



# COALITION OPERATIONS HANDBOOK

**EDITION 4**

**14 APRIL 2008**

*This manual is dedicated to the soldiers of the American, British, Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand Armies. "Five nations divided by a common language."*

## Preface

The American, British, Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand (ABCA) Armies Program is not an alliance nor has an ABCA force ever been employed under the program. However, the ABCA nations have served together in ad hoc coalitions on numerous occasions to pursue common objectives and the *ABCA Coalition Operations Handbook* (COH) has been used on numerous occasions to help create successful coalitions. The COH is intended to assist ABCA nations serving in any coalition, whether the coalition consists of ABCA or other nations, and will prove useful to any other countries serving in a coalition.

As in the first three editions, this edition of the COH provides the coalition commanders and staff with general information on important topics necessary for conducting coalition operations. It primarily provides questions that coalition partners need to ask to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the coalition to accomplish its assigned missions. Every coalition differs. The purpose, character, capabilities, composition, and scope of a coalition is a function of changing missions, which are magnified by the complexities of two or more armies operating together. Each army brings its own view and methods of operations. **The COH is not a doctrinal publication, nor does it include tactics, techniques, or procedures.**

This handbook provides guidance to commanders and staff of organizations operating in a coalition environment. It is a handy reference of fundamental issues and interfaces that they must address for a successful coalition operation. When using this handbook, one key issue that crosses all functions, which commanders must identify, is distinguishing those areas within coalition control and those that remain under national control. Then coalition commanders and staff can focus on important coalition issues and develop procedures to function more effectively and efficiently.

ABCA nations conduct coalition operations to prevent, contain, or resolve conflicts that may pose threats to common national interests.

While the ABCA program has achieved some levels of standardization in certain areas, no common doctrine exists between the armies. This handbook does not fill this gap, rather it assists the coalition commander to understand and develop solutions to create an effective fighting force. It incorporates selected information from ABCA products but does not reproduce these documents. This manual does not repeat staff planning procedures and the military decisionmaking process. It includes some of the differences in doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures used by each of the ABCA armies.

The *ABCA Coalitions Operations Handbook* is supported by these ABCA handbooks and planning guides:

## Preface

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- *Coalition Logistics Handbook (CLH).*
- *Coalition Health Interoperability Handbook (CHIH).*
- *ABCA Analysis Handbook.*
- *Coalition Intelligence Handbook (CIH).*
- *Coalition Engineer Handbook (CEH).*

These publications provide detailed information in their specific areas for assisting in the conduct of successful coalition operations. The COH, CLH, CHIH, and CIH can be found in electronic version on the ABCA Internet site at [www.abca-armies.org/](http://www.abca-armies.org/).

The masculine form used in this document also designates, when relevant, women as well as men. The masculine form is used to simplify reading of the text

This version replaces Edition 1 (11 May 1999), Edition 2 (1 November 2001), and Edition 3 (11 April 2005).

Each of the nations and the ABCA Armies Program maintain a database with lessons learned. These can be accessed over the Internet. Start at the ABCA Program home page at [www.abca-armies.org/](http://www.abca-armies.org/) under the Lessons, Exercises and Experiments.

# Coalition Operations Handbook

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\*This publication supersedes *ABCA Coalition Operations Handbook*, 11 April 2005.

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## Introduction

Where commonality of interest exists, nations will enter political, economic, and military partnerships. These partnerships can occur in both regional and worldwide patterns as nations seek opportunities to promote their mutual national interests or seek mutual security against real or perceived threats. Cultural, psychological, economic, technological, and political factors all influence the formation and conduct of coalitions.

Coalitions, which are created for limited purposes and for a set time, do not afford military planners the same political resolve and commonality of aim as alliances. Thus, planners must closely study the political goals of each participant as a precursor to detailed planning. Political considerations weigh more heavily with coalitions than with alliance operations. Coalition military operations are not new. The American, British, Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand (ABCA) nations have participated together in several coalition operations during the twentieth century. Since human nature has not changed, conflicts over territory, religion, politics, and economics, such as those that prompted previous military operations, will continue to be widespread. The precise role of armies in these operations will vary according to each political and military situation.

Another reason nations conduct coalition operations is that rarely can one nation go it alone either politically or militarily. Coalition operations will involve a comprehensive approach that includes other government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and international and regional organizations. This blending of capabilities and political legitimacy makes possible certain operations that a single nation could not or would not conduct unilaterally.

Almost all coalition operations, regardless of how they are formed, build from common fundamentals. All coalitions form in one of three ways. Coalition headquarters have similar components. In addition, all coalitions assess the area for operations. Many of the points will be further developed in the individual chapters.

## UNDERSTANDING COALITIONS

A *coalition* is an ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action. A *coalition action* is a multinational action outside the bounds of established alliances, usually for a single occasion, or for longer cooperation in a narrow sector of common interest. This handbook centers on those operations in which one or more of the ABCA armies participate with other non-ABCA nations in a coalition.

Sovereignty issues will be the most difficult issues for the commander of the coalition force to deal with, both in regard to forces contributed by nations and by host nations. Often, the coalition force commander is a “commander” in title only; the coalition force commander will accomplish the mission through coordination, communication, and

consensus or leadership rather than by traditional command concepts. Such is the nature of coalition operations.

*Coalition operations* are conducted by forces of two or more nations, which may not be allies, acting together for the accomplishment of a single mission. Coalition operations cross the spectrum of conflict from major combat operations to peacetime military engagement. Coalition operations are a subset of multinational operations. These operations can also include various nonmilitary organizations and other services. Conducting military operations with foreign military partners, like operations with civilian partners, is uncommon to many soldiers, so a clear understanding of this different environment is necessary.

Coalition operations may be driven by common agreement among the participating coalition partners or through a mandate provided by the United Nations (UN). Either way, their multinational character merits particular attention because national interests and organizational influence may compete with doctrine and efficiency. Consensus is painstakingly difficult, and solutions are often national in character. Commanders can expect contributing nations to adhere to national policies and priorities, which at times complicates the coalition effort.

In UN-sponsored coalition operations, a force is employed under a single commander. The secretary general appoints the force commander with the consent of the UN Security Council. The force commander reports either to a special representative of the secretary general or directly to the secretary general. While the force commander conducts day-to-day operations with wide discretionary powers, referring all policy matters to the special representative or secretary general for resolution.

In coalition operations, consensus building to ensure compatibility at the political, military, and cultural levels between partners is key. A successful coalition must establish at least unity of effort, if not unity of command. The success of a coalition operation begins with the authority to direct operations of all assigned or attached military forces.

The coalition force commander has much to consider, in addition to military considerations. Considerations such as the strategic context within which the operation will be carried out; civil administration; the reestablishment of justice; civil policing; humanitarian assistance; post-conflict development and reconstruction; the possibility of election organization; financial management; and multicultural issues. Commanders must harmonize these considerations to ensure that the operation has the best possible chance of success. Doing this well, early, and professionally with the optimum level of input and up-front accountability from all likely participants will provide a firm base for a successful operation.

### **CONFIDENCE**

Successful coalitions are built on the commander's focus, which includes the political objective, assigned mission, patience, sensitivity to the needs of other coalition members, a willingness to compromise or come to a consensus when necessary, and mutual confidence. After World War II, General Dwight D. Eisenhower said that "mutual

confidence” is the “one basic thing that will make allied commands work.” This mutual confidence stems from a combination of tangible actions and entities and intangible human factors. Although they do not guarantee the success, ignoring them can usually guarantee failure of the coalition in accomplishing its mission.

## **FORMING COALITIONS**

Creating a coalition is a political act that sets the conditions for success or failure of a multinational operation. Commanders have an overriding interest in providing advice to assist their political leadership in forming practical military guidance. Further, all national military commanders in a coalition will require specific understandings and agreements with the coalition commander and their counterparts if they are to achieve and maintain unity of effort. Establishing these understandings and agreements are a commander’s first responsibility. They provide not only the basis for unity of effort, but also the foundation for the command guidance needed by staffs when doing campaign planning (political-military-civil). These commander-to-commander understandings and agreements are central to setting the conditions for success. It is far better to negotiate them during coalition formation, or when a new member joins, than after operations commence. In establishing these understandings, commanders need to be acutely aware of the national interests of each coalition partner.

## **STRATEGIC SCHEME**

Military advice to the national authorities is critical in the early planning to determine the strategic end state, objectives, and composition of the coalition force. Commanders should take every opportunity to ensure that political leaders fully understand the force’s abilities and limitations and the time required to successfully plan and prepare for an operation. See appendix A for further details on coalition capabilities.

Strategic planning begins with the mandate of a legitimizing authority, such as the UN or other multinational political coalition. The mandate is usually expanded by terms of reference (TORs) that establish for the military the limits of the mission, operational parameters, and specified authorities to conduct operations—for example, the right to search civilians and seize property. Nations often supplement the TORs with national guidance for their own military forces.

Whether in TORs or another form, the guidance must be secured since it is the starting point for the military appreciation, analysis, and estimate process. This process—which precedes or is the first step in campaign planning—establishes a common understanding of the mandate among coalition partners. Without a common understanding, agreement on such factors as the role of the military, required forces, acceptable risk, and rules of engagement cannot be formed.

## **PLAN EARLY**

Coalition planning must start well before the actual operation and may use generic plans around which to build the specific plan. Depending on the type and nature of operations to

be conducted, planning may include other government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and international and regional organizations. The plans address predeployment, deployment, sustainment, and transition.

### **CAMPAIGN PREPARATION**

Thorough campaign planning is a vital factor in achieving unity of effort among coalition partners and civilian agencies. Processes must be simple enough for subordinate commands to agree to and understand. Habitual relationships in peacetime or sufficient training time before operations allow enough time for coalition planners to teach others the key points of the process. These relationships build consensus on the approach to the particular operation.

The mandate expresses political will. The TORs establish conditions for execution. The campaign plan translates these into military and political ends, ways, and means. Transition planning should be an integral part of campaign planning and done simultaneously with the other organizations. This not only assists in the timely creation of the follow-on force but it also promotes a smooth transition.

### **FORCE PROJECTION**

Force projection, especially for a coalition, is critical to overall mission success. From the beginning, commanders must know the coalition considerations to smoothly deploy forces and most effectively use lift assets. Coalition operations often have duplicated effort and unit capabilities. For example, before the UN Protection Force (known as UNPROFOR) deployed to the Former Republic of Yugoslavia, each participating nation performed its own engineer reconnaissance of the infrastructure resulting in duplications and omissions. The coalition force must coordinate and anticipate requirements during this phase to maximize capabilities and minimize resources. Planners must review national military contingents and host-nation assets and agree on a division of labor.

Limited lift calls for maximizing its efficiency during deployment. This requires coordination with the host nation so units do not deploy capabilities already available, such as port operations forces. In some cases, one coalition nation may transport another's forces to the area of operations. Liaison officers from national contingents must coordinate one of two groups: directly with the nation that is moving its forces or with the coalition force headquarters if it is responsible for coordinating the movements with the nation providing lift. Chapter 19 provides additional information on logistics considerations.

### **NATIONAL INTERESTS AND CAPABILITIES**

Political agendas of participating countries affect coalition operations. Many nations will not, or are reluctant to, relinquish full command of their forces to other countries. On a case-by-case basis, the national authorities may place national forces under the operational control of a coalition commander. In such cases, parallel chains of command may exist, with part being through the coalition force and part through the national authorities. The

coalition's challenge is to arrange the best command relationships with its subordinate forces to ensure mission success.

The national interests of nations regarding the operation are usually described in the terms of reference between the contributing nations and other coalition partners or, if involved, the UN. Developing a written document is vital. Examples include an annex to an operation plan, an operation order, or the military contribution to the comprehensive campaign plan that outlines command relationships.

Command jurisdiction is the legal position of command by one national commander over the soldiers of another nation. Each nation participating in a coalition has its own national authority for the conduct of operations. Each nation will view the conflict based on its own national interests. Where those interests coincide, coalition commanders will have their greatest latitude, and where those interests vary, they will have the least. They will be dealing not only with the national force commander, but also with the national authorities of that nation. Coalition commanders always operate within constraints of one sort or another. Therefore, commanders must understand not only what has been agreed to, but also what national caveats have been made so they can account for them in plans. Commanders should be prepared to spend time working political and military issues rather than purely military matters.

The coalition force must remember that many countries lack the staff or equipment to offer comprehensive support. They may not possess a full array of combat support or combat service support assets; maps of the projected area of operations; the ability to obtain or use intelligence and imagery data commonly used by other coalition forces; and chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) hazard warning, reporting, and prediction systems. These military forces probably will look to other nations for equipment and staff. Commanders must know what agreements exist between the UN and these militaries before they arrive in the projected area of operations.

## **COMPREHENSIVE CAMPAIGN PLAN**

The coalition commander and staff will seek as much guidance and information as possible in planning and preparing to execute their mission. Of significant help to the commander would be a comprehensive campaign plan provided by either the mandating authority or the coalition governments. If none exists, the commander should use this process as a source for obtaining guidance and information for planning.

The comprehensive campaign plan provides a means by which all agencies can discover and coordinate their efforts. This plan results in a single document that captures every agency's intent. It fully informs civil government and military decisionmakers at the strategic level before committing coalition forces in response to a crisis. It provides nongovernmental organizations with the opportunity of providing input which can impact on the composition and operational approach of those forces prior to their arrival. The comprehensive campaign plan—

- Takes a long-term view. It deals with both the underlying causes and symptoms of conflict and crisis.

- Considers the whole environment. It looks at the whole situation; it recognizes that it is complex, adaptive and, to a certain extent, unpredictable.
- Focuses on end states. It focuses on strategic outcomes and operational end states as well as the conditions required to realize them.
- Facilitates collaboration. It allows all levels of command to take part in collaborative and iterative engagement.
- Orchestrates all instruments of national power. It plans for and executes using a comprehensive approach.
- Ensures continuous analysis and assessment. It plans for the conduct of continuously analyzing and assessing as an iterative process to deepen understanding of the changing environment and adjusts as execution and circumstances change.

### **PLANNING GROUP**

Forming a coalition planning group (CPG) will facilitate the coalition planning process. When the coalition is formed, the commander decides on the organization and functions of the CPG as well as how the CPG and staff sections will interact during planning and execution. The CPG should conduct crisis action planning, be the focal point for operation plan or operation order development, perform future planning, and accomplish other tasks as directed. The CPG comprises representatives from appropriate coalition staff sections, national formations, and others deemed necessary.


### **FORMING A COALITION HEADQUARTERS**

A coalition headquarters can form as a lead nation, as a parallel command structure, or as a combination of the two.

### **LEAD NATION**

Command and control in most coalition operations will use the lead nation concept. This concept recognizes that one nation is assigned the lead role and its command and control predominates. Normally, the lead nation is the country providing the largest number of forces for that operation. Figure 1-1 illustrates the concept of a force structure with a lead nation. In NATO, this structure is referred to as the framework nation model.





**Introductory Figure. Force structure concept with a lead nation**

In the lead nation concept, the lead nation determines the command and control procedures, working closely with the other national contingents. The lead nation should provide unique command and control equipment and software to the national component headquarters of other nations whenever feasible. Other nations participating in the operation provide appropriate liaison to the lead nation headquarters. Robust liaison is essential to developing and maintaining unity of effort in coalition operations.

Depending on the size, complexity, and duration of the operation, staff augmentation from other national contingents may be required to supplement the lead nation staff to ensure that the lead nation headquarters represents the entire coalition. Such augmentation may include designated deputies or assistant commanders, planners, and logisticians. This facilitates the planning process by providing the coalition commander with a source of expertise on coalition members. Augmentation will be required if a coalition partner possesses unique organizations or capabilities not found in the forces of the lead nation.

### **PARALLEL COMMAND STRUCTURE**

An alternative to the lead nation concept is the parallel command structure. Under a parallel command structure, no single coalition commander is named. The coalition leadership must develop a means for coordination among the participants to attain unity of effort. Because of the absence of a single coalition commander and lack of unity of command, the use of a parallel command structure should be avoided if possible.

### **COMBINATION: CONCEPT AND STRUCTURE**

The lead nation concept and a parallel command structure can exist simultaneously within a coalition. This occurs when two or more nations serve as controlling elements for a mix

of international forces, such as the Gulf War coalition. While more desirable than the parallel command structure, an effort to achieve a total lead nation concept for unity of command is preferred.

### **COORDINATION WITH NONMILITARY AGENCIES**

When dealing with most nonmilitary agencies, the coalition commander focuses on cooperation and coordination rather than command and control. These agencies will have their own missions and goals. The coalition commander will have a limited ability to influence their actions. To ensure that the coalition commander can accomplish the mission and end state while allowing these agencies to do the same requires the commander to seek their cooperation and to coordinate their efforts to prevent interference in one another's missions. Additionally, these agencies may be in a position to help the commander in mission accomplishment. Developing a civil-military operations center or coalition coordination center for civil-military cooperation is one way of achieving cooperation and coordination with nonmilitary agencies. Chapter 12 discusses the civil-military operations center and coalition coordination center for civil-military cooperation. It also provides a single point of contact between these agencies and the commander.

### **DEVELOPING COALITION MISSIONS**

Each operation is conducted in a unique setting with its own political, diplomatic, geographic, economic, cultural, and military characteristics. Key considerations involved in planning and conducting coalition operations vary with the international situation and the perspectives, motives, and values of the organization's members.

The mission of the coalition can be derived from several sources. These sources include mission statements or orders issued through national chains of command or through international treaties, accord, mandates, resolutions, or agreements. An important first step for the coalition force is to establish connectivity immediately with the higher authority. The coalition force can then be prepared to accept the responsibility for detailed planning and immediate execution.

Politicians and diplomats develop missions. These missions often consist of collections of compromises. Because of ambiguities—purposeful or otherwise—in a mission statement, the commander who receives the mission may find it difficult to put into operational terms. Naturally, changes to missions require the consensus of all participating countries, after approval by an implementing body, if there is one.

### **MISSION FOCUS**

Political considerations and military capabilities of the coalition force are the most important factors in coalition operations. Commanders stay focused on the assigned mission and understand why each national contingent participates. This determines the structure of the coalition force. Failure to understand it may cause the force to split into components operating under differing political direction. While agreeing to the overall goal, national contingents may differ in how to execute the mission. Commanders must

recognize that political considerations may force them to choose an acceptable course of action rather than the optimum military solution. They must remain flexible to adjust to unforeseen political influences, keep the coalition forces focused on the military objective, and avoid mission creep.

To overcome differences in doctrine, training, or equipment, leaders may assign selected functions to a smaller group of partners. For example, the coalition force could assign the mission of sustainment area security to home defense or police forces. Commanders may also entrust one member of the coalition force with air defense, coastal defense, or some special operations based on the threat force's special capabilities. They must recognize the strengths and differences of the cultures from which these forces come. Their decisions on employment, made with the military leadership, consider the capabilities of each force. Subordinate commanders may request control of forces that provide capabilities not organic to that nation's forces. The guiding principle is to allocate assets, as needed, while maintaining concentrated critical capabilities.

### **COMMANDER'S INTENT**

The glue that binds a coalition operation together is the commander's ability to understand and integrate each nation's capabilities into a cohesive force. The commander must clearly articulate the commander's intent so each nation forms the same picture of the end state and the rules of engagement. Given the language difficulties found in many coalitions, the commander's intent must be clearly and simply stated.

### **TRANSFER OF AUTHORITY**

One essential issue in command and control concerns the transfer of authority (TOA) of coalition forces to the coalition commander's control. Nations may not agree on when the transfer should occur. The earlier the coalition force gains control, the more flexibility it has in training for and conducting operations. Differences in national interests, objectives, and policies at the national level, as well as the availability of forces based on concurrent military commitments, may delay initiation of combined planning and agreement to subsequent decisions.

The timing of the TOA must be part of the initial negotiations that govern how the coalition forms. Planners must determine where the TOA and the follow-on integration of units and headquarters occur.

The first option is to arrange the TOA to the coalition force before deploying from a unit's home station. Commanders can then control the sequence of unit arrival to best suit operational requirements and facilitate reception area base operations. This option also assumes clear political consensus, timely decisions on national participation, and a significant lead time for planning and setting up the coalition force headquarters.

A second option is to have a TOA at an intermediate staging base en route to the operational area. Forces resolve problems in a secure area and deploy only when fully ready and in the sequence required by the coalition force.

The third option is to have a TOA occur once forces arrive in the area of operations. This option leaves each nation responsible to deploy its contingent and prepare it for operations. It does not allow the coalition force positive control of deployment into the area of operations and is less than ideal if immediate combat is likely.

Whichever option is chosen, central coordination of deploying forces is preferred. Then reception operations are not done by repetitive crisis management. Centralized control of force flow best supports the coalition's requirements and coalition forces.

### **CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS**

Each coalition nation has a slightly different process for the conduct of operations. If a lead nation commands the coalition, then their process for the conduct of operations will be used. At national contingent headquarters, nations will use their own process.

Operations conducted by a coalition force require continuous coordination among coalition formations throughout the process. Coordination must occur in all phases of the operation from planning and deployment to include analysis, execution, assessment and redeployment. Coalition force commanders and their staffs should involve their coalition partners in each phase to the greatest extent possible. Exchanging information among coalition formations must occur as soon as possible.

### **ASSESSING THE AREA FOR OPERATIONS**

A valuable tool for mission analysis is the early deployment of an assessment mechanism to evaluate requirements for operations in the area of operations. The team can validate the mission analysis, reduce duplication of effort, and provide for a rational division of labor. It can help clarify the mission by actually deciding what needs to be accomplished, what type of forces are required to accomplish it, the proper sequence for deployment, the availability of in-country assets, and what ongoing operations are conducted by civilian organizations in the area of operations. Team members should attempt to answer as many of the checklist questions as possible at the end of each chapter. Some of this information will be directed by the tasking; however, this should not deter the commander from emphasizing requirements.

Composition of the assessment team varies. The team should have members capable of identifying, determining, and assessing infrastructure, transportation limitations, and environmental concerns in the area of operations. The team should also include members of the coalition who will participate in the actual operation. Suggested team membership is—

- Commander or commander designate.
- Linguists or interpreters.
- G-2.
- G-3.
- G-4, to include engineer, transportation, and contracting.
- G-5.

- G-6.
- G-9
- CBRN staff with G-3 and G-4.
- Medical staff to include preventive medicine personnel.
- Legal staff.
- Special operations forces.
- Civil affairs staff.
- Psychological operations staff.
- Public affairs staff.
- Political-military representative.
- Embassy liaison officer.
- UN representation, when appropriate.

### **SUCCESSFUL TERMINATION**

Success is more likely if nations agree on a strategic end state with well-defined termination and exit conditions. These conditions help prompt the decision to end an operation. All participants should agree to these conditions. Exit conditions are critical to the transfer of responsibility from the coalition force to another authority—such as the UN or other regional political bodies—or the overall termination of the operation. UN Security Council resolutions may impose these conditions. The UN or political leadership sets the strategic end state conditions before committing forces.

Commanders must establish and regularly review indicators of success related to the end state since progress and success or victory often are difficult to assess. They have to recognize when the mission is not achievable without restructuring or committing additional assets, or when further action may waste resources.

Transition planning should be an integral part of the campaign planning done simultaneously with the other elements. This will not only assist with the timely creation of the follow-on force or civil capability, but will also promote a smooth transition for any subsequent follow-on operations or transition to another authority.

### **STAFFING**

The coalition staff organization will be based on what option is used to form the coalition headquarters. The commander may not have a choice if the establishing authority designates an organization. If the lead nation concept is used, the routine duties of the commander and staff will be those assigned by the doctrine of the lead nation, modified as necessary for the specific situation. If a composite headquarters is selected, the commander and staff will have to specify duties in more detail. It may be necessary to change the names of various coalition functions based on sensitivities when working with organizations such as the UN. This section highlights several responsibilities unique to coalition operations.

## **COALITION FORCE COMMANDER**

The coalition force commander is responsible to the coalition nations to successfully accomplish the mission. Specific responsibilities include—

- Making recommendations to the establishing authorities on properly using assigned and attached forces and on accomplishing the mission, to include identifying requirements for additional forces needed.
- Notifying the establishing authorities when prepared to assume responsibility for the assigned area of operations.
- Determining the requirement for and providing guidance on the establishment of staff functions.

## **DEPUTY COALITION FORCE COMMANDER**

Normally, the deputy commander comes from a country different from the commander. The deputy commander's selection may be based on the mission assigned or the number and type of forces in the coalition. The deputy usually is of equal or senior rank to the subordinate force commanders. The deputy should possess a comprehensive understanding of the operation to be conducted. The commander directs the deputy to perform special duties, such as chairing committees and coordinating liaison personnel, incoming and outgoing requirements, and interagency requirements.

## **CHIEF OF STAFF**

In most cases, the chief of staff will come from the same country as the commander, probably from the same command. Because the staff may have officers from different nations, the chief of staff places special emphasis on training, coordinating, and directing the work of the staff. The chief of staff must pay particular attention to establishing routine procedures that ensure necessary coordination takes place and in reviewing staff actions for completeness and clarity.

## **STAFF**

Depending on the type of headquarters, the staff will derive its prefix—such as C for coalition, J for joint, G for general—for each element. Discussions of specific staff responsibilities are contained in appropriate chapters.

Personnel nominated to fill coalition augmentation billets should possess the following attributes: knowledge, confidence, forcefulness, preparedness to represent their nations and units, understanding that they are the de facto country experts, and ability to work as part of a coalition team without country parochialism.

## **POLITICAL ADVISOR**

Commanders will routinely work directly with political authorities in the region. The commander should establish a close and efficient relationship with the political advisor (POLAD). The responsibilities of the POLAD include—

- Working with the commander and assisting the national authorities in creating policies that meet coalition objectives and are executed realistically.
- Acting as the principal contact with ambassadors and informing the appropriate diplomatic personnel of coalition force plans in the area of operations.
- Supplying information regarding policy goals and objectives of the diplomatic agencies relevant to the operation.

