Terrorism, Risk and the Global City

Towards Urban Resilience

Jon Coaffee

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Preface

The book on which this volume is based, *Terrorism, Risk and the City*, was published in 2003 at a time when London, along with many other global cities, was coming to terms with the expanded threat of international terrorism and were reappraising their counter-terrorism measures accordingly. The original book offered both a historical and a contemporary account of the physical, financial and managerial measures utilised in the financial cores of London, ranging between the years 1992-2002, to reduce the risk of terrorist attack. In addition *Terrorism, Risk and the City* incorporated the initial changes in urban securitisation stimulated by the events on September 11 2001 (henceforth 9/11). The reaction to *Terrorism, Risk and the City* exceeded expectations, receiving positive reviews from both the academic and professional security press. This was partly a function of timing as well as being a relatively uncontested field of inquiry. Since 9/11 this area of research has expanded significantly with many accounts being written regarding the impact, urban or otherwise, of the so-called 'War on Terror' on the functioning of cities, societies and states. Many of these accounts draw upon material from *Terrorism, Risk and the City* in their own analysis. Many commentators have also contacted me requesting an updated version of this book. As with all rapidly moving fields of policy inquiry, research material dates rapidly as new data comes to light, as political priorities change and as academic critique in the field develops.

In time, and subsequent to the publication of *Terrorism, Risk and the City*, systems of counter-terrorist security and management in London, as elsewhere, have developed significantly and broadened in scope, both in terms of the methods of attack to be deterred as well as the range of geographical targets to be defended: in short many sites in London, not just the financial zones, are now perceived be under threat of attack and hence require strategies of security and defence. Likewise, the vocabulary used by policy makers to articulate such changes has also altered. Post-9/11, metaphors of resilience have commonly been used to describe how cities and nations attempt to 'bounce-back' from disaster, and to describe the embedding of security and contingency features into planning and management systems. Traditionally, most emergency policy centred upon reacting to a disaster once occurred and in developing appropriate plans to create 'a business as usual' situation as soon as possible. However, more contemporary approaches view resilience as *both* reactive and proactive which brings together aspects of preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery. Such new logics of anticipatory policy have been implemented in large part to deal with the changing nature of the terrorist threat facing London at a city-wide scale. This has occurred

most noticeable through managerial measures and strategies developed through London resilience partnerships to deal with a variety of counter-terrorism and other 'emergency' scenarios.

Since the publication of *Terrorism, Risk and the City*, London has also suffered its own incidents of internationally inspired terrorism – most notably on 7 July 2005 (henceforth 7/7) and a series of other unsuccessful or thwarted attacks. 7/7 occurred the day after London was awarded the 2012 Olympic Games – a mega-event which is now facing enormous security planning. Moreover, many of the security strategies that have been enacted in London are related to the UK's counter-terrorist strategy (known as CONTEST) which developed post-9/11, and the first National Security Strategy and National Risk Register both published in 2008. Equally, the lessons learnt from the experiences of counter-terrorism in London have been increasingly transferred to other countries. This has occurred most notably in New York, but also global cities such as Sydney and Mumbai.

This revised and updated version of *Terrorism, Risk and the City* – now entitled *Terrorism, Risk and the Global City: Towards Urban Resilience* – will hopefully make a valuable contribution to the current debate regarding the impact of new security challenges presently facing western nations and their cities. Although some of the original text remains relatively unaltered, the latter sections of the new volume have been significantly changed and updated, and new chapters have been added. The research material collected for these additions has been facilitated through funding from grants obtained from the UK Research Councils between 2005-2009 (Grant Numbers: RES-228-25-0034 and EP/F008635/1) through which issues of counter-terrorist resilience have been explored.

This book contributes to emerging discussion regarding the impact of terrorism on major cities in perhaps four important ways: *first*, through an attempt to connect to the wealth of academic and policy literature that emerged in the post-9/11 era relating to how terrorism is reshaping the contemporary city and its institutions; *second*, by exploring the changing nature of the terrorist threat against global cities in terms of terrorist tactics and targeting strategies; *third* by highlighting how London is leading the way in developing best practice in counter-terrorist design and management, and how such practice is being 'mainstreamed' on an international stage; and *fourth* by illustrating how enhanced security and improved resilience to terrorism can be utilised in city marketing to enhance, or maintain, a reputation of an urban area.

Jon Coaffee
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PART I
TRANSFORMING CITIES IN THE AGE OF TERRORISM

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Chapter 1

Introduction: Terrorism, Risk and
the Global City

After the 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington the fortification and militarisation of globally significant cities has proceeded at an unparalleled pace, particularly given the perceived threat of further terrorist attack (Davis 2001; Light 2002; Swanstrom 2002; Graham 2004; Sternburg and Lee 2006). It was also hypothesised that this would continue with, 'military doctrine and strategy [becoming] more and more closely geared to the tactical and strategic protection of the political and economic key sites, zones and spaces of the global capitalist systems' (Graham 2001, 415).

It is however important to be careful when ascribing the events of September 11 2001 as the *start* of a new and dramatic militarised urban counter-terror response (Coaffee et al. 2008a). Rather we can perhaps see the events of 9/11 as *accentuating* trends in security which in many cases have a long historical trajectory and that were already taking place. In this sense, it is important to note that military technology and strategy has always played a key role in the urbanisation process. Since the beginning of urban civilisation, defence against people or the natural elements – what today we might term resilience – has always been a factor influencing the landscape of cities, becoming an ever-present preoccupation as the ruling powers sought to defend and secure their interests through creating increased feelings of safety (Forbes 1965; Postgate 1992). As early urbanisation proceeded, so the defensive systems deployed by city authorities became increasingly sophisticated to repel the improving strategies of intruders (Morris 1994), in particular, through the construction of physical barriers such as gates, walls and ditches – the most common features of urban defence (Mumford 1961; Jordan et al. 1997). Such defensive structures, especially the city wall, also became associated with class distinction and the dual processes of inclusion and exclusion as the social élite lived within the defended citadel whilst the poor often lived in relative danger outside the city wall (Sjoberg 1960; Pile et al. 1999).

But with time even the city wall became less important as a symbol of wealth, privilege and safety, as technological advances – most notably the invention of gunpowder – made such defences less effective (Keegan 1993). Cities, however, continued to be characterised by defensive features as new walled and gated spaces developed, this time within the city boundaries, as danger was increasingly seen to originate from within, rather than outside, the urban area (Luymes 1997; Atkins et al. 1998). By the mid-nineteenth century many Western cities were characterised

by secure residential estates amidst vast tracts of working class housing, which were seen as *terra incognita* (Newman 1980; Jackson 1992).

The Contemporary Fortress City

Contemporary Western cities are no different from their predecessors. They too attempt to use defence and try to embed resilience into the urban landscape. This situation has perhaps been most pronounced in the United States where, since the 1960s, the relationship between defensive architecture and urban design has received widespread attention given rising crime rates and the declining condition of high-rise residential dwellings (Jacobs 1961; Boal 1975; Gold 1982; Newman 1995; Gold 2007). In particular, in the early 1970s the ideas of Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) (Jeffery 1971) and, more notably, Defensible Space (Newman 1972) became popular. Such approaches advocated 'designing out crime' through the addition or removal of physical features which could control access, increase surveillance capabilities, and hence limit the opportunities for crime to occur in certain areas (Flaschsbart 1969). Although this work was situated in an American context, during the 1970s and 1980s such territorial approaches were extensively used by local authorities in the UK, and elsewhere, in existing housing schemes and in the design of new residential areas (Coleman 1984, 1985; Dawson 1984; Goodey and Gold 1987), and adapted to defend particular sites from terrorist attack, particularly in Northern Ireland during the 1970s and 1980s (Brown 1985a; Coaffee 2003) and Israel (Soffer and Minghi 1986).

In the 1990s further increases in violent crime, racial and cultural conflict, and material inequality within Western cities served further to fragment the urban landscape creating 'radically new and complex logics of segregation and displacement' (McLaughlin and Muncie 1999, 117). This scenario was aided by the adoption of an array of fortification and surveillance devices in the cityscape. Residential areas, commercial centres, retail spaces, entertainment districts, and public facilities were defended as the result of the actions of urban authorities, private businesses and wealthier citizens (Christopherson 1994; Dillon 1994; Flusty 1994; Fyfe 1997; Oc and Tiesdell 1997). As Mike Davis (1995, 356) argued from an American perspective, 'we do indeed live in "fortress cities" brutally divided into "fortified cells" of affluence and "places of terror"'. The work of Davis on what he termed 'Fortress LA' (Davis 1990; 1992; 1995; 1998) depicted a city in which the 'defence of luxury has given birth to an arsenal of security systems and an obsession with the policing of social boundaries through architecture. This militarisation of city life was increasingly visible everywhere in the built environment of the 1990s' (Davis 1995, 355).

Davis' work also showed how both occupiers and property developers are now assessing building security at the design phase with the militarisation of commercial buildings and their borders becoming 'strongpoints of sale' (Flusty

1994; Dear and Flusty 1999). Other work in this field has also been important in highlighting insurance reductions that might be obtained for embedding security features into buildings (for example Graham 1995), the increasing influence of the police within the planning and building design process (Herbert 1998), the increasing role played by the private security industry (Jones and Newburn 1998), and the juxtaposition within urban landscapes of controlled and regulated spaces with areas of disadvantage and poverty (Zukin 1992).

The contemporary trend towards increased urban fortification *per se* was strongly related to enhanced perceptions of fear amongst urban dwellers (Glassner 2000; Furedi 2002). Ellin (1997) for example, argued that 'form follows fear' in the contemporary city, with people in areas perceived to be at risk increasingly constructing defensive enclaves to protect themselves – to 'pad the bunker', to use Davis' (1990) term. The ability to pay for such fortifications is crucial. As Christopherson (1994, 420) asserted, 'there is no doubt that the new fortress-like environments respond to some version of consumer preferences'. As a result, many have argued that contemporary city life has been fundamentally reorganised as certain sections of society seal themselves away from the rest of the city, creating new types of 'privatised' public space which do not provide the same degree of access to all members of society (Sorkin 1995; Lees 1998; Gottdiener 2000; Atkinson and Helms 2007).

Within the Western city the desire for secure urban environments is now seen in many quarters as one of the defining characteristics of so-called postmodern urbanism (Ellin 1997; Dear 1999) or at least an element of the design-led approach of new urbanism (Harvey 1997; Fainstein 2000). Oscar Newman who suggested the concept of 'defensible space' in the 1970s as a solution to urban crime was, in the 1990s, seen as one of the most influential thinkers on urban design issues in the United States (Harvey 1996). Indeed, Newman himself (writing in 1995) reflected that defensible space ideas could be rejuvenated and used as a new physical planning tool for urban revitalisation. In the UK there is also clear evidence that 'Newman-esque' ideas continue to influence urban policy, promoting neighbourhood renewal, social inclusion and a design-led urban renaissance. For example in recent years local governments have been increasingly encouraged to form strategic partnerships with the police and local residents to reduce crime in their area with importance being placed on 'policies and guidance for designing out crime' (Urban Task Force 1999, 127).

More recently, community safety, admittedly a broad issue, has become central to recent government attempts to create sustainable communities and secure public places, and to merge criminal justice with social policy often through a neo-liberal lens (Gilling 2001, 381). In the UK, for example, the publication of *Safer Places: The Planning System and Crime Prevention* (ODPM/Home Office 2004) argued that safety and security are essential to successful, sustainable communities (Raco 2007; Coaffee and O'Hare 2008). Not only should such sustainable communities be well-designed, attractive environments to live and work in, but they should also be places where freedom from crime, and from the fear of crime, improves the quality of life. The ideas contained in this policy document draw significantly

on ideas of CPTED and defensible space, which have been utilised by built environment professionals and law enforcement agencies since the 1970s.

Such an emphasis on countering crime through changes in urban design and management have for many years, in certain cities, also been linked to reducing vulnerability from terrorist attack. This concern has become ever more pertinent since 9/11 with many commentators drawing attention to the potential impact of 'new' and evolving terrorist threats in relation to the design, functioning and marketing of cities (Marcuse 2002a; Marcuse and van Kempton 2002; Mills 2002; Warren 2002; Light 2002; Coaffee 2005). Indeed, the *Safer Places* document mentioned above has also proved influential in assisting those charged with countering the threat of terrorism in UK urban areas. In 2009 it will be appended with a counter-terrorism supplement which highlights possible design solutions for mitigating the impact of terrorist attack (Coaffee and O'Hare 2008).

The Evolving Terrorist Threat

As noted above, in recent years it has not just been the perceived risks of crime and intrusion that have led urban authorities, in collaboration with the police and the private security industry, to construct defensive urban landscapes. Increasingly, the potential threat of urban terrorism in certain cities has necessitated attempts to 'design out terrorism' (or perhaps more correctly to 'design-in' counter-terrorism) through the addition of advanced security design features. These are constantly updated to keep pace with the ever-changing terrorist threat (Haynes 1995; Hyett 1996; Hoffman 1998; Coaffee 2008). Previous studies have highlighted that if an urban area is vulnerable, or perceived by the community to be at risk from terrorist attack, then a reduction occurs in business confidence and public unease ensues (Compton et al. 1980; Brown 1985b; Jarman 1993). This, in the worst-case scenario, leads to business relocation from the threatened area or, the reluctance of the public to visit certain parts of the city. For example Brown (1984) showed how Belfast city centre was adversely affected by the Provisional Irish Republican Army's (Provisional IRA's) bombing campaign of the 1970s and the early 1980s, and, how business establishments were in favour of high levels of security to ease public concerns over their safety. This study starkly illustrated, that in certain contexts, terrorism could serve to exacerbate fears for safety, which is already a key concern for users of the city, and may well lead to increased fortification of the urban landscape (Rycus 1991).

Since the 1960s, fuelled by the growth of the mass media, terrorism has been sporadic but widespread. It has been varied also, with attacks against military establishments, government buildings, VIPs, or concentrations of particular racial or cultural groups (Picard 1994; Wilkinson 1997; Sageman 2004; Rees 2006). In the early 1990s the global tendency of such targeting shifted noticeably towards economic targets, with the principal aim of causing economic disruption, social unease and inflicting direct or indirect political pressure on the ruling powers

(Hillier 1994; Rogers 1996; Coaffee 2000a). Such targeting commonly began to be concentrated against business districts or critical national infrastructure such as gas and electricity plants, telecommunication infrastructure, and transport networks.

Moreover, in the early 1990s important financial centres became prime targets of attack because of their vast array of new 'designer' office buildings, their increasingly cosmopolitan communities, the potentially devastation effects of bombing on commercial activities, and the significant media attention and publicity that could be obtained by the terrorists. Examples of commercial targeting at this time included the bombing of the financial districts of New York and Bombay in 1993, and Tokyo, Madrid, Paris, Riyadh and Colombo in 1995. In a UK context, the main terrorist threat during the early to mid-1990s came from the Provisional IRA, with their prime target being the City of London (also known as the 'Square Mile' or 'the City') due to its symbolic value as the traditional heart of British imperialism (and State power) and its economic importance at the centre of the British and global financial system. This book in large part, is concerned with the impact and reaction to two vehicle-bomb attacks the Provisional IRA carried out in the City in April 1992 and April 1993, the indirect effect on the City of two bombings in 1996 in the London Docklands and central Manchester, and the more recent worldwide attacks on or after, 9/11, most notably in London in July 2005.

During the late 1990s the threat of such economic terrorism received a great deal of attention from international leaders. For example, in June 1996 the then US President Bill Clinton called on world leaders to work together to combat international terrorism. Similarly, the British Prime Minister of the time, John Major, cited the Provisional IRA bombings in London and Manchester in 1996 and the Tokyo subway poison gas attack in 1995 as examples of how terrorism affects security and freedom and stated that 'it is a problem from which no one can hide and on which we must all co-operate. This is the security challenge of the 21st century.'[1]

In short, the threat of terrorist attack over the last fifteen years has had huge material and symbolic effects upon the contemporary urban landscape in areas perceived to be at risk. Urban terrorism has created security threats to which municipal and national governments have been forced to respond in order to alleviate the fears of their citizens and business community. As a result security measures similar to those used to 'design out crime' have been increasingly introduced, including physical barriers to restrict access, advanced surveillance techniques in the form of security cameras, insurance regulations and blast protection, as well as innumerable indirect measures that operate through activating individual and community responses.

However, as will be highlighted in the latter sections of this book, after 9/11 both the perception of what constituted terrorism and the subsequent counter-responses changed dramatically, as a result these acts of mega-terrorism in New

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1　Cited in Jones (1996).

York and Washington, and future fears about so-called 'postmodern terrorism' using weapons of mass destruction (WMD). As Saifer (2001, 42-3) noted in the wake of 9/11:

> The attack on New York has been by far the most hideous and devastating of that class of terrorist outrages which have which have been conceived and implemented by dedicated terrorist groups and networks on a 'demonstration' basis, in circumstances where otherwise vigilant security systems have foiled many other attempts. Death and destruction have been visited on cities and their citizens in the same way, by terrorist attacks on individual buildings and urban spaces, in such places as … the central area of Manchester and the financial district of the City of London. The attack on the World Trade Center expanded the scale and the 'global reach' of such 'demonstrations' by a truly appalling margin.

Moreover, and with particular reference to the UK, the threat of terrorism and the methods of attack used by terrorists have evolved rapidly. New approaches to counter terrorism are needed in response. It is not just economic and military targets that are considered under attack. Crowded public places (e.g. shopping areas, transport systems, sports and conference arenas) are considered to be at high risk, but cannot be subject to traditional security approaches such as searches and checkpoints without radically changing public experience (Coaffee et al. 2008). More recently concerns about the likelihood and impact of terrorist attack against such crowded public places using a variety of novel and experimental deployment methods – as recently seen by failed attacks in central London and a partially successful Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) at Glasgow airport in June 2007 – has heightened the sense of fear in many urban locations as future attacks against 'soft targets' appear more likely (Coaffee 2008).

New forms of terrorist tactics have subsequently led to new levels of urban vulnerability, and hence new forms of protective security. In one regard we can see this as part of a rescaling of international diplomacy with a refocusing upon the everyday experiences of the homeland. As Richard Johnson (2002) highlighted in relation to the US and UK, security policy in the wake of 9/11 has been skewed towards defending the 'orderliness' of everyday life.

The study of international relations and security concerns has generally been referenced to a national, transnational or global scale and largely in terms of broad governance coalitions of macroeconomic institutions. Since the 1990s emerging ideas of 'human security' has tried to wrench security away from its institutional bias, to focus it on the needs of people and populations who are placed at the centre of security policy (Krause and Williams 1997; Paris 2001; McDonald 2002). Localised responses to new security challenges, which require analysis through different frames of reference, have therefore emerged as a focus of study (Coaffee and Rogers 2008a). This has occurred particularly due to the on-going fragmentation and rebordering of increasingly large and cosmopolitan urban centres, and an on-going rescaling and reterritorialisation of security as a concept, practice and even a

commodity. As has been argued, 'security is becoming more civic, urban, domestic and personal: security is coming home' with significant implications for the spatial planning of cities (Coaffee and Murakami Wood 2006, 504).

Just as the spatial target of security has shifted in recent years, so too has the process through which policy is developed. This will be developed in some detail in Chapter 4 where it will be argued that this mode of security and counter-terrorism policy-making is becoming increasingly anticipatory and pre-emptive as preparation for the *inevitable* attack is prioritised in security strategies. Counter-terrorism responses, in this sense are attempts to be *seen* to be in control, or to promote at least the illusion of resilience, in the face of terrorism. Such policies have been critiqued as being deliberate attempts to heighten fear, based on the premise that a fearful population is easier to control (Mythern and Walklate 2006). For example, Brian Massumi's (2005) work on the US 5 colour-code public threat assessment system is of note here. Massumi argued that the alert systems aim is to 'calibrate the public's anxiety' and 'modulate' the fear of immanent attack and 'trigger' the public into action. This system, noted Massumi (2005, 33) is solely was 'designed to make visible the government's much advertised commitment to fighting the "war" on terror …'

The Book Structure

This book proceeds in light of these recent debates about the risk and uncertainty of urban life and the spatial restructuring of contemporary cities relating to the control and organisation of city spaces. The focus of this inquiry on London highlights the strategies that have been adopted by key agencies such as political authorities, financial institutions and security professionals – to exert control over selected areas of the city to reduce perceived risk of terrorist attack. The time period covered by this study spans over 15 years from the time of the first major City bomb in April 1992 until the end of 2008.

This book addresses a number of key issues. First, it highlights the need for, and the consequences of, the high-levels of security deployed in parts of London due to the risk of terrorism. In particular it shows how the physical form of the urban landscape was, and continues to be, altered due to counter terrorism initiatives. In particular, forthcoming chapters will highlight how such initiatives impacted upon the functioning of key sites in London, most notably the Square Mile and its neighbouring areas. It will detail how these physical alterations evolved over time and the reasons why particular security designs and features were adopted. In this context, emphasis is placed on the historically and geographically contingent nature of the City of London. For example, the City in previous eras has sought to defend itself against attack and as such, attempts to deter terrorism in the 1990s and 2000s may be viewed merely as the latest example of this defensive tendency.

Second, the book highlights how these counter-terrorist security measures were developed and activated by a distinctive set of local governance arrangements and

global processes initially defending the economic functioning of the Square Mile. This will show how the tightly-knit institutional arrangements in the City were crucial in the decision to develop counter-terrorism security measures, and indicate how the power embodied in these networks served to exclude alternative views or criticism of the development of high levels of security in the City. In other words, the book highlights the contested ways in which the construction of defensive landscapes in the City was viewed by different governance groupings both within and outside the City. To do this it draws on versions of 'institutional theory' which has highlighted the importance of institutional arrangements in a variety of social settings (Giddens 1984; Beck 1992a; Amin and Thrift 1994; Healey 1998). Such work has drawn attention to the tendency for powerful 'voices' to dominate the urban planning agenda and in so doing marginalise alternative visions of development (Raco 1998; Macleod and Goodwin 1999; Coaffee and Healey 2003). This analysis will be expanded to look at how a pan-London governance infrastructure has emerged in the post-9/11 era to provide a greater degree of resilience for Londoners as they go about their daily lives, as well as preparing for specific high profile events (most notably the 2012 Summer Olympics and Paralympics).

Third, the book investigates the influence of the regulatory role played by a particular non-state agency – the insurance industry – in shaping the City landscape as a result of enhanced terrorist risk. Traditionally, most previous work in British urban studies has neglected the role of the insurance industry as a regulator of the urban landscape, focusing instead on the industry's investment practices (Cadman and Catelaeno 1983; Henneberry 1983; Faulsh 1994; Murray 1994; Doornkamp 1995). During the 1990s, and beyond, the role of insurance has received considerable attention in academic accounts of the influence of environmental and manufactured risk on social and economic relations (Giddens 1992; Beck 1992b; 2000; Adams 1995; Coaffee 2003).

During the 1990s, and moreover in the new millennium, it became increasingly evident that high impact risk events (such as terrorism, global warming, flooding, and earthquakes) were beginning to worry the insurance industry. In some cases this forced them to withdraw from the specific markets concerned, citing the high cost of their liability as well as the impossibility of calculating the risk involved. It was not that the frequency of such events increased; rather it was the insured cost that rose exponentially leading to fears of insolvency among insurers. For example, Giles (1994) cited a report by the Chartered Insurance Institute, which warned that British insurers were only now beginning to realise the scale of risk, they were 'carrying on their shoulders'.[2] This is precisely the scenario that faced the insurance industry after the first major terrorist bombing of the City of London in April 1992.

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2   In short, insurability has become a critical issue especially within the reinsurance world. By reinsuring part of their initial risk insurance companies have traditionally been able to underwrite large risks without fear of bankruptcy.

Against this context, sections of this book focus on the evolution of terrorism insurance in the UK. In particular, it assesses the role of various insurance associations and representative bodies stimulating a suitable terrorism insurance scheme and how this sought to redistribute the financial risk of terrorism away from the City, providing financial security to businesses in the wake of terrorist attacks. Furthermore, the relationship between insurance and counter-security measures within the City is assessed to show how terrorism insurance policies influenced and reinforced the proliferation of physical security measures within the Square Mile during the 1990s and how this has subsequently evolved in the post-9/11 era. Using more recent material, the latter sections of the book will also focus upon how further non-state professions and institutions, most notably urban planners and architects, have been increasingly drawn into the implementation of counter-terrorism policy (Coaffee and O'Hare 2008).

Overall, this book is structured into three main parts. Following the introduction, the remainder of Part I (Chapters 2-4) considers a number of conceptual and contextual ideas.

Chapter 2, *Urban Restructuring and the Development of Defensive Landscapes*, initially notes the historic nature of defensive cities. It relates such features to the changes that have occurred within the structure and functioning of major cities in the past forty years, particularly due to the dual trends of the militarisation and the privatisation of public space. It does this through the use of the concept of *territoriality.* In particular, this chapter also examines the response of the Belfast authorities in the 1970s to the threat of terrorism.

Chapter 3, *Controlling Security Discourse* depicts the way in which institutional networking and partnership are increasingly influencing urban governance agendas with a particular emphasis on the merging of economic competition and security agendas. This draws upon contemporary examples from North America (in particular Los Angeles) and the UK to show how the police, the business community, the local government, as well as other key urban stakeholders, are attempting to promote security in specific localities to reduce the fear and occurrence of crime. It is argued that this is achieved through a combination of the managerial and regulatory strategies undertaken by the agencies of security, fortification techniques and, enhanced surveillance capabilities.

Chapter 4, *Risk Society, Resilience Planning, and the Global Terrorist Threat*, introduces contemporary risk theory. It uses the recent work of German sociologist Ulrich Beck and others, showing that Western society has created a scenario where new and destructive forms of risk have now become a major concern and are often deemed commercially uninsurable. This chapter also deals directly with the ideologies underlying contemporary terrorist risk and relates this specifically to the UK context, both historically and during the 1990s. It finally discusses new forms of terrorist threat in the post-9/11 era. This chapter finally considers the rise of resilience policy as a key feature of the post-9/11 managerial landscape of cities, arguing that this is emblematic of a growing trend towards anticipatory and pre-emptive policy making.

Part two of this of this book contains Chapters 5-7, which outline and discuss the main findings of this inquiry in specific relation to the City of London in the 1990s. Chapter 5 explores the role of the agencies of security, most notably, the City of London Police, in constructing a security cordon and a number of other security initiatives, in and around the City. Chapter 6 analyses the important influence of the insurance industry as it attempted to protect the City from the financial risk of terrorism. This chapter also considers the relationship between terrorism insurance and an increasingly fortified landscape. Chapter 7, by contrast, describes the critical role of the Corporation of London, (the Local Authority for the Square Mile) in facilitating the enhancement of physical security for the City. It shows how local pro-security strategies were seen as essential to allow the Square Mile to remain competitive in the global economy, and how the powerful influence of the Corporation of London dominated arguments regarding responses to the terrorist threat.

Part three of the book includes Chapter 8 and 9 and 10. Chapter 8, *Beating the Bombers: A Decade of Counter Terrorism in the City of London*, summarises the key findings in Part II and situates the experiences of the City within a wider theoretical and empirical frame. It also highlights how City of London-style security has been transferred to other parts of the UK, specifically the London (Docklands) and the UK (Manchester). Chapter 9, *Terrorism and Future Urbanism in the Wake of 9/11*, by contrast, initially moves away from the experiences of the Square Mile and highlights a variety of possible urban scenarios that were depicted in the aftermath of 9/11. It then illuminates the changes made to counter-terrorist strategies in the City after 9/11. Chapter 10, *London Prepared? Resilience, Reputation, and Securing the Global City*, highlights how the discourse of resilience has in recent years become increasingly important to ongoing security, both in the City of London but also at a pan-London level. This chapter broadens out the spatial focus to look at how London authorities and pan-London partnerships have adapted to new security challenges after the terrorist attacks on the transport system in July 2005, and are preparing the city for the 2012 summer Olympics and Paralympics. This chapter also contains the overall conclusion to the book, which highlights how security, economic development and place branding are becoming intricately and necessarily intertwined. In doing this it is argued that security solutions should be proportional to the ongoing threat of terrorism and strike a balance between reducing risk and impacting negatively upon the everyday city.

Chapter 2

Urban Restructuring and the Development of Defensive Landscapes

Introduction

In the last thirty years the urban landscape has been increasingly restructured and fragmented as a result of geographical processes at both local and global levels, which continue to divide the city into a series of independent territories, societies, cultures, and economies (Soja 1989; Harvey 1990; Davis 1992; Graham and Marvin 2001; Coaffee and Murakami Wood 2006).

However, there is nothing new about fragmented and divided cities and attempts by certain sections of urban society, especially the rich and powerful, to cluster in certain territories for social and economic advantages it brings, such as security, economies of scale, and cultural solidarity (Soffer and Minghi 1986; Atkins 1993; Marcuse 1993; Harvey 1996; Graham 2004; Coaffee et al. 2008b). This has formed distinct *territorial enclaves*, within the urban landscape – the development of which has intensified in recent years, given the increasing growth of economic competition between cities, and due to the increased occurrence, and fear, of crime and terrorism in urban areas (Cheshire and Gordon 1993; Fischer 1993; Budd 1998; Glassner 1999; Furedi 2002; Savitch 2008; Coaffee and Rogers 2008a). As Jewson and MacGregor (1997, 1) contended, 'relationships of contest, conflict and co-operation are realised in and through the social and spatial forms of contemporary urban life … [which] are creating new patterns of social division, and new forms of regulation and control.'

The Privatisation and Militarisation of the City

Privatisation and 'militarisation' are commonly highlighted as key features of contemporary urban life where 'form follows fear' (Ellin 1997). This often leads to changes in the physical form of urban landscapes as a result of increased perceptions of crime, terrorism or external attack, emanating from the occupants in a particular area (Davis 1992; 1998; Dillon, D. 1994; Archibald et al. 2002; Graham 2002; Marcuse and Kempton 2002; Coaffee 2005; 2006). As a result, a plethora of fortified landscape features can now be found, or are planned, in many Western cities. Such features range from the simple removal of benches and other amenities to stop the homeless living on the street, to the other extreme of gated and heavily guarded residential and commercial areas (Davis 1990; Flusty 1994; Jones and Lowrey 1995; Dear and Flusty 1998; ODPM 2004; Atkinson and Helms 2007).

The control of the urban fabric by the higher status socio-economic groups has always been a characteristic of cities, but in recent years, and especially after 9/11, this control has been increasingly asserted through an array of evermore-sophisticated physical and technological measures. Such measures have the explicit aim of excluding sections of society deemed to threaten a particular way of life, or to the cultural and commercial vitality of urban areas (Bauman 2000). The popularity of such security features explicitly expresses the privatisation of space according to the preferences of the rich and powerful, and subsequently fuels the growth of the private security industry (Zukin 1995; Lees 1998; Bauman 2002; Wakefield 2003). As Flusty (1994, 67) noted whilst talking about the erosion of what he termed 'spatial justice' in Los Angeles in the 1990s:

> Traditional public spaces are increasingly supplanted by such privately produced (although often publicly subsidised) "privately owned and administered spaces for public aggregation" such as shopping malls [and] corporate plazas … In these new post-public spaces, access is predicted upon real or apparent ability to pay.

Flusty further suggests that such changes in the urban landscape were inherently related to economic productivity and that 'in such spaces, exclusivity is an inevitable by-product of the high levels of control necessary to ensure that irregularity, unpredictability and inefficiency do not interfere with the orderly flow of commerce' (ibid.).

Within this context, the remainder of this chapter is divided into three parts, and will highlight how, and why, such defensive features are becoming increasingly prevalent within the landscape of many Western cities. The first part will describe in some further detail the historical trends of defending certain areas of the city. Second, this chapter will consider attempts to design-out-crime in urban environments, which were in large part based on findings from research into human territoriality conducted in the 1970s. This will be exemplified by a study of Belfast in the 1970s which increasingly sought to 'design out terrorism' through the construction of an array of access restrictions and surveillance measures. The third part of the chapter will explore the contemporary meaning of territoriality as applied to the city, indicating that it should be used as no more than an analogy for describing the fragmentation of the city for defensive purposes.

Urban Security

Cities have always been characterised by feelings of insecurity, invasion by competing groups within society, and the fear of crime and insurrection[1]. The need

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for defence against external attack has been an ever-present pre-occupation for urban authorities (Chermayeff and Alexander 1966; Morris 1994). Archaeological records show, for example, that the early urban areas on the floodplains of great rivers such as the Nile, Tigris, Euphrates and Yangtze were often surrounded by walls, ditches and other defensive features to delimit the 'known' from the chaos and danger of the outside world (Postgate 1992; Keegan 1993; Morris 1994; Atkins et al. 1998). Such defensive features – typically a combination of a wall, tower and ditch – became the universal blueprint for the fortified city. This was a design that was to change little between the building of Jericho and the introduction of gunpowder some centuries later (Keegan 1993).

What is clear is that where centralised modes of governance began to be established, construction of strategic defences around cities or regions became widespread. As Gold and Revill (1999, 230) noted, these defences secured 'the *interests* of an imperial power, serving to establish a presence and create and image of power that might impress an indigenous population or rival colonialists.' The development of such urban assemblages inside city walls meant that the urbanisation process could therefore be read as an agent of social control (Wittfogel 1957). In particular, the threat of external attack meant the ruling class could justify the dense concentration of population into an easily regulated and controlled space (Atkins et al. 1998).

As cities developed, defensive systems became more complex in order to cope with the improving strategies of intruders. For example Poyner (1983) cited the castles and the walled towns of Medieval Europe as historic examples of this trend. Here internal defences, as represented by the fortress which dominated the centre of the city, and external defence, in the form of a wall, were key defensive features. Atkins et al. (1998) indicated that the developments in military technology at this time meant that defensive technologies improved. For example, designs for stone-clad castles were imported into Europe from Arabia, which formed the centre of new settlements as urbanisation spread within the safe confines of the city-wall. Such a wall served a defensive purpose, but also became 'a symbol of the sharp distinction between the city and the country, and stood as formidable reminders of class distinction' (Dillon, D. 1994, 10; see also Fumagalli 1994). In contrast to today, it was the poor that were found located outside the city walls with the noxious trades and were, in effect, the first suburbanites (Sjoberg 1960).[2] In time, the city wall and castle became less important, but still remained as symbols of wealth, privilege and power.

In a similar way, today's cities have their own particular expressions of defence that are equivalent, yet distinctly different, from historical examples. In the last thirty-forty years such defensive measures have responded to rising crime rates, the escalation of social conflicts related to material inequality, intensifying racial and ethnic tensions, the heightened fear of crime, and of particular relevance to

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2   It should be noted that, in the UK, outer-estates for lower socio-economic groups disrupt the generalisation that suburbia was exclusively for the richer sections of society.

this book, increased attacks by terrorist groups against commercial and political infrastructure. This has subsequently led to an increasingly sophisticated array of fortification, surveillance and security management techniques being deployed by urban authorities and security agencies. These urban trends are often described in terms such as the 'fortress city', the 'walled city', 'gated communities' or as modern day 'panopticons', and which focus on reducing access, enhancing surveillance and increasing the number of security personnel on patrol. Such strategies evoke the notion of human territoriality, related to the spatial control of a given area by certain social groups.

Territoriality: A Concept of Significance?

Social scientists' concern with space has led them not just to study the characteristics of individual places but also the processes that territorially divide or appropriate space for specific purposes (Demko and Wood 1994). In the last forty years the concept of territoriality has been used in diverse research fields, and according to Gold and Revill (1999, 235) has become a 'translation term'. This is a term which 'allows connections to be made between disparate strands of research with common terminology and consistent threads of analysis, without needing to make assumptions that the phenomena under investigation are the product of similar processes that apply regardless of cultural context.' For example, since the 1960s human territoriality has been studied in a number of contexts, including geopolitical change (Giddens 1985; Agnew 1987; Agnew and Corbridge 1995; Anderson 1996), the impacts of economic restructuring (Scott and Storper 1986; Robertson 1992a; 1992b; Swyngedouw 1997; Brenner 1999), religious and ethnic conflicts (Rowley 1992; Shirlow 1998), localism and the role of place attachment (Sibley 1990; Atkins et al. 1998), the need for cultural solidarity (Boal 1996; Anderson and Shuttleworth 1998) and, in particular, crime prevention (Jacobs 1961; Coleman 1984; Newman 1995). More recently it has been argued that the concept of territoriality can help explain the impact of defence as a key feature shaping the contemporary urban landscape (Flusty 1994; Harvey 1996; Herbert 1997a; 1997b; Coaffee 2000b). As Gold and Revill (1999, 232) noted, territoriality is now 'an area of enquiry that examines the rationale for the creation and maintenance of defended spaces in human affairs'.

   The concept of territoriality was originally developed at the beginning of the twentieth century to describe patterns of animal behaviour, particularly birds (see for example Howard 1920). As Gold (1980, 79) noted, 'developed by the work of ethologists, territoriality is the name given to the processes and mechanisms by which living organisms lay claim to, mark, and defend their territory against rivals.' Territoriality was seen as an innate imperative linked to the need for privacy, safety and security (Morris 1967; Eser 1971; Porteous 1976). During the 1960s a renewed interest in ethological studies led to attempts to highlight links between human and animal behaviour, and sought to conceptualise the spatial

relationships between areas and boundaries (Ardrey 1966; Hall 1966; Flaschsbart 1969). Consequently, the development of behavioural geography in the 1970s led to widespread discussions regarding the strength of the relationship between animal and human behaviour and whether or not territoriality was instinctively or culturally produced. With specific relation to human action, territoriality was defined at this time as:

> A broad term that describes the motivated cognitive and behavioural states that a person displays in relation to a physical environment over which he wishes to exercise proprietorial rights, and that he, or he with others, uses more or less exclusively (Gold 1980, 80).

It was concluded by most commentators that the concept of territoriality could be utilised to gain insights into human behaviour, but that comparisons with animals were minor and analogous (Edney 1976; Malmberg 1980): 'when applied *carefully* as an analogy, territoriality affords insight into human spatial behaviour and provides a framework by which geographers can profit' (Gold 1982, 45). This however, required an appreciation that territories are constructed on a variety of spatial scales and formed by widely divergent processes and practices, and that the analogy between animal and human behaviour 'has its limits'. This can lead to the 'territorial illusion' if 'human attributes and behaviours are oversimplified in order to fit frameworks best reserved for animals' (Gold and Revill 1999, 233).

This 'territorial analogy' has subsequently, and most frequently, been used in urban research to describe segregation in terms of 'conflict interpretation'. Here social groupings are often shown to react to a hostile environment by evoking territoriality or creating 'turfs' to preserve the character of a defended area, and/or to instil a sense of cultural solidarity (Clay 1973).

An example of early work in this field is Peter Collison's *Cuttleslowe Walls* (1963), which provided a detailed account of territorial behaviour. Collison described how the friction between people living in adjoining middle and working class areas in Oxford, England, in the 1930s, led to the erection of two formidable barbed wire-topped walls. Collison also highlighted two other similar examples in Cardiff (1955) and Dartford, Kent (1958), but these, he noted, represented extreme cases of class segregation. The construction of defensive walls, as in this case, was considered rare at this time.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, another city which experienced such 'walling' but on a much larger scale, was Belfast, this time along religious lines. Boal's study of the Shankhill/Falls 'interface' in West Belfast in the late 1960s illuminated one of the best known examples of human territorial behaviour, with Protestant and Catholic communities kept apart by a series of physical barriers – defensive walls, or 'peace' lines – which acted as territorial markers in the urban landscape (Boal 1969; 1971). Consequently, the residential geography of the city became fragmented into a series of religious enclaves (see also Boal 1975; Boal and Murray 1977; Boal and Douglas 1982; Dawson 1984). Boal in a review of this

work published in 2008 (233), argued that although he had utilised the territorial metaphor quite loosely, but with care not to equate human behaviour with that of birds (see for example Ardrey 1966), he believes it was an appropriate choice. He adds that in retrospect he has found Edward Soja's interpretation of spatial territorial behaviour illuminating. Soja, he noted, argued that:

> Territoriality . . . is a behavioural phenomenon associated with the organization of spheres of influence or clearly demarcated territories which are made distinctive and considered at least partially exclusive by their occupants or definers. Its most obvious geographical manifestation is an identifiable patterning of spatial relationships resulting in the confinement of certain activities in particular areas and the exclusion of certain categories of individuals from the space of the territorial individual or group (Soja 1971, 19).[3]

It was not just physical barriers that were seen to exemplify territoriality, although undoubtedly the majority of studies focused on this aspect. The use of symbolic territorial markers has also been heavily researched. For example, Ley (1974) illustrated the local geography of the fear of crime in inner city Philadelphia, by showing that certain areas were actively avoided, where local inhabitants knew drugs were sold, due to the demarcation of gang territories by graffiti. The distribution of graffiti in this case was mainly concentrated in two areas – first at the centre of the territory, and second at its boundaries where space was actively contested (see also, Ley and Cybriwsky 1974). Milgram (1970) also undertook similar work in New York, producing a 'fear map' indicating areas where New Yorkers felt threatened. Such a sense of fear was, however, seen as time-dependent, either short term – for example areas which are seen as safe by day and unsafe at night – or over a longer period of time whereby areas of cities or even whole cities, get stigmatised (Tranter and Parkes 1979). Such research was mirrored by work in the 1990s by Davis (1990) in Los Angeles, by Campbell (1992) on urban housing estates in Britain with serious crime problems, and by Jarman (1993) on the use of sectarian murals as symbolic barriers in Belfast.[4]

Arguably though, the most notable research undertaken in the last thirty-forty years on human territoriality has been related to attempts to reduce criminal behaviour by 'designing-out' crime on public housing estates (Jacobs 1961; Jeffery 1971; Newman 1972; Freedman 1975; Ronchek 1981). The following two sections of this chapter will explore this work, and also present a detailed example of how the principles of defensible space were applied outside the residential context to help counter terrorist attacks in central Belfast in the 1970s.

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3   Cited in Boal (2008), 333.
4   See Gaffikin and Morrissey (2006) for a more recent account.

Defence Through Urban Design

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, defensive architecture and urban design were increasingly used by built environment professionals in American cities as a result of research which indicated a relationship between certain types of environmental design and reduced levels of violence (R. Gold 1970). There were, however, serious concerns that enhanced urban fortifications were socially and economically destructive (in terms of economic decline of the city centre and social polarisation) and that the provision of security was becoming increasingly privatised as individuals, having lost faith with the public authorities to provide a safe environment, increasingly sought to defend themselves. Robert Gold (1970, 153) noted that there was in fact nothing new in this trend, noting that:

> … historically when political institutions have failed to protect the public, individuals have taken steps to safeguard themselves, their families and their properties. The present trend is no different in this regard.

This era, as Sharon Zukin reminds us, became 'a watershed in the institutionalisation of urban fear' (1995, 39) with consumer preferences increasingly influencing the proliferation of anti-crime features at this time. As Robert Gold further noted:

> The urban environment is being fortified today, not primarily by public decisions, but mainly through a multiplicity of private choices and decisions individuals make in our decentred society. The private market is responding to growing demand for an increasing range of crime control devices and other means of safety. In some cases, safety has become a commodity that is explicitly sold or rented with real estate. (1970, 153)

As a result of such concerns, American urban planners and designers looked for strategies to reduce the opportunity for crime. This was a direct response to the urban riots which swept many US cities in the late 1960s, as well as the perceived problems associated with the physical design of modernist high rise blocks, which were seen as breeding grounds for criminal activity. Such places were sometimes described as 'indefensible' space (Newman 1972). Increasingly though, planners explored how the strategic manipulation of the built environment could create places that would discourage unwanted behaviours (particularly opportunistic crime) and encourage 'good citizenship'.

Initially, C. Ray Jeffery (1971) developed an approach called *Crime Prevention through Environmental Design* (CPTED), which suggested that the design and arrangement of buildings could create environments which would discourage normal patterns of social interaction and encourage criminal behaviours. His key idea was that the built environment could be designed, or modified, to facilitate social cohesion among residents in order to deter crime by making criminal acts harder to commit or get away with. In short, opportunities for crime could

be reduced leading to a decrease in crime and the fear of crime. As Jeffery (1971, 178) stated 'in order to change criminal behaviour we must change the environment (not rehabilitate the criminal)'. This work was followed by a host of studies on architectural and design determinism, which highlighted how certain urban structures, could affect behaviour (Kaplan and Kaplan 1978; Mercer 1975; Rappoport 1977). However, it was the publication of Oscar Newman's (1972) *Defensible Space – Crime Prevention through Urban Design* that stimulated the most intense debates on the relationship between crime and the built environment. Newman highlighted, like others before him (see for example Wirth 1938; Jacobs 1961) that anonymity in the city ran parallel to rises in crime rate. For instance, Jane Jacobs in the seminal *The Death and Life of Great American Cities* (1961) highlighted how urban design could contribute to diminishing community safety. Newman also drew attention to the increasing sense of anonymity and danger that city life entailed noting in particular that residents in high-rise blocks did not appear to know each other, making neighbourhood organisation of crime prevention difficult.

Newman's work on housing estates in New York and St Louis, led to the concept of defensible space, which he saw as a 'range of mechanisms – real and symbolic barriers … [and] improved opportunities for surveillance – that combine to bring the environment under the control of its residents' (Newman 1972, 3). Defensible space was seen as the physical expression of a social fabric that could defend itself and could arguably be achieved by the manipulation of architectural and design elements. In his studies Newman did not rule out the use of security fences or electronic surveillance technologies, but viewed reliance on these measures as a *last resort* if more subtle design solutions were unsuccessful. Defensible space was, in Newman's words, offered as an *alternative* to 'target-hardening' measures that were being introduced to American housing at this time and were a means by which the residential environment could be redesigned 'so they can again become liveable and controlled not by the police, but by a community of people who share a common terrain' (1972, 2). What was required, he argued, were physical 'communities of interest' that have a common use for the space surrounding their immediate environs and create zones that are 'unused and unsafe public space which is costly to maintain and police and turns it into intensively used semiprivate space which is identified with the particular group of families who use, maintain, and control it' (Newman 1980, 12). This would change space from public to semiprivate status. It would not, however, limit spaces to non-residents, but attempts to ensure 'use of the newly defined terrain by non-residents will be with the approval of the contiguous resident population and must meet their criteria of acceptable usage' (ibid., 17).

Newman's basic assumption was that most criminals behave rationally, selecting targets in relation to perceptions of high rewards coupled with a low risk of getting caught. Thus deterring crime was fundamentally about giving would-be intruders a strong sense that if they enter a certain space, or territory, they are likely to be observed and would have difficulty escaping. Newman concluded that

outside spaces become more defensible if they are clearly demarcated (for example by 'grated' fences and shrubbery) and were well lit. By contrast, the construction of solid fences and tall hedges, for example, would serve as a potential hiding place for the criminal, and should be avoided.

Newman proposed that four interrelated design features could create a secure residential environment: first, *territoriality*, which could be achieved by the zoning of public space, in and around residential areas, to promote a greater sense of community; second, improved *natural surveillance*, which could be enhanced – for example by the realignment of windows; third, the *image* of the building structures could be altered to avoid the stigma of public housing; finally, *milieu* could be enhanced, whereby the environmental surroundings of residential areas could be altered so that they merged with areas of the city considered safe, such as institutional and commercial areas. This final idea was also put forward by Jacobs (1961) who saw mixed land use in the city as achieving greater safety as this would increase the times of day the streets were frequented.

Newman's ideas were inexorably linked to the late 1960s and early 1970s and as such reflected the 'growing interest of the architectural profession in the relation between environment and behaviour, with some influence from rather popularised anthropology and ideas of territoriality' (Poyner 1983, 8). Poyner further highlighted that 'defensible space' was considered attractive at this time, because the 'emphasis was on the use of the environment to promote residential control and therefore somehow return to a more human and less threatening environment' (ibid.).

These ideas became popular, mainly in the United States, as a concept underlying the design of new residential communities The ideas were also used by many local authorities in the UK in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Clarke and Mayhew 1980; Coleman 1984, 1985; Dawson 1984; Goodey and Gold 1987). For example Alice Coleman (1984; 1985) argued that the physical design of high rise housing estates in London and Oxford had a noticeable affect on the behaviour of its residents and that 'more humane conditions' could be achieved by revising housing layouts and estate access to give residents more control over their local environment. These ideas became popular in the UK as many British local authorities 'Colemanised' their worst estates with enthusiasm but failed to combine such design changes with much-needed housing management, and community and employment initiatives. As Goodey and Gold (1987, 130) noted at this time, 'Colemanisation is fast becoming as significant a heading for an array of territory-creating measures as Newman's defensible space a decade earlier.'

Newman's influential work was however criticised for its poor statistical analysis containing 'unverifiable assumptions about causal relationships between physical design and crime' (Gold 1982, 57), and its omission of the interplay between social and physical variables. In particular its focus on environmental determinism was seen as too much of a generalisation (Bottoms 1974; Mayhew 1979; Poyner 1983; Madanipour 1996; Tijerino 1998). However, the relationships

between urban design and behaviour remained unclear although many studies pointed to possible correlations (Tijerino 1998).[5]

Since the work of Jeffrey and Newman, 'second and third generation' defensible space or CPTED schemes have subsequently evolved over time to increasingly include measures such as access control, tactics such as 'target hardening' and advanced technologies such as CCTV, to enhance the formal surveillance of space (Moffat 1983; Crowe 2000). For instance, in the late 1980s the UK Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and the Home Office pioneered a new approach to reduce crime called *Secured by Design* (SBD). SBD sought to embed CPTED and defensible space ideas into the design of new build housing developments (Cozens 2002). Not only did SBD prove successful in reducing criminality in such developments, but owners/residents were also often able to elicit a significant discount on household insurance (see for example Cozens et al. 1999).

UK Government priorities have, in more recent years, focused upon how issues of safety should be seen as key element of successful place making. Here a combination of design *and* management has a vital role to play.

> Successful places are *safe*, well maintained and well managed. Achieving this depends on managing the physical asset effectively and appropriately. With the right structures, people who live and use the place will be able to influence what happens there (English Partnerships 2007, 172, emphasis added).

Community safety is a broad issue, which has become central to recent government attempts in the United Kingdom (UK) to create sustainable communities and to secure public places (Coaffee et al. 2008). For example, the policy guidance document *Safer Places: The Planning System and Crime Prevention,* argues that 'safety and security are essential to successful, sustainable communities' (ODPM 2004). Not only are such places well-designed, attractive environments to live and work in, but they are also places where freedom from crime, and from the fear of crime, improves the quality of life. The guide also identifies seven 'attributes of sustainability' which should be considered 'as prompts' when considering community safety (ODPM 2004, 13). These are highlighted in Table 2.1. *Safer Places* shows how planners, developers and other designers might use crime-prevention principles to make parks, streets and other public spaces safer.

