overseas must be acclimatized to the local conditions and their work load adjusted on initial deployment. See AFM Volume IV for the adjustments needed to meet particular special environments, such as jungle and desert.

Manning and Miscellaneous

5. **Manning Restrictions.** The Ministry of Defence will lay down:
- a. The minimum age for the commitment of troops to a particular theatre.¹
 - b. The minimum length of service troops should have before posting to such a theatre and the policy on residual service.
6. **Interpreter Support.** In a theatre where English is not the primary language it will be necessary to engage interpreters to communicate with allied forces and the civil population, for intelligence purposes, including the interrogation of EPW and arrested persons and for the examination of witnesses, including the preparation of court cases.
7. **Veterinary.** A veterinary service may be required for the acquisition or replacement, and the treatment of protection, sniffer and tracker dogs and for the provision and treatment of pack animals.

SECTION 2 - LOGISTIC PRINCIPLES AND PLANNING

Principles and Planning Factors

8. **Principles.** The principles governing combat service support (CSS) generally are described in Chapter 1 of Combat Service Support, AFM Volume 1, Part 6 *Combat*

1. While under-18 year olds were allowed to serve in the Gulf during Operation GRANBY a soldier must be over 18 before serving in Northern Ireland.

Service Support. Here, they are merely listed as a reminder to the reader:

- a. Foresight.
 - b. Efficiency.
 - c. Simplicity.
 - d. Cooperation.
 - e. Flexibility.
9. ***Applicability.*** The same principles also apply to counter-insurgency warfare but with appropriate allowances for the lower intensity of operations, at least in the preparatory and insurgency phases, and the planning factors mentioned below.
10. ***Planning Factors.*** Some modifications to normal practice are necessary to allow for the circumstances under which counter-insurgency operations take place:
- a. Deployment of the security forces in small detachments over a wide area.
 - b. Land communications are vulnerable to insurgent interference. A SAM and AAMG threat may complicate the provision of air supply.
 - c. Dependence on local resources, for example, construction, purchase, storage and perhaps distribution, which adds to the overall security problem.
 - d. A possible need to assist the civil administration with the maintenance of public utilities and essential services.
 - e. Because counter-insurgency operations are manpower intensive there will be pressure for economy in CSS manpower.
 - f. While, on the one hand, low rates of expenditure of combat supplies reduce the CSS burden, the dispersed deployment mentioned in sub- para a above increases it.
 - g. If the security forces assisting a host nation are multi-national there will be problems of coordination and standardization.

The Combat Service Support System in COIN Operations

11. ***The Geographical Factor.*** The normal layout of the rear and forward support groups for conventional warfare operations may have to be adjusted to meet the conditions peculiar to counter-insurgency operations. The layout will be determined by:
- a. Operational and geographical considerations: if during the insurgency phase guerrilla operations are widespread a 'hub and spoke' system may be more

appropriate. The 'hub' will correspond to the rear support group, located near the main point of entry, and the 'spokes' to the forward support groups deployed to support combat units throughout the area affected by the insurgency. Should the insurgents consolidate an area sufficiently large to support a conventional war or should a neighbouring state intervene on behalf of the insurgents it would be necessary to set up a normal rear and forward support group organization with the 'hub and spoke' system superimposed on it.

- b. Host nation infrastructure: the layout of airfields, ports, the railway and road systems, inland waterways, depot facilities, including cold storage, in relation to the area of operations.
12. **Security.** The rear support group (RSG) and its static installations should be sited in an area where there is least risk of attack, commensurate with operational and geographical factors. If the scale and intensity of the operation warrant the establishment of a forward support group (FSG) its units are likely to be more at risk and will require more security force effort to defend them. While a quiet area is desirable, ease of access to the RSG group and the points of entry (POE) on the one hand and convenience for forward distribution on the other may be the determining factors. The greater the amount of air and helicopter lift that is available the more it will be possible to cut out intermediate bases with the advantage of economies in grounded resources, guards and theatre transport. The use of an 'afloat RSG' would ease the physical security and protection of these vulnerable installations.
 13. **Operational Security.** Care must be taken that CSS preparations do not prejudice the security of information and plans. Sudden increases in stock levels, exceptional amounts of road, rail and air movement, the arrival of new combat service support (CSS) units in the forward areas and the local purchase of unusual items are just some examples of changes in a normal pattern of replenishment which might betray a future operation. A combination of secrecy, insofar as it is possible to hide CSS preparations, and convincing cover plans help to preserve security. Discretion in dealing with contractors and taking care not to discuss operational matters, especially future plans, in the hearing of local labour are essential, if elementary precautions to keep our secrets secret.
 14. **Fragmentation and Dispersal of Combat and CSS Units.** There may be a tendency to fragment and disperse CSS units to support widely deployed security force sub-units. However, the support of isolated detachments in villages is a problem better solved by the unit logistic staff than by an uneconomic dispersal of CSS units. The helicopter is a useful aid provided that it is not exposed to the fire of insurgent small arms and anti-aircraft weapons. Nevertheless, some dispersion of CSS units may be inevitable under the 'hub and spoke' system. It will be necessary to exercise a careful control of resources to keep the size and number of CSS units down to an affordable burden on the Army's assets.

The Combat Service Support Plan

15. **Reconnaissance Party.** Points to note are that:
- a. The reconnaissance party sent to a new theatre is likely to be organized on a joint service basis with the Army providing, perhaps, the major element. The party will aim to make early contact with the host nation government through the local British diplomatic representative in order to assess the resources available in the theatre and to provide an estimate of the requirements which must be sent out from the United Kingdom.
 - b. It follows that the reconnaissance party must include a strong CSS element headed by a sufficiently senior officer, who is fully aware of the kind of operation envisaged and of the CSS requirements to support it. He should have the authority to arrange liaison with the host nation and allies, to take decisions and to make recommendations to the Ministry of Defence at home and, through the high commissioner or ambassadorial staff, to the host nation's ministry of defence. A Service lawyer should be included in the reconnaissance party. He will advise, in conjunction with the Foreign Office staff in-country, on the content of a Status of Forces Agreement, if one has not already been negotiated. Again, working through our diplomatic staff, he could coordinate with the host nation officials, draft rules of engagement and detailed instructions on powers of arrest so that, if agreed by G3 staff and commanders, they can be issued to troops before they arrive in the theatre.
 - c. The earlier the reconnaissance party is sent out and the sooner CSS preparations for the arrival of our forces are made the better.
16. **Initial Planning.** The CSS element of the reconnaissance party must make arrangements with the host government, through the high commission or embassy, for the following facilities with regard to the reception and logistic support of our forces:
- a. *Liaison.* A liaison machinery for coordinating CSS requirements with the host nation, any other allies and the Ministry of Defence in the United Kingdom.
 - b. *Bases.* Proposed location of the support groups.
 - c. *Provision of Resources.* What supplies, from fuel and rations to consumer items, can be provided locally and what must be brought in from the United Kingdom or friendly neighbouring countries. See paragraph 18 below for a cautionary word on the exploitation of host nation resources.
 - d. *Special Requirements.* It may be necessary to put in hand the provision of:
 - (1) Covert vehicles, such as covered vehicles, for use as TCVs and recovery vehicles.
 - (2) The supply of any protective clothing, from non UK sources if this is necessary.

- e. *Equipment Support.* The equipment support plan must be geared to providing special requirements:
 - (1) Enhanced electronic repair facilities to deal with extra radios, CCTV systems, alarms and ECM equipment.
 - (2) Local modifications to vehicles, eg, armouring.
- f. *Expansion of CSS Units.* The build up of CSS units must be planned to support the combat element as it arrives, taking into account the assistance available from the host nation.
- g. *Accommodation and Real Estate.* The estimated requirement for operational and logistic accommodation and real estate must be given to the host nation's ministry of defence as soon as possible. The procedures for obtaining accommodation on loan, by requisition, on hire or by purchase must similarly be worked out with the host nation's authorities with all possible speed. The availability of local labour, building material, services (electricity, water, sewage, etc) must be ascertained quickly. Detailed planning for the establishment of base installations, hospitals, transit and leave camps and the siting of unit camps needs to be put in train at the same time. In conjunction with the intelligence and operations staffs it will be necessary to draw up a plan for the provision of protection from blast, mortar bombs, RPGs and shells for key or exposed headquarters, installations, isolated bases and positions.
- h. *Labour.* Detailed requirements for each installation and area in terms of skilled and unskilled labour.
- i. *Port Facilities.*
 - (1) Alongside berthing, discharge rates using existing unloading facilities and storage accommodation at and near the main port of entry.
 - (2) Unloading and lighterage facilities at small ports.
 - (3) Inland water transport.
 - (4) Road and rail exits.
 - (5) Requirement for reinforcing RE and RLC specialist units to help run the ports.
 - (6) Liaison with the harbour authorities.
- j. *Airports.* Points to note are:
 - (1) Agreement on the main entry airfield and availability of forward airfields or airstrips in conjunction with the air force element of the reconnaissance party.

- (2) Agreement on aircraft schedules leading to a planned flow of reinforcements and supplies.
 - k. *Rail Transport.* Estimates of freight to be moved, schedules, loading and off-loading arrangements and security. Any requirement for specialist troops.
 - l. *Allocation of Main Supply Routes.* In a country with a limited road network it may be necessary to allot time blocks for the road movement of resupply convoys and routine troop movements.
17. **Communications.** Good communications are essential to the efficient running of a CSS organization, particularly one likely to be spread over a wide area. Telephone lines are vulnerable to sabotage and espionage. Radio and, in particular, radio relay is required. Radio relay rebroadcast stations must be located in secure areas.
18. **Accounting.** The accounting system developed is likely to be a mixture of peacetime procedures augmented by a special budget for operational, combat service support, works services, utilities, and transport. There will be a need for financial staff on any advance party. Agreement with the host government will be needed on the following topics:
- a. Cost sharing.
 - b. Accounting procedures.
 - c. The need for banking facilities and the opening of imprest accounts.

SECTION 3 - REPLENISHMENT AND RESOURCES

Replenishment Plan

19. **Ground Replenishment.** The G4 staff tasks are to:
- a. Decide on the stock levels to be held in the RSG, the FSG, if one is required, and by units to provide for:
 - (1) The predicted intensity of operations.
 - (2) A cushion of reserves to meet interruptions in the replenishment system by insurgent action and,
 - (3) The changing dependency of units.
 - b. Bid on the MOD and on the host nation government for commodities and work out a movement and distribution plan to transport material from the entry points to the main base installations.
 - c. Organize distribution points for commodities in the operational areas and allocate dependency for units based on the nearest or most appropriate source of supply.

- d. Arranging rail transport, road convoys, inland and coastal water transport, fixed or rotary wing airlift or air dropping.
 - e. Traffic control and route protection; it will be necessary, in conjunction with the G3 staff, to arrange:
 - (1) Escorts and pickets.
 - (2) 'Road open days' in high risk areas.
 - (3) Avoidance of a routine and predictable pattern of convoy movements in areas where there is high risk of insurgent attack.
 - f. Units are to be responsible for the movement of material from the distribution points or CSS installations to their own areas. Units may require helicopter lift or pack animals in difficult country.
20. **Air Replenishment.** Fixed or rotary wing aircraft may be used to advantage for replenishment because:
- a. Forces can be supplied in inaccessible areas avoiding the necessity for a vulnerable surface supply route.
 - b. Troops are able to move with light scales of equipment unencumbered with echelon transport, thus exploiting the principle of flexibility to give them a good level of tactical mobility.
 - c. Subject to the capacity of the airlift resources, weather and terrain air replenishment is quicker than overland resupply and can be sustained over any likely distance.
 - d. Reserve stocks can be reduced and held centrally allowing the establishment of fewer but larger bases situated in more secure areas.
 - e. Reducing the dependency on surface routes lessens the risk of ambush and cuts the convoy protection commitment, which is expensive in combat unit manpower.
 - f. Rapid casualty evacuation improves a wounded man's chances of survival, which is good for morale.
 - g. The urgent needs of the civilian population in isolated areas can be met quickly.
21. **Air Dropping.** This method is less economic than airlanded resupply but is often necessary in very broken country where there are no landing zones, even for helicopters, without engineer work. The penalties for air dropping are that the recovery of parachute equipment may be difficult or impossible and there may be a serious risk that the supplies fall into enemy hands.

