

Special Warfare

The Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School

[*Special Warfare*](#) is an authorized, official quarterly of the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Its mission is to promote the professional development of special-operations forces by providing a forum for the examination of established

doctrine and new ideas.

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FOREIGN SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

(BELOW IS A SUMMARY OF ARTILCES DETAILING FOREIGN SPECIAL OPERATIONS UNITS PUBLISHED IN SPECIAL WARFARE NEWSLETTER 1992-2001)

Mexico Replaces Federal Judicial Police

Following a series of other actions taken by Mexican President Vicente Fox to reform Mexico's law-enforcement and security establishment, Mexico is replacing the Federal Judicial Police with a new law-enforcement body called the Federal Investigation Agency, or AFI. The AFI will employ the latest scientific means of criminal investigation. It is slated to receive training from the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation and from the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. The AFI's strength is projected to be 2,500 agents. Agents will concentrate their efforts in the areas of Mexico that are experiencing the greatest problems with crime and conflict. The replacement of the Federal Judicial Police is being billed as a de-emphasis of the heavily armed federal police elements that based their activities on the application of armed force. In contrast to those elements, the AFI represents a move toward creating a multiskilled, investigative police force.

Danes Take New Approach to Homeland Defense

During the Cold War, Denmark was a potential target of the Soviet Union and of other members of the Warsaw Pact. Regular Danish armed forces were trained to defend against attacks by ground, airborne and amphibious forces that might attempt to seize the Danish offshore islands or conduct operations along the Jutland peninsula. Today, with substantial changes in the operational environment and in the external threat, forces of Denmark's regular army, air force, and navy are being reduced in size and are being assigned to international peacekeeping duties. Limited numbers of personnel in the Danish home guard, which consists of about 62,000 volunteers, are also being assigned to international peacekeeping duties. At the same time, Denmark is developing a new approach to homeland defense. During the next 4-6 years, the home guard will form a 3,000-man special force that will be organized into 92 units. Those units will be assigned to guard key infrastructure (e.g., bridges, communications centers and power stations) and other facilities around the country. A number of the units have already been created. The units' training approximates the training given to personnel of the regular Danish armed forces, and the units are under military oversight. In time of war, the guard units would be placed under the control of Denmark's Army Operational Command, and they would be led by the commander of the local defense region.

North Korean Infiltration: A Japanese Assessment

A recent article written by a Japanese military commentator addressed issues associated with possible war on the Korean peninsula. One issue of the commentary concerned the role of North Korean naval special-operations forces - under the Reconnaissance Bureau, or Chongch'al Kuk - and their potential for making covert landings in rear areas using North Korea's complement of surface and submarine vessels that are designated for that purpose. According to the commentator's estimate, vessels under the control of the Reconnaissance Bureau include a number of Sango submarines (the type found washed ashore in South Korea some years ago), mini-submarines, other submersibles and high-speed boats. Because of the presence of South Korean and U.S. naval forces, any conventional North Korean naval operation would be an extraordinarily dangerous undertaking. According to commentator, the multiple landings of sabotage groups on the Korean peninsula may well be the most effective maritime activity available to the North Koreans. Among the likely targets postulated were the large South Korean port of Pusan, the port of Inchon near Seoul, other areas of Korea tied to the ground-combat situation, Japanese ports that are used by U.S. forces (e.g., Sasebo and Kure), and other Japanese coastal facilities. The Japanese Maritime Self Defense Forces, in the view of the commentator, need to be upgraded to deal with these and other threats from seaborne foreign special-operations forces.

Russians Commemorate Airborne, Special-Ops Forces

Despite continuing force reductions, funding shortfalls and varying levels of disarray in their organizations, Russia's airborne and special-operations forces retain some measure of their former identity and status. On Aug. 19, for example, the Federal Security Service's Vypmel special-operations unit (created for counterterrorist actions) celebrated its 20th anniversary. The occasion generated great praise for the unit's past "combat" performance and for its current state of readiness. A much larger commemoration had been observed on Aug. 2, when the Russian Airborne Forces celebrated their 71st anniversary. During an interview, Airborne Forces commander Georgiy Shpak addressed the history and the current status of the airborne units. He noted that during the post-World War II years, Soviet airborne strength had been around 80,000. Shpak insisted that while that number has declined sharply during the post-Soviet period, the Airborne Forces remains combat-ready. He noted their past role in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan indicating that the units had visited 32 "hot spots" during the last 10 years. Shpak's son, Oleg, was killed in Chechnya in 1995. Shpak also indicated that despite rumors to the contrary, the Airborne Forces would remain an independent arm and would not be subsumed by the ground forces. Shpak compared Russia's Airborne Forces to Western airborne forces this way: "Naturally we observe our counterparts and compare them to our own officers and men. In Bosnia, for instance, we compare them to the Americans; in Kosovo we compare them to the Germans and the French. And I can say, without bragging, that our assault troops are better-trained and better-adapted to combat - they are unpretentious, hardy, better-educated and physically stronger. In terms of certain parameters, individual weaponry, for instance we do lag behind, but our men are an order of magnitude better than NATO soldiers in terms of their fighting qualities.

Mexico Arrests Members of Militant Group

Following the Aug. 8, 2001, detonation of three bombs in front of Banamex bank branches in Mexico City, Mexican authorities arrested five members of the People's Armed Revolutionary Forces, or FARP, in connection with the terrorist acts. They also confiscated tens of thousands of dollars, weaponry, uniforms, computer equipment and other items. Banamex had recently been purchased by U.S. Citigroup. Statements pertaining to the arrests were issued by General Javier del Real. He is the deputy operations chief of the General Staff of the Defense Secretariat, which evidently played a role in the capture of the FARP militants. A congressional study that was published just after the bombings occurred indicated that there are more than 15 armed groups operating in Mexico. They are characterized as armed groups with militant support, with an organized structure, and with military training in the center, northern and southern regions of the country. The FARP, which split from the larger Popular Liberation Army, was not included among the groups mentioned in the study.

Chinese Conduct Maritime Special Forces Exercise

The Chinese People's Liberation Army has reported that it conducted a maritime special-forces exercise in early August 2001. During the nighttime tactical exercise, landing-assault boats unloaded assault swimmers (said to number in company strength) 1,000 meters from the coastal target. The assault force, equipped with individual weapons, a

global-positioning system, night-vision devices, small missiles, and a new rope-throwing device seized a beach landing area, evidently in preparation for the arrival of a larger force. PLA reports compared the exercise to the Normandy invasion and noted how useful special-operations forces can be in knocking out enemy gun positions and otherwise preparing beaches for landings. The report was likely part of the PLA's continuing efforts to impress Taiwan with the invasion capabilities of the People's Republic of China.

Greece Establishes Special Security Force

Greece has established a new special-security force called the Social Insurance Foundation Guards, or IKA Guards, to provide physical security for Greek facilities and infrastructure. The force consists of about 2,500 members, many of whom are former members of the Greek army's special forces component. The IKA Guards are well-armed, and they are capable of serving as riot-control units. While the IKA Guards are not police officers in the full sense of the term, they do receive four months of training, and many aspire to become fully integrated into the police establishment. The force is currently guarding important government agencies, such as the National Intelligence Service and the Ministry of Public Order. Members of the IKA Guards have been assigned to various police units, and they are located around the country and on Crete. The number of IKA Guards is expected to double by the time of the 2004 Olympics.

Mexico Arrests Members of Terrorist Groups

The Mexican president's national-security advisor, Adolfo Aguilar Zinser, announced in late May 2001 that the Mexican government is taking steps to end the presence of Spanish and Islamic terrorist groups in Mexico. According to Aguilar, the Basque Fatherland and Liberty Party, or ETA, and Islamic terrorist groups had sought refuge in Mexico. In its efforts to dismantle these groups, the Mexican government has already arrested 20 ETA members. Mexico is concerned that these groups will establish, or have already established, contacts with Mexican armed organizations that could lead to terrorist acts within Mexico. Aguilar also stated that the groups had first established a presence in northern Mexico, but that they are now moving to the south, possibly an indication that the terrorists intend to exacerbate troubles with some of the armed organizations in southern states like Guerrero, Oaxaca and Chiapas. Although Aguilar did not specifically mention Hezbollah, the Lebanese Shi'ite terrorist organization, Hezbollah responded quickly, denying that it has any bases in Mexico, thereby raising suspicions that it does. Underscoring the potential for additional complications in Mexico's south, the Federal Judicial Police in Guerrero State were attacked in late May 2001 by the Jose Maria Morelos y Pavon Guerrilla Coordinating Group, which comprises the People's Villist Army, the People's Revolutionary Armed Forces and the 28 June Justice Command. One policeman was wounded during the attack.

Italian Carabinieri Integrated Into Armed Forces

In 2000, the Italian government designated the large paramilitary Carabinieri force as the fourth branch of the Italian armed forces (the other branches are the army, navy and air force). The designation drew criticism from other Italian police organizations who fear that abuses will occur if police information is used by the Italian Ministry of Defense. The document, "2001 -- New Forces for a New Century", recently released by the Italian defense ministry, succinctly outlines the role of the Carabinieri as part of the armed forces. The document, citing the requirement for effective command and control in the modern Italian military establishment, states, "The Carabinieri is the force that acts in the gray areas, where war has ceased, but peace has not yet begun. In the operational area, they manage a series of emergencies that extend from the criminal, to public order, to paramilitary confrontation." In fact, Carabinieri elements have been operating as part of the Kosovo Peacekeeping Force for some time. As part of their duty in Kosovo, they have been performing law-and-order functions and engaging in weapons searches and seizures.

Piracy Prompts Renewed Countermeasures

Growing recognition of piracy as a security problem has prompted increased multinational attention. According to the International Maritime Organization - which has been advocating greater regional cooperation - the Malacca Strait, South China Sea, the eastern Indian Ocean, the western and central-western African coast, and Latin American coastal areas are especially vulnerable to pirate attacks. In 2000, there were 471 acts of piracy, representing a 150-percent increase over 1999 levels. Of the 471 acts of piracy, 257 occurred in Southeast Asian waters (reportedly 112 of those in the Strait of Malacca). In Indonesia, what has been termed an "explosion" in piracy has evidently resulted in the firing of the commodore who had commanded Indonesia's Western Fleet Sea Security Task Force. Japan has also become increasingly concerned in recent months. In 2000, pirates attacked 32 Japanese ships. As a consequence, in July 2001, Japan began deploying an armed patrol boat of 3,000-5000 tons a year to participate in joint exercises with other nations. Japan may also send coast-guard aircraft and helicopters. Japanese coast-guard members armed with automatic rifles will descend from the helicopters to inspect what the Japanese term "suspicious ships".

Bulgarian Special-Ops Modify Training

The Bulgarian General Staff concluded recently that there were increasing possibilities that Albanian armed groups (which are being pursued by Macedonian forces) might penetrate Bulgarian territory. In addition, the Bulgarian Army's special-operations force responded to a requirement to deal with the Bulgarian legs of arms-trafficking routes. In order to be better prepared for dealing with incidents and threats, the special-operations force has reportedly modified its training approaches. Rather than focusing on operations in enemy rear areas, Bulgarian airborne, reconnaissance and assault, and psychological-warfare elements are undergoing specialized training to learn how to neutralize terrorists. As part of their training, the Bulgarian forces recently conducted a "secret" exercise designed to destroy armed groups. The exercise was held near the Macedonian border.

Exercises Highlight Special-Ops Forces of PRC, Taiwan

Activities of the special-operations forces of both the People's Republic of China and Taiwan were highlighted in May and June, months that were marked by military exercises on both sides of the Strait of Taiwan. An article in the Shanghai newspaper *Jiefang Ribao* discussed the history and the development of the PRC's special forces. The initial special-forces groupings of the Red Army (1927-46) - said to be equipped simply with "one rope and one knife" and trained to "strike, kick, and run a long distance" - were referred to as "reconnaissance infantry" or "reconnaissance teams operating in the enemy's rear". The article took note of the Red Army's "elite handgun team" and the "armed work team operating in the enemy's rear" who operated against the Japanese during World War II. Chinese special-operations forces operated against the U.S. in North Korea, destroying bridges and attempting to disrupt US operations. According to the article, however, special forces of "true significance in China" were not developed until the 1980s. Re-equipping and training of the PRC forces were undertaken to prepare them to operate in a variety of reconnaissance and direct-action missions hundreds and thousands of kilometers away. Because of their unique organization and training, the army, navy and air-force special-operations units were characterized as "three mini armed forces" that by virtue of their training and high readiness were able to deploy rapidly. Also in May and June, Taiwan's main special-operations unit, the 862nd Brigade, participated in an exercise in a mountainous region of central Taiwan. The exercise was "mainly designed to test the special-operations forces' combat skills, including infiltration in forest areas and the blasting of mock radar stations in mainland China's southeastern coastal regions," and it included a broad range of additional general and specialized training. During the exercise, the Taiwanese forces conducted a 300-km march through mountainous areas before reaching a designated training site. Such training is judged essential in the face of what has been termed "mainland China's intensified military threat against Taiwan.

Indian Army Exercise Shows Value of Special-Ops

In May 2001, the Indian Army conducted a corps-level exercise that it said highlighted the value of "judicious, timely and bold use of the special forces to cripple the enemy's war-waging capabilities and keep him bogged down in his own backyard." The army also judged the exercise useful for evaluating the use of special-operations forces in "future conventional wars [that might be] fought against a nuclear backdrop." During the exercise, helicopters and fixed-wing transport aircraft inserted Indian special-operations units into enemy territory, where they performed target-identification and intelligence-collection tasks. According to media reports, the exercise suggested that special-operations activities need to be elevated from the level of a tactical resource to that of a strategic asset that is integrated into the overall intelligence-gathering system. Its targets could then include "nuclear warhead stores, missiles and the road-and-communications infrastructure".

Mexican Navy Establishes Counterdrug ROE

Media reporting indicates that the Mexican navy has established detailed rules of engagement, or ROE, regarding the use of armed force against suspected narcotraffickers and other lawbreakers at sea. The ROE apply to surface craft, the Marine reaction forces usually on board the surface craft, and accompanying aviation elements operating in territorial waters. The ROE were prompted by the scope of drug trafficking, illegal fishing, alien smuggling, piracy off Mexican shores, and by the dangers posed to naval personnel attempting to stop vessels at sea. Incidents at sea in which lawbreakers used firearms have endangered Mexican naval personnel. The ROE stress the need to adhere to all legal guidelines and to undertake a phased series of measures designed to halt a suspected vessel. These measures range from radio communications, audio warnings and lights, to buzzing ships with helicopters, and firing warning shots into the water. If a vessel is reported to have engaged in illicit activities and does not halt after these measures have been used, naval personnel may use disabling fire. Reaction forces operating under the orders of the commander may board apprehended vessels and may defend themselves through the "proportional" use of firearms.

FARC Denies Trafficking Activities in Mexico

The guerrilla conflict in Colombia, along with its clear affiliation with international drug trafficking, continues to be a focus of U.S. initiatives in foreign policy and security assistance. The guerrilla conflict is also a concern to other states in the region, particularly those that border Colombia: Venezuela, Panama, Ecuador, Peru and Brazil. Most recently, Colombia's largest insurgent group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC, has become directly involved with the activities of one of Mexico's largest drug-trafficking organizations, the Tijuana Cartel, which is also called the Arellano Felix Organization, or AFO. Mexican law-enforcement officials have reported that the FARC is negotiating extensively with the AFO to make cocaine-trafficking deals. According to Mexican officials, in December 1999 the FARC proposed sending cocaine to Mexico in return for arms and money, and the transactions began in 2000. For its part, the FARC adamantly denies the allegations and asserts that it has never been involved in drug-trafficking activities. Evidence cited by the Mexican authorities, however, is far more compelling, and Mexico's Attorney General's Office is hopeful that arrests made in connection with this operation have disrupted the FARC-Mexican trafficker ties.

Russian Special-ops Unit Nears 25th Anniversary

The well-known Russian Vityaz' (Knight) special-operations unit is approaching its 25th year of existence. Established in December 1977 as part of the Soviet Ministry of Interior, or MVD, Internal Troops, Vityaz' had the specific mission of countering any terrorist activity during the 1979 Moscow Olympics. Fortunately, no such terrorist acts occurred during the Olympics, but Vityaz' was heavily employed throughout the late Soviet period. Today, Vityaz' operates under the Russian MVD. During the past 15 years, elements of the unit have been active in combatting ethno-national conflicts and armed criminal activities throughout the Russian Federation. Elements of Vityaz' that are based in Chechnya are scheduled to be withdrawn during 2001.

Mexican Army to Retain Counterdrug Role

Mexico's new president, Vicente Fox, plans to keep the Mexican army involved in counterdrug operations, even though counterdrug functions may eventually be transferred to a new police force. The Mexican military's role in law enforcement has been controversial over the last few years, but it is deemed necessary by many. Counterdrug functions also fall to a number of Mexican police agencies, including the Federal Preventive Police, or PFP. The PFP, one of the most ambitious law-enforcement initiatives undertaken by the Mexican government, is responsible for the enforcement of Mexico's drug laws. The PFP combines many of the functions of the Federal Highway Police, the Federal Fiscal Police and the Federal Immigration Police. Its composition also includes strong components for military-police and intelligence roles. Still, it appears that the PFP itself may someday be subsumed under a new police force. Fox's advisers continue to express interest in withdrawing the military from all police functions and establishing a national combined police force that would include the PFP.

North Korea Criticizes Japanese Antiguerilla Units

North Korea is concerned about the increased development in Japan's Ground Self-Defense Force, or GSDF, particularly in the conventional and special units that Pyongyang asserts are oriented against it. North Korea further asserts that Japan is moving toward a more offensive force - one capable of invasion. The North Koreans point in particular to Japan's plans to purchase a fuel tanker for the Japan Air Self-Defense Force, but their strongest rhetoric is focused on the establishment of GSDF antiguerrilla units, which they say will comprise five 200-member companies equipped with high-mobility vehicles, helicopters and short-range ground-to-air missiles. The North Korean government has been particularly critical of the antiterrorism aspect of Japan's long-term force-modernization plan, even though North Korea is purported to be the most likely country to generate terrorist or guerrilla attacks against Japan.

Russians Establish Counterterrorist Center in Chechnya

In late January 2001, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed Presidential Edict No. 61, entitled *On Measures to Combat Terrorism on the Territory of the Russian Federation's North Caucasus Region*. The edict established an "Operational Headquarters for the Command and Control of Counterterrorist Operations on the Territory of the Russian Federation's North Caucasus Region." The headquarters, which is under the Russian Federation Federal Security Service, or FSB, involves representatives and forces of essentially every major security-associated organization of the Russian state. The Regional Operations Staff, an element within the headquarters, is headed by the FSB deputy director, Vice Admiral German Ugryumov. According to Russia's FSB press, the Regional Operations Staff will be primarily responsible for the management of "special forces and means during the final stage of the anti-guerrilla operation in Chechnya". However, it is far from clear to most specialists whether Russia's Chechnya campaign is in its "final" stage. Russian military and internal-security forces continue to suffer relatively small, but frequent losses to Chechen fighters. The new Russian command-and-

control entity will face immediate challenges and is likely to undergo leadership and organizational changes in the months ahead as Russia seeks to find the correct approach and the right combination of forces needed to pacify a region that continues to assert its independence from the Russian Federation.

Indonesian Special Forces to Reorganize

Early this year, the Indonesian military announced that its army's special forces, Kompassus, will be reduced in size and reorganized. Execution of the reorganization plan is awaiting approval by the Indonesian military headquarters. Specifically, reports attributed to the chief of the Indonesian army staff indicate that Kompassus will likely be reduced from 7,000 to 5,000 personnel and that it will be realigned to more effectively meet the demands of the security environment of the future. Indonesian assessments postulate that the future environment will face more internal domestic threats than regional ones, and they emphasize that Kompassus elements will be used only for operations of special complexity or when police forces are unable to deal with internal challenges. With its headquarters in Cijantung, East Jakarta, Kompassus is headed by Major General Amirul Isnaini. Under the reorganization plan, Isnaini's five special forces groups will be reduced to three, and excess personnel will be dispersed throughout the rest of the army. The new organization will comprise two combat groups, one intelligence group, an antiterrorism unit, and a special-forces training center. The army chief has denied that foreign pressure played a role in the decision to reorganize Kompassus.

Italian 'Carabinieri' Assesses Islamic Extremists

The special-operations section, or ROS, of the Italian paramilitary organization Carabinieri has assessed that Islamic militant organizations are likely to increase their attacks on targets in Italy during the early years of the 21st century. In particular, ROS counterterrorism specialists point to "Al Qaeda," headed by Usama Bin Ladin. According to US sources, "al Qaeda's mission allegedly includes killing members of the American military stationed in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Somalia and elsewhere; and killing American civilians worldwide, in an effort to influence, through terrorist acts, the foreign policy of the United States." ROS believes that Italy, because of its association with both the US and NATO, and because of its major roles in international affairs, is a prime target for an organization determined to disrupt the international system in order to advance its extremist goals. Al Qaeda cells have been present in Italy for some years and are quite well-established. ROS specialists also point to the Algerian Armed Islamic Group, which is present in Italy and in other parts of Europe; Al-Gamma'at al Islamiya, still active after suffering heavy losses in Egypt; the Hizballah (Party of God), now seeking logistics-support bases in Italy; and a number of other Islamic extremist organizations that all pose a direct threat to Italy in the years ahead. The concerns of ROS rest substantially on the potential of Usama Bin Ladin's planned "International Islamic Front," given that so many Islamic extremist groups have established a presence on Italian territory.