Defending Belfast

In the British context, ideas of territoriality and defensible space ideas were to have wider adaptations than the residential context. For example, in relation to

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5   For example, Coleman blamed the pathology of high-rise public housing estates directly on design deficiencies (Gold 1997) which were a product of the modernist aim of social engineering.

Table 2.1   Attributes of sustainability relevant to crime prevention and community safety

Attribute	Descriptor
Access and movement	Places with well defined routes, spaces and entrances that provide for convenient movement without compromising security
Structure	Places that are structured so that different uses do not cause conflict
Surveillance	Places where all publicly accessible spaces are overlooked
Ownership	Places that promote a sense of ownership, respect, territorial responsibility and community
Physical protection	Places that include necessary, well-designed security features
Activity	Places where the level of human activity is appropriate to the location and creates a reduced risk of crime and a sense of safety at all times
Management and maintenance	Places that are designed with management and maintenance in mind, to discourage crime in the present and the future

Source: Coaffee et al. (2008).

the need for counter-terrorist security in Northern Ireland, Boal (1975) argued that the ultimate level of security provision in a city is defensible space (with its emphasis on territoriality) existing alongside physical barriers (the target hardening mechanisms that Newman saw as a last resort). From the mid-1970s onward we have thus seen attempts to militarise defensible space (Coaffee et al. 2008b).

Belfast in the 1970s could be seen as a laboratory for radical experiments on the fortification of urban space. A number of distinct defended territories were created along sectarian lines to give the occupants of a defined area, or individual buildings, enhanced security. The polarisation between different communities became institutionalised and intimately connected to the political organisation of space (Bryan 2003). For example, Shirlow and Murtagh (2006, 256) have highlighted how a number of distinct defended territories were created along sectarian lines for enhanced security 'by razor wire, armoured vehicles, peace walls and a series of police and army checkpoints.'

Defensible space was therefore the order of the day. As Jarman (1993, 107) commented, since the early 1970s:

> The apparent permanence of the conflict and the lack of any solutions acceptable to all parties has meant that the ideological divisions have increasingly become a concrete part of the physical environment, creating an ever more militarised landscape.

During the first years of the 'Troubles' (1968-1970), the commercial core of the city was seen as a relatively neutral space within the segregated sectarian landscape, and

was relatively unaffected by terrorism. All this changed in July 1970 when a large bomb was detonated in the city centre without warning. In the following years the defensive landscape transformation in Belfast, and in particular its central area, could be seen as the model that other towns in Northern Ireland adapted to their own local circumstances (see for example McKane 1975; McQuillen 1975). For example, on 15 July 1972 concrete barriers were placed around the shopping district of Derry by the British Army to seal off direct access to the centre from the Bogside, the western area of the city from which the majority of Provisional IRA attacks were believed to have originated. The central area was not completely sealed off, but rather the number of entrances were limited, making the control and the searching of vehicles easier. The local Chamber of Trade, who had seen business premises destroyed and damaged and destroyed in previous attacks, welcomed the moves.

The counter-terrorist security apparatus around Belfast city centre itself was first initiated three days after those in Derry. On the 18 July 1972 new traffic restrictions were imposed, without warning, as barbed wire fences were thrown across the main streets creating a number of defensive segments with access controlled by the British Army. The city centre in effect became a 'besieged citadel' (Jarman 1993, 115). This initially led to fears that these measures would destroy the city centre in a way the Provisional IRA never could; by keeping the customers out. Brown (1985a) also pointed out that at this time the usual forces of city centre decline such as population dispersal, the impact of out of town shopping centres and increased car ownership also, in part, contributed to the decline of central Belfast's retail core. Boal (1995, 89) further commented 'the bombing campaign of the Provisional IRA, which appeared to be a concerted attempt to cripple the city's commercial life, led to the destruction of some 300 retail outlets and resulted in the loss of almost one-quarter of the total retail space.' These drastic security measures were implemented by the authorities to tackle the security problem and can be seen as a radical example of territoriality as encompassed in notions of defensible space.

The bombing campaign against Belfast city centre peaked in intensity on the 21 July 1972, three days after the construction of the cordon, when the Provisional IRA detonated 22 bombs in and around the central area within the space of seventy five minutes. This day became known as Bloody Friday. As the *Belfast Telegraph* commented on 22 July (1):

> The city has not experienced such a day of death and destruction since the German blitz of 1941 [however] ... it was significant that all yesterday's explosions occurred outside the new restricted traffic zones.[6]

This indicated that the Army and police's defensive strategy had been successful as far as defending the central business district was concerned. However, there were fears that the risk of further attack would be transferred, as the Provisional

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6   This was the forerunner of the ring of steel.

Figure 2.1   The initial security segments in Belfast city centre (1972/74)

IRA would continue to plant bombs just outside the security cordon. This led to more Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) police officers being deployed in such areas. This highlighted a possible disadvantage of such a defensive landscapes, namely that by overtly securing one area, the would-be intruders, criminal or, in this case terrorists, will seek out less well defended targets.

Figure 2.2   The maximum extent of the Belfast security segment ('ring of steel') in 1976

By 1974 the barbed wire fences encircling the central area of Belfast had been replaced by a series of tall steel gates, and civilian search units were established. This became known locally as the 'ring of steel' – a term first used in 1976 to refer to the amalgamation of the four individual security zones around Belfast city

centre into one large security sector ringed by seventeen 10-12 foot high, steel gates.[7]

Figure 2.1 shows the initial placement of the security cordon around Belfast city centre made up of seven different areas. Upon entering each area a body search was undertaken. Further advances were made in March 1976 when the four main security segments were amalgamated to form a single security zone (see Figure 2.2). This made shopping in the centre easier as only one search was required, although many shops employed their own searching teams to improve security. This arrangement also meant that the personal needed to run the scheme was minimised. There were only two vehicle entry points with the others being exit-only. In addition, controlled parking zones were set up around the city centre in a further attempt to stop car bombers on the periphery of the security cordon. For example, Compton et al. (1980) described the formation of two types of parking zones, one covering the city centre where parking was strictly prohibited at all times (the so-called Pink Zone), and secondly, on the streets immediately surrounding the centre where cars could only be left in the evening and on Sunday (Yellow Zone). Subsequently, as the risk of terrorist attack subsided, the three peripheral security segments to the south and north east were disbanded leaving just one main security zone (Figure 2.3).

Promoting the Defensive City

As the relative threat of terrorism against Belfast city centre decreased during the 1980s and 1990s, urban planners and city marketers sought to re-image this 'pariah city' in an attempt to attract businesses back (Neill et al. 1995). Reduced levels of security, decreases in the number of terrorist attacks, and quite substantial redevelopment and pedestrianisation subsequently helped to re-patronise central Belfast. Neill (1992) provided the following summary of these stages:

- *First*, the defensive policy of the seventies, which encompassed a radical defensive landscape designed to deter terrorist attack;
- *Second*, the encouragement of tentative development between 1980-1984, which saw a partial repatronisation of retail activity to the city centre, and;
- *Third*, active promotion and planning from 1985-1992, which saw a concerted effort by the city council to improve the physical infrastructure of the area as well as to promote the city to business organisations world-wide.

However the re-imaging of Belfast was only partially successful and was often seen as superficial. It did not, in the minds of many, tackle the real problems of the city. Place promotion campaigns have also been used to re-image the stigmatised Central Belfast area. That said, Gold (1994, 23) referred to the type of advertising used for Belfast as the apotheosis of the traditional place marketing campaign to the point

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7   See *The Belfast Telegraph*, 29 March 1976.

Figure 2.3   The Belfast ring of steel in the 1980s

where the name Belfast was removed from adverts and was frequently replaced by 'Laganside' or other development area names in an attempt to shake off its image of terrorist violence (see also, Coaffee and Rogers 2008b). Jarman (1993, 109) also commented on how Belfast was perceived by the outside world: 'the view from outside, largely mediated by television and newspaper photographers, is presented

mostly as bomb-damaged buildings, endless parades and colourful paramilitary murals, and ignores their context within the more extensive transformations of the urban environment.' As such Neill (1992, 9) concluded that Belfast city centre, at this time, was a place where:

> A post-modernist consumerist kaleidoscope of images floats uncomfortably on top of the squat brutalism of terrorist-proof buildings and the symbolism of the past. It is a condition of visual schizophrenia.

That said, the Belfast city centre came 'back from the dead' (Brown 1985a, 10). Brown qualifies this sentiment through a discussion, summarised in Table 2.2, which shows how Belfast city centre changed in the decade following the construction of the ring of steel. This indicates the direct positive correlation between enhanced security a lack of terrorist bombs, and business vitality in the central city.

Table 2.2   A decade of change in Belfast – 1974-84

	1974	1984
Bombings	62	3
Manned security gates	38	None
Off-street parking spaces	400	4500
Fully pedestrianised street	None	12
Private sector investment	Nil	£100 Million

Source: Brown (1985a), 10.

Furthermore, Boal (1995, 90-1) indicated that as terrorist violence continued to decline in the 1990s 'city centre accessibility was improved (new road works, multi-story car parking provision and some upgrading of public transport), while the environment of the centre was enhanced by extensive pedestrianisation and wide spread tree planting.' That said, the New Year's bombing blitz of 1991-92 against the city centre, and increases in security provision following major London bombings in the mid-1990s, provided a testimony to the brittleness of Belfast's re-imaging (see Chapter 3).

The Success of the Security Cordon

The overarching aim of the authorities and the security forces in Belfast during the 1970s was to contain the terrorist threat. However, there was also recognition of the need to achieve a balance between security and the ability of businesses to trade. As Compton et al. (1980, 84) indicated, 'the traders tended to adopt an ambivalent attitude towards security measures, on the one hand wishing for

increased security but on the other fearing loss of trade because of the curtailment of free access to the shopping area' (see also Hudson 1973; Sheppard 1976; Brown 1985b). Since its inception in the early 1970s no car bomb exploded inside the Belfast ring of steel, and it was therefore, according to security forces, judged successful. However, it was severely criticised by those traders just outside the cordon as they were increasingly attacked. For example, Compton et al. (1980) highlighted the worry of the traders outside the cordon as well as those inside it and also stated that there were preferential trading locations within the cordon situated near the gates. The RUC indicated that as it attempted to balance security and commerce many traders were 'choked-out' of business by the security cordon for which they received no compensation. Ironically, it was often better for proprietors to be 'bombed-out' as, under these circumstances, compensation would be paid.[8]

In short, Belfast provides an example of a city with a 'hardened' urban landscape, as exemplified by the central security cordon. Here the spatial configurations within a defined area, especially borders and boundaries, became more pronounced in an attempt to create territoriality by delimiting buildings and territories from their surroundings through defensive architecture, and demarcated boundaries. In addition to the fortification of public and shared spaces, segregation was formalised, and partially institutionalised, as a method of managing and containing civil conflict – a process marked by the creation of vacant 'no-mans' lands which separated conflicting communities (Shirlow and Murtagh 2006). More broadly, civil unrest and insecurity in Belfast and throughout Northern Ireland, since the 1970s, has had a huge influence on virtually all aspects of life but especially on spatial planning briefs, segregated settlement patterns and in the development of the built environment. Importantly, in such restructuring of the urban landscape the security forces such as the police and army became 'major agents' of change (Jarman 1993).

Subsequent landscape 'softening' also occurred in Belfast, particularly through the 1990s, as attempts were made to remove territorial barriers and boundaries in order to increase access between previously contested territories given the reduced threat from terrorism, and given Belfast's increased attempts to re-image itself within the global economy (Brown 1987). Belfast's security cordon, according to the RUC, forced the Provisional IRA to stop attacking the city centre on a regular basis.[9] The Provisional IRA on the other hand would perhaps point to a change in overall tactics – away from attacking commercial property in Northern Ireland and towards attacking the security forces and the England – as the reason why Belfast could begin to rebuild and rebrand itself in the early 1980s and beyond.

During the 1980s, and 1990s a softening of the landscape was evident as a result of the removal of much of this overt security apparatus. This meant that a more

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8   Research interviews conducted with senior RUC officers in December 1995.
9   Research interviews conducted with senior RUC officers in December 1995.

symbolic approach to defending the area was taken as attempts were made to portray the city centre as a neutral space and to encourage inward investment. That said, even during the ongoing peace processes of the 1990s Belfast's residential areas remained as segregated and polarised as ever particularly, at interface areas between conflicting territories (Bryan 2003; Shirlow and Murtagh 2006; Shirlow 2008).

In Belfast, it was the city centre that became a focal point of both hardening and softening approaches. Linked to the perceived threat from terrorism, Jarman (1993, 116) commented that whilst the British Government's approach to Belfast city centre was intimately linked to Provisional IRA tactics, it is also linked to what he called the 'Ulsterisation' strategy 'which principally involves criminalising the Republican movement while emphasising the uninterrupted continuation of daily life.' He continued:

> The city centre is the key to this approach, with the projection of an air of normality, accessibility and prosperity central to attempts to attract both British and foreign investment. A principal element in this strategy has been to remove the visible security presence … (which) has largely been reduced to security cameras. (ibid., 116)

He concluded (117) by indicating that:

> The demilitarisation of the core emphasises the neutrality and impartiality of the commercial and administrative activities. The centre is projected as an area above and beyond the sectarian conflict.

The 'hardening' and subsequent 'softening' of the urban landscape of central Belfast over the past forty years has been linked to an assumption that territoriality can be expressed though the built environment. This was initially achieved trough the construction of walls, gates and security cameras, which served to exclude unwanted persons or activities from a defined area. These began to be slowly removed and it was not until mid-1995 that smaller security barriers replaced the remaining gates in the main shopping streets (see Figures 2.4, 2.5). Figure 2.4 show examples of the security gates around Belfast city centre in 1995, whereas Figure 2.5 shows a newer swing barrier-style gate, which replaced the former 1970s steel gates. The RUC during the Provisional IRAs cease-fire, from August 1994 until February 1996, indicated that they would have no compunction about resurrecting the ring of steel (and other security measures) if the cease-fire broke down. They considered the threat of the city centre being attacked as realistic. These new gates themselves were removed in the mid-2000s, limiting the ability of the police to seal off the area if required.

Indeed any decrease in security was offset by a centralised CCTV scheme, which became operational in December 1995. Security cameras were problematic to use at the height of the troubles due to expense and technological deficiency.

Figure 2.4   An example of security gates around Belfast city centre in the mid-1990s

The current system of cameras was similar to those adopted in many towns within Britain in the 1990s for generic crime reduction purposes.

As indicated previously, Belfast in this period highlights a clear example of attempts by branders to strategically manage a city's image to increase its attractiveness to inward investors by removing negative references to terrorist-related insecurity. Indeed during the late 1990s and early Twenty-First century Belfast began to actively market itself as a cultural centre of European significance and as a 'post conflict city' (Shirlow 2006). The aim of its leaders was to bid for the prestigious 'European Capital of Culture' crown which was to be given to a UK city in 2008. The 'failure' in 2002 to even get on the final shortlist of six cities for this honour was perhaps a reminder of the legacy of the Troubles. For example, during the marketing campaign that led up to short-listing, the city had experienced continual bomb alerts, sectarian shootings and, more generally, 'the peace process' was viewed by many to be on the brink of collapse.

Overall, the ways in which changes in urban design and its management, attempted to reduce the risk of terrorist attack in Northern Ireland, and in particular Belfast city centre, are of direct relevance to the subsequent experiences in London. In particular, it is suggested that the principles underlying attempts in Belfast to contain terrorism in the 1970s were utilised, albeit in a modified form, by the agencies of security in London in the 1990s and 2000s.

Figure 2.5   A swing barrier at the entrance to Belfast city centre, which replaced the 1970s steel gates

Towards New Definitions of Human and Urban Territoriality

During the 1980s social scientists began to use territoriality in a wider context making a distinct break from the behavioural and ethological approach of previous decades. Perhaps the best-known work is geographer Robert Sack's classic text *Human Territoriality* (1986). For Sack, territory was both the definition of a space, and the attempt to influence thinking and behaviour with regard to that space. It was the filling of space with power and could thus work on levels from the purely symbolic, through the influential, to the material. Sack saw territoriality as 'socially and geographically rooted', and therefore 'intimately related to how people use the land and how they organise themselves in space and how they give meaning to place.' (1986, 19) Territoriality in this sense was seen as an expression of the interrelationship between space and society, and was defined as:

> The attempt by an individual or group to affect, influence or control people, phenomena, and relationships, by delimiting and asserting control over a geographical area (ibid.).

Relating Sack's ideas to the residential geography of Belfast, Shirlow (2008, 340) argues that: 'the perpetual search, by some, for spatial enclosure and socio-spatial demarcation is clearly tied to Sack's (1986) notion that the creation of ethno sectarianised spaces' produces:

> Boundaries which are virtually impermeable . . . [and which] isolate communities,
> create fear and hate of others, and push in the directions of equality and justice
> (Sack 1986, 254, cited in Shirlow 2008, 340).

In this context, territorialisation can refer to the process of establishing a territory, and deterritorialisation to the counter-process of stripping power from established territories (Coaffee and Murakami Wood 2006). In later work Sack (1992, 52) argued that territoriality can help to embed meaning into place and organise spatial relations creating 'a personal sense of being in place to fixed locations in space' and showed that 'territoriality is a strategy for maintaining social order and imparting meaning to phenomena' (ibid., 42). His definitions of territoriality had three interdependent spatial variables. First, a bounded spatial area that classifies the territory; second, the territory, often at its boundary, contains a form of communication identifying the territorial area; and third, direct attempts are also made to control access into the territorial area.

Sack also argued that territorially is contingent on the particular history and geography of places and, importantly, that territoriality is a social necessity. Sack's ideas have however been criticised for overemphasising the general desire for, and apparently universal features of, human territoriality. Gold and Revill (1999, 233) for example highlighted the deficiencies and contradictions in Sacks' approach, noting that he 'falls foul of his own call for a historically and geographically sensitive approach [in that] … he works towards an abstract functionalist definition which itself becomes merely a set of empty and a historical categories when divorced from specific historical settings.' Gold and Revill (1999) contended that territoriality should be conceived as having 'its own cultural politics which, when deployed, serve the interests of certain groups rather than, and at the expense of, others.' This view, they noted, moves away from the idea of seeing territoriality primarily in terms of conflict resolution where space is contested, with the urban landscape being seen as being 'partitioned into mutually hostile units' (ibid., 234). Instead it moves towards a more inclusive definition where territoriality can be conceived in terms of:

> physical expressions of conflict which overtly demarcate space, but can equally
> be viewed in terms of patterns of social and cultural organisation and rule
> making where individuals and groups can make important statements about the
> self and identity [which] are conveyed by the manipulation of controlled space
> and artefacts within that space (ibid.).

This under-emphasised aspect of territoriality studies is based on the idea of symbolic interaction (Cooper 1974; Ericksen 1980) where an area is seen as a 'landscape of social symbols' (Greenbie 1982). In this case areas can perhaps be seen as symbolically displaying power and control over space to the rest of the city, by what R.B. Taylor (1988) called 'territorial functioning'. This refers to how specific behaviours are a function of a sense of place which serves to enhance

control of an area by clarifying spatial relationships and by strengthening social bonding though a shared sense of identity and community (see also Ardrey 1970; Gottdiener 1995).

Conflict, Territoriality, and the New Enclaving of the City

Whilst it is acknowledged that territoriality can be expressed through strategies of social and cultural organisation, it is most commonly articulated within the contemporary city in terms of defended enclaves of perhaps two distinct kinds – *global* enclaves and *local* enclaves. These are commonly a result of the desire of higher-income residents and commercial enterprises to control and defend the space in which they live and work (Norfolk 1994; Dillon, D. 1994). *Global* enclaves in this sense can relate to processes linked to the world economy, which are causing agglomeration and territorialisation in financial areas of western cities. In particular, cities are now increasingly developing strategies to enhance or maintain their place within an emergent global economy 'where a multiplicity of globalisation processes assume concrete, localised forms' (Sassen 2000, 147). For example, Zukin (1988, 435) further highlighted how such 'landscapes of power', 'directly mediate economic power by both conforming to and structuring norms of market-driven investment, production and consumption.' This includes such features as new-look buildings, high levels of place promotion, and processes which eventually lead to greater asymmetry of power between a territory and its neighbouring areas.

Despite the economic importance of new commercial buildings and districts, there is a noticeable downside to the urban restructuring efforts of local authorities in many cities in that 'the urban landscape is remodelled into visual spectacles of revitalised urban space and imagined community that mask real geographies of decay and neglect' (Goss 1997, 181). In short, as globalisation increasingly influences western cities, urban complexity, as well as asymmetry, increase along class, ethnicity and gender lines. For instance, injustice and inequality are frequently associated with the contemporary city, which is commonly seen as 'carceral' (Soja 1989, 1997; Davis 1990; Marcuse and Kempton 2002). During the 1990s this could be amply illustrated in and around the City of London. A report by Paul Valler (1999) in the *Independent* illustrates this point by equating the cheek-by-jowl proximity of wealth and poverty at the borders of the City of London with areas of the Third World. Furthermore, Goodwin (1995) cited the differences between the Broadgate centre in the east of the City, the largest of the 1980s developments, which only came under the City's jurisdiction in 1994, and, the ward of Spitalfields, the centre of London's Bangladeshi community and one of the most deprived wards in London, situated directly north-east of the City. He commented that: 'if the Broadgate development epitomises the emergence of London as a 'global city', then the poverty and deprivation experienced literally in its shadow in Spitalfieds alert us to the huge social disparities that are increasingly evident in such cities' (ibid., 2). In subsequent chapters the relationship between the City of London and the surrounding boroughs will be developed. It will be

argued that the addition of counter-terrorist fortification served to reinforce this disconnectedness between the City and the neighbouring boroughs.

In short, *global* enclaves can be seen to embrace inclusion in the globalisation process whilst at the same time excluding themselves from the rest of the city through their 'hardened' territorial boundedness. As such, fortified solutions can be seen to most frequently 'help protect and enforce the privileges of social elite areas, and areas of economic investment – the corporate office enclaves and new consumption spaces of the post-modern city' (Graham and Marvin 1996, 222).

Today's cities are also increasingly characterised by *local* enclaves, which do not have a global function or reference *per se* but which are critical to the functioning of the city. Examples of these can include shopping malls, libraries and schools, which are becoming increasingly fortified (Davis 1990; Lees 1998; Atkinson 2003; Coaffee 2005; Atkinson and Helms 2007) often as part of broader urban renaissance strategies. However, perhaps the most noticeable manifestations of *local* enclaves are so-called gated communities where there is an attempt to create new communities in privately owned and highly defended spaces. For example, Merrifield and Swyngedouw (1997, 11) indicated how in advanced western cities new technologies and consumer preference led to a dramatic increase in gated communities in the 1990s where:

> The powerful ... are now able to insulate themselves in hermetically sealed enclaves, where gated communities and sophisticated modes of surveillance are the order of the day. Concurrently the rich and powerful can decant and steer the poor into clearly demarcated zones in the city, where implicit and explicit forms of social control keep them in place.

By the middle of the 1990s it was reported that in many parts of the United States one-third of new communities are incorporating such fortifying principles into their design because 'terrified by crime and worried about property values, Americans are flocking to gated enclaves in what experts call a fundamental reorganisation of community life' (Dillon, D. 1994, 8; see also Blakely and Synder 1999). This trend is not just related to the United States. Most advanced countries are undergoing such transformation, though to different degrees. For example Caldeira (1996) showed how such developments were altering the physical and cultural landscape of Brazil. Likewise, Doeksen (1997) shows similar changes occurring New Zealand and Australia whilst, Jürgens and Gnad (2002) and Atkinson and Flint (2004) highlight this 'spatial revolt' phenomena in South Africa and the UK respectively.

Further, from a British perspective, Marxist commentator, David Widgery (1991) described what David Harvey (1996) refers to as 'urban apartheid' in London's East End which kept the 'rich' and 'poor' apart through to 'a series of fences, barriers, security gates and keep-out signs which seek to keep the working class away from the new proletarian-free yuppie zones … '(cited in Harvey 1996, 409).

Between them, new *global* and *local* enclaves are increasingly becoming reference points in the city, creating a hardened geography of fragmented territories that limit levels of contact with the rest of the urban area. Such urban areas can therefore be viewed a 'landscape of defence':

> a landscape shaped or otherwise materially affected by formal or informal defensive strategies to achieve recognisable social, political or cultural goals … [which] may be seen in terms of rich diversity which extends from the loci of violently contested conflict to places heavily invested with symbolic meaning that helps provide a reliable background to everyday life' (Gold and Revill 1999, 235).

Furthermore we might also conclude that all human landscapes can additionally be seen as 'landscapes of exclusion' with the rich and powerful monopolising space, excluding the weak to less desirable environments (Sibley 1995, 4). This can be expressed by the territorial enclaving of the city in an attempt by particular groups to achieve 'spatial purification' (ibid., 77).

The next chapter will pick up this theme, highlighting how certain groups, for their own benefit, are controlling the discourses influencing the proliferation of security measures in the contemporary city. This has become a pertinent issue after 9/11, although it is reiterated that the policy responses to these unprecedented events should be viewed as an extrapolation of the prior trends outlined in this chapter.

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Chapter 3
Controlling Urban Security Discourse

Introduction

In recent years, and in particularly from the 1970s onwards, we have witnessed deep-seated changes in the landscape of many Western cities as a result of successive waves of economic, social, political, technological and cultural transformation (Soja 1989; Harvey 1990; 1996; Watson and Gibson 1994; Scott and Soja 1997; Bridge and Watson 2002; Brenner and Keil 2006). The result of such changes has been the increased development of new urban forms which are commonly profit-driven and security-centred and which have enhanced the fragmentation of the urban landscape (Zukin 1995; Fainstein 1994; Pryke 1994; Graham and Marvin 2001). As Jewson and MacGregor (1997, 1) contend, this has led to:

> …new patterns of possession and dispossession in urban spaces, the production of cultural representations and city images, the evolution of novel forms of political power, emerging patterns of policing and surveillance, the development of partnerships between public and private agencies, the mobilisation of resistance by urban residents and implications for the empowerment of communities and individuals.

Coupled with such physical expressions of change has been the establishment of new forms of urban governance and management as the relative role of the public sector in service provision has reduced, and as responsibility for urban development is increasingly placed in the hands of new forms of public-private partnership and entrepreneurial modes of governing (Harvey 1989; Boyle and Hughes 1995; Gottdiener 2000; Pierre 2005).

In particular, increasing attention has been paid to the specific roles played by key urban managers in constructing new forms of institutional arrangements, governance arenas and partnerships. Such managerial networks in turn influence urban form and design solutions linked to the continual securitisation of the city. These different actors have a variety of different motivations which affect what is built, where, and in what style. It is therefore vital to understand the complexities and interrelationships between such institutions and how they constrain and facilitate action, to properly understand the contemporary urban landscape (Wolch and Dear 1989; Jacobs 1993; Guy and Harris 1997; diGaetano and Strom 2003; Pierre and Peters 2005).

Within the context of urban security being viewed as a combination of physical design and managerial interventions (what will later in the book be referred to

as resilient planning), this chapter is concerned with a number of key ideas. It highlights the extent to which powerful groupings, or individuals, have sought to control the security discourse that is becoming increasingly influential in urban affairs. It will also be highlighted that the power to shape places is often in the hands of a dominant elite who seek to influence urban change for their own benefits and that an appreciation that the 'density' and 'quality' of the relationships between powerful stakeholders can be of significant importance to a locations economic position. In short, as such powerful economic and political elites often attempt to develop 'institutional capacity' or 'institutional thickness' around key issues (Rose 1996; Raco 1999). This is a central idea within this book, which investigates the role of a number of institutions involved in implementing and constructing counter-terrorist security measures in London. This is referred to as the 'inside' discourse and pays particular attention of three powerful institutions – the insurance industry, the City of London Police and the Corporation of London. This will be counterpoised by an 'outside' discourse – a number of more peripheral and less powerful actors who opposed the enactment and enhancement of counter-terrorist security measures in London for a range of reasons.

This chapter will also focus upon recent accounts of the fortification of the urban landscape as a result of such powerful pro-security discourse. The argument made is that in recent years, most notably in the 1990s, these discourses have been disproportionately focused on Los Angeles, providing a dystopian outlook on future city life. The final section of the chapter, moves away from the normative rhetoric created by 'Fortress LA' and analyse the ways in which UK city authorities and agencies of security in the 1990s and early Twenty-First century have attempted to control the urban landscape through a combination of management, fortification and surveillance measures as a response to the occurrence and fear of crime, and increasingly, the perceived threat from international and 'home-grown' terrorism.

Institutional Capacity and Thickness

The capacity of institutions to react and adapt to change is built up in a set of particular circumstances, often related to 'threats' or 'prizes' and characterised by a strong local political leadership (Wenban-Smith 1999; Borraz and John 2004). As such, recent work by urban theorists has indicated that a key characteristic of economically successful regions is the ability to change their institutional structures to cope with changes in a dynamic global economy (Harrison 1994; Cooke 1995; Lowther 1999; Giordano 2001; Streeck and Thelen 2005). This has been commonly referred to as institutional capacity or institutional thickness; terms which are now used almost synonymously to refer to the creation of new networked structures and interactions within a locale by which certain interest groups attempt to assert their influence (Amin and Thrift 1994; 1995; Healey 1997, Henry and Pinch 2001). Institutional capacity/thickness also relates to the quality and permanence of locally derived stakeholder networks which build a framework

through which shared problems and concerns can be addressed. As a result, there is an increasing recognition that institutional capacity matters in relation to achieving the service delivery and planning objectives of the local state (Healey 1998; Healey et al. 2002). This framework argues that the ability of a place to achieve economic success is not simply down to a narrow set of economic criteria. Rather, 'the capacity to "pin down" or territorially "embed" global processes in places is becoming increasingly dependent on a whole series of social, cultural and institutional forms and supports' (Macleod and Goodwin 1999, 512).

Of particular relevance, given the focus of this enquiry are the institutional arrangements within London, and especially the City of London, that have been highlighted as central to its success as a key financial centre (Sassen 1991; Pryke 1991, 1994; Budd 1998 Travers 2003). Research centred specifically on these networks by Amin and Thrift (1994, 1995) noted that an institutionally 'thick' locale is characterised by a strong institutional presence, high levels of interaction and the development of a well-defined power and control structure. They followed similar assumptions made by other institutionalists who attempted to highlight the influence of socio-cultural relations in the economic process (see for example, Granovetter 1985; Hodgson 1988; Belussi 1996). They further noted that institutional thickness, as exemplified in the City of London, was developed by four key factors: a high number of civic institutions; high levels of interaction between social groups; coalitions with crossed individual interests; and a strong shared purpose. This work highlighted that socio-cultural factors are significant influences on securing local economic growth with an institutionally thick locale displaying a high level of institutional capacity, which can be seen as 'the ability of place focused stakeholders to ... make a difference to the qualities of their place' (Healey 1998, 1541).

In this sense the emphasis on the socio-cultural relations that exist within the broader economic process mean that networking and relational webs are regarded as a capital asset, indicating that institutional capacity is seen as a socio-cultural resource (Suh 1999). As Raco (1999, 956) noted:

> Institutional thickness emphasises the importance of local social and cultural relations ... It stresses the importance of the local *milieu* – the socio-economic environment of an area resulting from the interaction of firms, institutions and labour, which leads to a common way of perceiving economic and technical problems and finding respective solutions.

In specific relation to the City of London, Pryke and Lee (1995) further showed how such local *milieu* is central to the financial nexus that has developed in the Square Mile. Moreover they noted that 'economic activity is a social and cultural process – not merely shaped and directed by distinctive sets of social relations but constituted through social and cultural practices … that cannot be reduced to inert stimulus-response models' (30).

It will be highlighted in Part II of this book how institutional thickness was a central feature, which framed the response to terrorism of key institutional stakeholders in the City of London in a number of ways, noting how institutional arrangements served to couple local and global relations. First, it will show how new institutional arrangements facilitated new 'interinstitutional arrangements' (Raco 1998) which can be seen as an attempt to keep the City of London competitive within the global economy, and to remove the negative images relating to the threat of terrorism. Second, it will note how these institutional partnerships were constructed both within the Square Mile and between City representatives, adjoining boroughs and Central Government. Third it will be highlighted that the terrorist attacks and subsequent security responses in the early mid-1990s occurred at a time when the City was attempting to increasingly promote itself on the world stage, given a series of concerns over its global economic position, due to the development of competing financial areas. Importantly it will show the power of certain dominant 'voices' to influence the composition of the security strategies enacted.

Dominant 'Voices'

Institutional research has sought to illuminate the multiple 'discourses' that exist within the city-making process. In this context a discourse refers simply to the recognisable agendas of individuals and institutions (such as economic development, localism, conservation, transport improvement, cultural promotion and urban renaissance). These agendas overlap, which can cause the establishment of discourse coalitions or 'communities of interest' (in the case of this book, the defence of London against terrorism).

   A related term is perhaps more appropriate for the analysis of the governance of crime prevention and for the concern with dealing with complex problems like countering terrorism: a community of practice (CoP). This is a term that has evolved in the business management literature and usually refers to networks that are formed which have an explicit focus on problem solving, knowledge exchange or developing innovative or creative practices (see for example Wenger and Synder 2000; Roberts 2006). Wenger (1998) argued a community of practice defines itself along three dimensions:

- What it is about—its *joint enterprise* as understood and continually renegotiated by its members;
- How it functions—the relationships of *mutual engagement* that bind members together into a social entity;
- What capability it has produced—the *shared repertoire* of communal resources (routines, sensibilities, artifacts, vocabulary, styles, etc.) that members have developed over time.

CoPs, he further notes, 'develop around things that matter to people' and 'as a result, their practices reflect the members' own understanding of what is

important. As Koliba and Gajda (2009, 97) further highlight, CoPs have emerged 'as a potentially powerful unit of analysis linking the individual and the collective because it situates the role of learning, knowledge transfer, and participation among people as the central enterprise of collective action'.

Within any locale where such a discourse coalition or CoP exists there might, at a general level, 'inside' and 'outside' discourses. The inside discourse in this sense refers to the practices, behaviour and decisions of actors central to developing institutional thickness and capacity. The decisions of the inside discourse are constantly questioned and negotiated by the outside discourse, which consists of the less powerful institutional voices and pressure groups. Often these 'minority voices' are dismissed, or their views marginalised, meaning the inside discourse comes to dominate, thus simplifying the planning process considerably by reducing consultation and limiting public protest. What the institutional approach to city management indicates is that collaboration between different discourses, representing different interests, can, and should, create a layer of cultural formation or a shared 'frame of reference' (Jacobs 1994; Phelps and Tewdwr-Jones 1998; Healey 1998). For example, Healey (1999, 1) noted that policy discourses are tied into institutional work where new relationships are built up and new frames of reference established:

> Policy processes are viewed as a product of complex social relationships through which 'political communities' articulate ideas and frames of reference which guide the way collective resources … and rules … are deployed … These ideas and the frames of reference within which they become embedded (policy discourses) carry power into the fine grain of action (the practices of agency) …

The institutional capacity/thickness perspective tries to show how the development of new institutional structures helps to counter collective concerns and reduce the vulnerability (and hence increase the competitiveness) of local territories. However, most research in this field fails to note the danger that certain urban managers are over-represented or are all-powerful in the webs of institutional arrangements, leading to domination of local agendas by a dominant institutional elite (inside discourse) which enhances, rather than reduces, local conflicts, often producing a great deal of mistrust about local politicians and planners and policy makers in the process (Rowe and Devanney 2003; Coaffee and Healey 2003).

In short, the relationships between institutions are locally contingent and reflect broader patterns of power in an area. As Macleod and Goodwin (1999, 514) have noted:

> Some institutions are more equal than others when it comes to building and deploying policy agendas … in concrete-complex terms, some institutions posses a 'whip-hand' or are more important than others in helping to construct and cement the thickness.

This, they argued, often leads to a situation where 'the substantive forms of partnership evolve as a politically 'thin' and mechanically driven strategy' (ibid.).

Shared discourses that develop are more often than not shaped by the actions of powerful actors within the network, who seek to determine the decisions of the policy process as a whole. This means 'power remains largely in the hands of those who make the rules about who can participate and on what terms, and the gatekeepers who allocate resources' (Bailey 1999). Dominant institutions therefore drive political actions and associated planning agendas.

Institutional research, however, also highlights – albeit to a lesser degree – how those stakeholders who contest urban policy can challenge the plans and decisions of the inside discourses, and produce and disseminate new discourses. As Healey (1999, 1) noted 'policy agendas are reinterpreted and remoulded to create different discourses which have the potential to maintain alternative sources of power and act recursively on the original frames of reference and transform them.'

It will be shown in Part II how a general pro-security community of interest or not of practice built up within the City of London around the key institutions of the City of London Police, the Corporation of London and the business community (in particular the insurance industry). Their joint concern was to find ways of reducing the physical and financial threat of terrorism. However, it will also be argued that the key managers within this process also had very different ways of pursuing this goal, leading to diverse strategies that were, in some cases, contradictory. Furthermore, it will be shown that a number of institutions and organisations outside of the inside nexus of the Square Mile opposed the plans drawn up by the Corporation of London and the police to reduce the threat of further terrorist attack. Like the inside discourses, the outside discourses were fragmented, embodying a number of different arguments regarding why the suggested proposals should not be implemented. This, it will be argued, led to an all too familiar story of the inside discourses marginalising the outside discourses, with powerful institutions controlling local policy agendas.

Pro-security Discourses and 'Fortress LA'

As noted in Chapter 2, in recent years, new defensible space approaches and the operationalisation of pro-security discourses are once again serving to influence the design and management of the urban landscape with it implied in some quarters that 'form follows fear' (Ellin 1997). For many commentators this represented a broader social shift towards a 'culture of fear', with fear being socially constructed and 'moulded by popular culture and institutionalised in the organisation of everyday life' (Furedi 2006, 3). The response of urban authorities to insecurity has in some cases been dramatic, especially in North America, particularly Los Angeles (LA), where it was argued that the implementation of crime displacement measures have been taken to an extreme.

In LA the social and physical fragmentation of the city is often shown to be very pronounced, and which, according to certain commentators could set a precedent for what it is commonly termed 'postmodern urbanism' (Soja 1989; 2000; Dear and Flusty 1998; Dear 1999).

During the 1990s LA assumed a theoretical primacy within urban studies with an overemphasis on its militarisation, portraying the city as an urban testing ground for anti-crime measures (Davis 1990; 1992; 1998; Flusty 1994; Christopherson 1995; Crawford 1995). Fortress urbanism was highlighted as a key trend, as an obsession with security became manifest in the urban landscape. For example, it was reported that in 1991 that sixteen per cent of Los Angelian's were living in 'some form of secured access environment' (Blakely and Snyder 1995, 1), which was viewed as an ultimate lifestyle choice and a dominant feature of contemporary urban life. The emergence of the fortress city also reflected the transformation of the city in the mirror of middle class paranoia combined with the necessity of economic vibrancy. As Haywood (2004, 115) noted in relation to the renaissance of downtown LA and its apparent blanket security and the privatisation of public space: 'this was the corporate Los Angeles manning the ramparts in a bid to protect its economic interests by excluding those individuals and groups no longer necessary for (or dangerous to) the perpetuation of profit in the city's new globalised economy'.

Davis, perhaps the most cited author on 'Fortress LA', depicted how in recent years the authorities and private citizen groups in LA responded to the increased fear of crime by 'militarising' the urban landscape. His dystopian portrayal of LA in *City of Quartz* (1990) provided an alarming indictment of radical territorial defensive measures, with the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) becoming a key player in the development process (see also Herbert 1996). As Davis starkly highlights: 'in cities like Los Angeles on the hard edge of postmodernity, one observes an unprecedented tendency to merger urban design, architecture and the police apparatus into a single comprehensive security effort' (1990, 203).[1] Here the militarisation of commercial buildings and their borders become 'strongpoints of sale' (Flusty 1994; Dear and Flusty 1999). As the boundaries between the two traditional methods of crime prevention – law enforcement and fortification – have become blurred, defensible space, once used at a micro-scale level, was increasingly used at meso and macro scales to protect an ever-increasing number of city properties and residences through target hardening and advanced forms of surveillance. This everyday militarisation of the city, notes Davis, leads to 'a proliferation of new repressions in space and movement', and 'a zeitgeist or urban restructuring, a master narrative in

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1   In *Beyond Blade Runner – Urban Control, The Ecology of Fear*, Davis (1992/1998) extrapolated current social, economic and political trends to create a vision for the future city in the year 2019, which in this account had become technologically and physically segregated into zones of protection such as high security financial districts and segregated gated communities. He argued that defensive strategies already used in LA need only be augmented to 'perfect' this vision.

the emerging built environment of the 1990's (1990, 223). Here Haywood (2004) also notes security and surveillance are now as desirable as floor space, and given the prevailing conditions, 'we are forced instead to make increasingly public and private investments in physical security' (129).

In his Marxist-infused account, Davis portrays fear and anxiety in LA as symptomatic of the negative consequences of the rise of capitalism where economic disparities have created an urban landscape of cages and wasteland. Likewise, in Dear and Flusty's (1998) account of postmodern urbanism focused on LA, localised social, political and economic inequalities are reflected in the fragmentary and fortified urban form of privatised spaces and 'carceral cities'. Other commentators have also taken up this theme noting that 'as some writers suggest Los Angeles is a crystal ball of capitalism's future, the forlorn dystopia of *Blade Runner* is maybe just around the corner' (Merrifield and Swyngedouw 1997, 12).

Davis's work was elaborated upon by Flusty (1994) who provided a categorisation of the different types of fortress urbanism, which he argued, had thrown a blanket of fortified and surveillance security over the entire city. He referred to the spaces of security as 'interdictory space', which are designed to exclude by their function and 'cognitive sensibilities'. A typology of such spaces is shown in Table 3.1, which highlights how such defended spaces, alone, or in combination, has pervaded all aspects of urban life.

Table 3.1   Typology of interdictory space

Stealthy space	Passively aggressive with space concealed by intervening objects
Slippery space	Space that can only be reached by means of interrupted approaches
Crusty space	Confrontational space surrounded by walls and checkpoints
Prickly space	Areas or objects designed to exclude the unwanted such as unsittable benches in areas with no shade
Jittery space	Space saturated with surveillance devices

Source: Adapted from Flusty (1994).

Although 'Fortress LA' has become a powerful vision for the city, it is important to realise that there are many ways in which urbanism in LA may be viewed. Critics of Davis, for example, argue that he 'contends that nature makes Los Angeles the most dangerous city in America' (Friedman 1998) and that he 'is selling fear and anxiety about LA' (Stewart 1998). Although, not all images of LA are negative most point to the potential for urban crisis. Benton for example (1995, 145) notes that the same urban landscape in LA can depict a variety of kaleidoscopic images and landscape meanings:

> Turned one way the kaleidoscope reveals images of a romantic, utopian Los Angeles. Turned another way, it shows a landscape of fear, inequality, and violence and the struggle to survive. Twisting the kaleidoscope once again, Los Angeles becomes a landscape of impending conflict and convergence, a city swirling with apprehension. All these representations could be accurate.

Despite the apparent omnipresence of fearful and defensive landscapes in LA, others have highlighted that it is important not to generalise about these trends as they appear to be very specific to this particular city (Hall 1966; Merrifield 1997; Oc and Tiesdell 1997). It is to the UK urban scene that this chapter now turns to further investigate how crime prevention and fortification trends have been deployed in a different context.

Relating the LA Experience to British Cities

As noted, recent writings about cities often present the complexity of these contemporary urban transformations as a series of general trends associated with postmodern urbanism. Whilst LA is often held up as a template of contemporary or future urbanism, particularly the 'Fortress' model, it can be argued that its universal applicability implicit in such accounts is misguided (Beauragard 1999; Jackson 1999; Lake 1999).

We should, therefore, be careful about including extreme urban experiences when hypothesising about the future UK city, and when viewing the writings of the self proclaimed LA or California Schools on 'Fortress LA'. As Merrifield (1997) asks, 'do British-style urban trends for instance, really chime with some of the American (Californian) hyperbole?' (59). He continued:

> Are our cities being turned into theme parks or into the dystopian horrors of *Blade Runner*? I don't think they are. This isn't to say that piecemeal commercialisation and McDonaldization hasn't taken place nor that CCTV surveillance hasn't proliferated in shopping centres, in residential complexes and in strategic centres of power … Nor does it deny how these developments have enabled the wealthy to reinforce their power and control over urban space and marginalize the poor and homeless into their own distinctive enclaves (such as assorted Skid Rows, deserted parks and unattended doorways).

Oc and Tiesdell (1997, 194-5) also indicated that British cities could avoid such fortification as exemplified in LA by rejuvenating central city areas:

> Los Angeles' 'fortress downtown', as colourfully depicted by Davis, is probably a singular case where extreme measurements were needed due to the extremity of the city's problems. If the necessary steps are taken in Britain to reverse the decline of city centres then British cities will not have to resort to creating similar fortress city centres.

It is therefore important not let the reported situation in LA (and the United States generally) influence the ways in which we view the British city. As Merrifield (1997, 59) reiterates it is important that 'the hyperbole and the prophesies of doom and dystopia coming from the United States aren't simply used as sloppy catch-all categories or simply mapped on to the British experience uncritically.'

Although the fortification tendencies in LA are far more dramatic than those that have so far occurred in Britain, the prevalence of defensive landscapes in the central business district and in middle class residential communities are increasing trends in many cities in the UK (Graham and Marvin 1996; 2001; Fyfe and Bannister 1998; Flint 2006; Atkinson and Helms 2007). Undoubtedly, defensive strategies employed in the city are becoming more widespread, especially given the recent emphasis on urban renaissance and city centre living.

Easily accessible, safe and well-managed public/private spaces have been promoted in UK urban policy since the late 1990s. Since then UK city centres have undergone considerable regeneration in order to reinvigorate and repopulate these previously neglected spaces. Such regeneration, that attempted to learn from previous less than successful revitalisation efforts, have sought to combine a number of design and management issues into a holistic strategy of 'urban renaissance' (Urban Task Force 1999; DETR 2000; Imrie and Raco 2003; ODPM 2004; Carmona and de Magãlhaes 2008). The discourse of urban renaissance has been associated with a design-led approach to regeneration, although this is implicitly connected with new ways of managing the public realm. As Rogers and Coaffee (2005, 323) highlighted:

> Urban renaissance can be viewed as an attempt to construct new sustainable urban realms, founded upon the principles of social mixing, sustainability, connectivity, higher densities, walkability, and high-quality streetscapes with the express aim of attracting the suburban knowledge and service industrial demographic back to the city.

They continue by linking such urban renaissance concerns to broader issues of urban safety:

> In the UK recent policies of design-led urban renaissance have been concerned with making the environment of cities as a whole more attractive whilst at the same time improving the safety, management and governance of public spaces (ibid., 323).

Ongoing urban renaissance has also brought to the fore concerns over the increasingly changing nature of 'publicness', which according to many is being diluted – or spatially purified (Sibley 1995) – by design and management processes that preferences particular commerce-friendly activities and demographics. This has been most noticeable in the privatised spaces of shopping centres or malls – seen as the 'prototype of instrumental public space' (Reeve 1996, 63; see also

Atkinson 2003; ATCM 2000) but is increasingly being seen in the public realm where the integration of diverse use-values is relatively poor. Here 'single-minded' design concepts of use often underpin these developments focusing on clean, safe and accessible public environments.

This focus on economic use value highlights what Lees (2003, 62) describes as a 'mismatch between rhetoric and lived reality' – that is, 'aiming to bring people back to the city and embracing diversity and social mixing but, at the same time, putting in place implicit and explicit measures that discriminate about who can be permitted access and what activities can be undertaken' (Rogers and Coaffee 2005, 325). Other critiques raise concern about the negative impacts of urban renaissance-related security design and practice on everyday public experience of the city (Holden and Iverson 2003; Atkinson and Helms 2007).

However, the balance has to be struck between, on the one hand, fortifying and managing the landscape so that it actively excludes people, and on the other hand, providing adequate security so that fear of crime is reduced and citizens give the central areas of cities patronage. Examples given in the last chapter from central Belfast and in this chapter from LA highlight extreme examples of how, if used to predominately exclude the 'Other' or the unwanted, strategies of urban security can destroy the public realm and severely influence the marketability of particular cities.

Part II of this book will highlight these ideas in relation to London's attempts to reduce the risk of terrorist attack through the 1990s and in the early years of the Twenty-First century. It will show that those responsible for security had to consider whether they wanted to create a fortified citadel in the vision of 1970s Belfast or LA in the 1990s, or construct a subtler regime of defensive alteration that balanced the needs of security with business continuity. This, it will be argued, resulted in a balance having to be struck between effective and acceptable counter-terrorism features (Coaffee 2008).

The next section of this chapter highlights three overarching and interconnected strategies used by the agencies of security in UK cities to improve safety and security, and reduce the fear of crime. This section will also note how these strategies are managed, as well as the potential negative side-effects of such security enhancement, notably civil liberty concerns and the displacement of criminal activity.

Urban Strategies of Safety and Security

Today, a number of inter-related strategies to deal with city security are noticeable: first, the *management* of the landscape whereby series of spatial and temporal rules and regulations are socially enforced or dictated by the forces of law and order or other key urban managers; second, the *fortification* approach that refers to the privatisation of space through the introduction of defensive measures such as walls, barriers, and gates, which causes physical segregation of the landscape;

third, the *surveillance* approach referring to the control of space through an explicit use of security cameras or security personnel, particularly at entry point to the territory.

The Management of the Landscape

Arguably, in the 1970s and 1980s crime prevention *explicitly* focused upon design measures, with only an *implicit* managerial dimension. Moreover, the traditional managerial approach to safety and security calls for the implementation of greater legal controls, with greater numbers of police who have more power to shape the way in which urban landscapes and community life are structured (Rubinstein 1973; Grogger and Weatherford 1995; Wekerle and Whitzman 1995; Mitchell 1997).[2]

However, perhaps the work which has received most attention in regard to how the police strategically use notion of territoriality to control the city is *Policing Space*, Steve Herbert's ethnographic study of the LAPD (see Herbert 1996; 1997a; 1997b; 1998). This study indicated the significance of territoriality for the LAPD who actively seek to control the spaces they patrol. The importance of territoriality, stated Herbert (1997b, 399), intensifies as power is resisted – 'contested spaces preoccupy the police most' as they create boundaries and restrict access as they seek to regulate space.

Herbert's work, despite being criticised for its lack of socio-economic context which effects the policing regime in L.A. (Fyfe 1997; Marston 1997), does provide insights of use for understanding the key role of London Police in countering the threat of terrorism. First, it highlights how the police were increasingly active in the planning process, forming partnerships with local authorities or community groups, to reduce crime and the fear of crime in the public realm. Second, it highlighted how the actions of the police can be interpreted through the control of space (see also discussion in Chapter 2 on *Secure by Design*). Third, and more broadly, it showed how the 'power of the police is inserted within the fabric of the city' (Herbert 1997a, 6/7). More recent UK based research into how the police, in particular, are seen to take on a risk management role as strategic advisers to planners, project managers and other built environment professionals, on the basis that good design and layouts reduce criminal activity is important in this regard. For example, in their article exploring the working relationship between planners and the police Architectural Liaison Officers (ALOs), Morton and Kitchen (2005) have noted how the police set up an Architectural Liaison Service to introduce crime prevention issues into the planning system. This tool is utilised in consultation with planning applications, as part of the development control process, and in collaboration on individual area-based improvement projects where crime prevention is a significant element in the project design.