## **TRANSLATORS AND INTERPRETERS**

Translators and interpreters can be critical to mission success. Communications with the local populace and coalition forces can be greatly hindered without them. Language barriers may cause difficulties in interoperability with other armies and in dealing with the host nation. Language problems can make it difficult to sustain a rapid decision cycle. Even common tasks, such as sharing intelligence, must await translation before data can pass through the command, slowing the development of plans and execution. Language capability speeds command, reduces confusion, and contributes to mutual respect. Forces must be able to exchange commands and other information effectively to work successfully together. Few linguists have both the technical expertise and depth of understanding to be understood fully while crossing both language and doctrinal boundaries.

Historically, the timely acquisition of enough translators and interpreters has been a problem that significantly affected both personnel tempo and coalition operations. These assets often are in the reserves and must be requested early to ensure availability and timeliness for deployment. Contracted interpreters can also be used. While this is acceptable for many requirements, some sensitive positions will require military translators with appropriate security clearances. In cases of less common languages, coalition components may require parent country or other country augmentation. If contracted linguists or interpreters are used, they will require predeployment training and security clearances. Always assume the other party may understand what is being said even when using an interpreter. Therefore, do not say anything that you would not want the other party to hear. An interpreter may not always say exactly what has been said but will try to convey the same meaning using other words. If the speaker wants exact wording to be used, the speaker should ensure that the interpreter is aware of this.

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Chapter 1

# Command and Control

To understand the factors that will affect this functional area, readers must answer the applicable generic questions in chapter 5. Additionally, the chapters on training and logistics have questions that pertain to each of the other functional areas.

This chapter provides guidelines for the command and control (C2) of coalition operations. It is specifically targeted to provide the commander with a guide to the political and military aspects that are keys to success in the campaign planning process.

## CHECKLIST

### POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

1. What is the source (United Nations or North Atlantic Treaty Organization) of the mission tasking?
2. What relationship exists between the military force and the source of the mission tasking? If the source is not the political authority sponsoring the coalition operation, has clarification and support from national military chains of command been requested?
3. Does a government agency have the lead?
4. What does the mandate specify as the role of coalition forces in—
  - General war?
  - Peace enforcement and peacekeeping?
  - Security and civil law and order?
  - Civil administration?
  - Economic and infrastructure?
  - Humanitarian responsibilities?
5. What constraints are imposed on coalition forces by their national authorities? Do political leaders fully understand the capabilities and limitations of coalition forces and the time required to successfully plan and prepare for an operation?
6. Is there a clear means to resolve disputes over use of forces?
7. Do commanders clearly understand the latitude given the commanders by their respective nations?
8. To facilitate known force employment options of troop contributing nation's units, is there a mapping of common coalition constraints and a limitation?
9. What political motivations are responsible for each nation's participation in the operation? What potential conflicts may arise?
10. Have the national sensitivities as well as differing norms of behavior among national militaries and civilian agencies been considered?
11. Do coalition members understand their partners' national views and work to minimize friction within the coalition force?
12. Do commanders clearly understand the political objectives of all parties, to include third parties and neighboring states?
13. Are military planners receiving advice from their command authorities at the early stages of coalition planning when the political leadership is determining the strategic end state, objectives, and composition of the coalition?

14. Have status-of-forces agreements been agreed to? If not, who should conduct negotiations?
15. Do coalition members fully know what treaty and international agreements have been signed by which country?
16. Which civilian chief do the commanders report to and which civilian agencies provide resources?
17. What is the operational environment, to include the threat, consent of disputants, and disputants' view of multinational forces, and national and regional culture? What are their implications? Have the effects of these on contemplated coalition operations been assessed?
18. Do all levels of the chain of command understand the military-civilian relationship? This understanding prevents unnecessary and counterproductive friction during peace operations where activities are often conducted at the small-unit level?
19. Do any coalition forces require direct communications capability<sup>1</sup> from the operational area to their national leadership?
20. How is the military role coordinated with the roles of other government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and international and regional organizations?
21. Have C2 arrangements been made to include the coalition ambassadors, military attaches, and nonmilitary government officials in coordinating functions?

### **TERMS OF REFERENCE**

1. Does the coalition have a clear mandate and terms of reference (TORs) for the operation that specifies all conditions and parameters for the operation, to include limits of the mission, operational parameters, and specified authorities to conduct operations?
2. Are the TORs supplemented by command authorities with national guidance for the coalition's military force?
3. Do the troop contributing nations understand how the TORs and status-of-forces agreements affect their national policies and international obligations? This understanding helps to avoid possible conflicts of coalition laws of armed conflict and rules of engagement, thus avoiding unacceptable use of force and weapons not acceptable by all coalition partners.

<sup>1</sup> This capability can ease coordinating issues, but it can also be a source of frustration if leaders external to the operational area issue guidance directly to their deployed national forces.

## **END STATE**

1. What is the end state? Does it clearly define mission success and the military role to attain it?
2. What are the national end state criteria of each coalition partner? Do they differ from the criteria of the coalition force itself?
3. Has the end state and exit strategy been articulated as part of the commander's intent? Does this intent support the desired political end state?
4. What courses of action do coalition forces follow when a troop contributing nation withdraws from the force?
5. What courses of action are executed if the sponsoring organization orders withdrawal of coalition forces in advance of end state achievement?
6. When does transfer of command authority to the lead nation take place?
7. Does the end state identify the conditions under which the coalition military operation can be terminated?
8. Are the conditions tangible in military terms?
9. Are the conditions contained in the mission statement?
10. What are the requirements for transition? Who is the transition force and controlling headquarters?

## **CAMPAIGN PREPARATION**

1. Are the coalition force requirements identified and each nation's commitment confirmed?
2. Is the mission statement tailored for the coalition force and for the subordinate command when necessary?
3. Has an atmosphere of cooperation and trust been put in place at the highest levels of any coalition?<sup>2</sup>
4. Is the perceived mission appropriate, achievable, and equitable in burden and risk sharing?

## **MISSION**

1. Has a comprehensive campaign plan been developed?

<sup>2</sup> Commanders must ensure equitable treatment and exposure of all units, regardless of national background. Failure to do so may be perceived as prejudice and result in political repercussions.

2. Are commanders considering how their actions contribute to initiatives that are also diplomatic, economic, and informational?
3. What is the role of partners in developing and vetting the campaign (political-military) plan?
4. What and how much of the affected nation's infrastructure should be restored?
5. Will the coalition's projected actions solve the long-term problem of the mission area?
6. What is "one thing" the coalition force can do to stabilize the situation?
7. Is a weapons bounty program needed to disarm certain groups?
8. Is the campaign planning conducted with nonmilitary government agencies, to include properly coordinating proper coordination with international and private organizations operating in the joint operations area?

#### **COALITION FORCE STRUCTURE**

1. Are the coalition force requirements identified and the nations' commitment confirmed?
2. What forces are required and are they sufficient to accomplish the mandate?
3. Are forces; command, control, and communications capabilities; and logistic support robust enough to respond to increased levels of operational intensity?
4. Are there minimum capability standards established for participation? Does a certification process exist to cover specific areas of concern: training-level competence; logistics capabilities; and deployment, sustainment, and redeployment readiness?
5. Has the coalition force commander determined which nations can offer special capabilities—airlift, special operations, intelligence collection, communications, security, and logistics—to offset other nations' shortfalls and enhance overall operational competence?
6. Have coalition commanders sought assistance from other government agencies in assessing other nations' capabilities to participate in operations?
7. During the mission analysis, did commanders consider the development and refinement of rules of engagement as well as resource and funding requirements? Is the process simple enough for subordinate commands to agree to and understand?

8. Have all agencies having a military, political, or social role in the planned operation been briefed for unity of effort between coalition partners and civilian agencies?<sup>3</sup>
9. Have the relationships been built during peacetime, or has sufficient training been conducted before operations commence? These relationships must allow coalition military planners to familiarize others with the key points of the process and to build consensus on the approach to the particular operation.
10. What is the probable cost of the operation in lives, money, and resources? Is it acceptable to the political authorities directing the force's involvement?
11. What courses of action do coalition forces follow when a national military element withdraws from the force?
12. What courses of action are executed if the sponsoring organization orders withdrawal of coalition forces in advance of end state achievement?
13. Have the forces relying on strategic mobility for deployment and redeployment from other coalition members been included in the supporting nations deployment sequence?
14. Has the deployment sequence been completed and validated?
15. Has the deployment plan deconflicted civilian agency and contractor transportation requirements to avoid competition for limited transportation infrastructure?
16. Does the coalition force lack any critical capabilities?
17. Has a reconnaissance of the operational area been conducted?
18. Has the use of strategic forces been considered and planned for?
19. Does the coalition force have sufficient assets to protect itself? Do the assets balance with the potential political ramifications of failure to protect the force?

### **TRANSFER OF AUTHORITY**

1. When and where does transfer of command authority for each troop contributing nation to the lead nation take place?
2. What transfer of authority option did each coalition nation select?

### **MISSION**

1. What is the mission? Is it clearly defined, decisive, and attainable?

<sup>3</sup> Such intentional involvement builds consensus and strengthens trust among commanders and the various coalition members.

2. How does the mission statement accomplish the desired end state?
3. What are the specific objectives of the force? How do the objectives help achieve the end state?
4. Have these objectives been translated into tasks for subordinate commanders?
5. Is the mission statement tailored for the coalition force and for the subordinate command when necessary?
6. Is the perceived mission appropriate, achievable, and equitable in burden and risk sharing.
7. What is the process to consider and approve changes to the mission statement?
8. Is the mission periodically reviewed to avoid both directed and self-imposed mission creep? How will the force control mission creep?
9. Can the force accomplish its mission in the allotted time?
10. Are the national honor and prestige considered when assigning the missions to coalition forces?
11. Do coalition members perceive that their contributions weigh equally toward accomplishing the mission, regardless of the rank of their senior member or size of the national force?
12. Has the mission, to include commander's intent, been disseminated? Do elements two echelons down understand it?
13. Do the tasks ensure that all elements make meaningful contributions to the mission?
14. Has agreement been achieved on the mission and end state?
15. Is there a specific time line for the operation?
16. What are the estimated costs (lives, money, and resources) of the operation?

#### **COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS**

1. To whom does the commander report?
2. What is the command structure? Is it lead nation, parallel command, or a combination?
3. Have supported and supporting relationships been established or referred to higher authority to resolve inadequacies?
4. Does the coalition commander remain visible to members of the coalition where personal visits to all units provide the opportunity to assess capabilities, readiness, and morale as well as to build rapport?
5. Have staff visits been coordinated?

6. Have visits by the unit commander to higher headquarters been coordinated?
7. What interoperability factors will affect the mission, for example, command, control, communications, or logistics?
8. Has the command structure been designed to minimize the number of layers?
9. Do coalition force commanders have the authority to remove particular forces or individuals from a coalition if required?

### **STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURES**

1. Does the command have a standing operating procedure (SOP) that includes reporting requirements and procedures?
2. Are the developed SOPs easy to understand and address “coalition” procedures, not single nation procedures?
3. In the case of a lead nation, has a forum to deconflict and resolve SOP misunderstandings been developed?
4. Has a policy been established for the coalition force for maintaining a journal or diary within the sections of the various headquarters?
5. What is the policy on operational reports and the gathering of lessons learned?
6. Have the military forces and civilian agencies developed and distributed a common lexicon of mutually-agreed terms to avoid confusion?

### **LANGUAGE AND INTERPRETERS**

1. Has the command established a common language and level at which it will be used?
2. At what command level will each coalition force resort to its national language?
3. Are there sufficient interpreters for planning and execution?
4. Have the planners determined the requirements for language-trained personnel early in the planning cycle because of the scarcity of these assets and the long-lead time required for deploying them?
5. Have the language-qualified personnel received sufficient training to familiarize themselves with technical terms and procedures of the organization?
6. Have translation requirements needed throughout the logistic functions been coordinated with local authorities, civilian transportation coordinators, refugee and relief centers, hospital staffs, legal offices, and local police forces?

### **FORMING A HEADQUARTERS**

1. Have the requirements for staff augmentation been identified?



2. Is the coalition staff composed of appropriate members in key positions from each country having forces in the coalition so that country representation and influence generally reflect the composition of the force?
3. Is the location of the coalition force headquarters selected to protect itself against various threats, but in a position to easily work with both the political and military sides of the operation?
4. Is there a need to establish a cell of experts prepared to augment a coalition by providing assistance in the early planning and organizing?
5. Are the staff positions stem from the mission, type of operations to be conducted, force composition as it applies to capabilities, limitations, and required support?
6. Does the commander wish to select staff members, such as the chief of staff or G-3, to know, trust, and quickly reach a comfort level with them?
7. Has the commander requested the necessary personnel, facilities, and equipment from either the commander's national chain of command or the coalition establishing authorities when mission requirements exceed staff capabilities?
8. Does the staff include experienced operators for the communications and information systems used to support the coalition?
9. Have all coalition legal constraints been considered in planning for C2?
10. Do the augmentation personnel possess the following attributes: knowledge, confidence, forcefulness, preparedness to represent their nations and units, required functional skills, training level, language skill and avoidance of historic animosities, an understanding that they are the de facto country "experts," and the ability to work as part of a coalition team without country parochialism?
11. Have a staff orientation program and a "buddy system"<sup>4</sup> been implemented to familiarize all individuals joining the staff with their surroundings?
12. Is the augmentation staff included in the coalition training and exercise program?

### **LIAISON OFFICERS**

1. Have liaison officers been identified?

<sup>4</sup> This could be accomplished by establishing a coalition personnel recovery center under the G-1/S-1. The "buddy system" is another program that the command could establish with the reception center or by itself. This system assigns an experienced staff member to a new staff member to assist in the familiarization process.

2. Have key liaison officers been interviewed for suitability?
3. What liaison officers must be sent to coalition force headquarters and adjacent, supporting, and supported units?
4. What are the requirements for interagency and multinational coordination? Does the force have adequate liaison officers or liaison officer teams to meet required coordination?
5. Do liaison officers possess requisite authorities and fully understand both national interest and coalition objectives?
6. Do liaison officers have appropriate communications, linguistic, logistic, and office support capabilities in place?

### **COORDINATION CENTERS**

1. Can the coordination center provide C2; logistics; and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear staff and civil-military operations?
2. Will the coordination center be the initial focal point for support issues such as force sustainment, medical support, infrastructure engineering, host-nation support, and movement control?
3. Will the coordination center role be expanded as a coalition matures to include command activities?
4. Has a search been conducted to determine if extant documents are available to support operations or on a given capability for military and nonmilitary agencies?

## REFERENCES

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- ADDP 3. *Operations* (Australia).
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- British Army Doctrine Publication Volume 1: Operations* (United Kingdom).
- FM 3-0. *Operations* (United States).
- JP 1. *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* (United States).
- JP 3-0. *Joint Operations* (United States).
- JP 3-16. *Multinational Operations* (United States).
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## Chapter 2

# Command Authorities

To understand the factors that will affect this functional area, readers must answer the applicable generic questions in chapter 5. Additionally, the chapters on training and logistics have questions that pertain to each of the other functional areas.

## INTRODUCTION

2-1. Establishing clear command relationships is fundamental to organizing all operations. These relationships prescribe clear command responsibilities and authorities between the coalition commander and subordinate troop contributing nation (TCN) units. Some forces are given command relationships that limit the commander's authority to prescribe additional relationships. Knowing the inherent authorities of each command relationship allows commanders to establish clear responsibilities when organizing their forces.

## COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

2-2. Normally the TCN national commands providing forces to the coalition assign national forces under operational control (OPCON) of the coalition force commander. Smaller nations may place their forces' OPCON to a larger force, and the larger force is placed under OPCON to the coalition force commander. The respective nations—in accordance with their national policies—may limit the assignment of these national forces under OPCON. Further assignment to Service component commanders in an OPCON status by the coalition force commander is approved by the respective national commands. Command less OPCON of the national forces is retained by the parent national commander and is exercised through the designated national commander of the respective nations within the coalition force. The coalition commander and national commanders discuss and clarify their mutual understandings of the command authorities that have been transferred to the coalition commander. This clarification ensures a common understanding of those authorities and precludes potential misunderstandings. ABCA, using North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) terms, has specific definitions for OPCON and tactical control. The United Nations also has a definition for OPCON. Figure 1-2 on page 2-2 compares the different command authorities using US and NATO terms.

Authority	Least Control				
	Most Control	US OPCON	NATO OPCOM	NATO OPCON	NATO TACOM
Granted to a command		X			
Delegated to a command	X		X	X	X
Set chain of command to forces	X				
Assign mission/designate objective	X	X			
Assign tasks	X	X		X	
Direct/Employ forces	X	X	X		
Establish maneuver control measures	X	X	X	X	X
Retain OPCON	X	X			
Delegate OPCON	X	X	X with approval		
Assign TACOM	X				
Delegate TACON	X	X	X		
Retain TACON	X	X	X		
Deploy forces (information/within theater)	X	X	X		
Local direction/control designated forces	X				X
Assign separate employment of unit components	X	X			
Direct joint training	X				
Exercise command of US forces in MNF	X				
Assign/reassign subordinate commanders/officers	May suspend or recommend reassignment				

<input type="checkbox"/>	- has this authority	DOD - Department of Defense
<input type="checkbox"/>	- denied this authority, or not specifically granted it	MNF - multinational force
		NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization
		OPCOM - operational command
		OPCON - operational control
		TACOM - tactical command
		TACON - tactical control
		US - United States

Figure 1-2. Comparison of command and control authority levels authority

## **OPERATIONAL CONTROL**

2-3. *Operational control* is the authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or location; to deploy units concerned, and to retain or assign tactical control of those units. It does not include authority to assign separate employment of components of the units concerned. Neither does it, of itself, include administrative or logistic control (AAP-6, *NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions*).

## **TACTICAL CONTROL**

2-4. *Tactical control* is the detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned (AAP-6, *NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions*).

## **UNITED NATIONS DEFINITION OF OPERATIONAL CONTROL**

2-5. The United Nations defines operational control as the authority granted to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time or location by troop-contributing countries in the Security Council Resolution/mandate, to deploy units and retain or assign tactical control of those units; it is a more restrictive level of authority than operational command: a commander cannot change the mission of those forces or deploy them outside the area of responsibility previously agreed to by the troop-contributing country without the prior consent of this country; further the commander cannot separate contingents by assigning tasks to components of the units concerned.

## **DISCUSSION POINTS FOR COMMANDERS FOR COMMAND AUTHORITY**

2-6. As stated in paragraph 2-2, the coalition commander and national commanders should discuss and clarify their mutual understandings of the command authorities. A number of discussion points will help to clarify that understanding. This list is not comprehensive and should serve only as a starting point in those discussions.

2-7. Does the coalition commander have the following:

- Authority to relieve troop contributing nation commanders?
- Ability to task-organize or cross-attach within national or transnational contingents?
- Ability to employ assets outside agreed sector?
- Restrictions on assigning missions?
- To modify the rules of engagement for TCN?
- Authority to impose more restrictive rules of engagement?
- To modify force protection, to include dress in the area of operation (chapter 15 addresses force protection)?
- To impose movement restrictions?
- To limit TCN use of host-nation facilities and resources?

- To limit indigenous fraternization?
- Ability to conduct training with TCN?
- To influence or direct predeployment activities?
- Authority over civilian support for TCN, such as TCN government employees or civilian contractors?

2-8. Do TCNs have:

- Restrictions to command authority that are cultural or religious based for employment of forces?
- Time and date related restrictions such as religious and national holidays or practices?
- Restrictions on participation in certain types of operations, to include:
  - War crimes criminal's apprehension?
  - Mass graves investigation or control?
  - Cross boundary or forward line of own troops operations?
  - Crowd control?
  - Psychological operations?
  - Disinformation and propaganda?
  - Movement of displaced persons?
- Restrictions on use of TCN military assets for support to:
  - Humanitarian assistance and civil-military operations?
  - Nongovernmental organizations or international and regional organizations?
- Restrictions on use of military for civil law enforcement or civil administration?
- Restrictions on working with other nations in the coalition?

## **SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS**

2-9. Support relationships define the purpose, scope, and effect desired when one capability supports another. Support relationships establish specific responsibilities between supporting and supported units.

2-10. The supported commander is the commander having primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by a higher military authority and who receives forces or other support from one or more supporting commanders. The supporting commander is the commander who provides a supported commander with forces or other support and/or who develops a supporting plan.



## CHECKLIST

1. Have command relationships for control of forces been defined?
2. Is there an initiating directive that clearly articulates the command arrangements?
3. Have the command relationships been defined and analyzed for the following:
  - Feasibility of achieving unity of command or unity of effort?
  - The feasibility of achieving the mission under the command relationships established?
  - Assistance required from national commands in negotiating unity of command or effort at the strategic level?
  - Clarity of relationships and understanding on the part of all coalition elements?

## REFERENCES

- AAP-6. *NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions* (NATO).
- ADDP 00.1. *Command and Control* (Australia).
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- JWP 0-10. *UK Doctrine for Joint and Multinational Operations* (United Kingdom).
- MCDP 6. *Command and Control* (United States).

## Chapter 3

# Rules of Engagement

To understand the factors that will affect this functional area, readers must answer the applicable generic questions in chapter 5. Additionally, the chapters on training and logistics have questions that pertain to each of the other functional areas

## INTRODUCTION

3-1. Rules of engagement (ROE) are directives to military forces and individuals that define the circumstances and limitations under which forces will initiate and/or continue combat with other forces. Often participants have similar political mandates. However, each nation likely comes to the coalition with different national ROE reflecting that nation's reason for entering the coalition. Some national ROE will be relatively free of constraint while others may be severely constrained. In many cases, commanders of deployed forces may lack the authority to speak for their nation in the process to develop rules of engagement. Commanders seek complete consensus or standardization of ROE but may not achieve it. Commanders need to reconcile differences as much as possible to develop and implement simple ROE. Member forces can tailor these rules to their national policies. For the individual soldier to understand and implement ROE, they must be clear and simple. Trying to obtain concurrence for ROE from national authorities is a time-consuming process that commanders should address early in the planning process.

3-2. All nations in the coalition will receive ROE from their respective chains of command. The force headquarters develops coalition force ROE during the planning process. Subsequently, subordinate formations, from nations other than that of the force headquarters, develop supporting ROE. Often, some subordinate ROE will vary from the lead nation's ROE. They will differ in compliance with national legal requirements and the parameters of national ROE provided by national chains of command. Subordinate ROE for any given national contingent also clarify national guidance on other coalition nations' weapons usage that would be prohibited by law or restricted for that contingent. Commanders recognize potential risks. Using another nation's capability prohibited by the command's national ROE may place the command at risk of national prosecution.

## CHECKLIST

### GENERAL

1. Does the coalition have a common definition for self-defense?
2. Are levels of self-defense defined such as necessary, proportional, or imminent?
3. Have rules been established concerning permission to attack based on hostile intent and hostile act?
4. Have rules of engagement been established for air operations?
5. Have rules of engagement been established for air defense operations?
6. Have rules of engagement been established for maritime operations?
7. Does the coalition have a common amplifying guidance and definitions relative to the rules of engagement?
8. What is the effect of national rules of engagement and objectives on force composition and mission assignment?

### SPECIFIC

1. Have rules of engagement been agreed upon by national authorities or by national military commanders?
2. How will national rules of engagement affect other coalition force organizations and operations?
3. What are the procedures for commanders to request a change to the rules of engagement?
4. Are there generic rules of engagement that all nations have agreed to?
5. What is the impact on each participating nation of the rules of engagement?
6. How does each nation disseminate rules of engagement to its soldiers?
7. Have the rules of engagement been distributed to the soldiers and training conducted before deployment?
8. What are the key differences in rules of engagement across the coalition?
9. Are there national “red cards” or points of contention concerning rules of engagement that the commander must know?
10. Are there rules of engagement on the use of indirect fire? What are the rules and do they impact on the engagement of targets?
11. Is there a dichotomy between force rules of engagement on the use of indirect fire and national force protection?

12. Does each nation have a common or clear understanding of the terms used in the rules of engagement?
13. Has the use of certain systems or equipment—such as defoliants, riot control agents—been evaluated for its impact regarding the rules of engagement?
14. What will be the coalition rules of engagement before hostilities and after committing the first hostile act?
15. Will the policy on pre-emptive air strikes be contained within the coalition rules of engagement?
16. Who will define weapon control statuses such as weapons free, weapons tight, and weapons hold?
17. What mechanism will exist to update rules of engagement during the operation?
18. Does the nation's rules of engagement include electronic attack, jamming, electronic, and deception?
19. Are forces authorized to use electronic countermeasures? What levels of electronic countermeasures can be applied and to what systems?
20. What are the guidelines on using indirect fire to demonstrate intent?
21. Do these guidelines vary among the nations?
22. What are the troop contributing nation's understandings of use of lethal force in self-defense, to protect property, and for mission accomplishment? Do any of the troop contributing nations assert a right of pre-emptive self-defense or do they assert a right of anticipatory self-defense?
23. What are the requirements for rules of engagement governing intelligence aspects of the operation like wiretaps, human intelligence activities, or reporting?
24. What are the requirements and limitations for implementing tactical questioning and higher order human exploitation?
25. What are the rules of engagement for different coalition countries?

#### **DEVELOPING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT**

1. What actions are authorized to prevent the boarding, detention, or seizure of designated aircraft, vessels, vehicles, personnel, or property? What levels and types of force can be applied?
2. Are forces authorized to intervene in nonmilitary activities? What nonmilitary activities are authorized for intervention? What level and types of force can be applied?
3. Will boarding operations be authorized? What levels and types of force can be applied?