Russian Arms Trafficking Takes a New Twist

Illegal weapons trafficking, a prominent feature of the continuing conflicts in Chechnya and in the Caucasus, is profitable for a number of "entrepreneurs," including organized crime, the Russian military and Russian government organizations. While arms have poured *into* Chechnya *from* all directions, the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs recently discovered that weapons, ammunition and explosives were being transported in large numbers *from* Chechnya to Moscow itself. The discovery linked the long-time smuggling operation to Russia's Ministry for Emergency Situation, or EMERCOM, a rough equivalent of the U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency. Arms delivered from Chechnya to organized-crime groups in the Moscow area were disguised as returned shipments of "rescue" equipment -- a deception that would have required the cooperation of EMERCOM personnel.

Brazil Plans Future Border Counterdrug Operations

Faced with continuing and in some cases increased drug trafficking and smuggling from neighboring countries, Brazil is reportedly planning a series of six long-term counterdrug operations along its borders with Guyana, Surinam and Colombia. These operations, which will be led by the Brazilian Federal Police, are expected to disrupt the production and the delivery processes of drugs, primarily cocaine. The police will also attempt to identify clandestine airstrips and so-called private-air-service or air-taxi ventures, a number of which have already proven to be covers for drug-smuggling. The size, timing and duration of the six operations will depend on the financial resources available. Counterdrug operations can be complicated in some regions because of the activities of Colombian guerrillas. Some regional specialists have raised the possibility that Colombian President Pastrana's "Plan Colombia" might score major successes against insurgents and drug smugglers, forcing them across the border into Brazil. While other observers have dismissed that concern, the Brazilian armed forces are nevertheless said to be prepared to reinforce Brazil's affected border regions on short notice.

South Africa Concerned About IO Threat

The threat posed by "cyberterrorism" has become a major concern for the South African National Defense Forces, or SANDF. Specialists are particularly concerned about the number of guerrilla groups that have turned to the Internet as a means of winning international support, communicating with other groups, planning operations and directly attacking opponents. South African commentators cite the Zapatista guerrillas in Mexico, the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia as prominent examples of groups that have successfully mobilized support abroad using the Internet. A further concern is the potential for attacks on communications systems, including "mail bombs," various forms of hacking, and the dissemination of viruses. The SANDF has reportedly established a special division to counter cyberterrorism. To enhance the capabilities of the new division, the SANDF sought the assistance of South African computer specialists, including those from the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research. Although the envisioned cyber threats have not yet materialized, the link between political agendas and the Internet was confirmed when hackers not only shut down a South African web site critical of Zimbabwe's President Robert Mugabe but

also threatened further actions. Because the hackers were located abroad and their identity is uncertain, it is doubtful that they will ever be apprehended.

Indian State Forms New Commando Unit

A police organization characterized as a special commando battalion is being formed in the Indian state of West Bengal. The battalion will track the increased militant activity in the state - activity that authorities fear will surface in increased levels of subversive actions. Indian reporting attributes the formation of the commando battalion to alleged Pakistani plans to shift activities from India's northwest frontier areas to the eastern and northeastern regions. The arrests of growing numbers of militants in West Bengal, and the flow of arms and ammunition into the state, have also received special note in the local press. The battalion's initial complement of personnel, drawn in part from existing state police organizations, has received a year of basic training and an additional three months of specialized "commando training." It is possible that the army may also be used to augment the training of the battalion's personnel.

Malaysian Armed Force Improves "Special Unit"

Malaysia is restructuring its special unit, the "Grup Gerak Khas," or GGK, in an effort to improve its capabilities. The GGK, which is charged with combating terrorists, armed militants, pirates and other low-intensity threats, will also receive better weapons and specialized training. The restructuring process, motivated in part by high-visibility subversive activity that includes kidnappings and thefts of military arms, comes at a time when piracy is increasing in the Strait of Malacca. According to statistics from the first six months of 2000, piracy activities have shifted from the Singapore Strait to the Strait of Malacca. During this period, 14 pirate attacks were reported in the Strait of Malacca and none in the Singapore Strait. This figure represents an almost exact reversal in the number of pirate attacks for the previous year. Responsibility for dealing with the increased acts of piracy is being shared by a number of states in the region, including Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia.

Chinese Conduct "Lightning War" Airborne Exercise

A Chinese airborne exercise conducted this summer demonstrated China's continuing use of heavy equipment and logistics airdrops to give its airborne forces greater firepower and mobility. Reportedly, the exercise featured a parachute drop of a new, unspecified type of airborne assault vehicle. Using the new vehicle, "special combat detachments" demonstrated greater mobility and speed, both in assembling their forces after the airdrop, and in attacking enemy missile and radar positions. A 120-man force landed and was ready to fight in less than three minutes. The exercise also featured airborne personnel descending into an area by means of "para-glider infiltration" to conduct reconnaissance and direct-action missions. According to the Chinese, the special detachments will be able to carry out complex missions, will possess greater sustainability and will be able to defend themselves from a variety of threats on the ground and in the air.

Indian Special-Ops Force Proposed for Kashmir Duty

A former director-general of India's Indo-Tibetan Border Police has proposed the creation of a special-operations force to deter cross-border terrorism in hostile, remote and culturally sensitive areas. The former director-general reviewed the advantages he had seen in special forces around the world, especially "in low-intensity conflicts because [they are] a relatively low-cost and more effective option, compared with fielding large conventional forces." He indicated that despite the fielding of various specialized military and police units, India has "never seriously considered creating an elite counterinsurgency (force)." He believes that a special-operations force, (along with combined, strong border-fencing programs) could help India deal with its terrorism, trafficking in drugs and arms, smuggling and other transnational issues. In addition, India would be better able to meet its security needs, especially in Kashmir. During the first four months of 2000, 65 foreign militants were among 227 militants killed in antimilitancy operations in the Kashmir valley. From India's perspective, these statistics indicate that the problem is not only a local one.

Montenegro Reportedly Trains Police Snipers

Western reporting indicates that a Montenegrin "secret program" is training an "elite team" of police snipers to target senior Yugoslav military officers in the event of a war between Montenegro and Serbia. These police snipers, along with other members of the 20,000-strong police force, could form part of an eventual Montenegrin army. Increased tension between Serbia and Montenegro established the setting for the local Montenegrin elections held in June, during which backers of Montenegro President Djukanovic's party and pro-Milosevic opposition supporters confronted each other.

North Korean Officers Train Congolese Special Forces

A special forces unit that is being formed in the Democratic Republic of Congo may be receiving training from North Korean officers. The new unit, the 10th Special Infantry Brigade, consists of several thousand troops and supposedly has a combined-arms composition -- including reconnaissance, infantry, and artillery elements. The unit's primary purpose will be to fight rebel forces that have been active for the last two years in a conflict that now involves several neighboring states. A television program featuring the graduation of 10th-brigade soldiers showed a number of North Korean officers in attendance.

Papua New Guinea Proposes to Merge Defense Force, Constabulary

The prospect of establishing a unified military and police force in Papua New Guinea, or PNG, has been advanced by a PNG cabinet committee. Under the proposal that was being considered in early May 2000, a paramilitary force would be established by combining the troubled PNG Defense Force (which is widely viewed as corrupt and inefficient) and the Royal PNG Constabulary. Tensions between the two organizations have been evident for some time, and a merger could provoke a strong reaction or revolt from the Defense

Force. In the view of some Western observers, this move could also have serious implications for the situation along the PNG-Indonesian border, where Indonesian Army Special Forces, or Kopassus, have reportedly organized militias inside PNG and have attempted to create internal problems centered on independence aspirations in West Papua. An even more weakened Defense Force would further reduce PNG's capabilities to respond to trouble in West Papua and elsewhere. Kopassus is facing its own challenges. Earlier this year, Indonesian President Abdurrahman Wahid visited the headquarters of both Kopassus and the Air Force Special Forces, or Paskhas. In late April, he inspected elements of the Strategic Reserves Command, or Kostrad, and visited Army special-operations components in West Java. At the same time, some foreigners were demanding that Kopassus be disbanded. Although the Kopassus commander asserted that no such plan had been decided, Indonesia is conducting a study to determine whether some military roles should be reduced.

Romanian Airborne, Special-Ops Units Resubordinated

In May 2000, Romania announced force-restructuring plans that would transfer parachute units and associated special-operations units from the air force to the ground forces by September 2000. Romanian military officials noted that the units designated for transfer are primarily land forces and that once the transfer occurs, the air force will be responsible only for transporting the units to their areas of employment.

Mexican Police Unit focuses on Paramilitary Forces

Faced with continuing violence by paramilitary groups in some Mexican states, Mexico's Attorney General's Office has formed a new unit designated the "Special Unit for Dealing with Crimes Committed by Suspected Armed Civil Groups." The new unit focuses on paramilitary groups, not on insurgent groups like the Zapatista National Liberation Army, the People's Revolutionary Army and the People's Revolutionary Insurgent Army. Many of the paramilitary groups are suspected of having affiliations with political, police and military components, and they have been responsible for murders and intimidation in Mexican states, including Chiapas and Guerrero. The new unit has investigatory powers and consists of 40 judicial agents, six agents from the Public Prosecutor's Office, and other key personnel needed to support the unit's agenda.

Colombian Paramilitaries May Be Gaining Strength

By some estimates, the number of Colombian paramilitary combatants engaged against guerrilla forces has doubled to 7,000 in recent years. The paramilitary combatants operate as part of declared umbrella organizations, such as the Peasant Self-Defense Units of Cordoba y Uraba and the Self-Defense Units of Colombia. In the spring of 2000, the Colombian military reported an increase in the kidnaping and extortion activities of the Colombian Revolutionary Armed forces of Colombia, or FARC. In the view of some specialists, FARC is now changing its tactics, reportedly moving its kidnaping activities away from its traditional rural areas into urban areas like Bogota. The change in tactics could be driven by a need for greater financial resources, since kidnaping and extortion

are the FARC's chief sources of income. It could also mean that the FARC would rather take on the Colombian police authorities than the paramilitary forces, with their strong ties to the military. In recent months, the paramilitary forces have boldly carried their military objective beyond the Colombian international borders into neighboring countries. In September 1999, a prominent paramilitary chief warned that his organization would attack any Panamanian or Venezuelan military unit found to be assisting Colombian guerrillas.

Belgium Combines Pathfinder, Recon Units

Two Belgian army special-operations units, the Pathfinder Detachment and the Long Range Reconnaissance Detachment, have been combined into an 80-man special forces company. The newly created company is a subdivision of the 3rd Lansiers Paratrooper Battalion, which is the reconnaissance battalion of the army's paratrooper brigade. According to press reports, elements of the Pathfinder detachment typically operate in teams of six to prepare drop zones and landing areas for follow-on forces. Elements of the Long Range Reconnaissance Detachment typically operate in teams of four to gather intelligence in enemy rear areas. Although the new special forces company is subordinate to the 3rd Lansiers, it will continue to perform special duties and will not be subsumed by the paratrooper brigade.

Chechens May Recruit Volunteers for Kosovo

Russian media reporting in mid-November 1998 suggested that official Chechen elements are undertaking support for the Kosovo Liberation Army, or KLA. The support, preparations for which may have begun in September, focuses on the recruitment of Chechen mercenaries to fight alongside KLA forces challenging Serbian rule in a "Muslim people's Holy War in Kosovo." According to the Russian reporting, the Chechen military's Organization and Mobilization Directorate – responsible for the manning and deployment of the Chechen armed forces – issued an order to subordinate departments and districts to begin organizing propaganda work and signing up mujahedin volunteers for Kosovo combat duty. Chechen volunteers have been active in a number of the Caucasus conflicts over the last decade. It has also been postulated that recruiting for a Muslim cause abroad may defuse militant internal critics of the Chechen government and reduce the disruptive activities (eg., kidnappings and clashes with rival groups) of armed Chechen groups. Many armed Chechen elements were left without missions and focus after the withdrawal of Russian forces from Chechnya. Directing the energies of these forces to a Muslim cause in Europe may be seen as contributing to the consolidation of the current regime of Chechen President Maskhadov. In the meantime, the Belarus Justice Ministry has warned leaders of the Liberal-Democratic Party of Belarus to cease the recruitment of Belarusian citizens for duty in the former Yugoslavia. The party is trying to build a force of former special-forces officers who have combat experience "to be sent to areas of possible combat operations in Yugoslavia." They, along with other Slavic mercenaries from various parts of the former Soviet Union, would be tasked to operate on behalf of Serbian forces. This exporting of conflict participants

threatens to further complicate conflict in the area and to draw the support of distant players.

Peru's Sendero Luminoso Still Has Teeth

Until a few years ago, Peru's Sendero Luminoso, or SL, was considered by many to be one of the most dangerous and violent terrorist organizations in the world. Although it is now greatly reduced in capability and in reputation, SL nevertheless remains capable of inflicting trademark acts of violence. Five years after the capture of Sendero leader Abimael Guzman, Oscar Ramirez Durand (aka "Comrade Feliciano") has been able to maintain the armed struggle despite efforts by Peru's Special Command of the Antiterrorist Police to destroy the residual nucleus of the Sendero leadership. As yet, the Peruvian army has been unable to capture Feliciano either in the deep forest of the Apurimac Valley, in the heights of Razhuillca, or in the mountains of the Ene River Valley. In the last 18 months, SL has stepped up its attacks: In 1997, it attacked San Miguel, the capital of La Mar province, three times – during the last attack, at least 180 *senderistas* participated in the action. According to Peruvian government sources, the *senderistas* who attacked San Miguel were between the ages of 14 and 16, and those in command were between 20 and 24. Sendero continues to finance its operations through robberies and other crimes, and through the "war tax" that it extracts from local businesses and individuals. Cooperation between the SL faction "Sendero Rojo" and drug-traffickers operating in the Huallaga valley may also be providing a source of revenue.

Afghan Guerrillas Plan Actions in Kashmir

There are numerous reports that Afghan Taleban guerrillas operating in the Indian state of Kashmir are intensifying what the guerrillas hope will be a protracted Muslim insurgency there. Some Indian reports indicate that there are as many as 28 secret Taleban training camps in Kashmir that are being used to train Kashmiri Muslim fighters. The Taleban presence is thought by Indian commentators to number in the hundreds and to include veterans of the successful 1979-88 mujahedin insurgent war against the Soviet invasion force. Dozens of Afghan fighters have been reported killed by Indian security forces conducting counterinsurgency operations in Kashmir. In the view of one Taleban commander now operating in the province, Afghan guerrillas will substantially strengthen the local Muslim guerrilla framework there.

Polish Counter terrorist Force May Target Organized Crime Groups

The Polish Ministry of the Interior and Administration recently honored two "commandos" from the special-operations unit of the Operational Maneuver Reaction Group, or GROM, for unspecified operations to save lives. The unit, which by a 1994 Ministry of Defense decree received the honorific name "Cichociemni - AK Paratroopers" in reference to a World War II Polish commando unit, is the premier Counter terrorist unit in Poland. It has missions to support Polish police and security forces as well as missions beyond Polish borders. Falling under the Interior and

Administration Ministry – with links to the Defense Ministry – its operations and control will be refined under new legislation scheduled to be put into effect in the summer of 1999. GROM may soon target especially dangerous international organized-crime groups operating on Polish territory. General Slawomir Petelicki, the commander of GROM, recently revealed the plan and discussed other aspects of the force. According to the general, GROM was established in 1990 with the assistance of U.S. and British specialists. The general said that he received training in the U.S. prior to setting up GROM. Notable international actions cited for GROM include VIP protection in Haiti and the arrest of a war criminal in Slovenia: Slavko Dokmanovic, "the butcher of Vukovar," who was wanted for the murder of 260 Croats. According to the Polish media, GROM members have begun training for the covert insertion of GROM Counter terrorist elements by high-altitude parachuting. Equipped with oxygen and jumping from heights of more than eight kilometers, GROM parachutists are said to be capable of covering a "horizontal distance of 30-60 kilometers" before landing.

GRAPO Continues to Worry Spanish Authorities

Reports of terrorism in Spain have focused largely on the activities of the group Basque Fatherland and Liberty, which has ongoing discussions with the Spanish government and may be on its way to reconciliation. A second organization, the First of October Antifascist Resistance Groups – known by the acronym GRAPO – is thought by Spanish security forces to constitute only a single command. GRAPO periodically emerges for public view with some form of terrorist activity. Recently, it has become more visible by dispatching two waves of letters to Spanish businessmen, demanding payment of a substantial "revolutionary tax." Early in 1998, some 200 individuals received these extortion letters, and 50 "reminder" letters arrived in October and November. According to GRAPO's demands, the revolutionary tax money would constitute repayment for exploiting the working classes. These demands were punctuated by a bomb explosion in mid-November at Madrid's Institute for Safety and Hygiene in the Workplace. Police credited the bombing to GRAPO. As a consequence of the letters and of the bombing, the Spanish Interior Ministry has set up protection for about 150 businessmen.

Elite Russian Military Forces Continue to Decline

While evidence of the general dissolution of the Russian armed forces abounds, the expectation that elite units would somehow retain a high measure of cohesiveness and effectiveness is being dashed as well. For example, morale of the Airborne Troops, or VDV, is reportedly low and is dropping, with special venom sometimes directed toward the VDV commander, General Shpak. Referred to by some as the "VDV grave digger," General Shpak has overseen troop reductions of 30 percent. In addition, he made the unpopular decision to support criminal charges against VDV intelligence officers accused of assassinating a prominent journalist. His support for those charges was seen as disloyalty to fellow airborne soldiers. At the same time, the Ryazan Airborne Troops Academy – with origins stretching to the earliest days of Soviet power – celebrated 80 years of service as a Soviet and then Russian military school. In its VDV and special-operations training role, Ryazan graduated thousands of officers and many famous Soviet

soldiers, including Russian presidential aspirant (and former VDV general), Aleksandr Lebed. Airborne graduates won numerous Hero of the Soviet Union and Hero of Russia designations – the highest military award offered. As of November 1998, however, heat had been shut off to the buildings of Ryazan because of budget shortfalls. The intake of new 1998 students had been reduced, the curriculum has been shortened, and no new inductees are planned for 1999. This is a consequence of the falling requirement of VDV officers in the wake of cutbacks and resource constraints. In the General Staff's Main Intelligence Directorate, or GRU, which is also celebrating its 80th anniversary, budget cuts, delays in salaries, and troop drawdowns have affected operations as well. Numerous officers have left service for commercial security positions and other "business" opportunities. In particular, the GRU Spetsnaz units, reported to have numbered 16 brigades at the height of the Soviet era, are now said to have been reduced to six brigades. While specific statistics and numbers need to be examined critically, it is clear from all reporting that the support and the status of elite Russian military forces are declining markedly, as they are for the rest of the Russian armed forces.

Counterterrorist Unit Prepares for Sydney Games

In preparation for the 2000 Sydney Summer Olympic Games, the Tactical Assault Group, or TAG, of the Australian Special Air Service Regiment, and its rotary-wing air support, have been training in the Sydney area to familiarize themselves with local operating conditions. TAG has been Australia's primary counterterrorism force since 1978. Since 1996, the elite unit has received more than \$30 million in upgrades and new equipment to enhance its capabilities. Full-time elements of the 4th battalion of the Royal Australian Regiment or RAR, and the New South Wales Police will augment TAG in counterterrorism operations during the Games.

New Terrorist Groups Prompt European Concerns

According to August 1999 documents received by a Milan radio station, there is a new European revolutionary group that calls itself the New Communist Party. The documents made note of traditional communist revolutionary goals and the need to fight against the "economic imperialism of Western capitalist societies". They also indicated that the New Communist Party views the terrorism and violence of the Red Brigades in a positive light, and hinted that the new group sees the need for assassination or other strikes to "continue on the road to revolution". The announcement of the new group - so far unvalidated by action or other means - may be inconsequential. However, it can also be viewed in a more serious context. Responsibility for the May 1999 assassination of Italian university professor and Labor Ministry adviser, Massimo D'Antona, was claimed two months later by the Red Brigades, a group heavily attrited by Italian authorities in past years. The assassination, one of several acts of European political violence over the last several months, raises questions about future European terrorism. Some specialists assert that successors to the old, largely dismantled terrorist groups - the German Red Army Faction, Belgian Fighting Communist Cells, French Direct Action and Italian Red Brigades - are re-forming and re-learning the clandestine crafts of the 1970s and 1980s. Recruits are said to be drawn from "lost young people, people excluded from capitalism,

and opponents of the all-powerful position of NATO and the United States". Whether such disaffected recruits will eventually constitute serious revolutionary terrorists or whether they will remain terrorist amateurs given to occasional violent acts is an active cause for speculation among some European security specialists.