22. **Landing Strips and Helicopter Pads.** These should be constructed whenever possible and as soon as possible to economise in airlift .
23. **Cooperation.** There is a need for close cooperation between the CSS, operations and air staffs.
24. **Anti-Aircraft Threat.** SAMs and AAMGs may pose a serious threat restricting the use of air supply and requiring the air force to take measures to neutralize the threat.
25. **Use of Local Resources.** While the maximum use must be made of local resources to reduce the lift requirement from the United Kingdom, care must be taken not to cause shortages in the host country's home market with consequent price rises causing an inflationary pressure, although there are obvious political advantages to be gained by boosting the local economy. The apparent ready availability of local supplies may be mistaken for a non-existent plenty with local entrepreneurs eager to exploit a rapidly growing market created by an influx of troops. If the civil population suffers from shortages and inflation the insurgents will be handed a ready propaganda weapon with unfortunate results for the host government and for inter-allied relations.

Security

26. **Insurgent Infiltration of Labour.** It must be assumed that local labour will be infiltrated by hostile intelligence agents. It will be difficult for incoming units and security sections to distinguish between loyal and disloyal elements. To reduce the potential threat to base installations, ports, airports, roads and railways reliance must be placed on good unit and installation security and an efficient local vetting system. The method of vetting must be agreed with the host government whose police and security units will be largely responsible for its implementation. The system may never be foolproof and measures must be taken to guard vulnerable installations from terrorist attack and to prevent the leakage of plans and intentions. All soldiers, especially CSS troops employing civilians, must be carefully briefed on security matters.
27. **Protection of Labour.** Labour must be protected from insurgent attack and intimidation. If the host nation cannot provide suitable protection, additional combat units may have to be deployed in an escort and protection role. In the worst case it may be necessary to bring in pioneer and labour troops to replace local labour coerced into leaving the employment of the British element of the security forces.
28. **Installations.** CSS installations must be suitably sited for security and defence, and effectively guarded. In the best case the host nation will provide protection. If this is not possible, extra combat troops may have to be provided because CSS units do not have sufficient men to carry out their functions and guard themselves except against the lightest of threats. Some installations may hold such vital stores that only British troops should man and guard them. Nevertheless, CSS troops must be sufficiently well trained in infantry skills to be able to defend themselves in an emergency.

SECTION 4 - MAINTENANCE OF ESSENTIAL SERVICES

Background

29. The possible need to help the civil administration with the maintenance of public utilities and essential services is always present and the potential commitment must be seen in the context of the types of military assistance which might be requested in escalating scenarios. The machinery of government may have broken down in parts of the country and there may be a requirement to provide help to maintain the commercial life of a host nation as well as humanitarian aid. Because such tasks have major CSS implications, they are dealt with in this chapter rather than in Chapter 8.
30. Normally, at least a skeleton work force and managerial staff will remain loyal to the civil administration and stay at their posts, reducing the demand for specialist service reinforcements. However, if the local labour has been intimidated to such an extent that none dare go to work the bill for specialists may be beyond the Army's resources, or perhaps of all three Services put together. Even if the host nation is supported by a number of allies the combined coalition resources may prove insufficient, at least initially. A practicable compromise may be achieved if at least some of the labour can be coaxed back to work with a guarantee of protection from the local forces as the arrival of outside reinforcements begins to bolster confidence. Whether sufficient labour can be persuaded to return depends on the attitudes and customs of the host state and whether the insurgents are prepared to concede that individuals have no choice in the matter in the face of determined administrative action.
31. There may be occasions when a civil administration considers that it is necessary to impose a curfew. In such circumstances the authorities will almost certainly call on the military to help run the minimum services necessary to maintain the essentials of daily life.

Planning

32. Contingency planning for the restoration or maintenance of essential services is a lengthy process that should be conducted as soon as is feasible so that military options can be prepared. An RE Military Works Force stationed in UK is the military focal point for all such contingency planning and this unit should be included in any planning where this type of contingency can be anticipated.
33. Because the skills required to run, or help to run, complex public utilities, such as power stations, are drawn from a relatively small number of specialists in all three Services it is necessary to analyse the requirement for all likely eventualities when planning staffs prepare contingency plans. It is then possible for the manning staffs of all three Services to earmark the most suitable specialists for each plan.
34. When a contingency plan is executed the CSS staff element in the reconnaissance party will establish, in conjunction with the civil authorities and advised by the high commission or embassy staff in the host country, the precise requirement to suite the circumstances. It will be necessary to:

- a. Break down the civil authorities' request for assistance in terms of specialists, tradesmen and unskilled labour, taking into account the size of the labour force which has remained at work.
 - b. In the event of the bill being in excess of the planned reinforcement figure, to place the requirements in order of priority. The priorities will reflect the order of importance of the utilities and services to be maintained as perceived by the civil authorities and agreed by the reconnaissance party.
 - c. The requirement will be signalled to the Ministry of Defence who will arrange to meet as much of the bill as is feasible and report shortfalls to the reconnaissance party, who in turn will inform the civil authorities.
35. It is possible that some of the excess demand may be met from specialists and units nominated for other contingency plans which are unlikely to be activated. Additional specialists and tradesmen may be found from CSS units in the home base or other theatres, the training organization or from the other two Services. The Royal Navy, for example, possesses technicians who may be capable of running some types of power stations, although this possibility recedes as technology changes.

Military - Civil Relationships

36. **Command.** Military forces employed to maintain utilities and essential services are used solely as organized labour under their own commanders. The latter effect liaison with the civil authorities and plant management to decide how best the troops can be employed. As mentioned earlier, military specialists will need protection, if possible by the local police or security forces but, in certain high risk circumstances, from British forces. The civil authorities should be warned if there is a possibility that the troops might be withdrawn if a higher priority civil or military commitment should arise. As such drastic action may have serious consequences any proposal to withdraw military specialist support must first be discussed in the appropriate joint civil-military committee.
37. **Civil Authority Action on the Logistic Aspects of Military Operations.** The corollary to military aid to the civil ministries is the need for liaison with the civil authorities to ensure that the latter warn the military of any decision they may take which might require a carefully prepared security force reaction. The closure of a factory, the removal of squatters, the dismantling of an illegal settlement or the clearance of a slum might lead to a serious confrontation for which the security forces should be well prepared. An intention to dispense with or restore street lighting would affect resupply movement timings as well as night patrolling tactics and a sudden, unnotified change might endanger soldiers' lives and give away a surveillance plan. Again, all such matters must be discussed in the forum of the local joint committee.
38. **G1 and G4 Liaison with the Local Population.** The local committee system also provides a point of contact which can be used to explain government and security force requirements to local leaders and to explain the need for measures which might cause quite unnecessary friction. Such matters might include the need to block off an

approach which might be used by insurgents to attack both civilian and military targets, the need to restrict movement in the interests of security and to explain how damage and compensation claims might be processed and complaints heard and dealt with.

39. ***Meeting the Essential Needs of a Civilian Population under Curfew.*** If a curfew is imposed the civil authorities are responsible for taking measures to meet the problems caused by the disruption of private, domestic life, industry and commerce. The authorities will almost certainly require military assistance to deal with such foreseeable difficulties as:
- a. Disruption of water supplies.
 - b. Food shortages and the need to buy some food daily, particularly in a hot country. Essential food deliveries may have to be made to areas where there are no local shops.
 - c. Fuel distribution.
 - d. Treatment of sick and maternity cases.
 - e. Hygiene. Threats to health due to accumulating rubbish, lack of indoor sanitation and interruption in the sewage disposal system.
 - f. Isolated police stations must be resupplied and administered.
 - g. Animals need husbandry, particularly cattle and goats which must be milked daily.
 - h. Crops have to be sown and reaped at particular times of the year.
 - i. The homeless and refugees must have a place in any plan.

CHAPTER 10

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL DIMENSION

"Everything is PSYOPS, but PSYOPS is not everything"

SECTION 1 - THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENT

The Battle for Hearts and Minds

1. Insurgency and counter-insurgency wars are contests between insurgent and government for the hearts and minds of a nation. The struggle is waged in four spheres, political, military, economic and psychological. All four are closely intermingled, interrelated and interdependent. In both government and insurgent plans of campaign the potential assets of all four are used in conjunction to reinforce each other. By themselves, psychological operations achieve little except in the case of an insurgency which has a weak military arm and relies mainly on propaganda with a sufficient number of violent incidents to back it up. Otherwise, 'The fact is that, despite its name, psychological warfare is not a method of war at all but an auxiliary tool. Like an artillery piece it is useless without the proper ammunition.'¹ Political initiatives and military action provide the ammunition in planned psychological operations. They also produce side effects which influence the minds of both subjects and insurgents, and which may be beneficial or harmful. When planning a military operation these effects should be anticipated so that the beneficial ones may be exploited in a deliberate, planned way as ammunition for the psychological campaign; the harmful effects may be avoided altogether by modifications to the military plan or, if modification is not possible, explained in such a way as to reduce the damage. The psychological aspects of an operational plan needs to be explored properly as part of the overall C2W campaign before any operations begin.
2. Events almost anywhere in the world are reported instantly by radio and television, and in substantial detail with a wealth of comment, accurate, misleading or malicious, in the daily newspapers and periodicals. While newspaper reporting may provide more in-depth analysis, the visual impact of television creates an immediate and dramatic impression. Facts, half truths or lies, the manner in which editorial policy interprets them, and the way in which governments and rebels exploit them, influence public opinion in nations friendly and hostile to the government fighting an insurgency, and also amongst neutrals.

Insurgent Aims

3. The insurgent aims to promote his cause and rally support for it, create an impression of effectiveness and inevitable victory, discredit the government and its security forces, and destroy public morale. His campaign will be directed primarily at the uncommitted, disadvantaged minorities, political factions which may be persuaded to back the insurgency, vulnerable elements of the security forces and the media. While

1. Charles W Thayer, *Guerrilla*, Michael Joseph, 1964.

those elements of the media which are sympathetic to the rebel cause will carry the insurgent's message, perhaps in a devious manner to circumvent security restrictions, the pro-government media will be the target for vilification and defamation to destroy its credibility.

4. The insurgents' propaganda machine will take advantage of any mistake the government or the security forces make, especially any incident in which the latter can be demonstrated with some plausibility as having over-reacted. Democratic governments are, in one sense, more vulnerable to hostile propaganda than autocracies because of the value they place on safeguarding freedom of speech.
5. Insurgency operations may be mounted primarily for their effect on the mind rather than to achieve a military aim. Bakunin's 'propaganda of the deed,' a violent terrorist outrage, was aimed at influencing public opinion rather than military success. Similarly, Carlos Marighella's 'armed propaganda' used violence for propaganda purposes. These are the principal methods of the small, extreme insurgent groups who are realistic enough to accept that they cannot escalate their struggle to the level of a large scale insurgency.

Countermeasures

6. ***The Value of Psychological Operations.*** Psychological operations are as old as the history of warfare and revolution. A government which neglects them fights with one hand tied behind its back and lays itself open to defeat by a weaker insurgent adversary who uses the weapon skilfully. Using the political, military and psychological instruments in a considered and coordinated manner the government can turn the tables on the insurgents by a judicious combination of coercion and persuasion.
7. ***Freedom of Speech.*** This is a valued right in any democratic society and any restrictions imposed on the public and the media are not only likely to be resented but will be exploited by the insurgents' propagandists. Inevitably, insurgents will make use of the freedom of expression to manipulate the media for their own purposes; the government will need to establish its own psychological operations and public information staff as quickly as possible to counter hostile propaganda and put across its own views. Credibility is of the utmost importance. The old saw, 'Honesty is the best policy' applies particularly to the statement of government intentions and the themes of its propaganda campaign. It should be noted that the media has its own agenda, and this is normally commercial, although it could be mixed with editorial bias. If unrestrained, these imperatives could threaten the governments OPSEC policy and seriously undermine public support for the forces of law and order.

The PSYOPS Relationship with Other Aspects of C2W

8. ***C2W (As a Whole).*** PSYOPS is the key pillar of C2W and the overall relationship between deception and truth and targeting and destruction. Only when a psychological plan of campaign has been fashioned can C2W staff then complete their planning by utilising other staff branches to play their appropriate part in the overall campaign.

9. **Civil Affairs/G5.** The condition of target audiences has a strong influence on the attitudes struck within that audience. G5 activity could directly affect conditions, for better or worse, and can be a vital tool for use in counter insurgency. Suitable G5 action at the appropriate time can remove potential grievances, boost public morale and instil more general confidence in a Government's campaign.
10. **P Info Staff.** While PSYOPS activity comes within the remit of the G3 Staff, it is quite separate from the Public Relations (PR) and Public Information (PINFO) staffs who are also part of the same staff branch. However staff officers of both functions must maintain a full awareness and appreciation of each others activities, despite having different aims and methods of operating.