4. Will detention or seizure operations be authorized? What is the defined scope of those operations? What levels and types of force can be applied?
5. Will infrared or visual illuminants be authorized? How will they be controlled?
6. Has the criteria to identify potential targets been defined? What specific requirements must be met before engaging a potential target?
7. Are forces authorized to exercise in the presence of a potential enemy?
8. Are forces authorized to conduct overt simulated attacks? What are the restrictions related to those actions?
9. Are forces authorized to designate targets?
10. Are forces authorized to respond to harassment operations? What levels and types of force can forces use in conducting counterharassment and harassment operations?
11. Are riot control agents authorized? What are the restrictions on using riot control agents and under what circumstances?
12. Is the use of force authorized? Under what circumstances and in what types of designated operations is it authorized? (This is related primarily to peace support, evacuation, humanitarian aid and other similar operations.) What levels and types of force can be applied?
13. Is the use of specific weapons prohibited or restricted in designated circumstances?
14. Are forces authorized to conduct information operations? What types of information operations can be applied? What levels of response can be applied? What nonlethal technology is available, how is the force trained to use it, and do the rules of engagement authorize its employment?
15. Are forces authorized to use land or maritime mines? What are the restrictions on the use of land or maritime mines?
16. Are forces authorized to conduct attacks (not related to self-defense)? What types of attacks are authorized and under what circumstances? What levels and types of force can be applied?
17. Are there any designated or specially protected persons, sites, or materials that need to be considered?

## REFERENCES

ADDP 06.1. *Rules of Engagement* (Australia).

*Guidelines for the Development of Rules of Engagement (ROE) for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*. Department of Peacekeeping Operations (Military Division). FGS/0220.0001, April 2002.

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## Chapter 4

# Communications and Information Systems

To understand the factors that will affect this functional area, readers must answer the applicable generic questions in chapter 5. Additionally, the chapters on training and logistics have questions that pertain to each of the other functional areas

## INTRODUCTION

4-1. Effective communications between members of the coalition and coalition headquarters is critical to mission accomplishment. Normally, the coalition headquarters determines the appropriate communications procedures for working closely with the other national contingents. The coalition headquarters and national contingent headquarters follow these procedures. Internal to national contingents, individual national procedures are used. If feasible, the coalition headquarters provides unique communications and information systems (CIS) equipment and software to national component headquarters of other nations to facilitate communications.

## COALITION COMMUNICATIONS PLANNING

4-2. Communications planning for deploying a single, national force into an operational environment is challenging enough. Continuous technical upgrades, demanding user requirements, technological limits, resource caps, hostile threats, and austere environments impose ever-present constraints on national planners. Coalition planners have an added set of factors to address when considering how communications affect coalition partners. They consider technological disparity, technical interoperability, procedural dissimilarities, language differences, security concerns, resourcing limitations, and command and control issues.

4-3. This chapter assumes the lead nation will deploy a headquarters to form the coalition headquarters and will provide its own national force and rear-link communications. Therefore, this chapter discusses adjustments and added considerations required to provide communications for the larger coalition. It focuses on the coalition planning factors. It assumes that a standard communications estimate process shapes most communications planning.

4-4. In the past, coalition forces achieved communications using a limited number of simple voice and data links. Those technologically limited or disparate coalition partners connect through equipment loans and liaison teams. Such connections will continue to occur for the immediate future. Still, user demands, sophisticated applications, and the goal of network-enabled operations push communications

planners to integrate coalition partners into a seamless, richly connected, information sharing environment. Any hope to achieve this vision requires communications planners to liaise with their coalition counterparts as early as possible in the planning phase of the operation. Early liaison helps planners identify and solve the inevitable interoperability and security problems.

4-5. Communications and information systems comprise information delivery (including spectrum management), information management, and electronic warfare.

## CHECKLIST

### COALITION CONTEXT

1. How will the size, terrain, climate, and operational environment of the coalition's area of operations impact the coalition communications and information systems?
  - How does the geographical separation of the coalition partner headquarters and the status of the intervening gaps impact on the communications of operations?
2. What impact will changes in headquarters staff and liaison arrangements have on requirements and configuration of the coalition communications and information systems?
3. How will the coalition's mission, commander's vision, coalition make-up, and command and control (C2) relationships impact implementing the coalition communications and information systems?
4. In addition to the coalition, what indigenous government, civilian agency, and higher-level theater elements need to be connected by communications and information systems means?
5. What is the implementation schedule and priority for communications and information systems within the coalition?

### INFORMATION DELIVERY

1. Will the principle of providing communications and information systems connectivity within the coalition be higher-to-lower, left-to-right, and supporting-to-supported; or will an alternative methodology or exceptions be followed?
2. What combat net radio networks will be used for the coalition?
  - What additional coalition outstations will these nets need?
  - Are the coalition combat net radios interoperable?
  - Do adjustments need to be made to normal operating parameters, such as using fixed frequency mode instead of frequency hopping or using nonsecure mode instead of encrypted?
  - Is there a requirement to establish remote sites for combat net radio rebroadcast or trunk system repeater detachments? What arrangements have been made with the theater terrain control authorities to reserve these sites?
  - Has a pool of combat net radios and mobile telephone equipment been established to provide service for mobile users and liaison officers?
3. What is the frequency spectrum management?

- What plan exists for addressing frequency requests and conducting overall frequency management within the coalition?
  - What are all the radio frequency emitting devices in the coalition?
  - What indigenous radio frequency emitting devices operate in theater?
  - What process exists for reporting and resolving frequency interference issues?
  - How do planners coordinate frequency issues with the theater frequency management authority?
  - What extant agreements exist for coalition use of the frequency spectrum?
  - What measures are in place to manage counter-improvised explosive devices electronic countermeasures in relation to the communications network?
4. What coalition electronic warfare (EW) plan exists?
    - Does the EW plan include the targeting process or surveillance and target acquisition plan and battle damage assessment process?
    - What countersurveillance control measures are in force?
    - What factors will affect coalition control of the electromagnetic spectrum?
    - What available coalition assets exist to support maneuver?
    - Do planners continuously review, develop, and disseminate the electronic preparation of the battlefield throughout the coalition chain of command?
  5. Are all nations' cryptographic systems interoperable?
  6. What plan exists for providing telephone services to the coalition?
    - What additional coalition outstations will require this service?
    - Will it be provided by landline, voice-over-Internet protocol, or cell phone?
    - Can the coalition telephones and terminal equipment technically interoperate with the telephone system?
    - How will the in-theater telephone network or cell phone system be adjusted?
  7. If using an area system, will access nodes and switches be deployed to provide service to coalition elements or will coalition access nodes and switches be used?
    - Can the coalition trunk equipment and switches technically interoperate with the area system?
    - Will switching or lateral links between troop contributing nation's systems be in-theater or at the national level?
  8. If using a satellite system, do coalition partners have appropriate satellite ground terminal systems?
  9. Will these systems need to be deployed or loaned to coalition partners?

10. What regular or on-call hand-carriage delivery service will the coalition require? How will forces confirm route security?
11. What coalition wide area network (CWAN) will planners establish?
  - Can the coalition host or interoperate with the CWAN?
  - Will CWAN capability need to be deployed or loaned to coalition partners?
  - Will coalition members use standardized security classification? If not, will the CWAN be configured to manage and generate corresponding national security classification equivalencies?
  - Are coalition network switches, servers, and routers interoperable?
    - Will forces need to implement standardized parameter adjustments?
    - Will networking equipment need to be deployed or loaned to coalition partners?
  - What information exchange capacity requirements and planned capabilities exist for the coalition?
  - What plan exists to expand the capacity beyond the initial system implementation?
  - What redundancy exists for the system's routing and capacity?
  - Have all critical points of failure been identified?
12. What plan exists to transition the system or parts of the system to a civilian agency, civilian contractor, or follow-on coalition lead?
13. What provisions will planners make within the coalition for welfare communications, such as reachback civilian telephone and Internet connectivity? What is the policy for usage?
14. What is the funding agreement within the coalition for the provision, sharing, and expansion of billable information system capabilities?

## **INFORMATION MANAGEMENT**

1. What messaging services will planners use in the coalition, such as e-mail, chat, and formal messaging? What capability does the coalition have to host or interoperate with these services? What are the policies for authorization, authentication, nonrepudiation, and archiving with respect to coalition messaging?
2. What services and formats will planners use for status reporting (such as reports and returns) within the coalition? How detailed and how often will this reporting occur?
3. What services and tools will planners use to work collaboratively within the coalition, such as remote file sharing, Web pages, and threaded discussion? What capability does the coalition have to host or interoperate with these services? What common office software products and file formats exist,

particularly in the areas of word processing, spreadsheets, databases, Web browsing, and graphics?

4. Will the coalition use video teleconferencing (VTC)? If so, do coalition partners have the appropriate terminal equipment? Does the information system have the requisite capacity to support VTC? What will be the VTC schedule and on-call capability?
5. How will language differences within the coalition and among the indigenous inhabitants be accommodated? How and from where will interpreters be employed?
6. How will coalition partners share situational awareness? How will they define what the common operational picture (COP)<sup>5</sup> entails? How will the coalition achieve the COP through the sharing and resolution of higher, lateral and lower situational awareness feeds?
  - What level of granularity, access, and timeliness will the COP feature have and be refreshed?
  - To what extent will the COP account for friendly force, enemy force, noncombatant, weapon system, obstacle, terrain, going condition, boundary, control measure, facility, installation, significant location, planning, and coordinating information?
7. How well do the coalition's battle command systems (such as command and control information systems) interoperate? What services can the different coalition battle command systems share? Can the battle command systems achieve interoperability through a gateway, such as the Multilateral Interoperability Programme gateway? Will terminals for battle command systems need to be deployed or loaned to coalition partners? Will liaison detachments need to input information manually into the coalition lead's battle command system (such as by "swivel chair" or "air gap")?
8. What is the standard georeference datum for the coalition? What geospatial information and services products will the coalition use? Are the coalition's geospatial information and services products on the standard datum? Do the coalition's battle command systems have access to the appropriate geospatial information and services data?
9. What plan exists for archiving coalition information, both for official record and for disaster recovery? What is the fallback for the loss of automated capability?

<sup>5</sup> A single identical display of relevant information shared by more than one command

10. With what information system capability will liaison officers be equipped? How will these officers interface with coalition information systems at the various coalition headquarters, including the coalition lead headquarters?

### **INFORMATION SECURITY/DISCLOSURE**

1. What level of security will planners apply to the coalition's information? Will the coalition operate in one security domain, or will it be compartmentalized into separate security domains? What will be the separation between coalition and national security domains? How will requisite information be exchanged between security domains, such as by an automated cross-domain solution (information guards) or by manual procedures?
2. What cryptographic devices will the coalition use? Are the devices interoperable? Will coalition partners need to deploy with or borrow cryptographic equipment?
3. How will certification and accreditation (C&A) of the coalition communications and information systems be conducted and by whom? How will the C&A of the coalition partners' communications and information systems be incorporated into the coalition's C&A process?
4. What are the information access and disclosure policies for the coalition? What security classifications and caveats will the coalition use? Are the information handling policies of the coalition partners equivalent or acceptable for these classifications and caveats?
5. What is the personnel security clearance policy for the coalition? How will the coalition share personnel security clearance status information internally? How will contracted coalition employees, especially indigenous personnel, be security screened and cleared? How will the coalition implement information access segregation, such as by zoning, badging, and access lists?
6. What information security handling policies does the coalition have? How will the coalition store and destroy information? What are the emergency destruction procedures? Will the coalition conduct security audits?
7. What is the coalition threat from hostile electronic warfare? What are the coalition policies for emission security?
8. How will the coalition report on, investigate, and recover from incidents involving security, information, or cryptographic compromise?
9. What is the physical security plan for coalition headquarters, mobile assets, information infrastructure, and remote combat net radio rebroadcast and repeater sites?
10. How will the coalition coordinate and process visitors?

11. How does the coalition information security plan, policies, and procedures coordinate with those of the coalition's other security dimensions, such as operational security and physical security?

### **TECHNICAL CONTROL**

1. How and to whom will orders, directives, instructions, and procedures relating to the coalition communications and information systems be disseminated?
2. How will the coalition conduct technical coordination meetings related to the coalition communications and information systems? Who should attend these meetings? How often should they be held?
3. How will technical control of the communications and information systems within the coalition be carried out, and what are the limitations and extent of that control? How will the coalition report the technical and resource status? How will the coalition measure performance of the coalition communications and information systems? To what extent can coalition communications and information systems resources be reallocated or reconfigured?
4. How will the coalition report technical problems of the communications and information systems within the coalition? How will coalition partners initiate, authorize, coordinate, and review technical maintenance in the coalition?
5. What is the plan for handling continuity of operations, disaster recovery, and performance degradation of the communications and information systems within the coalition?
6. Have the planners coordinated the coalition's information system power requirements with the coalition's overall power requirements?



## REFERENCES

JP 6-0. *Joint Communications System* (United States).

LWD 6-0. *Signals* (Australia).

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## Chapter 5

# Generic Questions

To understand the factors that will affect the functional areas, readers must answer the generic questions in this chapter as they apply to each functional area and the coalition as a whole. Additionally, the chapters on training and logistics have questions that pertain to each of the other functional areas. The questions in this chapter are basic to all coalitions. Readers should go through these questions as well as the questions in the individual chapters.

### GENERAL

1. What is the nature of the coalition operation?
2. What mandate, if any, has been given by the United Nations or other relevant body?
3. Have any constraints or restraints been placed on operations?
4. What areas come under coalition control and what areas remain national issues?
5. What is the likely duration of the operation and on what is that estimate based?
6. What are the legal, acceptance of risk, financial, human factors (physical, moral, and cultural), and environmental constraints on coalition operations?
7. What host-nation perceptions and cultural issues will likely affect or constrain coalition operations?
8. What are the relevant differences between coalition partners in language, values, religious beliefs, infrastructure, and social outlooks that may affect coalition operations?
9. What is available in lessons learned?
10. Is there a coalition mechanism for capturing lessons learned and informing nations?

### ORGANIZATION

1. What capabilities do troop contributing nations (TCNs) provide to the coalition?
2. Are these capabilities sufficient to accomplish the mission?

3. What is the manpower capacity and skills capability of the operational organizations in the field?
4. What are the limitations and readiness levels of the TCNs?
5. How will the lead nation headquarters change the personnel, organization, and procedures to convert it into a coalition headquarters?
6. Does the coalition headquarters have specialist staff advisors?
7. Does the coalition headquarters have a capabilities brief, description, and organizational chart of its own force and coalition forces, including unique capabilities?
8. What coalition member capabilities can be shared or consolidated collectively?
9. How will the deployment be carried out (land, air, or sea)?
10. What is the deployment timeline?
11. What is the desired order of arrival of capabilities?
  - What is the desired organization for battle for early entry forces?
  - What are the phases and flow of units, capabilities, and materiel to the area of operations?
  - Does the coalition time-phased force and deployment list reflect this flow?
12. Have issues of rotation and sustainability of personnel and equipment been considered?
13. Is there a common coalition doctrine, including definitions and coordination procedures?
14. What is the availability of doctrinal publications?
15. Will there be an opportunity to exercise and test interoperability between systems and procedures?
  - Prior to deployment to the area of operations?
  - En route to the area of operations?
  - Upon arrival in the area of operations?
16. What coalition agreements or standards are available?
17. What levels of standardization and interoperability exist among TCNs?
18. What is the impact of any lack of standardization for coalition operations?
19. What scope is there to exploit existing agreements or standards, or to develop new ones?
20. Who will be designated as the lead nation for providing particular specialist functions? What will their responsibilities be with respect to providing this support?

## COMMAND AND CONTROL

1. What is the commander's intent?
2. Have sound and effective command and support relationships been arranged and clearly stated?
3. What is the current situation in the area of operations?
4. How will the common operational picture be distributed to TCNs?
5. Has an operational estimate been conducted overall and for each functional area?
6. What are the commander's critical information requirements? How are these requirements integrated into the collection plan and assigned?
7. What reports and returns will be available to the coalition forces commander?
8. How will information and intelligence products be accessed?
9. Does the coalition have a mechanism to identify potential threats?
10. Is there a coalition synchronization plan that articulates a common operational approach across boundaries (such as military, social, political, cultural, or economic boundaries)?
11. Has the coalition commander delegated coordinating and technical authority for the employment of specialist assets throughout the force?
12. What are the TCNs rules of engagement?
13. How will digitized and nondigitized forces operate together?
14. Has there been a common understanding of terminology and communications established?
15. How do communications and information systems (CIS) interface with those other components and contingents?
16. What coalition CIS will be used?
17. How will national CIS be integrated?
18. How will digitized and analog components and contingents operate together?
19. What are the national requirements for liaison officers?
20. How will liaison, augmentee, exchange, and specialist elements, and personnel be embedded in the headquarters?
21. What liaison will be provided between components and between contingents?
22. What training will be provided to liaison officers to ensure standardization of processes and understanding of procedural applications?

23. Has the need for interpreters been established?
24. Are language-qualified personnel needed for coalition augmentation? What training is available?

## **LOGISTICS**

1. What support is required for coalition forces?
2. What support is required from coalition forces?
3. What are the host-nation capabilities are there to provide services to the coalition if required?
4. Will logistic support be provided by the lead nation, host nation, role specialist nations, or a combination?
5. What is the logistic support structure?
6. What are the coalition funding arrangements for operations?
7. Are procedures in place to capture costing and expenditure information?
8. Are coalition and national funding authorities clearly understood throughout the coalition?

## Chapter 6

# Transition Planning

To understand the factors that will affect this functional area, readers must answer the applicable generic questions in chapter 5. Additionally, the chapters on training and logistics have questions that pertain to each of the other functional areas.

## USE OF TRANSITION PLANNING

6-1. Most coalition operations end in a transition from coalition control to United Nation (UN), host-nation military, or host-nation civilian control. Transition planning is an integral part of operational planning. It extends throughout the planning process and into operations and redeployment. It must be as detailed as any other planning. It should be done in cooperation with the organization taking control. The coalition force will be most vulnerable during transition and redeployment; therefore, force protection will likely be the most important consideration.

6-2. Staff sections use the transition plan to highlight their organization and how they function. Checklists are developed to facilitate the transition. Staff sections recommend how to organize the incoming staff. Staff sections should develop turnover files. Often staff sections forget these files in the haste to redeploy.

6-3. Planning links the departure of the force with the anticipated arrival of the organization taking charge. Knowledge of the incoming force or organization is paramount. Funding can be a major obstacle, especially when working with the UN. Another concern in working with the UN is to ensure that enough UN staff and officers are deployed for the transition process. The incoming headquarters should co-locate with the coalition force headquarters. This will enhance the assimilation of the incoming staff with the outgoing staff.

## TYPES OF TRANSITIONS

6-4. Described below are the types and some of the key planning aspects of transition operations:

- **Coalition military relief in place** (with normal military operation emphasis on military mission and force protection). The relief would use doctrine from lead nation relief in place.
- **Coalition military to civilian or UN authorities** (with normal UN civilian support type mission with emphasis on military support to the civilian and UN missions). Both the military and authorities would need to—
  - Identify the conditions suitable for handover.

- Identify and agree on responsibilities for command and control of operation.
- Identify the necessary phases of the operation.
- **Escalation or de-escalation by UN chapter or the rules of engagement situation** (with the situation's military aspects of escalation or de-escalation with emphasis on rules of engagement and force protection). The command must—
  - Confirm coalition members.
  - Identify national differences of rules of engagement.
  - Identify force protection issues.
- **Coalition military handover to a national government.** A withdrawal conducted in peaceful conditions having achieved the desired end state with emphasis on fully handing over responsibilities and allowing the government to assume power and authority. The command identifies those capabilities that need to remain behind to ensure that a seamless transfer of authority and support to the government occurs.



## CHECKLIST

1. Has the coalition agreed upon transition operations?
2. Have the issues and key coalition force events (past, present, and future) that lead to the current situation?
3. What work is required to accomplish the transition?
4. What force or agency will take control of the operation?
5. Has contact been made with counterpart planning staffs?
6. Who will determine when the transition begins or is complete?
7. Who will fund the transition?
8. What is the coalition force policy for transition and redeployment?
9. Have potential issues that will exist for the transition force once the transition is complete been provided to the incoming transition force?
  - Has the coalition force's end state been accomplished? If not, will this have a bearing on the incoming force?
10. If there is a new mission, can the coalition force assist the incoming force in preparing for it?
11. What coalition forces, equipment, or supplies will remain behind?
12. What is the disposal plan to facilitate disposal of commodities?
13. What will be the command relationship for coalition force during the transition and for those coalition forces remaining behind?
14. Who will support coalition force remaining behind?
15. What will be the communications requirement for the coalition force remaining behind?
16. Will the coalition provide communications capability to the incoming force?
17. Can information be shared with the incoming transition force or organization?
18. Will new rules of engagement be established for the transition?
19. Will ongoing operations be discontinued or interrupted?
20. Will the incoming force use the same headquarters facility as the coalition force?
21. What agreements have been developed with civilian agencies that may impact the incoming force?
22. Have points of contact been developed for the incoming force?

23. What will be the requirement for liaison personnel?
24. Will sufficient security be available to provide force protection? Who will provide it?
25. How will the turnover be accomplished?
26. Who will handle public affairs for the transition?
27. What command and control arrangements are for departure?
28. What are the customs, immigration, and quarantine implications for the incoming and outgoing forces?
29. What are the incoming and outgoing coalition forces' obligations with respect to employed local labors and contractors?
30. Will there be a transfer of facilities and infrastructure to the incoming or host nation force or host government agency? How will it occur?
31. What functions and appointments does the outgoing force maintain during the transfer?
32. Is it the intention to proceed with the transition upon achieving military end state or not?
33. What ongoing obligations has the outgoing force left to the incoming force?
34. Is this an in-contact (hot) transition operation or an administrative (cold) peaceful transition operation?
35. Will the transition require that a force be maintained outside the area of operations as contingency to support the indigenous force?
36. Do plans exist to transition from a standing start to stability operations standing start to war, or war to stability operations? Who will determine when the transition begins or is complete?
37. What are the redeployment or withdrawal plans for coalition forces? Is there a plan for extraction, if necessary?
38. Is the departure of forces to be accomplished under tactical conditions?
39. What are the environmental standards to be met by withdrawal in humanitarian or other peaceful operations?

## REFERENCES

ADDP 5. *Joint Planning* (Australia).

B-GJ-005-500/FP-000. *Canadian Forces Operational Planning Process* (Canada).

FM 5-0. *Army Planning and Orders Production* (United States).

JP 5-0. *Joint Operation Planning* (United States).

MCDP 5. *Planning* (United States).

MCWP 5-1. *Marine Corps Planning Process* (United States).

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## Chapter 7

# Training

To understand the factors that will affect this functional area, readers must answer the applicable generic questions in chapter 5. Additionally, the chapters on training and logistics have questions that pertain to each of the other functional areas.

### INTRODUCTION

7-1. The success of the operation may well depend on the training the command does before and during the operation. Most components of the force will not likely have trained together, or if they have, it will be of limited frequency. Commanders stress the importance of training together to participating nations. Training best develops an effective coalition force formed from national units. It is a continuing process for both personnel and units. Commanders base the predeployment and in-theater training programs on assessments of the mission and area of operations. Often the command assembles national contingents from different cultural backgrounds at different states of training. The more that coalition forces and civilian agencies participate in training, the more the command will learn about how these organizations think and operate. This participation also enhances team building and staff member's perceptions of one another.

### STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES

7-2. Training teaches participants about the strengths and weaknesses of coalition partners and how to integrate them into an effective force. Training occurs at all levels of command and includes all staffs. Before deployment, command post exercise simulations can be used for staff training and solving problems in the coalition force command structure.

7-3. Training continues once the command arrives in the area of operations, based on specific requirements and functions. Training includes exercises to rehearse operational tasks, the operation order, or new missions. The command also may use training to advertise its capabilities and serve as a deterrent.

7-4. Command post and field training exercises can be used with simulations. Distributed simulation can enhance training between remotely separated forces. A comprehensive training program helps commanders identify weaknesses and helps build troop cohesion. Whenever possible, commanders arrange seminars to develop or stress standing operating procedures and tactics, techniques, and procedures. Force

protection requirements may impact on areas available for training. Some exercises and training such as live firing will require host-nation approval.

7-5. Some nations possess doctrine that fully addresses strategic, operational, and tactical issues. Other nations focus primarily on the tactical level. Some nations prepare for highly mobile, mechanized operations while others focus on counterinsurgency or light infantry operations. A few nations stress rapid, agile operations—emphasizing ingenuity, creativity, and improvisation within the commander’s intent—while some nations regard this approach as too risky. Because of these variations, commanders carefully consider which units are best suited for particular missions. When the situation permits, commanders provide training assistance and share resources such as radios, vehicles, or weapons. Such actions help improve the contributions of national forces. The value of training assistance and dedicated liaison teams cannot be overstated, particularly when working between a force with digital warfighting capability and a force that works with analog means. Coalition exercises are essential to training and doctrine refinement. Coalition exercises should include robust logistic play to exercise logistic support mechanisms and identify possible problems in providing logistic support with forces from other nations. Ultimately the coalition commander needs a clear matrix of the capabilities and national caveats for each of the multinational element so that operational tasks reflect what each component can achieve.

7-6. All it takes is one soldier or small unit acting improperly to undo weeks of effort building goodwill in an area of operations. Inappropriate individual statements and actions may offend forces from other nations or civilians in the area of operations, creating negative perceptions. Individuals should not assume that others would not understand derogatory statements made in their own language, slang, or gestures. Training on proper personal conduct and continued emphasis may prevent this.

7-7. All personnel, especially junior and noncommissioned officers, require instruction on understanding the methods of operating in coalitions. Commanders—

- Ensure that all augmentees participate in their host formation training events.
- Provide training to all units or individuals that receive equipment from other nations.
- Evaluate training opportunities offered by each nation, such as training offered by the 7th U.S. Army Training Command in Germany, the Operational Training and Advisory Group in the United Kingdom, and the Swedish Armed Forces International Center. These all have extensive experience in training units and individuals for operations.