2   See also Brantingham and Brantingham (1984, 1990); Zukin (1995); De Souza (1995); Fyfe (1997).

Underpinning this move to embed security features into British development plan work was the establishment of a dedicated unit employing ALOs linked to the 43 polices forces of England and Wales, in order to implement the SBD scheme. However, Morton and Kitchen (2005) argue that the lack of training by police ALOs regarding the planning system limits the effectiveness by which they can work. Moreover, and since 2007, a key role in government counter-terrorism has been given to planners, urban designers and architects who are urged to protect urban areas and their critical infrastructure by designing in protective security features to the design of buildings and public space (Coaffee and O'Hare 2008).

Furthermore, on police advice, individual businesses are now increasingly active in developing appropriate risk management and security strategies. Likewise, the banding together of a number of businesses in order to enact area-based security strategies (for example pub-watch schemes) were increasingly common in the 1990s (Oc and Tiesdell 1999). Sometimes such strategies are formalised under particular local legislation such as Business Improvement Districts (BIDs) (Mallet 1994; Hoyt 2005) which often have an explicit remit to develop safer public and private spaces.In this situation a supplementary tax raised through local businesses and traders pays for improvements to the locality, usually in the form of private sector management/interventions (i.e. security guards).

More broadly, recent critical literature on the changes in public space management picks up on this transfer away from local government and policing to private sector governance (Low and Smith 2006; Carmona and de Magalhães 2006). As the 1990s progressed, there was a move toward the integration of business communities and policing in strategies to create safe and secure urban areas. For example, in the UK, Section 17 of the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act placed a statutory duty on local authorities and police services to prepare and publish a crime audit that also outlines broader concerns such as community safety and sustainable development. Importantly Section 17 also stresses that this must be done in consultation with local communities.

In the 1990s, improving the quality of the city, town centre or large-out-of-town shopping complexes in the form of safety and crime prevention has also seen the growth of city and town and city centre management (TCM/CCM).[3] TCM is often the management mechanism for regeneration schemes transforming central urban areas, although as previously noted, concern has been expressed regarding how such policies and developments overlap with the regulation and control of public space.

Alongside both the increased involvement of businesses and private urban managers, there has been an expanded role for private security firms in the maintenance of public and private spaces. During the 1990s and beyond, the

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3 Partnership building between the public and private sectors is evident in the complexity and diverse nature of the task of TCM (Oc and Tiesdell 1997, 91). Put simply, TCM aims to generate solutions to local problems, managing change effectively and efficiently.

private security and risk management industries grew at a fast rate (Ericson and Haggerty 1997; Loader 1997; Wakefield 2003). For example, Jones and Newburn (1998) indicated that the number of people working in private security in the mid-1990s now approximated to that of the 43 police forces in England and Wales. They described a 'benign co-existence' (181) between the local police force and the private security agencies that tended to operate in different geographical spaces – the police in the public realm and the private security professionals in the spaces of commerce (Coaffee 2003). At this time it was frequently argued that the popularity of security features expressed the increased privatisation of space according to the preferences of the rich and powerful, subsequently helped to fuel the growth of the private security industry (Sorkin 1995; Lees 1998) and such 'partnership policing'.

In Part II it will be shown how the police instigated a series of counter-terrorism procedures in the City of London (and increasingly London-wide), but, were supported by private security personnel and risk management specialists, in the management of security and the establishment of security zones.

More recently the literature on the process of governing public space and the importance of safety in urban development looks at the changing forms of public space management and the transfer of responsibilities to private management and other stakeholders (Raco 2003; Low and Smith 2006). It was during the 1990s that this hitherto less-prioritised management element was increasingly developed. Here, the central argument was that protective security through design, alone, is insufficient, and should complemented by managerial measures in order to improve urban safety (Oc and Tiesdell 1997). The rhetoric of not just creating better public space management 'but safer too' has become part of the broadening 'designing out crime' agenda (Paskell 2007; Raco 2007). Today, effectively managing and regulating the spatial and design aspects of crime prevention and safety is viewed as integral to high-quality places and the renaissance of English towns and cities (see Lees 2003; CABE 2007).

Efforts by both the police and the private security industry to reduce crime (and increasingly terrorism) have been aided in recent years by a host of specific legalisation linked to countering the terrorist threat. For example in the UK we have seen: the Prevention of Terrorism (Additional Powers Act) 1996;[4] the Terrorism Act 2000, which came into force in February 2001;[5] and the Anti-Terrorism,

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4   This Act backed up previous legalisation (1974) permitting random police searches, and for the imposition of police cordons. This act was rushed through Parliament in April 1996 due to fears of further Provisional IRA bomb attacks following the large explosions in the London.

5   This Act provided permanent UK-wide anti-terrorist legislation to replace a number of separate pieces of legislation. It sought to redefine – and in essence broadened – definitions of what was considered 'terrorism'. However, the Act was criticised by many who pointed out that it could potentially turn activist movements into terrorist organisation.

Crime and Security Act 2001.[6] More recent legislation includes the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2005,[7] and the 2006 Terrorism Act which enhanced the powers of the 2000 Act and also made it a criminal offence distribute material that 'glorifies' terrorism. As will be highlighted later in the book these Acts although undoubtedly useful for improving security in London, have also been used by the police to prevent activity not directly linked to terrorism such as public protest (Coaffee et al. 2008b). Finally, and at the time of writing, the UK Counter Terrorism Act (2008) has been passed which increases police powers for countering terrorism. Provisions of this Act include: the removal of the right to silence protection; increased terrorism sentences; the creation of a register and monitoring for those convicted of terrorism related offences; greater powers to seize the assets of convicted terrorists, and, controversially, greater use of DNA samples and fingerprints from those subject to a control order. Given ongoing concerns about would-be terrorists reconnoitering targets before attack, a provision is also include which makes it an offence to take a photograph of police officers, or members of the armed services or intelligence communities. This has attracted condemnation within the press. As one journalist (Vallee 2009) noted, after 16 February 2009:

> In a nutshell, you could be arrested for taking and publishing a picture of a police officer if the police think it is "likely to be useful to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism". Your defence if charged by the crown prosecution service would be to prove that you had a "reasonable excuse" to take the picture in the first place. I can see it now: "If you don't stop taking pictures of me hitting this protester on the head, I'm going to nick you under section 76 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008.

He continued by quoting from a letter sent by the minister for policing, in a letter to the National Union of Journalists in December 2008 to emphasis how section 76 might impact upon the activities of journalists and public protest, by limiting photography in a public place:

> This may be on the grounds of national security or there may be situations in which the taking of photographs may cause or lead to public order situations or

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6   The Act was passed in after 9/11 as a mechanism to tackle new forms of global terrorism especially linked to weapons of mass destruction. It proported to strike a balance between respecting civil liberties and bringing in targeted measures which could enforcement and intelligence gathering capabilities of the security services. The Act significantly extended police powers for example on data gathering and surveillance, holding suspected terrorists without charge and on seizing or 'freezing' suspected terrorist funds. Like the 2000 Act it has been viewed as overly draconian by civil libertarians (Liberty 2002).

7   This Act allows for the issuing of a 'non-derogating' control order which might include restrictions on travel, their use and access to communications equipment, the imposition of curfews, 'house arrest', or in the case of foreign national, possible deportation.

inflame an already tense situation or raise security considerations. Additionally, the police may require a person to move on in order to prevent a breach of the peace or to avoid a public order situation or for the person's own safety and welfare or for the safety and welfare of others.

Overall, this section has highlighted the growth in importance of managerial and regulatory measures which have in the last decade, alongside design features, impacted upon safety and security agendas in town and city centres. It has also highlighted how the police have become increasingly critical strategic players in planning and 'regeneration' agendas, often using defensible space-based schemes as its modus operandi. Finally, it has been highlighted how urban safety agendas have also increasingly sought to involve other stakeholders within the commercial sector and the private security industry. Such an apparent 'holistic' approach to security is now progressively embedded within the latest round of Government initiatives concerning community safety and the development of 'safe' and sustainable communities (see Chapter 2).

The Fortification of the City

The agencies of security noted above, in conjunction with planning authorities, are primarily responsible for the 'fortification approach', which, in some cases, has taken the form of turning office blocks, shopping centres and residential communities into territorial enclaves through methods of restricted access and electronic surveillance. Fortified landscapes have, in selected locations, led to the increased privatisation of the city, and to what has previously been referred to as global and local enclaves, where there is 'replacement of public access with private spaces that can be controlled by security guards and the ability to pay' (Wekerle and Whitzman 1995, 6). This has led to further restructuring of the city 'creating a patchwork quilt of private buildings and privately appropriated space' (Trancik 1986).

   The desire for fortified territories in the city has meant that Oscar Newman's *defensible space* principles (as detailed in Chapter 2) are now back on the public policy agenda in an attempt to make residential communities (and increasingly commercial and leisure areas) in America and elsewhere more 'desirable' by altering the design of areas (see for example Cisneros 1995; Ekbolm 1995; Newman 1995; 1996; 1997; Harvey 1997; Blakely and Snyder 1997; Cozens 2002). For example Ellin (1996) noted that Newman in the 1990s was given a grant from the United States Justice Department to improve security in fifty residential areas. Newman himself (1995, 151) believed crime would be reduced in these areas by 'limiting access and egress to one opening … it was reasoned that such a street system would be perceived by criminals and their clientele as too risky to do business in'. Indeed, findings from this work show that crime has been reduced by 25 per cent and violent crime by 50 per cent (Newman 1997). More recently work in the UK by Cozens et al (1999; 2000) undertook to test aspects of Newman's theory and

found that the design of residential environments was important to the 'image' of the area as well as its perceived 'criminogenic potential.'

Other research results on defensible space principles have differed somewhat, highlighting that residential street closures or traffic modification, while not likely to have a major impact on crime rates, will significantly reduce the fear of crime (Griffiths 1995; Wagner 1997). Indeed, tackling the fear of crime is now becoming as important as tackling crime itself with the fear of crime, aided by the media, perhaps having greater potential to destroy urban communities (Pain 1995). Box (1988) concluded that a number of factors are most significant in contributing to the fear of crime – vulnerability, environmental cues and conditions, personal knowledge of crime and victimisation, and confidence in the police. Fisher (1993) also proposed that methods to reduce the fear of crime could be viewed as methods of risk avoidance, risk management and target hardening. Moreover, some research views anti-crime fortification measures as ineffective. Ellin (1997) for example, edited a series of contemporary essays entitled *Architecture of Fear*, which examined 'the ways in which the contemporary urban landscape is shaped by a preoccupation with fear' as apparent in design, security systems, gated communities, semi-public places, and zoning regulations. She noted that such design often acts as a placebo:

> This fixation [with security] manifests itself in such efforts... despite the evidence that they do not lessen crime ... [and] that such disjointed efforts exacerbate rather than eradicate the sources of fear and insecurity.[8]

Furthermore, Marcuse (1993, 101) argued how city walls can be seen as both 'walls of fear' and 'walls of support', whilst Ellin (1997) herself noted that whilst 'form follows fear' in the city, this relationship can be reversed to one in which fear is seen to follow form. The inference here is that changes to the urban fabric intended to reduce risk and crime, actually serve to exacerbate the fear of crime. As Ellin noted, 'certainly, the gates, policing and other surveillance systems [and] defensive architecture … do contribute to giving people a greater sense of security. But such settings no doubt also contribute to accentuating fear by increasing paranoia and distrust among people' (1996, 153).[9]

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8   See Ellin (1997) back cover.

9   This relationship between fear and urban form will be investigated in Part II in relation to the counter-terrorist measures constructed by the City of London Police in the 1990s. Furthermore the overall impact of 9/11 on urban form will be highlighted noting that this event appears to be advancing the barricading of the city leading to increasing partitioning and citadelisation of the urban landscape in certain locations (Marcuse 2000a).

The Surveillance Approach

The fortification approach is often complemented by enhanced surveillance, particularly closed circuit television (CCTV), which it is argued can deter crime. In the UK the first centralised CCTV scheme was erected in Bournemouth in 1985 to stop vandalism along the sea front. Following this, a series of terrorist bombs, football hooliganism and rises in city centre crime rates encouraged many more local authorities and private businesses to install security cameras (Brown 1995). Horne (1996), arguing for more CCTV in our cities, indicated that 'the demand for CCTV systems has been in response to increasing crime and incivilities which affect the quality of life.' This was due to its proposed benefits – deterring crime, the freeing-up of police manpower (which can then be redeployed), possible insurance discounts, and reducing the fear of crime. He further indicated that it would reduce the perception of insecurity, as citizens will feel that they are in a 'protected area'.

CCTV is now the most common preventative measure taken to stop crime and 'has had more of an impact on the evolution of law enforcement policy than just about any technological initiative in the last two decades' (Davies 1996b, 328). For example Fyfe and Bannister (1996; 1998) noted that at the end of the 1990s over ninety towns in the United Kingdom at that time had centralised CCTV systems. This number was rapidly increasing with over 280 further towns considering introducing similar schemes (Poole and Williams 1996). This meant that in 1996 between £150-300 million per annum was spent on CCTV cameras, equating to 200,000 cameras, many of which are erected in high-rent commercial areas (Davies 1996b, 328). Williams and Johnstone (2000) highlighted that this represented a 550 per cent increase of CCTV in commercial centres between 1994-1999. Post-1999 there was another influential Central Government programme (The Crime Reduction Programme CCTV initiative) which aimed to enhance CCTV in towns and cities in order to re-invigorate central shopping areas. In short between 1992 and 2002 it was estimated that over £3 billion has been spent on CCTV installation and maintenance in the UK (McCahill and Norris 2002).

It is not just the apparent effectiveness of CCTV in recording crime that is highlighted. The visual deterrent that such schemes produce are often seen as a key function. Geake (1993) for example, cited a security consultant who stated 'the effect of CCTV is 95% deterrent and 5% detection'.[10] Warning signs that are commonly displayed indicating that the area is under CCTV surveillance further reinforce the deterrent value of CCTV. However, Home Office research conducted in 1995, clouded this perspective, showing that the deterrent effect became less significant with time, as criminals worked out the direction the CCTV cameras faced (Ditton 1996 Millward 1996).

Amongst the agencies of security, the general consensus is that CCTV is a panacea having positive benefits for an urban environment making it feel more

10   Cited in Oc and Tiesdell (1997).

secure, both in terms of limiting crime and reducing the fear of crime. Durham (1995) writing in *Police Review* gave an account of the success of a typical CCTV scheme in Newcastle indicating that the system has been a 'revelation' in policing. Starting in 1992, the effectiveness of the scheme could be seen in the 50 percent reduction in overall crime in its first two years of installation. The scheme was a joint initiative between the police, the local authority and local businesses. He also noted that non-CCTV areas also benefit, as resources can be increasingly deployed in these areas to minimise any possible displacement effects. In addition, it is reported that people began perceiving central Newcastle as a safer place to visit and work. This was reflected in insurance discounts that were offered to businesses located within the CCTV area. Davies (1996b) further indicated that discounts of up to 30 per cent have been obtained from insurers for CCTV installation in other parts of the UK.

This type of argument has often been supported by the results of surveys carried out by the UK Home Office and the police, which support the implementation of centralised CCTV systems. Research carried out by the Police Authority for Northern Ireland prior to the activation of the Belfast CCTV scheme in December 1995 (see Chapter 2) indicated that the public supported the scheme. Out of nearly 1500 full and partial interviews, 89 per cent of respondents were broadly in favour of the scheme with only 7 per cent against it. Of further note, 98 per cent of those over the age of 65 were in favour of the scheme and 83 per cent thought that CCTV did *not* represent and infringement of their personnel freedom.[11]

The Home Office during the 1990s provide significant funding for the installation of CCTV. For example they made £5 million available through a 1994/95 initiative (Home Office 1994) for the installation of such camera networks. Additional financing in the following years has also been forthcoming (Horne 1996; Williams and Johnstone 2000). It is estimated that during the 1990s the Home Office spent 78 per cent of it crime prevention budget on installing CCTV (Norris and Armstrong 1999; Murakami Wood et al. 2006).

However, many commentators have subsequently highlighted what they consider to be the negative impacts of CCTV, mainly regarding how it reorders and controls urban life (Lyon 1994; Sorkin 1995; Soja 2000). Such accounts have drawn attention to the growth of surveillance technologies viewing it pessimistically with surveillance signifying social control (Marx 1985; Lyon 1994; Davies 1996a; Norris and Armstrong 1999). The intense surveillance is viewed by some commentators as creating 'a carceral city', a collection of surveillant nodes designed to impose a particular model of conduct and disciplinary adherence on its inhabitants' (Soja 1995, 25). The plethora of surveillance technologies within the city are seen to evoke fears of an Orwellian society with a 'Big Brother', or rather a variety of 'Little Brothers' (Lyon 1994, 53).

Moreover, centralised CCTV systems are often equated with Jeremy Bentham's Panoptican prison idea first formulated in 1791, and seen as a metaphor for control of urban space (Dandeker 1990; Lyon 1994; Bosovic 1995; Marx 1995; Fyfe and

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11   Police Authority for Northern Ireland, opinion poll on CCTV (1995).

Bannister 1996).[12] As Davies (1996, 17) stated, 'CCTV … creates a means of enforcing public order on an unprecedented scale'. The panopticon concept has now been extended beyond the confines of individual buildings and into the public realm in an attempt to control urban space (Oc and Tiesdell 1997).

Indeed, Steve Graham writing in 1999 argued that CCTV was fast becoming 'the fifth utility' – an integral part of the infrastructure of our cities alongside, water, gas, electricity and ICT networks (Graham 1999; see also Norris and Armstrong 1999; Johnston 2002). Perhaps most notably CCTV has become integrated within many traffic management systems. For example, systems around, and within, the City of London, which will be described in detail in subsequent chapters, was one of the first such systems to use digital CCTV technology to automatically read the number plates of vehicles entering or exiting particular areas. Such Automated Number Plate Recognition systems (ANPR) are now highly advanced and reliable in terms of identification rates (McCahill and Norris 2002) and have been rolled out nationwide in the UK (Coaffee 2006). Today, the technology backing up CCTV is being developed around digitalised and biometric technology, in particularly the ability to identify facial features (Lyon 2002). Such systems can instantly compare an image of a face with a database of suspected terrorists or anyone else. For example, a system of 100 biometric cameras was reportedly suggested for Times Square, New York, in the aftermath of 9/11, to scan the faces of pedestrians and then to compare these to a database of suspects (Rosen 2001). As will be detailed, similar suggestions were also made in relation to updating the CCTV networks in the City of London. 9/11 has undoubtedly proved a catalytic event for the mass introduction of hi-tech surveillance systems – a 'surveillance surge' with the intensification and expansion of existing systems (Wood et al. 2003; see also Graham and Wood 2003; Lyon 2003). As Murakami Wood et al. (2006) in *A Report on the Surveillance Society* for the Information Commissioner, noted:

> Following the most recent surge of CCTV installation from the early 1990s, prompted by attempts to reverse the decline of city centre shopping districts as well as fear of terrorism, crime, there may now be as many as 4.2 million CCTV cameras in Britain: one for every fourteen people, and a person can be captured on over three hundred cameras each day.

They further highlight a recent Home Office report that concluded that 'the CCTV schemes that have been assessed had little overall effect on crime levels' (Gill and Spriggs 2005, 60-61).

Civil libertarians have also been worried about issues surrounding the accountability and monitoring of such schemes. A Home Office survey in the early 1990s (cited in Honess and Charman 1992) indicated that over 50 per cent of

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12   In Bentham's original idea, prison inmates were to be constantly under the gaze of the prison officer but could never see if they were actually being watched. An impression of omnipresence was constructed, intended to modify behaviour.

respondents felt neither the government nor private businesses should be allowed to install CCTV without public consultation; 72 per cent thought the CCTV cameras could be abused by the wrong people; 39 per cent had a distrust of the CCTV system *per se*; and perhaps most importantly, 37 per cent felt that in the future there was a danger that the system could be used by the government to control people. Subsequently, the Local Government Information Unit (1996) drew up a code of practice for the installation and use of CCTV, although regulation in the UK was minimal until 1998, when CCTV was subject to some nominal legal requirements under the Crime and Disorder Act Human Rights Act, and Data Protection Act (Coaffee et al. 2008).

Others have highlighted the potential negative impact of CCTV on police procedure meaning that alternative 'community' methods of crime prevention are often seen as secondary, as CCTV is, 'waved aloft by police and politicians as if it were a technological Holy Grail, and its promises chanted like a mantra as a primary solution for urban dysfunction' (Davies 1996, 328). Public support is nearly always forthcoming. Indeed it is commonly highlighted that 80-90 per cent of town centre users support the introduction of CCTV (McCahill and Norris 2002).

In today's cities surveillance and control limit public access in order to keep city centres clean, safe and well-maintained. Indeed, CCTV increasingly became a key part of a wider narrative or urban renaissance and is systematically embedded with the regeneration schemes. As Coleman (2004, 200) argued:

> The entrepreneurial city is fostering a new urban aesthetic emerging around the creation of privatised spaces for consumption within which proponents of CCTV elaborate a form of 'regeneration-speak' that provides 'confidence' to consumers, tourists and investors ... In the UK, regeneration strategies regularly promote the development and funding of street safety initiatives in which street camera surveillance figures prominently.

Emerging Tensions for Creating Community Safety

In recent years public space management and the requirement for safety and security have produced a series of managerial and design-led tensions which have implications for the 'right to the city' (Mitchell 2003) and potentially more negative issues of the active displacement of people and risk. These centre upon issues of social exclusion; social control; and displacement.

The right for people to use the wide variety of public spaces which make up cities may engender conflicting purposes and tensions (Franck and Stevens 2007, 4). The 'right to the city', premised on a sense of freedom to access streets, shopping malls, river fronts, and more, may be circumscribed by the very regeneration schemes and safety and security policies (e.g. designing out crime) aiming to improve public urban spaces. Access to public space for all has become a key battleground issue as the shift toward the 'privatisation of the public realm'

in response to insecurity takes hold (see for example, Nemeth and Schmidt 2007) and 'has implications for how spaces are governed and controlled, managed and maintained' (Imrie and Sakai 2007, 449).

The literature on public space management is also indelibly connected to issues of social control; of restricted access, or surveilled spaces and of regulating-out dangerous and risky behaviours. Many such social, symbolic and physical controls have their antecedents in US initiatives, such as the 'zero tolerance' policy operated by Major Giulianni in New York the 1980s and 1990s. Most critically this evolving dynamic of social control is commonly expressed by a number of commentators, although this symbiosis between urban revitalisation and the retrofitting of defence and control feature should not be seen as a new phenomenon.

As the 1990s progressed the fortress LA vision spread to other cities as different accounts of the physical and institutional reaction to perceived urban danger were generated. These often used emotive metaphors to express how the search for urban safety and security was creating an increasingly fragmented metropolis with serious implications for everyday life. This was perhaps most forcefully encapsulated in Neil Smith's (1996) use of the concept of 'revanchist' urbanism where urban transformation was seen to involve an aggressive and punitive domination and dispossession of the city's poor and the spaces of the city they occupy. Describing attempts to upgrade particular areas in New York as 'revanchist', Smith drew on the analogy with the right-wing French political movement of the 19th Century. This political movement of the petit-bourgeoisie – reactionary, nationalist and anti-working class – was associated with a revengeful and repressive response to the failed revolutionary challenge of the Paris Commune. Smith suggested that a similarly aggressive attack on the urban poor could be seen emerging in the burgeoning gentrification of the central city. The metaphor of the revanchist city has proved enduring and has been utilised by many commentators in the 2000s to describe what they see as the systematic displacement of, and discrimination against 'undesirable' or 'unsightly' users of public space (Rogers and Coaffee 2005) or the ratcheting up of social control for counter-terrorism purposes (Coaffee 2005). Here we can also see tensions emerging between who those who are 'in charge' of public space management and the citizen – some have referred to this as a broader strategy of new forms of discipline and control in public space management (Columb 2007, 16).

As defensive landscapes *per se* are becoming increasingly widespread in the city, it is important to note how apparently secure spaces relate to other places within the same city. In particular, the danger of defending one area within a city is that the geographical displacement of crime to alternative targets and areas that are not so well defended will occur (Reppetto 1976; Cornish and Clarke 1987). For example McDowell (1999) argued that strategies of urban authorities to remove prostitutes and drug dealers from certain city spaces appear to be offset by a parallel increase in neighbouring areas. Despite the rational choice logic behind crime displacement, it is a highly contested area with many studies highlighting no, or only limited, displacement as a result of enhanced security.

Barr and Pease (1990)[13] suggested that a number of types of displacement could occur: spatial (an alternative location for crime is sought), target (an alternative target sought) or crime displacement (an alternative crime is undertaken in the same locality). Furthermore, Evans (1995, 95) suggested that it is possible to identity conditions under which displacement could occur. These include the motivation of the offender, the availability of alternative targets and the location of low vulnerability targets in close proximity to highly vulnerable targets. By contrast, some commentators have noted that it is difficult to prove that such displacement does occur (Gabor 1981; 1990) whilst others have highlighted that crime prevention measures initiated to stop a certain type of crime often serve to reduce other forms of criminal behaviour in that area (Clarke 1992).

Oc and Tiesdell (1997, 71) further note that the extent to which displacement is likely to take place relates to the 'availability of alternative targets and … the offenders strength of motivation'. They also provide a useful typology of the temporal, tactical, target and territorial dimension of this relationship (see Table 3.2 below). They further include issues associated with benign or malign deflection.

Table 3.2   Types of crime displacement

Temporal displacement	Displacement so that crime takes place at a different time of day
Tactical, functional or method displacement	Offenders employ new methods to achieve the same goals
Target displacement	Where the type of crime committed changes
Territorial, spatial or place displacement	Where the spatial target of crime alters – usually from well protected area to a less well protected area (this is considered the most usual form of displacement)
Benign deflection	A less serious offence is committed
Malign deflection	A more serious offence is committed

Source: Adapted from Oc and Tiesdell (1997).

A further category which we might add to this typology is 'deliberate' displacement. Here we can see certain technological fixes being introduced to public space in an active attempt to remove certain groups. Perhaps the best known contemporary example is the 'mosquito' which emits a high pitched sound and is seen as an 'ideal irritant' to teenagers hanging around, public spaces, such as shop fronts' (Walsh 2008, 122).

Concerns over displacement of criminal and terrorist activity forms a key aspect of security in the Square Mile. As will be shown, as London, and especially the

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13   Drawing on the work of Hakin and Rengert (1981).

Figure 3.1   The vulnerability of the exterior of the ring of steel: the Christmas/New Year bombing campaign 1991/92

City of London, has introduced counter-terrorist measures, the risk has increased at other sites in the capital. This idea of crime transference will be highlighted in Part II of this book. Incidents in Belfast such as the Christmas and New Year's bombing campaign of 1991-92 show how the risk of terrorism was exported to

the periphery of the security zone, where bombs could be left with less fear of detection and without having to pass through security checks (see Figure 3.1).

Drawing on experiences from Belfast, it was feared there would be displacement of terrorist activity to the exterior of the ring of security measures encircling the Square Mile was feared in the City during the 1990s. This subsequently led to further security measures being deployed to counter this threat in the areas directly outside the security cordon.

Conclusion

With the development of new urban enclaves, cities are becoming socially and spatially restructured with a new territorial order controlling and organising space. As Oc and Tiesdell (1997, 16) noted, these:

> … new territories in the central city areas are increasingly privatised as the agencies responsible for their creation seek to create a sanitised environment with certain well-controlled and regulated safe areas or spots.

In general, crime prevention management measures can serve to enhance social segregation through the construction of defended territories. As Harvey (1996, 209) argues, the territorial imperative is of considerable importance to the study of place and community and the construction of the geographical landscape, indicating that the fear of the 'other' 'now leads to all sorts of exclusionary territorial behaviour' in the city. Furthermore, Soja (1989, 150) noted how contemporary notions of territoriality refer to 'the production and reproduction of spatial enclosures that not only concentrate interaction … but also intensify and enforce its boundedness'. This has led to the growth of what can be referred to as 'pseudo-public spaces' where commerce has sought to secure their agglomeration of interests by restricting entry to a given area by means of street barriers (Davis 1990, 226). What was once considered public space is now increasingly enclosed for private benefit. In today's cities there is an emphasis upon the 'jostling of landscapes of consumption, spectacle or power with landscapes of despair, exclusion and negation in our cities' (Badcock 1996, 92).

Defending the city is not a new trend and is as old as urbanisation itself. Today's cities have their own expressions of security forged by a series of managerial, fortressing and surveillance approaches. Since the 1970s strategies to design out crime have been resurrected and hardened, and images of fortified security are now commonplace. In some cases, they have expanded rapidly after 9/11. Indeed, the rhetoric of 'the appearance of being safe is almost as important as being safe' has never been more pertinent (Schmaltz 1988, cited in Jones and Lowrey 1995, 117). As Marcuse (2002a) further noted 'security becomes the justification for measures that threaten the core of the urban social and political life, from the physical barricading of space to the social barricading of democratic activity' (276).

In Part II of this book these ideas will be articulated through the case study of the terrorist threat to the City of London in the 1990s and then through the reaction of London authorities as a whole to the events of 9/11 and the subsequent bombings in July 2005.

Chapter 4

Risk Society, Resilient Planning, and the Global Terrorist Threat

Introduction

For many years social and environmental scientists have studied natural hazards and the need to make contingency for their impact (White 1942; Kates 1962; Burton et al. 1978; 1993). However, detailed study regarding the impact of technological risk has, until recently, not been undertaken to any great degree. Today, increasing emphasis is being placed on the analysis, assessment and response to *both* natural and technological risks. Indeed, a number of sociological accounts in the 1990s suggested that concerns about natural hazards and technological risks have become defining characteristics for contemporary society (Beck 1992a; 1992b; 1997a; 1997b; 1999; Smith 1992; Douglas 1994; Adams 1995). Such accounts argued that 'risk' had an uneven distribution in both spatial and social terms and was increasingly creating definitive physical landscapes (such as flood defences or the proliferation of surveillance technologies in city centres) and social formations (such as environmental pressure groups or exclusive residential communities).

Over recent decades conceptualising the social impact of risk – risk theory – has emerged primarily around concerns regarding global environmental hazards, and has been closely linked to insurance which for centuries has offered financial security – assurance – against risk (Ewald 1993; Adams 1995). As starkly demonstrated by 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina (2005), it is only in recent years that the limits of insurance against certain risks are becoming, in fact, uninsurable. These hazards potentially often have severe environmental, social, economic and political implications, and through the media, the public are becoming increasingly aware of their unbounded nature. This has led to a series of academic and media, debates surrounding notions of risk and their effects on social relations; the interaction between local and global processes; the collapse of the idea of the nation-state; and the rise of pressure groups that challenge the existing social and political order, redefining the rules and principles of decision making (Beck 1995).

This chapter will first explore Ulrich Beck's *risk society* theory and consider how the nature of risk has changed in recent years and is effecting the relationship between society and space. The second part of the chapter deals specifically with one type of large-scale risk, namely the terrorist threat, both during the 1990s and after 9/11. The relationship between aspects of *risk society* theory and the changing nature of the terrorist threat will then be discussed. This draws on a re-working of Beck's original ideas relating them to economic terrorist targeting prevalent in

the 1990s (Coaffee 1996a; 2000a; 2000b) as well as Beck's own account of the changing nature of *risk society* after 9/11 (Beck 2002; 2003; 2008). The third and final part of the chapter outlines the broad policy responses to 9/11, and subsequent terrorist trajectories, through the emerging notion of resilience – the metaphor of choice for governments in outlining their national security and counter-terrorism planning. This, it will be argued, represents a classic example of anticipatory and pre-emptive policy, where intervention is justified upon predictive intelligence and the assumption of inevitable attack.

Contemporary Risk Theory

Until recently the social and cultural factors regarding risk has been hidden beneath a preference for an 'objective' and 'rational' approach to risk assessment (Ewald 1993; Douglas 1994). Risk was seen as 'systematically caused, statistically describable and, in this sense, 'predictable' types of events, which can therefore also be subjected to supra-individual and political rules of recognition, compensation and avoidance' (Beck 1992b, 99). Today, risk has evolved into a concept that goes well beyond the idea of financial loss, although it is still common for insurers to view risk entirely in monetary terms (Dickson and Steele 1995).

Although risk is translated into objective financial terms by the insurance industry, it should also be viewed as a cultural expression which includes individual and public perception of intangible loss. Douglas (1994) for example, from an anthropological perspective, argued that risk perceptions are related to a whole series of cultural factors reflecting a number of economic and political values. As Mythern (2004, 1) notes:

> Economic convergence, political fluctuation and national insecurity have become the motifs of age. We are living in a 'runaway world' stripped by ominous dangers, military conflict and environmental hazards. As a result, increasing portion of our everyday lives are spent dealing with uncertainty and assessing personal impacts of situations that appear out of our control. In one way or another, the defining markers of modern society are all associated with the phenomena of risk. In contemporary culture, risk has become something of an omnipresent issue, casting its spectre over a wide range of practices and experiences.

Risk is often also seen as an unacceptable danger that is economically, socially or politically articulated. From this perspective, risk comes, for example, from the actions of those countries, corporations, groupings or individuals that are perceived as 'bad', 'dangerous' or simply as 'Other'. This has particular resonances with how terrorist risk has been viewed post-9/11 with the demonisation of certain countries and regimes as 'the axis of evil' or 'rogue states' (see for example, Johnson 2002).

In short, risk has become increasingly prevalent in today's society, because as we increase our knowledge about the cause and effect of particular risk events we become more aware, through the media, that such events are inherently unpredictable and chaotic and bound within the processes of globalisation. As Deborah Lupton (1999, 13) notes of the ever-changing contemporary age:

> Juxtaposed against this world of change are the meaning and strategies constructed around risk, which both spring from uncertainties, anxieties and lack of predictability characteristics of late modernity and also attempts to pose solution to them. Risk meanings and strategies are attempts to tame uncertainty, but often have the paradoxical effect of increasing anxiety about risk through the intensity of their focus and attention.[1]

Risk Society

In the 1980s, Ulrich Beck began to consider what society might look like when disputes and conflicts about new types of risk produced by industrial society are fully realised. In 1986 he published *Risikogellschaft* in German, which was subsequently translated into English as *Risk Society – Towards a New Modernity* (1992a).

Beck's work has provided the impetus for academic research in a number of disciplines in the social and human sciences related to the impact of the emergence of a set of newly defined 'mega-scale' risks on western society.[2] The risks Beck referred to were diverse and 'cannot be delimited spatially, temporally, or socially: they encompass nation-states, military alliances and all social classes, and by their very nature, presented wholly new kinds of challenge to the institutions designed for their control' (Beck 1995, 1).

Beck provided a novel critique of contemporary risk. However, this work was itself criticised, primarily for apparent vagueness and pessimism in terms of an irreversible process of degeneration (Leiss 1994; Blowers 1999) whilst Adams (1995) saw *risk society* as being 'no longer concerned with attaining something "good", but rather preventing the worst' (see also Carter 1993; Hall 1994; Boyd 1995). Despite the criticisms, Beck's work illuminates a number of issues of direct relevance to this book:

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1   Many writers on risk have explored its impact upon society, both past, present and in the future through the lens of Foucauldian ideas of governmentality where, in short, risk might be seen as a mechanism by which controlling powers and their institutions might regulate, control and monitor populations. See Lupton (1999) for a good account of this perspective, which is not central to the more practical focus of this book.

2   For a detailed account of Beck's work and influence on contemporary risk debates see Mythern (2004).

- The transition from modernity to a different type of society based on the perception of risk in an increasingly globalised society;
- The role of the media in the identification and social construction of risk and dangerous landscapes;
- The intense social criticism of the institutions of society through 'reflexivity';
- The spatial distribution risk and the creation of distinctive cultural landscapes;
- and, the processes by which new risks reflected by this new distribution pattern are denied the financial security of insurance coverage.

Each of these will now be briefly discussed in turn.

Towards a New Modernity

The central theme of Beck's work was that society is in a period of 'transition' towards a 'New Modernity' in which the logic of industrial production and distribution based on wealth is increasingly tied to the social production of risk. Beck (1996, 27) argued that as industrial society has advanced, a *risk society* emerges which illuminates hazards of global magnitude. This he described as:

> A phase of development of modern society in which the social, political, ecological and individual risks created by the momentum of innovation increasingly elude the control and protective institutions of modernity.

In short a *risk society* has emerged as the hazards produced by industrial society are increasingly criticised by the society that once legitimised and accepted them. As Beck (1996, 27) argued, 'industrial society sees and criticises itself as a *risk society.*' In *The Consequences of Modernity* (1990) and later in *Modernity and Self Identity* (1991), Giddens adopts aspects of Beck's *risk society* theory in which he too argues that modern societies are essentially risk societies. To give a sense of the foreboding that the modern world has introduced, Giddens (1990, 139) employed a metaphor of an out-of-control juggernaut – 'a runaway engine of enormous power which collectively as human beings, we can drive to some extent but which also threatens to rush out of control'.

Both Beck and Giddens therefore talked of a new and radicalised modernity and referred to tendencies which enhance and expand modernity to a global scale but which have direct local affect. As Giddens further noted in *Runaway World* (1999, 34):

> Whichever way you look at it we are caught up in risk management. With the spread of manufactured risk, governments can't pretend such management isn't their business. And they need to collaborate, since very few new-style risks have anything to do with the borders of nations.

Risk and the Media

Beck's thesis, although not explicitly devoted to the role of the mass media in the social evaluation of risk, does contain a number of 'buried references' (Cottle 1998) which highlight how the media can be viewed as important in the social construction and criticism of global risk. As Beck (1992a, 22-23) indicated:

> They [risks] can thus be magnified, dramatised or minimised within knowledge, and to that extent they are particularly open to social definition and construction. Hence the mass media and the scientific and legal professions in charge of defining risks become key social and political positions.

In this situation, the media also provide the site for the contestation of risk: 'The *risk society* in this sense encompasses the science, media and information society. Thus new antagonisms grow up between those who produce risk definitions and those who consume them' (Beck 1992a, 46). This 'gives the mass media a leading role in sounding the social alarm' (Beck 1995, 100).

As well as forming a key feature of the social construction and contestation of risk in the *risk society*, the media are also central to the criticism of technological risk; whilst at the same time inward investment and promotional agencies are attempting to actively construct a non-risk view of a particular society and space:

> The technocracy of hazard squirms in the thumbscrews of the safety guarantees which it is forced to impose on itself, and tightened time and time again in the mass media spotlight (Beck 1995, 1).

The media in this sense perform a critical surveillance role for a *risk society* (Cottle 1998), illuminating hazards that are deemed threatening such as global warming, the proliferation of nuclear weapons and terrorist attack (Beck 2002).

Reflexivity and Foresight

Another key aspect of Beck's thesis concerns the concept of reflexivity by which society can adapt to new risks. Beck argued that *risk society* is also associated with a new attitude towards scientific expertise where society increasingly has to place their trust in expert systems, which tell them what is safe or unsafe. In relation to this, Beck often cited the work of François Ewald and the emergence of the 'assurance state':

> The effective reality of a risk, that which "creates" the risk, is the contestation to which it may give rise... Some are accepted, others are not. Are some rejected because they are more serious, more dangerous than the others? Decidedly not. The idea of an objective measure of risk has no meaning here; everything

depends on the shared values of the threatened group. They are what gives risk
its effective existence (Ewald 1993, 225).

Ewald continued by indicating how the general public has been socialised by
such a system of shared values. The only conclusion is 'an acceptable risk is an
accepted risk' (Ewald 1993, 285) As Smith (1992) further noted, the concept of
acceptable risk is linked to the relationship between voluntary and involuntary
risk taking, and that this leading to a certain risk tolerance being accepted. Using
Ewald's ideas, Beck (1995, 92) further highlighted that:

> All this serves to qualify the purely technological calculation and containment
> of risks, since the calculations are no longer thought of as arbitrators but as
> protagonists in the confrontation, which is enacted in terms of percentages,
> experimental results, projections, etc. Risks are social constructions disposing
> over technological representations and norms. *An acceptable risk is, in the last
> analysis, an accepted risk*. In the process, what appears unacceptable today may
> be routine tomorrow, while previously quotidian practices suddenly fill one with
> anxiety and terror in the light of new data (emphasis added).

Here, the control exercised by expert knowledge is, however, questioned through
disagreements between experts as to the assessment of risk, where threats and
hazards have the ability to continually reshape public attitudes towards particular
risks:

> *risk society* is tendentially a self-critical society. Insurance experts contradict
> safety engineers. If the latter declare a zero risk, the former judge: non-insurable.
> Experts are relativised or dethroned by counter-experts... The former can be
> challenged by the latter, inspected, or even corrected (Beck 1996, 32-3).

As such, experts are seen as attempting to shape maximum acceptable risk levels
to allow business, commerce and ultimately globalisation to progress as the 'the
destinies of markets, and hence companies … depend on them' (Beck 1995, 94).

Distributing Good and Bad Risks

In Beck's *risk society*, assessments of risk made by institutions and the media
have helped create a society in which risk distribution is central. As Beck (1992a,
12) indicated, 'in classical industrial society the 'logic' of wealth production
dominates the 'logic' of risk production, in the *risk society* this relationship is
reversed.' He noted that the concerns in industrial society with the distribution of
wealth and useful resources (which in part has been eroded by the success of the
welfare state in reducing scarcity) have been replaced by a quest for the avoidance
of risk and uncertainty. This creates the need for safety, creating distinctive new
landscapes based on risk aversion. As Beck (2000, 103) further noted, such threats

can 'develop a society-changing power precisely in places where they have not appeared and put into action the underlying political meaning of risk dramaturgy, to act before it is too late.'

In this situation, governments and institutions, most notably insurance, begin to lose their historical foundations and legitimacy. This, as Beck (1996, 28) stated, poses 'questions of accountability' related to the way in which risks are 'distributed, averted, controlled and legitimated.' Society's ability to manage contemporary risk is reduced and the need to privately employ risk management becomes increasingly accepted by individuals and social groups, who then actively attempt to limit the affects of risk (a social 'bad') for example, by moving to 'safer' areas. As Beck (1992b, 112) noted:

> No matter how abstract the threats may be, their concretisations are ultimately just as irreversible and regionally identifiable. What is denied collects into 'loser regions', which have to pay the tab for the damage and its 'unaccountability' with their economic existence.[3]

As Beck showed, there are increased institutional demands for knowledge about risks in terms of definition, management and assessment. As such the increasing involvement of welfare agencies, health authorities, the risk management profession and insurance companies actively changes the way in which risk is defined and managed. Ericson and Heggerty (1997, 6) further noted Beck's work on the distribution of good and bad risks, illustrating how society increasingly focuses on the fear of 'bads' rather than on the progress on 'goods'. They suggested that as fear within society increases, necessitates ever more intricate ways of judging risk. As Hope and Sparkes (2000, 2) highlighted, Beck's risk society thesis 'impute to late modern citizens an array of concerns and worries that suggest a permanently unfulfilled quest for security.' They further argue, from the perspective of everyday law enforcement, the police are no longer seen as the sole agency of social control but as part of a widening fragmentary web of surveillance and control, which attempts to reduce the risk of 'bads'. Here, they also note the heightened importance placed on community based law enforcement where through 'communications policing' the police can encourage residents and businesses to solve their own risk and security problems or can employ private security (Jones and Newburn 1998). In short, a wider cross section of society is increasingly expected to be risk managers. Individuals, families, firms, organisations, and communities are urged to assume responsibility for the security of their property, their persons, and for their own families. Ultimately, as Nicolas Rose (2000, 322) noted, it appears

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3   In contrast to Beck, Giddens (1994) provides a less pessimistic approach to risk distribution. In relation to Beck's concept of distributing 'goods' and 'bads', Giddens (1994) develops a concept which he calls 'active trust' (developed from work on ontological security) where new forms of social solidarity are developed through reflexivity and seek to deal with the occurrence of contemporary risk by either acceptance or affirmative action.

that formal, hierarchical government is increasingly replaced by an emphasis on 'active' citizenship through the self-regulation of conduct: '…individuals and communities [should] take more responsibility for their own security, whether this be through 'target hardening' or by setting up neighbourhood watch.'

Beyond the Insurance Limit

Traditionally, insurance is one possible method of reducing financial uncertainty and risk transference (Dickson and Steele 1995). As Diacon and Carter (1995, 7) indicated, the relationship between risk and insurance is 'one where you exchange a situation of risk for one of financial certainty, since the insurance company guarantees the purchaser, subject to certain provisos, that his [or her] financial position will not be affected by the occurrence – or non-occurrence – of certain specified events.' Moreover, contingency planning traditionally comes in the form of an insurance contract, which objectively assesses the potential risk using statistics to put a projected financial value on projected loss. Risks, argued Beck (1994, 181):

> Are an attempt to make the incalculable calculable. Events that have not yet occurred become calculable (at least economically) through the insurance principle.

One of Beck's key arguments is that in a *risk society* it is not possible to insure against all types of risk. This, he noted, occurs when industrial society becomes a *risk society*, and when a fully insured society becomes impossible as some risks become incalculable. As Beck (1996, 31) indicated:

> Industrial society, which has involuntarily mutated into *risk society* through its own systematically produced hazards, balances beyond the insurance limit (ibid.).

The residual risk (industrial) society has thus become an uninsured society, with protection paradoxically diminishing as the danger grows (Beck 1992b):

> It is the private insurance companies which operate or mark the frontier barrier of *risk society* (Beck 1996, 31).

To clarify this, Beck (1992b, 103) drew a further distinction between actual risks and threats within such a society relating this to insurance coverage:

> Is there an operational criterion for distinguishing between risks and threats? The economy itself reveals the boundary line of what is tolerable with economic precision, through the refusal of private insurance. Where the logic of private insurance disengages, where the economic risks of insurance appear too large or

too unpredictable for insurance concerns the boundary that separates 'predictable' risks from uncontrollable threats has obviously been breached …

From a more institutional perspective, Giddens (1991, 29) also showed how the strategy of objective statistical risk assessment and an attempt to predict or 'colonise the future' has been built into contemporary institutions:

Insurance, for example, has from early on been linked not only to the risks involved in capitalist markets, but to the potential futures of a wide range of individual and collective attributes. Futures calculations on the part of insurance companies is itself a risky endeavour, but it is possible to limit some key aspects of risk in most practical contexts of action ... and such companies typically attempt to exclude aspects or forms of risk which do not conform to the calculation of large-sample probabilities.

Giddens here hints strongly at the practice whereby the insurance industry and other financial services discriminate and refuse to insure against certain risks and certain high-risk geographical areas.

Insurance and the Urban Landscape

As noted above, in recent years a number of specific urban risks have generated much concern for the insurance industry, leading to the exclusion of certain risks and certain geographical areas from policy protection. Urban risk, in this sense, encapsulates concerns over flooding, subsidence and atmospheric pollution, as well as socio-cultural risks such as fear of crime, rioting, and in extreme cases, terrorist attack.

There are however certain economic factors which determine whether or not these particular risks are deemed insurable. First, the insured risk must be measurable in monetary terms to allow a premium to be charged. Second, the exposure to a particular risk must be, what insurers call, homogeneous – there must be a sufficiently large number of separate and independent exposures to allow the insurance companies to compile objective statistics for a particular risk. In the event of an incident occurring this allows the cost to a few to be covered by the premiums of many, allowing the insurer to remain solvent. In short, insurers attempt to ensure that the properties they cover are geographically spread so that only a small part of the total exposure can be damaged or destroyed in a single event.[4]

The insurance industry works therefore by transferring the risk of loss from one person, or area, to another. Insurance is a mechanism for *sharing* risk – in

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4   This situation relates to a fundamental principle of insurance called the Law of Large Numbers by which the larger the group of similar exposure units the more accurate the insurers can be in calculating their premiums.

essence; everybody pays a little so nobody is forced to pay much. However, not everyone pays the same. Individuals are expected to pay premiums in relation to the level of risk each is perceived to represent. Such premiums can be reduced as the insurance industry can also directly influence the risk of loss by encouraging clients to install loss prevention and risk management measures for which the insured often receive a reduced premium.

Conversely, there are certain risks, as well as certain areas of cities, where insurance companies will not offer an affordable premium due to an unfavourable ratio of claims to premiums. The insurance industry can thus be seen to discriminate against 'bad risks' on the basis of economic rationality, a practice which has been termed 'redlining', and which received substantial attention in North America during the 1970s and 1980s.[5]

The limited UK research undertaken in this field has often been critical of redlining practices, arguing that negative stereotyping, particularly of inner-urban areas, unjustly penalises the businesses and residents located there (Feldstein 1994; Threadgold 1995; 1996) with many insurers have been unwilling to insure them at any cost.[6] For example, using leaked material from London insurers, the Association of London Authorities (ALA 1994) accused the insurance industry of redlining in certain London districts considered to be 'high crime', 'high risk' or 'high claim' areas (ALA 1994).[7] Furthermore, using the example of ground subsidence in London, Doornkamp (1995) showed how perceptions of the insurance industry are related to experience and time elapsed since the last catastrophic event. In the UK the decision of the insurer to offer coverage appears to depend on a subjective or institutional perception of the dynamics involved and not necessarily the reality of the situation; that is the statistical likelihood of a risk event occurring.

Whereas the assumptions behind the insurance redlining of home contents and business insurance are now basically understood by urban commentators, a new set of risks (as noted by Beck and others) which have important geographical consequences have come to dominate the insurance and reinsurance agenda during the 1990s and the 2000s. These catastrophic risks include both natural hazards such as hurricanes and earthquakes as well as technological risks such as chemical

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5   See for example, Squires and Valez (1987); Squires et al. (1979). Redlining has also been studied in relation to the lending practices of banks, mortgage firms and loan institutions, see for example, Dingemans (1979); Kantor and Nystuen (1982); Dymmski (1995); Cho (1996); Li (1997); Tootell (1996). The behaviour of these institutions is, however, often influenced by the insurance industry, as lenders will not be keen to do business in areas where insurance cannot be obtained and which are seen as overly 'risky'.

6   After these riots, the Secretary of State, Michael Heseltine, called upon the private financial sector, including insurers, to help improve conditions by supporting government efforts to regenerate the inner-city (Murray 1994; Falush 1994; Threadgold 1995).