Japan Plans Greater Counter guerrilla Capability

Japan is planning to develop a greater capability of dealing with the threat of terrorists and guerrillas. The Japan Defense Agency plans to budget for this effort beginning in the year 2000, and it will also stress the need for defense against terrorist groups that use chemical and biological weapons. According to press reports, Japanese military representatives will travel to the United States to learn more about creating and equipping counter guerrilla forces. The Japan Ground Self-Defense Force is also creating a research center that will develop a counter guerrilla manual, address the protection of Japan's critical infrastructure and examine other associated issues. The North Korean press reacted quickly to these developments by noting that Japan is "plotting to have its Self-Defense Force officers learn the methods of special operations by sending them to the United States". The North Korean press also characterized the homeland defense plan as the "Japanese reactionaries' criminal maneuver to start an anti-Republic aggressive war at any time by expanding the Self-Defense Force's area of responsibility and by fully completing preparations for a war of aggression". What was probably the most provocative for the North Koreans were reports of an upcoming Self-Defense Force exercise in 2000, in which the "guerrillas" are envisioned to be North Korean terrorists infiltrated into Japan.

China Forms New Force for Long-range Operations

China has reportedly developed a force capable of carrying out long-range air-borne operations, long-range reconnaissance, and amphibious operations. Formed in China's Guangzhou military region and known by the nickname "Sword of Southern China", the force supposedly receives army, air force and naval training, including flight training, and is equipped with "hundreds of high-tech devices", including global-positioning satellite systems. All of the force's officers have completed military staff colleges, and 60 percent are said to have university degrees. Soldiers are reported to be cross-trained in various specialties, and training is supposed to encompass a range of operational environments. It is far from clear whether this unit is considered operational by the Chinese. It is also not clear how such a force would be employed. Among the missions mentioned were "responding to contingencies in various regions" and "cooperating with other services in attacks on islands". According to the limited reporting, the organization appears to be in a phase of testing and development and may constitute an experimental unit. While no size for the force has been revealed, there have been Chinese media claims that "over 4000 soldiers of the force are all-weather and versatile fighters and parachutists who can fly airplanes and drive auto vehicles and motor boats".

South African Police Unit to Battle Vigilantism

The high level of violent crime in South Africa has sparked responses by organized and ad hoc vigilante groups. A new police organization characterized as an "FBI-style Special Operations Directorate" is being established to combat urban violence and vigilantism, especially in South Africa's Western Cape and Northern Cape provinces. A major target of the "Scorpions" (as the police unit is called) will be the vigilante group, People Against Gangsterism and Drugs, or PAGAD. Despite its avowed aim to curtail criminality, especially drug trafficking, PAGAD is perceived by the government to be "deliberately subverting the authority of the state". A second vigilante group - reportedly more exotic in its approach - is the Northern Cape vigilante organization called Mapogoa Mathamaga. It has recently become active in Pretoria. Whether the group's supposed practice of dangling its victims in front of crocodiles is myth or fact, it is clear that the group has beaten people to death while administering its nonjudicial punishment. The new Special Operations Directorate was supposed to have begun operations Sept. 1. When it is fully operational in December, the organization will consist of 2,000 agents with a variety of intelligence, investigative and other skills.

Colombia Reports Growth of Insurgent Militias

The Colombian Administrative Department of Security, or DAS, has reported a continuing increase in so-called insurgent militias in major cities like Medellin, Cali, Barrancabermeja, Cucuta and Bogota. Formerly, the presence of both the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC, and the National Liberation Army, or ELN, in large urban areas was associated with logistics support. Now, however, the FARC and the ELN appear to have achieved coercive and military capabilities in their own right, and they are able to create disorder and extort money in some areas. According to Colombian security specialists, each guerrilla "front" in the field is represented by "an urban cell run by a zone commander and special commissions." These militias possess money-raising, intelligence, and "shock troop" components. The latter are responsible for undertaking direct armed actions against selected urban targets, including kidnappings. With the FARC and ELN cells gaining in strength, they have been able to control a number of urban neighborhoods and city areas, while financing themselves through extortion, kidnappings and other criminal activity.

Turkey Cites Iranian Terrorist Acts

According to the Turkish media, a May 1999 assessment by Turkey's General Directorate of Security, or GDS, found deep Iranian involvement in subversive activities affecting the Ankara regime and the Ankara region. In addition to supporting Hizbullah, Hamas and the Islamic Jihad Organization, among others, Iran is also believed to be supporting the Kurdish Workers Party, which has been waging a war of separatism against Turkey for 15 years. GDS accuses Iran of being "directly and indirectly involved in arms and narcotics smuggling because of its regional and international support for terrorism, and its involvement with around 100 radical terrorist groups worldwide. Also, because Iran supplies arms, ammunition, and explosives to the terrorist organizations it directs or the militants of these organizations it trains".

Kashmir Again Center of Military Conflict

Kashmir, the geographic subject of two of the three wars that Pakistan and India have fought against each other, is again the center of military conflict, according to Indian, Pakistani and international sources. Pakistani insurgents destroyed an Indian Army ammunition dump at Kargil in May 1999 and occupied a number of sites in the area. At an elevation of 9,000 feet, Kargil is one of the coldest and most hostile battlegrounds in the world. It is important to the Indian Army because it protects the main supply route for the Army's forces in the high country of Kashmir, and because it overlooks a large area of northern Pakistan. The Indian Army's Northern Command headquarters advises that there is no evidence that the Pakistani Army has come across the line of control (the defacto border between the two nations in Kashmir). However, heavily armed infiltrators estimated at 100-300 had crossed into the Indian sector and occupied some of the heights and the outposts that are not manned by the Indians during the winter. Indian commandos and three brigades of conventional ground forces with artillery support were able to regain control of most of the sites. Ten Indian soldiers were killed, as well as an estimated 30-40 insurgents. There have also been reports of civilian casualties. Reports indicate that approximately 48,000 civilians have been displaced from the immediate area because of the fighting. Indian sources see the current infiltrations as an attempt by Pakistan to gain a decisive advantage in Kashmir while India has a caretaker government. There are now reported to be at least 44 armed organizations involved in the insurgency in the Indian sector of Kashmir. Most of these seek the union of the sector with Pakistan. Since 1989, 24,000 people have been killed as a result of the fighting. The demonstration of nuclear-weapons capability by India and Pakistan in 1998 has created great concern about the potential consequences of any escalation of the current fighting. Pakistani sources report that nuclear capacity is a deterrent against India's overwhelming conventional-weapons capability. Notwithstanding the Kashmir dispute, the two countries have already begun negotiations regarding their nuclear and missile technology, and they are slated to consider a draft agreement to exchange information on these matters.

Haitian Security Concerns Increase

Haitian political exiles living in France are reported by the French media to have established a committee to seek the trial of former dictator Jean Claude "Baby Doc" Duvalier for crimes against humanity during his dictatorship (1971-86). Within two weeks following the reports, Duvalier, in a French television interview, asserted that he is considering returning to Haiti. Asked about the continuing presence in Haiti of Tontons Macoutes (Duvalier's private paramilitary group), Duvalier denied such a presence, but he asserted that there are more Duvalier supporters in Haiti than most people ever could imagine. In Haiti, President Preval dissolved Parliament mayoralities and the Departmental Community Administrative Councils nationwide on Jan. 11, 1999, creating alarm in opposition parties, labor and business sectors about the ruling party's intentions. Media sources report concerns about criminal acts and violent demonstrations that threaten the future stability of Haiti and the presidential election that is to be held within the next nine months. The Haitian National Police, or PNH, created after the return of

Aristide in 1994, are at the center of these concerns. PNH statistics for April 1-8, 1999 report 20 assassinations, 12 attempted murders and 86 assaults nationwide. A series of demonstrations in Port-au-Prince resulted in heavy property damage and the interruption of business activity for weeks. Blame for this violence and disorder has been placed in different hands, depending upon the source. Haitian government sources charge that right-wing supporters of the coup of 1991 are seeking to destabilize and demoralize Haiti. On the other hand, the president of the Chamber of Commerce and Industries in Haiti asserts that government authorities have not attempted to restore order; that the authorities have not prosecuted those responsible for the violence; and that the violence is a means of avoiding elections. There are other views as well: An opposition party leader from the National People's Assembly places the blame on rivalries within the domestic politics of the United States. Reported Haitian government responses to these events and criticisms include the announcement of a National Security Plan designed to ensure security for the upcoming elections. The plan recognizes some of the weaknesses of the judicial and law-enforcement system. It calls for greater efforts by concerned agencies in fighting corruption, intensifying police patrols, and securing the streets at night. The PNH's general director points to the dismissal of 500 PNH members and to the elimination of many paramilitary gangs as progress toward security. Meanwhile, the PNH has received equipment valued at \$200,000 through the United Nations Police Mission in Haiti. This equipment will help provide security measures during the election period.

Colombian Insurgency Spillover Intensifies

The March 1999 murder of three U.S. hostages, presumably by rebels of the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces, or FARC, in Venezuela (near the border) has underscored the still-increasing spillover of the Colombian conflict. Colombian, Venezuelan, and U.S. authorities are investigating the murders. Overall, a whole complex of related problems has centered on Colombian insurgent activity (from FARC and the National Liberation Army, or ELN): drug and arms trafficking by guerrillas and criminal groups; extortion, kidnaping, and other criminality and violence; and illegal immigrants - all of which are affecting Colombia's border areas with Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela and Panama. In addition, the rise of so-called self-defense groups has added to border lawlessness and bloodshed, as group sponsors pursue their own, sometimes criminal, agendas. As a consequence, some of these countries have increased their military and police presence opposite Colombia, a strategy that the Colombian defense minister acknowledges is fully understandable. For Peru, well-experienced from its own insurgent problems, the increased border dangers from both the FARC and the ELN have precipitated the deployment of the Peruvian Army's Fifth Division to the Amazon border area. This division includes counterguerrilla units that successfully fought Peru's Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) guerrillas. In deploying these forces, Peru indicated that FARC incursions have been occurring since 1993. Ecuador is also considering what measures it should take in light of the FARC activities and the violence inside Colombia.

Polish Counterterrorist Unit to be Resubordinated

The Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration currently controls the Operational Maneuver Reaction Group, or GROM. However, this special unit will be reassigned to the Defense Ministry in the near future. "Military Unit 2305", as it is also known, has been in the news recently, with reports of some 10 GROM commandos present in the Balkans and in Kosovo, where they have been performing bodyguard duties for William Walker, chief of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Mission in Kosovo. The resubordination would be part of needed programs of military reform and modernization. Polish Deputy Defense Minister Romuald Szeremietiew judged that "in the case of uncontrolled local conflicts, special forces are gaining significance". He believes that Poland, now part of NATO, should develop light, highly capable forces like GROM that are capable of striking enemy targets precisely. Under the Defense Ministry, GROM would form the basis of a larger special-operations establishment. Elements of the special unit, said to total some 200 personnel, have been used in at least two peace operations: Haiti and East Slavonia in Croatia. In the latter, which is the sole remaining Serb enclave in Croatia, GROM forces under U.N. auspices reportedly captured a wanted war criminal.

Ecuador Employs Military in Anti-crime Role

Rising levels of crime and violence in Ecuador - particularly in the capital city of Quito and in the major port of Guayaquil - have prompted the government to make wider use of army troops in anti-crime patrols. Ecuador's President Mahaud declared a state of emergency in early 1999 and ordered the army to more intensively support law enforcement. By February 1999, the Ecuadoran armed-forces chief reported that more than 8,000 soldiers were assisting the police in dealing with criminality. Ongoing troop-patrol efforts in rural areas and along the coast are intended to free police for demanding urban law-enforcement duties. The army is also engaged in border-protection duties aimed at halting the flow of drugs and illegal immigrants, as well as maintaining what Ecuador considers a requisite presence opposite Peru. The armed forces have controlled customs since 1996 - a move undertaken to reduce corruption and inefficiency. The military claims that customs receipts have increased by 40 percent during the armed forces' tenure in this role. However, customs is scheduled to return to civilian control in 1999.

Exercise Highlights Chinese SOF

A Hong Kong publication - reportedly with close ties to the Chinese military establishment - has recently described the structure, roles and missions of special-operations units of the People's Liberation Army, or PLA. Attention focused on an exercise in northern China in which a newly organized special-operations unit from the Beijing Military Region surprised opposing forces in an assault conducted thick fog. The unit parachuted in, using steerable "powered parachutes", and was followed by additional forces rappelling from a helicopter. The mission of blowing up the targeted command post and other objectives was supposedly completed in three minutes, after which the special-operations unit departed by helicopter. According to the publication, China began to organize its modern version of special-operations units in the late 1980s, selecting

personnel from the best PLA units. Dropout rates for selected recruits are reportedly 50-90 percent, and the training is described as analogous to that received by other special-operations forces around the world.

Russia Reorganizes Antiterrorist Groups

Despite the proliferation of and the continued reorganization of "counter-terrorist" and other special-operations forces in Russia in recent years, the topic of restructuring and coordinating these various military and security units preoccupies Russian planners. In February, Russian Federation Prime Minister Yevgeniy Primakov endorsed the idea of "creating a nationwide system for antiterrorist action" in light of the continuing violence in a number of regions and the threat of intensified Chechen terrorist acts. Among the organizations expected to take part in this system are the Antiterrorist Center of the Federal Security Service, or FSB, and the Antiterrorist Center's principal arms, the Department for Combating Terrorism, the Directorate for Special Operations (that was formerly called *Vympel*), and the *Alfa* counterterrorist unit. The Ministry of Internal Affairs' Militia Detachments of Special Designation, stationed in areas around the country, constitute another major contribution. The FSB's Directorate for Counterintelligence Operations is also present in all of Russia's major cities. While it is not clear how these organizations would be reorganized, the intent is to "make the antiterrorism system in Russia flexible, controlled from a single center, well-equipped, and capable of inflicting pre-emptive strikes". Drug trafficking is also a concern for special-purpose police units. A heroin shipment of 220 kg was seized in Astrakhan in January 1999 - one of the largest shipments ever for Russian law enforcement. On a different terrorism front, the FSB has also established a new organization, the Information/Computer Security Directorate. Its aim is to protect Russian information systems from foreign special services and from other attacks and penetrations.

Colombian Special-Ops Unit Fights Urban Crime

Colombia's Urban Antiterrorist Special Forces Group (or AFEAU) - with approximately 70 officers and men - is intended to fight violent crime and to combat a range of terrorist activities. The unit is composed of specialists drawn from the armed forces and police who are skilled in hostage rescue, urban-assault operations, and sharpshooting. A special team from the AFEAU recently deployed to Cali to combat "the activities of the guerrillas, narcotraffickers, and common criminals" at the request of Cali's mayor. The city has experienced rising murder rates and heightened activity by armed groups and gangs throughout the area.

Chinese Express 'Strategic' Internet-security Concerns

A recent article in a publication of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, or PLA, highlighted Internet security as a critically important strategic issue. In defining the problem confronting the PLA, the article cited "hacker" efforts to attack or access U.S. military computers and noted what is characterized as a high success rate (65 percent) and a low detection rate (only one detection in 150 attempts). Attention also focused on

U.S. countermeasures, including the formation of special groups intended to counter information attacks and penetrations. After establishing a wide range of measures that the PLA must undertake to increase the security of its Internet and other information systems, the article summed up its message: "We need to be highly responsible to our country, drawing up Internet attack and counterattack countermeasures, and ensuring the security of our computer systems, to ensure that our armed forces 'win' future information wars!" In fact, in another recent PLA publication, an article authored by a recognized Chinese information-warfare specialist called for the Chinese establishment of "information protection troops" to guard the "national information boundry", just as navies guard maritime borders and air forces protect air space. Such information troops, in the author's view, should include military, police, scientists, and information specialists who would be prepared not only to protect systems, but to counterattack against countries groups or individuals.

Russian Special-Ops Unit Marks Fourth Anniversary

A Little-known and relatively new special-operations unit that served during Russia's military debacle in the Chechen conflict continues to exist in the post-conflict period. The 8th "Rus" Spetsnaz Detachment of the Separate Division of Special Designation, Ministry of the Interior, or MVD, observed its fourth anniversary in August 1998. The detachment - distinguished by the red berets that characterize some MVD spetsnaz units - served in Chechnya from November 1995 through October 1996. During that period, the detachment participated in special operations in the Chechen capital, Groznyy, as well as in Argun, Bamut and Pervomayskoye. The detachment also provided bodyguards for MVD Internal Troops General Anatoliy Romanov, who served for a time as the Russian commander in Chechnya. In the fall of 1995, Romanov was critically injured by a Chechen-detonated bomb and remains comatose. According to press reports, Rus detachment casualties numbered 14 men killed and 110 wounded during the Chechen hostilities. One soldier was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of Russia. The Rus detachment also served in Nagorno-Karabakh (site of hostilities between Azeris and Armenians). The detachment's fourth-anniversary commemoration was said to have been a somber one.

Colombian Urban Counterterrorist Troops Focus on Capital

As a consequence of strong guerrilla activity in various regions of Colombia, threats of insurgent actions within the capital, Bogota, have risen. For that reason, forces of the Colombian Urban Counterterrorist Command have been tasked to patrol Bogota and its periphery and to conduct surveillance operations. The counterterrorist units can be air-delivered by U.S.-made Blackhawks and by Soviet/Russian-model Mi-17 transport helicopters of the Colombian Army Air Services.

Iranian Exercise Highlights Border Tensions

In September 1998, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan conducted a three-day exercise in northeast Iran near the Afghan border. Code-named Ashura-3 and covering some 600

square kilometers of terrain, the exercise involved 70,000 ground and air elements of the Islamic Revolution's Guards Corps, or IRGC; many hundreds of personnel in the *basiji* (Volunteer Resistance Forces) from other provinces; and 30 fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft. The IRGC commander emphasized the exercise's role in "acquainting commanders with geographical and tactical conditions of the operational area in northeast Iran, and practicing heliborne and airborne operations by paratroop units in the area"; testing new weapons; and practicing rapid force-deployment. Because of Iran's hostility toward Taleban forces across the border in Afghanistan, the exercise has been seen as a possible preparation for actual military engagements. Iranian media specifically linked the exercise to concerns over Taleban, noting that "this is the logic behind the Ashura-3 war games, especially when the situation is tense in Afghanistan, and the Taleban's military operations in northern Afghanistan have disturbed security along the eastern Iranian frontiers."

Kosovo Liberation Army Promises Independence

Conflict in Kosovo has focused considerable attention on the Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK in Albanian), which vows to create an independent Kosovo for the Albanian majority living there. Serbian denunciations of the "terrorist UCK" include detailed assertions that the organization's support and direction are provided by Albanian hroin and arms traffickers, abetted by Croatians. Regardless of the truth of these assertions, the UCK has gained a new prominence in regional-security affairs. A June 1998 interview with UCK representatives gave insight into the way UCK wishes to be perceived. The representatives insisted that because of the continued oppression by Serbs, the UCK was formed as an army of liberation, and that the UCK believes it can never succeed except by force of arms. They described the UCK's armaments as light infantry weapons and quantities of anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns. Tactics were described simply as "getting up close, to within a few meters of the Serbian special forces, opening fire, and then rapidly withdrawing." The UCK claims that its membership is rapidly increasing because of an influx of volunteers, but the representatives did not provide any strength figures. The UCK representatives expressed the hope that the U.S. would intervene, but they do not foresee that happening "until there has been a bloodbath".

Russian Helicopter Has Special-Ops Potential

The Russian aviation firm Kamov has developed a light-helicopter prototype capable of performing multiple missions. The experimental model -designated the Ka-60 - was exhibited in the summer of 1998 and is expected to take its first test flight in the near future. The Ka-60 is tagged for eventual deployment in Army aviation units, and it may also see service with the Border Troops and with the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The Ka-60 is to be used for reconnaissance, for transporting air-assault forces, and for various light-transport missions. With advanced avionics and electronics added, the Ka-60 can also be used for radio-electronic jamming and for special-operations missions, which have the most demanding requirements for navigation and security. The Ka-60 may also operate as part of "mixed strike groups," in conjunction with Ka-60 Black Shark helicopters. The Russians are developing new tactics for the helicopter, which likely will

become operational early in the 21st century. The Ka-60 is powered by two 1,300-horsepower engines. It has one four-blade main rotor and an 11-blade tail rotor; a 245 kilometer/hour cruising speed; a 2100-meter hovering ceiling; and a range of 700 kilometers, which can be extended by adding fuel tanks. Its maximum take-off weight is 6,500 kilograms. Variations for foreign sale are expected.

Reorganization to Transform Russia's Internal Troops

As part of a broader restructuring of the Russian security establishment announced in August 1998, the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, or MVD, will be reorganized over the next few years. As an early step, these internal-security forces, who have been active in most areas of ethno-national conflict in Russia and around its periphery, will no longer be required to guard state buildings or to escort convoys. During the period 2001-2005, the Internal Troops are to be transformed into the Federal Guard, which is characterized as a "Federal internal security police." Federal Guard forces will be assigned to regional commands and directorates that will replace the current MVD districts where Internal Troops are deployed. The force will be manned on a professional basis - personnel will be recruited on a volunteer contract basis rather than being conscripted. It has been suggested that the Federal Guard may also contain forces from the other "internal power departments," though this is far from clear. In fact, elaborate proposals to transform Internal Troops into a national-guard-type force that could better respond to Russia's domestic security concerns were advanced years ago without result. Given Russia's enduring economic problems and other turmoil, any fundamental change in structure is likely to be more in name than in substance.