The Purpose of Psychological Operations

11. The purpose of PSYOPS is to "influence attitudes and behaviour thereby enhancing the achievement of the commanders political and military objectives. Specifically, PSYOPS seeks to undermine an enemy's will to fight, strengthen the support of the loyal and gain the support of the uncommitted" (ADPVol 1 *Operations*). They are applicable at all levels of conflict though they will be aimed at different target audiences within each level. PSYOPS within C2W are directed at both the Command and Control functions of an insurgents capabilities. Against commanders, PSYOPS seek either to induce a specific course of action, probably in support of an ongoing, larger deception plan, or to deter against a specific course of action. Against an insurgent organisation PYSOPS seeks to undermine the natural trust and reliance of insurgents for their commanders, to question the worthiness of their mission and their ability to win. PSYOPS can also be used to direct other C2W activities, such as deception, into areas where they are most likely to succeed.

The Nature of Psychological Operations.

12. Psychological operations may be defensive or offensive in character:
 - a. Defensive psychological operations are concerned either with reacting to an insurgent initiative (counter-propaganda) or pre-empting one. Furthermore defensive psychological operations should include the protection of troops by:
 - (1) Suitable briefings on the current situation.
 - (2) Training troops to be aware of hostile PSYOPS techniques and propaganda.
 - (3) Cultural briefings to avoid the antagonism of local communities.
 - b. Offensive psychological operations are designed to take the initiative. When the target audience is the individual insurgent or a specific group, psychological operations may be launched with the aims of exploiting weaknesses in the leadership or differences between rival factions, impugning motives, promoting a surrender campaign or publicising an amnesty. Whether the audiences are the

civil inhabitants of the theatre, the public at home in the United Kingdom or the populations of foreign states, friendly or ill-disposed, they will aim to justify the government's aims and methods, promote the credibility of the security forces and their operations and isolate the insurgents from the local community and international support. At the same time they will be directed towards fostering links and loyalties between the security forces and the local population.

The Government Response

13. The host nation government, its allies and their security forces must consider the combined effects of political initiatives and military action from the psychological operations point of view on:
 - a. *The Indigenous Population.* Its support is vital. However, the civil population is not a simple audience. While each individual has his own views and opinions there are all kinds of ethnic, cultural, religious and political groups to be considered. Broadly, the audience may be divided into three categories:
 - (1) Loyal supporters, who must be reassured.
 - (2) The uncommitted, who must be persuaded that the government offers them a better way of life than the insurgents, and
 - (3) Insurgent sympathizers, who must be convinced that the insurgents cannot win, that their sympathy for a bad cause is mistaken and who must be induced to change sides.
 - b. *Opinion in the United Kingdom.* The British public must be convinced that the host nation's cause is just, that it will be advantageous to this country if it wins and that the British government's contribution in terms of troops and taxes is worth the effort. There are bound to be casualties and they must be seen to suffer or die for a legitimate cause. Insurgent attempts to undermine popular support must be anticipated and thwarted.
 - c. *The International Community.* Allies and those countries on whom the United Kingdom is dependent for trade and, perhaps, the supply of equipment or staging facilities, must be convinced that our cause, or that of a host nation, is just.
 - d. *The Security Forces.* British troops must also be convinced of the reasons for their presence and the methods of dealing with the insurgency. Insurgent jibes of neo-colonialist interference and of the willingness of the host nation to fight to the last British soldier must be expected and answered.
 - e. *Dissidents.* The insurgents must be isolated from the population psychologically as well as physically. A psychological campaign must be launched to discredit their cause, undermine the insurgent's loyalty to his leaders and offer him the alternative of security and a new life if he surrenders. Psychological operations

must reflect government policy on surrendered insurgents and military pressure applied to make the individual insurgents life as dangerous and uncomfortable as possible.

SECTION 2 - PROPAGANDA

Definition and Categories

14. **Definition.** NATO defines propaganda as, 'any information, ideas, doctrines or special appeals disseminated to influence opinions, emotions, attitudes or behaviour of any specified group in order to benefit the sponsors directly or indirectly.' It is a useful tool to promote a psychological operations campaign.
15. **Credibility.** The remarks made about credibility with regard to psychological operations in general apply with particular force when directing a propaganda campaign towards one's own subjects and those of one's allies. Although the word 'propaganda' has pejorative overtones in a democracy it is neither intrinsically good or bad. Its merits or demerits depend on the user. Because of the prejudice against propaganda it should be employed with care and caution.
16. **Categories.** Propaganda categories are often misunderstood. They apply to source, not content.
 - a. *White.* Propaganda disseminated and acknowledged by the sponsor or by an accredited agency thereof. The material is clearly identifiable and makes no attempt at deception.
 - b. *Black.* Propaganda which purports to emanate from a source other than the true one. While the audience is led to believe that the source is other than the real one, the message may be true. Indeed, there are many advantages in sticking to the truth. Although black propaganda has a romantic and mysterious appeal its range and effectiveness are limited.
 - c. *Grey.* A further category sometimes used. It covers propaganda which does not specifically identify the source.

Types of Propaganda

17. **Content.** In addition to categorizing propaganda by its source it is useful to consider content and the range of subject matter. There are three broad types of propaganda described as follows:
 - a. *Cohesive Propaganda.* This seeks to to strengthen and invite friendly or neutral target groups. Mao's little red book was an obvious and very useful cohesive instrument during the Cultural Revolution in Red China.
 - b. *Divisive Propaganda.* This seeks to divide groups within the target audience against each other. The Germans used this type of propaganda very effectively against the French and British during World War 2.

- c. *Cohesive/Divisive Propaganda*. This combines both Divisive and Cohesive propaganda in one leaflet or item.

18. **Further Sub Types of Propaganda**. Although there are variations of the different types of propaganda, the following eight examples give some indication of the sophistication that can be applied to the task of winning the attention and support of designated target groups. These have been formulated by Jacques Ellul², a French sociologist, and are described in the following eight sub paragraphs.

- a. *Pre-Propaganda*. The conditioning of minds with vast amounts of incoherent information posing as 'facts' and as 'education', which create artificial needs that other forms of propaganda can satisfy later. Pre-propaganda is a form of psychological manipulation which aims to prepare a target audience to take a particular line of action or react in a predictable way when given the right cue. It is concerned with creating feelings, sentiments and stereotype images which can be exploited for a particular purpose when the time comes. The permeation of a target audience's minds with pre-propaganda takes time.
- b. *Political Propaganda*. Used by both governments and insurgents, political parties and pressure groups with the object of changing public behaviour. Political propaganda can be strategic, to establish a general line of thought and the order in which arguments will be deployed in a campaign, or tactical, to achieve immediate results within the strategic framework, for example, broadcasts and leaflets to induce the surrender of terrorists after a government success or to discredit the government after a security force indiscretion.
- c. *Sociological Propaganda*. The method used by any society which seeks to integrate the maximum number of individuals within itself, to standardize or unify its members' behaviour according to a pattern, to spread its life-style and thus to impose itself on other groups. Sociological propaganda is the penetration of an ideology by means of its sociological context. It produces a progressive adaptation to a certain order of things, a certain concept of human relations, which unconsciously moulds individuals and makes them conform to society. It acts slowly and is most effective in relatively stable and active societies or in the tensions which develop between an expanding society and one that is disintegrating.
- d. *Agitation Propaganda*. Agitation propaganda is usually subversive, and bears the unmistakable stamp of opposition. It is used by a party seeking to destroy a government or the established order. It promotes rebellion or war or the denigration of a particular sector of society. It works through the delicate creation of an over-excited atmosphere in which the individual is obliged to participate actively, to break down the established habits, beliefs and restraints of society and to make sacrifices in order to introduce the propagandist's regime. All insurgency movements have been fed by agitation propaganda from

2. Jacques Ellul, *Propaganda; The Formation of Men's Attitudes*, Alfred A Knopf, New York, 1962.

Sparticus to the present day. The term 'agitprop' was introduced by Lenin to crush resistance to Bolshevism and, in particular, the smallholder, peasant kulaks. The instrument was used again by Mao Tse-tung, together with a good deal of violence, to introduce the commune system during the 'Great Leap Forward'.

- e. *Integration Propaganda.* The propaganda of conformity in large, developed societies like states, it is essentially the instrument of governments aiming to make the individual participate in society in every way. It demands total adherence to the values and ideals of those in authority. However, it is more subtle than agitation propaganda, seeking not just a burst of enthusiastic activity but a more enduring integration of the individual within a society.
- f. *Vertical Propaganda.* A further way of classifying propaganda is to consider it as 'vertical', in the sense that it is the creation of the leader of a hierarchy, such as a head of state or a religious patriarch, who uses his authority and the state or church networks, often unchallenged, to promote a political or moral ideology. It requires a receptive and fairly uncritical audience.
- g. *Horizontal Propaganda.* While vertical propaganda is as old as human society horizontal propaganda is a recent development. It manifests itself as group dynamics in human relations and in the kind of propaganda used by Communist Chinese governments to induce a consensus of thought throughout the nation. Whereas vertical propaganda needs a huge mass media organization to reach its audience, horizontal propaganda needs a huge organization of people because groups should be small, no larger than fifteen to twenty individuals. To avoid unwelcome argument and dissonance groups with different interests are kept apart. Ideally, groups should also be homogeneous, consisting of people of the same sex, class, age and environment, as a further precaution to prevent the intrusion of discordant and divisive issues. The Chinese Communist Party broke up the traditional social nexus, enlisting the members of families in different groups by occupation, age and sex. Political education was used to promote the thoughts of Mao Tse- tung as a catechism.
- h. *Rational and Irrational Propaganda.* The usually accepted distinction made between information and propaganda needs some qualification. Although information, addressed to experience and reason, provides facts and is, therefore, rational, while propaganda is addressed to feelings and passions, and is, therefore, irrational, the two become confused in practice. Hitler's inflammatory speeches always contained some factual elements and although his style of propaganda was widely discredited his technique has been repeated with some success with less sophisticated domestic audiences by such demagogues as Lumumba and Saddam Hussein. While there will still be plenty of receptive audiences for irrational propaganda, the better educated and informed the audience the more propaganda must rely on a factual approach. It remains a useful propaganda technique in politics, war and commerce.

Guidelines

19. If propaganda is to be effective it must abide by certain simple guidelines, such as:
 - a. Being founded upon an accurate knowledge of the conditions and attitudes of the target audience as revealed by an analysis of the group.
 - b. Using selected credible truth. It is important not to lie in counter-insurgency operations because there is so much exchange of news and information between the two sides and the uncommitted through family connections, village gossip, the newspapers, radio and the insurgent's intelligence system.
 - c. Presenting material to the target audience in a way which will attract its interest.
 - d. Avoiding rigid dogma.
 - e. Identifying with the target audience.
 - f. Exploiting weaknesses in insurgent propaganda to discredit the leadership.

Limitations of Propaganda

20. There are limits to the use and effectiveness of propaganda:
 - a. Initially, propaganda can only operate within the framework of existing attitudes. Every society has a structure of ideas, attitudes and customs instilled by its culture, spiritual beliefs and social system. Some of the sociological mores and patterns of thought are so firmly entrenched that they cannot be altered. Other attitudes can be modified but only slowly and carefully. It is essential to distinguish between those attitudes which are malleable and those which are not.
 - b. Propaganda must be consistent with facts and must be firmly based on them. Successful propaganda rests more on the judgment of facts rather than on the pronouncement of ideas, although appeals to tradition, nostalgia and the promise of a better future can be powerful and persuasive.
 - c. Time is an uncertain ally. On the one hand propaganda needs to be lasting and continuous to make an impression. A rumour can develop into folklore. On the other hand, over-prolonged exposure to a single message may result in boredom and irritation. Fine judgment is needed to draw the line between the advantages to be gained from the consistent exploitation of a fact or theme and the dangers of saturation.
 - d. Following from the above it is not always possible to foresee the response from the public and the individual which a particular subject will evoke. Careful target analysis initially, and the monitoring of the audience subsequently, should elicit sufficient evidence to indicate the efficacy of a particular line or theme. While a successful one can be exploited a failure can be replaced by a more promising subject before too much damage is done.

- e. Because it is difficult for an outsider to appreciate the subtleties and nuances of a foreign target audience it is generally advisable to use spokesmen from the indigenous community. Popular and well known personalities should be chosen whose image is appropriate to the material to be presented . The list is not restricted to politicians and recognized leaders but may include trusted news-readers, entertainers and prominent sportsmen. The communists always used spokesmen from local parties and front organizations who were known to their communities.