7   This report also indicated that redlining is a continuing problem in many major cities in the UK as a result of further civil unrest. For example, the 1995 urban riots in Bradford and Brixton again focused attention on the insurance industry.

and nuclear leakage, the effects of global warming, and large terrorist attacks. Assessment of such risks shows that insurers and reinsurers, anxious to protect their solvency and profits, now see redlining as a strategy that can be increasingly used on both a local and global scale to cope with new types of risk. For example, at the time of writing and following a number of years of serious seasonal flooding in urban areas, UK insurance experts are warning that flood insurance, usually relating to home contents insurance (but often with an excessive premium in high risk areas), will be increasingly expensive or 'redlined'. As Master (2009) notes writing in the *Insurance Daily*:

> Insurance for new properties built in flood-prone areas will become increasingly difficult to find … Developers who build in areas of high flood risk will find it difficult to sell properties because insurance will be prohibitively expensive or unavailable.

The article quotes Stephen Haddrill, director general of the Association of British Insurers (ABI)[8] who noted:

> We encourage the building industry to develop a kite mark scheme, so that buyers and insurers can easily see if a building has been designed to be climate-resilient … Avoiding high flood-risk areas, and building better-protected buildings will enable flood insurance to remain widely available and competitively priced.

Thus, today's insurers, faced with accusations of redlining, operate, often openly, a policy of 'adverse selection' attempting to limit their liability to large-scale risks. This is increasingly done for mega-risks through association with a national government who bears part of the risk. Earthquake cover in Japan (Morimiya 1985), and general disaster protection in New Zealand (Smith 1992) are historical examples of this.

Insurers are no longer able to offer policies on certain risks that break the fundamental rules of insurance, as they are financially immeasurable, non-homogeneous and not limited in time and space. As such, in Beck's terms, we have entered into a *risk society* where certain risks are denied the security of insurance cover. These ideas will be further explored in Part II of this book in relation to the provision of terrorism insurance cover in the UK.

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8   New guidance for planners and developers regarding specific flood prevention measures, including raised floors and flood resilient building materials was published in January 2009 by the ABI. This guidance also outlined the insurance provision available in high risk areas. The new guidelines follow the ABI's announcement in 2008 that over 500,000 small businesses could become uninsurable if flood prevention schemes are not improved and made resilient.

Terrorism and Risk Society

Large-scale risks, such as those Beck refers to, are increasingly denied insurance coverage and become subject to high levels of exposure in the media. These risks necessitate that society, and in particular its key institutions, act reflexively to determine whether or not risk is acceptable, and hence accepted, or whether risk management measures should be implemented in an attempt to reduce the occurrence, and fear, of particular risks. Such risk-reducing measures are most commonly undertaken at the sites of greatest risk, or 'loser regions' as Beck terms them, often serving to alter the material landscape significantly. This section of the chapter will first highlight how terrorism against specified economic targets, common in the 1990s, fits into this *risk society* scenario. It assesses how new threats from different types of terrorism are causing concern in the post-9/11 era and have led to a new paradigm of *resilience* replacing traditional conceptions of risk and emergency management (Coaffee 2006).

Defining Terrorism

In the last forty years, terrorism has become an issue of worldwide attention and a subject of intense analysis by politicians, security agencies and academics alike. This is especially the case in the aftermath of 9/11 where the academic, policy and popular press have been inundated with writings on terrorist activity and threat. However, the term terrorism is inherently subjective and contested, relating to the motivations of the perpetrators as well as the positionality and values of the commentator and viewer, and hence, definitions vary between and within, cultures (Merari 1993). Generalisations about what the concept of terrorism actually is should be treated with a good degree of scepticism. This is not only because of the specific context in which each supposed terrorist act occurs but, importantly, if we over-simplify the terrorist phenomenon there is a danger we also over simplify the counter-response to such acts. As Davidson-Smith (1990) noted:

> An accurate understanding of terrorism is obtainable through precise assessment in a given context. The assessment however must include the complexities of motivation, organisation, methodology and desired goals. It is through a serious appraisal of these factors that the threat may be better understood and more effectively countered.

In attempting to clarify how we should regard terrorism, Schmid (1992, 7) outlined four ways in which terrorism could be defined in which he attempted to escape what he noted was the defeatist position that 'one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter.' As such he distinguished between the academic discourse, the governmental position, the public perception, and the terrorist's own view. Other commentators on terrorist issues have, by contrast, used a variety of different classifications to characterise terrorist motivations, including

'cultural', 'ideological', 'criminal', 'nuclear', 'chemical' 'computer', 'moral' and most notably 'political', 'religious', and 'state-sponsored'. Although a detailed description of terrorism *per se* lies outside the scope of this book (for more information see Dobbs 1990; Schmid 1992; Hoffman 1998; Silke 2004) most definitions contain what Merari (1993) called the three 'cornerstones' of terrorism: violence, political motivation and installation of fear into the target population.[9]

We must however always remember that terrorism as a concept is multifaceted, and that in many Western societies, certain powerful discourse communities dominate definitional agendas. In recent years this perspective has been taken forward by the work of anthropologists, Zulaika and Douglass (1996) in *Terror and Taboo: the follies, fables, and faces of terrorism*. The approach they adopt contrasts with that of most counter-terrorist experts or politicians who, they argue, view terrorism in terms of statistical analysis and adopt a normative approach:[10]

> The discourse of the terrorism expert is buttressed by the scientistic idea that true knowledge must afford the objectivity that allows one to talk about society in terms of universal criteria (ibid. 1996, 181).

They argued that how terrorism is viewed is contingent upon the socio-cultural, and political context in which it occurs, and, upon the observer:

> We view terror as a shifting representation that commands diverse perceptions from different actors and audiences in separate situations. What is happening is simultaneously a *struggle* for supporters of the violence, *crime* for its detractors, *error* for *those* who know the actors too well, *stupidity* for those maintaining satirical distance (ibid. 1996, 89).

They argue that such discourses drive the need for counter-terrorism within society to deal with what is portrayed as an ever-increasing risk:

> Once something that is called "terrorism" – no matter how loosely defined – becomes established in the public mind, "counterterrorism" is seemingly the only prudent course of action. Indeed, at present there is a veritable

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9   For example, the City of London Police defined terrorism as 'the deliberate use of violence and threat of violence to evoke a state of fear (terror) in a particular victim or audience. Usually the use and threat of violence are directed at one group of targets (victims) while the demands for compliance are directed towards a separate group of targets.'

10   Douglass and Zulaika (1996) further argue that terrorism is articulated within society as an 'expert view' backed up volumes of statistical data. They note however, that this is a biased process, as the figures given on different databases, controlled by different countries and organisations, vary considerably as a result of differences in the way violence is defined and categorised. They conclude by noting that 'statistical manipulation is therefore unavoidable. Yet such statistics are the backbone of the entire discourse' (ibid., 23).

counterterrorism industry that encompasses the media, the arts, academia, and, to be sure, the policy makers of most of the world's governments. There is now in fact an "official" line acknowledging that terrorism poses a global threat to world security, which in turn justifies the expenditure of billions of dollars on counterterrorism measures (Douglass and Zulaika 1996, ix).

However we choose to define terrorism it is clear that it has led to both reactive and proactive measures by many governments and organisations. Moreover, in line with the broad tenets of *risk society*, the media can have a significant role to play in shaping public opinion against the terrorist by being supportive of the official government policy and the reactive military response (Alexander and Latter 1990; Dobkin 1992; Paletz and Schmid 1992; Schaffert 1992; Picard 1994; Nacos 2002; Rohner and Frey 2007). As Wilkinson (1997, 53) indicated:

> As long as the mass media exists, terrorists will hunger for what former British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, called 'the oxygen of publicity' and for as long as terrorists commit acts of violence the mass media will continue to scramble to cover them in order to satisfy the desire of their audiences for dramatic stories in which there is inevitably huge public curiosity about both victimisers and their victims'.[11]

If terrorism is designed to have psychological effects and aimed to impact upon an audience, then public fear of terrorism is strongly influenced by the media. As Gearty (1991, 9) further observed:

> The opportunity for communication with the wider audience... is, of course, one of the main reasons why it [terrorism] occurs in the first place. Society wonders who will be next and, in its weakened state is more susceptible to the political message of the moment... in this way terrorism springboards issues into public debate. It uses horror and fear to jump the queue of ideas waiting for public attention.

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11   Wilkinson (1997) further highlighted that the terrorist is trying to achieve four main objectives from increased media coverage: first, to convey the propaganda of the deed and to create extreme fear among their target group(s); second, to mobilise wider support for their cause among the general population and international opinion, by emphasising such themes as the righteousness of their cause and the inevitability of their victory; third, to frustrate and disrupt the response of the government and security forces, for example by suggesting that all their practical anti-terrorist measures are inherently tyrannical and counter-productive; and fourth, to mobilise, incite and boost their constituency of actual and potential supporters and in so doing to increase recruitment, raise more funds and inspire further attacks.

Economic Terrorist Targeting in the 1990s

In a risk society Beck argued that the distribution of wealth is now being juxtaposed with the distribution of risk. Economic terrorist targeting provides a stark illustration of this tendency where financial areas have been targeted or remain fearful of attack. In the UK this was especially the case in the early 1990s where there was a perception that acts of economic terrorism were occurring more frequently in England, as well as globally (Rogers 1996).

In the 1990s terrorism was increasingly targeted against key economic areas. This type of targeting was most prevalent in the early mid-1990s with such attacks becoming less widespread in recent years given the fluid *modus operandi* of international terrorist groups or networks (Oakley 1995; Wilkinson 1996; Johnson, L. 1997; Leader 1997; Sageman 2004). However, at the beginning of the 1990s there was a growing realisation by terrorist groups that by targeting business centres and their commercial infrastructure they could not only cause severe damage directly to valuable building structures, but also to the reputation of the area through the extensive media exposure that was guaranteed. As Timothy Hillier of the City of London Police (1994) stated after London's financial core had suffered two massive vehicle bombings:

> Massive Explosions in London, New York and other major cities world-wide clearly demonstrate that important financial districts have become prestigious targets for terrorist organisations, regardless of their motives. In addition to causing significant loss of life, these bombs severely disrupt trade and economic transactions. Further, modern satellite communications broadcast grisly bomb scene images around the world within minutes adding to the lure of this type of target for groups seeking media publicity.

Other prime examples of this type of targetting included the World Trade Center bombing in New York in 1993 when a van bomb parked in an underground car park exploded killing six, injuring thousands and causing extensive damage; the bombing of Central Bombay in 1993 when a series of 13 bombs were detonated in India's financial centre killing over 250 people; and the Tokyo subway attack in March 1995 when the Aum Shinri Kyo religious sect attacked the Tokyo subway system with improvised chemical weapons containing the nerve agent Sarin (see for example Brackett 1996).

As a direct result of the occurrence and fear of such attack, individual buildings as well as districts in many global cities increasingly attempted to 'design-out terrorism'. Patricia Leigh Brown (1995), writing in the *New York Times*, exemplified how defensive landscapes, based on Oscar Newman's defensible space principles (see Chapter 3) were constructed in certain parts of the city to restrict further acts of terrorism. She relates the responses of the New York Authorities after the 1993 World Trade Center bomb with the thought of controlling the urban area through

ideas of defensive design, indicating how the threat of terrorism is becoming a key determinant of architectural form and urban morphology:

> After the World Trade Center was bombed in 1993, the principles of defensible space design were put into place there. In addition to concrete planters parking is no longer open to anyone. Tenant parking is controlled and includes a hydraulic barrier – a latter day drawbridge – lowered by a guard, only after the proper credentials are shown, and capable of stopping a truck at 50 miles an hour.

The responses of urban authorities and the agencies of security, is however, directly related to local circumstances of place and the tactics of the threatening terrorist group. As Hoffman (1998, 205) notes, 'terrorism is among the most fluid and dynamic of political phenomena … constantly evolving into new and ever more dangerous forms in order to evade security procedures and surmount defence barriers placed in its path.' He continued by noting that effective counter-terrorism must also move with the times:

> Any government's ability to craft an effective response to terrorist attack … will inevitably depend on its ability to understand the fundamental changes that distinguish today's terrorists from their predecessors. Only in this way can the array of required counter-measures be first identified and then brought to bear with genuinely positive results (ibid., 206).

The following section will highlight changes in terrorist targeting towards economic targets in the 1990s, followed by a shift towards prioritising mass casualty strikes against public places in the 2000s.

Targeting the British Economy

As noted in Chapter 2, during the 1970s, and to a lesser extent in the 1980s and 1990s, central Belfast was attacked many times by the Provisional IRA. Such attacks were specifically directed against economic targets and can be seen as a precursor to the 1980s and 1990s Provisional IRA bombings in central London. The experience of Belfast, in particular, provides a historical context for the defensive landscape changes introduced in London, and especially the City of London, as a result of Provisional IRA activity in the 1990s.[12]

During the 1970s terrorist targeting in Northern Ireland aimed to disrupt the economy and took a variety of forms with attacks made against central business

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12   However, it should be noted that economic targeting in England, and especially London, by the Provisional IRA was not a new phenomenon. The Provisional IRA has periodically targeted London since the 1930s, although the City itself was not specifically targeted until recently (see Dillon 1996). For example, on 24 June 1939 the IRA were responsible for a series of attacks against six separate banks in London.

districts, energy and raw material resources, communication facilities, and transport infrastructure (Murray 1982). Such attacks led to security measures being built into the physical landscape of Belfast and other towns (see Chapter 2). In the 1970s the commercial insurers also decided to withdraw coverage for terrorism and terrorist related risk in Northern Ireland as their financial liability was becoming too high. This created financial insecurity, and eventually forced the British government to pay all insurance and compensation claims related to acts of terrorism. This, in Beck's terms, is indicative of a *risk society* where the insurance industry judges that a fully insured society is impossible in the given circumstances, necessitating new risk management measures to be adopted.

Although Belfast continued to be attacked during the 1980s the frequency of bombing reduced considerably. This was due to two key factors. First, there was a change in Provisional IRA tactics, which increasingly saw England as the key target and second, the belief by some that the success of the security cordon around Belfast city centre forced a change in Provisional IRA targeting priorities towards 'softer' targets in England, and in particular, London.[13]

The Provisional IRA in London

It became clear to the Provisional IRA in the 1970s that a protracted bombing campaign in Northern Ireland would not put sufficient pressure on the British Government to withdraw from Ulster. They thus decided to extend their campaign to England in the hope of thrusting the 'Irish question' back into the centre of the political agenda. This would also have the affect of restricting bombings in Northern Ireland. As persons present at the June 1972 meeting of the Provisional IRA Army Council[14] indicated, 'sooner or later there would have to be a drift to another area to take the heat off Belfast and Derry' (Bishop and Mallie 1987, 250).

According to Dillon (1996) the Provisional IRA Army Council decided (in June 1972) that an English bombing campaign should be restricted to targets in central London with minimum civilian casualties.[15] The Provisional IRA 'campaign' was finally enacted in early 1973. In 1973-74 there were a variety of attacks against different types of targets with the aim of 'striking at the economic, military,

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13   Interviews conducted with senior police officers in Northern Ireland in 1995.

14   The controlling council of the Provisional IRA.

15   It is important to note that the Provisional IRA were not the only terrorist group attacking London at this time. In particular the left wing anarchist group the Angry Brigade, were behind a series of explosions outside state buildings and at the homes of leading politicians and businessmen particularly between 1968 and the end of 1971. This group were, in large part, responsible for generating fear amongst Londoners about the threat of terrorism (Davidson-Smith 1990; White 1991) and set the scene for the fear and disruption caused by Provisional IRA attacks.

political and judicial targets.'[16] During this period England, as a whole, suffered over 100 Provisional IRA bombings, killing nearly 50 people. This campaign was followed by a cease-fire between December 1974 and mid-1975. The summer of 1975 saw the renewal of a London bombing campaign with hotels and banks in central London being especially targeted. When this wave of bombings subsided, London was only targeted sporadically as it became evident that the bombings were not having the desired affect on the English population. Indeed, it could well have been seen as counter-productive, serving to alienate opinion against the Provisional IRA, as well as the Irish population in England, particularly in London (Bishop and Mallie 1987).

The bombing of the Grand Hotel in Brighton in 1984 during the Conservative party political conference effectively brought to an end another bombing campaign (1981-1984) aimed at key English targets. The arrests of Provisional IRA suspects following this event broke up the terrorist cells (Active Service Units, or ASUs) acting in and around London, and as a result, no more attacks occurred in 1985-6. The creation of new ASUs in 1987 led to a number of high profile bombs in London between 1987-90. It is at this stage that military and political targets were promoted, such as attacks on army career centres and the assassination of prominent Members of Parliament (Clutterbuck 1990).

In the late 1980s there appeared to be a shift in specific Provisional IRA tactics towards attacking non-civilian targets. The British Security Services cite the bombing of the Mill Hill Army barracks, in North London in August 1988 as the moment when the Provisionals' began to move away from previous strategies. By the early 1990s the majority of bomb attacks were against industrial, commercial or transport infrastructure – in short, economic targets. These were increasingly favoured, partially due to the media attention such attacks received. As Rogers (1996, 15) commented:

> In the early 1990s PIRA continued with a range of paramilitary actions … but there was a progressive move away from the deliberate targeting of civilians and towards economic targeting.

Dillon (1996, 265) further commented:

> Political assassination was always favoured by the IRA, but their main aim for the 1990s was to bring terror to the heart of London with a ferocity never before experienced in the capital.

The Provisional IRA successfully attacked a number of key economic targets in London in the 1990s. Most notably large vehicle bombs exploded in the City of London in April 1992 and April 1993. In November 1992 a bomb was found near

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16   Daithi O'Connaill, interview with *Weekend World* (London Weekend Television), 17 November 1974.

the Canary Wharf Tower in the London Docklands, and in February 1996 they succeeded in bombing South Quay Station in the southern part of the London Docklands peninsula. These bombings, and the subsequent reaction of urban authorities, the police, and the insurance industry, provide the context for a number of the forthcoming chapters.

Revisiting Risk Society Post-9/11

Although Beck's conceptual work in the 1990s covers many aspects which were applied to the impact of large-scale terrorist risk (Coaffee 2000a; 2000b; 2002), Beck himself did not make any substantive comment upon this issue until after 9/11. In *The Terrorist Threat: Risk Society Revisited* (2002), Beck, noted that global terror networks and the way in which they empower governments and states has become a new axis of the world *risk society* since 9/11. In particular he argued that notions of 'trust are replaced with mistrust and as such 'the terrorist threat triggers a self-multiplication of risks by the de-bounding of risk perceptions and fantasies' (ibid., 44). He argued that the key question is 'who defines the trans-national terrorists?,' because this, of course, will ultimately determine outcomes and possible reprisals. He argued that such enemy images are a gross simplification and are constructed by security services and government departments without a semblance of public discourse (ibid.). Beck also draws attention to what he calls the 'speed of acknowledgment'; whereas certain global environmental risks are not recognised or at least disputed (for example the rate of global warming), terrorist risk has a far greater immediacy:

> With the horrific images of New York and Washington, terrorist groups instantly establish themselves as new global players competing with nations, the economy and civil society in the eyes of the world. The terrorist threat, of course, is reproduced in the global media (Beck 2002, 45).

In short, when dealing with the actual dynamics of *risk society*, Beck offers the following argument in relation to terrorism:

> To summarize the specific characteristics of terrorist threat: (bad) intention replaces accident, active trust becomes active mistrust, the context of individual risk is replaces by the context of systematic risks, private insurance is (partly) replaced by state insurance, the power of definitions of experts is replaced by threat of states and intelligence agencies; and the pluralisation of expert rationalities has turned into the simplification of enemy images (Beck 2002, 45).

During the 1980s and 1990s, the attention of those concerned with *risk society*, largely centred upon large-scale risk particularly given concerns regarding nuclear

power generation[17] and climate change. But whilst such perils represented Acts One and Two of the 'world *risk society*' 'play' (Beck 2008), the events of 9/11 represented the commencement of a Third Act, and signalled the 'universalising' of the fear of terrorist attacks against urban areas and their critical infrastructures. In Beck's own words, global terrorism opened a 'new chapter' in the *risk society*, though he drew a distinction between terrorist *attacks*, and the terrorist *threat* which had become 'universal as a result of it' (Beck 2002, 46-7).

The Attack against the Everyday City

Counter-responses to pre-9/11 threats of terrorism, predominantly seen as emanating from vehicle borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) targeting major financial or political centres, often utilised planning regulations and advanced technology to create 'security zones' or 'rings of steel' where access was restricted and surveillance significantly enhanced (Coaffee 2004). The events of 9/11 made such counter-terrorist tactics appear inadequate, and has forced a rethinking of traditional emergency planning and counter-terrorist tactics given the increased magnitude of the threats faced, especially those from chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear sources (CBRN) sources which many terrorist groups have expressed significant interest in utilising in attacks. Equally, however, the threat posed by person-borne explosive devices in a multitude of crowded public places such as hospitals, schools, shopping promenades and sports stadia, is setting new challenges for the security agencies (Silke 2004; Sageman 2004; Pedazhur 2005; Rees 2006; Coaffee et al. 2008a). These crowded areas are seen as 'soft targets' and have common features such as their lack of access control, in-built permeability and the encouragement of public milieu.

   These and similar such observations have been articulated by the counter-terror response of many Western cities through the employment of overt and covert security features into the everyday cityscape, and new managerial systems. The message from Governments in many Western states, appears clear, and is disseminated widely. Defence of the city – of the places where people work, relax and live – is promoted as being central to wider national security strategies (Coaffee et al. 2009).

The Requirement of Urban Resilience

National policy makers and the Security Services now perceive attacks against crowded public places as one of their key priorities in the ongoing 'War on Terror'. As a result, recent security policy has been manifest through anticipatory, precautionary and preparatory security measures and counter-terrorism strategies that aim to fuse risk-management policy-making agendas across a range of scales

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   17   Particularly fears in the wake of accidents such as Three Mile Island, 1979 and Chernobyl 1986.

and stakeholders (Coaffee and Murakami Wood 2006; Coaffee and O'Hare 2008).

In light of this, in the post-9/11 world, not only were new or modified solutions to contemporary forms of terrorist risk sought, but new ways of managing these risks were initiated (Coaffee 2006). As Harvey Molotch and Noah McClain (2003, 679) argued, 'the attacks of September 11th indicate a new kind of threat to urban security and imply the need for new urban knowledge's or at least fresh ways to apply older understandings.' Likewise Beck (2003, 256) argued that in the light of 9/11 we need a new vocabulary and practice to articulate how we manage and govern in an ever expanding *risk society*: 'we live, think and act in concepts that are historically obsolete but with nonetheless continue to govern our thinking and acting'.

There is now an understanding that more integrated approaches are required in order to cope with new security challenges, both internationally and within state boundaries. Consequently, the issues of crime, terrorism and contemporary warfare began to coalesce, their synthesis drawing on risk management, disaster recovery, and emergency planning, articulating a more holistic concept of security or combined multi-hazard management.

Likewise, the language used by political leaders and policy makers has been central to framing the contemporary terrorist threat. The language used in the counter-terrorism effort has similarly been modified. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11 a number of commentators argued that this change in rhetoric was a consequence of the altered geopolitical relationship between the nation state and security. The new vocabulary used by agencies of security placed greater emphasis placed on the defense of the 'homeland'. This relates to what Richard Johnson (2002, 211) referred to as 'defending ways of life' as a 'result of chaotic events which break into the orderliness of ordinary living.' In this context it is now common to talk of minimising the terrorist risk by developing *resilience*.

The concept of resilience first emerged in research regarding with how ecological systems cope with stresses or disturbances caused by external factors.[18] More recently, the term has been applied to human social systems (Agar 2000; Pelling 2003), economic recovery (Rose 2004), and disaster recovery in cities (Vale and Campanella 2005; Coaffee et al. 2008b). Post-9/11 metaphors of resilience have been used to describe how cities and nations attempt to "bounce-back" from disaster, and to the embedding of security and contingency features into planning and governance systems in urban areas (Coaffee 2006).

As such, resilience against terrorism has undoubtedly become a relevant concept for politicians and policy makers alike. Security policy has begun to shift towards proactive and pre-emptive solutions – what Heng, utilising the work of Beck, referred to as 'active anticipation and "reflexive" risk management strategies' at a number of sub-national spatial scales (2006 80). However, as noted in previous chapters resultant policy responses have often amounted to little

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18   For a good review of this, see Davic and Welsh (2004).

more than extrapolations of ongoing trends regarding reducing the occurrence and perception of crime and terrorism. That said, recent literature suggests that such policy interventions occurred in a number of interrelated ways that have 'surged' since 9/11 (Coaffee and Murakami Wood 2006). This, it can be argued, has occurred in four main ways since 9/11.[19]

First, through the growth of electronic surveillance within public and semi-public urban spaces, particularly automated to software-driven systems (Lyon 2003). 9/11 is proving a catalytic event for the mass introduction of hi-tech surveillance systems – a 'surveillance surge' with the intensification and expansion of existing systems and the adoption of ever more refined technologies initially developed for military purposes (Wood et al. 2003). Examples of this include the rolling-out of surveillance cameras developed with ANPR technology to civic CCTV system, and the popularity, despite technological limitations, of biometric recognition (Introna and Wood 2004). This is testimony to the ever-advancing way in which electronic surveillance is now inherently linked to notions of ensuring everyday urban resilience (Murakami Wood and Coaffee 2007).

Second, through the increased popularity of physical or symbolic notions of boundary and territorial closure – for example residential gated communities, airports, defended civic buildings or major financial districts into which access is restricted. After 9/11 many commentators hypothesised that fears linked to the threat of terrorism would speed up the fragmentation of the city into safe and unsafe zones and have a lasting impact on global cities. Others have documented how the institutional response to terror has led to the 'shrinkage of urban space' as communities seek the sanctuary of purpose-built enclosures (Savitch 2005). Indeed, certain cities have taken security to extremes in territorially-focused plans for security across the entire urban fabric. Perhaps most notably the Washington DC plan, *Designing for Security in the Nations Capital* (National Capital Planning Commission 2001), has argued that the variety of ad-hoc security measures put in place around at risk sites should be rationalised, made permanent and be more aesthetically pleasing to advance safety whilst minimising overt fortress-style landscapes (see also Benton-Short 2007; Coaffee and O'Hare 2008).

Third, through the increasing sophistication and cost of security and contingency planning undertaken by organisations and different levels of government, intended to decrease their vulnerability to attack and increase preparedness and 'boucebackability' (Coaffee 2006) in the event of attack. Most institutions have reviewed and re-evaluated individual risk assessments to become more resilient and create more effective emergency planning, including locally and regionally focused strategic resilience partnerships. Full scale testing and post-evaluation of disaster plans is now also increasingly common (for a full account, see Coaffee et al. 2008b).

Fourth, through the linking of resilience and security strategies to competition for footloose global capital. Many cities are now overtly linking security to urban

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19   The following typology is drawn from Coaffee and Murakami Wood (2006).

regeneration, both in terms of the micro-management of new 'cultural quarters', gentrification initiatives and the macro-management of urban image through 'city marketing'. These initiatives which increasingly play on the importance of the 'safety' of cities as places of business utilising security as a vital selling point in their global city 'offer' (Coaffee and Van Ham 2008).

These four categories of urban securitisation have become prominent in policy debates, as cities are scrutinised through the lens of resilience. In practice, this has forced a rethinking of traditional emergency planning and counter-terrorist agendas given the increased magnitude of the threats faced. In response, new counter-measures have been required, focusing on worst-case scenarios representing a shift in emphasis from previous emergency planning philosophies which emphasise stopping the threat at source. Such alterations in traditional ways of working have led not only to the return of designing-out approaches through physical or symbolic territorialisation, but also to developing an affective governance of resilience at multiple spatial scales in order to deal with 'inevitable' emergencies.

Conclusion: Affective Urban Resilience

As noted above, the protection of the city has received widespread attention in recent years as a result of concerns over the impact of natural hazards or a large-scale terrorist attack on the functioning of large urban areas. Recent initiatives to protect the built environment have focused on the capability of the urban landscape, and its urban managers to both resist and recover rapidly following disastrous events. However, Dainty and Bosher (2008) have suggested that the nature of the interaction in the UK between those who plan, design, construct, operate and maintain the built environment provides a problematic context within which to integrate urban resilience. Attaining urban resilience will therefore demand a paradigm shift in the way that built environment professionals integrate their activities and interact with the communities within which built assets reside (Coaffee and Bosher 2008). As David Godschalk (2003, 142) argues:

> If we are to take the achievement of urban resilience seriously, we need to build
> the goal of the resilient city into the everyday practice of city planners, engineers,
> architects, emergency managers, developers and other urban professionals.

Recent years have witnessed a shift to a more transdisciplinary concept of resilience that integrates the physical (both built and natural) and socio-political aspects of resilience. This change has been key because the socio-political aspects are arguably as important to the attainment of resilience as the physical aspects. Resilient planning and engineering also demands a more resilient infrastructural context with regard to the professions and the structures and processes which govern construction activity (Bosher 2008). Therefore, a resilient built environment should be designed, located, built, operated and maintained in a way that maximises

the ability of built assets, associated support systems (physical and institutional) and the people that reside or work there, to withstand, recover from, and mitigate the impacts of extreme natural and human-induced hazards (Coaffee and Bosher 2008).

In short, embedding resilience in the planning and design of cities requires not just engineering and planning solutions to 'harden' buildings from potential attack, but also systems of governance that seek a co-ordinated effort amongst built environment professionals. As Richard Little (2004, 55) has noted, resilience is not just about physical robustness or designing out risk. A fully inclusive governance system can be enacted for dealing with resilience:

> Developing a successful strategy for urban security requires that these interactions be understood and enabled by all involved stakeholders. Security will be neither holistic nor effective if it is restricted to narrow professional or disciplinary stovepipes or if interactions among government officials, security professionals, program and financial staff, and emergency responders occurs only on a product-by-product basis.

Importantly, this push in many cities to incorporate resilient principles into systems of planning and design has been undertaken within a context of widespread urban revitalisation, renewal and regeneration, particularly in the central areas of cities. This 'design-led' approach, referred to in the UK as urban renaissance, and in North America and beyond as New Urbanism, has stimulated an array of new commercial and residential buildings, often making extended use of glass (perhaps the greatest cause of injury in bomb blasts is caused by glass fragments), and has focused upon improving the liveability of urban areas by promoting the greater use of public spaces, greater access to the public realm more generally and the ongoing 'beautification' of many central city areas (Rogers and Coaffee 2005). Conversely, these new spaces of urban rejuvenation, might, paradoxically, also become key targets of terror attack (Coaffee et al. 2008a).

Pre-emptive and Anticipatory Policy

This chapter has noted that in recent decades the emergence of a *risk society* has witnessed an increased emphasis upon anticipatory risk management measures as drivers for organising contemporary society. Today, the mitigation of risk has proved to be the catalyst, if not the defining priority behind an array of policy discourses – from increasing 'civil resilience' (Coaffee and Bosher 2008), developing 'safer cities', securing energy supply, mitigating the impact of climate change and flooding (Howe and White 2004) and perhaps most contentiously, countering terrorism (Coaffee et al. 2008a).

The nature of potential terrorist threats is rapidly changing. With it must change public and private responses to it. Contemporary terrorist tactics now encompasses the potential use of weapons of mass destruction, specific types of criminal activity,

hostage-taking, political assassination, suicide and mass causality attacks, and even civil rights or single-issue (e.g. animal or parental rights) protests. Likewise targets of attack have expanded to cover crowded public places as well as more traditional military, political and economic targets. It has subsequently led to a change in thinking by policy makers and security professionals with new working definitions and new ways of thinking, seeing and responding to terrorism being developed in response to the catastrophic potential of terrorist attack.

The unprecedented physical, financial and psychological damage of 9/11 (and the bombings on the London transport network on 7 July 2005) have had a lasting impact on the way society views terrorism and how our major cities are planned, run and function (see for example Savitch and Ardashev 2001; Grover 2002; Marcuse 2002a; 2002b). As Graham (2002a) notes, 9/11 'has underlined once again, the critical roles of cities as key strategic sites of military, economic, cultural and representational struggle as we enter this quintessentially urban century' (589). As such, commentators are posing questions about whether we should rethink urban development strategies on the basis of 'worst case scenario' terrorism. Should we seek to generate a 'bunker mentality', construct an 'architecture of fear', create 'exclusion zones', '*cordon sanitaires'* or modern-day 'panopticons', on the basis of what might, or might not, happen? And importantly, will such security schemes, if developed, be acceptable to the public? (Coaffee et al. 2008).[20]

Moreover, recent security and counter-terrorism policies – often badged as resilience – have become increasingly anticipatory and pre-emptive, relying on *affective* 'fact' (to act on or produce an effect or change in) to justify *effective* action (something that is produced by an agency or cause). Anderson (2007, 159) for example has noted how 'fear dread and anxiety accompany the emergence of anticipatory logics of governance …' and how 'heightened concerns about a range of risks, now in almost every conceivable sphere of thought and life are argued to have generated a culture of fear'. Here it is possible to trace the onset of such policy processes to the arrival of the *risk society* – where risk is seen as an unacceptable danger that is often economically, socially or politically articulated, and predicted and framed as a sense of impending doom.

Specifically in relation to the so-called post-9/11 'War on Terror' Greg Elmer and Andy Opel (2006, 477) have highlighted how 'what if' scenarios, relating to the likelihood of the US being attacked again, have been replaced by 'when, then' scenarios. In other words, the inevitability of further attack is assumed, and pre-planned for. Such anticipatory logic of course provides the justification for affirmative and pre-emptive action to remove unwanted or dangerous 'elements'. A number of commentators have also argued that the politics of fear is being manipulated by Governments through 'planning for emergencies' guidance to

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20   It is interesting to note that in the direct aftermath of 9/11 80 per cent of Americans questioned in a *New York Times*/CBS poll indicated they were prepared to have less personal freedom if it meant the country as a whole could be made more secure further terrorist attack (cited in Rosen 2001).

citizens or public 'threat assessment levels (Mythern and Walklate 2006; Massumi 2005). Notably, Massumi (2005) argues that the public US threat-alert system for terrorism is intended to 'calibrate the public's anxiety' and 'make visible the government's much advertised commitment to fighting the "war" on terror …' This is, more often than not, facilitated by enhanced surveillance and intelligence gathering techniques, with varying degrees of accuracy. This is not a new concern. Brian Massumi's earlier work (1990, viii) on the politics of fear highlighted that for some time, and particularly after the Second World War, the 'social landscape of fear' has intensified with a low level 'ambient' fear now insinuating itself within everyday life. Likewise Gilles Deleuze, in his groundbreaking essay 'Society of Control' (1992), argued that since the end of the Second World War a new society – the society of control – has replaced the pre-war disciplinary society where 'enclosures' maintained order through the management of wages and discipline or other regulatory networks. In a society of control, everyday control is more pervasive but hidden and, according to Hardt and Negri (2002, 23), 'ever more immanent to the social field [and] distributed throughout the brains and bodies of the citizens.' Moreover, this means that the society of control is 'characterized by an intensification and generalization of the normalizing apparatuses of disciplinarity that internally animate our common and daily practices …' (ibid.).[21]

As will be highlighted in subsequent chapters, the rolling-out of UK resilience policy as a cornerstone of countering the terrorist threat (and mitigating other risks), has been operationalised largely through a variety of foresight documents, forward looking security strategies, future threat assessments and risk registers, and associated simulated practice exercises, which in affect has attempted to embed the need to be prepared for terrorist threats. This form of anticipatory 'affective' governance, as will be highlighted, also raises serious questions about the power of political rhetoric in shaping policy and the role of citizens and other stakeholders in decision-making and the enacting of policy (Coaffee et al. 2008b).

The previous chapters (2-4) have sought to illuminate a series of key issues facing cities, especially global cities, as urban managers attempt to reduce the risk of terrorism. The proceeding chapters' progress this discussion by focusing attempts at counter-terrorism strategies adopted in London since the early 1990s. Specifically the next set of chapters (Part II) highlights how key urban managers in London, and especially in its financial heart – the City of London – have sought to 'design-out terrorism' over the previous decade. Moreover, it will highlight how this process was contingent upon local histories, geographies and institutional arrangements, as well as the influence of the global economy. It will further note how the defensive measures employed were constantly altered in relation to the perceived threat level and changing tactics of the Provisional IRA and other terrorist threats, and how the provision of insurance coverage against terrorist attack influenced the development of the physical landscape.

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21   Cited in Campbell (2005).

PART II
THE CITY OF LONDON'S RESPONSE

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Chapter 5
Constructing and Reinforcing the Ring of Steel

Introduction

The City of London has always been a defined and contained territory which has required defending at various stages in history, for instance against crime or intrusion or, against economic competitors. The response to the terrorist threat since the early 1990s, combined with the need to remain competitive in the global economy commenced the most recent example of this trend. Following a brief introduction to the built form of the City, this chapter will chart the physical changes to the urban landscape, and the associated strategies employed by the agents of security, primarily the City of London police, that were developed in the Square Mile as a result of the terrorist threat in the 1990s and early Twenty-First century.

Recent attempts to defend the City from physical attack is by no means the first time the Square Mile had been fortified to protect itself and maintain its economic pre-eminence. The City of London was formed in 43 AD as a Roman military base, centred on a rectangular fort, and steadily developed into a leading commercial centre in the preceding centuries.[1] The site was in a good defensive position with rivers on the south (the Thames) and west (the Fleet) and lower lying ground to the north and east. The City was first 'walled' in about 200AD when a substantial defensive stone wall was built around it on the landward side.[2] Enclosing the City from the site of the Tower of London in the east to Blackfriars in the west, this main wall incorporated the north and west wall of the earlier fort, with an outer ditch. A supporting bank of earth against the inner face of the wall completed the defences.[3] Entrance to the City was gained through a number of gates in the wall. These include Ludgate, Bishopsgate, Aldgate, Newgate and Aldersgate. These gates no longer exist but the names are retained in contemporary street names. The City of London at this time could be seen as a classic example of a stronghold, as described in Chapter 2. In time, the function of the City of London changed, from initially that of a fortress to that of a port and commercial centre.

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1 See for example Morris (1994).

2 This wall was more then 3km long, 2.7m thick at the base and at least 6m high.

3 The defences were further enhanced towards the end of the 4th century AD by the construction of a riverside wall and by the addition of bastions to the outside of the landward wall in the east of the City.

Following Roman withdrawal, Alfred the Great in the ninth century repaired the walled defences, creating a fortified garrison town. This wall subsequently formed the boundary of the City of London, which continued to develop into a domestic and international commercial centre. The remains of this wall are still visible today. At this time, markets were created for insurance, shipping, and commodities, which laid the foundations for the City's future economic success.

The Buildings of Global Finance

The trading links between the City and the rest of the world continued to expand especially in the sixteenth century with the development of new trade routes to the East, and the discovery of the Americas. London developed during this time into a mercantile city through the expansion of ocean trade, and by 1700 was the largest city in the world with the City of London playing the pivotal role in this expansion (Duffy and Henney 1989; Corporation of London 1995). This expansion continued, allowing the City to become the world's leading financial centre between the Franco-Prussian war (1870-71) and the First World War (see for example Cassis 1985a; 1985b; Harris and Thane 1984; Lisle-Williams 1984). This coincided with a period of history in which Britain dominated international trade, with the City becoming the 'central switchboard' for the increasingly global market (Anderson 1987, 24). As the industrial revolution progressed in Britain, the growth of manufacturing highlighted the demand for the City's commercial and financial expertise, which was adapted to fulfil its role as a nerve-centre of the Victorian empire. This was reflected in the built form of the City with 'its grand buildings' standing as 'a testament to the City's historic centrality' (Jacobs 1994, 751; see also Daniels 1993; Jacobs 1993).

The inter-war years of the twentieth century saw the partial erosion of the City's pre-eminent position in the world economy through increased competition from America. This competition continued and intensified in the 1950s and 1960s, with further competition from America as well from Western Europe and Japan. However, as Jacobs (1994, 751) noted, 'in the span of half a century the City of London had gone from the centre of an empire with global reach, to one of three urban centres given the privileged designation of global city' (see also Pryke 1991; Sassen 1991; Thrift 1994). This was reflected in its built environment with the increasing construction of buildings of global finance.

In the 1980s the City was 'both a postimperial city and a postmodern(ising) city: it was a city of transition and change' (Jacobs 1994, 751). The role of the City in the advancing global economy at this time necessitated periods of intense development, the most recent of which, in the late 1980s, led to the construction of 'postmodern' office complexes, which became the new status symbols of the City, advertising the wealth and power of the Square Mile. Their development can be linked to the deregulation of financial markets in London in 1986 (the so-called Big Bang), which necessitated new types of buildings appropriate for multinational financial companies. Indeed, in the mid-1980s and early 1990s one-

third of the City's buildings were rebuilt or replaced as competition from other financial centres intensified. As Cathcart (1993, 19) reported:

> In the mid-1980s, after a long period of restriction on new development, the Corporation saw that the electronic markets that followed the Big Bang would require new trading floors and new kinds of building. It looked east and saw just such buildings being planned in Docklands and other European financial centres. If the City did not open the way to change, it concluded, it would be abandoned ... The result was spectacular: in eight years, one-third of all the buildings in the City were replaced.

In short, during the 1980s and 1990s the City of London underwent significant rebuilding reinforcing its position in the global economy through the provision of new buildings which could cater for the demands of modern business. Modernist architecture become antique as the City increasingly renewed itself (Daniels and Bobe 1992). Despite the slowing down of the building boom in the 1990s, individual projects are still being suggested in an attempt to express the character of the City. The new Millennium has once again seen a building boom in the City and on the City fringes with a particular emphasis on tall and iconic buildings.

Whilst noting the necessity of these new buildings, the City has always been concerned with maintaining its heritage identity. This commitment was reinforced by the Local Plan of 1986 which highlighted that preservation of the City's historic character was important to its continual role as a financial leader. As the Corporation of London (1986, 3) noted:

> … the City ... is noted for its business expertise, its wealth of history and special architectural heritage ... [giving it] ... a world-wide reputation ... and distinguish[ing] it from other international business centres. The ... City's business activities, which are underpinned by the benefits of its precious heritage, further the wealth and opportunities of London and the surrounding region, and also provide a significant contribution to the well being of the nation's economy.

This all served to make the Square Mile in the 1990s a unique place of significant tradition and symbolic importance, and one which helped promote the City as 'the place' to conduct business. Paradoxically, it also made it a key terrorist target, given the concentration of high value properties owned by global institutions, which would guarantee significant media attention if attacked. The remainder of this chapter will analyse how the reaction to this terrorist threat led to the development of counter-terrorist security in and around the City. This sought to control and regulate space, reinforcing localisation whilst still attempting to enhance the global economic function of the Square Mile.[4]

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4   This analysis is reinforced by the testimony of those involved in enacting security – collected through primary research conducted at this time.

Figure 5.1   Map of Provisional IRA incidents in the City of London in the early 1990s

The Evolution of the City's Defensive Landscape

In the early 1990s the City was attacked a number of times by the Provisional IRA, although those responsible for security in the Square Mile were also concerned about other threats (see Figure 5.1 and Table 5.1).

The City was attacked by the Provisional IRA, not to cause major loss of life (the two main bombs in April 1992 and April 1993 were detonated at a time when the City was virtually deserted), nor to impact upon the concentrated transport infrastructure to be found in the Square Mile. Instead, it was attacked to cause economic disruption (in particular through insurance claims) and to put additional political pressure on the British Government to remove themselves and their troops from Northern Ireland.

As a result of the terrorist threat several attempts were made to 'design-out terrorism' through the construction of a number of defensive features and modifications to urban design. These can be characterised in seven stages between 1990-2001, which brought about distinct changes to the physical landscape (see Table 5.2).

The agents of security – the police and private security personnel – adopted a series of territorial strategies that gradually became more advanced, and directly impacted upon a greater geographical area both within and outside the boundaries

Table 5.1   Provisional IRA incidents in the City of London in the early 1990s

20/7/1990	A bomb explodes in the Stock Exchange.
29/2/1992	A device explodes at the Crown Prosecution Service in Furnival Street.
10/4/1992	A large van bomb explodes outside the Baltic Exchange in St Mary Axe.
25/6/1992	A device explodes under a car in Coleman Street.
24/4/1993	A large vehicle bomb explodes in Bishopsgate.
28/8/1993	A device is recovered from Wormwood Street near Bishopsgate.

of the Square Mile. These stages therefore relate not just to the direct physical changes that took place but also to the management strategies employed by the City of London Police, who were responsible for activating the major security measures. The City of London Police are unique in the UK as they are responsible to a Local Government – the Corporation of London – and cover a territorial area of around one square mile. The Metropolitan Police control the area surrounding the City.

In short, the following section will highlight how, over the past fifteen years, the City has increasingly been separated from the rest of London in both physical and technological terms (Coaffee 2000a; 2000b; 2002; Power; 2001 Graham and Marvin 2001). It will also be highlighted how the security apparatus was fully mobilised according to the perceived threat level from terrorism which ebbed and flowed through since the early 1990s, as well as the impact of non-terrorist events such as anti-capitalism demonstrations and the development of traffic management schemes for central London.

Apprehension

As highlighted in Chapter 4, the Provisional IRA's main bombing campaign in the 1990s was aimed at economic targets in London with one of the first attacks occurring at the Stock Exchange in the centre the City of London. This bomb exploded in the public gallery causing much damage to the visitor area. No one was injured due to a telephone warning being received. Of perhaps more political significance however was the mortar bomb attack on Downing Street on 7 February 1991, which symbolically carried the Provisional IRA's message to the heart of the establishment in an attempt to force the British Government into political dialogue.[5]

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5   During this attack three bombs were launched from an improvised mortar launcher attached to a van which was parked approximately 200 metres from Downing Street. One of these bombs landed in the garden of 10 Downing Street during a meeting of the Gulf War Cabinet. The other two shells failed to explode. Downing Street had previously erected tall steel gates in 1989, in response to the threat of car bombing (Coaffee 2004).

Table 5.2   Stages in the evolution of the ring of steel

Stage	Dates	Key incidents	Main features of response
Apprehension	1990 – April 1992	• Beginning of IRA mainland attacks against economic targets (Stock Exchange, July 1990) • Furnival Street bomb (February 1992)	• More overt policing especially for major events • Plans for City-wide security schemes
Containment	April 1992 – April 1993	• St Mary Axe Bomb (April 1992) • Coleman Street bomb (June 1992)	• Armed Police checkpoints • Traffic management enhanced • CCTV adapted for counter-terrorism uses
Deterrence	April 1993 – Sept 1994	• Bishopsgate Bomb (April 1993) • Business lobbying for enhanced security • Wormwood Street bomb find (August 1993)	• Security checkpoints introduced • Advanced police-operated CCTV and alert systems • Private CCTV schemes • Increased no-parking areas
Optimism	Sept 1994 – Feb 1996	• Provisional IRA ceasefire	• Downgrading of visible police presence • Checkpoints become permanent • Updated police-operated CCTV
Reactivation	Feb 1996 – Feb 1997	• Docklands bomb (February 1996) • Subsequent attacks in London and Manchester	• Large increase in visible policing • Increased frequency of roving checkpoints • Use of legislation to increase stop and search
Extension	Feb 1997 – June 1999	• Decision to extend the ring of steel westwards	• Expansion of ring of steel coverage • Advanced CCTV employed • Environmental improvements highlighted
Re-appropriation	June 1999 – Sept 2001	• May Day/ anti-capitalism riots (June 1999) • Subsequent anti-capitalist demonstrations • Threats from dissident Irish republican terrorists	• Proactive enhancement of private building security • Better liaison between City police and other Forces • New anti-terrorism legislation

After the Downing Street attack the Provisional IRA began to extend their campaign to cause maximum civilian disruption, for instance attacks against transport facilities. Such attacks included a litter bin bomb at Victoria Station, which injured 43 and killed one person during the morning rush hour. This led to the bins on the London Underground being removed to prevent similar incidents[6]. Perhaps aware of the state of the developing recession in Britain, and the pressure on government finances, the Provisional IRA at this time also began to appreciate the value of inflicting massive economic damage on Britain, although this may have been more a question of 'stumbling' upon a strategy. For example, they would have no doubt noticed that in late 1991 and early 1992 the number of large bombs they detonated in Belfast city centre (see Chapter 2) caused massive costs, both in terms of actual damage caused (with no injuries), and insurance and compensation claims, as well as negatively affecting Belfast's identity as a place of business. This concept of economic disruption was then put to use in London, particularly against the City.

However, the perceived threat level before the 1992 bomb in the City was not considered high enough for the police to establish any special counter-terrorist measures. Before the St Mary Axe bomb the City Police would offer general security advice when approached but had not at this point set up any specific counter-terrorist campaigns or altered the physical landscape in any way:

> Prior to the first bomb we would offer advice, but generally there was not a concerted campaign as such as the City had only been targeted in 1990 at the Stock Exchange. And that was only a small device (Senior Police Officer).

As 1991 progressed the perceived threat to the City from the Provisional IRA was enhanced as bombs continued to explode in London. As such the City Police increasingly felt the need to defend the Square Mile from terrorism. In his Annual Report for 1991 the Commissioner of the City Police referred to the question of likely terrorist attacks by the Provisional IRA, given other attacks elsewhere in London. He noted that 'although we had no serious incidents in the City in 1991, the effects of terrorist attacks elsewhere in London had a significant effect in heightening the need for even greater security …' (City of London Police 1992, 5). In particular the potential for attacks on the City's transport infrastructure was noted given the five mainline railway terminals, City Thameslink, and the ten underground stations in the Square Mile. In response the police significantly enhanced security arrangements for major events in the City, for example through the deployment of a specialist counter terrorism search team. Such high profile policing, the Commissioner noted, had also led to a ten per cent reduction in

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6   This had been preceded by an earlier explosion at Paddington Station, and a threat that bombs were planted at all of London's main line railway stations. Police had been searching Victoria Station (and others) when the bomb went off, and evacuated all the main line terminals in London immediately afterwards for the first time in London's history.

recorded crime.[7] For the first time, a counter-terrorism effort was having a noticeable knock-on effect on general crime rates. It will be shown later in this chapter how this effect, in time, became a central justification for maintaining an overt counter-terrorist strategy.

During the early months of 1992 a number of bombs were planted in and around London to coincide with the forthcoming General Election, which aimed to keep the Northern Ireland issue at the top of the political agenda. Election arrangements thus determined the timing of the Provisional IRA's strikes, whilst economics determined the target of their attacks. In early 1992 over 15 bomb hoaxes were received directly relating to the area covered by the City[8] and in February a small terrorist bomb exploded in Furnival Street in the north-east of the City. No substantial damage was caused though two police officers were treated for shock. The police were now beginning to take the threat to the City more seriously, although little in the way of proactive security enhancement was contemplated until the threat level was heightened in April 1992 by the bombing of the Baltic Exchange at St Mary Axe in the heart of the Square Mile.