Serbian Counterterrorist Plie Grow to 500 Personnel

Three years ago, Serbia created the Serbian Police Special Counterterrorist Units, or SAJ, as a component of the much larger Serbian Special Police Forces. Initially thought of as about 200 personnel, the SAJ are now believed to constitute two units (one in Vojvodina and the other in Kosovo) with an estimated strength of 500. Organized into brigade- and battalion-sized components, the two units have helicopter transport available and are expected to operate as paramilitary forces in urban situations that may approach regular combat. One report has estimated the size of the overall Serbian Special Police Forces to be 7,000 personnel; that number could be expanded by drawing personnel from other police formations.

Colombian Guerrilla Operations Affect Venezuela

The continuing spillover of Colombian guerrilla activity into Venezuela led to an early September ambush on an 11-man Venezuelan patrol. The attackers were believed to be combatants of the Colombian National Liberation Army, who, together with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, have raised tensions along the Colombia-Venezuela border. In the ambush, a Venezuelan National Guard transport vehicle was struck by 15 rounds. Even though there were no casualties, the encounter underscored growing Venezuelan concerns about escalating border incursions. The ambush was said

to be the third such clash this year. Venezuelan border-protection posts and bases have been reinforced in case the guerrillas plan larger actions. At the same time, the leader of the Colombian Self-Defense Units, or AUC, has asserted that 35 Venezuelan and 25 Ecuadorian paramilitary members were training with the AUC in order to prepare themselves to fight guerrillas in their respective countries. The 35 Venezuelans are said to be patrolling the Colombia-Venezuela border as part of a 70-man force. The Venezuelan government has denied that there are paramilitary forces operating along the border and has stated its intent to deal "rigorously" with any paramilitary activity detected. The Colombian AUC has been particularly forceful in stating its intention to permit no establishment of guerrilla buffer zones or autonomous areas within Colombia, a development sometimes raised as a peace-accord bargaining option.

Reports Discuss Korea's 707th Special Mission Unit

The history, roles, and activities of Korea's 707th Special Mission Unit have been discussed in recent reporting. The unit, which is part of the Korean army's Special Warfare Command, was created in 1981. The 707th provided security for VIPs and for key facilities during the 1983 Asian Games and during the 1986 Olympics. At both events, terrorist attacks were considered to be a real danger. The 707th's soldiers – distinguished by their black berets – are assigned urban counterterrorist missions. They also constitute a quick-reaction unit for other kinds of emergencies and special-warfare requirements in wartime. In addition to working with special Korean counterterrorists police units, the 707th also trains with special units from Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia and Australia.

Indian Navy Introduces Special-operations Craft

Reports from late June 1998 indicate that the Indian navy has introduced a "superspeed" coastal patrol boat that is intended to play important roles in low-intensity-conflict environments. Designated the Fast Attack Craft T-80 – and built in cooperation with Israeli partners – the T80 has a crew of ten, displaces about 69 tons, and has a speed of 45 knots. According to the reports, the T-80 is the "smallest and fastest combatant in the navy". It is armed with two 20 mm cannons (with laser range-finding and laser target-designation), and its forward cannon is said to be capable of remote-controlled firing. The T-80 is ideally suited for, and will be used in, the interdiction of arms and explosives trafficking, particularly along the Gujarat and Maharashtra coastlines. The reports anticipate that the T-80 will be used in joint surveillance, reconnaissance, and interdiction operations with the Indian police and Coast Guard forces. The T-80 can also be used to insert and extract special-operations forces. So far, the Indian navy has only one T-80. A second boat is being built, and the navy is hopeful that more will be constructed. While Indian public statements assert that U.S. economic sanctions – imposed in the wake of Indian nuclear tests last spring – are unlikely to affect on-going defense-production programs like the Fast Attack Craft T-80, they do acknowledge that international military education and training, or IMET, will be curtailed. The curtailing of IMET will halt a number of budding programs, evidently including joint Indo-U.S. naval maneuvers and

the special forces training that has been conducted with U.S. SOF on several occasions during the 1990s.

Executive Outcomes Confronts Cattle Rustlers

As part of an expansion of services into rural areas, Executive Outcomes, or EO, a controversial South African private security organization, has undertaken efforts to curtail cattle rustling along the South African-Lesotho border. Staffed heavily by former South African Defense Force personnel, EO was hired by local South African farmers to combat the serious problem of cross-border livestock theft. According to a company spokesman, "EO's service to the farmers includes advice, security awareness and the 'protection of livestock and client assets.'" Already, rustling in the border area where EO is operating has dropped precipitously. Local stock raisers had tried various approaches in the past – to include hiring Bushmen to protect herds – but none of their efforts were successful. Often characterized as a "mercenary firm," EO is best known for its military/paramilitary actions abroad, particularly in Angola, Sierra Leone, and also in Asia and Latin America. In addition to running its other activities, the company believes that it has a promising future market in providing tailored kinds of security support within South Africa itself.

Russians Profile Current Naval Spetsnaz

Russian naval special-designation forces, or spetsnaz, have been less visible in the wake of the USSR's dissolution. Recently, however, the Russian navy's commander in chief, Admiral Vladimir Kuroyedov, reaffirmed that naval special-operations units – which have a long, active history in the Soviet armed forces – remain assigned to the Russian Baltic, northern, Pacific and Black Sea fleets. Although the admiral provided few specifics on the size and capabilities of the units, he did indicate that they were elite, that they were equipped with special weapons (including small submarines), and that they were comparable to U.S. Navy SEALs or the Israeli Navy's 13th Flotilla. Stating that these units have no special name beyond their "combat swimmer" or "naval spetsnaz" designations, the admiral indicated that most of the units are directly subordinate to their respective fleet commander. Of particular note, Kuroyedov said that he retains naval spetsnaz subunits under his direct control as well, "for resolving fleet tasks and rendering assistance.

Enduring Colombian Security Problems Worry Neighbors

According to widespread reporting, states bordering Colombia are becoming increasingly worried by the success of Colombian guerrillas and by the uncontrolled drug trafficking that provides the insurgents' financial support. Concerns are being voiced in both official and unofficial venues. Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori, for example, has charged that Colombian guerrillas are supporting logistics centers used by Sendero Luminoso insurgents. Ecuadorian President Fabian Alarcon has pointed to the frequent use of his country's territory by Colombian insurgents and armed groups. Venezuela's President Rafael Caldera has pointed to the need to deploy several thousand additional troops to

deal with Colombian guerrilla raids and the rising levels of cross-border crime. Panama similarly has reported that Colombian paramilitaries and guerrillas are crossing into Panama; as a result, Panama has stepped up its border security-force presence. Finally, Brazil has complained about the environmental damage to the Amazon, caused generally by trafficker-supported coca growers and drug laboratories. Collectively, the conflict in Colombia and its spillover of crime and violence are being increasingly felt by the other states throughout the region.

Ukrainian mercenaries serve in many conflict areas

Continued economic and organizational disarray in Ukraine has created a substantial pool of disaffected active and former military and security personnel. According to Ukrainian estimates, several hundred former servicemen have agreed to serve as mercenaries in the Caucasus and in other areas of the former USSR, as well as in the former Yugoslavia, the Middle East and Africa. Often recruited by foreign *commercial* representatives in Ukraine, other mercenaries, using Ukrainian passports, deploy to conflict areas under the pretense of being tourists, workers or specialists. They serve in regular military units as well as in illegal irregular or paramilitary formations. In any case, such service is contrary to Ukrainian law, and mercenaries face lengthy prison sentences if they are caught and convicted. Mercenary activity in Ukraine has also been associated with the country's widespread arms trafficking. Recently, Ukrainian security services reportedly detected an intensified effort to recruit Ukrainian officers for mercenary service in Algeria. Leaflets are also being distributed in an effort to win recruits for an *expedition corps in the Caucasus*.

Colombia forms new counterinsurgency force

Colombia has announced the creation of a 5,000-man counterinsurgency task force to deal with the increasing threat posed by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC. In early March 1998, the Colombian 3rd Mobile Brigade lost 70 troops killed in a clash with the FARC. The task force, under the command of a major general, will be composed of Army troops supported by Air Force and Marine elements. Officers with strong counterinsurgency experience will occupy key positions. The force will operate in Caguan, the most important area of the Caqueta Department in southern Colombia. As Colombia mobilizes its forces to deal with the FARC threat, there have been Colombian media reports that FARC plans to target foreign advisers, including law-enforcement and military personnel, who are assisting Colombian counterdrug efforts. The FARC and another major Colombian guerrilla group, the National Liberation Army, are heavily involved in the Colombian cocaine trade.

Indian Army reorganization may shape internal-security roles

The Indian army's counterinsurgency efforts against Muslim militant groups in Kashmir have generated huge costs for India. By some estimates, these costs now exceed one million U.S. dollars per day, and counterinsurgency requires large deployments of regular and specialized troops. In 1993, the Indian army expanded its role in the Kashmir Valley

when it deployed the *Rashtriya Rifles*. The 36-battalion formation, a light elite counterinsurgency force, was formed specifically to compensate for weak and untrustworthy local police and increasingly well-armed insurgents in Kashmir. By 1996, however, as guerrilla problems grew, tens of thousands of regular army units joined the *Rashtriya Rifles* in the valley, further supplemented by a police counterinsurgency *special task force* composed principally of non-Muslim personnel not from the local area. Faced with internal security challenges in Kashmir and elsewhere, the Indian army is interested in reducing its overall strength and using available revenue for force modernization. Some Indian spokesmen have suggested that increasing the use of light army forces, such as the *Rashtriya Rifles*, to fulfill missions in Kashmir and elsewhere could reduce the need for regular army forces in an internal-security role and help realize cuts. Such a move, it is argued, would better correspond to the real security issues with which India must deal. Others have suggested that the *Rashtriya Rifles* battalions be re-examined in light of their predominant internal-security duties and gendarme-like character. This is likely to remain a topic of close consideration and debate within the army and the government in the months ahead, as India re-evaluates its national-security requirements, its force-modernization priorities, and its approaches to internal security.

Chechen *special forces* deployment threatened

A variety of tensions, armed clashes and assassination attempts continue to threaten a broader conflict throughout the Caucasus region. In March 1998, a spokesman for Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov threatened retaliation if Russia continues to violate the bilateral agreements that in 1996 ended - up to now at least - Russia's badly failed military efforts to forcibly end Chechen independence claims. According to the presidential spokesmen, Chechnya will consider cutting the transport of oil through the Baku-Gorzny-Novorossiysk pipeline. The consequences of this action would be a major loss of revenue for Russia: a serious economic blow to Moscow. The Chechen spokesman also claimed that the Russian GRU - the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff - was planning to assassinate Azerbaijan's President Heydar Aliyev. Chechen Vice President Vakha Arsanov echoed this charge and asserted that Chechnya was prepared to deploy *several special-forces battalions* to the Azeri capital Baku to protect the Azeri president. The interaction of Muslim armed groups and mercenaries around the region has become a feature of Caucasus clashes.

Bolivian *Blue Devils* undertake counterdrug duties

Emphasizing that the struggle against drugs is a national responsibility, the commander of the Bolivian armed forces, General Carlos Bejar, recently announced that the Bolivian Navy special-forces unit *Blue Devils* would soon be participating directly in counterdrug operations on Bolivia's rivers and lakes. Interdicting drugs and precursor chemicals that increasingly move along Bolivia's riverine routes constitutes a new role for the unit. The force is said to possess 33 speedboats and patrol boats capable of carrying out interdiction missions on the Amazon, its tributaries and lakes. Two other Bolivian military units - the army's *green Devils* and the air force's *Red Devils* - will continue to provide logistics

support to the police - notably the Special Antinarcotics Force and the Mobile Police Unit for Rural Patrol.

Russia tries new approach to border security

On a section of the Russian border with Kazakhstan, a new style of Russian *border watch* is being used to stop drug traffickers, contraband smugglers, and illegal immigrants from China, Afghanistan and elsewhere. The so-called *nonmilitary* method of guarding border areas depends on support from local volunteer people's militias, Cossack groups and local government bodies. The approach is also being tried in the Transbaikal region. If successful there, it will be used more widely throughout Russia. Plans have also been announced for revitalized maritime Border Guard fleet to be created over the next decade. The enhanced force is to have ships similar to those of the U.S. Coast Guard. The force will patrol some 46,000 km of ocean, river and lake frontiers. Currently, maritime border forces have 250 ships and 671 cutters, numbers which are considered far too few. Nevertheless, Russia's extreme economic problems make the acquisition of new border vessels problematic, and the precipitous, unaddressed decline of the regular Russian navy adds another dimension of conflict over scarce resources.

Slovenian military police have counter-PSYOP role

Military police or VP, now constitute an important part of the Slovenian army. In peacetime, the VP are responsible for maintaining military order and discipline, controlling military traffic, and providing security for defense sites and facilities. Their work is carried out in cooperation with the Slovenian Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Defense Ministry's Intelligence-Security Service, the military's criminal police. VP units are manned entirely by long-term service personnel, with units assigned to every regional command. In addition, an independent VP battalion established in 1998 plays a central role in Slovenian-army training. In wartime, VP units are tasked to protect the security of mobilizing units and to facilitate the deployment of those units. The force will also play a key role in rear-area protection and security, to include eliminating enemy sabotage-diversionary teams, identifying other infiltrators, guarding POWs and preventing enemy psychological-warfare operations.

Military counterdrug roles debated

Thailand's promises to vigorously attack the burgeoning drug trade have raised the prospect of greater Thai military participation in counterdrug activities. Among the options being considered--all of which have generated sharp discussion or controversy--is the possibility of giving military personnel limited arrest powers; assigning second-year conscripts and military police to community-policing duties; and developing other approaches of military-police cooperation. While many specialists acknowledge that the Thai drug problems exceed the capabilities of the Thai police, fears of military human-rights abuses and greater drug corruption within the military itself promise to temper the most ambitious proposals for armed forces' participation. Meanwhile, on another continent, Argentina is addressing similar issues. Namely, Argentina's air force and navy

are considering ways by which to monitor air and maritime drug-trafficking activities, which have increased in recent years. In part, these efforts may involve increased radar coverage of Argentina's borders with Brazil and Paraguay, with other military support possible. But in Argentina, as in Thailand and a number of other countries, using the military in law-enforcement roles--combined with the danger of a too-close association with the corrupting influence of international drug criminals--evokes controversy and discussion in and out of the Argentine armed forces. An Argentine commentator posed the same question that other states have recently asked: "If the militaries do not destroy the drug traffic, who will?" This question will clearly continue to preoccupy security establishments in those states facing drug trafficking and transit problems that exceed traditional law-enforcement resources.

Columbian guerillas concern Venezuela

The ambush of a Venezuelan army and national-guard patrol in February 1997 in the western state of Apure, an apparent reduction of Colombian military and police presence in parts of the border area with Venezuela, and the increased activities of Colombian drug traffickers and other violent criminals crossing into Venezuela have generated worry among the border residents and have evoked a Venezuelan government protest to Colombian authorities. Clashes with Colombian guerrillas--along with coca-planting activity and cross-border kidnappings and robberies--have led to closer interaction among Venezuelan forces near border areas; more focused intelligence work; and the creation of the Sierra Nueve Special Command, whose role, in part, is to eliminate drug crops on Venezuelan soil. In planning for more effective border countermeasures, Venezuelan authorities recognize that Bogota's efforts to counter the attacks of the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces, or FARC, and the National Liberation Army, or ELN, in other parts of Colombia have reduced the Colombian army's border presence. As a consequence, it seems likely that Venezuela's attention to the cross-border activity of guerrilla and criminal groups--and to the progress of FARC and ELN insurgent efforts in Colombia--will remain concentrated.

Russian assessment calls for special-ops reform

In Russia, struggles to formulate and to implement military reforms have sparked criticisms of past and current approaches regarding the organization, equipment, employment and affiliation of Soviet and Russian specialoperations forces. A 1997 assessment by a Russian general-staff officer highlights many examples of such organizational and performance shortfalls and singles out the past association of "spetsnaz" and military intelligence as a particularly flawed and incompatible relationship. The assessment is also critical of the performance in Chechnya by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, or MVD, and the Federal Security Service, or FSB. For the armed forces, the assessment calls for the creation of a General Staff Special Operations Directorate (within the Main Operations Directorate). With regard to all of Russia's other special-security units, a Federal Special Operations Committee would handle the restructuring of Russian special-operations forces (e.g., the MVD, the FSB, the Federal Border Service, etc.). Under a proposed scheme for the military, there would be nine

categories of "special operations" or "special actions." They are as follows: commando operations (direct action against command and control and other military targets during a period of threat or at the start of military operations); reconnaissance operations (collection prior to the start of operations and in support of the first and subsequent conventional operations); psychological operations (altering civilian or military behavior and countering enemy efforts); operations to support internal security and constitutional order (of the Russian Federation, foreign nations, and regions or territories); operations to protect the rights and the property of Russia and its citizens (in and out of Russia); search-and-rescue operations (of Russian military and civilian personnel, including hostage rescue); operations to form, support and employ foreign irregular forces (on behalf of Russian military objectives or Russian Federation interests); auxiliary operations (to support the security of peacekeeping operations, of humanitarian-assistance operations and of various kinds of support to civil authorities); and other unspecified operations or actions that the minister of defense or the president might designate. Whatever the merits of the arguments outlined in the assessment, it is the slow, under-funded status of Russian military reform that makes a major change in military special-operations forces unlikely in the near future.

Columbian authorities link guerillas to drug trafficking

Against a backdrop of strong, continuing guerrilla activity that is challenging government forces, Colombian authorities continue to highlight the evidence of enduring narco-insurgent linkages. In February 1997, Colombian national police discovered near Cali a cache of automatic weapons, grenades, explosives, uniforms, and an antitank missile, together with 500 kg of cocaine--an indication of drug-insurgent linkage. The director of the Colombian national police echoed views heard often over the last decade in Colombia and elsewhere, "One does not know if the drug trafficker is a guerrilla or if the guerrilla is a drug trafficker. The line is now blurred; it is a brotherhood community."

New Guatemalan National Civilian Police operational

The newly formed Guatemalan National Civilian Police, or PNC, began operations July 15, 1997. The force formed in the wake of peace accords between the Guatemalan government and the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity guerrillas is projected to have 20,000 members by the year 2000. The initial contingent will be expanded every three months as new recruits graduate from training. Eventually, the police will replace the security forces and Army units assigned temporarily to law-enforcement duties in the Guatemalan capital. Now that the new force is formally operational, Guatemalan President Arzu has declared war on "lawbreakers, white-collar criminals, drug traffickers, rapists, agitators, members of youth gangs, and other social outcasts." In recent years, organized crime, street crime and associated violence have soared in Guatemala as a consequence of war and weakened institutions. A major mission of the PNC will be to develop strong ties with the population and to win the trust and respect of society at large.

Russians examine future of special-operations forces

A July 1997 military-scientific conference in Moscow addressed the evolving role and structure of Russian "special operations forces" in future conflict. Participants examined special-operations concepts not only from the perspective of the Russian Federation Armed Forces (especially the Airborne Troops) but also from the perspective of the Federal Security Service, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Federal Border Service, Civil Defense/Emergency Situations, and other agencies. All of these organizations have their own "special operations" requirements, approaches and definitions. Specialists at the conference noted trends in the development of a "new concept of war involving the use of noncombat systems or limited use of combat equipment and arms"; they characterized SOF as a "modern high-precision weapon, Russian-style"; and they observed that little of the extraordinarily rich base of practical Russian SOF experience had been incorporated into theory. Participants also were warned that the Russian Airborne Troops so well-suited as candidates for newly formed SOF units were only one source, and that all ministries and agencies involved need to collaborate on SOF structure and roles.

African militaries to provide environmental security

The 1997 U.S. National Security Strategy includes "protecting the global environment managing our forests, stopping the spread of toxic chemicals" as one of a number of strategic priorities requiring interagency approaches. Environmental security is also emerging as an important security consideration in other areas of the world. As some militaries around the world examine their future roles in supporting civil authorities, environmental protection and law enforcement are being added to such nontraditional tasks as immigration control and counternarcotics. In this regard, some African militaries have been given the additional role of providing environmental security. Under the DoD Biodiversity Program, the U.S. has provided materials and training to the military forces of a number of African countries for the protection of wildlife and other natural resources. The Botswana Defense Forces, or BDF, for example, are active in biodiversity missions, especially anti-poaching. At any time, up to 20 percent of the BDF may be involved in these missions, and the BDF have been successful in countering commercial poaching. The Uganda People's Defense Force, or UPDF, has also received an environmental security role. The UPDF is training an anti-poaching squad to fight poaching in Murchison Falls National Park. Some West African navies have also received patrol craft and fisheries-protection training. The overall success rate of such programs in Africa is arguable, in light of reports of the less-than effective use of U.S.-provided material. Also, there have been reports of some military poaching by less disciplined armies.

Bolivian guerrilla elements still active

Bolivia's Tupac Katari Guerrilla Army, or EGTK, which most specialists believed had disbanded, is evidently still in existence in rural areas of Bolivia and is thought to be in contact with the rebels of the Chilean Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front, or FPMR. The EGTK best known for its bombings of power pylons and oil pipelines in the Bolivian Altiplano in the early 1990s was badly damaged when its top leaders were arrested in 1992. With the recent arrest of another EGTK member, there have been indications that

the EGTK is still active and that its members possess arms and explosives. In addition, EGTK members are apparently developing plans to surface as the Malkus Rojos rebel group. Meanwhile, concerns over possible guerrilla infiltration from Peru and Chile, coupled with rumors that FPMR escapees have entered Bolivia, have resulted in a heightened awareness of Bolivia's potential guerrilla and terrorist problems and in more intensive army patrolling along the Peruvian and Chilean border areas to prevent guerrillas from crossing into Bolivia.