Themes and Examples of Effective Propaganda

- 21. Experience has shown that there are some useful and effective themes that can be adopted in a COIN related psyops campaign. These are listed at Annex A to this Chapter. As always the best form of propaganda is that of the deed itself, the classic example of this is the attack on the King David Hotel Jerusalem in 1946 during the anti British campaign in Palestine. It is described in Annex B to this Chapter.

SECTION 3 - THE DUAL AIMS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN COIN

- 22. ***The Dual Aims.*** The government's overall information campaign is likely to concentrate on two broad aims:
 - a. Winning the support and confidence of the population.
 - b. Lowering the morale and effectiveness of the insurgents and their supporters.
- 23. ***Winning the Population's Confidence and Support.*** The government's campaign may have any of the following objectives:
 - a. Promoting the legitimacy of the government and its policies.
 - b. Explaining the need for restrictive measures.
 - c. Persuading the population to give information to the security forces.
 - d. Countering hostile propaganda.
 - e. Portraying the insurgents in an unfavourable light.
- 24. ***Lowering the Morale and Effectiveness of the Insurgents.*** Amongst the governments objectives may be:
 - a. Inducing worry and fear over personal survival.
 - b. Encouraging a feeling of isolation, which may be aggravated by unpleasant living conditions such as a shortage of food.

- c. Drawing attention to a lack of progress in the political and military fields.
 - d. Exploiting terrorist atrocities and excesses by discrediting the insurgents and their leadership in the eyes of the public and inducing guilt amongst the rebels.
 - e. Promoting dissension between the leaders and the led, the political and military wings and exploiting rifts between any factions which develop in the organization.
 - f. Exploiting specific intelligence.
25. **Correlation.** Some degree of success with the first aim may be a prerequisite for progress with the second one. Commanders at all levels must be alert to the psychological implications of and the correlation between the political, the military and the psychological aspects of the campaign. In particular they should take care that action in one sphere which seems to promise a quick return does not jeopardise the success of the other two spheres and so of the campaign as a whole.
26. **Advising the Commander.** The success of psychological operations depends on good intelligence. The planners will work in close conjunction with the G2 staff during the process of research, the close observation of people and events, and the analysis of intelligence and hostile propaganda. The psychological operations planners will advise the commander on:
- a. The psychological threat facing the military forces in the theatre or area of operations.
 - b. The psychological strengths and vulnerabilities of all the relevant groups in the area, friendly, neutral and hostile.
 - c. Possible psychological operations campaigns or initiatives to:
 - (1) Gain the local population's support and confidence.
 - (2) Lower the morale of the insurgents and their supporters.
 - d. Those activities or lines of persuasion which are likely to give the security forces an advantage and, conversely, those which might be damaging and should be avoided.
 - e. The psychological implications of proposed military operations and activities.
27. **Responsibilities Towards the Operations Staff.** The psychological operations planners are responsible to the G3 staff for the following tasks:
- a. Keeping the psychological threat under continuous review.
 - b. Carrying out detailed research and analysis of the intelligence upon which a psychological operations campaign is based. This includes the identification of

information which may be useful in reducing the credibility of the insurgent leadership.

- c. Planning, implementing and monitoring psychological warfare campaigns.
- d. Monitoring, analysing and advising on how to counter insurgent and foreign hostile propaganda.
- e. Monitoring and analysing the results of our own psychological operations activities.

SECTION 4 - THE ORGANIZATION AND CONTROL OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

Requirements

28. A comprehensive United Kingdom military psychological operations capability would comprise:
 - a. Political and military oversight at government level and below.
 - b. Psychological operations staff officers at appropriate headquarters.
 - c. One or more psychological operations units and support teams. For details of their composition and capabilities and further types of support the reader is referred to JSP1 and JSP 7.³
 - d. Dissemination capabilities. Psychological units rely on other agencies, such as Army Aviation, the Royal Navy, the Royal Air Force and also for sky-shouting. The RLC normally makes the arrangements for leaflet-dropping through whatever assets are available in the theatre.

Organisation of PSYOPS Units

29. Pressures on the national defence budget prevent the establishment of a comprehensive psychological operations capability in peacetime. Outside the Ministry of Defence the only dedicated focus in peacetime is the Psychological Operations Wing at the Defence Intelligence and Security School (DISS). In time of crisis or war the Chief Instructor, Psychological Operations Wing would command a small joint service organization, activated with shadow-posted regulars and some volunteer reservists, which could reinforce specified military headquarters with psychological operations support teams. These teams would consist primarily of intelligence and planning specialists. Production and dissemination assets to implement plans would have to be obtained from allied or host nation sources or through the use of United Kingdom officers, NCOs, men and equipment which, although not established for psychological operations, could be employed if released from their primary tasks.

3. JSP1 (Chapter 16) and JSP7 (all chapters)

30. Specifically, in an emergency some of the requirements mentioned in the last paragraph might be met from:
- a. Allied military psychological operations units and capabilities.
 - b. The civilian infrastructure of the host nation.
 - c. British military resources which, although not established for psychological operations, might be so employed on release from their normal tasks:
 - (1) Linguists, borrowed perhaps from the interrogation organization.
 - (2) Printing facilities, including a cartographic capability and desk-top publishing equipment.
 - (3) Radio transmitters.
 - (4) Military audio-visual production facilities.
31. While recourse may have to be made to improvisation in an emergency the lack of a permanent peacetime capability should not be made an excuse for failure to think about the psychological dimension and to train individuals at the DISS.
32. As psychological operations are a combat support function a psychological operations support team reinforcing a headquarters would expect to report to and receive direction from a designated member of the operations staff. An annual DCI lays down those appointments within the United Kingdom Armed Forces whose incumbents are to receive psychological operations training; the list extends down to the headquarters of certain brigades.

Political and Military Oversight

33. **Approving Authorities.** Commanders are responsible for ensuring that their psychological operations and related activities are consistent with the host nation and the United Kingdoms' governmental policies and conform to any specific political guidance. This should be achieved through designated approving authorities which have the power to sanction plans or to veto those which fail to meet the criteria laid down. Doubtful plans will be referred to higher authority and it may be necessary to obtain the approval of the British Ambassador or High Commissioner accredited to the host country, or from the Government in UK as well as the host government.
34. **Psychological Operations Committee.** The approving authority is likely to be a psychological operations committee consisting of:
- a. Chairman, normally a civilian political appointment. Abroad, he will be nominated by the host nation.

- b. Representatives from:
 - (1) Relevant government departments.
 - (2) Government information services.
 - (3) Police, including the special branch.
 - (4) Military intelligence and operations staffs.
 - (5) Military public information staff.
 - (6) Military operations staff officer assigned responsibility for psychological operations. The senior member of the subordinate psychological operations support team may also attend. The former will probably act as the committee's secretary unless the host nation wishes to nominate one of its own officials for the post.
 - (7) Military G5 public affairs staff.

The Psychological Operations Staff Officer

- 35. **Appointment.** The psychological dimension of counter-insurgency is so important that a staff officer should be nominated in all formation headquarters with specific responsibilities for psychological operations. Only in the largest headquarters will it be possible to establish a dedicated staff post. In smaller headquarters he will normally be a member of the operations staff. He will work hand in glove with the intelligence staff but will have no responsibility for public information or deception.
- 36. **Duties.** These include:
 - a. Advising the commander on the implementation of psychological operations doctrine within the constraints of political direction and the available capability.
 - b. Advising the commander on the psychological implications of projected military operations and activities.
 - c. Coordinating the analysis of hostile propaganda and advising the commander on appropriate counter-propaganda initiatives.
 - d. Coordinating the collection of intelligence which is potentially exploitable through psychological operations. This involves close liaison with the intelligence staff, who must be given clear direction on intelligence and information requirements.
 - e. Taking the lead responsibility for psychological operations appreciations and identifying opportunities for psychological operations to support specific missions.

- f. Tasking and supervising supporting psychological operations units and support teams.
 - g. Coordinating the contributions to psychological operations provided by the Royal Navy, Royal Air Force, artillery and other supporting agencies.
 - h. Liaising with the appropriate host nation and allied organizations.
 - i. Clearing proposed plans and products with the approving authority. If a psychological operations committee is formed he should be the secretary.
37. **Status and Functions.** The psychological operations staff officer must be a member of the permanently established component of the commander's headquarters. He must have a thorough understanding of the commander's intentions, be conversant with staff procedures and be well acquainted with all the personalities involved in psychological operations. His key function is to ensure that supporting units, teams and other agencies are given clear direction to implement the commander's mission. As reinforcing psychological units, supporting teams and other relevant agencies arrive in the theatre he must integrate them into the organization and brief them.

SECTION 5 - THE PREPARATION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

Factors

38. The conduct of psychological operations should be based on the following factors.
- a. Conform strictly to the political and strategic aims. No psychological campaign will be effective if it is not in harmony with the policies pursued by the government. Experience suggests that this requirement may best be satisfied through the establishment of a formal psychological operations committee. Such a committee should be given responsibility for the scrutiny and the approval or the modification of proposed psychological operations campaigns.
 - b. Be based upon sound civil and military intelligence.
 - c. Be planned on a joint civil/military basis.
 - d. Be planned to secure specific psychological objectives from a specific target audience.
 - e. Be credible to the target audience.
 - f. Be disseminated in a manner which will be accepted by the target audience.
39. Long experience has taught that:
- a. Psychological operations conducted in an inept manner can be disastrous.

- b. Research and analysis must be objective. Issues must be seen through the eyes of the target audience. Wishful thinking, what Napoleon called 'making pictures', must consciously and carefully be avoided.
- c. Campaign planners must be realistic with regard to the reaction they expect from the target audience. A campaign will forfeit credibility if it seeks to prompt action which is beyond the capability of the individual being addressed.

Planning

- 40. The planning and implementations of psychological operations is a complex and specialist task. The planning process is outlined in a diagram at Annex C to this Chapter.
- 41. Commanders and their staffs embarking on a counter-insurgency campaign should be aware of the enormous advantages which may accrue from a successful psychological operations campaign. If the opportunities look promising they should be prepared to ask for a psychological operations support team if one has not already been included in the order of battle. They should not try to run the campaign themselves. Identifying the need is a staff function. Implementation should be left to the specialists.
- 42. Further and more extensive details for the preparation and planning of psychological operations are given in Part 3 of this Volume.

PROPAGANDA THEMES

1. **Themes.** Themes are ideas or topics on which PSYOPS campaigns are mounted. Some themes are used throughout a campaign by both the government and the insurgents to promote a consistent policy. Others are used to promote attitudes of mind during specific phases of a campaign or employed on an opportunity basis to exploit or take advantage of the other side's strengths and weaknesses or to capitalize on a particular event. Below is a list of likely insurgent themes followed by possible government replies. The Annex ends with an outline of the possibilities by which both sides may use to counter the other's propaganda. The list is not exhaustive.

2. ***Pre-insurgency Phase:***

Theme 1: 'Righteousness'.
Theme 2: 'Hatred'.
Theme 3: 'Inevitable triumph'.
Theme 4: 'Allegiance'.
Theme 5: 'Moral certainty'.
Theme 6: 'Terror'.

3. ***The Insurgency Phase***

Theme 7: 'Glorification of heroes'.
Theme 8: 'In praise of violence'.
Theme 9: 'Justified reaction'.
Theme 10: 'The long war'.
Theme 11: 'Guilt'.
Theme 12: 'Bad faith'.
Theme 13: 'Security force incompetence'.
Theme 14: 'Legitimacy'.
Theme 15: 'Credibility'.

4. ***Themes of Survival***

Theme 16: 'Counter-productivity'.
Theme 17: 'Special status'.
Theme 18: 'Security'.

5. ***Concluding Phase***

Theme 19: 'Cost and futility of resistance'.
Theme 20: 'Climate of collapse'.

6. ***Government Counters to Insurgent Propaganda Themes***

- Theme 1: 'Righteousness'.
- Theme 2: 'Hatred'.
- Theme 3: 'Inevitable triumph'
- Theme 4: 'Allegiance'.
- Theme 5: 'Moral certainty'.
- Theme 6: 'Terror'.
- Theme 7: 'Glorification of heroes'.
- Theme 8: 'In praise of violence'.
- Theme 9: 'Justified reaction'.
- Theme 10: 'The long war'.
- Theme 11: 'Guilt'.
- Theme 12: 'Bad faith'.
- Theme 13: 'Security force incompetence'.
- Theme 14: 'Legitimacy'.
- Theme 15: 'Credibility'.
- Theme 16: 'Counter-productivity'.
- Theme 17: 'Special status'.
- Theme 18: 'Security'.
- Theme 19: 'Cost of futility'
- Theme 20: 'Climate of collapse'.