## **PREDEPLOYMENT FOCUS**

7-8. Predeployment training should focus on those areas needed to prepare units for coalition operations and for operations with in proposed area of operations.

## **IN-COUNTRY TRAINING**

7-9. The coalition commander may need to evaluate the level of training of each troop contributing nation (TCN) to determine if it is ready to commit to the area of operations or if additional training is needed before commitment. This training may be related to cultural or other issues related to the host nation. Ideally, some form of induction training in-theater immediately before any tactical deployment is beneficial.

## CHECKLIST

1. What predeployment training has been conducted by TCNs?
  - What specific agencies have been involved in the mission rehearsal exercise?
  - What collective training and assessment of specialist elements will take place?
  - Have designated troops from a TCN trained previously with other troops from TCNs?
  - What predeployment training has been conducted by each TCN? Does it include:
    - Individual military skills?
    - Individual and collective preventive medicine procedures and practice?
    - First aid, both individual and “buddy?”
    - Understanding of the threat?
    - Education lessons in the coalition structure, mandate, chain of command, and division of responsibilities to include nongovernmental organizations and international agency structures?
    - Unit training (rehearsals should be mandatory) based on projected operations?
    - Team building and staff training to include training with coalition forces and nonmilitary organizations?
    - Liaison officer training to ensure that personnel are knowledgeable representatives?
    - Customs, culture, religious practices, political situation, geography, economic, and historical background of the situation and population of the area of operations?
    - Adversary capabilities?
    - How to communicate effectively to the public through the news media?
    - Negotiation and mediation, and the use of interpreters?
    - Language training, especially key phrases used in issuing orders?
    - Situational awareness to include mine, booby trap awareness, and weapons recognition?
    - Rules of engagement?
    - Law of armed conflict?
    - Training drivers and vehicle commanders on in-theater driving conditions and skills?
    - Sensitive site preservation?
    - Operational security issues?



2. What in-country training will be necessary before the commitment or deployment of troops into the area of operations? Does it include:
  - Acclimatization?
  - Test of weapons?
  - Latest situational update briefings?
  - Use of theater specific equipment?
  - Exposure to new tactics, techniques, and procedures?
3. What level of training does each TCN have?
4. Does each of the TCNs have some form of training for liaison officers or will the coalition headquarters need to establish a program?
5. What training areas exist in theater?
6. What are the procedures for building and running training areas in the theater?
7. When will training take place either at home, en route to operation, or in concentration area?
8. Will in-theater ranges be available?
9. What will be the policy on test firing weapon systems in-theater?
10. What part will simulators play in the transition to war training strategy?
11. What collective training will take place?
12. What are the cultural issues within the coalition?

## REFERENCES

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- B-GL-300-002/FP-000. *Land Force Tactical Doctrine* (Canada).
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- British Army Doctrine Publication Volume 5: Soldiering* (United Kingdom).
- FM 3-90. *Tactics* (United States).
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- JP 3-06. *Doctrine for Joint Urban Operations* (United States).
- MCDP 1-3. *Tactics* (United States).
- Selection Standards and Training Guidelines for United Nations Military Observers*. United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations.
- United Nations Peacekeeping Training Manual*. United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

## Chapter 8

# Joint Fires

To understand the factors that will affect this functional area, readers must answer the applicable generic questions in chapter 5. Additionally, the chapters on training and logistics have questions that pertain to each of the other functional areas.

### INTRODUCTION

8-1. Across the continuum of operations, the coalition force commander orchestrates components to deliver overwhelming force to achieve a decisive outcome. The noncontiguous and expanded operational environment results in land forces having to operate over larger geographical areas and in more complex terrain. To address this gap, the land component commander increasingly depends on the unique and complementary attributes of other components to enhance land domination and reduce vulnerability. The seamless integration of fires capabilities from other components and a joint approach to the planning and execution of operations is required to achieve the end state.

8-2. In this chapter, joint fires means “fires produced during the employment of forces from two or more components in coordinated action toward a common objective.”

### COALITION JOINT FIRES

8-3. Joint fires support the actions of friendly forces by influencing the enemy through the application of lethal and nonlethal fires. The integration of joint fires is a complex process, even more so when operating within a coalition environment. Modern operations are required to maintain an operational tempo against an adaptive enemy in a disaggregated and complex operational environment. They are further constrained by rules of engagement and a low tolerance for fratricide and collateral damage while under the scrutiny of the media. Mission success requires the ability to plan and execute timely, safe, and appropriate joint fires. To achieve this, coalition nations require the ability to communicate and share resources and overcome the inherent frictions within a multicomponent and multinational force. The land component commander synchronizes the shared resources to include sensors; communications, and information systems; and weapons systems from all components to achieve the desired effect. Applying joint fires allows the land component commander greater flexibility in selecting the most appropriate capability to attack targets.

8-4. Interoperability is essential to providing joint fires in that it overcomes potential friction points. Key elements of interoperability are intercomponent liaison and

battlespace management. Intercomponent liaison depends on communication between established organizations, particularly given the disparity of levels of communications and information systems within coalition nations. Battlespace management is the key enabling activity that relies on situational awareness provided by a common operational picture.

8-5. To deliver joint fires effectively, contributing nations and components need to develop mutual trust, fostered by a common understanding, training, exercises, or previous operational experience. Targeting is the recognized process through which joint fires will be coordinated and will take into account national constraints, rules of engagement, and legal issues.

## CHECKLIST

### JOINT

1. What is the commander's intent for the application of joint fires?
2. What are the rules of engagement (contingent and coalition) that affect the application of joint fires?
3. What is the coalition process for targeting?
  - Has a targeting directive been issued?
  - What targeting tool is in use within the coalition?
4. What fire support and airspace coordination measures will be used?
5. What joint intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance assets are available for the application of joint fires?
6. With respect to targeting, what degree of situational awareness does the joint force commander have in the area of operations?
7. What is the procedure to request joint fires and how will they be allocated to the land component?
8. What procedures are in place to conduct a battle damage assessment?

### LAND COMPONENT

1. Will contingent land organic fire support and offensive support assets be tasked to support other components or contingents?
2. What will be the command and control arrangements for land organic offensive support assets?
3. What is the coalition policy for survey, meteorology, calibration, and registration?
4. What is the capability and interoperability of coalition munitions including proofing compatibility and ballistic data contained in fire control computers?
5. What procedures are in place for cross boundary fires? Are there any national caveats in place for cross boundary fires?
6. Who is responsible for the integration and synchronization of both lethal and nonlethal joint fires within the land component command headquarters?

### MARITIME COMPONENT

1. What are the characteristics, capabilities and limitations of coalition naval surface fire support assets, including range, and authorized munitions?

2. How will coalition naval surface fire support be coordinated for the land component?
3. Are land component observers authorized to call for and adjust coalition naval surface fire support? If not, are specialist naval surface fire support observers available to the land component?

### **AIR COMPONENT**

1. Are the battlefield coordination element and air support operations center being deployed?
2. Are tactical air control parties, air liaison officers, joint terminal air controllers, and forward air controllers deployed?
3. Are land component observers authorized to control coalition close air support?
4. What is the process for deconflicting time sensitive targeting and joint accelerated targeting with air component commander assets within the land component area of operations?
5. What access to space-based capabilities does the land component have? What will they deliver?
6. Have kill boxes been designated?

## REFERENCES

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- B-GL-300-007/FP-001. *Firepower* (Canada).
- B-GL-300-009/FP-001. *Manoeuvre* (Canada).
- JP 3-09. *Joint Fire Support* (United States).
- JP 3-60. *Joint Targeting* (United States).
- LWD 3-4-1. *Employment of Artillery* (Australia).

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## Chapter 9

# Engineers

To understand the factors that will affect this functional area, readers must answer the applicable generic questions in chapter 5. Additionally, the chapters on training and logistics have questions that pertain to each of the other functional areas.

### INTRODUCTION

9-1. Effective military engineering support across the spectrum of conflict, throughout the area of operations, and from conception to end state is vital to the success of the mission. Using military engineers in any coalition operation works most effectively when the commander and staff thoroughly understand the effects that engineers can generate and know of the relevant planning considerations. Commanders therefore must consider the required military engineering effects from the outset of the planning process.

9-2. Force protection is considered in more detail in chapter 15. Detailed information for the engineer planner is to be found in the ABCA *Coalition Engineer Handbook*.

### PRINCIPLES OF EMPLOYMENT

9-3. Commanders consider several general principles when planning to employ engineers.

### CENTRALIZED CONTROL, DECENTRALIZED EXECUTION

9-4. To ensure effectively and efficiently applying the military engineering effort, centralized control and decentralized execution are imperative. This requires a force engineer and staff. There are always more engineer tasks than engineer resources available and, once tasks are prioritized and assigned, the tasked engineer units should plan and conduct them.

### Force Engineer and Force Engineer Staff

9-5. The force engineer on the coalition headquarters staff is the principal engineer advisor to the joint force commander on all military engineer issues.

9-6. Within an area of operations, the joint force commander has responsibility to prioritize the engineer effort, normally on the advice of the force engineer. The force engineer will, on behalf of the joint force commander, have coordinating and technical authority over using engineer assets throughout the force.

9-7. The force engineer staff is the focal point for all engineer aspects of intelligence, operations, policy, plans, force protection engineering, environmental protection, and infrastructure.

### **EARLY WARNING**

9-8. To ensure informed planning, planners include an engineer element at all levels of reconnaissance because every engineer task has a significant requirement for materiel and equipment. Engineering tasks usually involve a long lead time (particularly where civil contracts are involved), significant logistic lift, and a great deal of physical space.

### **PRIORITY OF WORK**

9-9. Usually there will be more engineer tasks than available resources. Seldom will commanders be able to execute them all or to implement all approved tasks simultaneously. Commanders therefore clearly prioritize work based on the advice from the engineer staff.

### **CONCENTRATION OF EFFORT**

9-10. Greater efficiency and earlier effects are obtained by concentrating engineer effort in turn on sequential tasks rather than by dispersing resources over several concurrent tasks.

### **CONTINUITY**

9-11. Handover of engineer tasks between units is complex, usually increases the time to complete a task, may adversely affect the quality of the result, and should be avoided. Problems arise from the differences in construction methods, statutory standards, specialized equipment, materials management, and other factors.

### **ECONOMY**

9-12. As engineers are trained and equipped to carry out technical tasks, it is inefficient to use them on tasks that other arms can perform. It may be possible to achieve additional engineer effects by employing qualified military engineers to supervise other arms in less technical tasks.

### **SECURITY**

9-13. Effects are delivered most efficiently if engineers can apply their effort to engineering tasks. Wherever possible, other arms should provide local security for the work site.

## CHECKLIST

1. What engineer resources are available to the force (host nation, contract, and coalition)?
2. What mission-specific engineer training requirements for the force, such as Explosive Hazard Awareness Training, are required?
3. Is the engineer command and control structure for the mission integrated at all levels of the force structure?
4. What international standards and agreements apply to the mission?
5. What are the technical authority and engineering technical standards for the mission?
6. What are the engineer coordination interfaces between national engineer contingents?
7. What are the critical vulnerabilities of coalition engineers?
8. What are the funding arrangements for coalition engineer tasks?
9. What are the environmental considerations, with a view to eventual handover to the host nation upon extraction of the force?
10. What coalition engineer command and control structure has been established?
11. What is the engineer materiel management system, including the command critical engineer resources list?
12. What is the impact of the activities of nongovernmental organizations and civil-military cooperation in-theater on engineer requirements?
13. What are the coalition procedures for managing hazardous waste?

## REFERENCES

- AAP-19. *NATO Combat Engineer Glossary* (NATO).
- FM 3-34. *Engineer Operations* (United States).
- LWD-G 3-6-1. *Employment of Engineers* (Australia).
- QAP 292. *Coalition Engineer Handbook* (ABCA).

## Chapter 10

# Geospatial Support

To understand the factors that will affect this functional area, readers must answer the applicable generic questions in chapter 5. Additionally, the chapters on training and logistics have questions that pertain to each of the other functional areas.

## INTRODUCTION

10-1. Geospatial support is the collection, processing, management, exploitation, analysis, production, presentation, and dissemination of geospatially referenced information to enable the commander and staffs during the planning, decisionmaking, and conduct of operations.

## GEOSPATIAL SUPPORT TO OPERATIONS

10-2. Successful land operations rely on commanders having timely and accurate situational awareness of their operating environment. Geospatial support provides the geospatial foundation data and the reference framework for the presentation of situational awareness.

10-3. Geospatial support provides focused operational and tactical support that provides the force commander and all other functional areas with decision support aids including support to intelligence preparation of the battlefield. These tools assist the visualization and conduct of activities within the operational environment.

10-4. Geospatial support provides other functional areas with a spatial presentational and analytical ability through the following functions: map supply/distribution, map reproduction, terrain analysis/visualization, data management, geodetic/field survey, and the provision of geospatial advice. These can be used to generate fused, geospatial intelligence products.

10-5. The common operational picture remains current and accurate, geospatial information (observations, changes to natural and manmade features) needs to be fed back through the relevant geospatial support provider.

10-6. The responsibility for providing geospatial support to national component forces resides with the respective nations. However, efficiencies and synergies can be gained from coordinating this support, such as the sharing of geospatial data sets across the coalition, which supports a shared situational awareness. In a coalition the synchronization of geospatial support responsibility is coordinated at the highest possible level and depends on the interoperability of national geospatial information

and services data and data exchange capabilities. Dividing these responsibilities is a high priority. Commanders address them early in the planning process.

## **SUMMARY**

10-7. To maximize the effects of employing geospatial support, the coalition integrates joint and multinational systems and procedures to determine priorities. The staff judges whether resources and requirements are balanced over the course of a coalition campaign or operation, ensuring the appropriate mix of forces and capabilities exist. Effective joint geospatial support contributes substantially to coalition success.

## CHECKLIST

### GEOSPATIAL SUPPORT PLANNING

1. Do coalition operations involve littoral, land and air phases as this will influence the need for different product types (such as topographical maps, aeronautical charts, hydrographic charts and/or imagery)?
2. Which of the geospatial functions will be required?
3. What geospatial capabilities need to be held at coalition level, and which will provide national support only?
4. Is there a requirement to provide integral geospatial support to all levels of command (such as theater headquarters, brigade headquarters, and battle group headquarters)?
5. What is the desired geospatial support organization for early entry forces?
6. What is the standard datum, reference system and theater control to be used within the coalition area of operations?

### COMMAND AND CONTROL

#### Command

1. Who will be designated as the lead nation to provide geospatial support? Which supporting nations will be designated?
2. What will be their responsibilities with respect to the provision of geospatial support?
3. Who is the mapping authority?
4. What are the mapping standards for the mission, including the authority for maintaining the common map database?
5. What will be the command relationships for geospatial support components?
6. Will they reside under the J-2/G-2 or commander force engineers?
7. Who will be responsible for managing, to include updating and maintaining, the theater geospatial database?
8. What formation headquarters is responsible to provide reachback capability?
9. What type, scale, and coverage of map products will be considered as standard designated products for use in the coalition area of operations? This will facilitate interoperability.

### **Control**

1. What geospatial management requirements exist in relation to the collection, analysis, fusion, and dissemination of geospatial information?
2. Are there any releasability or licensing issues with respect to geospatial data, imagery, and/or derived products?
3. What are the procedures for reporting and dealing with errors on geospatial products?
4. Is there a cohesive geospatial information and services production plan to coordinate all coalition products?

### **COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS**

1. Who is responsible to provide geospatial related equipment and software—NATO, coalition, or national?
2. Will there be a dedicated communications or data link to receive and disseminate geospatial data from the theater geospatial database?
3. What coalition bearer communications systems will be used as a backbone for transmission and dissemination of geospatial information and products?
4. Will the deployable geospatial support systems be networked or stand alone? This leads to concerns of interoperability of national systems.

### **INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, TARGET ACQUISITION, AND RECONNAISSANCE**

1. Will there be a common operational picture? How will intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance for maritime, land, and air units contribute to and enhance geospatial support to the common operational picture and recognized environmental picture?
2. Will theater unmanned aircraft systems have sensors suitable to facilitate rapid map updating?

### **LOGISTICS**

1. What will be the in-theater equipment repair policy?

### **TRAINING**

1. Will in-theater geospatial information/data be available to support predeployment training?



## **REFERENCES**

MC 296/1. *NATO Geospatial Policy* (NATO).

*NATO Geospatial Support Planning Guide* (NATO).

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## Chapter 11

# Land Forces Aviation

To understand the factors that will affect this functional area, readers must answer the applicable generic questions in chapter 5. Additionally, the chapters on training and logistics have questions that pertain to each of the other functional areas.

### **INTRODUCTION**

11-1. Land forces aviation will have an important role in coalition operations. Early predeployment liaison is imperative as nations group, command, and support their land forces aviation differently. The emphasis could even change within a single nation depending on the type or phase of an operation. The combination and coordination of Army, Naval, Air Force, and Marine Corps aviation will impact the control and use of the airspace in the area of operations.

## **CHECKLIST**

### **FORCE STRUCTURE**

1. What availability and readiness levels are coalition aviation forces and supporting elements to maintain? How long can they sustain this readiness?
2. What are current and projected requirements for an air line of communications?
3. What is the intended base of operations?

### **COMMAND AND CONTROL**

1. What is the coalition command and control structure for aviation?
2. Has a coalition aviation commander been appointed and what is the command, control, and coordination authority?
3. What airspace control procedures will be used to deconflict air, aviation, indirect fire, and unmanned aircraft system use?
4. What is each nations' navigational equipment performance (input requirements, accuracy, and susceptibility to attack)?
5. Will relative performance affect control and use of the operational environment or control, direction, and coordination of fires and rules of engagement?
6. Are nations' target designators interoperable? If not, what effect will this have and what can be done to avoid or mitigate these designators?
7. Where are the aviation coordination interfaces?
8. When will any changes of status of command and coordination measures take effect?
9. Is there a requirement for a coalition airspace management cell for the land component commander? What type of airspace control procedures will be used?
10. What are the command arrangements for the conduct of coalition deep attacks?
11. What is the coalition command and control warfare plan? Can aviation enhance its effectiveness?
12. What is the coalition plan for recovery of critical aviation equipment, facilities, and resources?

### **CONSTRAINTS AND FREEDOM OF ACTION**

1. Do nongovernmental organizations and civil-military cooperation activities affect the aviation plan?

2. What are the environmental and area of operations characteristics likely to impact on aviation equipment and coalition interoperability such as terrain, altitude, and climate?
3. What are troop contributing nation's capabilities and aircraft performance (weapons, payload, and radius of action) in light of environmental conditions?

## **PROTECTION**

1. What are the coalition aviation protection requirements?
2. Have limitations been placed on using white illumination to facilitate aviation night vision goggle operations?
3. What are the troop contributing nation's individual aircraft electronic warfare and defensive aid capabilities compared to threat and aircrew individual protective equipment against laser and nuclear, biological, and chemical hazards?
4. Is the coalition command and control structure capable of delivering threat information and essential codes and preflight messages?
5. Are fills and threat library information for identification, friend or foe systems; missile approach warning equipment; and infrared or radar jammers available? Are means and media to move and load codes and fills interoperable?
6. Are combat identification systems available to all coalition partners? If not, can they be made available and embodied to enhance allied freedom of action?
7. Are nations' combat identification systems interoperable? If not, what coalition joint antifratricide measures are in place?
8. Are coalition plans, procedures, and training (scale, radius of action, quality, quantity, and timely) suitable for likely combat search and rescue as well as recovery of encircled forces?
9. What nuclear, biological, and chemical protection measures (individual and collective) are afforded to other nations' aircrew, ground crew, and technical personnel?
10. How will adopting protective measures or using protective equipment affect coalition aviation operations (quality, quantity, and sustainability)?
11. Are nations able to decontaminate aircraft, to what standards, and to what effect will residual nuclear, biological, and chemical contamination or hazards have on operational output?

## **G-1/G-4**

1. Is there a common understanding of national technical regulatory requirements?

2. Has a coalition, host-nation, or theater facilities survey been conducted and coordinated at the coalition headquarters aviation level?
3. How will the commander's concept of operations affect logistic support to aviation operations such as a requirement for forward arming and refueling points and forward operating bases? Are the required logistic capabilities in-theater?
4. What arrangements exist for coalition resupply of common user items and are appropriate procedures in place? If fuel and munitions are included, is the system appropriate for the planned operational activity level?
5. Does the coalition lead nation's criterion for fuel quality and fuel system icing inhibitor meet national equipment requirements?
6. What is the in-theater repair policy? What mutual support is planned for common user equipment? Are aircraft cross-servicing arrangements in place?
7. What support capabilities and levels of service—to include national environmental restrictions—can nations' aviation forces offer each other?
8. What are national aircrew duty time specifications? How will this affect planned coalition aviation surge and continuous operational output?
9. Are there national fleet management issues that will reduce expected coalition operational output?
10. Are there coalition support issues that will affect the nations' efficient aircraft fleet management resulting in reduced operational output?

### **TRAINING AND COLLECTIVE PERFORMANCE**

1. What scope is there for coalition aviation mission rehearsal and war gaming, particularly environmental?
2. Is appropriate simulation equipment available; can it be made available; can an appropriate environmental database be developed?
3. What scope exists for coalition forces using coalition, national, or host-nation training facilities, particularly simulation and live firing training space?

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## Chapter 12

# Civil-Military Cooperation

To understand the factors that will affect this functional area, readers must answer the applicable generic questions in chapter 5. Additionally, the chapters on training and logistics have questions that pertain to each of the other functional areas.

## INTRODUCTION

12-1. The purpose of civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) is to establish and maintain full cooperation between the military and civilian populations and institutions within the area of operations in order to support the accomplishment of the commander's mission. Generally, this is accomplished through activities in the areas of civil-military liaison, coordination of support to the military force from the civil environment, and support to the civil environment by the military force. The concept of CIMIC was developed to allow the commander to interface effectively with all parts of the civilian environment within the area of operations. CIMIC is the relationship of interaction, cooperation and coordination, mutual support, joint planning, and constant exchange of information at all levels between military forces and civilian organizations, agencies and in-theater civil influences needed to achieve desired effects at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels in pursuit of the desired end state.

## DEFINITION

12-2. The NATO definition of CIMIC is "the co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including the national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and nongovernmental organizations and agencies."

12-3. As with many areas discussed in the *ABCA Coalition Operations Handbook*, civil-military cooperation does not have a single doctrinal core that all the nations share. For example, some nations see CIMIC or civil affairs solely supporting the commander's mission within a very limited framework. Others believe that CIMIC is wider than that; that CIMIC not only helps to realize the commander's mission and end state through the interplay of military forces and other agencies, but it also contributes directly to the achievement of the strategic end state. For the latter nations, CIMIC funding may come from government departments other than their defense establishment. Therefore, CIMIC for these nations does not necessarily support the military mission alone, but could contribute to broader national objectives.

12-4. CIMIC is a function of operations conducted by staff that is fully integrated into headquarters at every level. CIMIC activity begins at the highest political levels, becomes integrated into the campaign plan, and should remain coherent throughout the operational to tactical levels. CIMIC, therefore, contributes to achieving the overall strategic mission as well as the commander's specific mission.

12-5. The comprehensive campaign plan guides the commander on the legal obligations to the civilian sector, prioritizes the major tasks, provides the necessary funding, ensures consistency across zones of national responsibility in the joint operations area, and outlines the relationships with the strategic decision makers. Commanders consider the CIMIC dimension of the operation early in the planning process; adequate CIMIC capabilities and other resources should be made available.

## **CHECKLIST**

### **PLANNING**

1. Does the campaign plan address CIMIC issues?
2. Has CIMIC been considered from the earliest planning stages?
3. Have CIMIC planners been included in the assessment team for the operation?
4. What are the political and civil implications of the desired strategic and operational end states?
5. What are the civil end states directed by the campaign plan?
6. What are the civil centers of gravity that need to be addressed? What are the associated decisive points?
7. What are the CIMIC culminating points?
8. What are the required civil and military resources to achieve the civil end state?
9. Are there adequate CIMIC personnel available to assist planners?
10. Do all participating nations have an understanding of CIMIC?

### **COMMAND AND CONTROL**

1. What areas of CIMIC come under coalition control and what areas remain national issues?
2. Have measures been established to synchronize the CIMIC activities with the campaign plan's lines of operation?
3. Have national civil-military plans been coordinated with coalition force headquarters?
4. What legal authority does the commander have to take a more prescriptive approach to CIMIC operations if this should be necessary?
5. Have CIMIC centers been established at appropriate levels to coordinate civil-military operations?

### **LOGISTICS**

1. Where the operational commander is to be reliant on host nation support, are sufficient resources available to sustain the force and are memoranda of understanding and technical agreements in place?
2. What will be the impact on the local economy as local human resources are drawn to host nation support of the military?

## THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

1. What key civil organizations will be operating in the area of operations?
  - Has an analysis been conducted on their respective end states, culture, objectives, and methods?
  - How will they affect military operations?
2. Is the national civil-military plan coordinated with the other government departments?
3. Has the coalition force headquarters established a relationship with coalition ambassadors and, if a United Nations operation, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General?
4. Is the civil administration sound, or will one be established? If the latter, what resources will be required?
5. What are the requirements for restoring or rebuilding the local infrastructure?
6. What are the requirements for restoring or providing essential services in the short, medium, and long term?
7. What coalition force support is required to assist or establish the host-nation civilian law and order?
8. Is there a lead agency or lead agencies for humanitarian assistance such as the United Nations or International Committee of the Red Cross?
9. What international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and international and national donor agencies will be operating in the joint operations area?
10. What is the policy for scrutinizing the activities and intentions of nongovernmental organizations?
  - Does this include consulting political advisors?
  - Do coalition partners have different views on how to scrutinize nongovernmental organizations?
11. Do all nongovernmental organizations subscribe to the code of conduct for the International Committee of the Red Cross and nongovernmental organizations in disaster relief?