Russian airborne troops downsizing

According to Colonel General Georgiy Shpak, commander of the Russian Airborne Troops, the Russian airborne numerical strength was already down by some 27 percent in 1996. The reduction, which is continuing, was accomplished by reorganizing the combat-support units and by making most of the airborne brigades subordinate to military district commanders. By the end of 1997, the Airborne Troops are to comprise three airborne divisions, one airborne brigade, support units and training facilities (including the Ryazan Higher Airborne Command School). The unit's mission focus will be on tactical-level support of ground forces. At the beginning of 1997, the Airborne Troops constituted about 2.5 percent of the total Russian Federation armed forces. In March 1997, in a further effort to cut their staff and administrative overhead, the Airborne Troops became a part of the Main Command of Ground Forces. With the loss of the Airborne Troops' autonomous status, concern has mounted over the potential loss of airborne traditions and esprit.

Illegal immigration and refugees challenge Russian security services

Russian authorities now estimate that at least 100,000 illegal immigrants (most of whom are from Vietnam, China, and Afghanistan) are living in Moscow. In March 1997, the problem of illegal immigrants which has grown in the wake of the Soviet collapse prompted Russia's Federal Security Service and Federal Border Service to begin "streamlining" their interaction and cooperation with one another in order to deal with the issue. The two agencies raised special concerns regarding illegal immigrants, including the potential for their engagement in subversive activities under the sponsorship of foreign intelligence bodies; their involvement in the flow of drugs and arms from the south; their potential for spreading serious diseases; and the economic impact of their taking jobs away from Russians. In Kyrgyzstan a transit area for illegal aliens, drugs and weapons on their way to Russia and beyond government resources are being taxed by some 20,000 refugees from the civil war in neighboring Tajikistan. An even larger concern is the ever-increasing amount of drugs from Afghanistan and Pakistan that pass through Kyrgyzstan into Russia and on into Europe. "Mountains" of seized raw opium, along with the violence that erupts among drug traffickers or that is caused by bandits preying on refugees, mark an early leg of the journey of people and contraband north to Russia. A recently established "special control zone," aimed at regulating the flow of illegal goods along the heavily traveled highway linking Kyrgyzstan with Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan, appears unlikely to seriously affect the flow of contraband. p>

Chilean terrorists strike from air and cyberspace

Peru's extraordinarily successful operation to free hostages held by the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement, or MRTA, in Lima did not end the regional unease over the potential for small, obscure or badly damaged subversive groups to reassert themselves with dramatic acts of violence. Remnants of old insurgent groups such as those in Paraguay, Uruguay and Ecuador are largely inactive, while some former guerrillas in Argentina, Chile and elsewhere in Latin America are widely believed to be working now for the government intelligence services they once fought. Nevertheless, occasional acts of violence and terrorism by remnants of these or other groups remind affected states that even obscure subversive organizations are not quite destroyed. In Chile, for example, a still-active faction of the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front, or FPMR, executed a stunning Dec. 30, 1996, rescue of four FPMR leaders from a maximum security prison near Santiago. The four, who were picked up from the prison by a helicopter flown by a kidnaped Chilean police captain, escaped in an exchange of automatic-weapons fire between the helicopter and the prison guards. The breakout, which is rumored to have had foreign support, underscored that the FPMR (split off from a larger organization formed in 1983 to struggle against the military rule of Augusto Pinochet) is still capable of effective action. It also raised the immediate specter of other actions (possibly with the MRTA or other groups), and it introduced a sensitive new issue into Chilean internal politics the current "threat of radical groups." Around the same time that Peruvian police and military special-operations forces were freeing MRTA hostages in Lima in late April, the FPMR appeared on a well-organized, colorfully presented Spanish-language site on the Worldwide Web (<http://www.cyberplus.ca/~labbe>). The site has instructive material on FPMR history, goals, leaders and revolutionary heroes, relationships with Cuba, and other features.

Thais establish Rapid Deployment Strike Force

Drawing on especially well-trained military personnel with field experience, the Thai Army is setting up the Rapid Deployment Strike Force. The unit which will be able to deploy by land or by water will be tasked to respond to especially challenging problems, including those arising along Thai borders. The force may also be used to support United Nations peacekeeping efforts. The 3rd Battalion of the 31st Infantry Regiment, in the southwest central province of Lop Buri, may be used as the basis of this new formation, owing to its location and to its assigned personnel who are "trained in special warfare." The unit will be supported by C-130 aircraft and combat helicopters. Additional equipment, transportation and firepower are to be procured from the U.S. and elsewhere. The force is to be "ready for combat round-the-clock in any weather condition and terrain." The unit may serve as a model for additional formations set up in each Thai military region.

Russia views Internet an PSYOP links

In a spring 1997 assessment of U.S. planning for information operations, a Russian commentator judged that the Internet was seen by the U.S. as a particularly promising dimension of "offensive information warfare." This was thought to be the case especially for U.S. military integration of Internet capabilities and "psychological operations." In

this regard, Internet monitoring and dissemination would serve for the early detection of threats to U.S. interests, as a means of exercising psychological influence, and as a means of alerting U.S. sympathizers during special operations conducted outside U.S. borders. The Russian commentator judged that an added advantage for special operations is that there would be virtually "no trace of direct interference."

Indonesian special ops force praised for protecting national security

In April 1997, a written statement by Indonesian President Soeharto singled out the 45-year-old Special Army Commando, or Kopassus, of the Indonesian armed forces as a central component in protecting the nation's security specifically, as "guarantors of national unity in the face of many threats and challenges." Soeharto's remarks were read at the force's 45th anniversary celebration, which was attended by past Indonesian commando officers and military leaders, as well as by the commanders of the Myanmar and Cambodian Special Forces. It is interesting that the statement emphasized domestic sources of "disturbance that need to be dealt with," while it noted that the international situation had changed for the better.

Finland to train counter-diversionary troops

The Finnish Ministry of Defense is reportedly preparing to train counter-diversionary troops -- temporarily designated the Utti Light Infantry--at a "special forces training center" near Valkeala in southeastern Finland. Beginning in the spring of 1997, the center plans to train 160 conscripts per cycle. Most of the conscripts will go to airborne units, but about 50 will receive training for "special task-force commando" units. In addition to jump training, the commando students will receive instruction in countering enemy saboteurs, infiltrators and guerrillas. The task-force commando units, which will comprise approximately 400 soldiers, will be responsible for performing intelligence-collection missions, for stopping border infiltrators and for preventing enemy efforts to sabotage mobilization. They will deploy and operate as small groups and will be transported primarily by helicopters. The jump school and the transport-helicopter resources already present at Utti will be expanded to support the new force.

Germany forms new special-forces group

Germany is forming a special-forces group, the *Kommando Spezialkraefte*, or KSK, to perform a range of military missions in enemy rear areas or in trouble spots abroad. Although unit missions may include operating against targets such as lines of communication or enemy headquarters, particular emphasis is being placed on ensuring the safety of German citizens in war or conflict zones, evacuating noncombatants, and rescuing hostages or downed pilots. Approximately 20 soldiers had been trained by the fall of 1996, and the unit is scheduled to be fully operational by April 1997. The unit is expected to reach its full strength of 1,000 soldiers by the year 2000. According to reports, the impetus for forming the force was the German experience during the Rwandan civil war in 1994. During that conflict, Belgian and French paratroopers were used to rescue 11 German nationals because no suitably trained German troops were

available. The KSK emphasizes the usual tough selection criteria and lengthy, thorough training associated with special operations units. The KSK commander, a brigadier, has emphasized the need for mature, reliable soldiers to man the unit. Despite the unit's hostage-rescue capabilities, reports stress that the KSK is a military unit with military missions -- not another GSG-9 counterterrorist force.

Chinese newspaper calls for "special operations corps"

A military column in the People's Republic of China daily *Jiefangjun Bao* has noted the proliferation of terrorist acts, hostage-taking and other unconventional types of conflict that increasingly threaten lives, property, and national and regional stability worldwide. The author indicated that while the consequences of these actions might be great, using conventional means against unconventional actions was like "beating a flea with a bear's paw." Additionally, he saw a greater need for specially trained units capable of performing reconnaissance, target location and designation, raids and ambushes, and a range of other direct and indirect actions in enemy rear areas. In reviewing the efforts of other military establishments to develop such forces -- noting especially the increase in U.S. special operations capabilities in recent years -- the author called for more Chinese attention to the development of a "special operation corps." The author concluded that China should "cast away the traditional mentality of fighting large scale decisive wars with large numbers of troops; strengthen special operation corps research; and further develop special operation corps theory.

Russian criminal groups recruit special-ops veterans

According to one Russian assessment, there are 15 government special-operations units in the Russian Federation that are subordinate to law-enforcement or military commands. (For an excellent Internet site addressing a number of these units, see <http://members.aol.com/spetsl/spetsnaz.html>). Together with Soviet-era security organizations, these units have generated large numbers of veterans, many of whom have drifted into, or have been recruited into, criminal enterprises. There are a number of active Russian veterans' organizations, including some based exclusively on service in the various special-operations units. The president of the "Vityaz Interregional Association for the Special Protection of Veterans of Special Units and Special Services," judges that about half of discharged Spetsnaz soldiers, finding themselves unwanted and at loose ends after discharge, join criminal organizations where their knowledge and experience are put to use. The consequences of this infusion of specialists include a large number of unsolved contract killings and a growing number of skilled bombings. In St. Petersburg, for example, there were 48 bombings from January to November 1996, only six of which have been solved. While some veterans' groups like the Vityaz association profess a mission of finding employment for Spetsnaz veterans, a number of groups have formed their own "security structures" that provide protection to business and financial organizations, as well as to their own members. The legality of these ventures is often unclear. The extent to which some veterans' groups are immersed in organized crime was suggested by the remotely-detonated explosion in November 1996 at Moscow's Kotlyakovskoye Cemetery, where members of at least three Afghan veterans' groups,

including the "Russian Afghan War Invalid's Fund," or RFIVA, had gathered to commemorate the assassination of a RFIVA chairman two years earlier. Fourteen people were killed by the blast, which was believed to be linked to the group's commercial activities and controversy over the diversion of money designated for "war invalids." In response to these developments, the Russian Federation security personnel now consider the criminal activities of discharged special-operations personnel (and veterans in general) to be an important issue.

Philippines establish special-ops command

In mid-1996, the armed forces of the Philippines combined their Special Forces Regiment, First Scout Ranger Regiment, and Psychological Operations Group to form a new force designated the Special Operations Command. Comprising 5,000 men and women, the new organization serves as a rapid-deployment force, carrying out counterterrorist missions and other special small-unit actions that draw on the urban counter-subversive skills of the Special Forces Regiment, the jungle-operations expertise of the Scout Rangers, and the techniques of the psychological-warfare elements. It may also be employed in disaster-relief and rescue efforts. In November 1996, the new force was employed to provide additional security for the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation conference, in support of police and other military units.

South African mercenary firm extends influence in Africa

Executive Outcomes, the mercenary firm based in Pretoria, South Africa, and manned mostly by former members of the South African Defense Force, has proven to be a decisive factor in the outcome of some civil wars in Africa. Involved most recently in forcing rebels to the negotiating table in Sierra Leone and more well-known for contributing to the Angolan government's success in forcing UNITA to accept the Lusaka Protocol in 1994, Executive Outcomes reportedly has a web of influence in Uganda, Botswana, Zambia, Ethiopia, Namibia, Lesotho and South Africa. Even though the firm's expertise lies in fighting bush wars, it has diversified and reportedly operates 32 companies, whose interests range from computer software to adult education. The firm's tactic of quickly regaining control of a client country's mineral-rich regions is well-documented. Within a month of Sierra Leone's hiring of Executive Outcomes in May 1995, government forces had regained control of the diamond-rich Kono district, which produces two-thirds of Sierra Leone's diamonds. In Angola, oil- and diamond-producing regions were the first areas secured by government forces trained by Executive Outcomes. The firm also reportedly mines gold in Uganda, drills boreholes in Ethiopia and has a variety of interests in the other countries noted above. Executive Outcomes claims that its sole purpose is to bring stability to the region by supporting legitimate governments in their defense against armed rebels. Nevertheless, rumors persist that the firm is connected to either the South African DeBeers Diamond Corporation or the South African government. These claims are denied by all parties, and the South African government has tried to restrict Executive Outcomes' business ventures. The intermixing of paramilitary and commercial ventures makes it difficult to determine the number of mercenaries involved in various countries. Most reports indicate there were between

150 and 200 in Sierra Leone, while reports from Angola vary, indicating between 500 and 4,000 members in that country. At any rate, Executive Outcomes has proven to be a sound investment for the governments of Angola and Sierra Leone. Those successes may help to persuade other countries in the region to employ the firm's services. Increased involvement in regional security problems and an expanded portfolio of affiliated businesses suggest that Executive Outcomes will play a periodically visible role in sub-Saharan African affairs.

Russia specialists perceive 'Islamic propaganda' targeting

Long-standing Russian concerns about an Islamic threat from the south have sharpened in the post-Cold War period. Some Russian security specialists believe that the drug trade, arms trafficking and simmering conflict along Russia's southern borders and in Central Asia are intended to serve Muslim extremist agendas. Others perceive also a heightened struggle for the minds of heretofore peaceful Muslim populations in the region.

Determined "ideological recruitment" and "psychological warfare" by Islamic extremists are increasingly judged to be a threat to Russian interests and the integrity of the state. The lost war in Afghanistan, the continuing conflict in Tajikistan and the embarrassing defeats of Chechnya--the first self-declared Muslim state to essentially leave Russian control--are asserted to be instances in which Russia has struggled with dimensions of Islamic extremism. Some Russians identify Saudi Arabia and Iran as sources of Islamic militancy in Russian Shiite and Sunni variants. They judge that efforts to radicalize their largely Sunni populations are aimed at incorporating Central Asian and Russian Muslim populations into the greater Islamic world. Many religious and educational organizations working openly in Central Asia and Russia are asserted to be nothing more than elaborately organized and heavily financed disseminators of militant Islam--some of these reportedly provide out-of-country training for individuals who then return to Russia to serve as militant recruiting cadre and as agitators.

Indonesia reorganizes special forces

It was announced this summer that the Indonesian Army's Special Forces Command, KOPASSUS, would reorganize and increase in size, and that its commander, the son-in-law of the Indonesian president, would be promoted to two-star rank. With its headquarters in Cijantung, East Jakarta, KOPASSUS is considered to be an elite force that has traditionally emphasized its small size and its quick-strike potential. It has been involved in numerous military actions in response to internal Indonesian unrest. In an interview, the KOPASSUS commander downplayed the extent of the force's expansion, emphasizing instead improvements in training and expected increases in professionalism. The reorganization of KOPASSUS, he stressed, would be small compared with Indonesia's population, the area that has to be defended, and the security challenges in Aceh, Irian Jaya, and East Timor. In addition, the commander noted that neighboring Thailand has special forces numbering 10,000 men, and that in the post-Cold War period, other countries, including the U.S. and some NATO nations, have reduced their heavier forces significantly while retaining their special forces. Because of the kinds of threats that are appearing around the world, the general anticipates greater needs for Indonesia's

special forces in the future; he expressed the view that these special forces must operate jointly with other military components.

Bosnian Black Swans' aggressive commando unit

The Bosnian Muslim army unit known as the "Black Swans" is considered one of the most motivated and professional indigenous units in the Bosnian force structure. More accurately described as commandos than as special-operations forces, the Black Swans, currently 800 men, perform missions ranging from spearheading tactical infantry attacks to providing security support for senior political officials. Soldiers are often equipped with French- or American-made assault rifles and rocket launchers. Initially comprised of refugees and formed near the central Bosnian town of Konjic under the operational control of the Bosnian 4th Corps, the unit quickly developed a reputation for aggressive action. It soon became directly subordinate to the Bosnian Supreme Command and transferred its headquarters to Kakanj. From this location, the unit began performing combat missions in all sectors along the confrontation lines existing prior to the Dayton Accords. Recruits for the Black Swans must be Muslim, must be under 21, must have prior military experience and must have been wounded at least twice in battle. They must also agree to abide by specific Islamic strictures. The commander of the Black Swans claims that Islamic fundamentalism does not necessarily provide inspiration to all of his troops; but he insists that obligatory prayers, religious education, and attendance at Friday mosque services aid in solidifying unit identity.

Russian general charged with weapons diversion

By all accounts, Russia has inherited from the USSR the largest chemical weapons arsenal in the world--about 40,000 metric tons of chemical agents, resident in bombs, missile warheads, artillery shells, other munitions, and canisters. According to the Russians, 32,300 mt of these include paralyzing nerve gases, such as sarin, soman, and VX, while the remainder comprise older agents, such as lewisite and yperite. The size of the chemical-weapons stocks continues to be challenged by internal Russian critics, with some charging that 100,000 mt of chemical agents are being maintained in Russia. Whatever the full size, the stocks, under the purview of the Russian Federation Radiological, Chemical, and Biological Defense Troops, are reportedly poorly accounted for, improperly maintained, and inadequately secured. Against this backdrop, in October 1995, the Russian Federal Security Service charged former Lieutenant General of Chemical Troops Anatoliy Kuntsevich with both the delivery of about 800 kg of chemicals in 1993 to Middle East buyers and the subsequent attempted smuggling of an additional 5.5 tons in 1994. The chemicals reportedly could be used for civil applications or for the creation of chemical weapons. It is worth recalling that Kuntsevich was awarded the Lenin Prize in 1991 (along with his fellow team members), for the development of Soviet binary nerve agents. It was revealed retrospectively that in April 1994, Boris Yeltsin removed Kuntsevich from a presidential advisory post on chemical and biological issues for "gross violation of his duties," but Kuntsevich remained affiliated with the Russian Academy of Sciences. Distinguishing truth from mere assertion in the shadowy world of Russian "weapons of mass destruction" is always I

difficult, but the dissension and the disarray in the military chemical structure suggest that the diversion of the materials or the technologies associated with chemical weapons is a continuing danger.

Russian counterterrorist group hanging on

Russia's premier counterterrorist group, "Alpha," is under the control of the Russian Federal Security Service, a successor organization to the KGB, after changes in subordination and status following Alpha's ambiguous role in the failed August 1991 Soviet coup. Reportedly, Alpha comprises a main group of 250 personnel as well as smaller detachments in Yekaterinburg, Krasnodar and Khabarovsk. The unit's morale and its capabilities may be declining, however. Alpha's mid-June 1995 attempt to storm the Budennovsk hospital and free hundreds of hostages seized by Chechen guerrillas ended unsuccessfully. Chechen rebels were later granted safe passage home. Meanwhile, a strong Alpha veterans association has been formed, which claims that it "can exert a real influence on Alpha activities." Other former Alpha members also have joined or created private security firms and entered other private ventures based on their Alpha affiliations and experience.

Peruvian subversives now on the internet

The Peruvian subversive organization Sendero Luminoso, or Shining Path, has been severely reduced in strength, cohesiveness and effectiveness over the last few years. Its leader, Abimael Guzman, was captured in September 1992 by the Peruvian National Police's National Counterterrorism Directorate, or DINCOTE; DINCOTE chief General Carlos Dominguez continues to dismantle the Sendero leadership and structure; and Sendero has suffered defeats in the field by the Peruvian armed forces. Nevertheless, remaining Sendero elements continue their efforts to reorganize, and they have carried out periodic terrorist acts in urban and rural areas as a reminder that they have not completely vanished. Another reminder, aimed primarily at foreign audiences, is found on a Worldwide Web site designated, "The People's War in Peru: Information About the Peruvian Communist Party" (<http://www.blythe.org/peru-pcp/>). The site is replete with portraits of Marx, Lenin, Mao and Abimael Guzman. It includes Guzman speeches, Sendero documents and position papers, and 29 "frequently asked questions." Although the site purports to represent the Peruvian Communist Party, or PCP, it is unclear whether information posted on the site reflects the positions of the Sendero/PCP leadership or those of foreign sympathizers who have for years been active in Europe and in the U.S. The site does note, in accordance with current orthodoxy, that the PCP continues to make preparations to "seize power nationwide in a final insurrection against the old State."

Reorganization of Mexican Army emphasizes 'special operation forces'

Mexican army force-modernization programs that were outlined in 1995 envision highly mobile units, including "special forces" components, based in each of the country's 10 military regions. According to Mexican military and media reporting, a coordinating headquarters for these Ranger-like, company-sized units is to be established, as are

"special forces" schools, with the Grupo Aerotransportado de Fuerzas Especiales (Airborne Group of the Special Forces), or GAFE, and with the First Army Corps special-operations unit. Special-operations training programs in desert, mountain and jungle environments will also be developed, with some units receiving training in urban operations. A particularly heavy emphasis is being placed on those forces that will be located in the states of Chiapas and Guerrero, where "special regional airborne forces" will be set up. The Mexican army largely destroyed insurgent groups in Guerrero in the mid-1970s, though the violence attributed variously to guerrillas, drug traffickers and criminals has recently become more visible there. The current Mexican Defense Secretary-General, Enrique Cervantes Aguirre, was chief of staff of the 27th Military Zone (Acapulco, Guerrero) during the 1970s, and his counterinsurgency experiences will no doubt influence the development of contemporary special-forces programs. In addition, the establishment of a regular military intelligence service—also envisioned in the overall force-development efforts outlined in 1995—is expected to enhance special-operations capabilities. Concurrent with these and broader Mexican force-modernization programs, some Mexican and foreign critics have attacked what they assert to be the growing direct U.S. support for Mexican military development plans. Other observers have hailed the professional-development process and what they hope will be an open and closer U.S.-Mexican military relationship that promotes cooperation in dealing with common security problems.