7. ***Counter-Propaganda***

- Direct refutation
- Indirect refutation
- Forestalling
- Diversion
- Silence
- Immunization
- Minimization
- Imitative Deception
- Restrictive Measures

**PROPAGANDA OF THE DEED
THE KING DAVID HOTEL, JULY 1946**

'In blood and fire Judaea fell.
In blood and fire Judaea will arise.'
Irgun Zvai Leumi

'The Messiah will not come to the sound of high explosives.'
Chaim Weizmann

'Oh, Christ, don't worry. We've had these warnings so many times before.'
Lieutenant General Sir Evelyn Barker, GOC, British Troops Palestine and Jordan to
Colonel Andrew Campbell, his legal adviser, on the morning of 22 July 1946.

1. This incident is worth recording in sufficient detail to explain the problems which faced an insurgent organization at the policy, planning and execution levels, and the complacency of the security forces which made such a spectacular attack possible. Operation 'Chick',¹ conceived by the Irgun Zvai Leumi and the Stern Gang² in conjunction with Haganah, aimed to blow up the King David Hotel in Jerusalem, a hotel as prestigious as Shepherds in Cairo and Raffles in Singapore. It housed the Secretariat of the then British Government in Palestine and Headquarters, British Troops Palestine and Jordan.
2. The decision was taken against the background of what the British called Operation 'Agatha' and the Jews 'Black Saturday'. In June, Field Marshal Montgomery had toured Palestine in his capacity as CIGS. Shocked at a situation which was getting out of control after nearly eight months of terrorism culminating in the kidnapping of six British officers, and indecision on the part of the High Commissioner, Lieutenant General Sir Alan Cunningham, his report reinforced the Attlee Government's determination to curb the terrorist campaign.
3. Early in the morning of 29 June, Operation 'Agatha' was launched with 100,000 troops throughout the length and breadth of Palestine. The operation had four aims: to search the Jewish Agency in Jerusalem for incriminating documents, to arrest important political figures believed to be connected with terrorist organizations, to search buildings in Tel Aviv, suspected of being terrorist headquarters and to arrest as many members as possible of the Palmach.³ It was also hoped that a substantial

1. An abbreviation of 'Malonchick', 'a small hotel' to 'Chick', 'small'.

2. Its correct name was Lohamei Herut Israel, Fighters for the Freedom of Israel, abbreviated to LEHI, but was popularly known as the Stern Gang after its founder, Abraham Stern. The Irgun Zvai Leumi, The National Military Organization, was founded in 1937 to retaliate against Arab terrorism when Haganah (see Note 4) stuck to its policy of *havlagah*, restraint.

3. Palmach, an acronym for Plugot Mahatz, assault companies, the regular 'storm troops' of the Jewish defence forces.

amount of arms and ammunition would be recovered. The troops faced widespread passive resistance from the settlers, who locked their gates and blocked entrances with tractors or human walls. 2,718 were arrested on the first day including a number of VIJs (Very Important Jews). The numbers of those detained was swelled by those who resisted the entry and search of their settlements. The majority were eventually released. Many arms caches were uncovered, the total find being 325 rifles, 94, two-inch mortars, 800 pounds of explosive and nearly half a million rounds of ammunition.

4. Inevitably, some damage was done and Jewish Agency propaganda made the most of it, exaggerating the operation into a program. The Operation 'Chick' planners were able to exploit the situation by pressing for the agreement of their more moderate superiors for action. Part of the King David building was still used as a hotel, which provided the terrorists with their opportunity. The only security check between the hotel bedrooms on the second floor and the headquarters offices on the third floor was an iron gate installed on the stairs and manned by guards who checked identity cards. The barbed wire surrounding the whole building provided only token protection because it was not normally guarded.
5. Operation 'Chick' was approved by the 'X' Committee, a five man body of activists and moderates set up by the Jewish Agency to vet Haganah⁴ plans to prevent loss of sympathy for the Jewish cause through outrages which were likely to be costly in human life. The hotel was reconnoitred by Irgun agents in various guises from guests to electricians, one even being escorted to a dance in the night club basement where the bomb was to be exploded, by the most notorious prostitute in Jerusalem. There was an argument between Yitzhak Sadeh, the Haganah Chief of Staff, and Amilhai Paglin, the Irgun 'project leader'. Unusually, the more moderate Haganah questioned the adequacy of 350 kilograms of high explosive to collapse the hotel. Next the Chief of Staff asked for an assurance that a warning would be given but then showed concern that the British might be given sufficient time to dismantle the bomb. Amilhai Paglin replied that a bomb had been devised which could not be dismantled. Paglin met Sadeh's next demand that there would be no loss of life with the observation that the British always evacuated a building quickly once they had been given a warning. Asked what warning he proposed to give, Paglin replied with forty-five minutes. When Sadeh observed that this was too long Paglin expressed surprise. It transpired that Haganah's reason for blowing up the hotel was to destroy incriminating documents lifted from the Jewish Agency in a recent security force raid. Sadeh pressed for a 15 minute fuse; a compromise was reached on thirty. The differences of opinion were a further reflection of the feud between Haganah and the Irgun pursued by the former's commander Moshe Sneh, in what was euphemistically called 'The Hunting Season'.
6. The question of warning had serious implications. When Menachem Begin, the Irgun leader and a future Israeli prime minister, debriefed Amilhai Paglin after his meeting with Haganah he also insisted on the issue of a timely warning. Apart from the 'honour

4. Haganah means defence. It was the clandestine part-time militia raised from the Histadrut, the labour and industrial organisation of the Yishuv, the Jewish community in Palestine.

code', which Irgun had not yet discarded, Begin considered 'Chick' to be a political operation aimed at humiliating the British and encouraging them to leave Eretz Yisrael (the Land of Israel) by destroying a supposedly impregnable headquarters and the most important political and military target in Palestine. There was also the consideration that Jewish civil servants worked in the building and Jewish lawyers, accountants and politicians constantly visited it.

7. Another and even more cautious voice was the Chairman of the World Zionist Organisation and the Jewish Agency, Chaim Weizmann. Essentially more pacifically minded than the clandestine military leaders, he sent a messenger, blindfolded by his Haganah escort, to meet its commander with a demand that all further terrorist operations should be cancelled. He was concerned that the British would respond with a drastic crack down which would destroy everything he had worked for to establish a Jewish State and that it might emerge at the end of the mandate too weak to face the Arabs. If his demand was not met he would resign the chairmanship. It was a threat Moshe Sneh could not ignore; it would split the Zionist movement and have a disastrous impact in the UK and the USA. Sneh had to play for time. He told Weizmann's messenger that he was unable to make a decision himself; he would have to refer the chairman's demand to the "X" Committee.
8. The Committee reversed its decision. Moshe Sneh resigned the Haganah command in disgust, cancelling all planned operations except for 'Chick' which he merely postponed. He set out for Paris to visit Ben Gurion, who was organizing the emigration of Jews from Europe to Palestine, to persuade him to change Weizmann's mind. Once he returned to Palestine with Ben Gurion's anticipated consent he intended to resume command of the Haganah. Initially, Ben-Gurion agreed but then changed his mind, fearing the consequences to the Jewish cause if the concept of havlaga, restraint, were to be abandoned.
9. Meanwhile, in Palestine Menachem Begin was determined to go ahead with 'Chick', telling Israel Galili, the new Haganah commander, that Irgun would proceed on its own if Haganah pulled out of the joint operation. Galili, concerned that Irgun would merely ignore Haganah in future and throw restraint to the winds if it was to act independently, reluctantly agreed but called for a delay. The other organization involved in the operation, the Stern Gang, readily agreed to a postponement because they were having difficulty in coordinating a simultaneous attack on the David Brothers Building less than a quarter of a mile away. If the explosions were not set off simultaneously, one or other of the groups would be trapped when the Palestine Police cordoned the area after the first blast. The day that Galili asked Begin to delay, 17 July, Chaim Weizmann departed for London for an eye operation in the belief that 'Chick' had been cancelled.
10. Irgun still planned tentatively on 19 July for the operation. The explosives were moved up by truck from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. With the truck travelled a car driven by Eliahu Spector, who had served with the British Army in the Second World War. He appreciated that the British Army entertained two levels of security, a cursory one for the British and a stricter one for everyone else. Dressing in English clothes and greeting the soldiers at check points in a hearty, military manner he trusted to bluff to

get the explosives through. On the outskirts of Jerusalem Spector was allowed through the road block but the truck was stopped. Sacks of grain were heaped up near the tailboard. A soldier prodded one with a bayonet. There was a loud, metallic clang. The soldier carefully lifted the sack, to find a milk churn. But feed and churns go together, so the barrier was lifted. The explosives had arrived safely in Jerusalem.


11. While the hit team quartermaster was briefing his fellow Irgun insurgents on 19 July for the operation which was planned for two hours ahead, a further message arrived from Moshe Sneh, Haganah's erstwhile commander, just before leaving for Paris. It asked for another delay. Begin had agreed but his patience was wearing thin.
12. On 22 July, he decided to go ahead with 'Chick'. The Stern Gang element raised objections, asking for a further delay to coordinate their attack on the David Brothers Building. Begin would not agree. The explosives had been in Jerusalem for three days, the teams briefed and too many people had got to know of the plan. So the Stern Gang pulled out. Nevertheless, the discussions with them had made an hour's postponement necessary.
13. A school at Beit Aharon, within reasonable distance of the objective, had been chosen as the rendezvous for the men, their weapons and the explosives. The attackers started assembling soon after the night curfew lifted at 0700. They were divided into five parties: porters to move the churns from the truck to the hotel basement, their immediate escorts, the fuse setter, an external protection group and a road blocking detachment. The latter was to trundle two barrows, each loaded with four cans full of kerosene. One had a top dressing of melons and vegetables so that the two would not look alike. The barrows were to be positioned at the kerbside on Julian Street on either side of the hotel ready to be pushed into the middle of the road and ignited after the explosion of the bomb. The burning kerosene would not only block the street but would provide a diversion to help the raiders to escape. The seven milk churns filled with TNT and gelignite were loaded into a hijacked pickup truck for delivery to the hotel after the porters arrived.
14. At the school the men put on their disguises. Most of them dressed as Arabs in jallabiyas and keffiyehs or as truck drivers in blue overalls. One wore a King David Hotel waiter's tarboosh, waistcoat, cummerbund and baggy white pantaloons bought off a Sudanese hotel servant. Those dressed as Arabs were taught to imitate their distinctive gait and gestures by one of their number who had been born and brought up in Iraq and who spoke Arabic fluently.
15. At 1100, Paglin gave the order to move. The men and their barrows set off in small groups at intervals to minimise the risk of detection. Some of the walking party were to catch a bus, others a waiting taxi. The taxi was to be parked near the hotel for use as an ambulance, complete with a first aid kit. As the 'Arabist' boarded the bus he was horrified to be greeted by the Jewish driver and asked why he was wearing Arab clothes.
16. There had been three contretemps. The original team driver became so frightened that he had to be replaced by the quartermaster, strictly contrary to Irgun SOPs.

Another had moral qualms and intended to betray the operation to the Security Forces but every attempt he made to use the telephone on the excuse of ringing his girl friend or to obtain leave to return home to hide incriminating papers was blocked by the team leader, Paglin, on the grounds that no one in the know could contact anyone outside. Finally, a United Press International 'Stringer', who was also an Irgun member and unaware of the hour's postponement, telephoned his London bureau at 1100 hours with the message, 'Jewish terrorists have just blown up the King David Hotel'. He had hoped to scoop his fellow journalists. The British censor had stamped the cable without bothering to read it. The London bureau considered that the telegram contained too little information and decided to await further details before passing the report on to the press and radio.