## REFERENCES

- AJP-9. *NATO Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) Doctrine* (NATO).
- B-GG-005-004/AF-023. *Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace, Emergencies, Crisis and War* (Canada).
- B-GL-355-001/FP-001. *Civil-Military Cooperation Tactics, Techniques and Procedures* (Canada).
- FM 3-05.40. *Civil Affairs Operations* (United States).
- JP 3-57. *Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations* (United States).
- JWP 3-90. *Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC)* (United Kingdom).
- LWD 5-2. *Civil Military Cooperation* (Australia).

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## Chapter 13

# Information Operations

To understand the factors that will affect this functional area, readers must answer the applicable generic questions in chapter 5. Additionally, the chapters on training and logistics have questions that pertain to each of the other functional areas.

## INTRODUCTION

13-1. Information operations are defined as coordinated actions to create desired effects on the will, understanding and capability of adversaries, potential adversaries and other approved parties in support of overall objectives by affecting their information, information-based processes and systems while exploiting and protecting one's own (AJP-3.10).

13-2. Members of a coalition will contain various information operations capabilities, understanding, doctrine, and policies. The coalition force commander must resolve potential conflicts so information operations are complementary and harmonized, horizontally and vertically, throughout the coalition to support objectives and avoid conflicts. Higher headquarters may have to augment the information operations capabilities of lower echelons to support operational and tactical objectives.

13-3. Information operations incorporate three core activities:

- **Countercommand activity.** Counter command activity seeks to physically alter an adversary's command and control capability. It affects the flow of information to and from a decisionmaker, thereby affecting understanding or influencing will. Countercommand activity seeks, within the rules of engagement, to disrupt, degrade, usurp, deny, deceive, or destroy an adversary's information, command, propaganda, and associated systems, processes, and networks and command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance structure.
- **Information protection activity.** Information protection activity comprises any activity that prevents an adversary from gaining information relating to friendly operations. Information protection activity includes operations security; counterintelligence; information security; and counter intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance.
- **Influence activity.** Influence activity comprises any activity, physical or cognitive, whose primary purpose is to influence will of a target individual, group or system. Influence activity seeks to predispose, persuade, convince,

deter, disrupt, compel, or coerce approved audiences to adopt or reinforce a particular behavior, or to assist, encourage, and reassure others.

13-4. Information operations are not a capability, but it incorporates a variety of capabilities. These capabilities may include:

- Operations security.
- Information security.
- Electronic warfare.
- Physical attack.
- Computer network operations.
- Psychological operations.
- Presence, posture, and profile.
- Deception.
- Civil-military cooperation and civil affairs.
- Public information (only related to information operations in United States terms).

13-5. Commanders get intimately involved in planning and applying information operations. Information operations planning must be integrated and coordinated so as to be complementary to, and harmonized with, all other planning, targeting and assessment.



## **CHECKLIST**

### **INFORMATION OPERATIONS: GENERAL**

1. How does each coalition nation view the environment and its elements? Through what filters and perceptions does it view the environment?
2. How does each coalition member define information operations?
3. What is each coalition member's doctrine for and understanding of the three activity areas?
4. How is each member organized to conduct information operations? How interoperable are information operations between coalition members?
5. What are the information operations vulnerabilities common to all coalition members?
6. What information operations vulnerabilities are specific to individual coalition members in terms of destruction, deception, exploitation, and influence?
7. What common solutions can be applied across the coalition to mitigate information operations vulnerabilities?
8. What measures have to be taken and allocations made to ensure coalition members have the means to fulfill collective and individual information operations objectives?
9. What tasks and direction ensure a harmonized information operations approach across the coalition?
10. What training requirement exists across the coalition or within certain members to establish a common understanding of information operations, their aim, and constituent activities?
11. Have psychological operations assets been requested?

### **COUNTERCOMMAND ACTIVITY**

1. What means does each coalition member have to conduct countercommand activity?
2. Are countercommand activities coordinated and approved at the coalition level to ensure complementary and reinforcing targeting and effects?
3. Is one of the coalition members better suited to conduct specific countercommand activities across the coalition?
4. Are countercommand activity objectives and planned activities in line with specific rules of engagement of coalition members?

### **INFORMATION PROTECTION ACTIVITIES**

1. How does each of the coalition members manage and safeguard information?
2. What are operations security and information security standards and procedures?
  - What operations security procedures need to and can be modified to effectively conduct information operations?
  - Are operations security procedures effective?
3. Is a threat assessment conducted to determine adversary information operations capabilities?
4. Is a vulnerability assessment of critical friendly nodes and systems conducted and are protection measures recommended and executed? What are the vulnerabilities to adversary psychological operations and propaganda for each coalition member?
5. What are the counter-intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance capabilities and intentions of each coalition member?
6. Is the command and control structure analyzed to identify critical friendly nodes and systems?

### **INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES**

1. Are there linguistic, cultural, religious, and social links between coalition members and a local populace that will assist or hinder influence activities?
2. What are the cultural perceptions through which each member will view the local populace?
3. What vulnerabilities does each coalition member have to influence adversary activities? Are some activities more susceptible and likely to be targeted due to cultural or national reasons?
4. What national policy restrictions exist on the targeting and use of influence activities by each coalition member?
5. How will the influence activities and capabilities of each coalition member be coordinated to ensure complementary effects in support of objectives? Is there harmony between coalition partners' key messages?
6. Does each coalition member have the staff and process to consider the second-order influence effects that will result from other activities?
7. Has there been target audience analysis?

### **PLANNING, TARGETING, AND EXECUTION**

1. In a coalition headquarters, have the information operations analysis, planning, execution, and assessment responsibilities been allocated and articulated?

2. How is the commander personally involved in information operations? Does the commander's intent and concept of operations sufficiently guide planning for information operations?
3. Is there information operations representation at any targeting working group and board?
4. Is the target development process appropriate to produce information operations targets?
5. What is each coalition member's capacity to plan information operations activities both in support of other activities and as independent activities?
6. Is there an integrating board, center, or cell for information operations?
7. Have the synchronization measures been applied to or harmonized with superior, subordinate, and flanking formations and units? Have they been issued to subordinates?
8. Does the higher headquarters intend to synchronize and coordinate the implementation of information operations support within the force?
9. What is the coalition targeting and approval process for the engagement of adversary and public command and control networks?

## REFERENCES

- AJP-3.10. *NATO Military Information Operations Doctrine* (NATO).
- B-GJ-005-313/FP-001. *Psychological Operations* (Canada).
- B-GL-300-005/FP-001. *Land Force Information Operations* (Canada).
- B-GL-354-003/FP-001. *Land Force Information Operations—Deception* (Canada).
- FM 3-13. *Information Operations: Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures* (United States).
- JWP 3-80. *Information Operations* (United Kingdom).

## Chapter 14

# Public Information

To understand the factors that will affect this functional area, readers must answer the applicable generic questions in chapter 5. Additionally, the chapters on training and logistics have questions that pertain to each of the other functional areas.

### INTRODUCTION

14-1. The coalition force establishes a coalition information bureau staffed by public information officers with the necessary logistic support. This bureau facilitates media coverage in the area of operations by sustaining the efforts of those media representatives accompanying units and by communicating with media agencies outside the area of operations. In taking advantage of the concepts of modularity and flexibility, the coalition information bureau expands its capability with that of the deploying force and evident media interest. It prepares to deal with the potential for a large number of media deployed throughout the area of operations.

14-2. To establish a coalition public information organization, the public information (PI) staff develops a plan. This plan not only supports the commander's concept of operations, but also takes into account the PI requirements of the coalition partners.

14-3. Coalition members are familiar with their respective national media organizations, their biases, and their methods; these may differ among countries. Commanders and PI staff consider these differences when developing working relationships that allow for open and accurate reporting with a minimum of ground rules to ensure operations security. Equally important, they factor other nations' public affairs capabilities into the overall public affairs plan.

14-4. Each coalition member force normally has its own PI plan and sanctioned media lines. The coalition commander and PI staff develop a coalition PI policy, plan, and related media lines, ideally acceptable to all coalition partners.

14-5. Commanders and staff prepare to deal with the language requirements of the various target audiences.

14-6. National media outlets from those nations providing forces will no doubt approach their own forces and national authorities for access to both the coalition forces and to the forces of their respective nations. The coalition policy and guidelines clearly stipulate the lines of communications and coordination to be followed so that visits can be coordinated centrally if deemed necessary. As a minimum, coalition PI cells should be made aware of national media visits.

## CHECKLIST

1. What are the overarching coalition PI objectives?
2. What is the key message?
3. What areas come under coalition control and what areas remain national issues?
4. What is the overall PI plan? Furthermore:
  - Does it identify the official spokesmen and who makes the initial public release?
  - Does it provide a contingency statement to use before initial public release is authorized?
  - Does it state agreed-upon procedures for the subsequent release of information concerning the coalition force and its national components?
  - Does it satisfy specific requirements for combat camera support, including communicating to subordinate units the need for operational documentation?
  - Does it provide specific guidance on media and public affairs coverage of special operations forces of the coalition?
  - Does it arrange for handling publicity, news correspondents, and journalists pertaining to individual coalition nations?
5. Has coordination been established with other national public information officers or equivalents?
6. Has the senior public information officer met the coalition senior leaders?
7. Has the coalition information bureau been established?
  - Has the coalition information bureau the necessary staff to plan, coordinate and implement the expected level of media activities and media visits?
  - Has the coalition information bureau the necessary equipment capability and resources to capture and disseminate imagery in support of the PI plan for internal consumption as well as external consumption by the media?
8. Has a media briefing facility been established?
9. Has a coordinated media policy, including a system to provide credentials for media, been established? This will allow control over who attends coalition force briefings.
10. Has the senior public information officer identified points of contact with other agencies operating in the area of operations to arrange referrals of media queries regarding their operations?
11. Is there a crisis management plan to handle controversial issues with potential negative impact on the coalition?

12. Does the PI plan reflect the cultural differences of all troop contributing nations and the host nation?
13. What coalition information is releasable to the media, to include such things as the biographical backgrounds of coalition senior leaders, technical details of unique equipment, and force levels?
14. What are the official responses to media questions and is there a schedule to review and update them?

## REFERENCES

- B-GJ-005-361/FP-000. *Joint Public Affairs* (Canada).
- FM 46-1. *Public Affairs Operations* (United States).
- JP 3-61. *Public Affairs* (United States).
- JWP 3-45.1. *Media Operations* (United Kingdom).



## Chapter 15

# Force Protection

To understand the factors that will affect this functional area, readers must answer the applicable generic questions in chapter 5. Additionally, the chapters on training and logistics have questions that pertain to each of the other functional areas.

### INTRODUCTION

15-1. Security is one of the principles of operations, and protection is a key component of security. A fundamental military principle is that all military units must be able to protect themselves. A coalition force remains vulnerable to various threats and hazards, including those inherent in the physical environment and those derived from the coalition's own force activities. Commanders at all levels must understand the importance of force protection to preserve force capability in the face of such threats and hazards.

15-2. Force protection covers an exceptionally diverse spectrum of measures and capabilities. It may extend beyond the military personnel of the coalition force to include nonmilitary personnel, civilians, or nongovernmental organizations. Force protection applies to all phases of operations, including planning, preparation, deployment, employment, and redeployment. Troop contributing nations provide their own force protection, as well as contribute to and integrate into the wider force protection plans of the coalition force.

15-3. In a coalition environment, the doctrine and practice of force protection may vary between nations. The troop contributing nations coordinate as early as possible to synchronize and integrate force protection plans. The coalition commander ensures that force protection guidelines are developed for the coalition as a whole. Effective force protection preserves combat power, maintains the credibility of the force, and contributes to mission success.

15-4. The definition of force protection is "all measures and means to minimize the vulnerability of personnel, material, facilities, information and activities conducted, from threats and occupational and environmental hazards, in order to preserve operational effectiveness and enhance freedom of action."

15-5. The nonlinear nature of the operational environment renders obsolete the concept of "safe rear-areas." As a result, force protection becomes an increasingly complex requirement and becomes a more important planning factor for staff, as well as a key tactical consideration for all force elements.

15-6. Force protection measures aim to preserve a force's operational effectiveness while maximizing its freedom of action. Military operations are invariably conducted in hazardous environments. Commanders always accept a degree of risk to maintain freedom of action. A coalition commander will seek to balance the risks to the force with the operational imperative of the mission.

## COALITION CONSTRAINTS

15-7. It is likely that various troop contributing nations will differ in their perception of risk and their threshold of risk acceptance, despite the common threat and environment. As a result, national constraints can be expected to impose upon coalition force protection measures.

15-8. In any coalition operation, the prevention of fratricide can pose a significant challenge. Differences in operational procedures, language, and equipment are likely to increase the risk of fratricide. Should an incident of fratricide occur, its potential impact on the mission may be far more significant than the mere operational cost of loss. Commanders must therefore be able to identify the conditions that increase the risk of fratricide, and make every effort to reduce the risk of it occurring. Appropriate preventative measures from the outset of operational planning may include the following:

- **Recognition.** Commanders are responsible for ensuring that their forces are trained to recognize friendly personnel and equipment.
- **Drills, procedures and combat identification.** Counter-fratricide measures should be included in the command's SOPs and other directives, should be coordinated at the highest applicable level, and should be promulgated throughout the force as early as possible in the campaign planning cycle in order to allow effective training and implementation prior to and during the campaign.
- **Close coordination.** During combined operations, close coordination between formations will be essential to maintain enhanced situational awareness. The use of liaison officers with adequate communications between contingent components will be of considerable importance, both during planning and conduct of a combined operation.

## NONMILITARY AGENCIES

15-9. Nonmilitary agencies such other government agencies or nongovernmental organizations may request or require some form of protection. The protection afforded to these agencies may enhance military credibility and thereby provide the coalition with an opportunity to advance a cooperative environment. However, the protection provided must be in proportion to mission requirements. Commanders weigh the risk of providing protection to nonmilitary agencies with increasing the risk of targeting of those agencies.

## CHECKLIST

1. What is the coalition responsibility for providing force protection to nonmilitary agencies such as nongovernmental organizations and contractors?
2. Does the force have sufficient assets to protect itself? Do they balance with the potential political ramifications of failure to protect the force?
3. Who in the coalition is responsible for assessing threats and directing force protection measures across the force are clearly articulated and promulgated?
4. What are the command relationships with reference to force protection and delegations of authority to impose force protection measures within the coalition?
5. What are the variations in national rules of engagement and resulting interoperability implications for force protection?
6. What are the variations in national force protection capabilities and any resulting interoperability implications?
7. What are the legal, cultural, or political requirements of the host nation that may impose force protection constraints?
8. What is the coalition procedure to exchange threat and hazard warnings?
9. What are the coalition standards of physical protection?
10. What are the national force protection minimum requirements and vulnerabilities?
11. What are the coalition force protection minimum requirements and vulnerabilities?
12. What are the force protection capabilities and vulnerabilities of the host-nation security forces?
13. What are the national force protection dependencies that must be mitigated (such as a capability gap in an embedded contingent that must be filled by the supported nation's force)?
14. What are the specific coalition requirements for predeployment force protection training?
15. What are the coalition requirements for predeployment medical prophylaxis?
16. What are national or coalition restrictions on the use of hazardous, active force protection measures (such as invasive scanning)?
17. Are there effective coalition occupational safety measures?
18. Are there effective coalition traffic control and traffic discipline measures?
19. Are there effective coalition measures to deal with environmental hazards?

20. Are there effective coalition emergency response and damage control measures?
21. Are coalition procedures and standards for dealing with explosive hazards compatible?
22. Are there effective entry control measures for coalition bases?
23. What is the host nation's capacity and intent for coalition force protection, and will this change during the campaign?
24. What are the coalition visual and other methods of recognition to facilitate fratricide avoidance?
25. Has a risk assessment been accomplished as appropriate?
26. What are the troop contributing nation's policies to mitigate risks?
27. Do national caveats impose limitations on force protection measures?
28. Have the troop contributing nations conducted the required training to recognize friendly personnel and equipment?
29. Does the coalition have combat identification measures?
30. What are the national approaches to risk management?
  - How have these approaches affected coalition operational output?
  - What is the impact on the planning cycle and battle procedure?

## REFERENCES

- AJP-3.14. *Allied Joint Doctrine for Force Protection* (NATO).  
B-GL-300-006/FP-001. *Land Force Protection* (Canada).

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## Chapter 16

# Military Police

To understand the factors that will affect this functional area, readers must answer the applicable generic questions in chapter 5. Additionally, the chapters on training and logistics have questions that pertain to each of the other functional areas.

### INTRODUCTION

16-1. The fundamental requirements for using military police assets consist of centralized planning, decentralized control, economy of effort, and cooperation. To optimize the military police's overall contribution to operations, often the deployed force provost marshal plans their activities. This will enable rapid application of support tasks responding to a commander's evolving campaign plan. To carry out assigned tasks in response to centralized planning, the decentralized control of military police resources will enable a timely response to a supported commander's needs at the appropriate operational or tactical level.

16-2. Regardless of the nature of the military campaign undertaken, commanders quickly and prudently include the deployed force provost marshal in the operational planning process. This inclusion ensures early recognition of military and civilian police issues and enables the development of specialist responses aimed at achieving the end state.

16-3. Limited resources require military police be allocated to the highest priority task and that, when possible, tasks be combined. Commanders avoid duplication of effort. Individual military police units likely will not maintain an uncommitted reserve. Therefore, commanders coordinate support from other force military police elements through the respective national provost marshal. Success requires unified action at all levels of command as well as cooperation with coalition partners, governmental agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and civilians. Military police units and subunits form an integral part of formations and units and provide each other mutual support.

16-4. In environments where the security of the population and the restoration of essential services are required to enable a nation to develop, specially trained military forces may be required. Military police are a vital aspect of these specialty forces, in particular in the management of detention/prison facilities. Genocide, crimes against humanity, torture, and war crimes can have a direct, immediate, and lasting effect on public opinion and the ability of the deployed force to achieve its end-state objectives. Crimes of this nature require the special investigative skills, techniques, and equipment provided by the military police.

## **CHECKLIST**

### **MILITARY POLICE SUPPORT (NATURE OF OPERATION)**

1. What are the military police coalition tasks and the division of responsibility for achieving those tasks?
2. Has a coalition provost marshal been appointed?
3. What are the coalition powers of arrest, search, and seizure?
4. Will coalition military police be granted special provision within the status-of-forces agreement such as performing criminal investigations, managing coalition enemy prisoners of war, and running criminal detention facilities?
5. What military police and coalition assets will be required for managing prisoners of war, detention centers, and/or prisoner facilities? For example, engineer, medical, and logistic support.

### **COMMAND AND CONTROL**

#### **Command**

1. Who will be the lead nation for the provision of military police support?
2. What will be the command relationships for military police components?
3. What is the coalition military police command and control structure? What are the command and control arrangements for military police of troop contributing nations?

#### **Control**

1. What liaison network has been established? Has liaison been established with host-nation, civilian police, and emergency services as well as nongovernmental organizations?
2. What reporting procedures are implemented? Do they address matters affecting national discipline, criminal activity, and arrest and detention?

### **COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS**

1. Will there be a dedicated communications network for the military police?
2. What coalition communications system will be used as the backbone of military police information and products?
3. Will the deployable military police support systems be networked or stand alone? This raises issues about interoperability of national systems.



## **LOGISTICS**

1. What contracts with the host nation will affect coalition policing tasks?
2. What system of resupply is being employed for coalition and national military police elements? There could be economies in scale for specialist equipment and resources (forensic).

## **TRAINING**

1. What are the mission-specific training requirements and responsibilities?
2. Is specialist training required for managing detention facilities, understanding host-nation policing requirements, and understanding interoperability issues with troop contributing nations?

## REFERENCES

- APP 12. *NATO Military Police Doctrine and Procedures* (NATO).
- FM 3-19.1. *Military Police Operations* (United States).
- LWD 0-1-3. *Military Policing* (Australia).

## Chapter 17

# Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

To understand the factors that will affect this functional area, readers must answer the applicable generic questions in chapter 5. Additionally, the chapters on training and logistics have questions that pertain to each of the other functional areas.

## INTRODUCTION

17-1. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) achieves a synergistic effect when synchronized in mission planning and execution. Outcomes are most fully optimized when resulting information is shared through a flattened coalition network.

17-2. Intelligence enables planning, execution, targeting, force protection, and mission support. It feeds the coalition commanders' need to know more than their enemy or adversary. The commander's critical information requirements drive information collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence products. The requisite knowledge enables the commander's decision cycle and supports the commander in achieving dominance of the operational environment.

17-3. Coalition intelligence products result from a cyclical process. The intelligence cycle is continuous and interdependent with other joint functions and capabilities. It enables the coalition commander to succinctly consider intelligence and intelligence-related operations as a single entity or in their entirety across the spectrum of conflict.

17-4. The term ISR refers to the planning architecture, operational process, and force elements involved in the intelligence cycle. ISR involves the following:

- **Intelligence.** Intelligence operations principally include activities related, but not limited to, human intelligence, imagery intelligence, and signals intelligence. More sensitive intelligence operations require the commander's approval.
- **Surveillance.** Surveillance operations, involving active or passive methods, continuously collect information over a set period and are conducted by specialist surveillance units or tasked to other maneuver units as required.
- **Reconnaissance.** Reconnaissance operations execute missions that are deliberately planned to obtain specified information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy, or about specific environmental data sets.

## **CHECKLIST**

### **GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS**

1. Where does the operation lie in the spectrum of conflict?
2. What is the nature of the coalition operation and how will this affect the intelligence planning, products to be produced, and ISR coordination?
3. What existing intelligence support products are currently available? For example, will human intelligence, imagery intelligence, and signals intelligence be available?
4. If the operation escalates, are there contingency measures to meet the requirement for increased levels of intelligence support to operations?
5. What is the deployment time frame for specialist covert or overt ISR operations? What redundancy exists in coalition ISR collection assets?
6. How will ISR assets be coordinated and tasked (development of synchronization matrix evolves as the operation progresses)?
7. Will there be a coalition fusion center to manage, exploit, and disseminate data and imagery of the operational environment?

### **COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS**

#### **Command**

1. Who will be designated as the lead nation for providing intelligence support?
2. What will be their responsibilities with respect to providing intelligence support?
3. What will be the command relationships for ISR and collection plan tasking? Which assets will remain as national task controlled assets (able to be cross-tasked 'in support')? Which assets will be coalition task controlled assets?

#### **Control**

##### *General*

1. How will national intelligence cells exchange intelligence between coalition nations?
2. What information and intelligence releasability issues exist?
3. Have sufficient intelligence collection resources been placed under the control of the coalition or are the resources immediately responsive to the coalition?
4. What in-theater capabilities provide national support only?

5. What links should be established with civilian agencies (including media)?
6. What are the handover procedures for intelligence and physical architecture to the United Nations or other agencies? Do these include protocols for information exchange and handling, resettlement, or handover of human intelligence sources?
7. What are the parameters for geospatial operations, specifically command and control across a number of contributing nations? For example, what parameters are required as geospatial resources are usually a highly specialized, in-demand capability?

#### *Deconfliction*

1. What are the procedures for reporting and dealing with deconfliction of intelligence analysis?
2. What are the procedures for reporting and dealing with deconfliction of collection plan tasking?
3. Has the use of a human intelligence coordinator been considered?
4. Have human intelligence and counterintelligence operations been deconflicted?

#### **COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS (TO INCLUDE DATA AND INTELLIGENCE FUSION)**

1. Who will be responsible for providing (and maintaining) a common operating software for the intelligence architecture?
2. Which coalition bearer communications systems will be used as a backbone for transmission and dissemination of intelligence information and products?
3. Will any national deployable intelligence support systems be networked or stand alone?
4. What are the levels of interoperability between different intelligence information systems, to include database compatibility?
5. Has the command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence system been established with the capability to rapidly disseminate to all participants the time-sensitive information for targeting or rapid reaction?
6. If automatic interfaces are unworkable, what will be the liaison officer requirements?

#### **OTHER FACTORS**

##### **Logistics**

1. What will be the in-theater ISR asset repair policy?

2. Are there any commercial or national constraints on using equipment in a coalition environment?

### **Training**

1. Have intelligence reporting formats been defined?
2. Will there be an opportunity to exercise and test interoperability between contributing nations intelligence cells?
3. Are training programs in place with a focus creating a common view of the enemy, enemy dispositions, order of battle, doctrine, capabilities, and intelligence systems?
4. Has all familiarization training been completed on those intelligence systems deploying?
5. Has write-for-release guidance been provided to intelligence staffs?

## **ISR – SPECIFIC OPERATIONAL PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS**

### **Predeployment**

1. Is the intelligence support package planned for (INT Annex – separate from the INT ESTIMATE) with capabilities, limitations, and tasks, and explained to supporting units? Consider the following as applicable to the scope of the operation:
  - Intelligence analysis and product dissemination (including imagery and geospatial).
  - Field intelligence.
  - Counterintelligence.
  - Psychological operations (see chapter 13 for further details).
  - Exploitation (material, technical, and personnel).
  - Field security capabilities.
2. What is the required operational structure of the coalition intelligence fusion cell, all source cell, and tactical fusion cell?
3. What considerations are required for fusion of troop contributing nations national intelligence estimates into a coalition intelligence estimate?
4. How are separate national intelligence estimates aligned?
5. Which country has the lead in compiling and aligning the coalition intelligence estimate? If alignment is not appropriate, whose national intelligence estimate has primacy?
6. What are the differences in availability and capability of national collection sources?

7. How does coalition ISR identify and respond to the chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threat?
8. Are there specialized ISR assets able to assess and respond to any threat?

### **Deployment**

1. What are the coalition or force security procedures?
2. Are security procedures for the redeployment of personnel, equipment, and documentation adequate and properly supervised?
3. What are the procedures for sharing intelligence and information or releasing information policies?
4. Are all coalition partners treated equally, considering compartmented and national sensitivities?
5. What information—such as intelligence, operations, and targeting—is being obtained and who needs to see it in single-source form?