At the same time the City witnessed the implementation of a territorial approach to policing strategies at a scale not previously seen in England. With the Provisional IRA increasingly targeting the 'mainland', and in particular at this time commercial and transport infrastructure, the City began to develop strategies to reduce the threat. This was a particularly *ad hoc* approach and was generally only undertaken during high-profile events occurring in the City. The ever-changing strategy of the Provisional IRA at this time also made it difficult for the police to justify, on grounds of cost, significant and permanent landscape alteration to limit access and enhance surveillance opportunities, when the City was considered only one of many potential targets in England. More particularly, overt security in the City would have been politically *unacceptable* at this time.

Containment

The St Mary Axe bomb exploded outside the Baltic Exchange on the evening of 10 April 1992 on the day of the General Election (see Figure 5.1). Three people were killed and over one hundred were injured, with a large area being devastated. A coded warning was given but, according to some police reports, the caller identified the Stock Exchange as the target. This was consistent with other targeting over the course of the election campaign. Immediately after this bomb emergency plans were devised to prevent further attacks. This was the first major bomb in the City, and it was felt that an increased police presence, with officers carrying out spot checks on vehicles, was a suitable and proportionate response:

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7   Police Committee of the Corporation of London, 27 January 1993.
8   Police Committee of the Corporation of London, 27 May 1992.

> After the 1992 bomb we [the Police] were still really only geared to offering advice, but we did create a much higher profile of policing on the streets... but the sort of things we did then were not as structured and co-ordinated as they were after 1993. (Senior Police Officer).

It was not considered appropriate at this time to use advanced security techniques to defend the City. As the leader of the Corporation of London's Policy and Resources committee, Michael Cassidy, noted:

> A ring of steel solution didn't arise then because it was the first such incident. I think people were taking the view that the policing was going to be very front-line and vigilant.

Therefore, putting more officers on patrol was seen as the best operational response. To increase their personnel on the street, the City Police took many officers away from desk jobs and allocated an additional £1.5 million to recruit an extra forty police officers to increase patrols within the Square Mile. In total over ninety more police officers were able to patrol the City streets, and campaigns to recruit and train a number of special constables[9] were initiated. Strategically, the police, stretching the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE)[10] to its limit, instigated a number of short term roving police checkpoints (also referred to as 'rolling random armed road blocks' or 'Operation Rolling Rock') on the major entrances into the City deploying armed officers. These began operating on 30 November 1992 and have been operational ever since. In addition to the random road checks a special team of officers known as the Counter Terrorist Search Team (CTST) was trained and subsequently deployed on 19 occasions during 1992. Searches were particularly thorough before important ceremonial occasions such as the Lord Mayor's show. The number of officers in the CTST continued to grow in 1992 and increased again during 1993 and 1994.[11]

However, in May 1992 a month after the St Mary Axe bomb, an evaluation report presented to a number of Corporation of London committees agreed that the Local Plan and draft Unitary Development Plan (UDP) for improving the City's environmental and movement policies called *Key to the Future*, should be implemented. Under these proposals (drawn up *before* the 1992 bomb) it was planned to pedestrianise a central part of the City around the Bank of England and alter traffic signalling on others, to improve traffic flow and reduce pollution.[12] These policies, as will be shown, became central to the City's construction of

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9   Part-time volunteer officers with the same powers as regular police officers.

10   The PACE and its Codes of Practice provide the framework of police powers around stop and search, arrest and detention.

11   Annual Report of the Commissioner of the City of London Police, 1993.

12   This was finally approved at the Policy and Resources Committee on 18 June 1992 'to aid traffic flow and road safety'.

counter-terrorist security measures in the preceding months and years. For example, an evaluation report of this was presented to the Traffic Management and Road Safety Sub-committee on 13 April 1992 just after the bomb, highlighting that the Corporation's movement and transport policies in the UDP aimed to: reduce the impact of through traffic; remove excess traffic from local roads; improve safety for highway users and pedestrians; and minimise noise and atmospheric pollution.

As a result, after the St Mary Axe bomb, and with the support of the Commissioner of Police, some traffic management measures were introduced on an experimental basis on three City roads which could be carried out under Section 9 of the Road Traffic Regulation Act, 1984:

> The ... experimental schemes … will each contribute to the implementation of the Corporation's policies in the local plans in the interests of pedestrian safety and the improvement of the City's environment (Minutes of the Court of Common Council,[13] 4 June 1992).

At this time no official reference was made in such discussions to the counter-terrorist security implications of these changes as the Corporation were keen to downplay the impact of the St Mary Axe bomb. It was also noted at the Policy and Resources committee meeting on 18 June 1992 that the proposals for Red Routes (no stopping by vehicles allowed at any time) were also being considered for implementation in the City. These were also capable of helping the security effort by reducing the areas in the City where vehicles could park. Furthermore, waiting restrictions on a number of roads in the vicinity of potential 'target' sites such as the Old Bailey, the Bank of England, the Stock Exchange and the Lloyds of London building were extended. This was a direct recommendation of the Commissioner of Police, who used his powers to suspend metered parking around these areas. This affected a total of fifteen roads around these buildings.[14] These minor modifications, together, resulted in a heightened awareness of the dangers associated with unattended vehicles on City streets.

The restrictions on movement around the central core of the City can be viewed as the first attempts by the police to identify particular spatial area of the City for special attention. These measures were officially put in place to ease emergency vehicle access but can be seen as an attempt to defend the most iconic and highest risk targets in the City from potential terrorist attack.

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13   The main Executive committee of the Corporation of London.

14   This was related to decisions made at the Court of Common Council (25 June). The Court of Common Council on 10 September also decided that further traffic management measures related to loading, parking and waiting restrictions, which would complement and offset any adverse reaction to the implementation of previous restrictions, should be implemented.

That said the police wanted to set up permanent vehicle checkpoints on all entrances to the City, which they felt could be undertaken in line with *Key to the Future* policies. However, a combination of legal issues (related to PACE) financial restrictions (primarily that City businesses would not want to pay for such measures) and, public opinion (the fear of a disproportionate response), made this impossible to do at that time. Moreover, there was a feeling that a permanent security cordon would be an over reaction given that this was the first major bomb in the City. Specifically, there were fears that such permanent arrangements could have made the City 'look like Belfast', giving a propaganda coup to the terrorists (Kelly 1994a). Consequently, a heavily fortified environment, overtly highlighting the extent of the terrorist threat, was seen at this time as potentially counterproductive in reducing the fear of terrorism. However, minor changes to the urban landscape did occur at this time including the removal of over one thousand litter bins that could not be made bomb-proof and, reducing the time black refuse sacks were left on the street, in an attempts to reduce the number of places a bomb could be concealed.

However, a minor explosion in June 1992 in Coleman Street further increased calls for improved counter-terrorism measures to be constructed. This bomb, although only a small device, showed that security in the Square Mile could be easily breached. As a result there was a rising in awareness of the threats faced by City occupiers.

In addition to random road-checks and vehicle access restrictions, the coverage of traffic management CCTV (named Area Traffic Control – ATC) was extended and adapted to focus on incoming traffic whilst private businesses were encouraged by the police to install CCTV cameras as another deterrent:

> After the 1992 bomb there was an appreciation that CCTV could play a part in combating crime generally, as well as terrorism specifically, as the terrorists had been caught on film (Senior Police Officer).

The feeling at this time was that the police must not just sit back and wait for the Provisional IRA to act, but must be increasingly proactive in trying to combat the threat. In particular, the police were beginning to liaise with private businesses and their security personnel in an attempt to act collaboratively to counter the threat.

The period of containment after the St Mary Axe bomb can be assessed as a time when there was an increased perception of the terrorist threat. Hence strategies were developed to enhance the control of space, limiting the ease with which terrorists could move around the City, and ensuring that vehicles parked suspiciously could be easily identified. The increased use of access restriction, police patrols and the minor modification of CCTV systems were, however, highly focused within a central core area of the City containing the most high profile institutions. As previously noted, the extent to which territorial control strategies could be introduced at this time by the police was limited on legal and financial

grounds and by the fear that overt defensive landscape features could lead to the City becoming stigmatised and ultimately a less attractive business location.[15]

Despite the proactive management strategies adopted by the police there was still a tremendous sense of apathy from sections of the business community with regard to the security threat, indicating that the perceived risk level was not universally accepted as a City security advisor noted:

> St Mary Axe was a watershed as far as counter-terrorist measures were concerned – it focused the minds of people on what could be done. This advice was taken up by some but others held the view that lightning doesn't strike twice and failed to heed the warnings.

He continued by indicating that this view began to change after the 1993 bomb: and that 'Bishopsgate was therefore much more significant than St Mary Axe as it proved this wrong'.

Deterrence

In the months preceding the Bishopsgate attack, much correspondence occurred between the City of London Police, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (who looked after Belfast's security cordon), security experts, and transport engineers in order to develop a blueprint for a possible 'ring of steel' for the City. This was to be based, in part, on similar cordons in Belfast and other towns in Northern Ireland. The nature of this collaborative relationship between the two police forces will be further discussed in later chapters. It is also important to note that the week before the Bishopsgate bomb in April 1993 a survey was carried out by the Corporation of London to reveal the likely impacts of the major traffic and environmental changes that were planned in line with the *Key to the Future* policies that were due to be carried out in the preceding six weeks (Power 1993). These were seen as supportive of, and in many cases synonymous with, security enhancement.

The City Police thus assessed the potential applicability of introducing significant security measures to control access into selected parts of the Square Mile well before the 1993 bomb. Given the concerns of City occupiers who wanted to avoid being associated with the 'stigma' of an counter-terrorist cordon, the police and the Corporation of London attempted to adopt centralised strategies of security under the guise of environmental and movement policies. This will be further detailed in Chapter 7.

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15   It was felt that this could lead to a situation where 'fear would follow form' as it did in Belfast in the 1970s with heightened security leading to an increased sense of danger being associated with the central area.

Evading the Post-1992 Security Measures

In hindsight, and despite the road checks and other measures set up after the St Mary Axe bomb, the police were well aware of the limitations of PACE which prohibited permanent checks on vehicles coming into the City. By using mobile communications, and a scout sent ahead to tell them whether or not there was a police check operating, terrorists could still easily plant a bomb in the City. During the early months of 1993, with the delicate state of political dialogue aimed at brokering a Provisional IRA ceasefire, the risk of further attack to the City had significantly increased. There were a number of factors which contributed to the increased threat level from the Provisional IRA. First, there was a lack of progress with political talks. Second, it was felt the Provisional IRA had more than sufficient funds, equipment and personnel to launch a sustained attack in England. As such a warning circulated to all police forces in England highlighting intelligence reports that suggested the Provisional IRA might strike:

> I heard on the grapevine that a major strike against the City was a possibility due to the failing of political talks at that time. I know the City intensified their road-checks at this time but they failed to intercept the lorry-bomb as the IRA simply exploited the inherent weaknesses of the random checks on traffic by the Police (City-based Risk Manager).

After a period of political negotiations between Sinn Fein (the main political party of left wing Irish Republicanism) and the British Government had failed to achieve any progress, the worst fears of the police were realised on 24 April 1993 when a Provisional IRA bomb exploded in Bishopsgate in the east of the City. This device killed one person, injured 94 and caused considerable damage, initially estimated at £1 billion (subsequently reduced to around £550-600 million). The location of this bomb was away from the more highly protected core in the centre of the City (see Figure 5.1), which had been subject to additional access restrictions to counter terrorist attack after the 1992 bomb. The edition of *An Phoblacht/Republican News*[16] on 29 April 1993 gave the Provisional IRA's version of events and highlighted how 'having spotted a breach in the usually tight security around the City' they planted their bomb and issued several warnings. They further noted how their 'surveillance operatives' exploited a loophole in security, which allowed builders' vehicles to park on the double yellow lines on Saturday mornings without being searched or asked to move by the City Police:

> IRA surveillance on the targeted site informed them [the bombers] that on Saturday morning's builders' vehicles are allowed to park on double yellow lines to carry out repair work. Most of this repair work, ironically enough, was being carried out after last year's massive Baltic Exchange explosion ... Despite

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16   The newspaper of the Republican Movement in Ireland.

heavy security the IRA volunteers on board the truck bomb took the decision
to move into position. Bypassing a number of police units, they parked their
vehicle into its pre-selected spot immediately adjacent to the Hong Kong and
Shanghai Bank.

It was well known that close to this site, and at this time, the European Bank of
Reconstruction and Development had been meeting. This demonstration of the
City's vulnerability could well have damaged the chances of London being chosen
as the location for the European central bank.[17] As such the Provisional IRA
could not have picked a better day to attack the Square Mile. Through the precise
placement and timing of this bomb the Provisional IRA succeeded in making
sure the impact of the bomb was felt politically as well as economically. As the
Provisional IRA further noted: 'as well as the huge cost of structural damage, the
loss of buildings and the knock on effects of insurance costs, the City of London is
assessing the damage to its prestige as a world financial centre.'[18]

The Reaction to Bishopsgate

Immediately after this bomb the Corporation's Chief Planning Officer called for
the demolition of the NatWest Tower and other buildings damaged by the blast.
He saw the devastation as an ideal opportunity to rid the City of London of some
of its 1970s architecture, constructing a new state-of-the-art structure as a 'symbol
of defiance to the IRA'. The Corporation of London, however, strongly distanced
themselves from his comments, noting that the NatWest Tower was an integral
part of the City's skyline.

   In the wake of the bomb the media, and sections of the business community,
also began to suggest that drastic changes should be made to City security (Jones
1993). An editorial in the *Sunday People* the day after the bomb captured the
popular view that security must be enhanced in the City:

> If we are to wage effective war against the IRA, there must now be an urgent
> review of security at their most likely target. Since the IRA mortar-bombed
> Number 10 from a waiting van, nothing is allowed to park in Whitehall. IF IT
> CAN BE DONE FOR DOWNING STREET IT CAN BE DONE IN THE CITY
> (25 April, 2, emphasis added).

Leading City figures cited in *The Times*, also indicated that a Belfast-style scheme
should be implemented:

> The City should be turned into a medieval-style walled enclave to prevent
> terrorist attacks ... (3) In private there is talk about a "walled city" approach

17   This was eventually established in Frankfurt in 1998.
18   *An Phoblacht/Republican News* (29 April).

to security with access through a number of small "gates" and controlled by security discs … (27 April, 27).[19]

In a similar vein, *The Sun* newspaper published a six-point plan 'which would keep the IRA bombers out' but only at great cost. They proposed a 'ring of steel' directly based on the Belfast model, which they thought would cost £100 million to initiate plus £25 million a year to run. Under this proposal they suggested that access be restricted to 8-10 entrances, which were fitted with security barriers manned by armed guards. These barriers, they proposed, would only operate during the evening between 7pm and 7am and at weekends, as they would be impractical to operate during working hours. During office hours only valid business traffic would be permitted entry. Other security methods this article suggested were an additional 250 police officers on the streets of the City, which, it was estimated, would cost £5 million a year, and a lorry ban in the City. By extension, the article also suggested that a national identity card scheme, a new National Anti-Terrorist Squad and the bomb proofing of vulnerable buildings could also help prevent attacks (see Kay and Lewthwaite 1993).

Other views differed, with some highlighting the pitfalls of high levels of overt security – the fear follows form argument. For example the City engineer, who also evoking medieval metaphors, stated that 'we wouldn't want the City turned into a castle with a moat around the outside'.[20] At this time such 'draconian security was dismissed as a propaganda gift to the Provisional IRA as well as being difficult to implement legally'.[21] Initially, the leaders of the Corporation wanted to take stock of recent events before deciding whether or not to implement such radical proposals. Referring to the day after the Bishopsgate bomb, Michael Cassidy (the Chair of the influential Policy and Resources committee and effective leader of the Corporation of London) noted:

> It's true that on that Sunday morning my reaction was that this is such a radical proposal that I couldn't immediately say it was one that we could embrace and support.

This uncertainty led to a series of talks between the Corporation, the Lord Mayor of London and the UK Government on ways in which the City should defend itself. In May 1993, given the heightened risk of further attack and severe pressure from the business community (especially the foreign institutions) to improve security (see Chapter 7), the police confirmed that they were considering radical plans, in the form of a security cordon, to deter terrorists from the City. The construction of the proposed scheme was essentially the same strategy (*Key to the Future*) that was being suggested on movement and environmental grounds prior to the

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19   See Sivell (1993).
20   Cited in *The Independent*, 5 May 1993.
21   Cited in Ford (1993a, see also 1993b).

Bishopsgate bomb. The emphasis of the rationale behind the scheme had however taken on a very different public persona, being seen as a direct response to the Bishopsgate blast rather than the move towards environmental improvements.[22] In short, opinions on enhanced security had moved from a position where they were rejected after the 1992 bomb – fear follows form – to a reversal of this position where changes to the landscape were seen to reflect the risk of further attack – form following fear.

Since the 1992 blast the City Police had been consistently calling for greater security measures, and had reached the conclusion that permanent road-checks, ensuring that all vehicles entering the City were captured on camera and were potentially liable to be searched, was the only way they could stop another vehicle bomb. Legally this was not possible after the St Mary Axe bomb. Under PACE (1984), the police were only allowed to search vehicles under suspicion of terrorism. The police believed the Act left them open to civil action in cases where a road check did not lead to a conviction (Burns et al. 1993).[23]

However, after the Bishopsgate bombing it was seen as better to risk abusing police powers under PACE by setting up a fixed cordon, rather than to experience further bombings. As the Commissioner of the City Police noted: 'I want the power to set up road checks wherever and whenever, without specific reason for doing so'.[24]

Initially it was thought that the security cordon could be in place within a year. However, given the perceived risk of further attacks, construction of the so-called *ring of steel* began in June 1993, with the removal of all remaining litter-bins, and the introduction of security checkpoints to bar all non-essential traffic.[25]

Such modifications were criticised by those who felt that it would cause traffic chaos at the boundaries of the City. Some felt that checkpoints could lead to large queues when entering the City as well as vehicles being increasingly pushed into neighbouring boroughs (this did occur at certain 'choke' points in the east of the City). There were also fears that such a radical scheme could geographically displace the risk of terrorist attack to other areas, as it had done in Belfast (Chapter 3). Kenneth Clarke, the Home Secretary at that time, summed up the situation the City faced, indicating the delicate balancing act between security and business normality:

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22   The latter would re-emerge, in time, as the City's main justification for the security cordon.

23   Subsequently, legal changes in the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act provided extensions to PACE allowing officers to search where he/she thinks fit, with no restriction placed on suspicion. This Act received Royal Assent in November 1994/January 1995 (see for example Hill 1995).

24   Cited in Burns (1993).

25   The term 'ring of steel' has now been blurred by the media and is used to refer to any area that undertakes a high profile police presence in order to deter a terrorist event.

> There is a balance to be struck between having roadblocks which will frustrate what the terrorists can do, and creating enormous traffic jams which would disrupt the life out of the City.[26]

Eventually, on the weekend of 3-4 July 1993, a full 'Belfast-style' ring of steel was activated in the City, securing all entrances. The main access restrictions imposed are shown in Figure 5.2.

This shows that most routes were closed or made exit only, leaving seven routes (plus one bus route) through which the City could be entered. On these routes into the City, road-checks guarded by armed police were set up (Figures 5.3). Locally, the ring of steel was often referred to as the 'ring of plastic' as the temporary access restrictions were based primarily on the funnelling of traffic through rows of plastic traffic cones, as the scheme was still officially 'temporary'. The City's ring of steel looked nothing like that constructed in 1970s Belfast. It represented a far more symbolic and technologically advanced approach to security, which avoided the 'barrier mentality' in favour of less overt security measures. However, the 'ring of plastic' provided a highly visible demonstration that the City was taking the terrorist threat seriously, even if many entering the City did not realise its counter-terrorist use.

The ring of steel did not provide full geographic security coverage within the Square Mile, although the area it covered was well in excess of the area in which traffic modifications were established in 1992.

As such, much of the western side of the City still remained outside the official cordon (see Figure 5.4). Initially, the police Commissioner wanted to make sure that all key financial targets were included, leaving some businesses unhappy about the exact placement of the cordon as it left them outside the secure zone:

> Some people were discontented that they were excluded. The point is that we had to begin and start somewhere, and, like it or not, there is a part of the City that is more vulnerable and has a greater economic value to the nation and the international economy as opposed to just the City of London (Senior Police Officer).

The ring of steel was an enhancement of prior strategies to secure this area, but was also developed so the traffic flow through the City stayed the same. The ring of steel, or 'Experimental Traffic Scheme' as the Corporation officially called it, was put in place for an initial period of six months with the possibility of a further six months extension. After a maximum of twelve months the Corporation of London had to apply for permission to make the scheme permanent. This involved consultation with neighbouring boroughs and other agencies that might have objections. Throwing a security cordon around the entire City would have led to all traffic being diverted to neighbouring boroughs leading to impacts outside the

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26   Cited by Garvey (1993).

Figure 5.2   Access restrictions in the City of London (1993)

City's spatial jurisdiction. Politically these would have been untenable given the array of predominantly Labour controlled borough councils which encircled the City:

> Logistically it was a nightmare to identify which streets you were going to put
> blockers on and which way you were going to have traffic going because we had
> to reverse the one-way streets in some areas (Senior Police Officer).

To assist with this the Corporation employed computer programmes that could predict and model traffic-flow in the City.[27] As Michael Cassidy noted during an interview:

> This programme could predict what would happen if we closed certain streets.
> For the process of defining the cordon we started at the very outer borders of the
> City and found that traffic disruption would have been unacceptable. What we
> did then was to shrink the cordon to a point where the knock on effects we felt
> were just about acceptable.

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27   Minutes of Policy and Resources Committee (11 November 1993).

Figure 5.3   Entrance into the 'ring of plastic'

The police, in effect, wanted to 'secure' the greatest area that was logistically feasible, with the proviso that the financial core around the Bank of England was included. The police were also conscious that a great many personnel would be needed to guard the checkpoints, thus by setting up the cordon as they did they minimised the number of entry points into the secure zone, and hence the personnel needed to run the scheme effectively. The benefits of the new cordon were demonstrated later that month when police sources believe that the Provisional IRA attempted to penetrate this cordon by sending in a bomber on public transport, avoiding the possibility of vehicle checks. The bomber was arrested and found to be carrying an 8lb-semtex bomb moulded around a petrol-filled milk bottle.[28]

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28   See for example Webb (1996).

Figure 5.4   The City of London's Ring of Steel (1993)

The Spatial Impacts of the Cordon

As previously noted, certain businesses located on the periphery of the Square Mile, (outside the ring of steel) were concerned that bombs could be planted at the edge of the new cordon, demonstrating the ineffectiveness of the police strategy. The City Police were well aware of this Provisional IRA tactic from experiences in Belfast. As a result they established a so-called 'collar-zone' around the ring of steel, which saw increased police patrols and roving checkpoints. The activation of a collar zone was made possible by additional staff attached to these units. The 1993 Annual report of the Commissioner of the City of London Police (1994) drew attention to the initial establishment of the experimental cordon, and the funding for 57 extra police constables provided by the City so that armed checks on vehicles could be increased. Overall in 1993, of the 3,560 roadchecks conducted in England and Wales, over 3,200 were conducted by the City Police resulting in 5,867 vehicles being stopped. As a result 168 people were arrested, but *none* for terrorist offences.[29]

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    29   In addition, after Bishopsgate the methods by which the vehicle checks were made in the collar zone were changed as a result of the lessons learnt by an officer from the City force being seconded to the RUC in Belfast.

Michael Cassidy indicated that he felt that the collar zone was increasingly vulnerable:

> It's just common sense that they were going to be exposed bearing in mind that there were some very senior businesses who were unfortunately just outside the cordon.

However, the police highlighted that by setting up the collar zone they attempted to treat the risk level in this area realistically. Indeed, the City Police did not see the collar zone as being at greater risk from attack:

> This area is not at any higher risk because in complementing the inner cordon we have armed patrols and random road-blocks and all the other things in place which support it (Senior Police Officer).

In short, the collar zone was a concerted attempt to alleviate the fears of those businesses within this area:

> There are certain targets within the City that receive increased security attention, but the general philosophy of the police was to spread resources right across the City. Indeed, when the threats were perceived to be high the police actively increased foot and vehicle patrols outside the cordon to redress imbalance, as there were complaints from those outside who had the same exposure to risk but were receiving less protection (City Security Advisor).

Indeed, at the Police Committee an elected member questioned the amount of policing available to those parts of the City outside the ring of steel.[30] In response, the Commissioner of Police acknowledged that the local policing plan prioritised counter-terrorism activities in the secure zone given that this was believed to be the most likely target.

The heightened fear of terrorism not only affected the area of the City outside the ring of steel but also impacted at other spatial scales. First, at a localised level where complaints were received from those in neighbouring boroughs that the ring of steel could serve to export the risk of terrorism (and traffic) to their area. Second, it was argued by some that by increasingly fortifying the City, risk was redistributed to other key targets in the wider London area. It was not until after the bomb in the London Docklands in 1996 that this fear was perhaps fully realised.

The agencies of security in the City, in this sense, acted in a very paternalistic way by protecting the majority of their territory and leaving others to look after their own areas. As one security advisor working in the City noted, 'our job is to look after number one, the Square Mile. What happens outside our boundary is not our concern as we have no jurisdiction outside the City.' Furthermore, in the

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30   25 September 1996.

months after the ring of steel was established, it was noted that plans to extend the cordon might be necessary in light of the 1994 local authority boundary changes, after which the Broadgate centre to the north-east of the City was to come under the Corporation's jurisdiction. This represented a very important economic asset that needed protecting.[31] That said, after Bishopsgate, there was increased coordination between the City Police and other London police forces. In May the Metropolitan Police launched Operation Rainbow to better co-ordinate policing intelligence on responses to the threat of terrorism in London. The main focus of Operation Rainbow was based upon is collating information from public and private CCTV systems across the capital (see also Chapter 10).

Creating an Electronic Panopticon

After Bishopsgate, in addition to access restrictions the City enhanced its electronic surveillance capabilities, and developed three separate but interdependent camera systems to deter terrorism. First, a modified ATC camera system; second, a series of police cameras at entry points; and third, enhancing the number, and overall coverage, of private CCTV systems. The development of CCTV in the City occurred for a number of reasons:

> CCTV has two implications related to the IRA. A principal aim of an IRA terrorist when carrying out an attack is not to get caught, therefore CCTV is a highly visible deterrent both when carrying out an attack and when planning one through surveillance. The Bishopsgate bombers, for example, were caught on film (City Security Advisor).

He continued:

> The key aim of CCTV in this respect was to alter the perception of risk for the IRA in the hope that they will go elsewhere and export the threat. The message CCTV gives is – yes you could get away with planting a bomb, as this is very difficult to stop, but you could well get caught on film which will be circulated all over the world including Ireland, and therefore you will always be looking over your shoulder.

The ATC camera network had been in operation for a number of years and was used primarily for management of traffic. It was first updated in 1991 with the addition of some colour-resolution cameras and further modified after the 1992 blast. Following the Bishopsgate bomb it was suggested that this camera network

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31   The extension to the cordon, as will be shown later, was actually planned in 1995 and came into effect in early 1997 (with a further extension northwards in 2000) in order to protect this important and valuable new area of the City.

should be extended by the addition of eleven colour cameras to provide coverage on minor City Roads.[32]

In addition to traffic management CCTV, police operated security cameras were erected to monitor the entrances into the Square Mile, 24 hours a day, so that every vehicle entering the security cordon was recorded. From November 1993 there were two (or more) cameras filming at each entry point into the ring of steel – one that recorded the number plate, and another that scanned the front profile of the driver and passenger (Figure 5.5). These provided high-resolution pictures, which could be compared against intelligence reports and photographs. The Commissioner of Police indicated that almost nine months after this camera technology was first used it had been exceptionally successful and was attracting a good deal of attention from elsewhere.[33] By the end of 1993 there were more than seventy police controlled cameras covering the City (ATC and entry CCTV), aiming to create a highly surveilled environment where would-be terrorists could not hide. Cameras were seen as highly symbolic 'electronic guardian angels' (Davis 1990) and were implemented, despite complaints from civil liberty groups on the basis of the police rhetoric which essentially said of 'if you have done nothing wrong you have nothing to worry about.'

However, there was still inadequate coverage of many public areas due to lack of private cameras. It was further noted that concerns over too many private cameras operating in the City meant that the police initially attempted to utilise those already in place more efficiently:

> At this time there was a perception that the City of London had a tremendous number of cameras in place and the view was taken that, rather than try to impose another regime of cameras, it would be better to make best use of the cameras that were already in place (Senior Police Officer).

He further noted:

> We conducted a survey [in 1993] to find out what the extent of the coverage was. Much to everyone's amazement, there was only something like 160 cameras that offered coverage of public areas.

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32   At the Police Committee on 26 July, and agreed at the Court of Common Council on 9 September, it was also proposed that colour units replace the existing monochrome cameras. These would require the installation of additional monitors at Wood Street Police Station. The total cost was estimated at £473,000. This equipment was installed by the police by the end of February 1994 (Police Committee, 26 January 1994). At this time it was decided to install four additional cameras to cover the Upper Thames Street tunnels at an additional cost of £120,000 (see also Notton 1997).

33   Cited in the 1993 Annual Report of the Commissioner of the City of London Police (1994).

As a direct result, the police launched an innovative scheme called CameraWatch in September 1993, to co-ordinate camera surveillance and create an effective, and highly visible, camera network for the City. CameraWatch aimed to deter terrorism and other criminal activity by the knowledge that CCTV systems were operating, and to provide a means of detection and evidence gathering should offences occur. The scheme was also seen as a potential catalyst for other security and community safety initiatives, the fostering of close co-operation between organisations helping them to achieve mutually desirable security goals, and the development of institutional links between City organisations, the City Police and the Corporation of London:

> CameraWatch aimed to get the City involved by setting up cameras on the side of buildings as a visual deterrent. It tried to get the City to talk amongst itself and to create an office-watch system involving teamwork and co-ordination between a number of businesses, with the rich subsidising the poor ... (City Security Advisor)

CameraWatch aimed to be proactive to the terrorist threat. It aimed to protect 'areas' and not just rely on the occupiers of individual buildings to protect themselves, given the realisation that modern bombs damage huge areas and not just the target building. As such there was little point in individual building managers developing their own independent surveillance systems in isolation.

However, the installation of cameras on City properties, as part of this scheme, was not always a feasible option due to leasing and heritage considerations:

> Many businesses are only tenants in the buildings and were reluctant to pay for expensive surveillance equipment. Additionally, there were objections from conservation groups about the aesthetic intrusion caused by cameras, which have to be overtly visible. Therefore, it was not just a matter of putting cameras up (City Security Advisor).

This second point was reinforced just before the Bishopsgate blast when the Corporation's Planning Department issued *Planning Advice Note 1* in April 1993 (subsequently revised in November 1997 and then a number of times in the 2000s), which dealt with design considerations of CCTV. This indicated the need for such cameras given the scale of the threat, but that special consideration should be given to their placement and size:

> Security Cameras have now become necessary in many cases, but their insensitive siting, and sometimes the size of the installation, can be visually detrimental to buildings and their surroundings.

The advice note continued:

Where cameras are proposed for general street surveillance, applicants will be encouraged to discuss their proposals with the City Police as well as adjoining frontages in order to achieve a mutually agreed system and thereby avoid the unnecessary proliferation in the street of several cameras performing the same task. An excessive form of street surveillance by a number of cameras on prominent display is something the [Corporation of London] Department of Planning would want to discourage, as it would drastically affect the character and general ambience of City streets.

City businesses were once again encouraged to liaise with the police to see if reciprocal arrangements with nearby businesses could be entered into, and to use the smallest cameras appropriate. These were to be installed as high on the buildings as practical, and where possible to paint the camera unit and cable the same colour as the building. If the occupiers of a listed building, of which there are many in the Square Mile, wanted to put up cameras, then special consent was required. This planning advice, although based on heritage considerations, contradicted the advice of security advisors who wanted cameras to be as overt as possible to actively deter criminal activity. Small concealed cameras would, in this instance, be seen as less effective in achieving security goals.

Nine months after CameraWatch was launched, still only 12.5 per cent of buildings had camera systems leaving a very large proportion of public areas without the 'protection' of constant CCTV coverage. However, by 1996, over 1000 private security cameras (in over 376 camera systems) were operational in the City, due in large part to the efforts of the police and Corporation security advisors in encouraging those who had previously not installed CCTV to do so in liaison with others. It was also suggested that in the future it might be possible for these private systems to be linked into the police camera systems when the need arose (Kelly 1994a).

The 'panopticon' of surveillance that was constructed after the Bishopsgate bomb served to reinforce the access restrictions that were imposed. Through these territorial strategies, space within the Square Mile was increasingly organised in such a way that almost complete surveillance coverage became possible, reducing the perceived opportunity for terrorist attack. The aim of the police was to create a landscape of cameras which both monitored and controlled space but also actively deterred criminal activity because of their symbolic function.

Camera technology was perhaps the single most important factor in the City Police's counter-terrorist campaign. This was highlighted during the trial of eight suspected Provisional IRA terrorists in London in 1997 that had been involved in a plot to blow up various electricity sub-stations in and around London in the early months of 1996. At the subsequent trial, one of the accused gave the immobilisation of the ring of steel as one of the key aims of this attack: 'If the IRA were capable of closing down all electricity in London without going into London, it would make the ring of steel null and void.[34] By implication this meant that the

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34   Cited in the *Electronic Telegraph*, 5 June 1997.

Provisional IRA could then have more easily planted a bomb in the City without being detected, as it would have taken hours, if not days, to restore power to many parts of London.

Fortifying Individual Buildings

As well as developing area-based security strategies, the police, in liaison with the private security sector, set about creating an extra layer of security around individual buildings through the addition of landscape features and the implementation of security strategies. After the first bombing, enhanced security measures were not particularly common in the City as many businesses saw the St Mary Axe blast as a one off attack. However, increased collaboration between the police and private security staff was illustrated in June 1992 when security guards on a routine patrol of their building discovered a bomb under a car in Coleman Street. In effect, the private security industry was co-opted to help the counter-terrorism effort. Their tasks commonly included being involved with contingency planning, exterior patrolling of premises, monitoring areas outside their building with CCTV, and promoting crime and terrorism prevention within companies.

Such approaches were increasingly undertaken in the City following the 1993 bomb for a variety of reasons. First, certain businesses because of their prominence or nationality, felt vulnerable from attack, not just from the Provisional IRA. For example, according to security advisors, French banks felt at risk from Algerian terrorists, American banks from Islamic radicals, and Turkish businesses from Kurdish extremists. The second reason why individual buildings were fortified was due to proximity to potentially high-profile targets such as the Bank of England, the Lloyds Building or the Stock Exchange. A third reason was in light of possible insurance discounts that they could be achieved for introducing risk-management measures (see Chapter 6).

Typical security plans adopted at this time aimed to deter an attack and deny the terrorist access to premises – creating what could be referred to as a 'mini ring of steel' – which fortified and 'hardened' the urban landscape by altering the spatial configuration of areas immediately outside buildings. Such plans aimed to do this by defining an area of control (territoriality) and delimiting a building from its surroundings in a number of different ways: first, controlling access to buildings through limiting the number of entrances, and screening of visitors by security personnel in the reception area; second, by restricting access to areas under the building such as car parks and storage-areas; third, through an increase in surveillance through organised means via vigilant security guards, and by CCTV; and fourth, by creating no-parking zones around buildings to create 'stand-off' areas.

There were other precautions that were also taken by many businesses to reduce the effects of a bomb blast such as application of anti-shatter window film, safety

glass (a legal requirement under building regulations at certain critical locations), the installation of blast curtains and the construction of internal shelter areas.[35]

The security precautions taken were implemented alongside advice from the police, and security services and in conjunction with Home Office Guidance – *Bombs: Protecting People and Property*, first published in 1994.[36] This guide highlighted how preparation was increasingly playing a part in counter-terrorism thinking within organisations, as well as strongly encouraging building occupants to 'participate in the counter-terrorist security planning in your community: communities defeat terrorism' (4).

Moreover, the City Police and the Corporation of London, as well as various insurance bodies and the Loss Prevention Council, all gave advice to businesses about what they could do to minimise the risk of attack. This also highlighted the increased number of risk management institutions who were concerned about the impact of this risk. In particular, the Corporation was increasingly proactive in getting individual buildings fortified, by employing specialist security advisors to liaise with business. As Michael Cassidy commented during an interview in 1997:

> One of the things I did after Bishopsgate was to get a security specialist in to advise businesses how they could protect themselves, for example by joining CameraWatch and getting better contingency plans.

The security of individual buildings can also be seen in terms of territorial reinforcement, which had the effect of adding an additional complementary layer of physical defence to the City. The subsequent retrofitting of crime prevention measures to 'design out terrorism' led to alteration in the shape and function of a number of streets and public places within the city. Others strategies, however, took the form of subtler landscape changes, less overtly associated with counter-terrorism, such as the use of bollards to restrict vehicular access near their building. There were also attempts at clear demarcation of private areas to define territorial boundaries – creating an exclusion zone around premises with the external configuration of many buildings in the Square Mile effectively being target hardened.

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35   It was felt that adding such structural considerations when designing a new building (rather than retrofitting) would cost an additional 0-5 per cent of building cost (Crawford 1995, 18).

36   Here preparation involved assessing the likelihood of terrorist attack on your organisation; preparing your staff for the possibility of telephoned bomb threats; choosing the mix of protective measures that best suits your premises and that will deter or detect the terrorist; encourage your staff to remain vigilance; and testing security plans regularly.

The Overall Effect of Post-Bishopsgate Fortification

Attempts to deter further terrorist attack after the 1993 bomb led the police and other security agencies to attempt to 'harden' the landscape at a number of spatial scales within the City. This took place in two main ways. First, through the construction of a ring of steel, and second, through specific target hardening undertaken in liaison with the private security industry. This formed what a senior security advisor referred to as an 'onion skin effect' – essentially a series of security layers which potential terrorists must pass through in order to reach the desired target. In other respects, such efforts amounted to the privatisation of space – the creation of a territorial container, which attempted to hermetically seal the core of the City from its geographical neighbours and selective parts of the Square Mile, deemed less economically important. Such localised boundary formation and reinforcement was, however, seen as vital if the City was to maintain its eminent position in the global economy.

After the Bishopsgate bombing the City police also established a Pager-Alert system which contacted all users of the system simultaneously with information on security alerts. The majority of the businesses in the Square Mile (and later Canary Wharf) subscribed to the scheme.

In addition 'warning' signs were also put up in and around the City of London indicating the dangers of terrorism and the need to stay alert (see Figure 5.5).

Importantly however, many aspects of this territorialisation moved away from the popular 'conflict' approach, which witnessed the urban landscape fragmented and divided into mutually hostile units. Instead, more symbolic and subtle notions of territoriality were displayed, which expressed a shared concern with defence but which attempted to balance the need to security with the continual functioning of the City as a global business centre.

Optimism

Immediately after a Provisional IRA ceasefire was called on 31 August 1994 there were suggestions in the media and from some businesses in the City that the ring of steel should be scaled down. Such suggestions were heeded to an extent as permanent armed guards were taken off most of the checkpoints, producing a less overt police presence on the street. This was a very visible indication that the risk of terrorist attack had decreased in the eyes of the City Police. This was the only operational change that the City Police introduced at this time. As Michael Cassidy commented:

> There was absolutely no call from our people for stepping down the security...
> the only thing that happened was that operationally the Commissioner of Police
> used to rotate his manning of the entry points on a completely random basis:
> sometimes they were unmanned.

This process was also summarised during an interview with a City security advisor conducted during the cease-fire period where it was noted that:

> It [the ring of steel] was highly visible – an in your face deterrent with armed check-points and a highly visible police presence. Today, the threat profile has been reduced and these measures have been scaled down (City Security Advisor).

However, it was further noted that the ring of steel was in a state of temporary suspension:

> The ring of steel's function as a security initiative will be maintained. It will provide a framework from which to launch a security operation if needed.

This slight downgrading of security did, however, have a noticeable influence on recorded crime levels. It was reported that during the ceasefire recorded crime in the City had increased and that this pattern was being monitored to assess whether this was related to the implementation of high profile policing.[37] For example, on 29 November 1995 it was reported at the Police Committee that during the previous six months a noticeable *increase* in crime had occurred, despite the fact that the City was still viewed as a high priority target by international terrorist groups.[38] Despite downgrading security the police still acknowledged that:

> During the last six months, the continuation of the Northern Ireland peace process has been heartening, but the entirety of measures put in place within the City were not wholly in response to PIRA terrorist threats.

The Report continues:

> Nevertheless, in the past year, some changes to the high profile policing measures, introduced after the last PIRA bombing of the City, have been inevitable. It is noticeable that levels of recorded crime have been rising since the measures were changed despite the number of alternative initiatives introduced.

In line with the ceasefire, from August 1994 permanent bollards, paving, and in some cases flower beds, began replacing temporary traffic cones (see Figure 5.6)

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37   Minutes of the Police Committee, 2 February 1995.

38   Crime fell drastically after both major bombing incidents in April 1992 and 1993 probably as a result of a high profile approach to City policing. However, it also shows a gradual increase in crime during the ceasefire period from August 1994 onwards until the end of 1995 coinciding with reductions in high profile policing. It is further reported by City Police that after the Docklands bomb in February 1996, and a reactivation of the full ring of steel, crime was reduced substantially (Police Committee, 8 January 1997).

Figure 5.5   Police warnings of the risk of terrorism

creating a less visible form of landscape alteration in an attempt to remove signs
of overt security and narrow the entry points. In addition, the Commissioner of the
City Police indicated that over the next few years the street environment of the City
around the security points would be 'landscaped to give the scheme an aesthetic
permanence in keeping with City street architecture' (Kelly 1994a). Indeed the
uniform iron bollards utilised in such a security set-up, decoratively painted black
red and white can be found throughout the Square Mile.[39]

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39   These bollards started to appear some time before the ring of steel was implemented.
There is one standard design, albeit in three slightly different sizes. This standardisation is
an attempt to keep design integrity of the City of London in tact, and not let it be swamped
by an array of different types of fortification.

A scaling down of security was demonstrated in early 1996 when a decision was made to re-install around 40 litterbins in the Square Mile. This decision was suspended after the Docklands blast on 9 February 1996.

The aforementioned security changes that occurred as a result of the ceasefire demonstrated a noticeable 'softening' of the landscape as a result of reduced threat levels. These moves all indicated that the City, at this time, felt more relaxed about the possible risk of attack. This however made it increasingly difficult for the police to call on public support to help them combat the threat:

> The business community were also beginning to feel that the risk of further terrorist attack had gone away, making it more difficult for the police to sustain a campaign of raising or maintaining public awareness of the need to be vigilant (Senior Police Officer).

In particular, there was an attempt on behalf of a number of prominent organisations, around Christmas 1995, to persuade the Corporation to disband the security cordon altogether. At the beginning of 1996, however, there was a feeling of optimism that the cessation of violence would continue, although the police were still being realistic about the potential threat, from organisations beyond the Provisional IRA:

> For a number of years, policing in the City [has been] significantly influenced by the necessity to respond effectively to the criminality of Irish Republican terrorists. During the past year, the cessation of this criminal terrorism has been heartening and optimism for a lasting settlement remains high. However, the measures put in place and being operated in the City are to deter all terrorist criminality. The City will always be a potential target for acts of terrorist criminality because of its high profile, high economic value and cosmopolitan business community (Corporation Police Committee minutes, 31 January 1996).

As previously noted, the police camera network had been continually upgraded to meet this terrorist threat. In the early months of 1995, the new high-resolution cameras for the traffic system were installed and 13 further cameras were added to monitor cars *exiting* the City. Before this date security cameras only focused on cars entering the cordon. Exit cameras were particularly important, as police could now monitor traffic into the City and, if needed, track suspect vehicles across the City.

Furthermore, during the ceasefire, plans to extend the ring of steel westwards were developed, encompassing a greater proportion of the City in the secure zone:

> It is now envisaged that the size of the ring [of steel] can be increased westward to cover areas such as St Paul's. This is out for consultation at present and is being dealt with by the Transport Department. It is seen as an early plan. It

represents a philosophy in relation to pollution, traffic and crime (City security advisor).

This meant that once again the City attempted to justify the ring of steel on grounds other than counter-terrorism (see also Chapter 7). After the Bishopsgate bomb the police justified references to the rings' counter terrorist function, as the risk level was perceived to be high. During the ceasefire period, however, overt references to the risk of further Provisional IRA attack were, perhaps, less politically acceptable, and hence improvements in transport, environment indicators and crime figures were used to justify the merits of the ring of steel and to push for its expansion.

Reactivating and Extending the Ring of Steel

The Provisional IRA's offensive strategy, as previously stated, was temporarily halted between August 1994 and February 1996 as a cessation of military activities was declared. In time, what the Irish Republican movement perceived to be a lack of movement on political dialogue led to the development of a twin-track approach of the bomb and the ballot box. However, as Myers (1996) ironically commented, just a few days before the cessation ended, and in relation to a spate of so-called punishment beatings on Catholics suspected of anti-social behaviour such as drug-pushing and joy-riding:

> The cease-fire is over, but only selectively so – on a sort of deferment plan. An equivalent butchery of Northern Catholics by British Soldiers would by now be causing bombs to detonate in the **City of London** where the war will most likely resume, if it ever does (emphasis added).

This cessation of terrorist violence lasted until early 1996 when a large 500lb bomb exploded at South Quay in the London Docklands, seen as a symbolic extension of the Square Mile.

Following this bomb a fortress mentality returned to the City with the full pre-cease-fire ring of steel being reactivated and operational within a number of hours due to fears that the City would be attacked:

> The resumption of IRA terrorist criminality earlier this year has once again highlighted the need for the City of London to be ever vigilant. The traffic control points are now equipped with entry and exit closed-circuit television cameras, and officers are deployed at the entry points, as judged necessary in response to the criminal threat (Corporation Police Committee minutes, 29 May 1996).

Initially, as a result of the highlighted threat level there was a large increase in a high visibility policing at both the entry points and on the City streets in general. There was also an increased frequency of roving checkpoints.

Figure 5.6   The 'concretisation' of the ring of plastic

After the Docklands bomb (the security reaction to which is detailed in later chapters), further proposals to increase security in the Square Mile were made. These centred on a proposed westward extension of the ring of steel that was initially put forward in February 1995. This proposal was in line with the Corporation of London's Unitary Development Plan but many newspaper reports in the days following the Docklands bomb inaccurately portrayed the possible extension of the City's security cordon as a new idea. In particular, it was felt the extension would discourage through traffic from using local roads, reduce the

conflict between pedestrians and traffic on local roads, improve environmental
conditions across the City, and give the Commissioner of Police improved security
opportunities on City streets. It was thought that the proposed extension would
allow coverage of nearly 75 per cent of the Square Mile and would divert an
additional 10,000 vehicles a day from the centre of the City. Some, however,
thought that this would create traffic gridlock.[40]

In April 1996 the Corporation's Policy and Resources committee agreed to
debate these proposals. On 23 July the Planning and Transportation committee
agreed to support the plans, a decision welcomed by the City of London Police
and the Policy and Resources Committees (17 October). On 26 November the
Common Council and the Planning and Transportation committee further debated
the merits of the extension. Feasibility studies involving computer modelling of
traffic flows had by this time been undertaken, in particular with regard to getting
St Paul's Cathedral, Smithfield and the Barbican areas within the security zone. At
the Policy and Resources meeting (17 October), however, concern was expressed
by some members about the need for adequate consultation (see Chapter 7) and
the possible restriction of business traffic into the City. In addition to the extension
of the security cordon the City Police also set up more 'Red Routes', which were
becoming increasingly common in other parts of London.[41]

Some commentators also saw the 're-steeling' of the Square Mile as an
opportunity to improve the environment in the City:

> The ring of steel thrown up around the City as a defence against terrorist attack
> shows that it is possible to make radical shifts in traffic without the capital
> grinding to a halt. Indeed, with security measures again being strengthened there
> is an excellent opportunity to pedestrianise many streets permanently.[42]

This once again drew on Belfast experiences where the shopping and commercial
area was sealed-off from most traffic by steel gates and anti-crash bollards.
Potential pedestrianisation in parts of the City was therefore seen to have two
benefits. First, to help improve the environment by reducing vehicular numbers,
and second, to reduce the manpower the police needed to use as there would be
fewer roads to monitor for potential vehicle bombs. The Commissioner of the
City's Police (1996) strongly supported the proposals:

> I believe an extended zone will be of considerable benefit to the traffic and
> environmental conditions in the City … A by-product of an enhanced traffic

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40   See the City Engineers Report, 26 September 1996 and the *Electronic Telegraph*,
22 January 1997.

41   In these areas parking is strictly prohibited at all times. The aim of such routes
is to improve the ease of traffic movement, whilst also benefiting the counter-terrorist
operation.

42   See Binney (1996).

zone would be the opportunity to introduce security measures (as necessary) in a manner similar to that currently attached to the present traffic zone. The threat to the City from criminal terrorism is high and whilst I judge that will change from time to time the source of the threat now and in the future is not one-dimensional and that a strategic approach is essential.

Despite the police downplaying the counter-terrorist importance of the ring of steel, the extension, could, at this time, be seen as primarily an attempt to keep the bombers out of the Square Mile, given that the City was still on a state of high alert regarding possible further attacks by the Provisional IRA.

The proposal for a western extension was ratified by the Court of Common Council on 5 December 1996 and implemented on 25 January 1997, becoming operational two days later for an initial period of six months[43] (see Figure 5.7).

Figure 5.7 shows the new check-points that were added along Queen Victoria Street, Ludgate Hill, Holburn Viaduct and Aldersgate Street. A number of minor roads were also blocked off as access into the City had been re-arranged with prominent places such as St Paul's included in the new cordon. Despite fears of traffic gridlock, initial indications contained in an evaluation report suggested that there had been no significant problems caused by the modifications.

On 3 February 1997, just after the extension was put in, the new cameras at police checkpoints were linked, first to the Police National Computer (PNC), and then to the vehicle database and 'Hot List' of vehicles at the Force Intelligence Bureau. These cameras were capable of zooming in and out and swivelling through 360 degrees and were fitted with lights, which enabled round the clock monitoring. The digital automated number plate recording (ANPR) technology they used could process the information and give a warning to the operator within four seconds. This considerably increased the capability of the City of London Police to run vehicle checks. Such technology was developed from technological advances made during the first Gulf War in 1991. The project to install this advanced system began in early 1995 and was completed in January 1997. The system was activated in February 1997. This coincided with the opening of the western extension to the ring of steel.

From a legal perspective, in April 1996 the ring of steel was itself protected by new legislation relating to the Prevention of Terrorism Act, which allowed the police to search pedestrians randomly, as well as cars, in and around the Square Mile. Fears of incendiary devices being smuggled into the City had long been a concern of the City of London Police. Signs were initially put up in the City warning visitors that they were liable to be searched. This, it was felt, was an invaluable tool, as once again, lessons from Belfast had indicated that when confronted with a security cordon the terrorists had a tendency to switch tactics and attempt to smuggle hand held explosive devices into the desired target area. As a Michael Cassidy stated at this time during an interview:

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43   Under Section 12 of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984.