17. The porters and their immediate escorts walked into the hotel basement where they were challenged by an officer, who was promptly shot and wounded. The kerosene bomb barrows were stationed at the side of the road running past the hotel, one to the north, the other to the south. The truck with the milk churns was driven through the wire barrier outside the building and up to the service entrance. The 'porters' rolled the churns into the basement, stacked them round the four columns supporting the interior of the building, activated the home-made acid delay switches and left. The barrows loaded with paraffin were pushed into the street and ignited.
18. There had been a vague intelligence warning of a terrorist attack, which Lieutenant General Sir Evelyn Barker had discounted with the remark quoted at the beginning of the article.⁵ One of the porters had given an unauthorized, premature warning to a hotel messenger to tell the Jews in the building to escape. He telephoned a priest in the Secretariat who told the messenger that there was nothing to worry about because the basement had already been searched following a previous warning. Operators in the telephone exchange rang the Palestine Police to report armed Arabs stealing food from the basement. Someone pressed an alarm in the basement which rang in the local police station but by the time the police had decided to react the terrorists had fled. Only one armoured car, minus its machine-gun, appeared on the scene during the escape. No one guessed that a bomb was about to explode. The terrorist with the guilty conscience tried to frighten the 'porters' into running away by raising a false scare of soldiers approaching the hotel. In an uncoordinated response by armed staff in the basement area three Irgun terrorists were wounded as the party made its escape.
19. The bomb went off early, at 2200, only seven minutes after the fuses had been activated. Over a hundred people were killed and wounded. They were not the only casualties. The magnitude of the disaster broke the alliance between Haganah and Irgun. A month after the attack, at a meeting of the Jewish Agency in Paris, Ben-Gurion ordered Haganah to stop attacks on British installations and to concentrate on smuggling illegal immigrants and weapons into the country to prepare for the day when the British would withdraw and the Jews would be left to face the Arabs alone.

5. The remark was made to General Barker's legal adviser, Colonel Andrew Campbell, who reminded him of the warning. It is perhaps only fair to add that while the conversation made an indelible impression on Campbell the GOC could not recall it in later years.

20. Irgun redoubled its campaign of violence, placing bombs in the British embassy in Rome and blowing up buildings without warning. In March 1947, the group blew up the officers' club in Jerusalem, killing twenty. In retaliation for the execution of three Irgun members in July 1947, two British sergeants, Paice and Martin, were kidnapped, held hostage for seventeen days and then hanged in an orange grove. It was Paglin himself, the leader of the King David Hotel bombing, who put the nooses round the sergeants' necks. Attempts to assassinate General Barker and the Chief Secretary, Sir John Shaw, and the chief prosecutor were all foiled.
21. The reaction to the King David Hotel incident in the UK was a mixture of shock, indignation and a questioning of the need to maintain the mandate. If it did not cause the British withdrawal it helped to accelerate it.



Illustrative Flow Chart in Planning for PSYOPS

CHAPTER 11

OPERATIONAL PUBLIC INFORMATION

SECTION 1 - PURPOSE AND RESPONSIBILITIES

Purpose

1. In counter-insurgency operations it is essential to conduct public information (PINFO) in a positive manner; it must be planned and executed with determination and vigour. It must project an accurate and balanced picture of the role of the security forces in general and of the Army in particular, and demonstrate the practical contribution they make to the solution of a difficult and frequently hazardous task.
2. Public information techniques and guidance are contained in the Army Manual of Public Relations. This chapter concentrates on operational public information in a counter-insurgency setting at formation level. At unit and sub unit level details of operational PINFO are covered in Part 3, although there is much similarity when dealing with the media at any level.

Aim

3. The aim must be to create and maintain a positive public image of the Army; this includes countering potentially hostile media activity.

Responsibilities

4. Operational public information is a G3 staff function and should be coordinated at the level of the highest formation headquarters in the theatre of operations. The normal chain of command must be followed for the passage of information upwards, which may be required for public information purposes, and also for the dissemination of instructions downwards to subordinate staffs concerning the disclosure of information to the public domain.
5. PINFO staff are responsible for all aspects concerning the authorisation of suitable facilities for the media, the nomination of units to host visitors etc:- and the allocation of escorts and other resources.
6. In an operational theatre Formation HQs would have a PINFO staff officer and all Units would have a nominated Press Officer (UPO). If these officers are not employed exclusively on these duties, their other responsibilities should not preclude their immediate availability.
7. In periods of intense operational activity or during major incidents the PINFO staff may need additional support, particularly in urban areas. Sub-units should be prepared to help the PINFO staff in terms of escorts, movement and the control of the media. Immediate supporting staff may also be required for photography, and the reproduction of material.

8. Contingency plans for the reinforcement of PINFO staffs must be prepared to meet all foreseeable operations.

SECTION 2 - CONTACT WITH THE MEDIA

The Roles of the Commander and the Chief PINFO Officer

9. It is of great importance that a commander maintains a close working relationship with his chief PINFO officer. When speaking to the media, and in accordance with QRs, individuals should restrict themselves to matters of fact at their own level. A military commander must not make any statement concerning government policies, political decisions, or on topics which are likely to be politically sensitive, nor should they speculate on any matter. The question as to whether or not communication with the media is desirable from both the political and operational points of view must also be considered. Care, too, must be taken to ascertain whether there are any legal or security restraints on an item of information before it is released. PINFO staff must always be consulted before statements are made to the media. The rule of thumb to adopt is not to talk above your appointment and grade.
10. The chief PINFO officer at a headquarters is the source of all operational information for the media and it is he who authorises contact with them. To this end, his office must provide a continuous day and night information service manned by a staff who are fully in the operational picture. If the office is to provide an authoritative, considered, consistent and credible information service, the press office must receive prompt and accurate information from subordinate headquarters and units. It must also receive early warning of projected operations together with clear instructions on how to deal with media enquiries, preferably in the form of a question and answer brief. However, provided that the information is received in time in notes or narrative form the PINFO staff will be able to polish the brief and provide suitable answers to all likely questions.
11. A large number of journalists representing the press, radio and television can be expected to report on counter-insurgency operations. Guidance on their handling is given at Annex A to this Chapter.

Media Reporting. Clearance, Attribution and Embargoes

12. To facilitate an effective two-way passage of information and to minimise unnecessary media queries, standing orders should give guidance on the limits of the information which may be disclosed. There are also conventions to be observed when journalists pose questions on certain sensitive subjects. Some guidance on press reporting is given at Annex B to this Chapter.
13. Before any information is passed to the media it must be cleared for release by the appropriate military agency, eg, G2, G3, and the appropriate host nation authorities or police authorities where this is applicable.
14. Conventions also cover the way in which information may be attributed to a source. Mutually understood and accepted by both sides they help to promote good working

relations between the Army and the media. Before a briefing journalists must be told if there are any reporting restrictions. If a journalist does not wish to abide by them he will refuse to attend. For the purposes of defining what may be reported and to whom it may be attributed briefings are divided into three categories:

- a. *Attributable*. This means that the information given can be used as a direct quotation and attributed to a particular source or individual. Journalists will assume that any statement is attributable unless they are clearly told otherwise. Those not in full-time PINFO appointments should only speak to journalists attributably. The term 'attributable' means the same as 'on the record'. However it is ambiguous and should not be used.
 - b. *Non-attributable*. This means that the information given may be used, but its origin must not be revealed, and it should not, therefore, be attributed to any individual or spokesperson.
 - c. *Not for Use*. This means exactly what it says. It applies to the issue of information in the form of an explanatory briefing, which cannot be published. Such briefings will only be given at the highest level.
15. Information may also be given to the media under cover of an embargo, usually for security or privacy reasons. The embargo specifies that the information may not be used before a given time and date. The restriction should be used sparingly and never merely for convenience.
 16. The above directions and restrictions apply equally to off duty, informal and social contacts with the media.

HANDLING THE MEDIA

General

1. The journalist in an operational area has a tough, highly competitive and sometimes dangerous job. His or her primary purpose is to get a better story than his or her competitors and to get it in time for the earliest possible publication. The basic principles to be applied in dealing with the media are:
 - a. No unnecessary hindrance is to be offered to a journalist's freedom to operate. It is in the interests of law and order that the press should have facilities to expose terrorism, acts of violence and the intimidation of civilians.
 - b. A member of the media has the same rights, liberties and obligations under the law as any other citizen.
 - c. Any entry into military premises and any contact with military personnel should be in accordance with standing instructions.

The Rights of the Media

2. Journalists have the right to speak to anyone, visit anywhere, and photograph anything they wish, providing it does not conflict with the law and does not involve any entry into political areas. The same applies to matters concerning the security forces' operations, or when life is endangered.
3. In practice this means that the media may conduct their business subject to the following caveats:
 - a. They have no right to enter MOD property without the permission of the officer responsible for that property.
 - b. The final decision as to whether or not to give an interview rests with the soldier and then only with the concurrence and guidance of PINFO staff.
 - c. Journalists may normally photograph all personnel and equipment in public places from public places. They may not photograph personnel, equipment or property within MOD premises. If there is a security reason why the security forces do not wish a photograph to be published, eg, an EOD team at work, this should be explained to the photographer, who is then in the wrong if he or she persists. If necessary a journalist may be removed from the scene and any film may be confiscated, but should be handed to the police in connection with any arrest action deemed appropriate.

- d. If a commander on the ground believes that the media are prejudicing security during an operation he should deal with the matter by persuasion, admonition or as a last resort, and only if a criminal offence is suspected, by physical restraint or arrest.
- e. It is possible that reporters may deliberately wish to expose themselves to danger against the advice of the security forces. If they do not yield to persuasion, a clear warning must be given, in front of witnesses, of the possible consequences of their actions and that they must accept responsibility for them.
- f. Reporters may ask for priority at a checkpoint. They have no right to this but they have deadline pressures. Where practicable operationally and when the request is seen to be reasonable, the reporter should be allowed to pass without delay.

Information for the Media

- 4. All operational information for the media is to be given by the PINFO staff or UPO, or by those authorised to do so when accompanied by one of these officers.
- 5. Commanders, or those authorised by them, may communicate directly with the media when the information given is strictly factual and relates solely to that commander's formation and does not touch on any politically controversial area.
- 6. PINFO staff approval is required before any member of the security forces agrees to give a statement or interview to the media. Before considering any request for a facility, PINFO staff must be aware of who the interviewer is, what agency, publication or programme he represents and agree the scope and line of questioning. Whenever possible, the best spokesperson, irrespective of rank, should be used, particularly if he or she can speak authoritatively. A member of the PINFO staff should be present at an interview.

Identification of the Media

- 7. Any person claiming to be a member of the media should produce an authenticated press card, of which there are many varieties. Unless security forces are satisfied that a journalist is bona fide, facilities should not be granted.
- 8. In certain circumstances members of the media may be accredited to the security forces and be given authenticated credentials.

Military Families

- 9. No official restriction can be placed on Service families in dealing with the media. However, they should be advised by their heads of family to seek advice from PINFO staff before making statements or commenting to the media on official military matters.

Impartiality

10. All members of the media must be afforded the same information service to enable them to do their job. However, there are situations where discretion may be exercised by PINFO staff.
11. No journalist can be guaranteed exclusive rights to any story. Should journalists discover their own exclusives, their 'scoop' must be respected and the information not divulged to others, unless they make an approach on the same topic.
12. Where facilities for the media are limited or there are operational or security reasons for keeping press invitations to a minimum, PINFO staff will arrange for a rota system by which a pool reporter covers the story for everyone.
13. Detailed guidance on the handling of the media will be given in local or theatre standing orders.

GUIDANCE ON REPORTING TO THE MEDIA

Wording of Statements

1. Any statement must be confined to what has been cleared and confirmed as fact. Speculation and comment must be avoided. When an urgent press enquiry requires an immediate response, a brief holding statement should be made, with the proviso that a more detailed statement will follow once the facts are confirmed. All statements must be made by, or cleared with, PINFO staff.

Reports of Shootings

2. These reports must include:
 - a. Time.
 - b. Location of security forces.
 - c. Location of firing point if known.
 - d. Number and type of shots fired at security forces (if known).
 - e. Any military casualties.
 - f. Whether fire was returned or not.
 - g. Insurgent casualties, if known.
 - h. Any additional relevant information (civilian casualties, etc).

Reports of Explosions

3. These reports must include:
 - a. Time and location.
 - b. Time of warning and to whom, if any; length of warning time.
 - c. Casualties if any (civilian and/or military).
 - d. Estimate of damage.
 - e. Estimate of size and nature of device (from an EOD report).
 - f. How device was positioned.
 - g. If possible, explain any delays in reaction (possible ambush or booby traps).

Reports of Disturbances

4. These reports must include:
 - a. Time and location.
 - b. Security forces involved.
 - c. Numbers of civilians involved.
 - d. Types of Weapons used by the rioters (if any).
 - e. Response by security forces, including use of weapons.
 - f. Casualties, civilian and/or military.
 - g. Arrests if any, numbers only.

Reports of Finds

5. Reports of finds must be cleared with G2, G3 EOD controllers, and police before being announced. The details will normally be confined to:
 - a. Location, but not so detailed as to prejudice legal requirements.
 - b. Description of a find in general terms (number of weapons, quantity of explosive, amount of ammunition).

Naming Individuals

6. Normally soldiers are not named, nor is any indication given of their rank.
7. Names of arrested persons are not given to the media. Queries should be referred to the police.
8. PINFO staff should be given details and any relevant background information on anyone who has been detained by the security forces. This information is not necessarily for dissemination to the media but to ensure that the PINFO staff are fully in the picture.