## REFERENCES

AJP-2. *Allied Joint Intelligence, Counterintelligence, and Security Doctrine* (NATO).

FM 2-0. *Intelligence* (United States).

JP 2-0. *Joint Intelligence* (United States).

JWP 2-00. *Joint Operational Intelligence* (United Kingdom).

LWD 2-0. *Intelligence* (Australia).

LWD 3-1-0. *Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance* (Australia).



## Chapter 18

# Prisoners of War, Internees, and Detainees

To understand the factors that will affect this functional area, readers must answer the applicable generic questions in chapter 5. Additionally, the chapters on training and logistics have questions that pertain to each of the other functional areas.

## INTRODUCTION

18-1. The capture, internment, or detention of persons can be a key part of many types of operations. In time of conflict, it may include the capture of prisoners of war (POWs) or the internment of civilians. During armed conflict, the taking of POWs brings many practical advantages: it reduces the enemy's numerical strength and fighting capacity, lowers the enemy's morale, and may constrain the tactics of enemy commanders. POWs also are an important potential source of intelligence. Peace support or counterinsurgency operations may include the arrest and detention of criminal suspects or internment of those who pose an imperative threat to security. The internment or arrest of criminal suspects contributes to stabilizing the situation on the ground and enhancing force protection.

18-2. Conversely, the abuse or ill-treatment of captured individuals can benefit an enemy or adversary in many ways. Even allegations of abuse may form the basis of powerful propaganda and undermine the credibility of coalition forces. Actual abuse, when made known publicly, leads to deterioration of domestic support and invites international condemnation. Deterioration in domestic support is equally likely. The abuse of POWs, internees, and detainees is unlawful. It is a misdirection of military effort that may indicate a breakdown in the internal discipline of a unit or formation.

18-3. All persons detained by coalition forces during the course of military operations shall be treated humanely from the moment they fall into the hands of coalition forces until release. This is the fundamental principle of the Geneva Conventions. Coalition forces are responsible for the safety and protection of all persons captured or detained by them until their release.

18-4. The management of captured persons, being of international concern, is monitored not only by coalition forces but also by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) as custodian of the Geneva Conventions. The coalition headquarters should identify differences in the adoption, application, or adherence to all aspects of the Geneva Conventions and their additional protocols by troop contributing nations and take measures to ensure consistency within the coalition.

## **Chapter 18**

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18-5. Coalition members must promptly report all alleged violations of the law committed by coalition personnel through the coalition chain of command. All alleged violations must be thoroughly investigated. Where appropriate, disciplinary action should be taken and corrective action should follow in order to prevent future occurrences.

## CHECKLIST

### PLANNING (NATURE OF OPERATION)

1. Is there a lead nation for the provision of POW and civilian detainee facilities?
2. Are contributing nations managing their own captured personnel?
3. What legal provisions does the mandate provide for the capture, internment, or detention of persons by the coalition force?
4. Does the legal staff understand the range of circumstances in which persons are likely to be captured?
5. Are there enough custodial specialists available to offer advice to commanders and planning staffs?
6. Have status-of-forces agreements (SOFAs) been negotiated with the host nation regarding the capture, internment, or detention of persons by the coalition force, and are there any significant differences between SOFAs across the coalition?
7. Are host nation criminal justice systems operating effectively, and could detainees be transferred to that system following capture?
8. What is the legal position of each coalition nation regarding whether the conflict has crossed the threshold into international armed conflict?
9. What is the status of all coalition nations in relation to adoption of the Geneva Conventions and their additional protocols?
10. What are the coalition's mechanisms for inspecting coalition POW and internee or detainee facilities?
11. When are the coalition partners expected to report detainees to the United Nations?
12. Is there a coalition policy on mandatory qualifications for interrogation of personnel?
13. Will the troop contributing nations allow questioning of their captured personnel by other nations?

### COMMAND

1. Is a single element of the coalition force responsible for commanding the force POW, internee, or detainee facility?
2. Have the appropriate equipment, manning, resources and administrative support been identified and allocated for the task?

## **CONTROL**

1. What are the coalition force system arrangements for moving captured persons to POW, internee, or detainee facilities?
2. What are the liaison arrangements between those force elements responsible for interrogation and those responsible for internment and detention?
3. If an international police force has been deployed, can captured persons be transferred into the custody of that force?
4. What procedures are in place to protect the rights of captured persons, including inspections of internment and detention facilities by the coalition force commander, the ICRC, or other humanitarian organizations?
5. How does the coalition intend to handle the transfer of captured personnel to the host nation if host-nation laws are in some cases contrary to fundamental human rights principles (such as the application of certain punishments)?
6. What will be the policy for the capture, detention and transfer of captured personnel within the coalition, to the host nation (see question 7 under planning in this chapter), or to other nations?
7. Who will have the authority to approve transfer of captured personnel?

## **COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS**

1. What is the coalition system to categorize and track the movements of captured persons?
2. Does it include tracking the movements of captured persons who are injured?

## **INTELLIGENCE GATHERING**

1. What interrogation techniques and procedures are the authorized?
2. What are the procedures for transfer of POWs (including personal equipment) to intelligence personnel for interrogation?

## **LOGISTICS**

1. What is the logistic support plan for the POW, internee, or detainee facility?
2. What is the movement plan for injured and uninjured captured persons?

## **POLICY**

1. What arrangements have been made to determine the status of captured persons whose status is not clear?
2. What arrangements have been made to ensure common treatment standards across the coalition if possible?

3. Have orders been produced and promulgated concerning procedures to be followed regarding captured persons, and do all coalition troops understand them?
4. What procedures are in place for the repatriation or release of internees and detainees?
5. What procedures are in place for the transfer of internees or detainees from one coalition nation to another or to the host nation, and have written agreements been concluded between the relevant parties?
6. What procedures are in place to handle suspected war criminals?

### **TRAINING**

1. Do all commanders understand their obligations regarding captured persons under the Geneva Conventions and their additional protocols (if applicable)?
2. What levels of training have coalition forces responsible for the treatment and management of capture persons received?

## REFERENCES

The Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols of 12 Aug 1949  
<[www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/CONVPRES?OpenView](http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/CONVPRES?OpenView)>.

## Chapter 19

# Logistics

To understand the factors that will affect this functional area, readers must answer the applicable generic questions in chapter 5. Additionally, the chapters on training and logistics have questions that pertain to each of the other functional areas.

## INTRODUCTION

19-1. Unity of effort is essential to coalition logistic operations. All nations must work together to identify requirements, prioritize them, and share capacity to provide the most effective and efficient support possible. This requires coordination not only between contributing nations, but also with civilian agencies in the area of operations. When possible, mutual logistic support should be developed for economy of effort. Coalition logistics should be flexible, responsive, predictive, and provide timely sustainment throughout the entire coalition force. Coalition planning must recognize varying logistic requirement by specific phase at the predeployment planning phase. Planning continues through reception, staging, onward movement, and integration; steady state; and redeployment operations.

19-2. Where appropriate, commanders control logistics on a coalition basis, with as much centralized control over logistics as interoperability permits. Creating a single coalition logistic command and coordination center provides visibility, economy of assets, and system efficiency. The G-4 should establish a planning group to define the extent of interoperability that may exist between coalition forces.

19-3. Coalition operations can complicate logistic support and reduce the degree of flexibility inherent in a national logistic system. Although responsible for logistic support of its national forces, not all nations have deployable logistic capabilities. Such nations then depend on other nations for all or part of their support.

## PLANNING

19-4. Early involvement of the logistic staff is critical to mission success and ensures that sustainment requirements balance with capabilities. The logistic staff includes liaison officers and representatives from the host nation, nongovernmental organizations, and contractor support to operations. Logistic planning has three aims: to create and sustain tempo, to extend the potential to take greater operational risk, and to increase the endurance of the force. To facilitate planning, personnel must be identified and made available as early as possible. Concurrent logistic and operations

planning is critical. Plans should be developed with all participating nations to achieve logistic efficiencies.

19-5. At the earliest opportunity, the coalition should establish a planning group to define the extent of interoperability and cooperation among coalition forces while designing the organization for the coalition, the command and support relationships, and the support relationships.

## **RESPONSIBILITY**

19-6. The responsibility for providing logistic support to national forces ultimately resides with their nations; some nations may not relinquish authority over their logistic assets. However, requiring each nation to perform all logistic functions separately is inefficient and would hinder the coalition force's ability to influence operations logistically. Varying degrees of mutual logistic support among coalition partners should be planned to complement partners' capabilities and minimize weaknesses.

19-7. The coalition commander should be given the responsibility to coordinate the overall logistic effort in all phases. In some cases, the coalition force may exercise control over the national logistic units, in other cases it will act only as the coordinating authority. The degree of authority will depend on existing agreements and arrangements negotiated with contributing nations.

## **LOGISTIC SUPPORT OPTIONS**

19-8. There are four methods of executing cooperative logistics in a coalition. All may be used individually or concurrently. These methods are national responsibility, lead nation, role specialization, and multinational integrated logistic support.

## **HOST-NATION SUPPORT**

19-9. Support from the host nation will be extremely valuable to the coalition. Therefore, the coalition command must analyze the physical infrastructure in the host nation. This analysis reveals what facilities and services are available to support the command and how they can reduce the logistic footprint. The coalition may establish a coalition contracting center to facilitate coalition procurement of scarce resources.

## **MUTUAL SUPPORT AGREEMENTS**

19-10. Participating nations have the option of developing support agreements, bilaterally and multilaterally, with other nations for providing logistic support to their forces. The coalition headquarters must be given an overview of these arrangements to understand their implications on the coordination of the overall support plan. These agreements are done at national government level.



## **CONTRACTOR LOGISTIC SUPPORT TO OPERATIONS**

19-11. Contractor logistic support is the use of preplanned and opportunistic civilian contracting to perform selected logistic support services. In a coalition, this support is a national responsibility to implement. However, nations should share vendor information, lessons learned, and contacts with the coalition command and other nations. The coalition headquarters must understand the role of this enabler, just as any other logistic capability.

## **CHECKLIST**

### **GENERAL**

1. Is a concise concept of support stated?
2. Do plans provide a summary of the requirements, tasks, and concept of the coalition operation that the logistic planning supports? Are national, role specialization, lead nation, and host-nation responsibilities defined for the various logistic tasks?
3. Do plans specify the multinational logistic objectives? Are they achievable with respect to the plans?
4. Do plans state the size, expected duration, and dates of the multinational operation?
5. Have standards regarding operational or logistic capabilities been established for certifying units to participate in the operation? Have nations with deficiencies indicated a method of resolution?
6. Have logistic deficiencies been negotiated for resolution with the coalition commander?

### **LOGISTICS ASSUMPTIONS**

1. Do plans include all assumptions (national and multinational) upon which the concepts of logistic support are based?
2. Do assumptions conflict or agree with supporting and supported operations plans? Are assumptions realistic?

### **CONCEPT OF LOGISTIC SUPPORT**

1. How will the support functions—supply, maintenance, transportation, facilities, field service, personnel, engineering—be provided?
2. Are known logistic constraints and limitations identified? Have alternative resources been considered where constraints are known to exist?
3. Are operational planners aware of multinational logistic strengths and weaknesses?

### **PLANNING**

1. What logistic preparation of the area of operations products and information are available and how can they be shared with other nations?

2. What are the logistic information requirements and who will find the information? Are there information requirements for logistics that the commander might consider for commander's critical information requirements?
3. Has liaison been established with other coalition nations and civilian agencies to obtain up-to-date logistic information on the area of operations?
4. What is the logistic requirement for the coalition and its troop contributing nations?
5. What are the common supplies and services that one nation or a multinational organization might provide?
6. What logistic support options best suit each combat service support function for coalition operations?
7. Have lead nations been designated where appropriate?
8. Which nations are responsible for what support to other nations?
9. What assistance is required for coalition forces to deploy and operate?
10. What is the division of responsibilities among coalition, national, and host-nation logistic support?
11. What is the logistic support structure? How will it identify capabilities and responsibilities of troop contributing nations?
12. Has the command coordinated diplomatic efforts to arrange for country and diplomatic clearances, overflight rights, and basing for forces transiting from one locality to another in the area of operations?
13. How will the coalition prioritize, allocate, and use common infrastructure capabilities (ports, airfields, roads) to support military and civil operations?
14. What are the in-theater capabilities and resources of civilian agencies in the area of operations? What is the coalition reception, staging, onward movement, and integration process?
15. What national forces will interface with the coalition movement control center?
16. Are provisions made for logistic support of civilians, prisoners of war, or nongovernmental organizations?

#### **LOGISTIC COMMAND AND CONTROL**

1. Is there a coalition logistic component commander and, if so, has a coalition logistic command been established?
2. If not, has a multinational logistics staff been established as part of the coalition headquarters?

3. Is there a need to establish multinational logistic formations or units and, if so, have their organizations been determined? Can they be manned, equipped, and validated prior to employment?
4. Have coordinating centers been established for movements, medical, contracting, infrastructure engineering, and logistic operations?
5. Have the relationships between the coalition and national logistic organizations been clearly defined? Are the command and support relationships clear?
6. Will there be, and if so when and how, a transfer of authority over national logistic assets to the coalition?
7. What is the coalition's authority to redistribute or cross-level logistic assets and services under routine and emergency conditions?
8. What legal restrictions do national laws impose on logistic support?
9. Do national legal authorities permit the provision of logistic support among coalition nations?
10. Are coalition legal representatives available to provide counsel on international law and legal agreements?
11. How does the command assess logistic requests, requirements, and actions to ensure that they are valid with respect to the operation and authority given to the command?
12. How will the command ensure compatibility and interoperability of communications and information systems, to include automated data processing interfaces, between the coalition and national logistic support systems?
13. Have logistic reporting procedures been established throughout the force?
14. Do coalition forces have the means to communicate requirements to the coalition logistic management center?
15. What procedures ensure in-transit visibility (ITV) at all transportation nodes? Lack of ITV will cause loss of confidence in the supply system and lead to unnecessary reordering, further clogging the supply lines.

### **INTEROPERABILITY**

1. How do computing requirements and stock levels differ among coalition partners?
2. How do doctrine, capabilities, methods for computing requirements and stock levels, organizations, and communications and information systems differ among coalition partners?
3. How do language, values, religious beliefs, economic infrastructure, nutritional standards, and social outlooks, which may impact logistic support to coalition forces, differ among coalition partners?

## **MUTUAL LOGISTIC SUPPORT**

1. Are mutual logistic support agreements in place and in accordance with existing legal authorities?
2. What are the mutual logistic support agreement procedures to account for and reimburse nations for services and supplies exchanged between nations?
3. Does the coalition have acquisition and cross-serving agreements among coalition partners?
4. What current agreements exist with other participating nations that provide logistic support? Does this include agreements governing logistic support with representatives of other nations?

## **FUNDING**

1. Has funding been identified to support operations or to reimburse expenditure? What are the limits on funding authority?
2. What is the availability of, and procedures for using, common funding for contracting, establishing coalition headquarters, and general or common support?
3. Does the command have funding codes from all coalition nations? What methods and documentation are required to record all expenditures?
4. How will the command capture costs associated with providing support to coalition forces?

## **HOST-NATION SUPPORT**

1. What policies and agreements are required to facilitate the best use of local resources, including host-nation support and local contracting, to prioritize requirements, reduce competition and thus inflation, and reduce negative impacts on the local economy?
2. Has host-nation support been evaluated to determine the logistic support available to include law enforcement, sanitation, medical services, facilities, storage, and materiel?
3. What are the capabilities of existing infrastructure, to include water treatment plants, power stations, reservoirs, and bulk and retail fuel storage? Engineers or facility managers can provide critical information on the availability of existing facilities.
4. Have negotiations to secure support either been established or completed?
5. What are the possible environmental impacts on the host-nation providing support?

6. What specific technical agreements—such as environmental clean up; customs duties and taxes; and hazardous material and waste storage, transit, and disposal—must be developed to augment agreements that may have been concluded with host-nation support?
7. Has an assessment of current environmental conditions—such as water and soil contamination—epidemiological surveys, and disease risk been completed? Has that data been recorded for future remediation?
8. What facilities and land are required and do they exist in the area of operations? Priorities for property acquisition should be established taking into account when the property is needed.
9. Does the coalition force have the authority to conclude host-nation support arrangements on behalf of participating nations, or is prior national approval required?

### **MAINTENANCE**

1. Is there a requirement for a coalition maintenance plan?
2. What will be the in-theater repair policy? What mutual support is planned for common equipment?
3. Do coalition forces have the means to order and receive repair parts?
4. Do coalition forces have recovery vehicle assets, platform trailers, or heavy equipment transporters?
5. Do coalition forces have communications repair facilities?
6. Do all coalition forces know and comply with the infrastructure repair plan?

### **TRANSPORTATION**

1. What is the coalition transportation command structure (movement control)?
2. What are the available coalition air and sea lines of communication?
3. What are the movement priorities for coalition operations?
4. What are assigned airlift and sealift capabilities and allocations? Keep in mind the requirements to support both military and civilian agencies.
5. Will a logistics over-the-shore operation be required?
6. Has the coalition identified the requirements for ports and inland transportation systems in the area of operations? What resources are required for new construction or necessary improvements to existing facilities?
7. What is the capability of coalition and host-nation transportation systems to move forces once they arrive in theater?

8. Do coalition forces have tactical rotary- and fixed-wing assets for intratheater supply?
9. Do coalition forces have transportation assets for moving troops?
10. How will the command control movement into and out of airfields and seaports?
11. How will transportation facilities be shared with civilian agencies and contractors?
12. What fixed ports are available to support military marine terminal operations and what are the priorities for use?
13. Can the port support roll-on, roll-off vessels and increased berth depth?
14. What airfields are available to support military logistic operations? What are the priorities for use?
15. What are the characteristics and capabilities of the road routes available to support military operations, such as road carrying capacity, road surface conditions, tunnels, bridges, cargo restrictions, and route redundancy?
16. Will the coalition or host nation perform highway repair work?
17. Are adequate rail lines available to support military operations? What are the priorities for use?
18. Is a movement system for personnel and cargo specified (intratheater, intertheater, in-country)?
19. Has use of foreign flag sea and airlift been addressed?
20. What transport support will be provided by or to coalition partners, host-nation forces, or other organizations? When will it be provided?

## **SUPPLY**

1. What major equipment will coalition partners bring to theater?
2. How will each class of supply be handled?
3. Is the coalition supply system described for all echelons and is procedural guidance provided?
4. Are the stock levels by class of supply specified?
5. Have coalition critical and common items been identified?
6. Are supply support responsibilities identified for various coalition activities in theater and for the national support organizations?
7. What are the coalition forces' capabilities to receive, store, and issue dry cargo, fuel, and water, to include producing and purifying water?

8. What is the best method for providing potable water?
9. What quality controls have been established for all coalition-provided services and supplies such as water, food, and petroleum, oils, and lubricants? How will they be monitored?
10. Will land forces provide fuel support to other services or receive support from other services? If so, how much and when?
11. What materiel handling equipment is available within the coalition?
12. Do coalition forces have a basic load of ammunition and what are their ammunition procedures?
13. What arrangements will be in place for coalition resupply of common ammunition?
14. Have requirements been developed for support of common munitions to coalition partners or other services?
15. Are ammunition requisitioning and issue procedures included for support to coalition customers and other services?
16. Are critical munitions requirements addressed?
17. Have arrangements been made or procedures developed for storing ammunition?
18. How will the command maintain national asset accountability from the national sustaining base to the front line units?
19. What is the system for property accountability?

## **CONTRACTING**

1. Is there a contract coordination center?
2. Is there a policy to prevent competition among coalition partners for scarce contracting resources?
3. Are there procedures and policies for contracting support in the area of operations, assuring full use of host-nation support and contracting resources?
4. Have contractor procedures been established to allow total coalition participation in contracts let by national personnel and used by coalition personnel?
5. Is there a contracting support plan? Does it cover the following requirements:
  - Ensures contracting receives consideration during logistic planning and becomes part of the operation order or operation plan?
  - Identifies subordinate command's requirements for host-nation or contracting support?



- Develops an area database containing all available data concerning local resources from area studies, foreign service personnel, civilian agencies, and locally developed logistic support data? It should also contain a list of contracting and host-nation support agreements in the area of operations.
- Addresses security performance measures and quality control aspects of contracting to include inspection of goods received to ensure against sabotage, poisoning, or other terrorist-style actions?

### **MORTUARY**

1. Are mortuary responsibilities defined?
2. Is local mortuary support available?
3. Is lift to evacuate remains available?

### **FIELD SERVICES**

1. Have waste disposal considerations been addressed?
2. Have catering, water, and hygiene requirements been addressed?
3. Is postal support adequately planned for?

### **ENGINEER SUPPORT**

1. What are the facilities requirements to support logistic systems and logistic planning?
2. Have these requirements been incorporated into engineer planning?
3. Can any of the facility requirements be satisfied by host-nation facilities?
4. Are firefighting capabilities addressed?
5. Is explosive ordnance disposal covered?
6. What security engineering enhancements are required?
7. What are the electrical power generation and distribution requirements?

### **DETAINEES**

1. Have logistic requirements been addressed for handling prisoners of war, civilian internees, retained personnel, and other detainees?

## REFERENCES

- ADDP 4-0. *Logistics* (Australia).
- AJP-4. *Allied Joint Logistics Doctrine* (NATO).
- B-GL-300-004/FP-001. *Land Force Sustainment* (Canada).
- British Army Doctrine Publication Volume 3: Logistics* (United Kingdom).
- FM 4-0. *Combat Service Support* (United States).
- JDP 4-00. *Logistics for Joint Operations* (United Kingdom).
- JP 4-0. *Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations* (United States).
- QAP 323. *Coalition Logistics Handbook* (ABCA).
- QSTAG 2020. *Coalition Logistics Planning Guide* (ABCA).

## Chapter 20

# Financial Services

To understand the factors that will affect this functional area, readers must answer the applicable generic questions in chapter 5. Additionally, the chapters on training and logistics have questions that pertain to each of the other functional areas.

## INTRODUCTION

20-1. In general, financial services are a national responsibility and will be arranged through memorandums of understanding or agreements between the relevant nations. The coalition force headquarters should play a coordination role and establish policies aimed at curbing black market activities and reducing how inflation factors affect local economies.

## FINANCIAL RESOURCES

20-2. Financial services provide commanders with the financial resources necessary to contribute to a successful mission outcome. In-theater financial services support the commander by providing financial advice, supporting local procurement efforts, and funding and tracking operations costs. The latter includes capturing and recovering costs for goods and services provided to or received from other entities and military pay support.

20-3. In-theater finance groups perform tasks that help the host nation and other supporting forces by paying for contracts and providing cash to agents. The agents make local purchases and hire local labor, equipment, and infrastructure facilities. The finance groups also provide military pay support, currency exchange for individuals, and limited support to other services such as audits and financial management reviews.

## RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

20-4. Resource managers focus on obtaining obligation and expenditure authority and on tracking operation costs. Finance agencies provide essential input into the accounting systems to support cost capturing. Accurate, detailed costs are needed for reporting dealings with coalition partners to determine how costs have been or should be apportioned. These costs help in determining the net additional cost of an operation to a government.

## PLANNING

20-5. To provide the necessary finance support to operations, inclusion in planning activities is paramount. Doing so enables ongoing advice to commanders and their staff on all financial and resource matters, allows costing to occur, and, where necessary, positioning of sufficient funds in the correct currencies, amounts, and denominations for future use.

## COMPTROLLER

20-6. The coalition must develop a policy for funding the operation. Finance management support to the coalition includes financial and resource management functions. Responsibilities of the coalition comptroller may include—

- Serving as coalition force principal financial management advisor.
- Representing the commander in identifying coalition resources and the needs of the financing country to the national authorities and others as required.
- Establishing financial management responsibilities, to include designating lead agents for specific financial management functions or special support requirements.
- Providing estimates of resource requirements to the national authorities and others as required.
- Establishing positive controls over funding authority received.
- Coordinating with the G-4 for a system to prevent fraud, waste, and abuse.
- Coordinating with the staff judge advocate on funding authority issues.
- Handling reimbursement for nations providing services to coalition forces and others.
- Preparing finance and disbursing section for the personnel annex of either the operation plan or operation order.

## CHECKLIST

1. Are there multinational logistic support agreements, memorandum or understanding, or other agreements or arrangements in place among coalition nations?
2. What is the impact of the multinational logistic support agreement in place?
3. Who are the delegated authorities in country?
4. What are the limitations on the amounts of cash payments that soldiers may receive in the area of operations? Who imposes the limitations?
5. How will coalition finance support provide currency exchange?
6. What are the arrangements for cash resupply?
7. What are the arrangements to provide or receive coalition support to the local procurement process?
8. Have contractor procedures been established to allow total coalition participation in contracts let by national personnel and used by coalition personnel?
9. Will contracted subsistence support to the coalition affect entitlements to personnel?
10. What is the transitional plan for operational assumption of in-place contracts, equipment, facilities, and personnel belonging to another agency or alliance?
11. Is there a requirement for financial support for weapon bounties and claims?
12. Has the coalition identified black markets or black market items?
13. Are there coalition policies aimed at curbing black market activities?
14. Are there policies for reducing how inflation factors affect the local economies?
15. Has funding been identified to support operations or to reimburse expenditure? What are the limits on funding authority?
16. What is the availability of, and procedures for using, common funding for contracting, establishing coalition headquarters, and general or common support?
17. What are the procedures to account for and reimburse nations for services and supplies exchanged between nations, to include replacement-in-kind procedures?
18. Does the coalition have funding codes from all coalition nations? What methods and documentation are required to record all expenditures?
19. How will subordinate commands capture costs associated with providing support to coalition forces?

## REFERENCES

FM 1-06. *Financial Management Operations* (United States).

LWP-PERS 1-1-11. *Cash Office Support on Operations* (Australia).