Internal critics emphasize Russian lack of UW preparedness

The Russian war in Chechnya has generated familiar internal military criticism regarding Russian preparations and training for counter guerrilla operations. Internal critics have said that if Russian plans for dealing with counterinsurgency exist, they are the exclusive province of intelligence specialists who do not share their knowledge. This lack of Russian unconventional-warfare preparation has been judged to be a major contributor to continuing Chechen rebel successes. The Russian-described success of Chechen mining and explosive devices has been particularly noteworthy. By the summer of 1995, the Chechen mining of transportation routes, buildings and other targets was said to be "acquiring a massive character," that left no one safe. The use of mines and ambushes in combination is exploited effectively by Chechen fighters, as is the use of mines and explosives to target leaders and facilities. In the fall of 1995, the Russian commander in Chechnya, General Anatoliy Romanov, was critically injured by a Chechen bomb. A subsequent bomb detonation near a Russian administrative headquarters in Grozny killed at least 11 people and injured scores more.

Guatemalan military forces target crime wave

During the last year, intensifying criminal activity in a number of countries has led to the unconventional employment of military forces aimed at curbing violent crime by armed and organized groups. In Brazil, rising crime in urban areas brought about a joint military-police action called "Operation Rio" under the control of a Brazilian army general and involving the heavy use of airborne and special-operations forces. The operation spanned a three-month period during 1994-1995 and was aimed at halting the

growing links between drug-traffickers and other criminal groups in Rio and the surrounding area. More recently, in Central America, Guatemalan army forces were deployed in Guatemala City and other areas to deal with the violent crime. Rising crime has alarmed Guatemalan security officials for some time, as the country has sought to end, through peace accords, the 35-year-old insurgency of the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity. A 1994 Guatemalan military intelligence assessment of current and developing security problems identified narco-trafficking, extortion, kidnapping and other crimes as growing threats to the Guatemalan state. The December 1995 surge in these kinds of activities—and a growing number of fatalities—resulted in deployment of military units to conduct patrols in centers of urban and rural criminal activity and to set up checkpoints along major roads. It was hoped that Army units—supported by Air Force helicopters for mobility—could reduce the number of murders and kidnappings, break up armed criminal groups, and offset the alleged inefficiencies and corruption of Guatemalan police by supporting and reinforcing them. The use of Guatemalan military forces in this role is clearly controversial, given the continuing allegations of human-rights abuses committed by the military in internal-security roles. However, it reflects the kind of unconventional security challenges being posed by armed criminal groups in many areas of the world, and the difficult decisions that states must make to deal with them.

Russian officer admits concerns over nuclear theft

Russian military and civilian leaders have generally minimized the threat of nuclear weapons theft or diversion. Colonel General Yevgeniy P. Maslin, chief of the 12th Main Directorate of the Ministry of Defense, or 12th GUMO, which is responsible for "nuclear munitions," similarly characterized theft from 12th GUMO nuclear-weapons facilities as "impossible." However, he qualified that reassurance when he identified vulnerabilities posed by criminal and terrorist groups, principally the theft of nuclear weapons during transport. In addition, he indicated that exercises conducted to assess the potential theft of nuclear weapons from 12th GUMO facilities identified a particular concern that had not been considered before: namely, "What if such acts were to be undertaken by people who have worked with nuclear weapons in the past? For example, by people dismissed from our structures, social malcontents, embittered individuals?" The results—unspecified but evidently alarming to the general—were delivered in a special report to the Russian Security Council. In a country filled with embittered, desperate active-duty and former servicemen—some of them veterans of Soviet/Russian nuclear weapons programs—Maslin's concerns seem well-considered and suggest enduring future proliferation dangers.

Violence continues in Mexico's troubled Guerrero state

Guerrero was the site of a small, active, and remarkably effective insurgency in the 1960s and 1970s. Guerrilla leader Lucio Cabanas and several hundred followers (organized as the Army of the Poor and Peasant's Brigade Against Injustice) operated for some years in the Guerrero mountains. Although a substantial counterinsurgency effort by the Mexican army largely ended their activity in late 1974, lingering political violence, high levels of

drug trafficking and criminal violence, and the presence of armed groups with unknown affiliations remained a feature of life there. The 1994 Chiapas uprising also underscored the still-unsolved problems in Guerrero, where several "new" armed groups announced their existence and in some cases their linkages to other insurgent bands and broader agendas. Armed groups are reportedly active in several areas around Guerrero. This summer a series of ambushes and attacks left more than three dozen activists, police and other citizens dead; sparked numerous charges by Mexican human-rights spokesmen of enduring abuses by Mexican police and other authorities; and further highlighted Guerrero's potential as a catalyst for broader instability. The most serious single incident occurred in late June, when state police killed 17 *campesinos* on their way to an anti-government demonstration in a town northwest of Acapulco. Some police officers and officials who were involved were later charged and arrested. The following week, in the municipality of Telolaupan, an ambush by unknown attackers with automatic weapons left five policemen dead, while in central Guerrero, 12 family members were killed in an apparently unrelated roadside attack. Collectively, these acts of political, criminal and random violence--together with Guerrero's troubled past--spotlight the north-central Mexican state as a source of increasing concern to Mexican security specialists.

'Feliks' group increases Russian security problems

High levels of violent crime and other real or perceived threats to regimes and interest groups have spurred the development of extra-legal "death squads" or vigilante organizations in many areas of the world. In Russia, recent media reports charged that the so-called "Feliks" group--reportedly formed in 1991 by former officers of the KGB and General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate--was involved in vigilante activities. According to July 1995 reporting, the Feliks group comprises at least 60 former security-service officers and is planning assassinations of officials judged to be either corrupt or "Western lackeys." Early in 1995, Feliks itself had advanced strong views of Russian and regional corruption, Western connivance with criminal groups in and around the former USSR, and the need for "extreme measures" to deal with the turmoil. The Feliks group's February release of a privately disseminated report, "International Drug Contraband and the Former USSR," painted a picture of an international drug trade involving many of the world's police and security services operating for political or mercenary reasons. Muslim drug trafficking and links to conflict in the former Yugoslavia were specifically discussed, as were presumed criminal and terrorist links of the "Chechen mafia" and the Chechen political leadership. The report expressed the view that some U.N. peacekeeping contingents were actually serving as drug-trafficking links for leading drug-producing countries. The Feliks report alleges deep corruption in Russian security services and law-enforcement bodies, and it rails against Russian criminal politicians, officials and bankers, as well as the "private armies" some of them have assembled. Whether or not these views have been translated into the "extrajudicial imposition of the death penalty" advocated in the Feliks report, the public surfacing of the shadowy Feliks group adds another organized "nonstate" voice to many other ultra nationalist groups advocating extreme, violent remedies to Russia's immediate crime and security problems.

Bolivia deploys force of 'Ecological Police'

On July 1, 1995, a three-company Ecological Police organization was officially formed in Bolivia to preserve the ecological balance in designated areas. Elements of the new force began initial deployment and "operational-tactical" training in the Isiboro-Secure National Park of the Chapare region of central Bolivia. Despite the region's prominence as a coca-producing and drug-trafficking area, spokesmen for the Special Antinarcotics Force insisted that the new police units would not have a role in drug interdiction or coca eradication. Rather, the Ecological Police would "preserve the environment; prevent the indiscriminate cutting of trees in the Chapare; and control forestry resources and indiscriminate ecological depredation." Nevertheless, some peasant spokesmen, critical of government interdiction and eradication efforts, viewed the force as an adjunct to other Bolivian-police Mobile Police Units for Rural Areas and Bolivian army counterdrug forces.

Reports suggest increasing criminality among Russian military forces

Allegations of Russian military arms and drug trafficking, as well as charges of traitorous dealings among Russian troops and opposition forces, have intensified in recent months in Tajikistan. Russian military personnel, including senior officers assigned to the 201st Motorized Rifle Division and other Russian military elements in that central Asian nation, have been charged by a variety of regional and Russian reporting with corruption and trading with the "enemy"; i.e., the Tajik opposition forces. In addition to numerous--and sometimes official--allegations of drug and illegal-arms movement via Russian military transportation, corrupt Russian officers have reportedly planned the assassinations of fellow officers and have actively participated in attacks against other Russian (and Tajik government) troops in behalf of criminal or other agendas. While these reports require skeptical consideration, they are analogous to reporting on the growing criminality of the highly stressed Russian military overall, especially among units assigned to peacekeeping duties or otherwise deployed in areas where crime is profitable.

Mujahedin intensify operations in Bosnia

Mujahedin units, possibly supported by Iranian SOF, have once again intensified their activities in central Bosnia now that the weather has become conducive to offensive combat operations. Their increasing influence on both the Muslim government in Sarajevo and the three army corps located west of the city has alienated much of the local populace and has developed into another source of irritation for the U.N. peacekeeping forces there. Detachments of Mujahedin have assisted in the training of selected Bosnian army elements for the past two years, but last summer they also began to spearhead many of the tactical-level attacks against Bosnian Serb forces. The potential for the Mujahedin to escalate their activities remains high and will further threaten regional stability in the republic's hinterland.

Funding for the Mujahedin has been provided by Iran and by various other Islamic states that have an interest in expanding extremism into the European theater. Additionally, international radical groups, such as Hizbollah, have been added to the suspected list of

sponsors. Bosnian government sources have grudgingly admitted the presence of the Mujahedin, but they publicly intimate that they have accepted the Mujahedin presence as a "necessary evil" to maintain the flow of aid from international Islamic contributors. Aid has been distributed in forms ranging from hard currency to clandestine arms shipments.

Although the numbers of Mujahedin currently operating in Bosnia remain a matter of speculation, most credible estimates indicate approximately 2,500 members. However, "professional holy warriors" constitute only a minority among them. Many of the others are indigenous Bosnian Muslims who demonstrate appropriate religious zeal and allegiance to the organization. In the near term, the Mujahedin are expected to continue to focus on local military operations and on the most effective means of establishing their influence with the Bosnian Muslim government. In time, they will likely surpass these original objectives and divert their attention to politicizing the Muslim population and attempting to establish an Islamic republic obedient to fundamentalist doctrine.

"Ninja" violence reported in East Timor

Indonesian military forces have reacted with patrols and greater vigilance in the streets of East Timor's capital of Dili in reaction to attacks on the local population by gangs consisting of 12-15 individuals. Known as "ninjas," because they wear black clothes and masks, these groups roam the city at night terrorizing the population. Typically, their activities include entering private residences and beating and torturing the occupants, assaulting nighttime strollers, and killing pets and poultry. This increased activity, coupled with the killing of six East Timorese by Indonesian military forces earlier in 1995 near Dili, has heightened security concerns in Indonesia's troubled 27th province.

Formerly a Portuguese colony, East Timor was annexed into the Republic of Indonesia in 1976 following an invasion the year before. Since then, its pro-independence forces have been waging war against Indonesian forces. According to current estimates, there are approximately 200 East Timorese conducting a guerrilla war against approximately 5,000 Indonesian troops. The ninja activity is the most recent twist in the battle for East Timor. Both sides deny ownership of the gangs. Catholic priests in Dili claim that the ninjas are members of Indonesia's special forces, with the specific mission to intimidate opponents of Jakarta's rule. Dissidents in Dili claim that the government is trying to suppress their activities, which include the international embarrassment experienced when 29 East Timorese occupied the U.S. Embassy compound during President Clinton's November 1994 visit to Indonesia.

The Indonesian government claims that the ninjas are gangs of dissident East Timorese youths. It points to the February 1995 arrest of 12 East Timorese who were said to have confessed both to their role in masterminding ninja activity and to their efforts in tarnishing the image of the Indonesian military occupation. However, in the minds of many Timorese, the real identity of the ninjas and their agenda remains an issue that is far from resolved.

Private security groups turn to crime, espionage

Many states around the world face high levels of crime and violence that are beyond the capabilities of their police or military forces to handle. As a result, these states are becoming host to large numbers of "private justice" groups, some of which have turned to vigilantism, crime or subversion. In Central and South America, for example, private security organizations have long existed to deal with the spillover from wars and terrorism as well as violent crime. Their relative merits, spotty performance and clear abuses continue to be debated. Despite concerns, private security organizations are expected to play an important role in helping the South African government cope with high levels of crime and violence as it works to consolidate democratic gains and to reorganize its police and security forces. It is the former USSR and Eastern Europe, however, where crime and turmoil have led to remarkable growth in private security organizations. As of April 1994, 6,605 Russian "private security enterprises and security services" had been officially registered, with some 26,000 individuals--many former military or security-service personnel--acquiring private investigative licenses. A number of these firms and individuals have become involved in organized crime or have turned into small private armies for individuals or organizations. An analogous situation exists in Eastern Europe. Romania, for example, now a crossroads of drug and arms trafficking and other forms of organized and random crime, and a periodic stopover for terrorists, has more than 160 private-detective agencies. A number of these are manned by personnel formerly of the communist military (police), Department of State Security and Ministry of Defense. Technologically, some agencies are well-equipped, and three are reportedly working for "foreign espionage services." These kinds of developments have appeared throughout Eastern Europe, highlighting the need to consider private-security elements as a growing security consideration there and in other areas of the world.

Separatist movement grows in East Timor

Discontent with Indonesian rule is escalating among the younger generation of East Timor, particularly those citizens born since the island's annexation during the mid-1970s. East Timor--comprising half of Timor island off northern Australia--was ruled by Portugal until it was invaded by Indonesia in 1975. The invasion followed a period of civil strife brought about by Portugal's withdrawal as colonial administrator. Indonesia formally annexed East Timor the following year, an act still not recognized by the United Nations. While the United States recognizes Indonesia's annexation of the area, long-standing American policy stresses that East Timor must be heard on the issue of its status within the Republic of Indonesia. The Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor, or Fretilin, has routinely conducted guerrilla actions ever since the 1975 invasion. According to current estimates, Fretilin forces are small, numbering less than 200 personnel. However, the growing popular resentment of Indonesia became embarrassingly evident in November 1994 during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting attended by U.S. President Bill Clinton. Some 29 East Timorese scaled a fence surrounding the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta and occupied the embassy compound for two weeks. They demanded the release of Timorese resistance leader Zenana Gizmo, jailed for leading an armed uprising, and asked President Clinton to intercede on behalf of the East Timor people. Simultaneous rioting in the East Timor capital of Dili left four dead and saw additional clashes with police. These continuing

incidents, the rising separatist sentiment and a clear polarization of East Timor's younger generation characterize the island as a potential hotspot. Indonesia maintains an 800-man combat battalion and six territorial battalions, totaling 4,522 personnel, on the island. While territorial units primarily conduct nationbuilding activities, they also are expected to support combat operations and counter-guerrilla actions.

South African military, police forces form security task force

Internal and external security problems have increased the importance of military-police cooperation in South Africa. In neighboring Mozambique's general elections in late October 1994, the Mozambique Liberation Front, or Frelimo, won a highly contested election over its archrival, the Mozambique National Resistance, or Renamo, following several years of civil war. Prior to the election, South Africa's concerns caused the country to deploy a combined task force composed of the South African National Defense Force, or SANDF, and South African police elements along its border with Mozambique. The task force increased patrols along the border to deal with refugees and conflict spillover in the event the elections sparked fresh civil war between Frelimo and Renamo. Various SANDF elements have continued their involvement in other law-enforcement and security-force roles, including crime-prevention and border-patrol duties. This shared mission marks continuing joint efforts by military and police personnel to deal with internal-security problems.

Mexico identifies arms trafficking as major problem

The Mexican Attorney General's Office has identified gunrunning as a growing Mexican problem. The demand for guns by criminal groups and by guerrillas is said to be a major cause of the problem, along with the proximity of the United States, which the attorney general's office calls the "world's largest manufacturer of all types of weapons." It is asserted that the movement of weapons from the U.S. into Mexico is a dimension of the overall problem. The Mexican media has also addressed the existence of financial support for guerrilla groups from American and European church and civic organizations. The Mexican government's February decision to more actively confront EZLN guerrillas in southern Mexico was linked, in part, to the claimed discovery of arms caches.

Central Eurasian conflict attracts foreign involvement

Continuing armed conflict and turmoil from the Caucasus to Central Asia have attracted outside participants with a sweeping array of affiliations and interests. The variety of combatants illustrates especially well the complexity of ethno-national-religious issues in the region and the many agendas associated with regional instability. Several incidents are notable:

Early in 1994, Armenian forces in the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh captured and displayed for public view several "Afghan mujahedin" extremists who had been fighting on behalf of Azeri army forces. As many as 2,500 Afghans have reportedly been

serving as mercenaries for Muslim Azeri forces. The Afghan government acknowledges the problem but claims no state involvement.

More recently, a Russian report indicated that three "assault elements" of Afghan mujahedin had been dispatched from Azerbaijan to the Chechen Republic—still considered part of Russia despite its claims to independence. The mujahedin were expected to join the forces of the Chechen president, who is challenging Moscow's authority and is also engaged in an ongoing civil war. This report was of particular concern to Russia, because it marked the first known use of Azeri territory as a staging area for Islamic extremists sent to operate in Russia and in other countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

The Azeri-populated Republic of Nakhichevan (inside Armenia and bordering Turkey and Iran) was the site of a September 1994 operation conducted by Turkish and Azeri forces against separatists of the Kurdish Worker's Party, or PKK. About 30 PKK militants were reportedly captured. The PKK, which is heavily involved in drug trafficking as a means of organizational support, is believed to have training camps in Armenia, from which members cross through Nakhichevan into Iran and then into Turkey to carry out operations against the Turkish government.

The Central Asian state of Tajikistan, which borders Afghanistan and is the site of a continuing civil war, has attracted numerous foreign militants and trainers with Islamic affiliations. According to Russian Border Troops, who by agreement guard the Afghan-Tajik frontier, captured documents substantiate the presence of militants from Iran, Afghanistan, Libya, Oman, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. In particular, the Border Troops have noted a marked improvement in opposition-force ambush and attack skills since the arrival of "Arab mercenaries."

Indian security challenged by narcoterrorists

Indian Prime Minister Narashimha Rao, concerned that instabilities created by ethnic, religious and criminal violence were threatening India's economic reform programs, has called for the establishment of modernized state police forces that are less dependent on the central security forces for support. While cautioning in his July 1994 remarks that security forces had to respect human rights and avoid excessive measures, he stressed that the national integrity of India was threatened by a variety of subversive forces. In particular, he noted the need to break the linkage between "narcoterrorism and the mafia," which has contributed substantially to the country's instability. Prime Minister Rao was probably referring to the penchant of a number of separatist and terrorist groups in India and around the periphery to use funds generated by drug trafficking to support their various agendas and infrastructure. India continues to be a challenge for internal-security approaches and practices because of its location near heavily productive and active drug-trafficking centers in southwest and southeast Asia; the diverse mix of ethno-national-religious groups in the region; a host of separatist aspirations; and the internal Indian drug cultivation, processing and trafficking activities.

Mexico forms new counterterrorist group

Reports from Mexico indicate that the forming Grupo Antiterrorista, or GAT, numbers about 300 personnel and draws its members from the Federal Judicial Police, the so-called Zorros (foxes) counterterrorist unit, the Mexican Army and other agencies. The new unit (reported in a Spanish-language periodical to be trained by U.S., Spanish and Argentine specialists) is intended to perform a range of missions dealing with hostage-taking, terrorist and guerrilla violence and associated problems. Given the rash of bomb detonations around the country, GAT is emphasizing training in explosives. GAT members are also trained to infiltrate subversive or guerrilla groups such as the Revolutionary Workers Party and the Zapatista Liberation Army. Elements of the force may deploy and operate in teams. In a recent operation, elements of GAT were thought to be deployed to the Mexican states of Guerrero, Michoacan, Oaxaca, Jalisco and Chiapas.

Drug trafficking may fund North Korean regime

While North Korea's economic problems and isolation grow, long-standing charges of official drug trafficking continue to receive attention. In this regard, the North Korean expansion of opium-poppy cultivation reported in late summer of 1993 was believed to be linked to the intensified efforts of the late Kim Il-sung and his son, current North Korean President Kim Chong-il, to acquire hard currency. Some reporting has charged that the establishment of a North Korean opium-processing plant was intended to produce heroin and morphine for sale and distribution by North Korean citizens living abroad, particularly in Japan. Under this scheme, the reports charge, drugs would be transported abroad by North Korean diplomats, official delegations, ship crews, etc., and sold through North Korean residents of the targeted countries. Other countries thought to be on the receiving end of North Korean drug trafficking include China, France, Indonesia and Sweden. More recently, in June 1994, some North Korean citizens were arrested in the Russian far east while attempting to smuggle eight kilograms of heroin. They were identified as part of a Russian-North Korean "joint venture," which was conducted without official Russian authorization (as a number of North Korean business ventures of this sort have been in the past). The incident suggests that through criminal enterprises, Russia remains a "privatized" source of revenue and support for the North Korean regime.