> It's a very useful extension of powers and it plugs a gap from our point of view
> because clearly the inability to search inside someone's big coat – which was the
> law beforehand – meant that semtex could be walked into the City.

Re-appropriation

Towards the end of the 1990s, with new paramilitary ceasefires in place in Northern Ireland and a reduced state of terrorist alert in the Square Mile, the full ring of steel became relatively dormant. However, the City, like a number of other strategic global sites, was targeted by anti-capitalist protesters. Initially a large scale demonstration was to have been held in the City in May 1998, but access restrictions and the blanket CCTV coverage given by the ring of steel, and, the fact that the planned event was going to be held during the weekend (meaning the City would be empty of office workers) meant the event was postponed (Do or Die 1999).

A year later (Friday 18 June 1999), this time a workday in the Square Mile, between 6-10,000 demonstrators under the collective banner of J18 assembled in the City for a worldwide 'Carnival against Capitalism' to coincide with a G8 economic summit in Cologne. This led to a massive mobilisation of Police drawn from the City as well as the British Transport and Metropolitan forces. The event descended into rioting, with damage estimated at £2 million. Many landmark buildings were attacked and over forty people were injured. As emotively noted by the Lord Mayor of London (cited in *The Sunday Times* 20 June 1999):

> It was wanton terrorism; anarchy. The riot police came to rescue and impossible
> situation. That was nothing short of a war zone.

During the demonstrations the ring of steel entry points were manned by Police who monitored the flow of people into the Square Mile. Although the counter-terrorist cordon could do little in preventative and legal terms to stop the vast number of people entering the City, the extensive camera system was used to monitor the event and retrospectively identify many of those involved in the worst of the violence. To an extent, this tactic was blunted when a number of protestors immobilised cameras by spray painting the lenses or covering them with plastic bags. In the aftermath of the disturbances the City Police published a large gallery of CCTV photographs of those they wanted to identify in relation to the rioting. It was reported that over sixty officers were working full-time to look at over 5,000 hours of CCTV coverage and other evidence in order to make arrests (Do or Die 1999).

Other initiatives put in place to counter the terrorist threat were seen as invaluable to the police before, during and after the rioting, for instance the Pager-Alert system which was used to convey updated messages to subscribers. Furthermore, City

Figure 5.7   The City of London's extended ring of steel (1997)

security advisers had suggested to businesses that they increase security around their buildings well in advance of the planned demonstration to minimise damage.

As a result of the J18 riot and subsequent smaller demonstrations, much closer liaison took place between the three police forces involved and new protocols were established, centred on 'zero tolerance' policing that were to be used for future demonstrations.[44] This was aided by the new Terrorism Act (2000), which came into force in February 2001 and broadened the scope of what could be considered to be terrorism, meaning activist movements could potentially be labelled as such, especially when alleged (as with the JI8 disturbances in the City) that the violence was pre-planned.

Despite the focus on thwarting anti-capitalist demonstrators, counter terrorism was still at the forefront of the City Police's thoughts. During 1998, 1999 and into the new millennium, the terrorist threat was still being taken seriously. As the Commissioner of Police noted in early 2000: 'Terrorism, thankfully, has not affected us recently and only time, coupled with our collective vigilance, will tell if that is to remain the case' (*City Security* 2000, 4:3). During this period, in line with the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, the City Police rolled out strategies which increasingly generated partnerships between themselves and the business community to reduce crime and terrorism. Problems with the Pager-Alert

44   As such, on May Day 2000, when similar demonstrations were planned, a highly co-ordinated joint policing operation was put into play.

schemes also led to the introduction of an E-mail alert system. However in the City the crime rate did rise during 2000 (8,066 offences compared to 7,577 in 1999), mainly from theft. This reflected a similar rise that occurred in the 1990s when the terrorist threat was considered less severe and police presence on the streets reduced.

During 2000 and 2001 the threat against the City of London was again increased by the terrorist bombing campaign of dissident Irish republican groups – the Real IRA[45] – believed to be responsible for bomb or rocket grenade attacks against a number of prominent landmark buildings in central London such as the BBC and MI6. As a senior City Police officer indicated, the Square Mile remained at risk:

> There is a clear and credible threat from Dissident Irish Republican Terrorists particularly the Real IRA … The Greater London area will always be seen as the most attractive target as it will raise their profile in the media. We all need to be vigilant at this time and remember that they pose a HIGH threat to the UK mainland.[46]

At this time further permanence was given to certain sections of the ring of steel. An extension was put in place around the Broadgate area in the north east of the City and came into effect on 9 April 2000.[47] The City Police were in favour of such an extension. The Commissioner of Police noted that.[48]

> This is an effective traffic management scheme which offers a security opportunity that will enhance community safety for a significant area of the City and create benefits for the business community, residents and visitors. The scheme and the policies which underpin it are sound and have our fullest support.

The Metropolitan Police also had no objections to the proposed scheme.

As with the 1993 and 1997 versions of the ring of steel, this scheme was referred to as an experimental traffic management scheme, pending consultation and reports as to its effectiveness. Discussions for example occurred between the Corporation of London and the London Boroughs of Tower Hamlets, Islington and Hackney regarding where the knock-on effects of traffic displacement could have occurred. Three months after its introduction 'no serious problems' were noted.[49] On 16 October 2000 it was agreed by the Corporation of London to recommend that the scheme be made permanent – subject to the agreement of the surrounding

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45   The Real IRA emerged from a split within the ranks of the Provisional IRA in October 1997.

46   *City Security* (2001), 9:4.

47   Minutes of the Planning and Transportation Committee, 29 February 2000, and 11 April 2000.

48   Minutes of Policy and Resources Committee, 29 July 1999.

49   Minutes of the Planning and Transportation Committee, 4 July 2000.

boroughs and Transport for London. This process was finally completed in March 2001.[50] After this extension had been made permanent ANPR camera technology was added to the new entry points in the expanded ring of steel. The development of this part of the ring of steel will be further discussed in subsequent chapters.

Conclusions

As a result of terrorist attack, and the risk of further bombings, a series of defensive modifications to the landscape were constructed in the City, primarily between April 1992 and February 1997, but also in April 2000. These changes were based on a radicalisation of crime prevention measures commonly employed in other Western cities in an attempt to 'design out terrorism' through the introduction of a number of armed road checkpoints, the imposition of parking restrictions, and the fortification of individual buildings. Additionally, three interrelated camera networks were established and continually updated. At the end of 1996 for example, CameraWatch had 1,250 private cameras, and the City Police, in addition, controlled 8 permanent entry point cameras, 13 exit cameras and 47 area traffic control cameras. These numbers subsequently increased as the new extension was implemented.

Overall, the defensive strategies implemented in the City had a number of central features. *First*, there was a gradual and continual enhancement of security strategies utilised to create and maintain territorial control of selected parts of the City. *Second,* as time progressed, the 'secure zone' increased in size and status – from an amalgam of minor traffic modifications after the 1992 bomb which sought to safeguard the core financial area, to the subsequent mobilisation of the ring of steel and its extension. The processes involved in bringing a greater area under such control was aided by the increased co-ordination between businesses, and in relation to cost, legality and public opinion which had hindered the original plans to construct a cordon in 1992. *Third*, the process of making permanent landscape changes in the City was articulated not in terms of counter-terrorism benefits, but in relation to reductions on crime, environmental pollution and traffic congestion. This, although fitting in with prior planning decisions, can be seen as an almost deliberate attempt by the police and the Corporation to remove references to terrorism that could undermine the City's attractiveness to global finance corporations. This idea will be further advanced in Chapter 7.

Fourth, as the ring of steel grew in size its spatial effects on other areas became more apparent at a number of geographical scales. This related to its 'collar zone' directly outside the cordon, as well as local effects caused by the exportation of traffic and potential terrorist risk into neighbouring boroughs. It also related to other key target sites in London which, due to the heavy security in the City,

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50   Minutes of the Planning and Transportation Committee, 17 October 2000, and 20 March 2001.

were felt to be more exposed to attack. *Fifth*, the response from the agencies of security to the terrorist threat served to strengthen the links between the City police and the other agencies of security and the general business community. The approach of the City to counter-terrorism should therefore be seen as a 'joint effort' highlighting the increasing co-ordination of risk management within modern society.

In short, the City police sought to control and regulate the space within the Square Mile, attempting to create a particular image for the City based on a balance between a flourishing business environment, and safety and security concerns; a balance seen as vital if the area was to be competitive within the global economy. They were helped in this by the private security industry. A duality emerged: the City embraced inclusion in the process of globalisation whilst at the same time excluded themselves from the rest of central London through their territorial boundedness and fortification strategies. The situation that developed in the City can therefore be seen in terms of both global connection and local disconnection – a condition, which, as a result of terrorism, continued to characterise the dislocated nature of the City's relationship with the rest of London.

In this context the ring of steel and other security measures highlight two of the most important trends in contemporary urbanism. *First*, the increased militarisation of urban space where the relationship between fear and form determines the extent of fortification measures. Initially, there was a reluctance to introduce radical fortification measures to the City as it was felt this would 'stigmatise' the area and increase the fear of those 'cocooned' within the secure area. However, as the risk of further bombing increased, so too did the desire of occupiers in the City to bring about alteration of the physical landscape to enhance security. *Second*, the City's defensive landscapes' express the privatisation and control of space, according to the preferences of the rich and powerful. Such control was increasingly asserted through physical and technological measures. This was associated with the need to maintain a predictable, efficient and orderly flow of commercial activity. The business community therefore supported enhancement of security at times of risk but wanted it downgraded when they perceived the risk to be declining.

The observations noted above should be seen as part of an overall schema that was in operation in the City due to the risk of terrorism; namely that through enhanced territorial strategies at a local level aimed at reducing the risk of terrorism, the Square Mile was increasingly able maintain its position in financial markets on a global level. The spatial imprinting of this trend was evident through the construction of defensive landscapes, which have become a concrete part of the contemporary urban scene in the City.

Post-9/11, the ring of steel has once again been reactivated and is being used explicitly for counter-terrorism purposes. New technologies continued to play a significant role in developing both the surveillance capabilities of the City Police as well as initiatives developed for businesses within the Square Mile. The key

point here is that in reality, apart from the natural upgrading of technological systems and a reassessment of contingency planning, the City of London has changed little as a result of 9/11 given that its counter terrorist approach was fully developed and could be activated immediately (Coaffee et al. 2008b). The post-9/11 reactions in the City will be explored in subsequent chapters as part of an emerging pan-London perspective.

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Distributing the Financial Risk of Terrorism

Introduction

The previous chapter discussed the strategies employed during the 1990s and early 2000s by the security agencies of as a response to the terrorist threat and the resultant alterations to the physical form of the City's urban landscape. Increased fortification provided material evidence that the City did all they could to restrict the damage the Provisional IRA could inflict on the UK economy through an attack upon the reputation and physical infrastructure of the Square Mile.

A less obvious, but equally important, manifestation of the reaction to terrorism in the City, especially during the 1990s, was the establishment of a specific insurance scheme to cover damage caused by terrorism. In this regard risk was viewed not as a physical threat to be dealt with, but in terms of statistical tables, relating to the probability of premium losses and premium gains in certain locations. As such, terrorism insurance coverage operated as a risk spreading mechanism and served to create distinct distributive geographies based on the principle of financial exclusion or 'redlining'.

This chapter will highlight how the insurance strategies employed after the 1992 bomb sought to manage and control terrorist risk in two main ways. First, through attempts to distribute the financial risk to terrorism throughout the national and global market place in order to remove liability from certain locales (especially the City); and second, by drawing boundaries around high risk 'hot spots' and encouraging, or insisting upon, risk management measures and contingency planning as a condition of granting insurance coverage. This chapter will also highlight how the methods of financial risk distribution were of limited success, succeeding only in concentrating the risk of further bomb attacks within the Square Mile. Furthermore, the chapter highlights the implications for the geography on the ground, by analysing how City institutions, on one hand, attempted to redistribute its localised risk in the national and global economies through insurance mechanisms, whilst on the other hand it increasingly fortified its local urban landscape.[1]

When the Provisional IRA stepped up its campaign of economic disruption in England in the early 1990s, questions regarding the insurability of terrorist risk

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1   Information and insight included in the chapter draws from a variety of sources included a series of interviews during 1995-1998 with senior insurance figures as well as personal correspondence with those involved in the terrorism insurance debate. These have been anonymised in the text.

were raised at the highest levels of commerce and Government, especially given the importance of the City, in the global economy. These are questions which re-emerged in post-9/11 era as the insurance industry has one again been forced to respond to an intensified climate of terrorism.

The remainder of this chapter is divided in two main parts. First, it will analyse the methods and success of the risk spreading mechanisms employed by the insurance industry in relation to the terrorist threat in the 1990s. The second part will link the provision of insurance to changes in defensive landscape features, indicating the subtle relationships between these two methods of 'risk management'. Overall, the provision of terrorism insurance in the period since 1990 can be summarised in six stages:

- Emergent Risk (1990 – April 1992);
- Reflecting on local terrorist risk (April 1992 – November 1993);
- Transferring the risk nationally (December 1992 – April 1993);
- Concentrating risk in the City (April 1993 – August 1994);
- Fluctuating risk and alternative risk sharing mechanisms (August 1994 – September 2001).

These stages will now be examined in turn, and related to the geographical processes operating within, and in relation to, the City.

Emergent Risk – Reduced Market Capacity but Increased Risk

During the early 1990s there was growing concern in the insurance market that the solvency of insurance companies could be threatened as a result of both natural disasters and old financial liabilities which were increasingly coming to the fore. In the City, the consequences of the latency of financial risk can be exemplified through insurance losses experienced by Lloyds of London in the late 1980s. Between 1988-1990 a string of natural and technological disasters such as the fire on the Piper Alpha oil platform, the oil spillage from the Exxon Valdez and a series of earthquakes and hurricanes in the United States meant a number of large insurance claims were sought against the company. Two features of the market compounded this situation at this time. First, insurance premiums were dropping as a result of increased corporate competition. Second, many 'old' risks were being claimed against, such as asbestos-related illnesses, genetic engineering and many different types of pollution. As a result insurance companies began to more closely examine the risks they were prepared to underwrite.

The periodic bombing of London at this time by the Provisional IRA meant the insurance industry were unable to predict with any accuracy the likelihood and potential costs of such attacks. Therefore insurance companies considered withdrawing from the terrorism insurance market.

As early as October 1991, the Association of British Insurers (ABI) were in discussions with the Government to review the existing cover against terrorism, as during the first Gulf War it was far from clear who would be financially responsible for associated acts of terrorism in the UK. This argument was important, as at this time terrorism was covered within standard insurance policies without additional costs to the premium holder. This could have had widespread geographical implications in some areas, such as the City (and other areas seen as economic targets by the Provisional IRA), if insurance against terrorism was unavailable in the face of rising threat levels. It was therefore realised by the insurance industry – themselves physically located, at this time, in the City – that continued risk spreading through the international reinsurance market was a necessity to protect their financial liability. This threat was fully realised in April 1992 when a bomb exploded at St Mary Axe. This bomb led to attempts to re-distribute the financial risk of terrorism at a variety of spatial scales away from the City in order to protect its insurance liability as well as the trading position of the Square Mile.

Reflecting on Local Terrorist Risk

In Northern Ireland, the Government had long accepted responsibility for damage caused by terrorism, given the withdrawal of traditional insurance mechanisms in the late 1960s (Greer and Mitchell 1982). The development of the Northern Ireland 'compensation scheme' can be traced back to the 1950s and 1960s, when insurers dealt with many of the same issues that confronted UK insurance industry in the early 1990s. These included:

- The insurance industry effectively withdrawing from the market;
- Compensation being paid by the state. This led to the financial risk being redistributed nationwide with the premiums of the many paying for the losses of the few (essentially through a slight rise in tax);
- The development of specific counter-terrorist measures becoming necessary as terrorism insurance became increasingly politicised due to Government involvement, and areas of high economic importance becoming increasingly attractive targets.

In the wake of the St Mary Axe bomb in 1992 the insurance industry became proactive, commencing an immediate review of their cover of terrorism losses. Similar arguments to those used in Northern Ireland in the 1970s were put forward by the insurance industry to try and get the Government involved and to remove their own liability, believing that the Northern Ireland scheme set a precedent of Governmental participation in providing insurance coverage against terrorism.

An Increased Threat Level?

After the St Mary Axe bomb, figures released by the insurance industry, and advanced through the media, noted that the cost of damage (initially estimated at around £800 million) was likely to be more than the total cost of damage in Northern Ireland over the previous 22 years (around £600 million). This publicity, the police believed, increased the threat level to the City. This bomb, according to the insurance industry, demonstrated the potential insurance cost of a major strike against the City, bringing home to the Provisional IRA the operational effectiveness of planting a bomb in Britain's financial centre.

Subsequently, it emerged that the initial figures released by the insurance industry were a large over-estimation. Some saw this as a deliberate attempt by the insurance industry to encourage Government participation by overemphasising the magnitude of the problem, as they saw the issue of terrorism insurance as the responsibility of the state, and not commerce. As one leading insurer indicated 'it may have suited the insurance industry not to analyse the expectations of loss too closely as they were keen to get the Government involved.' The net result was that both the British insurance industry, and their reinsurers, began to publicly express concern about their future liabilities to such risk, and hence their ability to underwrite terrorism insurance in the UK. Post-St Mary Axe, the ABI voiced its concerns to the Home Secretary in May 1992, to the President of the Board of Trade in June, and to the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) in July. As one leading insurer noted:

> It is a social risk but it is also a political risk. However there was an increasing
> corpus of feeling that the Government should have taken more responsibility for
> this (Senior City Insurance Consultant).

The insurers, concerns centred upon two issues. First, the large number of catastrophic incidents that had occurred globally in the years preceding the bombing, which had pushed many insurers and reinsurers near to the limits of insolvency. Second, the nature of terrorist attack defied most of the normal 'laws of insurance'. The industry could not quantify the potential financial exposure of a terrorist bombing when they could not predict where it is going to be located, its explosive force, or how business disruption would affect financial markets. It was also reported that the reinsurers realised that the direct insurers did not have accurate financial risk profiles in place for areas, such as the City, and hence adequate information about potential liability could not be accurately calculated. As such, given these restrictions the insurance industry felt economically vulnerable:

> If the UK insurance industry had continued to underwrite terrorism risks, and the
> bombing campaign had continued at a high level, the industry could potentially
> have gone bankrupt (Director of Association of British Insurers).

There was also obvious annoyance from the insurers that the Government were, at this time, unwilling to support the market either by extending the Northern Ireland scheme to the Britain, or by financially supporting the existing market. Government reluctance was for two main reasons. First, it reflected a particular concern over cost, given that the bill for the St Mary Axe bombing was estimated as equivalent to the sum of twenty years of terrorism-related compensation paid out in Northern Ireland. Second there was a feeling that if the Government subsidised insurance coverage, terrorists could increasingly claim that attacks against economic targets were politically motivated. Therefore the Government, in contrast to the insurance industry, saw the issue of terrorism insurance as an issue for the insurance market.

The argument the insurance industry continued to highlight was that if the Government paid for the damage caused by terrorism it would come out of public funding and the whole community could have contributed a small amount in taxes. Not unsurprisingly, the view of many in the City was that the Square Mile should not have been singled out for higher premiums, but instead, the cost of insuring society against terrorism should be distributed in line with other risks such as flooding. This would have redistributed risk, in financial terms, away from the City institutions and their international reinsurers. As a senior City insurer noted: 'it shouldn't have just been lumbered on those people who pay an insurance premium in a particular area. It should be more equitably spread over society.'

Alternatively, some proposed that the Government could have imposed a levy against commercial companies (see for example Bagnell 1993). The Government at the time opposed charging a compulsory levy to commercial organisations, as companies in low risk areas would see it as unfair if they were subsidising the more vulnerable areas. This was seen as a politically unacceptable solution:

> Another way of dealing with the risk would have been through a compulsory levy for all insurance premiums. In this situation, all those who buy insurance are contributing to a common pool, which would pay for the losses of the few – the general principle of insurance. This was undoubtedly considered but was rejected as it would have created a high profile situation for the Government (City Insurance Broker).

A Northern Ireland Model for Britain?

Several months after the St Mary Axe bomb the insurance industry was still concerned about its liability, and continued to put pressure on the Government to introduce a similar scheme to that in Northern Ireland. The Government were not keen to extend the Northern Ireland model for both financial and political reasons:

> It felt like Northern Ireland, in that the Government should take the risk. But the Government were averse to taking the risk, not just because they didn't want

to take it financially, but at that stage they were absolutely petrified of being seen to have bowed to terrorism and taking it in the public purse (Senior Risk Manager).

The Corporation of London, too, saw the Northern Ireland model as the obvious solution. As Michael Cassidy, Chairman of the Corporation's Policy and Resources committee, stated during an interview:

> Because we were in new territory, and it was simply my job to make sure something happened, the most obvious model to go for was the Northern Ireland scheme.

Not only would a Northern Ireland scheme have been the easiest to establish, but it would also have been of most benefit to the City, as it would completely remove any financial liability from insurance companies within the Square Mile, moreover, there was growing pressure to develop a scheme quickly. Cassidy indicated that the Government were 'very resistant to any idea of extending the Northern Ireland scheme' as this would be viewed as politically difficult at the time. A Corporation of London insurance officer also indicated that he felt the Conservative Government were not keen to extend the Northern Ireland scheme at this time due to the fragile majority they held in Parliament. As he noted: 'insurers were hoping for that... consumers were hoping for that...but the Government were not keen as they didn't want to increase their tax burden at a time when the Government were in some difficulty.'

Issues came to a head in October and November 1992 when one of the major European reinsurers wrote to all their ceding companies[2] indicating that they would be excluding terrorism from their standard policies from January 1 1993. Due to the potential financial liability from terrorism, it was inconceivable that any particular insurance company would be willing to bear the whole risk themselves. In normal circumstances a reinsurance arrangement would have been entered into where a company does not accept the whole risk, but parts of it, with other insurers or reinsurers. This is done through the automatic transfer of risk via a standard 'contract' which covers a certain percentage of every policy an insurer underwrites on a certain risk. The biggest reinsurers in the world at this time were European based, predominately located in Germany and Switzerland. Without their support it was impossible to obtain cover at economically viable terms for any major terrorist-related risk. This meant the underlying insurers, who relied on this reinsurance cover would not offer terms of cover without this back-up facility. Therefore, when the large reinsurers removed themselves from the market, British reinsurers subsequently followed suit. In turn, direct insurers said they would operate a terrorism exclusion from their standard policies. The ABI's position at

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2   Companies who reinsure part of their risk with reinsurance companies.

this time was that they didn't have to act to resolve this situation as the onus was on the Government:

> In reality they [the ABI] didn't need to do anything because they were walking away from it. Therefore, the insurance market didn't have to necessarily have to try and find another solution (Senior City Insurance Consultant).

At this time, the bodies responsible for the organisation of risk management and insurance in Britain such as the Association of Insurance and Risk Managers in Industry and Commerce (AIRMIC), the Confederation of British Industry (CBI), and the British Insurance and Investment Brokers Association (BIIBA) became involved in the continuing debate:

> In October 1992 before the exclusion was announced I saw some correspondence from Munich Re, one of the two biggest reinsurers in the world, indicating that they were going to operate a terrorism exclusion from the year end. Nothing had been said at this point. I took this to AIRMIC and we leaked it to the *Financial Times*[3] (Senior AIRMIC Consultant).

The involvement of these insurance and risk management groupings typifies how the assessment of risk is now determined in modern society, as financial necessity has resulted in an ever expanding range of institutions now seeking to judge risk for their own benefits. In particular, the involvement of these insurance and risk management groupings can be seen as an attempt by bodies to establish a 'voice' for themselves in order to strengthen their position. In addition, the ongoing debate about the removal of insurance cover can also be seen as an event which stimulated the Corporation of London to get involved in this matter.

The removal of reinsurance cover caused much concern amongst businesses in locations vulnerable to attack, especially given the expiry date of many insurance policies on 31 December 1992. The situation was particularly worrying for the Corporation of London who were due to renew their own insurance policies even earlier, on Christmas Day. A Corporation's insurance officer indicated that they had heard rumours from as early as May 1992 that the reinsurers were going to pull out of the market. This caused concern in the City. As Michael Cassidy noted:

> We [the Corporation of London] felt that this was a national Government responsibility and that to leave people unable to obtain cover was going to be completely unacceptable to the City so we tried to mobilise the Government into doing something.

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3   On 12 November the *Financial Times* ran an article based on leaked material from AIRMIC indicating the reluctance of reinsurers to cover terrorism. This, it is believed, triggered an ABI press statement confirming this state of affairs (AIRMIC Newsletter January 1993).

Both the insurer's associations and the Corporation of London were keen to get the Government involved as they saw the risk of terrorism as an issue which affected the whole country, and believed the distribution of financial risk should reflect this instead of being concentrated in certain areas such as the City:

> There was a lot of lobbying from the Corporation of London for two reasons. Firstly because they found themselves with the risk that their own property portfolio, which is enormous, was not covered. Secondly the City as a whole would not be covered. Both of these things drove the Corporation to lobby very hard indeed (Senior City Insurance Consultant).

In short the City's localised response was an attempt to reduce its vulnerability against the financial implications of a blast which would not only be detrimental to its long term prospects as a global trading centre, but would feed back to affect the entire UK economy.

The ABI Standard Exclusion

On 12 November 1992 the ABI issued a press statement indicating that it had advised its members (the majority of the UK insurers) to exclude terrorism from its industrial and commercial policies in line with most other European countries. The statement went on to blame the reinsurers for this scenario: 'leading world-wide reinsurers have forced this exclusion on the UK market in the light of considerable losses earlier this year in major bombing incidents and the continuation of terrorist bombings in the UK.'[4]

The international reinsurers still insisted that Provisional IRA terrorism was a political issue that the British Government must address, just as it did in Northern Ireland in the 1970s. Other commentators pointed out the coincidence of the press release, occurring just after a bomb was found, and defused, at Canary Wharf in the London Docklands, which would have caused massive devastation if detonated. Gloyn (1993) for example noted that this 'near miss' did nothing to weaken the resolve of insurers to pull out of the market for terrorism.

A period of stalemate followed where the ABI appeared to want to wash their hands of the issue whilst the Government were equally determined that they were not going to be bullied into submission and portrayed the issues as a commercial matter. The timing of the ABI announcement could not really have been worse as there was much anxiety surrounding the fear of Provisional IRA attempts to bomb London, and particularly the City, over the Christmas period:

> In the insurance market there was a great worry about terror insurance both with
> Christmas coming up and the understanding that the IRA are likely to try and

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4   ABI press release 12 November.

give a present [a bomb] to the City before Christmas. The Corporation were very nervous (Corporation of London Insurance Officer).

Others reaffirmed that the insurance ruling was, in their opinion, a boost for the Provisional IRA as it made the campaign to attack economic targets more attractive. It also acted as a disincentive for firms wishing to relocate to Britain, particularly London:

My view was that if you go back to basic terrorist philosophy the IRA wished to compromise the economic well-being of the country. So, it could be argued that once insurance cover was reduced, or withdrawn, the terrorists have won – we have actually given them an economic victory (Senior City of London Police officer).

Reducing the Competitive Position of the Square Mile

At this time the Lord Mayor of London wrote to the Prime Minister expressing concern over the future economic success of the City if the Government refused to offer cover against terrorist attack. Indeed, an internal memorandum circulated by the Corporation of London on 24 November 1992 indicated that the City's global reputation could be jeopardised further by the bombing, noting that: 'if the situation were unresolved, taking high grade property in the City would be a less attractive [i.e. risky] option.'

The situation could have had disastrous effects on London's economic competitiveness, by reducing the attractiveness of locating in the City, and by undermining the investment potential of City institutions. *First*, it was felt that lack of adequate terrorism insurance could harm the already fragile economy (which was just emerging from recession) by a combination of the threat of terrorism and the unavailability of insurance which would weaken the commercial position of the City, and the UK as a whole. In particular, there was a fear that the removal of terrorism insurance could discourage businesses from locating in the Square Mile and led firms to relocate in other European cities, which were in direct economic competition with the City. There was also concern that the situation would jeopardise the efforts, at this time, to encourage the Central European Bank to locate in the City.

Second, there were concerns that the property investment industry could be affected as property developers would not be able to secure funding on the strengths of the property they owned because it was not possible to fully insure their stock. The lack of financial security could also have led to a future lack of investment in property development. For example, chartered surveyors in the City pointed out at this time that the inability to obtain terrorism insurance was delaying the completion of property deals. Similarly, there were fears that tenants, who would have to bear the cost of terrorism insurance through their leases, would avoid high premiums and move elsewhere.

The lack of terrorism cover therefore increased the vulnerability of high profile City buildings to attack, with implications for the future functioning of the City economy. Illustrating this, a letter to the Prime Minister from the City Property Association[5] underlined that: 'the City is clearly a prime target, not only because of the value of its buildings, but also because of its importance to "UK LTD".'

The letter continued by indicating that the Government should step in to help avoid 'areas of the City of London remaining literally as "bomb sites"' and to stop the City 'becoming a "no-go" area in terms of occupancy and investment, to the benefit of our overseas competitors, particularly in financial services':

> It was important to the City that business continued and didn't go to Frankfurt or anywhere else. The fact that the London insurance market couldn't buy commercial reinsurance for itself meant that they were unable to offer primary insurance cover for bomb damage. This had big implications for business (Representative of Pool Reinsurance).

Transferring the Risk Nationally

After the ABI announcement, the Corporation of London took the lead in trying to persuade the Government to get involved with covering terrorism insurance and help spread the financial risk nationally, avoiding a situation where the City's niche in the global market place was adversely questioned. A letter sent by the Lord Mayor of London to the Prime Minister on 2 December 1992 noted that:

> In our view, the withdrawal of insurance facilities will discourage new businesses from locating in the City and could well be the catalyst for foreign institutions to relocate elsewhere.

Furthermore this letter highlighted that if the position of one of the inter-related financial markets was jeopardised this would feed back into the overall performance of the City:

> London is successful because its various markets and professional services feed off each other and this fragile relationship could be harmed if there were to be a loss of confidence.

The letter continued by indicating the link between the lack of available insurance cover and the development of an increasingly fortified urban landscape:

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5   The City Property Association represented a wide range of membership, including the major financial institutions, legal firms and property investment companies, who owned or occupied property within the City of London.

> We are already aware that some property owners are proposing to initiate their own security arrangements in order to protect themselves against an open ended risk and the appearance of security measures such as fences, etc alongside our streets, will further undermine confidence.

This is indicative of the relationship between financial security provided by insurance and physical risk management measures used to reduce exposure to particular risks. It highlights the different ways in which insurers viewed terrorist risk at this time. On the one hand, they reduced their own risk exposure in financial terms as they signalled their intention to withdraw from the market. On the other hand, the insurers had served to enhance the physical risk level in the City as the non-availability of insurance cover made it an increasingly attractive target to terrorists, and hence, encouraged businesses to install additional risk management measures in an attempt to reduce their potential liability costs.

Continued Pressure to get the Government Involved

In the lead up to Christmas 1992, the Corporation of London continued its efforts to get the Government involved in offering terrorism insurance cover. In a press release on 4 December 1992, Michael Cassidy noted that the City was anxious about the terrorist insurance issue: 'the Government must resolve the insurance position to ensure that a framework is provided in which business can proceed with confidence.'

By mid-December, the media had, at last, begun to realise fully the implications of the removal of terrorism insurance cover given the stalemate between the insurers and the Government. A number of small bombs in London in early December undoubtedly contributed to this state of affairs. For example, a City underwriter indicated that the media were now beginning to show an interest in the issue, serving to publicise the Corporation's case:

> One or two newspapers at this time started to take up the theme sensing that there was something quite big here. This no doubt helped the pressure wave that was building on the Government to sort the situation out.

In their struggle the Corporation to persuade the Government to act as 'insurer of last resort' even enlisted the help of the Prince of Wales who indicated that he would raise the matter personally with the Prime Minister. This followed comments by Michael Cassidy, that some of London's prestige landmarks could not be rebuilt if destroyed by bombs.[6] Furthermore, a confidential letter from the Lord Mayor to the Prime Minister indicated that until the insurance situation was resolved

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6   See Olnis (1992) and Carolan (1992).

'German and Japanese investors are no longer prepared to purchase property in the City.'[7]

However, the ABI continued to insist that the insurance industry could not, and would not act without Government support. Clearly however, negotiations that took place between industry representatives, the Corporation and the Government were vital to creating pressure which forced the Government to look again at its stance. Indeed, meetings the Corporation had with the Government in December 1992 were, he believed, 'instrumental' in getting the government involved:

> It is true to say that the Corporation was a major factor in getting the Government involved – using the argument that, with the country's economy, the City is a big part, and that in this regard, they [the Government] need to provide a safe place for domestic and overseas financial institutions to exist within the City boundaries (Corporation of London Insurance Officer).

The Government as Insurer of Last Resort

On 21 December 1992 the Government amended its position indicating that it was willing to act as the ultimate reinsurer, the so-called 'insurer of last resort',[8] behind a pool of insurers who had agreed to set up a mutual company, Pool Reinsurance (Pool Re), to provide insurance in the traditional way. Under this scheme the insurance industry were effectively passing on all the additional premiums in return for the transfer of the terrorist risk to the Government who were reinsuring the scheme. As the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) press notice stated: 'in recent months it has become virtually impossible for insurers operating in the UK to obtain the reinsurance protection they need so they can continue to offer terrorism cover in Britain for new policies and renewals from the end of the year'. The statement continued:

> In the light of this decision the Government expects that owners and tenants of industrial and commercial property should continue to be able to obtain cover against terrorist attacks. The price of such cover will, however, be adjusted to reflect the changes in risk in the usual way.

The scheme was a compromise between a Northern Ireland model, which was dismissed as politically unacceptable, and a purely commercial solution, which the insurance industry had rejected. It initially represented a series of promises by the Government, which in due course would be ratified by Parliament. The formation of Pool Re averted a potential crisis in the property industry as tenants and owners were now able to purchase insurance cover against terrorism, albeit

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7   Cited by Peter Sharp (reporter) on *News at Ten* (ITV), 18 December.

8   An insurance plan that accepts 'uninsurable' risk that cannot obtain coverage at market rates.

at great cost. The way that the scheme was set up ensured that the Government would not be held responsible for compensation for businesses who are not insured for terrorist risk, and that the premium rate for such terrorism insurance policies would be periodically reviewed in line with political/peace developments in Northern Ireland. The Government agreed to meet 90 per cent of further claims not covered by premiums gathered by Pool Re. The insurance companies would collectively cover the remaining 10 per cent. The Government at this time also insisted that their involvement would be short term and would not be detrimental to the taxpayer.

Government involvement effectively aimed to spread the financial risk of further terrorist attack throughout the national economy, and away from the City markets. This reduced risk as the Government, given its powers, could absorb the potentially huge cost of terrorist attack. In addition, Government involvement effectively stopped other insurance or reinsurance companies, both at home and abroad, who might have considered underwriting terrorism insurance from doing so. In this instance there was no incentive for other companies to compete with the British Government given the enormity of potential losses.

Insurance Zoning

The Pool Re scheme, as it emerged in the 1990s, had a number of unforeseen geographical impacts, which meant, that the Government's aim of national risk spreading was defeated. The risk became spatially concentrated in the selected urban areas which were viewed as key terrorist targets. Under Pool Re, areas of the country were designated as either high risk (Zone 1) or low risk (Zone 2). This designation was based on two issues. First, the speed at which the scheme was set up required a simple, yet workable, premium rating structure. Second, by setting the scheme up with only two zones meant that all those in Zone 1 would be charged the highest premium. Therefore, if there was a large take-up of policies, the pool of premiums could be maximised. This logic relied on all those businesses in Zone 1 regarding themselves as 'at risk' from terrorism.

There were nine designated high-risk centres – Birmingham, Glasgow, Leeds, Manchester, London (not just the City and West End, but all London postcodes), Bristol, Liverpool, Edinburgh and Cardiff. High-risk areas had substantially higher premiums, which reflected their greater perceived risk exposure. In addition, if property was located next to a high-risk property, such as a Government building or a high profile construction project, an additional 'target risk' premium of 50 per cent was charged. In short, Zone 1 rates were approximately 3-5 times those of Zone 2 without the target risk classification. Zone 1, in the opinion of some, covered areas of the country which were felt to be at little risk from terrorism. As a City insurance company director indicated, this classification was particularly hard on non-London areas in Zone 1 as 'there may have been a number of areas seen as high risk but we all know that the City and perhaps Oxford Street or Knightsbridge are the realistic targets.'

The perception at this time was that London, and especially the financial zones were the main target of the Provisional IRA, and that the other 'high-risk' rated areas were put in Zone 1 to increase the pool of money the scheme collected. City of London premiums were especially high due to the large number of buildings within the Square Mile considered 'target risks'. However, Pool Re was still advantageous for the City, as their risk was in effect subsidised, at least in part, by businesses in other locations. Such territorial rating in this case could be seen as an attempt to let 'good' risks subsidise 'bad' risks in line with the general principle of insurance. The Corporation still continued to push the DTI for reduced premiums. Michael Cassidy noted that he was angered that the City was being singled out for higher premiums:

> The Corporation of London is not the only area of the country at risk from the terrorists; the whole country is. We felt that we should not receive higher premiums as a result.

The Corporation were still disappointed that insurance costs would, in their opinion, unduly affect City properties. They saw the City as a national economic asset, which was being plagued by a national fight against terrorist attack and that they would like to see 'a national scheme to deal with a national battle' (Cassidy). The Corporation, in this sense, was trying to persuade the Government to spread the risk even further by setting premium levels the same for all areas of the country, which would have led to reduced premiums in the Square Mile. However, realistically the City at this time was considered one of only a small number of areas the Provisional IRA would actually target. Most of the country was not considered at genuine risk from significant explosions and would therefore have been unwilling to give patronage to such a scheme.

However, the Government's decision to finally become insurer of last resort was reluctantly welcomed by the City. As Cassidy stated: 'I think it's very good that the Government have seen sense on this and are able to respond in the way they have but there are many details to be resolved'.[9] As this news report further highlighted:

> The City of London's breathing a sigh of relief tonight, with the Government's decision to underwrite insurance cover against terrorist attacks. Insurance companies had threatened to withdraw cover next week ... The Government's initial reluctance led to warnings of economic disaster, not only for the City but the UK as a whole.

Bernard Harty, the Chamberlain (financial director) of the Corporation of London, indicated that the announcement 'must be a mixture of concern that premiums will increase so much – in our case it could be somewhere between 90 and 100 per cent

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9   *Newsroom South East* (BBC1), 21 December 1992.

which is very significant. But, on the other hand, up until today we had no prospect of cover of any kind.'[10] Insurance, in this sense, was seen as a very important and necessary safety net against the risk of further terrorist attacks in the City.

At this time there was even talk that the Corporation had agreed a special discount from Pool Re for insuring all its property holdings in the City (believed to be worth some £5-6 billion), but specific details have not been revealed. What the Corporation continued to do, at this time, was to put pressure on the Government to negotiate a better deal for occupiers in the Square Mile. As Cassidy noted:

> All property owners need to be alerted to the fact that by pestering their insurance companies that their buildings are not at risk, and by increasing security, they can reduce their premiums.[11]

Concentrating Risk in the City

As noted above, a major criticism of Pool Re after it was initiated was that the risk of financial loss from terrorism attack was not, despite its intentions, dispersed throughout the national and global economy in the way other catastrophic risks were. Risk was, in short, concentrated in the Square Mile. Potentially, this could have had devastating effects on the economic competitiveness of the City in terms of loss of business confidence, and in particular by a strike against an uninsured building.

This concentration of insured risk occurred for a number of reasons. First, most of the members of Pool Re were British. Therefore in the event of a major terrorist act the cost would be almost entirely borne by the British economy, or, in the event of the pool running out of capital, the British Government. This was in contrast to other catastrophic loss events which are dispersed throughout the global economy by reinsurance arrangements, reducing the effect on any one nation. Second, risk spreading was cut down even more by requiring the member companies of Pool Re to act as reinsurers to the scheme. This was done in terms of a ten per cent levy they would be required to pay on any outstanding claims if the pool became exhausted. Thirdly, the risk to the British economy was accentuated as the major commercial insurers were significantly represented in Pool Re, particularly in certain geographical areas. The risk of loss was therefore not only concentrated in the British economy but in selected companies. The degree of risk spreading was further decreased by the fact that the majority of the risk was located in the City, which is insured by the same groups that fund Pool Re.[12] As Bice (1994, 456) noted, the problem with Pool Re was that:

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10   Cited on the *Nine O'Clock News* (BBC1), 21 December.
11   Personal correspondence.
12   For example Sun Alliance insured a large proportion of the Corporation of London buildings – approximately one-third of the property in the City.

If a bomb explodes in that area, the loss will not be spread throughout the country, but will be borne primarily by the insurers in the City of London. Hence risk distribution is defeated.

The insurance principle that the losses of the few should be shared by the premiums of the many broke down in this case, as owners of property outside of London were reluctant to buy terrorism insurance. As such the high rates nationwide meant that many decided not to buy cover resulting in the pool of money being much lower than anticipated. This was partially due to the 'tactics' of the DTI, who, in order to spread the risk, insisted that companies insure their entire property portfolio, and not just those buildings in the City or other high-risk locations. This 'all or nothing' rule was to ensure that the Government had a balanced portfolio of risk that was not just in high-risk zones. In reality, companies with exposures in many locations often chose to self-insure or take a chance by not insuring at all. Thus the size of the pool was diminished and concentrated with predominantly high-risk exposures in certain geographical areas. For example a survey carried out by AIRMIC a few months earlier indicated that 26 per cent of their members were not planning on buying additional terrorism insurance policies as premiums were simply too high.[13]

The resulting situation was criticised by the Corporation of London and other economists, as it did not spread the risk properly. It left the City with the burden of liability, where risk was disproportionately concentrated. This financial situation can be likened to Ulrich Beck's notion of 'loser regions' created as a result of inequitable distribution of insurance provision and levels of risk. In such a situation, new landscapes often develop through the actions of local institutions and organisations, that attempt to form a risk adverse environment by enhancing risk management in order to reduce risk. The defensive landscapes constructed in the City exemplify this philosophy. It can therefore be argued that this higher economic exposure became a catalyst for enhanced security measures to be constructed in City, especially after the Bishopsgate bomb, as the insurers, in their quest to provide financial security to businesses operating in the City, attempted to improve the physical security in areas that were most financially liable in the event of a terrorist attack.

The Insurance Response to Bishopsgate

The Bishopsgate bomb inflicted heavy damage and disruption on City businesses and put the Northern Ireland question at the top of the Government's public policy agenda. Initial reports suggested the damage from the bomb would cost around £1 billion. The decision of reinsurers to withdraw from the market six months earlier was, in part, vindicated by this attack.

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13   *Lloyd's List*, 26 April 1993.

Immediately after the Bishopsgate blast there were forecasts that insurance premiums for terrorism would rise dramatically as it was felt that future premiums should reflect the perceived risks on the ground. It was thought that the Government would have to pay most of the bill, as it was believed that the terrorism insurance money collected by Pool Re only stood at around £300-400 million. This estimate meant that it was feared that the taxpayer might well be asked to pay between £25-50 per household to make up the shortfall. This scenario was 'blamed' on the reluctance of businesses outside London to take out the expensive terrorism cover.

Soon after the 1993 bomb, the initial estimates of £1 billion were being viewed as 'wildly inaccurate' by the ABI and 'a knee jerk reaction' by Lloyds. Estimates made several days after the bomb put the damage significantly lower – at between £500-800 million. As with the previous bomb at St Mary Axe, the insurance industry could be seen to be creating an impression, through exaggerated claims of damage, that they could not cope with the terrorist threat and that the Government should continue to assume the burden of risk and perhaps remove any remaining liability from them. There were also renewed calls at this time for the Northern Ireland model of terrorism insurance to be adopted in full, instead of Pool Re.

Such inaccurate forecasts, often advanced through the media, were seen by some to unwittingly provided a morale boost to the Provisional IRA, who could use the impact on the British economy as useful propaganda material:

> The bloody media got it wrong again. You would have thought that after the last bomb they would realise the cost is never as much as the wild speculative guesses being banded around. £1 billion is just a nice figure for them to latch on to and show the extent of the terrorist damage (City Insurance Broker).

Subsequently, in May 1993, the Government provisionally published the Reinsurance (Acts of Terrorism) Bill which gave legal authority to the promises made by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) in December 1992. There was concern that with the formal recognition of this Bill the Government would try to recover much of the cost of the Bishopsgate explosion through raising premiums to protect themselves financially in the event of further strikes.

Subsequently, Pool Re came under immense pressure from the Government to raise premiums under a 'rate review' initiated following Bishopsgate. In general insurance practice, one method of reducing the risk a company bears, is by decreasing the financial consequences of that risk by charging an excessive 'safety loading' on premiums for that risk – the amount collected by the insurer which is in excess of an economically efficient premium. It is, in effect, their safety net. Safety loading increases the premium pool which can be used to pay claims. In a free and competitive market this is seldom used, as policyholders would change insurers to obtain cheaper rates. However, the absence, at this time, of any credible alternative scheme meant that the Government was considering a high safety loading. Premium increases of 300 per cent were feared in the City.

Many felt that this would further undermine the scheme and would discourage people from taking out terrorism insurance. In short, it was felt that more people might 'take a chance on terrorism' or perhaps relocate their businesses away from high risk zones. The ABI commented that already some twenty to thirty per cent of businesses in London did not have terrorism cover rising to seventy per cent or more in the rest of Britain. However, to keep the terrorism pool viable, premiums needed to be increased, as the firms taking out cover were in predominantly high-risk locations. This was a problematic issue for the DTI:

> We were looking at a substantial rise in terrorism costs after the second bomb as the City more than ever before is seen as being vulnerable to a third bomb. However, there was a feeling that if Pool Re hiked-up the cost too much then there would be problems (Insurance Analyst).

Furthermore, the chief executive of the loss assessors for the Corporation of London, warned that the City could be severely damaged financially if further terrorist incidents forced premiums too high: 'If the Government won't pick up the tab and the insurance companies won't, the City will shut down and the terrorists will have won'.[14] In particular, the CBI was vociferous in their disapproval of the supposed rate rises. Their policy advisor indicated that rates 'would place an intolerable burden on hundreds of firms, particularly those in the City of London'.[15] A BIIBA spokesperson indicated that such rates could frighten business away and decrease the City's competitiveness.

Indeed, immediately after the bomb the ABI noted that the whole of the City might have to be classified a 'high risk area' and as a result, get a similar risk premium ratings as a 'target risk' – 50 per cent more than other Zone 1 risks:

> With two bombs in 13 months ... insurance companies are likely to reclassify the whole of the financial centre as a target risk with an inevitable increase in premiums.[16]

New Zones of Risk

Revisions to the premium structure in relation to the cost of insurance, following the rate review, were announced on 3 June 1993. These included the creation of four Zones (A-D) for the calculation of premiums instead of the two (Zones 1 and 2) that previously existed. This was a more realistic zoning in terms of who was potentially at greatest physical risk, and was an attempt to extract most money from those perceived to be at most risk. The re-alignment of zones was done as the Government decided that it must increase premiums to produce a sufficient cash-

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14   Cited in Pendlebury (1993).
15   Cited in Lapper (1993a).
16   A leading member of the ABI cited in *New Builder*, 30 April 1993.

Table 6.1 **Terrorism Insurance premium increases as a result of the Pool Re rate review of 1993**

Zone A Terrorism Premiums (formally Zone 1)			
Value	Premium of Previous Basis (without target risk loading)	Premium from July 1993	Increase
£0.5M	£450	£720	+60.0%
£1.0M	£900	£1440	+60.0%
£5.0M	£4500	£7200	+60.0%
£10.0M	£8300	£14400	+73.5%
£25.0M	£17750	£36000	+103.5%
£50.0M	£31000	£72000	+132.5%
£100.0M	£51000	£144000	+182.5%
£250.0M	£102000	£360000	+251.5%
£500.0M	£175000	£720000	+311.5%

flow into the pool to achieve its stated objectives of nil cost to the Government, and to be able to withdraw from the scheme as soon as possible.

Under the new scheme, Zone A, which comprised central London with the postcodes W1, WC1, WC2, SW1, EC1, EC2, EC3, EC4, SE1, E1, E14, had a rate of 0.144 per cent per annum of total sum insured. This amounted, in some case to a 300 per cent increase in premium (see Table 6.1).

Zone B (rate of 0.072 per cent – representing an increase of 200 per cent) comprised the rest of London and the central business districts of most other major towns. The rest of London had previously been classified as 'high risk' and in the old Zone 1. Figure 6.1 shows the geographical distribution of the new Zones throughout London. In particular it shows the concentration of Zone 'A' postcodes around the City (EC1-EC4) and West End, indicating the most likely geographical targets for the terrorist attack, based on the insurance perception of risk.

Zone C on the new scale (rate of 0.018 per cent slight increase for smaller portfolio's but up to 80 per cent increases on portfolios of £500 Million or more) comprised the rest of England with the exception of Devon and Cornwall. Zone D (rate of 0.009 per cent – decrease of between 10-50 per cent) covered the rest of Great Britain i.e. Devon and Cornwall and Scotland and Wales (with the exception of the major urban areas covered by Zone B).

Premiums in lower risk areas were decreased in order to encourage more companies to contribute to, albeit negligibly, the terrorism insurance pool. This rating structure attempted once again to spread the risk of terrorism nation-wide and allow good risks to subsidise bad risks, though through a slightly different mechanism than before.

Figure 6.1   The London postcode districts used by Pool Reinsurance

City Premiums Continue to Rise

City of London premiums were hit particularly hard in this rate review especially given the high property value of many of the buildings located there. For example, property in the City with a value of £500 million had a terrorism premium for material damage of £175,000 (without target risk classification) prior to 1 July 1993. This increased to £720,000 after this date, and overall this amounted to a net increase of over 300 per cent. Subsequently many City businesses were highly critical of these initiatives:

> Our clients were very unhappy with what they saw as an extortionate increase. They would not have been that bitter if the rates had doubled given the recent bomb in the City, as they would see this as realistic. But frankly 300% was a bit steep, to say the least (City Insurance Broker).

The large increases in insurance rates had potentially damaging consequences, in that it was feared that they could raise business costs and reduce the competitiveness of the City. The business community was unhappy with such rises as it felt other areas of the country were at risk from attack. For example, to promote this argument, they drew on the bomb in Gateshead in the North East of England, where a gas-storage depot was attacked in June 1993. As in the aftermath of the 1992 bomb, it was feared that businesses could consider relocation as a reaction to the City being given high insurance rates.

The concentration of financial risk in the City reinforced the view that the ring of steel was necessary, and that the innumerable private security initiatives being undertaken were justified. In short, increased insurance premiums meant that increased fortification was both required and initiated by the Corporation, as the insurance industry had not managed to spread the risk sufficiently to leave them financially secure if a major bomb was detonated in the City.