## Chapter 21

# Health Service Support

To understand the factors that will affect this functional area, readers must answer the applicable generic questions in chapter 5. Additionally, the chapters on training and logistics have questions that pertain to each of the other functional areas.

## INTRODUCTION

21-1. Coalition health service support (HSS) plays a key role in developing and maintaining combat power and can be a major factor in achieving strategic goals. The health services mission is promoting health, preventing casualties, and providing capable medical units. These units can respond to the challenging deployments in coalition operations.

21-2. The coalition force commander should ensure that forces deliver health care rapidly, effectively, and efficiently without interfering with the coalition force mission. It is an abiding principle of coalition operations that one nation's forces may be treated by another nation's medical personnel or in another nation's treatment facilities. This requires coordinating all HSS assets, a detailed health plan, and effective liaison among the senior health service officers of each nation.

## PLANNING HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT

21-3. The ability of coalition forces to conduct land operations successfully is predicated on thorough preparation and planning. HSS is essential to maintain the health and well-being of the forces to preserve capability and enhance operational effectiveness. Knowledge of the capabilities of contributing forces, including those of the host nation, helps to reduce duplication and ensures efficiency. Knowledge of limitations allows risk management and helps to identify gaps to be covered. Together they ensure the medical resources are structured efficiently to meet the needs of the deployed force and support the coalition commander's intent.

21-4. A comprehensive HSS plan is complex. It should be written and coordinated at the highest level. Such an approach helps the early development of critical policies and the management of common issues. These issues can include evacuation, standards of care, information management, medical waste disposal, care of detainees, care of civilians, sustainment, and provision of specialist medical capabilities such as mental health. Long-term resourcing and structural requirements need to be addressed early in the planning process. In addition to planning, the force command surgeon

must provide professional direction, operational execution of the HSS plan and timely and accurate health advice to the force commander.

## **COALITION SURGEON**

21-5. The coalition surgeon is responsible to the commander for medical support in the area of operations. As chief medical advisor, the surgeon requires direct access to the commander. The surgeon's staff should have representatives from all nations.

21-6. The surgeon prepares the HSS plan and medical annex to the operation plan or operation order.



## **CHECKLIST**

### **HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT PLANNING (NATURE OF OPERATION)**

1. Which HSS capabilities need to be at the coalition level and which are the responsibilities of each troop contributing nation? What forces have organic HSS? For those that do not have this support, what level will other coalition forces provide?
2. What resources or facilities are available from the host-nation organizations, and nongovernmental organizations, or civilian agencies in the area of operations?
3. Is there health services representation on the reconnaissance and assessment team?
4. Has a thorough threat assessment been conducted? Are the results included in supporting HSS plans?
5. What is the desired HSS organization for early entry forces?
6. What HSS capabilities are to be located in the coalition area of operations?
7. What is the casualty evacuation plan? Consider coalition partner capabilities for air, maritime, and ground, intra- and intertheater.
8. Are health facilities prepared to deal with chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear casualties?
9. What provisions exist for managing the in-theater mental health needs of the force?
10. What provisions exist for veterinary services?
11. What provisions exist for caring for detainees and civilians?
12. Does the coalition have a comprehensive mental health strategy? Have chaplains been included in the plan?

### **COMMAND AND CONTROL**

#### **Command**

1. Who will be designated as the lead nation for providing HSS?
2. Have national elements appointed senior health service officers?
3. Has a command surgeon been appointed?
4. Have troop contributing nations provided staff or liaison to the command surgeon?

5. Are there health assets available for surge situations such as mass casualty situations?
6. What is the command policy regarding the display of distinctive markings under International Committee of the Red Cross regulations?

### **Control**

1. Are there adequate arrangements for communications, coordination, and liaison among health service organizations?
2. Is there a coordinated medical evacuation system?
3. Is HSS in reasonable proximity to all forces?
4. Are the HSS assets sufficiently mobile to provide support to the coalition force?
5. Have provisions been made to coordinate health service support with host-nation forces, nongovernmental organizations, and international and regional organizations?

### **HEALTH INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE**

1. What are the health threat assessment and health surveillance requirements?
2. Does the health surveillance include pre- and post-surveillance programs; evaluation of infectious diseases, risks; and determination of the requirements for an entomologist for vector control.
3. What is the plan for collecting, analyzing, and disseminating health information and intelligence to include that related to the local population?

### **COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS**

1. Has a process been established to track and report casualties of one nation using the health facilities of another?
2. What are the procedures for tracking patients and coordination requirements for return-to-duty transportation?
3. What is the communications system for casualty regulation?

### **LOGISTICS**

1. Which items of medical supply are common and which are nation-specific? Have provisions been made for national supply chains when required?
2. What is the blood supply and distribution system?
3. Who will inspect food stuffs and water from a health perspective?
4. What provisions exist for repairing medical and dental equipment?

5. Does the coalition logistic plan account for graves registration and mortuary procedures to service coalition fatalities? Does the plan include recognizing cultural differences in dealing with human remains and procedures and policies for local civilians? Is this plan coordinated with national authorities?
6. What provisions exist for handling and disposing of hazardous and medical waste?

**POLICY**

1. Has the coalition established eligibility for health care including noncombatants, civilian coalition members, contractors, displaced persons, refugees, and host-nation civilians including arrangements for reimbursement?

## REFERENCES

- B-GJ-005-410 FP-000. *Health Services Support to Canadian Forces Operations* (Canada).
- FM 4-02. *Force Health Protection in a Global Environment* (United States).
- LWD 1-2. *Combat Health Support* (Australia).
- QAP 256. *Coalition Health Interoperability Handbook* (ABCA).

## Chapter 22

# Personnel

To understand the factors that will affect this functional area, readers must answer the applicable generic questions in chapter 5. Additionally, the chapters on training and logistics have questions that pertain to each of the other functional areas.

### **PERSONNEL SUPPORT**

22-1. Personnel support functions are a national responsibility. However, if opportunities for interoperability exist, they should be pursued where multinational cooperation is a more efficient option. Personnel support includes replacements; strength management; personnel accounting; casualty management; personnel database and information management; postal services; personnel evaluations; promotions, transfers and discharges; morale, welfare and recreation; and awards.

22-2. Finance, religious ministry, public affairs, and legal support to the command are discussed in separate chapters.

### **G-1 (PERSONNEL)**

22-3. The coalition G-1 is the principal staff assistant to the commander on personnel management. The G-1 provides guidance, oversight, and coordination of overall personnel issues.

22-4. In consultation with the troop contributing nations, the coalition G-1 may recommend a rotation policy based on the coalition's mission, length of operation, operational environment, and requirement for appropriately trained and skilled personnel. The rotation policies of participating nations will affect tour length. However, the coalition commander will require visibility of national contingent rotations to remain aware of the status of national forces and to account for all the forces in the area of operations.

### **RECEPTION CENTER**

22-5. The coalition G-1 runs the coalition personnel reception center. The coalition personnel reception center familiarizes coalition personnel with the coalition, its mission, and the situation for which the coalition was formed. It also assists personnel in acclimating themselves to the host nation, its culture, and its history. Each coalition nation should be represented in the coalition personnel reception center. The center may also serve as the central location of national personnel service support operations.

## **VISITOR'S BUREAU**

22-6. The number of visitors to an area of operations may warrant establishing a coalition visitor's bureau. This bureau can help to handle all visitors, especially distinguished visitors. This is usually a full-time responsibility. A senior officer should be the director of the coalition visitor's bureau. It should consist of representatives from all coalition nations. It must possess sufficient communications and transportation capabilities.

## CHECKLIST

### PERSONNEL

1. What is the coalition management scheme for personnel replacement in coalition headquarters?
2. Have coalition personnel services support assets been co-located for ease of coordination between the national organizations of the coalition force?
3. Have instructions for special coalition requirements—such as passports, visas, immunizations, uniforms, equipment, and travel restrictions—been addressed?
4. What coalition morale, welfare and recreation policy exists?
5. What coalition leave policy exists?
6. Is there a multinational force recognition of service policy for awards or honors?
7. Is postal support for the all coalition members/nations adequately planned for?
8. What coalition mortuary affairs capabilities do the troop contributing nations have?
9. Has the coalition visitor's bureau been raised in consultation with G-3?

### ROTATION AND STRENGTH MANAGEMENT

1. Is there a coalition rotation plan or policy?
2. Does the coalition commander have visibility of national contingent rotations and rotation policies?
3. Does the strength management scheme accurately account for all personnel in the area of operations?
4. Does an information management system exist for the coalition? Does it allow summation of personnel status reports including authorized, assigned, and deployed strengths; critical personnel shortages; casualty accounting; and personnel requisitions?
5. Have coalition member nations been asked to stagger personnel replacement to maintain skills set and expertise in the area of operations?
6. Has a coalition personnel reception center been established to handle personnel flow into and out of the area of operations? Have manning requirements for the coalition personnel reception center been identified and agreed to by the coalition members?
7. Have procedures been established to identify personnel information on all in-bound personnel upon arrival and out-bound personnel upon departure?

## REFERENCES

- FM 1-0. *Human Resources Support* (United States).
- LWD 1-0. *Personnel Support* (Australia).
- QAP 323. *Coalition Logistics Handbook* (ABCA).



## Chapter 23

# Religious Support

To understand the factors that will affect this functional area, readers must answer the applicable generic questions in chapter 5. Additionally, the chapters on training and logistics have questions that pertain to each of the other functional areas.

### INTRODUCTION

23-1. Religion plays a pivotal role in the self-understanding of many people. It has a significant effect on the goals, objectives, and structure of society. This may impact coalition policy, strategy, or tactics. Religious differences among personnel of both participating nations and populations in the area of operations need to be identified and addressed during the planning stages. Religious occasions or holidays may affect the conduct of operations, and it is essential that they are approached with sensitivity.

23-2. Coalition religious support plays a key role in promoting, developing, and maintaining the spiritual health and morale of the soldier, as well as advising the command and staff on the spiritual and moral well-being of the command. Coalition force commanders must maintain the religious needs of the command. This requires coordinating religious support assets, a detailed religious support plan, and effective liaison with the senior chaplains of each nation. The idea of one nation's chaplains providing worship services or pastoral care for the soldiers of another nation should be possible.

### TEAM MINISTRY

23-3. Chaplains should communicate with one another to provide needed information and mutual support. Some chaplains may be limited by the laws or regulations of their nations with regard to the ministry they may perform. These limitations must be understood and respected.

23-4. Chaplains and those enlisted personnel assigned to assist chaplains may identify the sign of posttraumatic stress disorder. As part of a comprehensive mental health strategy, they can advise soldiers seeking or requiring support and the commander on force effectiveness.

## CHECKLIST

1. What are the religious differences among personnel from both participating nations and populations in the area of operations?
2. When are the religious occasions and what is their significance? How are they celebrated?
3. Have religious support assets been coordinated?
4. Is there a coalition religious support plan?
5. Is there a process by which one nation's chaplains can provide worship services or pastoral care for the soldiers of another nation?
6. Is there a letter of cooperation or memorandum of understanding for combined religious support?
7. How do laws and regulations of their nation limit chaplains with regard to the ministry they may perform?
8. Are there religious support lessons learned available for dissemination?
9. How do the chaplain's roles in mental health coordinate with the overall mental health plan for health service support?

## REFERENCES

FM 1-05. *Religious Support* (United States).

JP 1-05. *Religious Support in Joint Operations* (United States).

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## Chapter 24

# Legal

To understand the factors that will affect this functional area, readers must answer the applicable generic questions in chapter 5. Additionally, the chapters on training and logistics have questions that pertain to each of the other functional areas.

## INTRODUCTION

24-1. The legal framework that influences the conduct of coalition operations needs to be understood by troop contributing nations (TCNs), coalition commanders, and their staff. Even coalition forces conducting operations under Chapter VII of United Nations (UN) peace enforcement mandates are subject to the law.

## LEGAL BASIS FOR OPERATIONS

24-2. A fundamental principle of the UN Charter is noninterference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. Therefore, any military action by a coalition of states on the territory of another state cannot be undertaken unless legally justified. It also must act consistently with the principles of the UN Charter, such as Chapter VII UN Security Council authority, Article 51 individual or collective self-defense.

24-3. The success of any coalition operation therefore does not only depend on the accurate and timely application of combat power, but also on the degree of domestic and international support for the operation. The legal (and moral) basis for the coalition's presence in the host nation, its mandate, and the privileges and immunities of any civilians must be established early in the planning process.

24-4. The law of armed conflict (LOAC) is legally binding on the coalition partners in any operation where a state of armed conflict exists to which the coalition members are a party. Some aspects of the LOAC, such as prohibitions on the use of certain weapons, may legally bind coalition partners even though no state of armed conflict exists. Even when not applicable as a matter of law, the humanitarian principles of the LOAC may be applied as a matter of national policy. International human rights law is also relevant. In particular, treaty and customary international law prohibitions—such as those in respect of torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, and deprivation of other fundamental human rights. These obligations shape the way in which operations can be lawfully conducted.

24-5. Status-of-forces agreements (SOFAs) and arrangements are powerful instruments for modifying how international and host-nation domestic law affects a

coalition operation. They set out the privileges and immunities of coalition personnel in the host nation to which they have been deployed.

24-6. Coalition forces also need to understand environmental constraints during operations. These could arise because of treaty obligations (such as the Basel Convention), host-nation requirements, or a TCN's own environmental legislation. Military materiel restrictions by one or more TCN or the host nation may also limit the method (such as the use of depleted uranium rounds) by which forces conduct operations. Additionally, host-nation cultural and historical sensitivities must be considered as a factor in the operational planning sequence.

## **LEGAL SUPPORT**

24-7. Given the complexities associated with the management and maintenance of a coalition legal framework, a coalition legal officer should have overarching responsibility for the management of legal issues from the outset. Long-term legal issues also need to be addressed early in the planning process. With appropriately qualified and experienced legal staff, the coalition legal officer can provide timely, accurate, and relevant legal advice to the commander and assist in the decisionmaking process.

24-8. All units and individuals remain subject to national rules of engagement and the laws of their country even when embedded in another coalition headquarters.

## **CHECKLIST**

### **LEGAL SUPPORT PLANNING (NATURE OF OPERATIONS)**

1. What legal areas and capabilities come under coalition control and what areas remain national responsibilities?
2. Is there a requirement to provide integral legal support to all levels of command?
3. Is the host-nation military and/or civilian judicial infrastructure intact?
4. What are the coalition force's powers of search, detention, and arrest of civilian suspects?
5. What are the coalition force's obligations to war crimes' investigations and indictment?
6. Has any SOFA been established with the receiving nation? What are the key differences in SOFAs, if any, across the coalition?

### **COMMAND AND CONTROL**

1. Has a coalition legal officer been appointed?
2. What military discipline system has been established by the lead nation and contributing nations?

### **LOGISTICS**

1. Is there a system to pay for claims arising from inadvertently injuring people or damaging property, incidental to operations?
2. What are the legal and fiscal restraints involving logistic assistance to nonmilitary organizations and other nations' forces?

### **PERSONNEL**

1. Do TCNs arm civilians that accompany the force?
2. Do TCNs equip civilians such as interpreters, war correspondents, and contractors with military uniforms?
3. Do TCNs have jurisdiction over civilian contractors for discipline and command and control deployed in support?
4. Do TCNs have any limitations on hiring locally employed civilians?
5. Does the TCN hire locally employed civilians for the full range of support to operations (administrative through to guarding) or are there any limitations imposed?

6. Are civilians or other nonmilitary personnel who may accompany the TCN in the field sufficiently distinguished from combatants? Are they furnished with the identity cards required by Article 40 of the Geneva Convention?
7. Have TCNs instructed civilians or other nonmilitary personnel accompanying them as to their rights, duties, and obligations under the LOAC? Are they subject to the TCN's military laws and regulations?
8. Has the International Committee of the Red Cross or other voluntary aid societies been assigned exclusively to medical and medical support duties?
  - Are they subject to the TCN's military laws and regulations?
  - Has their intended assistance been notified to the enemy?
  - Have they been instructed as to their rights, duties, and obligations under LOAC?
  - Have they been furnished with the identity cards required by article 40 of the Geneva Convention?
9. Are there differences among the TCNs on whether medical installations, facilities, and personnel will be protected by the Geneva Conventions or will the TCNs rely on camouflage and camouflage discipline?
10. Have TCNs provided the names and descriptions of all hospital ships to the conflicting parties at least ten days before their employment? If hospital ships of the TCNs use the International Committee of the Red Cross and hire private citizens of neutral countries, have they placed themselves under the control of one of the parties to the conflict?
11. Are personnel from one TCN permitted to use the weapons and personal protective equipment from another TCN?
12. Is the coalition capable of dealing with proscribed organizations or personnel (outlawed organizations or personnel)?

### **USE OF FORCE AND FORCE PROTECTION**

1. Does the TCN permit its troops to be transported in the vehicles of other TCNs?

### **LEGAL AND INVESTIGATIONS**

1. Will TCNs fully cooperate in joint criminal and administrative investigations?
2. Will TCNs share findings and evidence during investigations?
3. Do TCNs have any specific evidentiary requirements for criminal and/or administrative investigations?
4. Will TCNs permit other nations to conduct customs and quarantine inspections of military aircraft and vessels?



5. What are the procedures for reporting alleged war crimes and related misconduct committed by the enemy and alleged misconduct by TCNs and allied prisoners of war?
6. Do TCNs have the capability to conduct war crime investigations? If not, have TCNs assigned responsibility for collecting and preserving evidence of all such matters?
7. What is the victim identification capability?
8. What is the deployable pathology capability?
9. What is the deployable forensic capability?

## REFERENCES

ADDP 06.4. *Law of Armed Conflict* (Australia).

FM 27-100. *Legal Operations* (United States).

JP 1-04. *Legal Support to Military Operations* (United States).

## Chapter 25

# International Law, Treaties, and Arrangements

To understand the factors that will affect this functional area, readers must answer the applicable generic questions in chapter 5. Additionally, the chapters on training and logistics have questions that pertain to each of the other functional areas

## INTRODUCTION

25-1. As stated in chapter 24, international law will apply to all coalition operations. International law is primarily concerned with the principles and rules of conduct, which nations observe in their relationships with each other. Important aspects of international law, including the law of armed conflict, also govern the actions of individuals. In international law, the term 'states' refers to nations that have been accepted as part of the international community and enjoy sovereignty.

25-2. Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice recognizes four sources of international law:

- International conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by contesting statutes.
- International custom as evidence of a general practice accepted as law.
- General principles of law recognized by civilized nations.
- Judicial decisions and teachings of the most qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for determining the rules of law.

25-3. Some provisions of international law, such as prohibitions on the use of certain weapons, may bind a coalition member who is a party even though no state of armed conflict exists. Other provisions of international law, such as those that are customary law, may bind a coalition member even if that state has not signed a treaty.

25-4. Not all coalition nations will be party to the same treaties and arrangements. Even those coalition members who are party to the same treaties and arrangements may have made reservations or declarations of understanding, which affect their individual obligations. Not all coalition members will have the same understanding of customary international law. Differing national perspectives can create marked disparities between what troop contributing nations (TCNs) can or cannot do. The question of what law is applicable in a given operation often depends on several factual considerations. Each coalition member nation must seek its own expert legal advice.

25-5. Listed in the reference section are relevant international treaties to coalition operations. The list is not exhaustive, but is a starting point for consideration. A more

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comprehensive list relevant to the planning and conduct of coalition operations can be found on the International Committee of the Red Cross' treaty database at [www.icrc.org](http://www.icrc.org). The database contains about 100 international treaties, commentaries on the four Geneva Conventions and their additional protocols, and an up-to-date list of signatures and ratifications together with full text of reservations.

## **CHECKLIST**

1. Have the Geneva Conventions and their additional protocols been ratified by all TCNs?
2. What other conventions or declarations have been ratified by TCNs?
3. Does the lead nation have a status-of-forces agreement or arrangement with foreign countries through which TCN forces will pass or be deployed into? If yes, does it cover all TCNs?
4. Do TCNs have their own bilateral agreements or arrangements?

## REFERENCES

International Humanitarian Law: Treaties and Documents by Topic. International Committee of the Red Cross  
<[www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/TOPICS?OpenView](http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/TOPICS?OpenView)>.

## Chapter 26

# Special Operations Forces

To understand the factors that will affect this functional area, readers must answer the applicable generic questions in chapter 5. Additionally, the chapters on training and logistics have questions that pertain to each of the other functional areas.

## INTRODUCTION

26-1. Special operations forces (SOF) can be a valuable asset for a coalition since they possess unique capabilities that complement conventional capabilities. Coalition SOF will share similar doctrinal tasks; however, capabilities will vary. When commanders consider using SOF, they must understand the capabilities of the forces and properly apply those capabilities. SOF staff and liaison officers will be the best to advise whether they have the required skill sets, support assets and the command and control infrastructure to operate successfully. National release of SOF will vary and may come with national caveats.

26-2. SOF work well across the spectrum of conflict and at all stages—preconflict, conflict and post-conflict—in support of political and military objectives. They are not bound by any set of environmental conditions. SOF are area oriented. Usually they have personnel experienced and conversant in the languages and cultures found in the area of operations.

## EMPLOYING SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

26-3. SOF are a capable but limited resource. Their missions should take advantage of their unique capabilities. Command and control arrangements are a key attribute to their success. SOF should be commanded at the highest appropriate level to ensure they are used to best effect. A SOF liaison to the headquarters and units (when necessary) with appropriate communications will ensure that there is effective coordination for the deconfliction and coordination of operations. This should include the use of control measures for the operational environment.

26-4. A SOF commander will be appointed to accomplish a specific mission or to control SOF in the area of operations. Normally this commander will be the commander with the preponderance of SOF and the requisite command and control. This commander would exercise day-to-day command and control of assigned or attached SOF. A special operations forces commander will also allocate forces against tasks in support of the campaign plan. The command may define a joint special operations area for exclusive use by SOF. Establishing such a joint special operations

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area may delineate and facilitate simultaneous conventional and special operations in the same general operational area.



## CHECKLIST

1. Has the SOF national representative been consulted to clarify whether a respective SOF unit has the required skill sets, support assets, and command and control infrastructure to operate successfully in a respective theater or for a respective task?
2. Will the unit remain in the area of operations continually or deploy into the area of operations only for specific missions?
3. What command and control arrangements will be required to ensure rapid passage of information, decisionmaking, and deployment?
4. Where will the SOF liaison officers be located and with what communications?
5. To whom will the SOF liaison officers report in the conventional headquarters or chain of command? Who will issue orders to the SOF?
6. How will the coalition force commander ensure that SOF are briefed on conventional operations and intention?
7. To ensure effective operations security, how will the principle of “need to know” be rigorously applied to all SOF operations?
8. This said, when required, what arrangements are in place to ensure that the appropriate commanders and staff throughout the conventional chain of command are briefed to the necessary detail?
9. Who is the supported and supporting force? Are SOF supported or supporting? Have the differing capabilities been considered to ensure seamless compatibility?
10. What will be the command arrangements and recognition arrangements if a conventional quick reaction force is tasked in support of a SOF operation, or vice versa?

## REFERENCES

ADDP 3.12. *Special Operations* (Australia).

FM 3-05. *Army Special Operations Forces* (United States).

JP 3-05. *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations* (United States).

## Chapter 27

# Support from the Maritime Component

To understand the factors that will affect this functional area, readers must answer the applicable generic questions in chapter 5. Additionally, the chapters on training and logistics have questions that pertain to each of the other functional areas.

## INTRODUCTION

27-1. On occasions the land component will be supported or supporting the maritime component. Coalition operations may initially involve amphibious operations, thereafter a land component might be deployed either across a beach or more likely through a port. During operations, the land component would expect to be supported by maritime fires and intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance (ISTAR) as well as sustained in certain circumstances. For example, a medical hospital ship can provide a base for advanced treatment and logistics may be in part sea based.

## **CHECKLIST**

### **MARITIME OPERATIONS**

1. What is the land component's relationship with the maritime component (supported/supporting)?
2. Are maritime forces operating in the littoral environment to project forces ashore as part of joint operations?
3. What is the likely duration of support from the maritime component?
4. Are maritime forces contributing to operations ashore by conducting operations in direct or indirect support of land operations?
5. What is the coalition structure of the maritime component and what capabilities do they possess?

### **COMMAND AND CONTROL**

1. What control procedures will be used to deconflict air, aviation, indirect fire, unmanned aircraft systems, and afloat assets including small boats?
2. What spectrum management requirements exist in relation to electronic warfare and emission control?
3. Who has access to the recognized maritime picture and intelligence products?
4. How will ISTAR for maritime, land, and air units link into a common operational picture?

### **COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS**

1. How will coalition intercomponent communications and information systems be integrated?
2. What coalition intercomponent bearer communications systems will be used?
3. If automatic interfaces are unworkable, what will be the liaison officer requirements?

### **INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, TARGET ACQUISITION, AND RECONNAISSANCE**

1. How will ISTAR assets be coordinated and tasked?

### **LOGISTICS**

1. Are there any commercial or national constraints on using contracted vessels?

2. What is the potential for sea basing?
3. Can all coalition partners be supported by the maritime component?

**MEDICAL**

1. What in-place medical facilities exist at sea?
2. Is a primary casualty reception vessel available?
3. Are evacuation assets available?
4. What is the policy for reception and treating of coalition casualties from the land component?
5. What are the coalition policies on maritime support to the indigenous population?

## REFERENCES

- ADDP 3.2. *Amphibious Operations* (Australia).
- AJP-3.1. *Allied Joint Maritime Operations* (NATO).
- ATP-1. *Allied Maritime Tactical Instructions and Procedures* (NATO).
- ATP-8. *Doctrine for Amphibious Operations* (NATO).
- ATP-31. *NATO Above Water Warfare Manual* (NATO).
- JP 3-02. *Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations* (United States).

## Chapter 28

# Support from the Air Component

To understand the factors that will affect this functional area, readers must answer the applicable generic questions in chapter 5. Additionally, the chapters on training and logistics have questions that pertain to each of the other functional areas.