Casualties

9. Names of security forces' casualties are only disclosed to the media in fatal and very serious injury cases but only after the next of kin or the alternative next of kin have been informed. Neither names nor units are given for seriously injured or unlisted cases. If asked about a casualty before the next of kin have been informed, the media should be advised that a statement will be issued as soon as this has occurred.

10. Any statement on wounded security forces' personnel should be kept as brief as possible, and only confirmed when the full extent of the injuries is known.

Legal Limitations

11. No statement should be made if there is any possibility of prejudicing a conviction. All statements concerning arrests should be made by the police.
12. Once an investigation, trial, enquiry, arrest or charge is announced a case becomes *sub judice*, and requests for information should be referred to the police.
13. Once a matter has been referred to a minister, no statement can be made by PINFO staff. When a ministerial response is given, that is the one that should be used by PINFO staff.

Conventions

14. Experience has resulted in certain conventional answers being given to routine media enquiries. If this convention is broken journalists are alerted to a possibly controversial topic. Conventional answers should be adhered to rigidly and not elaborated upon. Once a convention is broken, a dangerous precedent is created. As a matter of policy, PINFO staff will not comment on anything relating to:
 - a. Intelligence matters.
 - b. The off duty or private affairs or addresses of security forces and their families.
 - c. Future operations.
 - d. Government policy or political decisions.
 - e. Reports and speeches which have not been seen by them.
 - f. Movement of VIPs.
 - g. Matters outside the responsibility of the security forces.
 - h. Military advice given to ministers or to the police.
 - i. Investigations, inquiries or criminal cases which are still in progress.
 - j. Contingency plans. Judicial findings, verdicts and sentences.

CHAPTER 12

CIVIL AFFAIRS

SECTION 1 - THE PLACE OF CIVIL AFFAIRS IN MILITARY OPERATIONS.

Background

1. In a world with a growing population and increasing urbanization military forces, when deployed on operations, are more likely than before to have contact with the civilian population. The relationship of the military with, and their treatment of, the local population in the area of operations inevitably will be subject to media scrutiny. Furthermore, the conditions and prospects of any indigenous population will probably be a dominant consideration in determining the desired conclusion of any campaign particularly in COIN operations. Commanders can expect to be bound by political and humanitarian imperatives to discharge international, moral and legal obligations to civilians.
2. Counter insurgency operations can be disrupted by the deliberately hostile actions of the populace, the failure of the population to cooperate fully with the security forces, or the uncontrolled displacement of civilians as a result of insurgency. However, civilians can also help to substantially enhance military effort and effectiveness. Gaps in Combat Service Support can be closed by use of local civilian resources; and, if commanders recognise the potential, synergistic advantages can be obtained by harnessing government and community support as a potential force multiplier.
3. In counter insurgency campaigns such as in Malaya there was a strong civil-military presence to guide commanders as an integral part of the overall campaign plan. This was more popularly known as "hearts and minds"¹. By service in Northern Ireland and on many international peacekeeping duties for the UN the British soldier has become particularly well accustomed to appreciate the civilian dimension of any problem and exercise the appropriate sensitivity. An awareness of the penalties of mishandling relations with the civil community is now deep-rooted in the British military experience;

SECTION 2 - DEFINITIONS AND DOCTRINE

Definitions

4. Civil Affairs is defined as "any question relating to relations in wartime between the commander of an armed force and the civilian population and governments where the force is employed, and which is settled on the basis of mutual agreement, official or

1. The phrase is attributed to Field Marshal Templer.

otherwise". Other terms² could be used but Civil Affairs is the most appropriate. G5 is the nominated staff branch responsible for Civil Affairs operations on the ground.

British Army Doctrine

5. **General.** The current British Army approach to Civil Affairs is at present modest and the most significant doctrinal acknowledgement of Civil Affairs is recorded in ADP Vol 1 *Operations* which notes that:-

"The operational level commander may have certain explicit responsibilities for Civil Affairs within his theatre of operations. He will possibly have to consider the movement of refugees and minimising damage to civil infrastructure, in addition to his legal and moral obligations to minimise civilian casualties. Once the operations have ended, the military may be the only form of government and authority in the area, and therefore responsibilities for Civil Affairs will assume greater importance, at least during the transition to civil control".

6. **Doctrinal Scope.** Civil Affairs are applicable at the military strategic, operational and tactical levels. There is particular and obvious relevance to rear and base operations in helping to ensure freedom of action by protecting the security forces sustaining combat operations and retaining the freedom of manoeuvre of uncommitted forces. The gaining and maintenance of popular support in counter-insurgency or peace support operations is in doctrine terms a deep operation which helps to set the conditions for subsequent close operations. Civil Affairs has applicability during pre-campaign planning and preparation, (eg gathering information and establishing relationships), as well as post-insurgency activity (eg. rebuilding and rehabilitation). Geographically, Civil Affairs is required in the whole area of operations, which in practice often means the whole state or where the government has control. All army formations and their headquarters have the need of suitable Civil Affairs/G5 staff representation.
7. **Joint and Combined Aspects.** The deployment, operation and support of ships and aircraft from other services in the area of operations implies the need for Civil Affairs to be arranged on a joint basis. In combined operations forces from other nations could face similar challengers from the local populace and are also likely to be competing for similar, if not the same, indigenous resources. Civil Affairs in common with other activities, should be coordinated with other services, allies and coalition partners.
8. **Military Capabilities.** The scale of Civil Affairs is variable according to the size of the force and the specific nature of the capability required. While refugees and displaced

2. Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) is defined by AAP-6 as covering "cooperation in peace or war between civil and military authorities both national and NATO area". Although closer to the concept of a spectrum of conflict the defensive and geographic qualifications are restrictive. CIMIC can be used in a wider sense also, as cited in AJP-1, to include military aid to the civil power, law and order enforcement, and military assistance to the civil power other than law enforcement (which are associated with national rather than allied operations).

persons are common to general war and peace support operations the detailed Civil Affairs response is necessarily very different, and contingent on the situation and environment. "Mission creep" is most likely to manifest itself in the Civil Affairs sphere as security force operations develop humanitarian dimensions, and flexibility will be necessary to cope with the various responses required during an operation.

9. **Civilian Expectations.** Expectations of modern societies are rising and the infrastructure and support that may be required other than basic humanitarian assistance are increasing in scope and technical complexity. It is unrealistic to expect any military counter insurgency campaign to have the capability to be able to fully replicate the full spectrum of civil administration; any capability provided should be of a general nature.
10. **Military and Civil Resources.** Where Civil Affairs can release military resources for other operational tasks it is a potential force multiplier. In relation to the demands of a situation the civil authorities may have a shortfall in terms of speed, scale, skills, organisation and specialist resources which can be met by use of military resources. Alternatively the civilian authorities may be able to provide better value based on cost, local knowledge, specialist civil skills, acceptability and endurance. Civil Affairs can advise and coordinate options in a 2 way street where civil and military resources represent alternative sources of capability; the Civil Affairs approach will often be based on brokering.
11. **G5 Staff.** The role of the G5 staff involves assisting the commander by advising on policy, developing plans and monitoring Civil Affairs activities. The G5 staff are both a recipient and provider of information and advice; they can operate effectively only if they coordinate their work with other staff and service branches within an HQ. The "value added" by their work comes from applying information, integrating responses and influencing others. The G5 emphasis is on facilitation rather than the direct provision of services.
12. **Summary.** Until the doctrine is fully established and developed further, Civil Affairs is in the minds of many officers, limited to wartime HNS and peacetime community relations, though the growing importance of peace support operations has created renewed interest in the G5 aspects of a commanders plan.³ However, the possible development of Civil Affairs activities in any governments' counter insurgency campaign plan will be a factor to be considered by military commanders in future. The production and execution of Civil Affairs component to operational plans should depend on the involvement of suitably trained staff officers, soldiers in units and civil servants in other government departments.

3. The adoption of the term G5 reflects its use, albeit loose, by the British rather than the wider term Civil Affairs. The component is taken to apply more widely to Civil Affairs and is not restricted only to the staff function.

SECTION 3 - MILITARY PLANNING FOR CIVIL AFFAIRS

The Provision of G5 Support.

13. The provision of G5 support embraces the conduct of relationships with the civil authorities and civil populace to enhance military effectiveness (through the provision of CSS and avoiding civilian interference); and the promotion of legitimacy (by recognising cultural factors and by respecting legal and moral obligations to protect the civilian population). Such Civil-Military cooperation is achieved by the development of civil/military relations; and influencing the use of resources for which the military force are a recipient, donor, or has an interest in denying to the insurgent.


Developing Civil/Military Relations

14. ***Improving Military Effectiveness and Civilian Support.*** This can be achieved by influencing, supporting and responding to civilian activity and civil organisations. In addition by establishing:
 - a. *Interface with Government.* By liaison with government departments and local authorities assist with the negotiation, interpretation and application of Status of Forces Agreements and Memorandums of Understanding covering the powers, jurisdiction, legal obligations and liabilities of the force.
 - b. *Coordination with Relief and International Agencies.* Work with non-government and private voluntary agencies to prevent duplication of effort and maximise effectiveness of military assistance.
 - c. *Communication with Local Communities.* To explain the intent and actions of military forces. If appropriate and possible obtain the agreement of local community leaders in advance.
 - d. *Provide Linguistic Services.* Support liaison with interpreters and translation services.
15. ***Minimizing Civilian Interference.*** By reducing the negative effects of civilian activity on military operations by measures such as control of disease, the maintenance of public order, the imposition of curfews and movement restrictions and support for "stay-put" or evacuation policies, as appropriate.
16. ***Reducing the Negative Impact of Military Operations.*** By encouraging and sustaining the support of civilians in any area of operations. This can be assisted by:
 - a. *Assisting the Civil Authorities.* By reducing the effects of insurgent actions on civilian populace by measures such as movement restrictions, advice on protection, registration and resettlement and support for "stay-put" policies.

- b. *Deconflicting Military and Civil Activities.* By measures such as allocation of routes and real estate, use of Out of Bounds restrictions, and other controls (eg over currency) preventing conflict with the civil authorities.
- c. *Discharging Political, Legal and Moral Obligations.* Fulfilling responsibilities imposed by international law and custom, and bilateral or multilateral agreements. By considering civil and cultural factors in the conduct of military activity, including the engagement of targets, reduce civilian suffering, avoid provoking offence and reduce loss of local support.
- d. *Payment of In-Theatre Costs.* Providing financial or non-pecuniary compensation for damage caused by forces and services or material received by the forces.

Influencing Resources

- 17. ***Acquiring Information, Services and Materiel.*** The scope of Host Nation Support (HNS) covers Military Assistance (eg security, accommodation, staging and reception facilities, POD, LOC) and Civil Assistance (eg in the areas of transport, labour resources, supply, maintenance and medical). These arrangements are normally reflected in General agreements, MOU, Technical Agreements, HNS Plans and other local contracts.
- 18. ***Managing Local Resources.*** By minimising shortages to the civilian community and maximising denial to the insurgent of scarce and critical resources by use of licencing regulations or guidelines, checkpoints, rationing controls, amnesties and inspection of facilities.
- 19. ***Facilitating Civil and Humanitarian Assistance.*** Advising the commander on the provision of emergency assistance which may be justified by humanitarian need in response to actual or threatened insurgent attack, and natural or man-made disasters. Civil and humanitarian assistance may be requested by the host nation, mandated by government decision, or may be offered to enhance the effectiveness, legitimacy and image of the government. Assistance should be provided to civilians who have stayed in place and other dislocated civilians (including displaced persons, refugees and evacuees) concerning:
 - a. *Advice on the Provision of Goods and Services.* Possible assistance includes the maintenance, restoration and provision of life sustaining services; maintaining order; and controlling the distribution of relief supplies and services.
 - b. *Assistance with the Restoration of Civil Administration.* Advice for the commander on the areas of need and the possible provision if requested of specialists to assist and support government in the area of operations.



- Interface with Government
- Coord with
- Communicate with Local Community
- Assist Civil Security Authorities
- Deconflict military-civil
- Discharge political, legal and moral obligations
- Negotiate for HNS
- Identify ICR
- Advise on provision of goods and services
- Assist with restoration of administration

An Illustrative Diagram of the Functions of Civil Affairs

GLOSSARY OF SOME TERMS USED IN COUNTER-INSURGENCY STUDIES

Introduction

1. The terminology defined in this section has been culled from a variety of sources and is generally accepted for use in counter insurgency operations. The definitions are not legal definitions and have no particular status in law. They define the terms in common military usage.