Fluctuating Risk Levels and Alternative Risk Distribution Mechanisms

On 31 August 1994 the Provisional IRA announced a ceasefire, which prompted immediate calls to Pool Re regarding possible premium discounts. The Pool Re Chief Executive issued a statement at this time indicating that they would not be making any immediate changes to their policy as they felt the Provisional IRA were not the only terrorist threat to the UK:

> Together with our members, Pool Re welcomes the cease-fire and very much hopes it will be permanent. At this stage it is too early to make any changes in the premium rates, but the progress of the peace process, together with the overall claims experience of Pool Re [in terms of balance of accounts] will be kept under review. It should be pointed out that terrorism is not easily predictable and the recent attacks on the Israeli Embassy and at Finchley demonstrate that the threat is present from organisations other than the IRA.[17]

This could be seen as an attempt to maximise revenue into the terrorism pool in case the ceasefire broke down and the Government became financially liable. At this time many in the business community were not happy with what they saw as the sluggish response of the scheme to the new conditions. Some even hoped that Pool Re could be scrapped. As one insurance broker indicated: 'when the ceasefire was signed in August, I had loads of clients ringing me up and asking me if this meant they could cancel their terrorism coverage.'

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17 August 1994 saw two separate terrorist attacks in London, one at the Israeli Embassy. Pool Re were quick to confirm that, despite these attacks not being aimed at the UK Government, their reinsurance cover would cover losses.

Initially Pool Re indicated that rates could not be reduced. Then, in December 1994, signs began to emerge that concessions for buyers of terrorism insurance might be forthcoming. As a result of the ceasefire a number of changes were made to Pool Re from 1 January 1995. A deposit premium of 60 per cent of the annual terrorism premium was paid and the 40 per cent balance would only be payable should estimated claims for acts of terrorism exceed £50 million during 1995. This was seen as both a commercial necessity, and as a response to the continuation of the peace process in Northern Ireland:

> Pool Re was under tremendous commercial pressure to reduce premiums but they were also under some political pressure to show the benefits of the progress the Government were making in working towards a total cessation of hostilities (Senior City Insurance Consultant).

He continued by noting that the insurance industry, in his opinion, was not keen on reducing premiums payable as it would decease the terrorism pool and heighten their possible exposure in the case of a major incident:

> The insurance industry wouldn't have been involved in the pressure [to reduce premiums] because they had walked away from the problem. In fact, the insurers stood to lose. Their interest was to keep the income as high as possible due to the 10% claw back they are liable for if Pool Re funds are exhausted. One could almost see some reluctance by the insurers to see reductions in premiums.

Subsequently, the cease-fire period held and no claims were made against Pool Re in 1995. The discount scheme was then extended into 1996, this time with a £75 million limit.

Renewed Vulnerability

The Docklands bomb in February 1996 led, once again to uncertainty surrounding the cost and provision of terrorism insurance. Additionally it was also reported that some of the worst affected buildings were *not* covered by terrorism insurance. After this incident, Pool Re announced a considerable increase in the number of clients taking out cover with them. Considerable interest was also being shown in the alternative schemes that had entered the market. Other Provisional IRA bomb incidents in London in the weeks preceding the South Quay blast further served to publicise the need to obtain terrorism insurance.

On 13 June Pool Re announced that the South Quay bomb had topped the threshold limit of £75 million and that they would be calling in the 40 per cent deposit from businesses that had taken out cover. Two days later a massive lorry bomb devastated the centre of Manchester, in North West England, with damage initially estimated at between £200-300 million. This estimate later increased to £400 million. Claims against Pool Re totalled £234 million.

The take-up of terrorism insurance by UK businesses increased as the perceived physical risk became more widespread. In particular, the bomb in Manchester shattered the commonly held belief that businesses would be safe if located outside London, hence distributing the financial risk of terrorism to a greater degree than it had previously done. As a City insurer stated:

> Following South Quay the volume of business from both London and the regions increased a great deal and we are forecasting that a similar thing will now happen, particularly in other areas of the country than the capital.[18]

The combined result of these bombs had effects on two key areas with regard to insurance. First, it kept terrorism on the agenda for businesses that continued to have to pay for it. Second, it increased the geographical scope of terrorist risk and hence encouraged those in locations previously considered at lower risk to take out coverage, and increase the flow of money into Pool Re.

Available Alternatives to Pool Re

As soon as terrorism insurance became a serious issue in late 1992 there were individual brokers, both in the London market and from abroad, who were initially prepared to offer limited cover against terrorist risk. At this time, however, the restricted capacity of such schemes meant that they were relatively unimportant in the market. For example, Bain Clarkson offered a simple first-loss insurance of £20 million for any one incident in May 1994. As previously noted, the huge potential losses made the Government the only viable scheme.

The reduction in terrorist activity after the Provisional IRA ceasefire in August 1994 led to the emergence of an alternative market, and in early 1995 the first 'feasible' non-Government backed form of terrorism insurance became available. Such alternative schemes began to receive much more attention after the South Quay and Manchester bombs in 1996. At this time there were a large number of businesses reconsidering their decision not to take out cover with Pool Re although many of these were also going to the alternative schemes, for a quotation. The alternative schemes operated a kind of 'cherry picking' arrangement selecting certain risks in certain areas whilst being careful not to insure too many buildings in high-risk areas because they did not want to over-expose themselves.[19]

> The alternative schemes have a specific capacity. They will insure in the City, and then, they won't take any more. We can't do this under Pool Re. This will

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18   Cited in Guy (1996).

19   Of all the alternatives on the market at this time three warrant a special mention here as they attracted widespread attention from City businesses: the BIIBA, Hiscoxs and Minets schemes.

leave us and others very exposed if the IRA come back again (City Insurance Broker).

The alternative schemes had a number of common features. They provided a non-selection policy whereby the client only needed to insure those buildings in locations they thought are at risk. Whereas Pool Re required the entire portfolio to be covered regardless of risk perception (as this would increase the money going into the insurance pool) the alternative schemes also assessed risk management discounts on an individual basis and employed the services of risk management specialists to do this. This meant that properties seen to be more security conscious (for example by employing increased security measures) were given reduced premiums. In short, alternative policies were tailor-made for specific client need and, unlike Pool Re, offered a cancellation policy which many companies saw as important given the faltering nature of the peace process.[20]

In essence, the alternative schemes were essentially in direct competition with Pool Re as they had the ability to influence the amount of money going into Pool Re and hence reduce Pool Re's ability to spread the financial risk of terrorism nationwide. As a Senior AIRMIC consultant, noted:

> I suspect that these schemes affected the way Pool Re operated because if there was no other option it would be much more rigid. With the advent of these schemes they realised money was going elsewhere.

The DTI were closely monitoring these schemes to try and assess how much non-Zone 'A' premiums were contributing to the Pool. A further danger to Pool Re revenue also presented itself, as larger global corporations were, in some cases, relying on their own in-house insurers rather than joining Pool Re, or 'taking a chance' on terrorism, knowing that their company could easily absorb the financial impact of a terrorist strike.

In the latter years of the Twentieth Century and early Twenty-First Century, as funds for Pool Re grew and the terrorist threat receded premium rates fell significantly, and many companies declined to take out cover. Despite this, Pool Re still maintained a sizable membership. At the end of 1999, Pool Re had 213 members spread between UK companies (104), Lloyd's syndicates (32) and insurance companies in the European Union and other parts of the world such as Australia and the US (77).

By the end of 2000 the company had accumulated a large surplus of £665 million. However gross premiums significantly fell from a high of £369 Million in 1994 to only £39 million at the end of 2000. This reflected a lack of coverage 'take up' as well as an 85 per cent discount rate given by Pool Re on premiums, as a result of no terrorist attacks occurring.

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20   Perhaps they even encouraged some businesses to stay in the City, by offering them significantly lower rates than Pool Re.

Insurance and Fortified Security

The changing risk agendas of the 1990-2001 period brought about a series of changes in the way in which the insurance industry spread the financial risk of terrorism. At the same time there was a series of relationships developing between the way in which the insurers viewed the risk of terrorism and the way in which it was perceived by agencies of security, most notably the police. The processes involved can be seen to be subtly supportive of one another as both were concerned with maintaining the reputation of the City as a safe and secure business centre. The behaviour of the insurance industry can be seen to have been important in influencing processes which eventually resulted in the increased fortification of the urban landscape, as well as educating business about the risks faced. In particular, contingency planning was widely utilised as a counter-terrorism measure.

Given the confusion over insurance cover and the risk of further terrorist attack great emphasis was put on contingency planning as a way in which the City could survive another attack and could return to a get back up and running as soon as possible if one occurred. This was important from an insurance perspective, as terrorism insurance covered business interruption costs as well as material damage.

There were two main elements to such contingency. First, there was crisis recovery planning (CRP) which highlighted how the City could bring about a 'business as usual' situation as soon as possible. Second, security plans were developed which included the risk management response such as CCTV and access control which formed the basis of protective security. These were the antecedents of the type of emergency planning measures rolled out across London in the post-9/11 period under the banner of resilience (Coaffee et al. 2008b).

Crisis Recovery Planning

CRP was initiated at two levels; first in relation to individual companies, and second, in respect to a City-wide emergency response plan. After the St Mary Axe bomb many companies had been preparing CRPs. In particular, such plans made contingency for temporary relocation to 'disaster recovery space' at short notice.

After the Bishopsgate bomb, one million square foot of 'alternative' office space was sought. Some companies even had disaster space purpose built including telecommunications links and computers, whilst others formed partnerships and leased a building for this purpose:

> Most businesses have 'hotsites', which allow them to continue to work at 20-40% capacity at a different location in the event of a disaster. Such sites have already installed IT and phone lines. Some are privately owned by the companies concerned whilst others are owned third party. There are also 'warmsites' which are less ready but still designed to cope with the initial response. These sites

are often managed by reciprocal arrangement or through using the unoccupied office space in the City (City Security Advisor).

At the time of the Bishopsgate bomb, CRPs instigated by the Corporation of London at a City-wide level were also in evidence. The Corporation's disaster plan had been refined through practice drills and aimed to get people back to work as quickly as possible. Michael Cassidy also noted:

> Like the first bomb, after Bishopsgate the Corporation's efforts were clean-up, and shrink the police cordon around the bomb site as quickly as possible to get people back to work, as well as conveying a PR message that we could take it and that things would be normal.

As the British Prime Minister at this time, John Major, indicated after Bishopsgate: 'we want to show that this type of terrorism does not pay dividends. We want to get the City back and working again and show that they will not disrupt the commercial heart of the country.'[21] As Baily (1993, 3) further concluded, 'the juggernaut of the City had shuddered and slowed, but it never stopped moving'. Importantly, the international finance community, commending the quick response of the Corporation, indicated that the bomb would not drive them out of the City.

CRPs employed after Bishopsgate were, as noted in the Corporation's *City Research Project* (Corporation of London 1995), themselves a result of corporate change at a global level. In particular: 'the large institutions which have taken the most extensive measures have not done so solely because of a specific threat [terrorism] but rather as part of a global scheme, not least to counter infrastructural failure such as power cuts and flooding [another danger in London].' The Corporation continued by indicating that in their opinion their efforts were superior to those in other financial centres: 'The level of contingency planning both by the Corporation and by individual firms is in contrast to centres such as New York, where the response to the World Trade Center blast was impressive but *ad hoc*.' Furthermore, this report highlighted that the City viewed the threat of terrorism as something to proactively confront: 'The degree of fatalism with regard to deterring terrorist incidents observed in officials interviewed in the United States was in contrast to the proactive approach of the City after its first bomb.'

Most commentators agreed that the recovery plans used in the City were well structured, and successfully conveyed a 'business as usual' message to the outside world following the attack. As Michael Cassidy indicated:

> Over 400 businesses contacted us [the Corporation] in the month after the explosion to enquire how they could improve security and contingency planning procedures. Enquires also came from New York as to how they could improve their disaster recovery planning.

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21   Cited in *The European*, 29 April 1993, 14.

At this time property companies in the City were keen to show that confidence in the Square Mile had not been dented. However, they were forced to concede that there was still a great deal of corporate concern regarding the impact of further bombs and higher insurance premiums, although other concerns were also evident. As one property agent noted, 'people are undoubtedly looking to move out of the City because of the bomb, but high rents and the feeling that the grass is greener are equally valid reasons' (Jacoby 1993).

Security Planning

Security planning like CRP at this time can be expressed on two levels: first the private response of individual companies in terms of risk management measures, and second, the co-ordinated response of the police and the Corporation of London in constructing a ring of steel and associated security infrastructure.

A key reason risk management measures are commonly undertaken in everyday life by individuals and businesses is because they are looked upon favourably by insurers. A common complaint about Pool Re's rating system is that initially it did not provide any premium reduction incentive for companies or local authorities to take risk management measures. As previously noted, the insurers and the DTI who were running Pool Re were not keen to provide incentives to business in the early stages of the scheme as they wanted to maximise the financial contributions.

According to the City of London Police, they tried to talk to the insurance companies independently, and to the ABI, to see if they were willing to offer an incentive to businesses in the City to put up cameras for crime as well as terrorism purposes. At this time, the insurers were unwilling to offer such incentives. Attempts by the Police to work with the insurance industry were hardly surprising. They had been severely criticised both publicly and privately for failing to stop the second major bomb and were keen to do all they could to stop a third incident occurring:

> It was me, or us [the City Police], that were trying to push insurance companies into offering a discounted premium because we thought that it would encourage greater security measures to be implemented or installed ... but it never came to pass (Senior City Police Officer).

However, the insurance industry did contribute to the reinforcement of security in the Square Mile through policy changes in the Pool Re underwriting rules that increasingly gave the opportunities for premium discounts for occupiers who increasingly fortified their buildings through use of risk management measures.

The review of Pool Re in July 1993 introduced improved discounts for risk management measures for up to 12.5 per cent of the total policy premium. Despite initial problems, most insurers, in time, complemented the risk management scheme[22]

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22   Much interest was shown in the potential of obtaining discounts for risk management measures i.e. taking positive measures against terrorist attack. Companies

as it became far more user friendly as not all buildings in a portfolio needed to comply to obtain a reduction. Subsequently, renewed and more workable risk management incentives began to be offered to policy holders from June 1994 after considerable lobbying from the insurance industry. As a Corporation of London's insurance officer, stated during an interview: 'I'm pleased a system of risk management discounts came in. We are now talking about big money. We are pushing it.'

For instance, the Corporation had to insure around £5-6 billion of property so *any* risk management discount was welcomed. The Corporation of London were certainly very aware of possible discounts that local businesses could claim. As noted in Chapter 5, after the Bishopsgate bomb the Corporation of London employed a specialist security advisor to liaise with City businesses in terms of how they could improve security and reduce business interruption losses in an event of a terrorist incident. As indicated by Michael Cassidy:

> His [the security advisor's] job is to go around City businesses encouraging them to come in on the Camera scheme [CameraWatch], to have contingency plans, to take out the [insurance] cover and all the rest of it ... Part of his pitch is that you can get discounts for insurance.

As well as individual firms and organisations improving risk management with the hope of improving their security and of getting a discount from Pool Re, a co-ordinated security response was organised by the City Police and the Corporation of London in the form of the ring of steel and associated measures.

At an official level, the insurance industry did not play any part in the actual decision to construct the ring of steel in July 1993. This was a decision taken by the Corporation in conjunction with the City Police to help retain international confidence in the City as a good place to trade. As Michael Cassidy indicated, 'there was no direct pressure whatsoever from the insurance industry for such measures.' A senior City insurance broker also noted:

> The insurers didn't really worry. They had washed their hands of the situation and could not find themselves in financial straits because the Government were backing up the scheme.

Whilst the ring of steel, in the opinion of most, enhanced security, these risk management measures provided a high-profile example of a proactive security strategy which was *unable* to elicit a financial discount from Pool Re. A senior

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were invited to complete a questionnaire covering a number of different aspects of security, from physical protection to recovery planning. If ALL the premises owned by the company in the UK conformed to the entire requirement, a 12.5 per cent discount could potentially be obtained on the material damage premium with a smaller discount for business interruption coverage. In January 1995, Pool Re confirmed that it was looking at further ways to improve the Risk Management Discount system.

City Insurance Consultant indicated that the City, after Bishopsgate, wanted a premium reduction for the ring of steel:

Among the problems with Pool Re at this time was the failure to give premium reductions for risk management measures taken. The Corporation of London, with their road blocks and camera network, were a particularly obvious example. They were all aggrieved that the City were not getting discounts for their exhaustive efforts to thwart the terrorist threat.

Others expressed the view that the substantial reductions in general crime in the City (a decrease of 10.6 per cent in 1992 and a further 17 per cent in 1993), attributed to the ring of steel, should have elicited a more favourable response from insurers regardless of terrorist implications.

This relationship between insurance and physical fortification in the Square Mile is complex. Views were mixed as to whether businesses inside the cordon should have received a discounted premium. This, of course, would have led to a reduction in the money being collected by Pool Re and increased the liability for both the Government and insurance industry.

There was also a strong suspicion that if the ring of steel was removed there would have been significant problems of insuring against terrorism within the Square Mile. In this scenario, premiums would have further increased. According to one respondent:

> Of course the premiums would increase if it [the ring of steel] were removed. However people in the City are not prepared to see it relaxed irrespective of insurance cost (Corporation of London Insurance Officer).

This comment indicates that insurers and the Government saw the ring of steel as an effective risk management strategy given that they were happy to insure in the area if the ring of steel was still active. Underwriters of terrorism insurance also took a lot of comfort from the ring of steel. As one insurance broker indicated, the security cordon was of benefit in this regard as: 'it gives far greater security to the insured risks located here.' Another senior City insurer also noted that those in the insurance industry felt much safer assessing policies with the security cordon in place: 'underwriters have taken a lot of comfort from the ring of steel.' Furthermore, Michael Cassidy noted:

> I think insurers would be alarmed if we didn't have it. I think given our special history it would be stretching it to expect any kind of discount. If the ring of steel were removed I think there might be problems of obtaining cover.

He continued by portraying a more realistic view of the situation, indicating that since the City was the number one Provisional IRA target, and that the ring of steel could perhaps increase the risk (see Chapter 5), it would be illogical for Pool Re to give a discount for the ring of steel:

> I don't think a premium reduction for the ring of steel is possible … because the City is the prime IRA target and you can't guarantee it [the ring of steel] isn't going to be breached. It could certainly be breached with small hand-carried bombs and it was even argued at the time that having the ring of steel is an incitement to terrorists.

In addition:

> From this point of view I think it would be [have been] unreasonable to turn around to the insurers and say 'we are so safe here – are you going to give us a discount?'

This opinion was reiterated by a City Insurance broker who also noted that the ring of steel could help to indirectly lessen premium costs by restricting the potential for terrorist attack in the City. This would feed back into reduce premiums:

> A discount for the ring of steel is a chicken and egg situation. If the ring of steel has a positive effect and the City avoids future losses then the absence of losses will feed through to the terms and conditions of the [Pool Re] facility. However the problem remains that you can't guarantee 100% security.

This, in short, meant that whilst the City could not obtain a discount for the ring of steel, its removal would have caused a potential crisis in the market with regard to the provision of insurance cover.

Conclusion

Since 1990, economic and political processes operating at a variety of spatial scales, shaped the financial distribution of terrorist risk in relation to the City. On a global scale, international reinsurers dictated that the UK direct insurers should withdraw from the market; hence creating a situation where the City's pre-eminence in the global market place was questioned. The refusal, or inability, of UK insurers to underwrite terrorist risk meant that the national Government was forced to act as reinsurer of last resort. The Government subsequently attempted to redistribute its possible financial losses from terrorism throughout the national economy through the original Pool Re scheme, which attempted to generate a large amount of money from around the country to cover the potential losses of some high exposures areas such as the City. Whilst, in theory, this scheme should have worked well, the more realistic approach taken by owners of commercial property as to whether or not they were actually at risk from terrorism (given that the Provisional IRA were mainly targeting the areas of economic importance in London), meant that in reality risk distribution was defeated, and the financial risk became concentrated in the City. In time, significant adjustments were made to

Pool Re (and alternative schemes were developed), which sought to once again to spread the risk more equitably across the country.

Within the aforementioned processes a key voice has been the Corporation of London who throughout this period constantly attempted to persuade the Government to adopt insurance mechanisms which would decrease the insurance costs to occupiers in the Square Mile, and give greater confidence to those businesses seeking to locate in the City. To this extent the Corporation had mixed fortunes. On the one hand they were influential in getting the Government to financially back up terrorism insurance, although the insurers would have preferred a Northern Ireland-type scheme, which left them with no liability. On the other hand, the Corporation were less successful in persuading the DTI to reduce City premiums. Rises of up to 300 per cent were experienced in June 1993 which, perhaps accurately reflected the reality of risk, but was also an attempt by the Government to increase the amount of money entering the Pool Re scheme, given the relative lack of interest from outside London. Thus the Corporation attempted to gain insurance discounts, whilst at the same time constructing a vast array of physical fortification measures to reduce the threat of attack. The next chapter will fully explore the role of the Corporation in attempting to deal with the risk of terrorism in the City.

However, the fact that some form of insurance could be obtained against terrorist risk undoubtedly helped the competitive position of the City at this time. Pool Re in this sense achieved a great deal. It enabled the City to continue to trade, secure in the knowledge, that the cost of damage resulting from terrorist bombs would be met through insurance, and allowing the City (as well as London's role as a financial centre, and the UK economy as a whole) to expand.

Importantly, it was the links between the provision of insurance cover and fortification measures that underpinned this success. Risk management incentives, for which insurance discounts could be obtained, had a pronounced spatial effect on the City landscape. More individual City properties produced adequate contingency plans and increasingly fortified themselves against possible terrorist attack, and in so doing reinforced the security effort and resilience in the Square Mile. This occurred through a proliferation of external CCTV systems, and highly visible security guards who operate computerised access procedures. Internally, many building occupiers made extensive use of CCTV, blast resistant curtains and anti-shatter window film. At a City wide level the ring of steel and the centralised security schemes and response plans put in place by the City Police were seen as essential if the City occupiers were to be able to obtain affordable terrorism insurance.

As with physical security, the events of 9/11 have led to significant reappraisal of the insurance mechanism for combating terrorism, both in the UK as well as noticeably in the US. Insurance losses for the events of 9/11 totalled over $40 billion. As will be fully explored in preceding chapters, the enormity of the losses experienced by insurers around the globe on and after 9/11 has led to the development of new and refined schemes to offer coverage against terrorist attack as well as leading to a host of cost cutting and efficiency drives by insurance companies as they realised the enormity of potential losses faced through acts of terrorism.

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Chapter 7

Framing, Legitimising and Negotiating the City's Response to Terrorist Risk

Introduction

The previous two chapters have highlighted how the nature of terrorist risk in the City was addressed differently by the agencies of security and the insurance industry. In both cases the governance role of the Corporation of London was highlighted as critical in allowing the ring of steel to be established and in putting pressure on the Government to set up a terrorism insurance scheme. As such, during the 1990s the Corporation of London became the principal driving force behind defending the City from both the physical and financial risk of terrorism. Previous chapters have also noted how the Corporation attempted to re-articulate their response to terrorist risk in terms of crime reduction, better traffic management and environmental improvements, and how the importance of the City in the national and London-wide context, was pushed to the fore as justification for the creation of the ring of steel. This chapter will investigate these assumptions showing how the Corporations' response to terrorism was framed, legitimated and negotiated as a result of institutional alliances between themselves and other key urban managers and political authorities, creating a powerful pro-security 'inside' discourse.

However, it will also be argued that the inside discourse, despite capturing a general feeling that security should be enhanced, was not truly representative of the variety of views expressed by the different interest groups within the City. This chapter will show that there was not a homogenous 'community of interest' regarding security enhancement. There was rather, a number of different spatial interests whose views were reflected in the way the ring of steel was developed. It will be argued that such views were constantly in a state of flux and are modified in relation to prevailing socio-economic and political conditions.

The chapter also details the opposition to the ring of steel, which formed the 'outside' discourse. This came from a number of institutions and organisations, most notably civil liberty groups and borough councils neighbouring the City. Furthermore, it will be argued that these views were marginalised and are relatively powerless in altering the strategies of the Corporation.

This chapter is divided into five main parts. The *first* briefly notes the historically and geographically specific institutional arrangements within the City, showing how these framed the construction of a powerful 'inside' discourse. It will also be illustrated how the views of the inside discourse were, in part, also constructed by the way terrorist risk in the City were portrayed in the media, and also by the

concerns expressed by Central Government that terrorism could negatively affect the portrayal of London as a 'global city'. *Second*, this chapter will show how the Corporation of London sought legitimacy for their security proposals through consultation processes. The *third* part of this chapter will argue that as a result of consultation it became obvious that whilst the need for security was accepted, there were strong disagreements between different interested parties within the City as to what form and duration such risk-management measures should take. *Fourth*, the chapter will investigate how the dominant views expressed by the powerful economic and political elite were contested by groupings operating outside the institutional networks of the City. *Fifth* and finally, the chapter will address how the City, as a result of terrorist risk, successfully operationalised local institutional strategies which strengthened the position of the Square Mile within the global economy entering the new millennium.

Institutional Thickness in the City

The growth of institutional thickness, as noted in Chapter 3, refers to a gradual process of change within urban governance that has taken place within the context of particular local histories and organisational realms subject to pressures derived from wider economic driving forces. To properly evaluate the changes in institutional arrangements that were established, particularly in the 1990s, the 'traditional' institutionalism in the City must first be outlined.

The historical development of a unique type of institutional culture within the Square Mile has been fundamental to the success of the City as a financial centre for many decades. The 'traditional city', it has been argued, had a number of key features, which allowed the Square Mile to reproduce itself and remain globally competitive. Of particular note is its relationship with Central Government which has been one of 'limited interference', with the job of running the City given to the Corporation of London. Furthermore, the development of a distinctive social structure based on face-to-face contacts and a series of interconnected business networks meant that spatial concentration of the Square Mile was maintained; 'keeping the City in the City' (Thrift 1994).

In the post-war years, the City was forced to partially reinvent itself as a result of the growing international financial system, which meant change was needed to transform itself from an international city to a global city with appropriate institutional arrangements, deregulated markets, and the construction of buildings suitable for global finance (Pryke 1991; McDowell 1994). The 'de-traditional City' therefore emerged from the mid-1980s, built around new institutional agendas – the development of trust, information sharing, knowledge production for enhancement of global economic functions, and the maintenance and construction of new forms of socio-economic networking (see for example Amin and Thrift 1995). In particular, this 'de-traditionalisation' necessitated the restructuring of local governance to increasingly couple local priorities and global agendas, and to enhance and maintain the City's 'institutional thickness'.

The Power of the Corporation of the City of London

The strong institutionalism in the City has led to the Corporation of London being seen as a very powerful organisation within the general governance of London (Travers 2004). The Corporation – the municipal governing authority of the City – dates back to 1123AD and is unique as far as governance in London and Britain is concerned, having survived all local Government reforms to date. As such it retains the institutional arrangements common in this period such as a Lord Mayor, Sheriffs, Aldermen, its own police force and a Common Council in the Guildhall. Unlike other local authorities the Corporation is non-party political (although the City is inherently associated with conservatism) with its members elected from the business community and the major City institutions. This is, in part, related to the lack of residential population in the City, which only began to significantly increase in the 2000s.

Historically the City became the world's leading centre of finance due to the controlling influence of the British Empire and has remained prominent ever since. The Corporation's electoral role is based on businesses that reside in the Square Mile. Powerful business voices have always dominated the local political agenda. In short, the City is run by business people to serve the need of business and has continuously resisted any political reforms which might affect its boundaries, electoral process and function (Travers et al. 1991).

However, in the mid-late 1980s the liberalisation of financial markets made other cities increasingly competitive, relative to the City. At the same time the established institutions in the Square Mile, most notably the Bank of England, were coming in for criticism for not providing strong leadership, for losing vast amounts of money (as best exemplified by Lloyds of London) and, in particular, for not 'moving with the times'.

Prior to the 1990s, the City traditionally preferred a liberal culture with minimal Government interference, which was seen as one of its strengths. However, the growing pace of change in the global economy meant that this became a weakness as cities such as Paris, Tokyo and New York embraced change with new forms of quasi-Government leadership, strengthening their economic position and 'world city' status as a result. As such in the 1990s the Corporation of London was quick to initiate a series of research programmes to look at London's competitiveness in the world of international finance, in particular how the City could contribute to enhancing London's inward investment profile.[1] Promoting London's competitive position was also a key priority of Central Government at this time as 'the idea of the world city permeated the discourse about London and [which] played an

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1   Budd (1998) indicated that two reports in the 1990s were central in establishing the strategies of the Corporation as they attempt to keep London, and especially the City, at the forefront of the global economy. These were, *The City Research Project* (Corporation of London 1995), and *Four World Cities: A Comparative Study of London, Paris, New York and Tokyo* (1996) written by Llewelyn-Davies.

important role in attempting to generate consensus over priorities' (Newman and Thornley 1997, 979). Furthermore, London was considered at a disadvantage for not having a clear 'voice' to co-ordinate the promotional effort and to provide a future 'vision for the city' (ibid., 977).

Therefore, in the late 1980s the Corporation, which had previously concerned itself with matters of financial interest, and hence remained relatively detached from the rest of London, began to widen its institutional involvement in the running of London *per se*. This coincided with a considerable entrepreneurial involvement in the governance of London as the private sector acquired a much stronger role in planning decisions. As Travers and Jones (1997, 14) noted, this was a fundamental change for the City:

> Traditionally the City had kept a low political profile, restricting itself to representing the interests of the financial services industry and providing ceremonial colour to the London scene. But during the years since 1992, the Corporation – and most particularly the chairman of its Policy and Resources Committee, Michael Cassidy – became directly involved in a number of London-wide initiatives and partnerships … such a high profile for the City would have been unthinkable until the early 1990s.

The City's involvement at this time included the joint establishment of an inward investment agency for London – the London First Centre (1993/94), alongside the City of Westminster and the London Docklands Development Corporation. These organisations subsequently took a lead in setting up the London Pride Partnership (1994), which set out a 15-20 year vision for the development of London based on the twin concerns of economic competitiveness and social cohesion. This latter partnership also brought the City together with significant players from the business sector, the London boroughs and voluntary organisations. Such an approach was needed to develop a coherent and co-ordinated strategy, essential due to the fragmented nature of local government in London, which, since the abolition of the Greater London Council (GLC) in 1986, had seen the thirty-two boroughs and the City of London responsible for local government policy and programmes.[2]

Indeed Newman and Thornley (1997, 978) point out that the Corporation was (and still is) an active member of most London-wide boards and that 'since abolition of the GLC, the City has come to play a wider regional role and [is] far from being just a Government anachronism.' Of particular concern to the City in the early 1990s was transport infrastructure in central London, which was having ever greater demands placed on it because of the vast increase in office stock in the Square Mile.[3]

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2   See for example Thornley (1998) and Kleinman (1999).

3   See for example *Meeting the Transport Need of the City* written by Glaister and Travers (1993).

From the perspective of this book, the strong, but changing, local and London-wide institutional networks that the City was operating within in the early 1990s became very evident in the aftermath of the terrorist bombings in the 1990s (and 2000s). The 'spirit of the City' was very important in getting the Square Mile up and running again as soon as possible and in mobilising support for radical security measures to deter further attack. It also became evident that the need to respond to the actual occurrence, and the wider implications, of terrorist attack would require new forms of institutional arrangements to be constructed at a variety of geographical levels: locally through negotiation with the key economic institutions in the Square Mile regarding the best way to respond; at a London-wide level as the City of London had to liaise with its neighbouring authorities; and at a local-national level as Central Government became involved to protect what it saw as a national asset and to defend the global image of London. This mirrored two aspects of London governance at the time: first, the increasingly role of Central Government in London affairs, and second, increased co-operation between the boroughs.

As a result of the terrorist threat in the 1990s, new institutional pillars were established which effectively hastened the modernisation processes the City was already experiencing. These new pillars allowed the City to enhance its institutional thickness and maintain its historic power, whilst increasing its economic competitiveness. The counter-terrorist proposals that were emanating from these new City-based networks also impacted upon the areas directly adjacent to the territorial boundaries of the City. Before 1994 these areas fell under the jurisdiction of a number of London boroughs that were collectively represented by either the Conservative-led London Boroughs Association (LBA) or the predominantly Labour-controlled councils – the Association of London Authorities (ALA).[4] The latter of these groups is of particular importance given that the Labour party in the early 1990s was committed to abolishing the Corporation of London, which it saw as being undemocratic. During the late 1980s and early 1990s the ALA also had an informal policy of non-co-operation with non-Labour boroughs (see for example Travers et al. 1991 and Hebbert 1999). As will be noted, the objections that a number of boroughs bordering the City had with regard to the ring of steel were expressed through the ALA, creating a climate where the City was accused of, once again, acting paternalistically and without consideration of London-wide agendas.

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4   The LBA was formed in 1983, succeeded by the ALA in 1986 after disagreements in the aftermath of the abolition of the Greater London Council 1986. These merged in 1994 to form the Association of London Governments, as a result of most boroughs becoming Labour controlled after the general election.

The Pro-security Discourse

As a result of the continual threat from terrorism in the early mid-1990s a pro-security discourse dominated the City's counter-terrorist strategy. Such a strategy was developed, in large part, by a partnership involving the Corporation of London, the main businesses within the City – the so-called 'City Fathers' such as the Bank of England, the Stock Exchange and Lloyds, as well as the insurance industry more generally and the police. The 'collective concern' of these institutions was to maintain the reputation of the City within the global economy at all costs.

Security enhancement was seen as especially important given the negative media reporting of the recent terrorist attacks against the City. This was particularly evident after the Bishopsgate blast where media reports focused on four main themes.

First, the impact of the bomb on the City's competitiveness and on the determination of the City to maintain a 'business as usual approach'. It highlighted the tremendous damage caused by the destructive nature of the bomb e.g. 'Cityscape of destruction' (*Daily Telegraph* 26 April) and 'Bishopsgate destroyer*'* (*Daily Telegraph* 27 April)*.* This demonstrated the tremendous power of modern bombs, indicating that the response should be at a community or area level, rather than *ad hoc*. Media reports further showed that the bomb could have a damaging affect on the City's reputation, jeopardising its international competitiveness, for example – 'City's reputation around the world put at risk' (*The Independent* 25 April). The initial media reaction moreover highlighted the determination of the City to conduct 'business as usual', sending a clear message to the Provisional IRA that they would not be defeated – 'City blooded but not unbowed' (*Sunday Times* 25 April).

Second, the media highlighted the failure of the security apparatus to prevent this attack, serving to heighten the perception of risk within the Square Mile that another bombing could occur – for example, 'It's too easy for the IRA' (*Daily Mail* 26 April); **'**IRA exploited reduction in spot security checks' (*Financial Times* 26 April) and 'Increased security failing to combat terror campaign' (*The Independent* 26 April).

Third, as noted in Chapter 7, the propaganda value of the Bishopsgate bomb to the Provisional IRA was further enhanced by media reports highlighting inaccurate insurable losses – for example, 'The £1 billion bomb' (*Sunday Times* 25 April*)*, 'Insurance Wipe-out' (*Daily Mail* 26 April) and 'Counting the cost in cash and confidence' (*London Evening Standard* 26 April), and the fact that insurance premiums would increase as a result – 'Insurance premiums set to soar after City bomb' (*Daily Telegraph* 26 April).

Fourth, the media were vociferous about the need to enhance security in the City by constructing a fortified landscape, similar to that employed in Belfast, to repel further attack – for example, '"Walled City" mooted to thwart terrorists' (*The Times* 27 April); by creating a Belfast-esque environment – 'Bishopsgate looks to Belfast' (*Financial Times* 30 April); by constructing a panopticon of surveillance – 'Camera blitz to thwart IRA bombers' (*Sunday Times* 2 May); or a landscape of fortress architecture – 'Bombings? We're off to the bunker' (*The Independent* 5 May).

These illustrative headlines were again a response to what was seen as the failings on the security procedures put in place after the 1992 bomb. As Dillon (1996, 129) noted: 'much of the media coverage of the bombing realised the IRA's twofold objective of striking at the heart of the financial centre of the capital and generating paranoia about the inability of the security apparatus to combat terrorism.' In summary, the media highlighted the need for a proactive security response from the City to demonstrate its resilience.

The pressure for high levels of security was maintained by continual threats from the Provisional IRA, who claimed that higher levels of security would be ineffective in stopping them bombing the area again. They attempted to create a climate of fear in the City to keep the Northern Ireland question at the top of the political agenda and to destabilise the UK economy. A statement released in Dublin by the Provisional IRA after the Bishopsgate bomb in 1993 vowed to breach any security measures the City could mount:

> These latest attacks underline both the ability and the determination of our volunteers to breach whatever level of security the British Authorities are capable of mounting.

Furthermore, threatening letters sent by the Provisional IRA, received by more than fifty foreign banks and businesses in the City after Bishopsgate, warned them that they were still very much at risk.[5] This was especially true of Japanese banks that were thought to be most nervous about the impacts of terrorism. For example, a letter in August 1993 to City institutions indicated that:

> We do not seek to target those with whom we have no quarrel but the reality is that simply by virtue of their location many businesses will suffer the effects of our operations. In the context of present political realities further attacks on the City of London are inevitable. This we feel we are bound to convey to you directly to allow you to make fully informed decisions.[6]

The driving agenda of the pro-security discourse was undoubtedly to protect the economic reputation of the City. This was summed up by the Commissioner of Police who noted: 'No one should be in any doubt that we are locked into a struggle with terrorists for the City of London and it is a struggle that we, the nation (not just the City of London), cannot afford to lose'.[7] He continued:

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5   Kelly (1994a) also points out that no American bank received such a letter, perhaps, he notes, related to the continuing support for the Irish republican cause in some sections of American society.

6   Cited in Buckingham (1994, 8).

7   Corporation Police Committee minutes, 24 November 1993.

I know that I need not remind you that another massive bomb could make the
City untenable as an international financial market place. Foreign investments
and business would flee, perhaps never to return. The £18bn a year earnings
from City business could be lost and irreparable damage done to the country's
economy (ibid.).

The Dominant Voice of the Corporation of London

As highlighted in Chapter 3, it is the dominant institutions and in particular
the ruling political authority that often dictate planning and development
agendas in a locality. This was exemplified after the first bomb in 1992 when the
Corporation were responsible for pursuing the counter-terrorist security agenda.
The Corporation's response was drawn from a number of quarters, involving,
in particular, its leader, Michael Cassidy (who, as noted earlier was centrally
involved in the marketing of London overall at this time); the City Engineer
who drew up the plans for radical security enhancement; the City Planning
Officer who was concerned with how the security-based plans fitted into the
City of London local plan and the Unitary Development Plan (UDP); a variety
of financial officers who dealt with the insurance implications of terrorism as
well as the cost of implementing the security operation; and, the Commissioner
of the City Police who was ultimately responsible for security enhancement and
broader community safety agendas.

   Directly after the 1993 Bishopsgate bomb the Corporation were quick to
contact all the major UK and foreign institutions in the Square Mile, as well as
ambassadors from around the globe, to reassure them that the Corporation was
doing all it could to get the City back to normality and was taking steps to prevent
further attacks. Initially, the Corporation had a series of meetings with Central
Government and organised a series public gatherings to obtain the opinions of
businesses on security options. The City also instigated an informal consultation
exercise with 200 prominent City businesses that were asked to comment on the
'menu' of security options. As Michael Cassidy noted during an interview, dealing
with the risk of terrorism was very much in the Corporation's hands:

   In the days immediately following [the bomb] we went to Downing Street to talk
   about what needed to be done and what the City police thought they could do.
   The Prime Minister basically said 'go away and do what you can do within your
   own powers, but don't trouble me with legislation'.

He continued:

   The Lord Mayor and I then instituted a round of contacts with businesses in the
   City to sound out opinion. We spoke to about 4,000 [business people] over the
   succeeding weeks either directly, by word of mouth or by presentation. I held a

series of meetings at the Guildhall and I set out some options. The idea was to test opinion as to the acceptability of radical measures.

As a result of such meetings Central Government indicated that it would be prepared to bear some of the cost of implementing fortification measures. This was further advanced by a number of additional meetings between City officials and senior Government ministers where the national and international implications of further bombings against the City were projected. Thus the minimal Government interference agenda, which had for so long been a cornerstone of the City's success, was forced to change due to the terrorist threat, with new forms of central-local relationships emerging.

At a City-wide level there was a behind-the-scenes campaign from some UK and foreign institutions, for radical security measures to be implemented. This led to substantial pressure building up on the Corporation of London to alter their security procedures and to provide a more formidable physical deterrent against terrorism. As Michael Cassidy commented at the time: 'They [businesses] made it clear that they wanted to see something happening on the streets, not just talk of improvements in the gathering of intelligence'.[8] Essentially, if the ratepayers (essentially financial institutions) demanded higher levels of security, the Corporation were compelled to consider it. The City Police indicated after the Bishopsgate that both UK, especially foreign businesses were very worried about a third bomb, and were mobilising support for a full security cordon:

> Over time we became aware of people's nervousness about a succession of bombs. In particular, the Japanese banking community wrote to the Government with an absolutely classic letter … and said 'whilst our citizens are working in your country we expect you to look after their personal safety and if you can't then we will have to look elsewhere (Senior City of London Police Officer).

He continued:

> It was a very direct letter. Now, you have got to respond to that and I remember that some City Fathers and chairmen of large companies were very strong [in their view] that we had to take the most extreme measures that were available.

A Financial Times/MORI survey conducted in the week following the Bishopsgate blast gave an initial indication of the views of City occupiers, many of whom favoured higher levels of security. This survey highlighted that 84 per cent of City organisations wanted an increased police presence on the street, 79 per cent wanted the police to have improved powers to construct roadblocks as deemed necessary and 74 per cent wanted 'formal co-ordination of security arrangements

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8   Cited in Elliot and Mackay (1993).

by organisations in the City.'[9] This latter concern indicated that occupiers saw the countering of the terrorist threat as a collective responsibility.

The Corporation's initial response was to employ a specialist security advisor to advise City businesses on what they could do to reduce the threat to themselves, and to organise a Crisis Response Team (CRT) on which representatives from the police, planning and financial associations could sit to discuss security issues. The Court of Common Council (23 June 1993) noted that the formation of the CRT was 'to draw up proposals to improve the security of the City from terrorist attack while retaining the character of the City as an enjoyable place to live and work.' Therefore, as a result of the terrorist threat, both defence and environmental improvement agendas were accelerated as increased security was sought alongside restricted traffic flows, pedestrianisation, and the growth of the City's residential population. It was thus apparent that the high levels of fortified security (like Belfast), suggested by the media, would not be an appropriate response.

Subsequently the Corporation, in partnership with the City Police force and Central Government Ministers, including the Minister for Transport in London, responded quickly by constructing the ring of steel in July 1993. The Government was quite happy for the Corporation to introduce measures in the short term as long as the measures were experimental, meaning they would have to seek legislative permanence within a year.

Immediately after the construction of the ring of steel the City undertook an informal consultation exercise 'to ascertain the views of people and businesses who use the City', and to seek further legitimacy for their security policies.[10] Around 9,000 consultation papers were delivered to businesses, residents, commuters, interest groups and neighbouring authorities between 4 August and 9 September 1993. Most responses were in favour of the City's plans to enhance security.[11] The City saw this as an endorsement of its policies, especially by attempting to ensure the cordon was made permanent:

> We are firmly of the opinion that there is overwhelming support for making the experimental arrangements permanent, subject to a few amendments that may be required to overcome certain local problems (Court of Common Council, 2 December 1993).

However, given the fact that this survey only attempted to ascertain the views of those working in the Square Mile, the results were far from surprising.

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9   See Jack (1993, 6).

10   See Corporation of London (1993a; 1993b).

11   This however was not a particularly valid sample given the low response rate. Only 279 replies were received in relation to the first document on security initiatives and 700 for the report on the traffic management scheme (i.e. the ring of steel). This was partly put down to the consultation being undertaken in the summer holiday period (Policy and Resources meeting, 16 September 1993).

Fracturing the Inside Discourse

The perceived need for added security in the City after April 1993 was undeniable given the Provisional IRA's intention to continue to target the area. However, the picture painted by the Corporation of London of the processes leading to the construction of the ring of steel, simplifies a far more complex reality. The pro-security discourse that was organised and put forward by the Corporation of London in terms of a 'collective concern' does not tell the full story of negotiations within the elite institutional networks of the Square Mile regarding the form and function of security enhancement. In reality there were a number of prominent parties who had different strategies and ideas with respect to how they coped with the terrorist threat.

In particular, the views of the City of London Police and the insurance industry differed from that of the Corporation of London. This is illustrated in Table 7.1. This table shows how different organisational frames of reference actively served to construct different 'ways of seeing' the threat of terrorism.

Table 7.1   Key managerial views of terrorist risk in the City

Key Urban Manager	Corporation of London	City of London Police	Insurance Industry
Geographical strategy	Localisation for globalisation	Territorial control of space	Risk spreading
Key institutional relationships	Local boroughs and national government; The City police	Corporation of London; RUC	Corporation of London; Central Government
Key spatial relations	Neighbouring boroughs	'Collar Zone'	National focus of spreading risk
Evaluation of strategy	Cost of insurance in the City; Location and relocation	Number of terrorist incidents	Take up of coverage under Pool Re
'Way of seeing'	A reputational area	A target to be defended	'Cooling' a risk hotspot

Working through the table it can be shown how each of these groups followed a different strategy, and embarked on different relationships, both institutionally and spatially, in an attempt to achieve their objectives. This table by no means shows all the different ways in which the defensive measures employed in the City were viewed, but is intended to reflect the views of the main groups, prominent in constructing the dominant inside pro-security discourse.

Assessing Different Spatial Strategies

As Table 7.1 illustrates, the strategies employed by the Corporation, the Police, and the insurers differed significantly in relation to their institutional priorities. The Corporation, for example, were concerned with maintaining and developing the well-established localised business networks which were essential for them to compete within the global economy. The key to this strategy was to create a safe and secure business location. The way in which this was assessed was through relative business migration to and from the City.[12]

The police followed a similar logic to the Corporation, highlighting the need for physical security enhancement but specifically structured on principles of 'territorial control' around the most likely target areas. As noted in Chapter 6, the police effort did not cover the entire City to the same extent. The assessment of the police strategy was simply related to the number of terrorist incidents in the City, although there were added benefits to crime reduction. The police and the Corporation were in agreement that the City wanted to avoid a 'Belfast scenario' where the historical period will best be remembered for bomb damaged buildings, high levels of policing and fortified architecture. As such, it was seen as important that Belfast-style security was mapped critically onto the landscape in the Square Mile given the distinctiveness of the two areas, the significance of heritage to the City, and the improved security–related technology available to the City authorities.

By contrast the insurers were mainly concerned about redistributing the financial risk of terrorism away from the City, thereby reducing their liability in the event of another bomb in the Square Mile. The success of this strategy was judged on the willingness of businesses in different parts of the UK to take out terrorism insurance coverage. The insurers' concern was on the financial and not the physical implications of a further bomb, although they were prepared to offer discounts for terrorism cover if businesses took preventative measures that would either help deter possible terrorist attack or would limit potential insured losses in the event of further bomb.

Collaborative Relations

Table 7.1 also shows that institutional relationships were developed at a number of spatial scales by the Corporation because of the continual terrorist threat. These evolving institutional arrangements served to strengthen the City's position at a time when acts of economic terrorism were attempting to undermine it. The response of the Corporation, in this sense, could be seen to mirror wider changes in the urban governance of London developing at this time, focused on notions of

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12   Evaluation was also in part based on the cost of terrorism insurance, although the fact that a scheme had been established meant this became of secondary importance to businesses that needed to maintain a presence in the City.

partnership between the private and public sectors, institutional alliances, strategic co-operation between adjoining local authorities, and vertical linkages between local and Central Government. Of particular importance were the spatial relations between the City and the local boroughs; as without their support, the ring of steel could only be set up on a temporary basis.

The police developed relationships around counter-terrorist security with the Corporation of London (for example attempting to create local CCTV associations, through schemes such as CameraWatch), and with the RUC in Belfast, whose operational experience in dealing with the threat of terrorism in Northern Ireland was influential in framing the City's response. The City, like Belfast, was being faced with balancing security with business normality. The Minutes of the Police Committee (27 July 1994) for example noted the positive benefits of this collaboration with the RUC:

> This Force has enjoyed a good working relationship with the Royal Ulster Constabulary for a number of years and, in particular, their assistance and advice given in respect of anti-terrorist measures has been of great benefit.[13]

Of particular note were lessons from Belfast, which highlighted the threat of the displacement of risk to the outside of a secure zone. Consequently, the police not only concentrated efforts on protecting the core of the city, but also paid attention to the areas outside the ring of steel – the so-called collar zone. By contrast, fundamental to the success of the terrorism insurance scheme was the relationship that developed between the insurance industry and Central Government, which attempted to establish a scheme that would spread the risk at a national level. This was a difficult relationship to establish and was helped by the backing the insurers received from the Corporation of London who were keen to involve the Government in what both considered to be a national risk.

Different 'Ways of Seeing' the Risk from Terrorism

Overall, the philosophy of the Corporation showed that protection of the City's global reputation required a series of localised responses, notably security measures, to form a so-called 'ring of confidence'. The police, by contrast, viewed the City as a target which it had to defend, and adopted a strategy based on the territorial control to achieve this goal by constructing (an at times) highly visible deterrent to prospective terrorists threats. The Commissioner was also quick to

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13   The process of constructing the ring of steel was itself helped by meetings in Belfast between the RUC and the City of London Police in 1992/93 which saw the beginnings of an informal partnership between the forces. Subsequently, the two forces were involved in an Exchange of Inspectors program in 1994, which allowed an exchange of ideas between the two forces to continue in relation to counter-terrorist tactics (see for example Ayres 1994).

point out that the fortified landscape was not just a public relations exercise to protect the reputation of the City:

> Some ill-informed people think that all we are doing is protecting those "fat cats" in the City. The reality is that if the City of London is brought down economically, perhaps never to be recovered, then all of us... will be the losers.[14]

This argument, as highlighted later in this chapter, was contested by some of the neighbouring local boroughs, who saw the ring of steel as dislocating the City from its less prosperous neighbours.

With regard to the insurance industry, Pool Re tried to distribute risk away from the City by dissipating it throughout the UK economy. The scheme, in short, attempted to 'cool', the risk 'hotspot' developing in the City by attempting to spread the risk nationally. This was unsuccessful, and the financial risk of further attack continued to be concentrated in the City, heightening the threat level still further. This in turn strengthened the need to adapt the ring of steel, additional risk management measures and adequate contingency planning. The relationship between insurance mechanisms and an increasingly fortified landscape was therefore important in the construction of the general pro-security discourse. Indeed, if it were not for the ring of steel performing a City-wide risk management function it might have been difficult for occupiers in the City to get any insurance against terrorism.