## INTRODUCTION

28-1. On most occasions the land component will be supported or supporting the air component. Coalition operations may initially involve an air operation. Following these operations, the land component might be deployed through an airhead. During coalition operations, the land component would expect to be supported by air fires and intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance but may also be sustained by air in certain circumstances.

## **CHECKLIST**

### **AIR OPERATIONS**

1. What is the land component's relationship with the air component (supported/supporting)?
2. Has the coalition force commander appointed an airspace control authority?
3. Has the combined joint forces air component command appointed an air defense commander?
4. Have air defense weapons control procedures been established and promulgated for all air defense weapons systems and forces?
5. Has the airspace control authority, in coordination with subordinate commanders, selected those airspace coordinating measures that are most suitable to accomplish the mission?
6. What airspace control procedures will be used to deconflict air, aviation, indirect fire, unmanned aircraft systems, and air assets?
7. Does the coalition or a single nation provide the coalition air operations center functions?
8. Are tactical air control parties providing appropriate support to ground combat forces?
9. What is the likely duration of support from the air component?
10. Are air forces contributing to land operations by conducting operations in direct or indirect support of land operations?
11. What is the coalition structure of the air component and what capabilities do they possess?
12. What battle spectrum management requirements exist in relation to electronic warfare?
13. Who has access to the recognized air picture and intelligence products?
14. How will intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance for maritime, land, and air units contribute to the common operational picture?

### **COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS**

1. If automatic interfaces are unworkable, what will be the liaison officer requirements?



**INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, TARGET ACQUISITION, AND  
RECONNAISSANCE**

1. How will air intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance assets be coordinated and tasked?

**LOGISTICS**

1. Can all coalition partners be supported by the air component?

**MEDICAL**

1. Are air evacuation assets available?
2. What are the coalition policies on air support to the indigenous population?

## REFERENCES

- ADDP 3.9. *Airborne Operations* (Australia).
- AJP-3.3. *Joint Air and Space Operations Doctrine* (NATO).
- AJP-3.3.2. *Air Interdiction and Close Air Support* (NATO).
- AJP-3.3.5. *Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control* (NATO).
- ATP-40. *Doctrine for Airspace Control in Times of Crisis and War* (NATO).
- ATP-42. *Counter Air Operations* (NATO).
- ATP-47. *Handbook for Air Reconnaissance Tasking and Reporting* (NATO).
- FM 3-52. *Army Airspace Command and Control in a Combat Zone* (United States).
- JP 3-52. *Joint Doctrine for Airspace Control in the Combat Zone* (United States).

## Chapter 29

# Private Military and Security Companies

To understand the factors that will affect this functional area, readers must answer the applicable generic questions in chapter 5. Additionally, the chapters on training and logistics have questions that pertain to each of the other functional areas.

29-1. The increasing complexity of the operational environment has led to more commercial companies providing military and security services to support the campaign. Such companies are significant actors in the operational environment. The industry may be broadly divided into those offering armed, and those offering unarmed, capabilities. Private military and security companies (PMSCs) compete for government, nongovernmental and, commercial contracts. The contracts provide services ranging from security advice and risk analysis to armed close protection and convoy security. Therefore, PMSCs are likely to be present in the operational environment and may affect coalition operations at all levels. Coalition commanders should consider PMSCs throughout the planning process.

29-2. The term PMSC does not refer to nonstate armed groups or militias, many of which might be considered as organizations that provide security, defense, or military services. PMSCs mainly differ in that they are motivated by commercial interests. Such motivations allow both positive and negative inferences. For example, PMSCs are driven by commercial success; poor performance and failure to adhere to contractual stipulations may deter future customers from employing the PMSCs.

29-3. There is no broadly accepted definition of a PMSC. PMSCs mostly avoid the term, preferring to refer to themselves as risk or security consultants, or similar. The term PMSC applies to the full range of companies involved in the supply of all types of security, defense, and military services. These services include providing support and training to commercial, nongovernmental organizations, or public sector interests. PMSCs does not refer to those companies providing contractor logistic support under existing national arrangements, nor to those defense industry companies covered under existing capability procurement policy and procedures.

## CHECKLIST

### COMMAND

1. How do PMSCs affect the campaign plan and campaign authority?
2. Where is the PMSC registered? Which national laws and regulatory framework apply to its conduct?
3. What are the legal and regulatory issues when dealing with PMSCs?
4. What are the self-regulation mechanisms across the PMSC industry?
5. What are the freedoms and constraints in dealing with the PMSC industry?
6. What is the operational risk relating to the failure of PMSCs fulfilling their contractual obligations (coalition-contracted and third party-contracted)? How can the coalition mitigate that risk?

### CONTROL

1. What are the operational considerations when dealing with PMSCs?
2. What are the risks to operations security when dealing with PMSCs?
3. How can PMSCs be integrated into the coalition and in the operational environment?
4. How can situational awareness and liaison with PMSCs be implemented?
  - When dealing with coalition-contracted PMSC?
  - When dealing with third-party contracted PMSC?
5. What are the PMSC's rules for the use of force?
6. What are the PMSC's command and control arrangements? Which PMSCs have communications and liaison capabilities established with the coalition force?
7. What procedures exist for communications with the PMSC management?
8. What considerations must be made, and what procedures are necessary, regarding the disclosure or release of information to PMSCs?

### PLANNING

1. What are the reputation, culture, history, ethos, and background of the PMSC?
2. What is the nationality and ethnicity of the employees of the PMSC? What is their professional background and training?
3. What languages are spoken by PMSC personnel?

4. What vehicles, equipment, and weapons do the PMSCs use?
5. What considerations must be made regarding the PMSC's use of weapons, including armory and ammunition management?

**CONTRACTUAL (ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS SEE CHAPTER 19)**

1. What is the contractual process? How does this affect operational and tactical commanders?
2. What are the capabilities and services provided under the PMSC contract?
  - Unarmed or armed capabilities?
  - Defensive or offensive operations?
3. With who is the PMSC contracted?
4. What services (tasks) are in the PMSC contract?
5. Where is the contract to be executed?

**SUPPORT**

1. What considerations must be made regarding the provision of security support to PMSCs?
2. What considerations must be made regarding the provision of medical support to PMSCs?
3. Where is the PMSC's operating base and who provides its force protection?
4. What are the PMSC's logistic support arrangements?

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Coalition Provisional Authority Order 17.  
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**WEB SITES**

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## Chapter 30

# Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense

To understand the factors that will affect this functional area, readers must answer the applicable generic questions in chapter 5. Additionally, the chapters on training and logistics have questions that pertain to each of the other functional areas.

## INTRODUCTION

30-1. Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threats exist in much of the world, either from deliberate attack or from accidental release. This danger necessitates protection in either conventional or asymmetrical threat situations. As a result, the coalition must consider how it will support other organizations incapable of self-protection from the threat of CBRN. These might include international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, other government agencies, contractors (both international and local), and local civilians.

30-2. CBRN defense is based on the following five enabling components:

- Detection, identification, and monitoring.
- Communications and information systems, warning, and reporting.
- Physical protection.
- Hazard management.
- Medical countermeasures and support.

30-3. Detection, identification, and monitoring detect and characterize CBRN events, identify the agents and hazards, delineate areas of contamination, and monitor the changes. They include CBRN defense surveillance, survey, reconnaissance, and sampling.

30-4. Communications and information systems, warning, and reporting aid the rapid collection, evaluation, and dissemination of data. This data addresses CBRN attacks and hazards, including the prediction of hazard areas. The coalition uses the operational communications and information systems network to disseminate CBRN defense data and hazard predictions. CBRN defense is a command responsibility and forms part of the force protection function. As such, CBRN defense is an integral part of the headquarters staff and is supported by the communications and information systems staff.

30-5. Physical protection is concerned with more than personnel. Individual and collective protection is required so that personnel can survive CBRN hazards and

continue to operate in a CBRN hazard environment. Measures to protect facilities and equipment are also included.

30-6. Hazard management is the process used to limit the impact of CBRN hazards. Hazard management is based on the principles of prehazard precautions, hazard control through avoidance, control of hazard spread, control and management of individual exposures, and decontamination.

30-7. Medical countermeasures and support serves both to diminish the susceptibility of personnel to CBRN hazards, and to treat and evacuate casualties. It includes the treatment and evacuation of conventional casualties in a CBRN environment.

30-8. The principles of employment are a national responsibility. While they provide individual protection equipment and training, the coalition still must prioritize the allocation of limited specialist assets at national and coalition levels. The senior CBRN defense advisor to the coalition commander will advise on the deployment of the limited theater specialist assets allocated through the force generation process.

## **SENIOR CBRN ADVISOR AND FORCE CBRN STAFF**

30-9. The senior CBRN defense advisor on the coalition headquarters staff is the principal CBRN advisor to the coalition commander on all CBRN issues. This requirement may be coordinated by the lead nation; however, one coalition member could well provide the bulk or even all the CBRN specialist elements to the coalition.

30-10. In an area of operations, the commander remains responsible to prioritize the CBRN defense effort, with advice from the senior CBRN defense advisor. With the assistance of the CBRN staff, this advisor, on behalf of the commander, provides coordinating and technical advice concerning the use of CBRN defense assets throughout the area of operations.

## **CHECKLIST**

### **CONTROL**

1. Has a senior CBRN defense advisor been identified?
2. What is the CBRN warning and reporting structure in the area of operations?
3. How are the high-value assets, such as biological detectors, allocated among coalition partners and deployed in the area of operations?

### **COMMUNICATIONS**

1. Have frequencies and communications networks been identified for the passage of CBRN information such as warning and reporting?

### **POLICY AND PROCEDURES**

1. Are troop contributing nations willing and capable of operating in a CBRN environment if a possible threat exists?
2. What national caveats exist for deploying biological detection assets?
3. What are the troop contributing nations' policies and positions for using CBRN? For example, when can coalition forces use pepper or capsicum spray?
4. Have coalition forces adopted standard guidance for interpreting hazards identified by chemical detectors?
5. Are sampling standard and identification protocols in place to verify first use of weapons of mass destruction?
6. Which national laboratories will be used to analyze collected samples for first use and treaty violations?
7. Has the coalition established an operation exposure guide to manage radiation exposures?
8. Have troop contributing nations adopted a standardized individual CBRN protective dress state?

### **MEDICAL**

1. What medical pretreatment or prophylaxis do coalition partners have for CBRN protection such as vaccinations, auto-injectors, and anti-emetics? What are national policies for their use?
2. What capabilities do coalition partners have to treat CBRN casualties?
3. How will the psychological impact of potential enemy CBRN use be countered?

### **CBRN DEFENSE**

1. What infrastructure exists for assisting coalition forces to deal with low-level radiation or toxic industrial chemical hazards like medical treatment facilities or detection equipment supply houses?
2. Are the necessary CBRN protection, detection, and reconnaissance equipment available to troops to counter a threat?
3. Are adequate stocks of chemical overgarments available? What is the resupply capability?
4. What plans exist to protect international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, other government agencies, contractors (both international and local), and local civilians against CBRN threats?
5. Can troop contributing nations conduct decontamination and cleanup of CBRN contamination?

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## Appendix

# Capabilities

To understand the factors that will affect this functional area, readers must answer the applicable generic questions in chapter 5. Additionally, the chapters on training and logistics have questions that pertain to each of the other functional areas.

A-1. Each American, British, Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand (ABCA) nation provides its own distinct forces and capabilities to a coalition. These capabilities differ based on national interests, objectives, arms control limitations, doctrine, organization, training, leader development, equipment, history, defense budget, and domestic politics. Orchestrating these capabilities into coalition operations depends on differences in organization, capabilities, and doctrine. If other nations are also involved, these differences will be much greater.

A-2. Understanding these differences can determine if coalition operations are a success or failure. Units of the same type in one nation's army may not perform the same as units in another army. An engineer unit in one army may have capabilities to build roads or buildings, while another may be limited to laying out minefields or building defensive positions. Unit designations in one army may differ in size from another army (see table A-1, page A-2).

A-3. The coalition force commander must be able to integrate these capabilities to achieve the desired end state. Selecting the right mix is a challenge. The coalition staff must be proactive in understanding the capabilities and limitations of the nations in the coalition force.

A-4. Representatives of each nation must be present during planning. If a unit is given a mission it cannot accomplish, the plan will not work. National representatives can ensure that taskings are appropriate to their force. If possible, national representatives should be available in each staff element. They must thoroughly understand their nation's capabilities and limitations.

A-5. Within the ABCA Armies Program, Standardization Agreement 1030, *Staff Planning Data Requirements*, provides a format for listing details of each nation's forces to guide planning decisions. Listed equipment is restricted to that which materially affects the organization's combat power and equipment unique to the organization. Using the format in ABCA Standard 1030 presents an option for obtaining information.

Table A-1. Comparative formation and unit designations

<i>Symbol</i>	<i>American</i>	<i>British</i>	<i>Canadian</i>	<i>Australian</i>	<i>New Zealand</i>
•	Squad	Section	Element smaller than a section	Section	Section
••	Section		Section		
•••	Platoon Detachment	Platoon Troop Flight	Platoon	Platoon Troop Flight	Platoon Troop Flight
I	Company Battery Troop	Company Squadron Battery	Company Squadron Battery Flight	Company Squadron Battery	Company Squadron Battery
II	Battalion Squadron	Battalion Regiment	Battalion Regiment Squadron	Battalion Regiment	Battalion Regiment
III	Regiment Group		Regiment Wing		
X	Brigade	Brigade	Brigade Brigade Group Aviation Group	Task force Brigade	Brigade
XX	Division	Division	Division	Division	Division
XXX	Corps	Corps	Corps	Corps	
XXXX	Army		Army		

A-6. Doctrine is another important issue. If a nation is given a mission for which it does not train or understand, it will probably fail. National forces will normally operate using their own doctrine internally, while externally their actions should conform to the overall direction of the coalition force. To make this work, however, coalition commanders must know the differences in the other nations' doctrine. ABCA forces operating as part of a coalition military command should follow imbedded doctrine and procedures previously ratified in ABCA standardization agreements.

A-7. Conventional coalition force capabilities include the following assets and operations:

- Air defense.
- Armor.
- Artillery.
- Aviation.
- Engineer.
- Infantry.
- Intelligence.



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**Capabilities**

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- Medical.
- Military police.
- Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense.
- Ordnance.
- Personnel.
- Quartermaster.
- Signal.
- Transportation.

## CHECKLIST

1. Did coalition commanders specify the capabilities that they need provided by troop contributing nation forces?
2. Has the coalition commander requested that each troop contributing nation provide their staff planning data requirements?
3. Have troop contributing nation commanders briefed the coalition commander on the capabilities of their forces?

# Glossary

## SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

<b>AAP</b>	allied administrative publication
<b>ABCA</b>	American, British, Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand
<b>ADDP</b>	Australian Defence Doctrine Publication
<b>AJP</b>	allied joint publication
<b>APP</b>	allied procedures publication
<b>AR</b>	Army regulation
<b>ATP</b>	allied tactical publication
<b>B-GA</b>	operational or tactical operations (air) publication
<b>B-GG</b>	operational or tactical operations (general) publication
<b>B-GJ</b>	operational or tactical joint operations publication
<b>B-GL</b>	operational or tactical operations (land) publication
<b>C&amp;A</b>	certification and accreditation
<b>C2</b>	command and control
<b>CBRN</b>	chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
<b>CEH</b>	<i>Coalition Engineer Handbook</i>
<b>CHIH</b>	<i>Coalition Health Interoperability Handbook</i>
<b>CIMIC</b>	civil-military cooperation
<b>CIH</b>	<i>Coalition Intelligence Handbook</i>
<b>CIS</b>	communications and information systems
<b>CLH</b>	<i>Coalition Logistics Handbook</i>
<b>CNR</b>	combat net radio
<b>COH</b>	<i>Coalition Operations Handbook</i>
<b>COP</b>	common operational picture
<b>CPG</b>	coalition planning group
<b>CWAN</b>	coalition wide area network
<b>EW</b>	electronic warfare

<b>FM</b>	field manual
<b>FP</b>	forces publication
<b>G-1</b>	assistant chief of staff, personnel
<b>G-2</b>	assistant chief of staff, intelligence
<b>G-3</b>	assistant chief of staff, operations
<b>G-4</b>	assistant chief of staff, logistics
<b>G-5</b>	assistant chief of staff, policy and plans
<b>G-6</b>	assistant chief of staff, communications
<b>G-9</b>	assistant chief of staff, civil affairs
<b>ICRC</b>	International Committee of the Red Cross
<b>INT</b>	intelligence
<b>ISTAR</b>	intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance
<b>ITF</b>	international task force
<b>ITV</b>	in-transit visibility
<b>J-2</b>	joint staff, intelligence
<b>JDP</b>	joint doctrine publication
<b>JP</b>	joint publication
<b>JSP</b>	joint service publication
<b>LOAC</b>	law of armed conflict
<b>LWD</b>	land warfare doctrine
<b>LWP</b>	land warfare publication
<b>MC</b>	military committee
<b>MCDP</b>	Marine Corps doctrine publication
<b>MCRP</b>	Marine Corps reference publication
<b>MCWP</b>	Marine Corps warfighting publication
<b>NATO</b>	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
<b>NBC</b>	nuclear, biological, and chemical
<b>NZDDP-D</b>	New Zealand publication
<b>OPCON</b>	operational control
<b>PI</b>	public information

<b>PMSC</b>	private military and security company
<b>POLAD</b>	political advisor
<b>POW</b>	prisoner of war
<b>QAP</b>	quadripartite advisory publication
<b>QSTAG</b>	quadripartite standardization agreement
<b>ROE</b>	rules of engagement
<b>S-1</b>	battalion/brigade personnel staff officer
<b>SOF</b>	special operations forces
<b>SOFA</b>	status-of-forces agreement
<b>SOP</b>	standing operating procedures
<b>TCN</b>	troop contributing nation
<b>TOA</b>	transfer of authority
<b>TOR</b>	term of reference
<b>UK</b>	United Kingdom
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>US</b>	United States
<b>VTC</b>	video teleconferencing

## SECTION II – TERMS

### **airspace control authority**

The commander designated to assume overall responsibility for the operation of the airspace control system in his or her assigned area.

### **alliance**

The result of formal agreements such as treaties between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that furthers the common interests of the members.

### **area of operations**

That portion of an area of war necessary for military operations and for the administration of such operations.

### **area of responsibility**

The geographical area assigned to an appropriate commander within which that commander has the authority to plan and conduct operations.

**battle damage assessment**

The timely and accurate estimate of damage resulting from the application of military force, either lethal or non-lethal, against a predetermined objective.

**civil affairs**

The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces and civil authorities, both governmental and nongovernmental, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile area of operations in order to facilitate military operations and consolidate operational objectives. Civil affairs may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of local government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations.

**civil-military cooperation**

Coordination and cooperation in peace or war between the military and civil actors, including the population and local authorities .

**civil-military operations**

Group of planned activities in support of military operations that enhance the relationship among the military forces, the civilian authorities, and the population. These operations should promote the development of favorable emotions, attitudes, or behavior in neutral, friendly, or hostile groups.

**coalition**

An ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action.

**coalition action**

Multinational action outside the bounds of established alliances, usually for a single occasion, or for longer cooperation in a narrow sector of common interest.

**coalition force**

Force composed of military elements of nations that have formed a temporary alliance for some specific purpose.

**coalition operation**

Operation conducted by forces of two or more nations, which may not be allies, acting together for the accomplishment of a single mission.

**combat search and rescue**

The recovery of isolated personnel during combat.

**combat service support**

The support provided to combat forces, primarily in the fields of administration and logistics.

**commander's critical information requirements**

A comprehensive list of information requirements identified by the commander as being critical in facilitating timely information management and the decisionmaking process that affect successful mission accomplishment. The two key subcomponents are critical friendly force information and priority intelligence requirements.

**compatibility**

Capability of two or more items or components of equipment or material to exist or function in the same system or environment without mutual interference.

**coordinating authority**

The authority granted to a commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more countries or commands, or two or more services or forces of the same service. He has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved or their representatives, but does not have the authority to compel agreement. In case of disagreement between the agencies involved, he should attempt to obtain essential agreement by discussion. In the event he is unable to obtain essential agreement he shall refer the matter to the appropriate authority.

**counterintelligence**

Those activities which are concerned with identifying and counteracting the threat to security posed by hostile intelligence services or organizations or by individuals engaged in espionage, sabotage, subversion or terrorism.

**electronic warfare**

Military action to exploit the electromagnetic spectrum encompassing: the search for, interception and identification of electromagnetic emissions, the employment of electromagnetic energy, including directed energy, to reduce or prevent hostile use of the electromagnetic spectrum, and actions to ensure its effective use by friendly forces.

**fratricide**

Unintentional deadly force used against friendly forces.

**geospatial information and services**

The collection, information extraction, storage, dissemination, and exploitation of geodetic, geomagnetic, imagery (both commercial and national source), gravimetric, aeronautical, topographic, hydrographic, littoral, cultural, and toponymic data accurately referenced to a precise location on the Earth's surface. Geospatial services include tools that enable users to access and manipulate data, and instruction, training, laboratory support, and guidance for the use of geospatial data.

**health service support**

All services performed, provided, or arranged by the Services to promote, improve, conserve, or restore the mental or physical well-being of personnel. These services include, but are not limited to, the management of health services resources, such as manpower, monies, and facilities; preventive and curative health measures; evacuation of the wounded, injured, or sick; selection of the medically fit and disposition of the medically unfit; blood management; medical supply, equipment, and maintenance thereof; combat stress control; and medical, dental, veterinary, laboratory, optometric, medical food, and medical intelligence services.

**host-nation support**

Civil and military assistance rendered in peace, crisis, and war by a host nation to allied or coalition forces that are located on or in transit through the host nation's territory. The basis of such assistance is commitments arising from bilateral or multilateral agreements concluded between the host nation and the nation(s) having forces operating on the host nation's territory.

**human intelligence**

A category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources.

**identification, friend or foe**

A system using electromagnetic transmissions to which equipment carried by friendly forces automatically responds, for example, by emitting pulses, thereby distinguishing themselves from enemy forces.

**information operations**

Actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one's own information and information systems.

**intermediate staging base**

A tailorable, temporary location used for staging forces, sustainment, and/or extraction into and out of an operational area.

**interoperability**

The ability of systems, units or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units, or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together. (QSTAG 894)

**in-transit visibility**

The ability to track the identity, status, and location of units and non-unit cargo (excluding bulk petroleum, oils, and lubricants) and passengers; medical patients; and personal property from origin to consignee or destination across the range of military operations.



**joint**

Connotes activities, operations, and organizations in which elements of more than one service of the same nation participate. (QSTAG 894)

**law of armed conflict**

That part of international law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities

**lines of communications**

All the land, water, and air routes that connect an operating military force with one or more bases of operations, and along which supplies and reinforcements move.

**mission**

A clear, concise statement of the task of the command and its purpose.

**mission creep**

Tangential efforts to assist in areas of concern, unrelated to assigned duties, that cripple efficient mission accomplishment.

**multinational operations**

Military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, typically organized within the structure of a coalition or alliance.

**national command**

A command that is organized by, and functions under the authority of a specific nation. It may or may not be placed under a NATO commander.

**nonmilitary agencies**

All civilian agencies, whether governmental, nongovernmental, intergovernmental, or international.

**operational command**

The authority granted to a commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces, and to retain or delegate operational and/or tactical control as may be deemed necessary. It does not of itself include responsibility for administration or logistics. May also be used to denote the forces assigned to a commander.

**operational control**

The authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or location; to deploy units concerned, and to retain or assign tactical control of those units. It does not include authority to assign separate employment of components of the units concerned. Neither does it, of itself, include administrative or logistic control.

**operation exposure guidance**

The maximum amount of nuclear radiation which the commander considers a unit may be permitted to receive while performing a particular mission or missions.

**operation order**

A directive, usually formal, issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation.

**operation plan**

A plan for a single or series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession. It is usually based upon stated assumptions and is the form of directive employed by higher authority to permit subordinate commanders to prepare supporting plans and orders. The designation "plan" is usually used instead of "order" in preparing for operations well in advance. An operation plan may be put into effect at a prescribed time, or on signal, and then becomes the operation order.

**operations security**

The process which gives a military operation or exercise appropriate security, using passive or active means, to deny the enemy knowledge of the dispositions, capabilities and intentions of friendly forces.

**order of battle**

The identification, strength, command structure, and disposition of the personnel, units, and equipment of any military force.

**petroleum, oils, and lubricants**

A broad term which includes all petroleum and associated products used by the Armed Forces.

**psychological operations**

Planned psychological activities in peace and war directed to enemy, friendly, and neutral audiences in order to influence attitudes and behavior affecting the achievement of political and military objectives.

**rules of engagement**

Directives issued by competent military authority which specify the circumstances and limitations under which forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered.

**signals intelligence**

The generic term used to describe communications intelligence and electronic intelligence when there is no requirement to differentiate between these two types of intelligence, or to represent fusion of the two.

**standardization**

The process of developing concepts, doctrine, procedures and designs to achieve and maintain the most effective levels of compatibility, interoperability, interchangeability, and commonality in the fields of operations, administration, and materiel.

**tactical control**

The detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned.

**time-phased force and deployment list**

A list that identifies types and/or actual units required to support the operation plan and indicates origin and ports of debarkation or ocean area.

**transfer of authority**

An action by which a member nation gives operational control of designated forces to an alliance or coalition commander.

**weapon of mass destruction**

Weapon that is capable of a high order of destruction and/or of being used in such a manner as to destroy large numbers of people.

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## LESSONS LEARNED AND POTENTIAL PROBLEM AREAS

Each of the nations and the ABCA Armies Program maintain a database with lessons learned. These can be accessed over the Internet. Start at the ABCA Armies Standardization Program Home Page at [www.abca-armies.org/](http://www.abca-armies.org/) under the Coalition Operations Lessons Learned Database.

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