Belarus forms border troops to combat smuggling

Even before the final disintegration of the USSR, legislation in the fall of 1991 established a border-troop force in the emerging state of Belarus. Since then, the growing but still critically undermanned force has recruited substantial numbers of "professional" troops (vs. conscripts) and has attempted to arm and equip them with high-quality material. Among the principal border problems identified by Lt. Gen. Yawgen Bacharow, the border-troop commander, are drug and arms trafficking. The quantities of drugs, weapons, hard currency, metals, and other contraband seized are increasing rapidly. The border-troop chief expressed the view that Belarus seemed to be changing from a transit area for drugs being moving elsewhere to a drug market itself. He also identified illegal

immigration as a particularly important problem. "People smuggling" and other forms of illegal population movements have become a serious concern for a number of former Soviet states.

Armenian operation targets drug trade

An announcement during the summer indicated that counternarcotics operation Poppy 94 had begun in the proclaimed "Republic of Mountainous Karabakh," or RMK, formerly the USSR's Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Republic. Bearing the same name as similar operations in central Asia, Russia and elsewhere, Poppy 94 was said to involve both RMK Internal Ministry and "army" elements. The objective of the operation was to arrest cultivators, processors and sellers of opium products and cannabis. Given the extremely limited resources of the new republic, it is certain that RMK's version of Poppy 94 is quite modest. The republic has been a center of Armenian-Azeri conflict for some years, and it was reported that when Armenian forces pushed Azeri units out of the area, Armenian criminals were quick to restore deserted poppy fields in an effort to re-establish what had been a brisk, lucrative drugs-for-arms trade. Given that opium and other drug sales may constitute a source of revenue and support for some RMK individuals or organizations, the vigor with which the operation was pursued is unclear.

Turkey bolsters efforts against terrorist group

In August 1993 Turkey announced its intention to begin increasing police and military forces designated to conduct operations against the terrorist Kurdish Workers' Party, or PKK. Under this plan, "special teams" within the General Directorate of Police would be strengthened with personnel who will receive six months training in police schools. Some 3,000 troops will be selected from commando units for the military component. They will have served in southeastern Anatolia, be especially well-paid and be expected to "live like the PKK members live" in the mountains. While under the Special Operations Department of the Turkish armed forces, the teams will operate under the control of ground-force and gendarmerie commanders. An associated intelligence organization of military and civilian personnel will provide information on PKK bases, deployments and operations.

Czechs resume Semtex exports

The on-again, off-again export of the general-purpose plastic explosive Semtex, manufactured in Czechoslovakia during the height of the Cold War and linked to terrorist groups around the world, is scheduled to resume. The Czech Republic recently announced that exports were beginning to selected countries. The first Semtex shipment under the resumed exports will reportedly go to the British Defense Ministry. Czech reporting suggests that the British authorities intend to run experiments on the explosive that is often used by Irish Republican Army terrorists—including the October 1993 destruction of a building in Belfast. According to the 1991 international convention signed in Montreal, Semtex intended for industrial applications is to be a bright red-orange color and detectable by security-monitoring equipment. Variants of the explosive

produced for civilian purposes are also less powerful than the nearly odorless version that became a favorite weapon of terrorists. Despite this and the export ban that had earlier been in place, Semtex continues to be smuggled across borders. Substantial quantities of the explosive have been stolen from industrial enterprises in the Czech and Slovak republics for sale on the black market. Shortly before the most recent ban was lifted, Czech police seized 100 kilograms of industrial Semtex from a group of Czech citizens who were planning its illegal sale abroad. In Slovakia last October, some 900 kilograms of the explosive were stolen from the warehouse of a private firm, together with more than 2,000 detonators. Czech officials candidly admit that they have no idea how much Semtex has been stolen or illegally diverted, and the continued black market trade in the explosive seems certain.

Andean Ridge governments increase counterinsurgency resolve

In late November, President Alberto Fujimori of Peru made a dramatic rejection at the United Nations in New York of a proposal by the Sendero Luminoso guerrillas for peace negotiations. The Peruvian government has taken an "unconditional surrender" approach, although an amnesty law, the Law of Repentance, allows for individual surrender and impunity for past association with the guerrilla group. Sendero Luminoso has become synonymous with fanaticism, though there seems to be more continuity and vision to the organization than would be expected from a simple personality-based movement that had lost its top leadership. In the euphoric aftermath of SL leader Abimail Guzman's capture last year, Fujimori promised to eliminate the group by 1995. Now the government seems to be backing off from that goal in light of SL's apparent resilience. Nevertheless, Fujimori's tough policy is both an indicator of government confidence and a morale booster for the stressed Peruvian public. Problems with armed local self-defense committees in rural areas, car bombings in Lima and criticism of the president's governance by decree are balanced by a measure of efficiency in the counterinsurgency efforts of the security forces and by generally positive economic trends. In sum, while Sendero Luminoso may be a resilient foe, the Peruvian state is more robust than it was sometimes thought to be.

In Colombia, there also appears to be a renewed commitment to overcome its leftist armed opposition. Security-force budgets continue to rise and major reforms, both of the military forces and, more importantly, of the police, are on the verge of implementation. Police reforms include short- and long-term projects to improve internal order. Higher pay scales and higher educational requirements for police personnel are tied to a new organizational structure. The police will stay under the ministry of defense to assure their apolitical professionalism, but they will have a new look and more missions. Lightly armed urban police will patrol Colombia's major cities while two other distinct subdivisions provide security services in rural areas. One of these would be given the capability and mission to counter organized internal armed groups. The hope is to eventually withdraw the Colombian Army as the primary countersubversive force in the country. Meanwhile, drug trafficking remains a challenge. New twists include the production and export of "liquid marijuana" (a more transportable marijuana extract) and an apparent reassertiveness of the ancient emerald mafia. Colombian society, however,

seems to be increasingly unified in meeting the challenge. Special operations against internal enemies of the state may fall increasingly to police departments and less to military forces. Whether or not the Colombian police can develop the level of professionalism and public legitimacy necessary to assume missions now falling to the military is in great measure dependent on funding commitments by the Colombian government.

Opium poppy cultivation reported in Peru

Peruvian authorities are monitoring reports of opium-poppy cultivation in traditional Peruvian coca-growing areas. According to Peruvian assessments, limited numbers of poppies are being grown in the Amazonas and Cajamarca areas, with Colombian narco-traffickers reported to be distributing poppy seeds in Peru's Sisa River Valley, San Martin Province. Poppy cultivation in Colombia itself increased rapidly in the late 1980s, although earlier reports were sparse. Heroin laboratories soon appeared, and by the early 1990s a vigorous, profitable heroin trade with the U.S. and Europe had developed. Peruvian specialists assert their intention to prevent the establishment of significant poppy cultivation in Peru. They point out that a glut of cocaine on world markets, falling prices for the coca cultivators and high profits to be made from heroin are factors that advise early Peruvian countermeasures.

Somalis may have ties to Islamic extremists

The Feb. 26, 1993, explosion at New York's World Trade Center highlighted U.S.-based links with Islamic extremist organizations abroad. Many other areas of the world perceive threats from Islamic separatist or terrorist groups, and to the extent that these threatened countries are U.S. allies or constitute areas where U.S. forces may be deployed, the issue of Islamic extremism constitutes an important intelligence collection and planning consideration. Somalia has become a case in point: U.S. humanitarian-assistance and peace-support operations in Somalia which began with Operation Restore Hope acquired dimensions that extended beyond the starvation and civil war that initially prompted U.N. involvement. Of particular note are the numerous reports of Islamic extremist elements providing weapons, training, manpower, planning and other assistance to Somali factions, including most prominently, those of clan leader Mohammed Farah Aideed's Somali National Alliance. Western and Middle Eastern reporting indicates that "Islamic" assistance from Iranian, Iraqi, Sudanese and other quarters (including Arab veterans of the war in Afghanistan) has been provided to attack U.S. and international forces in Somalia. While the levels of support by these groups vary widely, some Moslem sources judge that the early June 1993 attack by Aideed's forces on Pakistani peacekeepers, which resulted in 25 killed, marked the beginning of a more aggressive posture by Somali forces that had been the recipients of outside aide from Islamic terrorists. Subsequent armed actions by Somali factions and U.S./U.N. forces have seen casualties grow and underscore what appear to be more effective actions by factions that earlier seemed more akin to well-armed street gangs than organized military forces. Whether this effectiveness can be attributed to outside terrorist cadres trained or provided by Islamic extremist groups awaits more authoritative information. Given potential U.S. peacekeeping

deployments, security-assistance missions and other roles in African, Middle Eastern, Asian or European areas where Islamic extremist groups perceive interests, their global organization, support infrastructure and tactics have gained new importance.

Somali 'khat' trafficking produces high revenues

From the earliest U.S. deployments to Somalia, the East African tradition of chewing khat leaves and stalks has received widespread attention. Khat trafficking has been identified as a substantial source of revenue for clan factions, and it may have increased as the opportunities to pilfer humanitarian-assistance shipments diminished. Some U.N. peacekeepers have complained about official U.N. indifference to khat trafficking, but it is generally acknowledged that the use of khat is so basic a part of Somali life that its ban would be unthinkable. In any event, the sale of khat is well-established among some East African immigrants abroad, including those in some major U.S. cities. Though its widespread use by other Americans is not anticipated, the drug dimension of the U.S.-Somalia association is the kind of unanticipated development that may characterize U.S. involvement in other regions.

Crime linked to various ethnic conflicts

Linkages between crime and a number of ethnic conflicts, insurgencies and civil wars increasingly present a spectrum of complex problems for law enforcement and security forces. In the former Yugoslavia, one of the byproducts of conflict has been further development of a brisk trade in drugs and arms. Local "mafias" in every former province cut out territory for their criminal activities and have developed international ties, as well. A feature of these groups is their ethnic composition, with numerous charges and countercharges exchanged over alleged drugs-for-arms deals and other criminal activities. State sponsorship of narcotics and arms trafficking has been alleged, as well. The former Yugoslav province of Macedonia, where a small number of U.S. troops have been deployed for some months, has been the target of a number of charges of criminal and terrorist activity, from Serbia and Greece in particular. The president of Macedonia, for example, has been accused of being a heroin trafficker and using the proceeds to buy weapons. Defenders, however, say that the charges are fabrications of the Serbs and Greeks, with the "real" heroin traffickers found in the Yugoslav (Serbian) security establishment, including the Serbian Armed Forces Special Operations component formed in May 1992. According to the Macedonian media, the presence of heroin and "ecstasy" laboratories on Macedonian territory is attributed to these kinds of schemes and is not associated with the Macedonian government. Members of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party of Macedonian National Unity terrorist organization are also said to be involved in drug trafficking with a Macedonian-Albanian drug mafia and Serbian traffickers. Thus, Macedonian smugglers, who with some frequency transport heroin into the former Yugoslavia, may be affiliated with any of several different political or profit-motivated agendas. Macedonia is well-situated to traffic in Turkish heroin but is an opium-poppy cultivator, as well. In Macedonia, opium-poppy cultivation is legal, and, according to the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Water Management, some 1,609 hectares are state-controlled, while 786 hectares are in

the private sector. Even assuming that clandestine crops did not exist, the opportunities for illegal diversion of opium products would be substantial. Overall, the security environment in Macedonia, former Yugoslavia and other parts of Eastern Europe have acquired complexities that, aside from their law-enforcement dimensions, constitute planning considerations for military forces operating in the area and region.

Reports say Russian security-service personnel free-lancing

With the dissolution of the Soviet Union's centralized security and military establishments, reports of Russian and other officers participating in private paramilitary or criminal enterprises have proliferated. Russian organized crime groups, for example, are reported to include former KGB personnel and veterans of the war in Afghanistan, while military or paramilitary volunteers have been employed as provisional armed groups in civil conflicts in areas of the former USSR, in the former Yugoslavia and in the Middle East. In the latter region, the use of former Soviet KGB personnel to train pro-Iranian Hizbollah terrorists has been reported. Early in 1993, the bodies of four well-armed Russians dead from gunshot wounds were discovered near the Beirut airport. They were reported to be former members of a Ministry of Internal Affairs counterterrorist unit disbanded after the August 1991 Soviet coup. They had reportedly contracted to train Hizbollah personnel, though the possibility that they were working for a "state" organization was left open, as well. While numerous details and rumors regarding the incident were examined, the clearest concern was expressed in the form of a question: had former military and security-service personnel "been transformed from real heroes into undesirable rabble, and had (they) become a mortal danger to the society that raised them?"

Russian SOF possibly used in counterdrug operations

The Russian military newspaper Red Star recently discussed a new Russian documentary film, "Black Shark," that deals in part with the war in Afghanistan and features footage of the KA-50 multi-role combat helicopter (NATO code name HOKUM) and other then-top-secret equipment items tested or employed in the conflict. The film was also said to reveal another "secret"—that military intelligence participated in counterdrug operations in the "Golden Crescent," which includes the high-volume drug-producing states of Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Precise activities and locations were not given, but personnel involved were said to involve "active and present-day officers of the 15th Independent Brigade of Special Designation (Spetsnaz)." Over the last year in particular, Russian spokesmen have expressed growing concern about the smuggling of drugs and weapons from Afghanistan to the former Soviet central Asian republics and on to Russia. The recent revelation of military spetsnaz actions against narcotics trafficking may presage increased actions against a problem recognized as a national security threat.

Guatemalan peace talks may end guerrilla warfare

The on-again, off-again peace talks between the Guatemalan government and the communist guerrillas of the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Union, the URNG,

could lead to a formal end of armed activities by that revolutionary organization. Even if an accord can be reached with the top guerrilla echelon, however, Guatemalans have reason to doubt that it would end guerrilla warfare in their country. The URNG high command does not always display complete control over its subordinates in the field. Some of the apparent lack of discipline may well be planned, allowing the URNG jefes to deny their responsibility. Guerrilla combat strength has diminished to perhaps as low as 800, but continuing use of Mexican sanctuaries puts total victory by the Guatemalan Army out of reach. Mexican attitudes have been a largely unmentioned factor in the determination of the war. In the opinion of some specialists, the Mexican government has generally turned a blind eye to the presence of Guatemalan guerrillas on Mexican soil, even though URNG leadership openly bases its public operations out of Mexico City. However, it seems that the Mexican government recently decided to distance itself from the URNG. This spring, when a cottage munitions plant belonging to the Guatemalan guerrillas blew up in Chiapas, the Mexican government recognized the illegal guerrilla presence. Guatemalan and Mexican officials have generally identified with distinctly different ideological colors, and many observers in Guatemala feel that subordinate leaders in the URNG will continue to find favor among elements of the Mexican government. According to them, if this pro-guerrilla sympathy remains, it will help the Guatemalan guerrillas continue armed pressure against the Guatemalan state indefinitely.

Colombian cocaine in Russia

In what was characterized as "Humanitarian Assistance: Colombian Style," Russian security officials reported the Feb. 16, 1993, seizure of 1,092 kilograms (1.4 short tons) of cocaine in the city of Vyborg. Concealed in cans labeled "Meat with Potatoes," it had been shipped from Colombia via Finland to Vyborg, a port city about 70 miles northwest of St. Petersburg, the shipment's destination. It would have subsequently been sent on to European markets. The largest-ever cocaine seizure in Russia, it marks the growing involvement of international drug traffickers in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. According to the Russian Ministry of Security, or MB, Russia is "on the eve of a massive offensive by the drug business." In a statement reminiscent of Soviet days, the deputy chief of the MB's Directorate for Countering Smuggling and Corruption added that he could not rule out the possibility that foreign intelligence services were aiding the drug deliveries, though he noted that he had no reliable information to that effect. Russia has also become a frequent transshipment or target area for illegal narcotics from the former Soviet Central Asian republics, the Caucasus, Southwest Asia and other regions. Indigenously-produced synthetic narcotics have also become a substantial problem, with some 70 illegal drug laboratories seized in Russia during 1992. This growing drug-trafficking problem, sometimes linked with arms trafficking and ethno-national conflict, will clearly shape the organization and activities of law-enforcement and security forces in Russia and neighboring states and has the potential of involving military resources as well.

Russian border troops on Tajik-Afghan frontier

Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, KGB Border Troops played a central role in border-security operations along the Soviet-Afghan border. During the war, according to Soviet statistics, 515 Border Troops were killed and another 3,000 injured. Prominent among the border units were special-operations forces termed "Assault-Landing Motorized-Maneuver Groups," which conducted heliborne strikes, raids and interdiction actions in defense of the frontier and against mujahedin targets 100 kilometers deep into Afghanistan. Today, in accord with a two-year agreement between Russia and the now-independent state of Tajikistan concluded in 1992, Russian Border Troops under the Russian Ministry of Security are stationed along the 2,000-kilometer border between Tajikistan and Afghanistan. By all accounts, the border is at least as active as it was during the war years, with Border Troops engaging in numerous firefights against narcotics and arms traffickers and with armed Islamic groups affiliated with factions in the Tajik civil war. Tajik fighters opposing the government are thought by the Russians to undergo guerrilla training in Afghan camps run by the Islamic Party of Afghanistan. Following their training, they cross back into Tajikistan, one of a number of factors that fuels Russia's concerns about Islamic extremism along the southern borders. Some 30 armed clashes with illegal crossers had occurred during the first two months of 1993. As of March 1993, Russian border guards were deployed on territory controlled both by the Tajik government and opposition forces, as well as facing hostile armed groups of various types in Afghanistan. Given recent historical precedent from the war in Afghanistan, and Russia's forcefully stated security interests in the region, the special-operations dimensions of Russian efforts to deal with a dangerous border and the threat of extremist-inspired instability may be particularly instructive in the months ahead.

Terrorism, ethnic conflict threaten stability of Eastern Europe

The proliferation of terrorist groups associated with ethno-national conflict in Eastern Europe is directly threatening the stability and development of fragile new states and institutions in the area. Virtually every ethno-national "flashpoint" in the region--of which the former Yugoslavia is the most notable at present--has spawned terrorism and terrorist groups, with growing emigre and refugee populations creating potential support bases for alienated groups using violence as a means to their goals. As with terrorist groups generally, the agenda, size, location and activity level of groups in Eastern Europe are far from precise. A few examples of groups appearing over the last two years illustrate the nature of the problem. Amidst growing conflict in Yugoslavia in 1991, a Pan-Serbian "Chetnik" faction threatened the destruction the Krsko nuclear power plant owned jointly by Croatia and Slovenia, the kind of threatened action that has continued to generate concerns in the region. In the fall of 1992, a Belgrade newspaper reported a smuggling network trying to bring "uranium" into Yugoslav conflict zones, and speculated about linkages to Soviet nuclear warheads rumored to have disappeared. While such rumors seem highly unlikely and often even absurd, the fact that the theft and diversion of nuclear fuels and materials of various types is under way is beyond dispute. In the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic, which at the start of 1993 became separate Czech and Slovak states, a 1990 text attributed to the "Slovak Republican Army"--an extremist right-wing organization that identifies its enemies as Hungarians, Czechs, Jews and renegade Slovaks--noted its contacts with the "Irish Republican Army, Vatra

Romanescu in Romania, Poland's 13 December Independence Group, (and) the PLO." The organization declared its intention to create an apocalypse in central and southeastern Europe through the destruction of nuclear power plants, petroleum and gas pipelines and other facilities, if the "Slovak nation is threatened with extinction." While the division of Czechoslovakia took place peacefully, the potential for this kind of activity remains a concern to security establishments in the region. In Bulgaria, the proliferation of small terrorist groups include the "Resistance National Revolutionary Committee," "Political Rights," "Eagle," "Future Innovation," the "Secret Revolutionary Committee," "Reality," "Warriors of Islam," "Red Pirates," and the "Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization," which has the apparent goal of creating a Macedonian state out of Macedonian-populated areas of Bulgaria and the Yugoslav republic of Macedonia. The "16 September Commando" in Hungary illustrates the ethnic dimension of terrorism. Claiming a membership of several hundred, the group has promised to murder Slovak law-enforcement officials involved in a so-called anti-Hungarian pogrom in Bratislava in 1992 stemming from a soccer match. Overall, these and other appearing, disappearing and changing terrorist groups in Eastern Europe seem likely to threaten stability in the region. This post-Cold War development has implications for foreign nations and forces providing peacemaking, peacekeeping and security-assistance support to East European states, since these groups have the clear potential for generating terrorist actions locally and abroad.