Glossary

2. **Agent.** 'An agent is a person specifically recruited, trained and infiltrated into a hostile organization with the task of gaining and reporting information about its activities.'
3. **Base.**
 - a. 'A locality from which operations are projected or supported.'
 - b. 'An area or locality containing installations which provide logistic or other support.'
4. **Base Area.** 'The area, virtually free from guerrilla interference, that has a defensive perimeter, and from which operations may be mounted and supported.'
5. **Civil Disobedience.** 'Active or passive resistance by elements of the civil population to the authority or policies of a government by unconstitutional means.'
6. **Civil Disturbance.** 'Group acts of violence and disorder prejudicial to public law and order.'
7. **Clandestine Operations.** 'Activities to accomplish intelligence, counter-intelligence and other similar activities, sponsored or conducted in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment.' See also Covert Operations.
8. **Command and Control Warfare (C2W).** The military part of Information Warfare is C2W which is defined as the integrated use of all military capabilities including Operations Security (OPSEC), Psychological Operations (PSYOPS), Deception, Electronic Warfare (EW) and Physical Destruction, supported by All Source Intelligence and Communications and Information Systems (CIS), to deny information to, influence, degrade or destroy an adversary's C2 capabilities, while protecting friendly C2 capabilities against similar actions.

9. **Community Relations Projects.** 'Projects undertaken by Security Forces aimed at improving the relationship between themselves and the local population. These projects often help to create favourable attitudes for specific political or military objectives.'
10. **Control Measures.** 'Restrictive measures imposed upon a civil population and relating to such matters as movement, registration or the possession of foodstocks or weapons. They are normally designed to separate the insurgents from the bulk of the population and deprive the insurgents of the resources they require.'
11. **Counter-Guerrilla Warfare.** 'Operations and activities conducted by armed forces, paramilitary forces or non military agencies against guerrillas.'
12. **Counter-Insurgency.** 'Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civil actions taken by the Government to defeat insurgency.'
13. **Counter-Intelligence.** 'Those activities concerned with identifying and counteracting the threats to security posed by hostile intelligence services or by individuals engaged in espionage, sabotage, subversion or terrorism.'
14. **Counter-Insurgency Operations.** (COIN operations) 'A generic term to describe the operations which forces may have to undertake when maintaining and restoring law and order in support of an established government. These operations will have to counter threats posed by civil disturbances, terrorism and organized insurgency, irrespective of whether they are nationalist, communist or racially inspired, or directed from within or outside the state concerned.'
15. **Counter-Subversion.** 'That part of counter-intelligence which is devoted to destroying the effectiveness of subversive activities through the detection, identification, exploitation, penetration, manipulation, deception and repression of individuals, groups or organizations conducting or capable of conducting such activities.'
16. **Counter-Terrorism.** 'Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter and respond to terrorism.'
17. **Covert Operations.** 'Operations which are so planned and executed as to conceal the identity of, or permit plausible denial by, the sponsor. They differ from clandestine operations in that emphasis is placed on concealment of the identity of the sponsor rather than on concealment of the operation: ie, disguised but not concealed.'
18. **Deep Operations.** 'Operations designed to locate, disrupt and destroy hard core insurgents, with a view to reducing insurgent pressure and giving other operations a better chance of success.' Deep operations in COIN at the strategic level of conflict will tend to cover political, diplomatic and psychological operations, whereas, at the operational level of conflict deep operations will generally be of a military nature.
19. **Dissident.** 'An individual who takes covert and overt action against a government.'

20. **Effectiveness.** 'The ability of a target audience to respond to a psychological objective'. (used in a psy ops content)
21. **Forward Operational Base.** 'An area providing a semi-permanent firm base from which actions against the insurgents can be developed. It should be established at or near a seat of local government as a formation base and will normally have an airfield, or an airstrip capable of quick development.'
22. **Framework Operations.** The term given to all overt military operations contributing to the defeat of the insurgent in an area.
23. **Guerrilla Warfare.** 'Military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces.'
24. **IED.** Improvised (or homemade) explosive devices.
25. **Informant.** 'A person who gives information.'
26. **Informer.** 'A member of an organization who passes information to the opponents of the organization.'
27. **Insurgency.** 'The actions of a minority group within a state who are intent on forcing political change by means of a mixture of subversion propaganda and military pressure aiming to persuade or intimidate the broad mass of people to accept such a change.'
28. **Insurrection (Revolt) and Rebellion.** When people revolt they openly express their dissatisfaction with the established government or its policies. When such an expression is armed and organized it becomes a rebellion. When a rebellion has a large measure of support and aims to overthrow the government a state of insurrection exists.
29. **Internal Security.** 'Any military role that involves primarily the maintenance or restoration of law and order and essential services in the face of civil disturbances and disobedience, using minimum appropriate force. It covers action dealing with minor civil disorders with no political overtones as well as riots savouring of revolts and even the early stages of rebellion.'
30. **Limited War.** 'International armed conflict, short of general war'. It may be limited geographically, by objective, by the scale of forces or by the weapons employed or by time but will be conducted overtly by formations of regular troops. Now overtaken by the term 'Operations Other Than War' (OOTW).
31. **Low Intensity Conflict.** Low Intensity conflict embraces forms of violence, often loosely controlled, with tactical or international political aims. These frequently include the overthrow of the established government. Each situation is unique but the range of conflict includes Civil Disorder and Revolutionary War. This term is now obsolescent. See also para 32.

32. **Pacification Operations.** 'Military operations designed to clear and hold an area of immediate insurgent influence and re-establish civil control'. Military forces will continue to provide security until paramilitary and police forces can accept responsibility.
33. **Paramilitary Forces.** 'Forces or groups which are distinct from the regular armed forces of any country but resemble them in organization and training and in the mission they undertake.'
34. **Prohibited Area.** The definition of a prohibited area will vary as it depends on the terms of the enactment or regulation which creates such an area. Generally it is automatically an offence to enter or be in a prohibited area, and security forces are given power over and above the general law in relation to using force to repel or apprehend anyone in the area. Where it is the local custom to carry arms, a prohibited area will often be one where the carriage of such weapons is forbidden.
35. **Psychological Mission.** 'A statement of the attitudes and/or behaviour required of a specified target audience to support the accomplishment of a commander's mission'. In addition:
 - a. A commander's mission may be supported by more than one psychological mission.
 - b. The identification of psychological missions is the end product of the psychological operations appreciation.
36. **Psychological Objective.** 'A description of the actual responses required of a target audience to support the accomplishment of a psychological mission'. This implies:
 - a. Psychological objectives are identified through the target analysis process.
 - b. A psychological mission may be supported by a number of psychological objectives and involve several target audiences.
 - c. A psychological objective is pursued through the identification of lines of persuasion (see paragraph 53 above) and supporting themes and symbols (see paragraphs 56 and 57 below).
37. **Public Information.** 'Information which is released or published for the primary purpose of keeping the public fully informed, thereby gaining their understanding and support'.
38. **Public Relations (PR).** 'The deliberate, planned and sustained effort to establish and maintain mutual understanding between an organization and its public'.
39. **Revolutionary War.** Revolutionary War generally aims to overthrow the state and its social system and is normally associated with communism or left wing ideology. It may develop through a series of phases: preparatory, guerrilla activity and finally

conventional military operations. Mainly associated with communist inspired revolutions.

40. **Sabotage.** 'An act, excluding a normal military operation, or an omission calculated to cause physical damage in the interests of a foreign power or subversive organization.'
41. **Security Forces.** 'All indigenous and allied police, military and paramilitary forces used by a government to maintain law and order.'
42. **Subversion.** 'Illegal measures, short of the use of force, designed to weaken the military, economic or political strength of a nation by undermining the morale, loyalty or reliability of its subjects.'
43. **Terrorism.** The use of threat of violence to intimidate a population for political ends.
44. **Terrorist.** 'A supporter of a dissident faction who resorts to violence in order to intimidate and coerce people for political ends'.

Terms Used in an Alliance Context

45. **Psychological Operations (Psy Ops).** 'Planned psychological activities in peace and war directed to enemy, friendly and neutral audiences in order to influence attitudes and behaviour affecting the achievement of political and military objectives. They include strategic psychological activities, psychological consolidation activities and battlefield psychological activities'.
 - a. The term 'psychological warfare' is not authoritatively defined, but it is essentially psychological operations directed at enemy audiences.
46. **Strategic Psychological Activities (SPA).** 'Planned psychological activities in peace and war which normally pursue objectives to gain the support and co-operation of friendly and neutral countries and to reduce the will and the capacity of hostile or potentially hostile countries to wage war.'
47. **Psychological Consolidation Activities (PCA).** 'Planned psychological activities in peace and war directed at the civilian population located in areas under friendly control in order to achieve a desired behaviour which supports the military objectives and the operational freedom of the supported commanders'. The above definition is valid in the contexts of general war and OOTW. In the context of counter-insurgency operations, PCA will normally support politico-military objectives.
48. **Battlefield Psychological Activities (BPA).** 'Planned psychological activities conducted as an integral part of combat operations and designed to bring psychological pressure to bear on insurgent forces and civilians under insurgent control in the theatre of operations, to assist in the achievement of the tactical objectives', but it should be noted that:

- a. The above definition is valid in the contexts of general war and OOTW. In the context of counter-insurgency operations, BPA may be directed at insurgents, terrorists, etc, and civilians under their control to assist in the achievement of politico-military objectives. BPA in counter-insurgency operations may be conducted in close conjunction with PCA directed at civilians not under immediate hostile control.
 - b. There would be logic in expanding the definition to embrace activities supporting the achievement of both operational and tactical objectives. Such expansion would be consistent with the US categorization of psychological operations into strategic, operational and tactical activities.
49. **Propaganda.** 'Any information, ideas, doctrines or special appeals disseminated to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes or behaviour of any specified group in order to benefit the sponsor either directly or indirectly. It can be categorised as:
- a. *Black.* Propaganda which purports to emanate from a source other than a true one.
 - b. *Grey.* Propaganda which does not specifically identify any source.
 - c. *White.* Propaganda disseminated and acknowledged by the sponsor or by an accredited agency thereof.
 - d. *Cohesive.* Directed at loyal or uncommitted audiences.
 - e. *Divisive.* Directed at hostile audiences.
50. **Target Audience.** 'An individual or group selected for influence or attack by means of psychological operations'.
51. **Psychological Situation.** 'The current emotional state, mental disposition or other behavioural motivation of a target audience, basically founded on its national, political, social, economic and psychological peculiarities but also subject to the influence of circumstances and events'.
52. **Susceptibility.** 'The vulnerability of a target audience to particular forms of psychological operations approach'. Assessment of susceptibility forms part of the target analysis approach.
53. **Psychological Operations Approach.** 'The technique adopted to induce a desired reaction on the part of the target audience'. This equates to the 'lines of persuasion' identified within the target analysis process.
54. **Psychological Media.** 'The media, technical or non-technical, which establish any kind of communication with a target audience'.

55. **Receptivity.** 'The vulnerability of a target audience to particular psychological media'.
56. **Psychological Theme.** 'An idea or topic on which a psychological operations approach is based'.
57. **Key Symbol.** 'In psychological operations, a simple, suggestive, repetitive element (rhythm, sign, colour, etc) which has an immediate impact on a target audience and which creates a favourable environment for the acceptance of a psychological theme'.
58. **Intelligence Cycle.** 'The sequence of activities whereby information is obtained, assembled, converted into intelligence and made available to users. This sequence comprises the following four phases:
- a. *Direction.* Determination of intelligence requirements, planning the collection effort, issuance of orders and requests to collection agencies and maintenance of a continuous check on the productivity of such agencies.
 - b. *Collection.* The exploitation of sources by collection agencies and the delivery of the information obtained to the appropriate processing unit for use in the production of intelligence.
 - c. *Processing.* The conversion of information into intelligence through collation, evaluation, analysis, integration and interpretation.
 - d. *Dissemination.* The timely conveyance of intelligence, in an appropriate form and by any suitable means, to those who need it'.
59. **Cover.** 'Those measures necessary to give protection to a person, plan, operation, formation or installation from the enemy intelligence effort and leakage of information'.
60. **Deception.** 'Those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion or falsification of evidence to induce him to react in a manner prejudicial to his interests'.

Terms Used in a British Context

61. **Psychological Themes.** 'Ideas or topics on which a psychological operation is based'.
62. **Key Communicator.** 'An individual who possesses persuasive powers which can influence or effect changes in attitude, opinions or behaviour among other individuals or groups of which the key communicator is a member'.