Arms trafficking serious problem in former USSR

Widespread arms trafficking in the former Soviet Union continues to fuel ethnic, national and criminal violence throughout the region. The theft and illicit sale of arms has sparked periodic countermeasures since the problems became acute in the late 1980s. Over the 1990-1991 period, for example, some 440,000 weapons were handed over to the then-Soviet Army by guard units and training facilities, with some 73,000 confiscated by the Army in centers of ethno-national conflict. What seemed remarkable two years ago, however, with the hemorrhage of weapons and explosives from Soviet units, depots and manufacturing facilities, is a commonplace problem now. Ministry of Internal Affairs figures indicate that some 2.5 million hunting weapons, mostly shotguns, are legally registered in Russia itself, but Russian estimates in the summer of 1992 put the total number of uncontrolled arms throughout the former Soviet Union at some 30 million weapons, many of them military automatic weapons. Heavier weapons, including armored vehicles and artillery, are available as well, especially in conflict areas beyond Russia. There are well-developed smuggling routes across the former Soviet Union (and Eastern Europe), and substantial weapons caches are discovered almost daily in some areas. Groznyy, the capital of the secessionist Chechen Republic on the north slope of the Caucasus in Russia, is a major step on the arms-trafficking route through the southern republics. Arms continue to flow into some Central Asian republics from Afghanistan, despite the presence of Russian border guards along the volatile Afghan-Tajikistan frontier. From May to mid-December 1992, Russian border guards detained more than 600 illegal crossers and seized 500 weapons. The uncontrolled arms trafficking promises to shape the security environment in the region for years to come. The ready availability of weapons has enabled extremist groups, whether motivated by ethnic, national,

religious or criminal agendas, to pursue their goals by armed conflict, terrorism and violence.

Broadcast describes elite Guatemalan counterinsurgency unit

The Spanish-language television network Univision recently carried an extensive report, the first ever permitted, on the Guatemalan Army's rigorous counterinsurgency training at the Kaibil training center. The report depicts in graphic detail the demanding training methods said to be used for los Kaibiles," who were described as "the most feared soldiers in Guatemala, with a high degree of combat morale and a questionable humanrights record." The school's own program of instruction refers to the Kaibiles as "killing machines." Unlike other Guatemalan Army units, the Kaibiles are tasked exclusively with engaging the communist guerrillas of the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Union, the URNG. Much of the training is familiar to special-operations forces around the world: obstacle and infiltration courses, training in camouflage, sharpshooting, ambushes, explosives and booby traps. The fatigue uniforms are patterned after those of the U.S. Army, and much U.S. equipment was evident in the report. Training is non-stop, and according to the report, the students are not given a training schedule, so that "each minute is a surprise." In garrison, the trainees are shown being fed in a mess hall, and they must complete a meal in less than three minutes. In the jungle, they are given no food or water and must forage to survive. Motivation also appears to be a major ingredient in the program. One sign read: "If I advance, follow me; if I stop, grab me; if I retreat, kill me." Each barracks is named for a Kaibil who was killed in combat. The school also instills a sense of comradeship. Each student is paired with a buddy, called a guas, which in the Mayan language means "inseparable comrade." According to the report, 95 soldiers are trained in each eight-week iteration. While the training proves too demanding for some, it was not indicated what percentage drops out. The most common injuries were said to be broken bones and dehydration. After a month and a half of training, the students are sent out in six-man combat patrols for real-world training against the URNG. The last man in the patrol walks backward and erases footprints. No details were given on actual combat encounters.

Soviet SOF restructured, resubordinated

Despite turmoil and force drawdowns in the former USSR, its special-operations forces have far from disappeared. Since the demise of the Soviet Union, the subordination and structure of military and security service (spetsnaz) units has continued to evolve in the former USSR republics. The Chief Intelligence Directorate of the Soviet General Staff, the GRU, for example, stood at the pinnacle of Soviet military intelligence. It had direct control of centrally subordinated spetsnaz units and oversight of those spetsnaz forces assigned to operational commands. With the dissolution of the USSR at the start of 1992, the GRU became for a time the principal intelligence body of the Main Command of the Commonwealth of Independent States Armed Forces. Following the April 1992 creation of a Russian Ministry of Defense, however, the GRU became Russia's military-intelligence arm. While most GRU spetsnaz units likely fell to Russian control, at least some elements--in Ukraine, for example--opted to swear allegiance elsewhere. As of

mid-1992, GRU special-operations groups reportedly remained trained to operate in 3-7 man groups for intelligence-gathering and directaction missions in enemy rear areas. They likely are assigned missions in interethnic conflict areas, as well. Their prominent role in the new Russian mobile force components now being planned (comprising largely airborne, naval infantry, air assault and transport aviation) seems assured. At least some of the spetsnaz units formerly assigned to the KGB are now to be subordinated to a new "T" Directorate of the Russian Ministry of Security, responsible for counterterrorism and said to have both field and analytical components. The foreign arm of Russian intelligence now is designated the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service. Formed from the KGB's First Chief Directorate, it may also retain those former KGB special-operations units oriented against foreign targets. Internal troop spetsnaz units fell under the control of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, the MVD, in 1992. They continue to be deployed from trouble spot to trouble spot and are among the most experienced and effective of all Russian forces in dealing with interethnic conflict. Activated in 1978, these forces have grown substantially and are currently organized in brigade, battalion and company increments. Paralleling these forces, but oriented more to dealing with violent criminal acts, are Russian Militia Detachments of Special Designation, or OMON, that have been retained under the Russian MVD. As of late summer 1992, there were 5,500 OMON personnel organized into 20 detachments around Russia. These units, intended principally to deal with violent criminal activities and local "terrorist" incidents, also are deployed to conflicts beyond their immediate operating areas.

Russians seek system to combat foreign SOF

Combating enemy sabotage and diversionary units, both in the rear of deployed operational formations and in strategic rear areas as well--was a continuing concern of Soviet military planners. As a consequence, rear-area forces and employment concepts were well-developed even at tactical levels. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991, however, military and internal-security forces designated to perform these tasks were initially fragmented and disorganized, and eventually allocated among the newly independent states and restructured. The requirement for dealing with enemy SOF, nevertheless, was identified as a most important mission for Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States. Just months after the USSR's dissolution, a 1992 article in the premier Russian military journal *Military Thought* reviewed the growing importance and effectiveness of special warfare as demonstrated in the Gulf War and elsewhere. The authors judged that it was necessary to create a "unified system for combating special operations forces" throughout the depth of the country, to include "specially formed (assigned) personnel and equipment distributed by zones of responsibility and by presumed areas of combat against special operations forces." The missions and actions of such a system were set out, to include the requirement for interaction among military forces, border troops and internal troops, National Guard units, and civil defense and territorial units. However, given the continuing disarray in Russian military and security forces, highly permeable borders and the presence of interethnic hotspots inside Russia and around its periphery, creating such a system remains a distant goal.

Salvadoran police force part of 1992 peace accords

The creation of a new police force in El Salvador, completely civilian in its membership and command, was one of the fundamental components of the Jan. 16, 1992, peace agreement between the Government of El Salvador, or GOES, and the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front. In March 1992, in response to this provision of the accords, the GOES abolished the National Guard and the Treasury Police Security Corps, which were among the most active counterinsurgency forces during the 12-year war. In their place, authorities created the Brigada Especial de Seguridad Militar (Special Brigade for Military Security—BESM). Directly subordinate to the Minister of Defense, the unit is composed of four battalions and includes a 456-man military-police battalion organized and structured after the U.S. Army MP doctrinal concepts model. The brigade's mission statement, unit TO&E, and training calendar were developed in 1992 with the assistance of a U.S. military adviser. Essential training to prepare the unit for its deployment included: provost-marshal operations, criminal-investigations procedures, physical security, crime prevention, deserter apprehension, prevention of drug and alcohol abuse, leadership, small-arms skills, and counterterrorism training. The MP battalion will deploy for military-security duties sometime in 1993. The other three battalions (475 men each) guard the borders with Guatemala and Honduras. They are charged with guaranteeing national sovereignty, suppressing smuggling of drugs and other contraband, and supporting other governmental agencies in the frontier regions.

Ukraine sets up Golden Eagle units

In a number of former Soviet republics, internal-security forces are required to deal with problems having both law-enforcement and military dimensions. Responding to rising levels of criminal and random violence and other acts of "terrorism," as well as a perceived need to maintain rapid-response units capable of dealing with natural disasters, epidemics and other emergencies, Ukraine has set up specialized paramilitary security forces throughout the state. These forces—called Berkut (Golden Eagle) detachments to symbolize their asserted mobility, combat readiness and resolve—began forming in January 1992 under the Ministry of Internal Affairs. They are based on previously existing Militia Detachments of Special Designation, which in the late Soviet period dealt with particularly violent acts of terrorism and challenges to Soviet authority. Planned Golden Eagle strength was to total nearly 3,000 personnel organized into a regiment in the Ukrainian capital of Kiev, with battalions or companies located in other cities. Berkut detachments are equipped and trained in ways analogous to the counterterrorist or special-weapons-and-tactics squads of large Western cities; they possess armored personnel carriers and are comparable to the Austrian "Cobra" counterterrorist force.

Multiservice unit primary Colombian hostage-rescue force

The Fuerzas Especiales Anti-terroristas Urbanas (Urban Counterterrorist Special Forces, or AFEAU) is Colombia's primary national-level hostage-rescue force. A multiservice force, it has elements from the Army, Air Force, Marines and the Colombian National Police. Created in 1985 after existing military and security forces were unable to respond

to the M-19 guerrilla attack on the Palace of Justice in Bogota, it has been deployed against terrorists, insurgents and drug traffickers. Each service element provides a 15-man force (two officers and 13 enlisted personnel), all volunteers and all possessing basic and specialized military skills. It is commanded by an Army major and has a headquarters section which includes an executive officer, first sergeant and radio-telephone operator, bringing its total strength to 64 personnel. The AFEAU is under the direct control of the Comandante de las Fuerzas Armadas (Commander of the Armed Forces), and is located at the Escuela de Caballeria (Cavalry School). AFEAU equipment includes scoped 7.62mm Remington sniper rifles, Israeli Galil 7.62mm rifles, 5.56mm AR15s, 5.56mm M16A-2s, 9mm MP-5 machine guns, 9mm Beretta pistols, Browning 9mm pistols, Remington 12-gauge shotguns, night-vision devices, M-79 40mm grenade launchers, 7.62mm M-60 machine guns, internal secure voice communication equipment, and numerous types of rappelling equipment. Training is conducted north of Bogota at Facatativa, and includes close-quarters combat; bus, train and airplane hostage-rescue operations; sniper training; explosive training; small- and long-arms marksmanship; airmobile/air-assault operations, and self-defense techniques. In February 1990 the AFEAU deployed to Cartagena during the first anti-drug summit, attended by President Bush. It secured and controlled the Cartagena airport, established sniper positions at the "Case de Huespedes" (guest house) where the Colombian, Peruvian, Bolivian and U.S. presidents met, established control of the roadway from the airport to the Cartagena Convention Center, and raided presumed narco-guerrilla houses and farms. It should be noted that the AFEAU was the unit that captured the notorious drug trafficker Carlos Lehder Rivas in February 1987.

New Colombian special police units to combat kidnapping and extortion

After 937 kidnappings by the summer of 1991 in Santa Fe de Bogota, Colombian President Gaviria's government announced the creation of a new hostage-rescue force, the *Unidad Antisecuestro y Extorcion* (UNASE), or Anti-Extortion and Kidnaping Unit, for exclusive use in Colombia's capital city. According to the Aug. 30, 1991, issue of the Bogota newspaper *El Espectador*, UNASE is composed of 35 personnel: a colonel-commander, four other officers, 15 NCOs and 15 special agents, all volunteers. The unit is said to be capable of responding to any type of hostage-rescue situation in urban or rural environments. Training for the unit was conducted by members of the Police Center for Special Operations; eight members of the group also received specialized hostage-rescue training in Madrid from the Spanish Civil Guard. UNASE has the latest weapons and equipment in the Colombian police-force inventory, including 9mm Beretta pistols; AR-15, G3 and Galil rifles; voice-secure communications equipment; various types of transport vehicles; and special equipment like fast-rope for rappelling. Following an Aug. 29, 1991, capabilities demonstration in which the unit staged a hostage-rescue operation, General Fabio Campo Silva, commander of the Metropolitan Police, announced the creation of two similar units in the northern Colombian cities of Bucaramanga and Barranquilla. On Oct. 7, 1991, in its first real mission, UNASE rescued a Colombian businessman taken hostage by a local gang, killing two of the hostage-takers.

Mexican 'Force F' handles antiterror, bomb-disposal missions

In June 1983, then-chief of Mexico's Capital Police, Col. Ramon Mota Sanchez, proposed the creation of a special police unit to combat organized crime and criminal violence. Once established, however, the unit evolved into an organization charged with high-risk missions requiring the special training, equipment and skills associated with urban counter guerrilla actions and antiterrorism. The unit, designated "Force F," is known more familiarly as the "Zorros." Commanded by a colonel directly subordinate to the Secretary General for Protection and Highway Administration of the Federal District, it is based north of Mexico City, close to the Secretary's headquarters. The force's approximately 350 men are armed with weapons including M-16A1s, CAR-15s, 12 gauge shotguns, 30-06 rifles, HK-33 machine guns, 9mm MP-5 machine guns, 9mm pistols, hand grenades and tear-gas guns. Zorros wear military battle dress, body armor and military load-bearing equipment, all in black. Helicopters and special vehicles provide transport. Personnel-selection criteria focus on physical condition, weapons-handling capabilities and the capacity to learn basic and specialized skills. The unit's internal structure is along military lines; it is organized into urban-commando squads, antiterrorist squads, emergency-ordnance-disposal squads and snipers. Usually they carry out 5-6 actions a day, including those dealing with deactivating explosives, rescuing hostages, capturing terrorists and violent criminals, and raiding houses and buildings. They are said to operate with a degree of autonomy and authority not possessed by other security elements. A few specific Force F actions have come to light: In 1986, for example, during the World Soccer Championship in Mexico, the Zorros were in charge of supervising and protecting all sport installations, press centers, hotels, embassies and the Mexico City Airport. They also helped dismantle a bomb placed close to the U.S. embassy in April 1986. In July 1988, they rescued 20 hostages being held in a commercial enterprise, and the officer in charge, Armando Duarte Badillo, was promoted to commander of the group within months for "heroic" actions. (He was killed in December 1988 during an assault on the Tepic jail.) In September 1988, the Zorros were involved in a controversial action: They assaulted their own judicial building and freed two fellow Zorros being held legally on charges of aggression and bribery. While the assault was publicly condemned, no further judicial action is known to have been taken. Since then, however, the unit has received less publicity. Force F most recently surfaced in the press in late March 1992, when it deactivated a bomb in Mexico City.

Failed Soviet coup highlights KGB spetsnaz roles

Voluminous reporting in the wake of the August 1991 coup debacle in the former USSR has revealed information about two KGB special-operations units and their roles in behalf of the "coup plotters." According to senior Russian Republic spokesmen and a number of KGB special-operations personnel interviewed, KGB spetsnaz forces were assigned to storm the Russian Parliament building early on Aug. 21 and seize key leadership personnel, including Boris Yeltsin. Units assigned this mission included the *Al'fa* (Alpha) counterterrorist group subordinate to the KGB's Seventh Main Directorate (Surveillance), and commanded by Hero of the Soviet Union, General Major Viktor Karpukhin. The other heretofore unknown group was under the KGB's First Chief Directorate (Foreign Operations) and intended principally for operations abroad. It was commanded by an officer identified only as Col. Boris B. According to a combination of sources, Alpha has

been involved in many counterterrorist and internal-security missions since its formation in 1974 and was heavily active in special-operations tasks in Afghanistan. Among its more recent missions was the seizing of a multi-story criminal detention facility held by armed prisoners who had taken hostages. The FCD group was formed in August 1981 with external reconnaissance, sabotage, training and security missions, and it seems to have been particularly active in internal-security actions. Commanders of both units said they could have accomplished their mission, but only at the cost of many defenders' lives. The assault was to have been commanded by Karpukhin, who controlled not only KGB assault groups, but elements of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) Dzerzhinsky Motorized Rifle Division, the "Moscow Special Army Task Force," and elements from an MVD Militia Detachment of Special Designation (OMON) that in combination totaled some 15,000 personnel. The OMON and other MVD elements were to clear a path through the crowd around the building with gas and water, with the assault groups following by ground and helicopter. Events surrounding the decision not to execute this plan have several variations. Clearly the decision was made by KGB special-operations participants on the scene, and some Alpha subgroup commanders and personnel refused to take part in the action. Karpukhin's role is less clear, but he evidently supported the idea of preventing unnecessary slaughter. He was later relieved from command, and the Alpha and FCD groups resubordinated directly to Soviet President Gorbachev, and secondarily to Russian President Yeltsin. The ultimate status and disposition of these units is uncertain.

Commander profiles Polish counterterrorist unit

A December 1990 interview with the commander of the Polish Capital Police Command Counterterrorist Division highlighted that unit's missions and training. According to the commander, the unit is charged with countering both criminal and political violence. The unit has been involved in protecting Polish and visiting foreign leaders; countering hijackings and hostage situations; and giving unspecified kinds of assistance in natural disasters. Unit training includes parachute, alpine, diving and skiing programs; as well as armed and unarmed combat, including sniper skills. Some members of the unit are said to be military reservists assigned to the 6th Assault Landing Brigade, an elite Polish airborne/air-assault unit.

Recent Soviet commentary favorable to U.S. Army special-operations forces

For three decades, spokesmen for the now-former Soviet Union reserved some of their harshest condemnations of Western military establishments for U.S. Army special-operations forces. Recently, however, some Soviet commentary on U.S. SOF has been clearly complimentary. One author expressed admiration for the "professional efficiency" of U.S. SOF in *Just Cause*, and suggested that the Soviets might "borrow" from the U.S. experience of fielding and employing a spectrum of light and special-operations forces—but for use in internal-security and stability actions. In discussing Soviet military *spetsnaz* training and activities in late 1990, the article said that *spetsnaz* groups studied the U.S. effort to rescue American hostages in Tehran, concluding: "the operation of the U.S. reconnaissance service ... was prepared for in a quite well-thought-out and thorough

manner - it was broken off purely because of events." The author said that Soviet *spetsnaz* treat U.S. SOF with neither arrogance nor uncritical approval, noting, "Professionals respect professionals." These assessments, stripped of ideological condemnations that characterized much of earlier reporting, highlight an intention to assess, and possibly draw on, U.S. special-operations experience as members of the commonwealth restructure their own military and security forces.

New aspects of illegal arms trafficking in former USSR

The acquisition of illegal arms by "terrorist" groups within the former USSR has become a major problem for military and security forces charged with controlling interethnic and national conflicts and responding to violence of all types. For several years, weapons have been stolen from military and security-force warehouses, illegally purchased from soldiers and police, and seized by nationalist or criminal groups in armed attacks on isolated garrisons. As a result, thousands of assault rifles and machine guns, as well as mortars, grenade launchers and other weapons, have found their way into illegal groups of various types. In March 1991, a military spokesman from the Soviet Main Missile and Artillery Directorate pointed to an alarming new development--the production of assault rifles and pistols in clandestine shops. According to the Soviet officer, recovered weapons produced in these shops are of high quality and clearly turned out by skilled specialists. Some models even included inscribed serial numbers, underscoring the increasingly organized nature of weapons production.

'Special designation units' used in Central Asian counterdrug operations

With a drug-cultivation problem in the Central Asian republics of the former Soviet Union that evokes comparisons with Colombia, 1991 reports indicate that Ministry of Internal Affairs Militia Detachments of Special Designation, or OMON, are being employed in drug-eradication efforts. OMON units gained notoriety for their repressive and lethal activities in the Baltic republics and are based in many other republic areas. Created to deal with terrorist incidents, serious criminal activities and the maintenance of public order," they are organized like SWAT teams or light infantry, depending on their roles. With rapidly increasing poppy and marijuana cultivation, the continuing problem of wild and cultivated hemp, and the growing phenomenon of armed traffickers, at least some Central Asian republics are now using OMON forces. In Tajikistan, for example, OMON elements are delivered by helicopter to "plantations." OMON forces destroy the crops manually, break down fences around the plots and destroy homemade watering systems. The loosening control of central authorities, the desperate need for hard currency and the move to a market economy are expected to result in an explosion of narcotics problems. As a consequence, "Soviet" or republic counternarcotics efforts may acquire an increasingly militarized character.

Polish military journal raises possibility of partisan warfare

Military establishments of former Warsaw Pact member-states have begun to examine war-fighting approaches that depart from the Soviet-Warsaw Pact coalition model. A

1990 article in a Polish military journal noted that future battlefields would see units operating in isolation, and it discussed the prospect that such units could become encircled. Under those circumstances, the author noted, if "there is no communication from the superior, the subunit has not received another mission, and there is not a chance of breaking through to its own troops, then the subunit should transition to battle in the form of partisan or special actions." This statement suggests that at least some Polish military theorists may be considering unconventional war-fighting approaches under some circumstances. Polish armed forces are being reduced sharply in size, with some units redeployed eastward. The emergence of some kind of "people's war" concept to deter a larger and more powerful neighbor would be an intriguing dimension to evolving military posture.

Panamanian security force to increase weapons and personnel

The Public Security and National Defense Council, or CONASEPUDEN, headed by former Noriega minister Menalco Solis, plans to train and add 300 new members to the 600-man Presidential Protection Services. The new personnel will be equipped from an arms inventory that includes RPG-18 and Light Anti-Tank Weapon rocket launchers, Galil and M-16 rifles, Uzi and Ingram submachine guns, M-60 machine guns, many crates of fragmentation grenades and other small arms. CONASEPUDEN is a relatively new organization which was created and organized in response to Cabinet decrees issued in 1990 and 1991. According to Panamanian reporting, many community members are apprehensive about CONASEPUDEN and its militarized and investigative components, fearing that they could become partisan paramilitary groups such as those that existed in the past.

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