Assessing the Initial Impact of the Ring of Steel

An independent property market survey in October 1993 revealed that most occupiers in the City saw the Corporation's response to terrorism as excellent and impressive (20.5 per cent), a quick reaction (19.2 per cent), very supportive and committed (16.4 per cent) and effective and efficient (16.4 per cent). Only a minority of those surveyed saw the response as slow and bureaucratic (4.8 per cent) or chaotic (2.1 per cent).[15] However, the results of this survey are not that surprising given the influence of business groupings in putting pressure on the Corporation to set up ring of steel in the first place. Importantly though, this survey also revealed that there were a variety of different views about the operational effectiveness of the security arrangements. The results of this survey are shown in full in Table 7.2. This can perhaps be seen as a more realistic assessment of what the City business population as a whole felt, and less of a 'knee-jerk' reaction,

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14   Minutes of the Corporations' Police Committee, 24 November 1993.

15   The survey was carried out by Applied Property Research who were concerned with the effect of the bombing on property prices, seen as a key measure of economic competitiveness. This report represents a telephone survey of 100 corporate occupiers in the City. The majority (79 per cent) were related to banking (46 per cent) and insurance (23 per cent), with most having between 100-499 (43 per cent) or 500-5000 (39 per cent) staff.

Table 7.2   Opinions of 1993 security arrangements in the City

	Number	%
Doing their best	35	24.1
Will not stop the IRA	25	17.2
Welcome improvement	17	11.7
Reassuring	12	8.3
Insufficient/could do more	12	8.3
Effective/necessary	18	12.4
Haphazard/relaxed	9	6.2
Acts as deterrent	4	2.8
Reduced traffic/crime	4	2.8
Appalling	4	2.8
Detrimental to City	2	1.4
Occupational Hazard	2	1.4
Public relations Coup for IRA	1	0.7
TOTAL	145	100

Source: APR, October 1993.

as reflected in surveys conducted directly after the bomb, which highlighted the almost unanimous support for radical security enhancement.

Table 7.2 suggests that despite the Corporation doing all they could to reduce both the terrorist threat and the fears of its institutions, the widespread support for the ring of steel should be seen against the realisation that the security arrangements are seen by a significant number as insufficient to stop the Provisional IRA if they were determined to bomb the City again (17.2 per cent). This led a minority to criticise the police and Corporation, inferring that the current arrangements are insufficient, and suggesting more could have been done (8.3 per cent). In particular the apparently haphazard and relaxed nature of the security arrangements was criticised (6.2 per cent). The third part of this survey also revealed that relocation by a minority of occupiers was being considered as a result of the continued terrorist threat: 11 per cent in the short term and 19 per cent in the long term. Others indicated that they were considering a move to the outskirts of the City or to a less prominent building. Only 3 per cent said they were definitely moving out, through others indicated that they would have considered this option if others relocated. This view was most prevalent from those occupiers who were directly affected by either the 1992 or 1993 bombings.

However, the Japanese financial houses – despite calling for additional security – insisted they would be staying and did not really consider relocating from the Square Mile; mainly because the City's position in the global economy meant that they felt they had to maintain a presence. Indeed, two leading firms – Tokai Bank and the Long Term Credit Bank of Japan – that had been severely damaged in the Bishopsgate blast indicated they were not considering moving out if security was reviewed. Directors of the Tokai Bank (which had occupied four floors in

the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank outside which the 1993 bomb was parked) noted that 'London is an international business centre and doing business there is necessary … the bomb doesn't damage that image but the risk is increasing. We will have to consider how to reduce the risks for our operators.'[16]

The ring of steel and the enhanced policing procedures called for by businesses can be seen to have prevented the exodus of businesses from the Square Mile that some feared would result after the second bomb. Indeed, a year after the Bishopsgate bomb, despite some fears of relocation, it was reported in the *Times* that more financial institutions had moved into the City than had moved out.[17] The Corporation's attempts to construct a 'ring of confidence' can therefore be viewed as relatively successful. As a terrorism analyst interviewed in 1995, noted:

> One of the pros of the ring of steel is that it maintains confidence among foreign commercial companies. Nobody can deny that banking is bloody important to this country and the fact that London is the prime commercial centre between Tokyo and New York speaks for itself. Frankfurt is increasingly going to mount a challenge, so the City is well worth protecting in this sense.

In this sense the ring of steel was seen to provide a way in which the concentration of financial services could be maintained within the spatial jurisdiction of the Square Mile, preventing an exodus to competitor locations. This was important as it helped maintain the physical proximity and institutional thickness of the Square Mile which was seemingly vital for the success of the area.

Moving Towards Consultation

Through negotiation and collaboration between the City's key stakeholders, common ground was established regarding how the terrorist threat should be countered. Initially this collaborative process was undertaken within the City's institutional networks. However, a period of statutory consultation was required in late 1993 as the initial ring of steel set up in July 1993 was only a temporary arrangement for six, or possibly, twelve months. Thus, through a series of local consultation and evaluation documents, the Corporation sought the views of local groups who might be affected by the proposed security measures. This became an almost constant process of evaluation and monitoring between 1993, when proposals to make the ring of steel 'permanent' were set out, and 1997, when further detailed consultation was required to extend the cordon westwards.

The results of consultation and evaluation between 1993 and 1997 were contained in a number of important Corporation documents. Initially, *The Way Ahead – Traffic and the Environment* was presented to a series of Corporation Committees in October 1993. This was a technical and costing assessment of

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16   Cited in Thompson and Waters (1993).
17   Cited in *The Times* 25 April 1994.

the experimental arrangements with the proposed aim of making the scheme permanent. It also highlighted the links this scheme had with the Corporation's UDP, particularly the long proposed *Key to the Future* scheme, which was seen to complement the access restrictions introduced to reduce terrorist risk. This 1993 report also set out the consultation framework that would need to be followed for the ring of steel to be made permanent.

Further results from this initial consultation came in the form of *The Way Ahead – Traffic and the Environment – Results of Statutory Consultation and Public Notice* in early 1994.[18] This report sought to advise the Corporation on the results of the public notice and the statutory consultation with a variety of stakeholders – the neighbouring boroughs, emergency services, representatives of road users, and other members of the public. It also updated the ongoing assessment process with regard to traffic and environmental issues, advising slight modifications to the temporary scheme. Unsurprisingly though, given that the Corporation undertook it, the report fully endorsed that the ring of steel be made permanent.

A year later in March 1995 a further report presented to a number of Corporation Committees entitled *Traffic and Environmental Area Suggested Western Extension,* highlighted the ways in which the present ring of steel could increase in size to encompass more of the Square Mile. The proposals were two-fold. First, a westward extension to the ring of steel *per se* to encompass the areas of St Paul's, Smithfield and the Barbican. Alternatively, the other suggestion looked at the possibility of creating a number of localised traffic and environmental improvements schemes in different areas of the City, which could, at some point, be linked together into one major zone. After the Docklands bomb in 1996 the former of these plans was highlighted as the preferred solution. A further report was then commissioned called *Suggested Western Extension of Traffic and Environmental Zone* where the City Engineer asked the Corporation for permission to extend the ring of steel based on a request from the City of London Police.[19] This was eventually implemented. A subsequent evaluation report – *Traffic and Environmental Zone – Western Extension – Evaluation Report* – was a technical assessment by the City Engineer on extending the ring of steel. This was presented to a number of Corporation Committees in May/June 1997 and sought to make the extension permanent under the guise of local environmental improvements.

As a result of this general consultation process two findings frequently emerged which the Corporation used to support the introduction of security measures, neither of which were directly related to security enhancement; the benefits of the ring of steel for road users and pedestrians, and environmental improvements brought about inadvertently by security enhancement.

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18   See Planning and Transportation Committee, 1 March 1994.
19   Policy and Resources, 17 October 1996.

Traffic and Movement Benefits

The maintenance and enhancement of the transport infrastructure in the City, as noted earlier, was a key concern of the City, given the expansion of its office stock since the 1980s. Therefore the transport-related benefits of the ring of steel were of significant importance for the Corporation. Initial computer records of transport patterns in the City during 1993 showed there was a significant reduction in traffic in the central areas of the City as a result of the changes to traffic routes introduced by the initial security cordon. However, according to Corporation records, the level of traffic in the City did not change, indicating that the displacement of traffic had been contained within the Square Mile. Changing transport routes also meant that 18 per cent of the bus routes into the City were affected, although most of the companies contacted reported no loss in trade. It was also reported that some bus routes benefited from up to 70 per cent reductions in journey time. The same was true of coach firms and taxi drivers, although isolated complaints were received. Furthermore, consultation between the Corporation and British Rail, London Underground and the emergency services, reported no initial problems with the new security scheme. Consultation with these bodies continued for a few months so that the implications of the construction of the ring of steel could be looked at over a longer time-scale.

The 1994 report to the Planning and Transportation Committee underlined the previously trends. It showed a 25 per cent reduction of vehicles entering the central areas of the City with an 18 per cent reduction in journey times. Consultation with occupiers of the City at this time also indicated that most perceived that there had been a significant reduction, in traffic noise and pollution. Furthermore, a noticeable reduction in serious road accidents occurred.

However, the results of the public consultation exercise showed that some taxi drivers were increasingly concerned about access to certain areas of the City, which they felt hindered their business. Furthermore, one major objection did arise with regard to the displacement of traffic from the City into areas under the jurisdiction of Tower Hamlets Borough Council. This will be returned to later in the chapter.

The 1995 City Engineer's report detailing proposals for an extension of the ring of steel noted that computer modelling indicated that the extended area in the west of the City should see a further 10 per cent reduction in traffic, with no effect on the original area. Police statistics also showed that road traffic accidents were continuing to decrease. The 1996 Engineer's report went further than this, indicating that no traffic should be displaced onto roads of neighbouring authorities. The evaluation report of the implementation of the extension qualified these predictions with the total traffic passing through the City staying the same. Prior to this, the minutes of the Policy and Resources meeting (April 1996) noted:

> It is considered that, in essence, the impact will be analogous to that created by the introduction of the 1993 Traffic and Environmental Zone. Some unavoidable inconvenience to vehicles requiring access to certain streets is inevitable.

However, a vital aspect is the ability to contain the displaced traffic on the City's Secondary and Local Road Network, with a neutral effect on roads in neighbouring boroughs with whom close consultation will be required.

Overall, the road users who put forward opinions to the Corporation saw the ring of steel as a primarily positive traffic management feature, although most were well aware of its counter-terrorist applications.

Environmental Benefits

As previously noted the ring of steel was, from its inception, seen as beneficial to the City's environment. This was in line with the Corporation's environmental policy '*Key to the Future*' which aimed to cut traffic congestion and pollution in the City. The 1993 consultation report showed that noise and atmospheric pollution were reduced in the central City as traffic volumes were reduced and many side roads closed to traffic. For example, a 12 per cent reduction in nitrogen dioxide was reported in the central City in the first two months that the ring of steel was in operation. This was further confirmed by the 1994 report, which showed that overall pollution levels within the cordon had decreased by around 15 per cent, and that pollution in the City as a whole had decreased slightly. This report again highlighted other benefits to the environment, such as reduced noise pollution and decreases in the soiling of buildings (important given the number of listed buildings in the City), due mainly to an 18.1 per cent decrease in particulate pollutants such as lead. This report, however, did qualify these findings by pointing out that traffic (and noise pollution) in other parts of the City might have increased as a result of the cordon. Additionally, this report noted that if the cordon were made permanent, continual environmental improvements would probably accrue.[20]

In the 1995 report by the City Engineer on a possible extension to the ring of steel, the same arguments as noted above were used by the Corporation – namely that the environment would benefit from a reduction in traffic flow and that this would provide an opportunity to enhance the City's street scene. As it concluded:

A scheme can be implemented that will extend the traffic and environmental benefits experienced in the core to a larger area of the City of London encompassing the environmentally sensitive areas of St Paul's, Smithfield and Barbican.

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20   However the City of London Environmental and Amenities Trust did officially object to the scheme being made permanent on the grounds that full access had not yet been assured for cyclists. A Corporation Policy as part of the Unitary Development Plan (UDP TRANS 28) requires that pedal cyclists be given special consideration when traffic management schemes are introduced.

The City Engineer, downplaying the proposed counter-terrorist benefits, further argued that: 'the scheme is operating efficiently and substantial environmental benefits have already resulted, with powerful enhancement of the City scene.' He believed that 'there was a strong case to build on our past experience and extend the environmental benefits further to the west by developing further complementary schemes currently in various stages of development.'

When formal plans were laid out for extending the ring of steel in the 1996 report after the Docklands bomb, environmental and transport justifications were officially given, with security enhancement noted only as a beneficial by-product. The 1996 report also noted that the extension to the ring of steel would divert or discourage a further 10,000 vehicles from entering the City centre each day.

By extension, the 1997 report showed that the experimental extension to the ring of steel had major environmental benefits in the new secure zones in terms of noise and pollution reductions. The 1997 Corporation of London publicity document – on what was officially called the *Experimental Western Extension of the Traffic and Environment Zone* – was distributed to all businesses within the Square Mile as well as in neighbouring areas, and summarised the Corporation's view that the ring of steel was advantageous without making *any* reference to counter-terrorism strategy:

> The original scheme was highly successful in improving conditions within the City's central area. People have praised the reduction of traffic and better quality of the environment. Since the arrangements were made permanent … additional planting, seating and new paved areas have been introduced, making the City an even better place to live and work.

Contesting the Inside Discourse – Objections from Outside the City

Whereas the ring of steel was undoubtedly beneficial to improving the internal environment of the City and in reducing the fear of further terrorist attack (even if this benefit was downplayed), such arguments do not account for the views of those excluded from the initial consultation processes who attempted to highlight the potentially negative aspects of the cordon. As well as legitimising the ring of steel and other security enhancing measures, the consultation and evaluation process also allowed many groups and organisations outside the Corporation of London's institutional nexus to comment on what the security measures employed meant for them, as formal consultation was legally required after the ring of steel had been in place for six months. Thus in December 1993 the Corporation set out the Corporation's proposals and asked recipients for any concerns they might have (Planning and Transportation Committee, 1 March 1 1994). Public notices were placed in the *Evening Standard* and *London Gazette* (21 December) and consultation letters were sent to neighbouring boroughs, the Metropolitan Police,

Table 7.3   Additional responses to the public notice (March 1994)

Grouping or organisation	Response to the Public Notice
London Docklands Development Corporation	Concerns over traffic between the City and Docklands areas
Metropolitan Police	No objections
London Fire Brigade	No objections
London Ambulance Service	No objections
London Transport Planning	No objections
London Buses	No objections
London Regional Passengers Committee	No objections
British Rail	No objections
Bus and Coach Council	No correspondence
Cyclists' touring club	Slight problems raised
The City of London Environment and Amenity Trust	Objection
Public objections to cycling access	Two objections received
License Taxi Drivers Association	Objection
The (Taxi) Owner Driver Society	Objection
Organisations representing people with disabilities (x 5)	No objections
The City Retail Traders	Welcomes the measures
London Chamber of Commerce	Supports the measures
The Freight Transport Association	No objection
Utility companies (x3)	No objections
The Royal Mail	No objections
The Barbican Association	No objections

the Emergency services, public transport operators, and the London Docklands Development Corporation.

The results of the Public Notice (Table 7.3) were still, on the whole, generally favourable to the ideas for security enhancement, under the veil of environmental protection, put forward by the City. The impression the Corporation were trying to create – of unanimous support for its scheme – was further enhanced by the views of a host of other predominantly City-based organisations and suggested almost unequivocal support for the security proposals, further reinforcing the Corporation's claims that the majority of people were in favour of their proposals.

For the first time the Public Notice did allow the neighbouring local boroughs and other interested parties, to *officially* have a say. This process yielded views, which in some cases, were in direct opposition to those expressed by the Corporation. Furthermore, objections to the security enhancement were also raised, contesting the view of the inside discourse that the security scheme would be mutually beneficial and have no knock on effects in areas outside its boundary. The 'outside' discourses that emerged questioned the assumptions of the Corporation about how

the counter-terrorist effort should be pursued. Opposition was centred on the views of neighbouring local authorities (particularly Tower Hamlets) and civil liberties implications. There were also those in the wider community that questioned the operational effectiveness of the ring of steel. The remainder of this chapter will detail these aspects of the outside discourse.

The Initial Views of the Neighbouring Boroughs

After the ring of steel was established, the neighbouring boroughs expressed their grievances, arguing that they had not been consulted properly on what the City was planning to do, and that the security cordon could have negative impacts on surrounding areas in terms of increased traffic and the possible displacement of terrorist risk. Furthermore, there were concerns that the scheme had little co-ordination with the policies (especially transport) of the neighbouring areas.

Objections immediately came (July 1993) from some neighbouring boroughs. Tower Hamlets wrote to the Government and the Corporation over the complete lack of consultation and Islington highlighted that it had only heard of the cordon by fax the night before it was implemented. Southwark also wrote to the Corporation regarding the inadequate consultation and pledged support for Tower Hamlets' objection to the Government. The London Docklands Development Corporation further objected to the scheme as they felt it made travel between the City and the Isle of Dogs increasingly difficult, as traffic to the east of the City (in Tower Hamlets) would increase. As a security officer in the Docklands, indicated, the neighbouring boroughs were concerned about how the ring of steel would affect them:

> I recall attending a meeting over in Canary Wharf after it [the ring of steel] went up to discuss the actions taken by the City in relation to the surrounding boroughs. All the surrounding boroughs could do was sit there and criticise them for putting it out without giving any thought to the knock on effects of traffic.

Tower Hamlets and the other boroughs did not oppose the idea of a ring of steel *per se* but they were concerned about how it could adversely affect their area in particular, and movement policies for central London as a whole. As a spokesperson for Tower Hamlets indicated:

> We are not saying they need to rethink the steel, but the City of London is not completely separate. The Corporation cannot do what it likes without thinking about the impact its moves may have on the neighbouring boroughs.[21]

The objections of many of the boroughs were articulated through the Labour controlled Association of London Authorities (ALA).

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21   Cited in Smith (1993).

Others saw the actions of the Corporation as paternalistic and an attempt to spatially imprint their ideas onto the landscape of central London, especially in relation to transport policies. When the ring of steel was implemented, Andrew Pharaoh, the director of 'Movement for London', the London arm of the British Roads Federation, indicated that severe disruption to normal traffic flow would occur: 'It is going to cause massive problems around the borders of the zone, especially if other boroughs introduced their own schemes.'[22] Similarly, the Islington council leader indicated that the implementation of the ring of steel had not been thought through properly, noting: 'there is a clear need to protect people from terrorism but this plan is completely ill-conceived.'[23] Furthermore, the ALA indicated that consultation is the key to a successful scheme: 'if one small part of London takes action without co-ordinating the plan with other boroughs, it could lead to chaos.'

Although there was obviously resentment about the adverse traffic effects and the lack of official consultation between neighbouring boroughs and the Corporation of London before, and immediately after, the ring of steel was implemented, such criticism must also be seen within the wider context of a fragmented London-wide transport policy. During the early 1990s proposals for changes in London transport management were causing borough councils and local pressure groups to oppose any new traffic measures that would encourage more traffic flow to their areas. Traffic management for London at the time of the introduction of the ring of steel was shared between the boroughs and the Department of Transport, which gave 'tangible political expression to the conflict between neighbourhood and wider issues' (Travers et al. 1991, 102). In order to alleviate this tension, the Chartered Institute of Transport suggested in June 1991 that:

> Transportation policies pursued in one borough can directly affect adjacent boroughs and there is a general agreement that it is essential for transport policy to be undertaken in a co-ordinated framework.

The construction of the ring of steel by the Corporation certainly contradicted this ethos, even though it did not officially have to consult with the boroughs for six months, as it was presented as a 'temporary traffic management scheme.'

In October 1993, the City Engineer, in support of the Corporation's proposals to make the ring of steel permanent, indicated that 'as yet, no detrimental traffic effects have been identified in surrounding boroughs as a result of the current experimental traffic arrangements.' However, in this report there was also an admission that the surrounding local authorities felt it was too soon to judge this as the scheme had only been operational during the summer holidays and did not adequately reflect normal City of London traffic flows and work patterns. The report continued by noting the concerns of the neighbouring boroughs and their wish to be fully consulted:

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22   Cited in Smith (1993).
23   Ibid.

Table 7.4   Views of the neighbouring authorities on the ring of steel

Neighbouring Authority	Consultation Comments
City of Westminster (West of City)	<u>No objection</u> to making the scheme permanent.
Islington (North of City)	<u>Holding Objection</u> with concern expressed about 'geographical' areas that would be expanded upon subsequently.
Camden (North-West of City)	<u>No objections</u> with the proviso that if any disbenefit with Camden occurs ameliorative measures will be sought from the Corporation.
Hackney (North-East of City)	<u>No objections</u> but would like to see better cycle access. Slight concern also expressed about the effect of Police activities on buses.
Tower Hamlets (East of City)	<u>Objection</u> on traffic management grounds.
Southwark (South of City)	<u>No objections</u> unless London Transport or the emergency services lodge complaints.
Lambeth (South-West of City)	<u>No objection</u> to making the scheme permanent.

> Some authorities have expressed a view that traffic flows have changed in their area, but no one is yet in a position to determine whether this was due to the City scheme... [and] some have also expressed the wish that the Corporation of London should attempt to consult more individuals in the surrounding local authority areas.

Subsequently, the 1994 report, which gave the result of the statutory consultation exercise, indicated that experiments carried out in October 1993 showed no clear patterns linked to the ring of steel could be proved. However, it was noted that certain roads in Tower Hamlets had received noticeable increases (up to 8 per cent) on certain roads.[24] This was not entirely unexpected, as Tower Hamlets had been indicating that this had been occurring for some time.

Official Consultation with the Boroughs

Given the limitations of the Road Traffic Act, the City based its legal case for renewal of the ring of steel (in 1994) on transport and environmental grounds. Therefore, between the approval of such measures at the Court of Common Council on 2 December 1993 and publication on 21 December, senior representatives from

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24   In particular, Aldgate and Tower Hill gyratories have been affected, although the opening of the Limehouse link tunnel could well have affected this.

the City Engineer's department visited all seven neighbouring boroughs and the London Docklands Development Corporation to explain the proposals and discuss concerns they may have. On 21 December consultation letters were sent out to the seven neighbouring authorities. This provided a twenty-one day objection period, later extended to eight weeks, so that the local authorities could properly consult with their members. The responses of the authorities are shown in Table 7.4.

Table 7.4 indicates that despite initial criticism of the scheme (in large part to do with the fact they were not consulted), the majority of the neighbouring authorities were happy with the ring of steel becoming permanent as long as it did not impact upon their area.

The 'holding objection' that Islington had was immediately dropped. This objection concerned the possible expansion of the scheme to encompass the Broadgate Centre, which was to become part of the City in 1994. Whilst the original ring of steel did not impact upon traffic flows in Islington, the borough council was concerned that detrimental traffic flow patterns might occur if the ring of steel was expanded northwards to cover Broadgate.

With Islington dropping their objection this left Tower Hamlets as the sole objector from the neighbouring boroughs. This was a potentially serious matter for the City, as if this objection were not withdrawn; a public enquiry would have been forced at great cost. For example, the Policy and Resources meeting on 10 February 1994 noted that the Corporation was concerned about the possibility of a public inquiry and had organised for MORI to carry out research on the public's view of the Corporation's proposals before any possible inquiry. This it was hoped would, highlight unanimous support for the Corporation's ideas.

On 4 March 1994 the Corporation of London asked the Secretary of State for his determination on Tower Hamlets' objection. At this time a number of meetings between the City Engineer and representatives of Tower Hamlets and the Minister for Transport in London took place. These meetings tried to resolve the specific objections Tower Hamlets had, particularly related to the substantial increases in traffic flow on their roads, to the east of the City, caused by recent modifications:

> The principle concern of Tower Hamlets is the current traffic situation immediately East of the City boundary which has significantly affected the opening of the Limehouse Link on 17 May 1993. This new radial link road has resulted in substantial increases in traffic arriving at the Tower Hamlets/City boundary and discharging into a road network not capable of adequately coping with it. The introduction of the experimental traffic and environment scheme on 3 July 1993 by Mr Commissioner had been perceived as a compounding problem by [the] London Borough of Tower Hamlets.[25]

After great pressure had been put on Tower Hamlets, a 'Memorandum of Understanding' was reached with a series of remedial measures planned which

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25   Minutes of the Policy and Resources Committee, 2 June 1994.

would attempt to ensure better traffic control on the boundary. This was a three-way agreement between the Corporation, the Government, and Tower Hamlets:

> On the basis of this 'Memorandum of Understanding' and a further letter of support from the Minister for Transport in London, the London Borough of Tower Hamlets has withdrawn its objection to the proposed permanent Traffic Orders for the City traffic and environment scheme.

The objection was therefore withdrawn allowing the ring of steel to be made permanent on 2 July 1994, a year after its initial implementation. Michael Cassidy, Chairman of the Corporations' policy and Resources Committee indicated that Tower Hamlets were not easy to liaise with during this process:

> We needed cross-borough co-operation and Tower Hamlets have not given it priority over the last three years. They raised strong objections at the implementation stage and were the last to withdraw their objections … Tower Hamlets dropped objections to the scheme at the last possible moment and a public enquiry was avoided. The City in return offered 'various assistance' to Tower Hamlets.

The next time major changes to the ring of steel were suggested by the Corporation – to extend the ring of steel after the Docklands bomb – again, only internal consultation was required. The extension was ratified in December 1996 and introduced on 27 January 1997 for an experimental period of twelve months. According to the Corporation:

> During this time [the experimental period] full consultation will take place to seek the views of those people who live and work or have businesses in the extended area. At the end of the consultation period all views received will be collated and carefully thought about by the Corporation when it contemplates making the extension permanent.[26]

This makes no mention of wider consultation with the surrounding boroughs, and as with the 1993 cordon, the planning of the extension was criticised by the neighbouring Labour councils who accused the Corporation of again failing to consult with them adequately. Islington were particularly aggrieved as they had foreseen this extension being implemented when they initially put in a holding objection to the standing order in early 1994. For example, a spokeswoman for Camden and Islington Councils noted that:

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26   Corporation of London publicity leaflet, January 1997.

> The City is using police powers to avoid going through the normal planning procedure. It is distributing its leaflets now telling people it has already decided on this.[27]

Corporation of London Minutes confirm that it was only on the day of implementation that leaflets were distributed in Islington and Camden. However, they also indicated that a meeting had taken place between them and Islington members after the extension was applied for to discuss the traffic effects, which were shown to be minimal.[28]

Indeed, in late 1997 there was talk of a further extension to the ring of steel to cover more of the area around the Broadgate centre. There were feelings expressed by the Corporation of London and the surroundings boroughs of Hackney, Islington and Tower Hamlets that the fringes of the City were vulnerable to attack. It was reported in the *Daily Telegraph* that the Corporation was considering 'shoring up the exposed flanks' by altering the traffic flow in these areas in early 1998.[29] The merits of this proposal can perhaps be shown by the attempt of an Irish Republican terrorist group to set off a series of firebombs in Central London in July 1998. One of the bombs was reportedly found at Chancery Lane underground station on the western border of the City. This extension was also planned with the idea of reducing traffic volumes in this area of London. For example a report in early 1998 indicated that total car volumes had decreased by 25 per cent in the City since the ring of steel was introduced in 1993.[30]

In summary, the consultation process with the surrounding local authorities saw the establishment of some institutional links between the City and its neighbours. Similar institutional links were also being made at this time in other policy areas, as there was a considerable emphasis on voluntary co-operation between London boroughs for London-wide benefits. However, there was also a feeling that the needs of the boroughs were being marginalised, as emphasis was placed on London's role as a global city and in particular the City's place within this. The implementation of the ring of steel exemplified the powerful nature of the City, and the almost uncritical acceptance of its 'inside' discourse, which was supported by Central Government but criticised by the neighbouring boroughs who were less concerned with 'global city' agendas than with local priorities.

Civil Liberties Implications

Despite the ring of steel improving business confidence in the City, some individuals and groupings, outside of the formal consultation process complained to the City

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27   Personal communication.

28   See for example Planning and Transportation Committee (20 May 1997) and Policy and Resources (5 June 1997).

29   Cited in the *Daily Telegraph*, 19 September 1997.

30   See for example the *Daily Telegraph*, 12 March 1998.

Police and Corporation about its side effects. As soon as the ring of steel was erected in July 1993 there were complaints about the scheme being an infringement of civil liberties, making everyone a potential suspect, and an encroachment on the public realm with each layer of security seen to be imposing further restrictions on the public's freedom. These complaints centred on three key concerns that are symptomatic of general complaints made against crime prevention measures: first, restrictions that measure have upon movement and access to public spaces; second, the freedom from suspicion and the ability of police to 'stop and search' citizens at random; and third, omnipresent surveillance coverage by CCTV.

A number of organisations were concerned that access restrictions to areas of the City would affect them economically. For example, the reduction in transport routes into the City was seen as detrimental to public transport operators. Table 7.3, for example, showed, as mentioned earlier, that there was some concern, most notably from taxi drivers, that access to the City was going to be restricted.

Furthermore, civil liberty groups were also critical of changes in the law, which allowed people to be randomly stopped and searched when entering the ring of steel when they had not committed any actual criminal offence. This reverses a fundamental principle of English law, that a stop and search can only be made on suspicion of intent. John Wadham, Director of Liberty, noted in 1993 that 'we believe the balance as it is now is about right. We understand why the police want more powers, but do not think their powers should be increased.'[31] In particular he believed that the new security arrangements would lead to harassment of the Irish Community in London. A year later, Wadham further noted in a letter to *The Times* in April 1994 that he believed the police were using the security cordon for activities not associated with terrorism:

> The statistical evidence for the ring of steel ... shows that police have stopped a disproportionate number of black people, despite the fact that to date no black people are believed to have been involved in the IRA activities in Britain.

There were also been those who complained about the imposition of surveillance cameras:

> There are always complaints about access restriction but I have also heard complaints about the invasion of privacy some people feel when they go though the cordon due to the CCTV – knowing they are being watched[32] (Senior City Risk Manager).

Civil liberty complaints were, on the whole, uncommon but provided a viewpoint that the Corporation did at least consider, even though they were marginalised

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31 Cited in Ford (1993).

32 This view was also prevalent in the Docklands after they introduced similar camera technology in 1996 (see Chapter 8).

and had little effect on the way in which the Corporation and the City Police developed the ring of steel. In short, civil liberty considerations, like those of the borough councils, were of minimal importance to the Corporation in their efforts to construct a 'ring of confidence' for business occupiers and to safeguard the City's reputation.

Questioning the Effectiveness and Usefulness of the Security Cordon

The extent to which the ring of steel genuinely provided a safe and secure business location, was also contested by a number of individuals and organisations, who questioned both its operational effectiveness, and the arguments initially made by the Corporation, that the ring of steel was creating a 'secure zone' within the City.

Many occupiers, perhaps naively, saw the ring of steel as an almost total guarantee of security. The merits of the ring of steel were further enhanced through the consultation process and subsequent Corporation reports. These attempted to legitimise this by pointing out the positive benefits of the scheme in terms of reducing crime and terrorism, as well as environmental and traffic benefits.

However, the Provisional IRA was certainly convinced that attacking the City was still a worthwhile tactic and that the ring of steel was ineffective. A letter to City businesses (dated 8 July 1993) sent after the plans for the ring of steel was announced indicated:

> No one should be misled into understanding the seriousness of the Provisional IRA's intention to mount future planned attacks in the political and financial heart of the British state. Furthermore, no one should allow the futile announcement of a City of London security zone ... to lull them into a false sense of security.[33]

Additionally, other commentators believed that the security operation provided an incentive for the Provisional IRA to demonstrate that the cordon *could* be breached. This view suggested that far from being the answer to the City's terrorist problem, the ring of steel increased the risk of further terrorist attack as media exposure in the event of a successful strike would be of propaganda value to the Provisional IRA. For example Conor Cruise O'Brien, a leading writer on Irish affairs, writing in *The Times* newspaper, indicated that in his opinion:

> The ring of steel increases the risk to the City in two ways. It increases the incentive to the IRA to strike, because of the propaganda value to be derived from penetrating that loudly trumpeted ring. The other way in which the charade increases the risk to the city is that it diminishes manpower available to counter the IRA threat. Fixed roadblocks need a lot of trained manpower.[34]

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33   Personal communication.
34   Cited in Dillon (1996), 292-3.

The Commissioner of Police indicated that at this time he had been getting criticised for throwing a gauntlet down to the terrorists. He defended his actions by noting that: 'given the history of what they have done to the City, one has to wander what more of a challenge they needed' (Kelly 1994a). Others also questioned whether the ring of steel provided an adequate defence against the Provisional IRA:

> The ring of steel is not even a serious attempt to stop the bombings. The security measures currently in place are insufficient to present sufficient deterrent to make someone think 'that's too dangerous, I'm going somewhere else (Senior City Risk Manager).

He continued by indicating the irony that he felt that offices located outside the security ring are in fact at an advantage as they avoid much of the traffic congestion the cordon causes – 'I think people were quite relieved they were outside the ring of steel as they don't have the hassle of having to get through it to get to work.'

Those who cast doubt on the effectiveness of the ring of steel served to contest the meaning that the City authorities had attempted to place upon their security operation. Furthermore, the dominant pro-security inside discourse was challenged as the perceived terrorist threat declined. After the Provisional IRA called a ceasefire in August 1994, some sections of the media were calling for an immediate scaling down of the City of London's ring of steel*,* indicating that in their opinion the threat had gone away overnight. Indeed, the City Police reported that they found it difficult to maintain a 'culture of security' in the area due to the apathy of the community about the risks they faced. Subsequently, the Corporation came under pressure from sections of the business community to down-grade security. This pressure intensified as the ceasefire progressed, and reached a peak towards the end of 1995 after the ceasefire had been in place for over a year:

> It came to a point just before last Christmas (1995) when there was a very real effort on behalf of a number of organisations and prominent individuals to actually get it back to where it was before. I mean we gradually sort of eased-off but our profile had been reduced. [That said] all our measures were in the back cupboard waiting to be put in place again (Senior City of London Police Officer).

He further noted:

> And it came to a final negotiation of the position to be readopted in the early part of February, and then the Docklands bomb occurred. Then everyone was saying 'thank Christ we didn't do it'.

This highlighted that there were sections of the business community who at this time wanted the ring of steel disbanded, with the City returned to pre-St. Mary Axe days when there were no overt signs of counter-terrorist security on the City streets.

However, after the Docklands bomb in early 1996, the risk-profile of the City was again high. Instead of backing a reduction of security, the business community, as a whole, was keen to get the cordon extended westwards.

Conclusion

The threat of terrorism facing the City in the 1990s increasingly sought to focus attention on how the Corporation was adapting to modern conditions and, in particular, its role in helping to promote London as a worldwide city, as well as maintaining its influence within the global economy. The ring of steel helped the City to create a secure platform upon which it could continue to develop and adapt its role as the financial heart of a 'world city'.

Despite its tradition, during the 1980s and 1990s the City showed itself to be a thoroughly modern organisation in the way it adapted its agendas. This was especially true after the abolition of the Greater London Council (GLC) in 1986. As Hebbert (1998, 120-121) noted after 1986, the Corporation:

> …took over most of the work of representing London overseas and receiving important visitors to the capital … Taking its seat on various new joint committees of the London boroughs, it used its current status – venerable, immensely rich, a political eunuch – to broker between the ideological blocs of boroughs controlled by Labour and the Conservatives … Happenings that would have seemed wildly incongruous ten years beforehand became commonplace.[35]

The development of the ring of steel can be seen as a physical manifestation of these sentiments and the evolving role of the City in London-wide agendas at this time. As has been noted, after the Bishopsgate bomb the need for the construction of radical security measures was articulated by a strong pro-security discourse as a variety of key institutional actors got together to mobilise support for security changes based on 'collective concerns' for terrorist risk. In particular, the Lord Mayor and the chairman of Policy and Resources, Michael Cassidy, became key voices in the City's response to terrorism (just as they were in the promotion of London as a whole), although the powerful financial institutions were still very influential in shaping Corporation policy and practices. Subsequently, the pro-security (inside) discourse was legitimised, at least in the eyes of the Corporation, through the consultation process. There was also a significant degree of negotiation and contestation from the disempowered 'outside discourses' over the Corporation's approach.

The various meanings attached to the ring of steel meant that it was viewed in a variety of ways by different organisations and groupings: a Belfast-style counter-terrorist cordon (by the media); a territorial policing strategy (City Police); an

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35   Cited in Kleinman (1999), 14.

effective traffic management measure and beneficial environmental approach (the Corporation's official line); a 'transferer' of traffic to adjacent areas (neighbouring boroughs); a public relations exercise to stop businesses leaving (critics of the cordon); an imposition of personal freedoms (civil liberty organisations); an insurance necessity (insurance industry); a beneficial measure helping promote London as a global city (Central Government); an exporter of the risk of terrorism, or simply as an effective or ineffective measure against terrorism.

The construction of the ring of steel was planned and executed along the lines proposed by the Corporation of London who either used other 'readings' of the landscape to legitimise the security cordon (environmental improvements, traffic management and crime reduction), or simply ignored them (displacement of traffic and civil liberty complaints). In short, the City was able to construct a ring of steel because of the powerful inside discourse that emerged based on a number of powerful organisations in support of radical security proposals. Attempts to construct rings of steel in other areas of the country at this time (most notably Manchester, in North West England after a bombing in June 1996) shed light on the key processes which developed in the City, showing the extent to which the ring of steel was based on wealth, power and a strong institutional thickness, with a shared discourse of action.

It can be argued that the risk of terrorism and the subsequent response in the form of a ring of steel actually served to enhance the City's institutional thickness through the construction of new networks of relations at a variety of spatial levels. At a local level, the Corporation increasingly liaised with businesses for security purposes and encouraged businesses to co-ordinate their efforts for mutual benefit. New City-wide committees were set up to feed in to the Corporation's response to the terrorist threat. At a wider geographical scale institutional relationships were also established with neighbouring boroughs as well as Central Government, which prior to the 1990s, would have been unthinkable given the detached role the City had traditionally played in London affairs.

However, it was the wider driving forces of the global economy that ultimately framed the response of the Corporation to terrorism, which was physically expressed in the ring of steel. The Corporation was well aware that it needed to reduce the perceived vulnerability of the City to acts of economic terrorism in order to enhance its position as a global trading centre, but also importantly, London's position as a 'global city'. As discussed in some detail, it did this by attempting to balance security with the effective functioning of business by providing a 'ring of confidence' for national and international businesses.

Indeed it was not long after the ring of steel was constructed that the landscape changes that occurred in the City were highlighted as improving the quality of life in place promotional material for London, in which the City was portrayed as safe for business:

> The City of London 'Square Mile' has particularly benefited from a cut in crime
> following the reduction in entry points ... following a bomb in 1993 ... The

unplanned result of the initiative has been a cut in office burglaries in the Square Mile and a corresponding increase in business confidence.[36]

However, whilst the risk of terrorism forced the City to look outside the borders of the Square Mile for institutional liaisons, the motives of the Corporation as a local authority can still be viewed as paternalistic, protecting itself first and foremost. Its seemingly inclusive agenda, whilst helping it connect to global markets, also led to it attempting to disconnect itself (in a physical sense) increasing its boundedness and physical separation from the rest of London at the same time as London-wide partnerships were increasingly being forged.

In its business dealings, the City has always tried to exist on a plane above the physical city, leaving the City of London in a disengaged relationship with its neighbouring boroughs. Therefore it was perhaps ironic that the risk of terrorism that afflicted the City during the early to mid-1990s, far from weakening the City's trading position, served to bring together firms, institutions and local and Central Government, all anxious to defend the Square Mile, even though the ring of steel in fact fragmented the physical landscape of central London.

Entering the new millennium the City continued to enact change to remain competitive as a global city. It continued to be central to London affairs, especially regarding economic competitiveness agendas, as well as being closely linked to the new Governance structures for London such as a creation of a Major and Assembly for London – collectively referred to as the Greater London Authority (GLA) (Tomaney 2001). As noted previously, the Corporation of London (after the abolition of the Greater London Council) had been actively developing an enhanced role for itself, not just as a global financial district, but within the governing structures and business networks of London and with the marketing of a new vision for London in the 1990s given the lack of strategic Government for London as a whole.[37] As Thornley et al. (2004, 1957) noted, the Corporation of London had been gearing up for a strategic role on London affairs for some time:

> It [the Corporation] was central to the business networking of the early 1990s and set about adjusting to the formation of the GLA ... it was very successful in gaining entry to a central position in the new regime.

The interaction between the Mayor (at the centre of the GLA regime) and London business networks was of particular note. Ken Livingstone, London's first contemporary major, argued in his election manifesto that he would 'work with the Corporation of London and major City institutions to ensure London remains the financial capital of Europe' (Livingstone 2000).[38] To this end, when elected, the new Major appointed the political leader of the City, Judith Mayhew, as his official

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36   London Chamber of Commerce (1994 and 1996).
37   Until 2000, strategic policy for London was prepared by Central Government.
38   Cited in Thornley et al. (2004, 1957).

**Figure 7.1   The Foster-designed building on the site of the St Mary Axe
              bomb**

business adviser. This was not a chance appointment. As Thornley et al. (2004,
1959) noted: 'leading members of the City Corporation, Michael Cassidy [who
oversaw the setting up of the ring of steel and Pool Re] and Judith Mayhew had
been working hard in the lead-up to the creation of the GLA in order to maintain

the influence of the City'. They further cite Tony Travers who argued that 'the political brilliance of Cassidy and Mayhew ensured the Corporation of London a key role in Livingstone's London (Travers 2004, 151).

The City's changing position was also expressed physically, demographically and culturally. The City continued to adopt a policy of expansion both upwards, through a 'tall buildings policy', and outwards, through the development of 'City Fringe' sites. In a key policy document *Tall Buildings and Sustainability* (Corporation of London 2002, 5), it was argued that:

> The City of London, as the world's leading international financial centre, is a key asset to the UK's national economy and to London itself. The Corporation of London, as the local municipal authority, wants to assure the City's continued dynamism given that its businesses require ideal conditions in which to operate. To do so, the Corporation needs to ensure that demand for office space can be met within the Square Mile. *In this context, tall office buildings are becoming increasingly necessary* as a result of the efficient use that they make of the limited land available (emphasis added).

As noted in Chapter 5, during the early 1990s, financial institutions required 'groundscaper' buildings – low-rise buildings with huge floors to accommodate large financial dealing rooms. Entering the new millennium the fashion was for high profile skyscrapers. Perhaps the best example of this is the new Swiss Re building – the Gherkin – designed by Sir Norman Foster for the site devastated by the 1992 St Mary Axe bomb (see Figure 7.1).

The tall building policy in the City and surrounding areas was pushed hard by the GLA and the City for mutual benefit (GLA 2001). The City required new buildings to stave off a fresh challenge from an ever expanding London Docklands, whilst the GLA could insist that the Corporation financed the building of social housing stock as a 'sweetener' for being given planning permission (McNeill 2002). As such the Corporation of London was increasingly entering into partnership deals with surrounding boroughs in a way unheard of fifteen years previously. For example the Corporation of London's Economic Development Action Plan for 2002/03 noted that:

> In pursuing economic development … the Corporation [needs] to demonstrate its overall relevance in relation to economic, social land environmental developments in London – that is London as a whole: the surrounding boroughs; and in the Square Mile itself.

After 9/11, questions were inevitably raised regarding the future of tall buildings and trophy skyscrapers that can not be constructed to withstand a direct hit from a plane or that take too long to evacuate (Archibald et al. 2002; Hall 2001; Williams 2001). However, it appears that in the City of London 9/11 has not impacted upon long term office development policy, in part because, as Bowers (2002) noted,

'there is no defence against a September 11-style terrorist strike short of living in bunkers.'

Into the new millennium the Square Mile has also continued to increase its residential population as well as the international presence of overseas firms. In doing so, some believe it has widened its structures of governance and hence destroyed the last remnants of the traditional 'club atmosphere' for which the Square Mile was renowned (Kynaston 2001). Others however, believed that at the turn of the century, change had still not gone far enough with the governance structures in place remaining undemocratic and inappropriate within wider London governance structures (Power 2001).

PART III
TERRORISM, RISK AND THE FUTURE CITY: TOWARDS URBAN RESILIENCE

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Beating the Bombers: A Decade of Counter Terrorism in the City of London

Introduction

Previous chapters have highlighted the impact of a number of different responses to the risk of terrorism in the City of London during 1990s. In so doing it addressed a number of key questions.

First, how did the physical form of the landscape in the City change as a result of attempts to 'design-out' terrorism? Who was responsible for such measures being implemented? How did such alterations change over time in relation to the prevailing socio-economic and political context? And, to what extent do the security changes adopted in the City relate to strategies adopted in other cities to design-out crime? In particular, the analogy of territoriality was adopted as a way of articulating literatures on the fortification and privatisation of urban space. This was presented in terms of how contemporary cities are enclaving and restructuring themselves in relation to capital flows, but also due to physical and financial risk. Furthermore, importance was placed on understanding how influential urban managers within a specific territory act as 'conditioning agents', creating an urban landscape that becomes, in the words of David Harvey (1990) 'necessarily fragmented'.

Second, preceding chapters have been concerned with the question of how the establishment of counter-terrorism security measures in the City was related to a distinctive set of local governance arrangements operating within the Square Mile. This discussion concerned the extent to which the 'institutional thickness' of the City helped the Corporation of London to establish and maintain the ring of steel as well as enhancing local partnership working to improve security. This aspect of the inquiry also sought to explain how these institutional networks were themselves modified as a result of the continuing terrorist risk. In addition, relations between the City and Central Government were outlined in relation to how the terrorist threat, and the subsequent construction of the ring of steel, effected the promotion of London on the global stage and facilitated the involvement of the Corporation of London into broader London affairs.

Third, prior chapters have questioned the impact of terrorist risk in the City in a financial sense, and analysed how insurers attempted to redistribute the financial risk of terrorism away from the Square Mile. It has also sought to illustrate the regulatory role played by the insurance industry in shaping the landscape of the

City through their policies of encouraging the retrofitting of security measures and the development of enhanced, and well-tested, risk management procedures.

Against these contexts, and by contrast, this chapter is predominantly concerned linking the City's response to terrorism with wider conceptual ideas in urban studies and the broader the social and political sciences, highlighting how counter-terrorism ideas adopted in the City of London were utilised in other 'high risk' UK locations.

This chapter will initially highlight the dangers of attempting to replicate the strategies that have developed in the City and in other locations, arguing that what developed to counter the terrorist threat in the Square Mile was geographically and historically specific. This will be further illustrated by cases from the London Docklands and central Manchester when large vehicle bomb attacks in the 1990s led to attempts to establish City of London-style security measures in response to the threat of further terrorist attack.

The second part of the chapter will summarise the attempts to embed security features into both the physical design and management arrangement in the City, arguing that such measures provide the genesis for a more widespread resilience policy which emerged after 9/11. The final part of the chapter will return to the analogy of territoriality unpacked in Chapter 2, to highlight the impact of risk and risk aversion strategies play in constructing an urban landscape of 'wild' and 'tame' zones and of specific sites which might be seen as 'exceptional' in terms of levels of security. It is argued that approaches adopted in the City were symptomatic of what Beck (1999) referred to as a 'protectionist reflex' – where instant unreflexive action is taken/required followed by a normalisation – an acceptance – of risk and risk mitigation measures. This staged approach to understanding risk management, it will be argued, has significant implications for how risk from terrorist attack has, and is, dealt with by urban authorities in the post-9/11 era.

Replicating the Ring of Steel

Much recent urban research has a tendency to assume that the increasingly prevalent trends of urban fortification and entrepreneurial urban governance can provide a partial model for the design and function of the future city. It is often argued that such a framework will result in a safer, increasingly egalitarian, and economically prosperous society. However, such accounts have a tendency to generalise their findings, proclaiming to represent the future of urbanism without accounting adequately for local circumstances of place and for the subjective interpretations of citizens and varied stakeholders. This later set of concerns represents part of a much wider 'normative drift' within the social sciences, where new ways of interpreting phenomena are commonly sought, given a new set of contemporary social, economic and political conditions which cannot be explained by traditional, and often normative, explanatory frameworks.

   With this in mind, research during the 1990s that adequately assessed the complex realities of urban areas and their broader geopolitical frame of reference was rare, with greater attention being paid to the 'big picture' of urban restructuring due to the large-scale social, economic, political and technological transformations. As noted in earlier chapters, in studies of the city many of these broad conceptions were based, in part, upon the development of LA, or other emblematic examples, representative of the so-called postmodern city.

   The findings presented in this book thus far challenge this assumption and have argued that the events that occurred as a result of the risk of terrorism in the City of London during the 1990s were a product of a unique set of historical, geographical and institutional factors which should not be mapped uncritically to other areas. Indeed, as will be shown below, attempts to set up – to transfer – City of London-style 'rings of steel' to other parts of the UK have been played-out in very different ways and with dissimilar effects.

The Mini Ring of Steel

Another site in London that was the focus for counter-terrorist planning through the 1990s was the London Docklands, particularly the Canary Wharf complex (see Figure 8.1). This new financial area in east London was seen as a symbolic extension of London's financial zone in the City (Daniels and Bobe 1993).

   Canary Wharf tower was the iconic structure in this development area. It was the centrepiece of the a strategic planning project – the London Docklands Development Corporation (LDDC)[1] – developed in line with the neo-liberal-infused regeneration agendas of Margaret Thatcher's Government. Canary Wharf Tower was seen by its developers at the time of construction in the 1980s as a 'beacon of hope for all Londoners', but by the early 1990s was struggling for tenants and suffering poor occupancy rates as a result of poor local infrastructure. As Thornley (1993, 207) noted, Canary Wharf was:

> …surrounded by incomplete buildings, empty sites and poor external environment. The only adequate transport access, in the form of the Jubilee line extension, is not due to arrive until 1996 and, in any case, because of the large amount of funding from [the developers] Olympia and York, its future is in doubt.

In 1992, the developers, Olympia and York, filed for bankruptcy, as a result of general downturn in the London commercial property linked to the ongoing recession.

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   1   The LDDC was a strategic regeneration agency set up by Margaret Thatcher's Government in 1981 to develop 8.5 square miles of the deprived East London Docklands. It ran for 17 years, until 1998.

**Figure 8.1	The Canary Wharf Tower in the London Docklands**

As a result of its commercial vulnerability, as well as its connections with the Thatcher Government, Canary Wharf was a highly political as well as economic target for attack. In 1992 it was subject to a failed terrorist bombing when a vehicle containing the bomb was spotted before it exploded next to the main tower. It is believed the detonator failed to ignite the main charge. As will be detailed later, the southern part of the Docklands area was also subject to a devastating explosion in February 1996. However, the beginnings of a coordinated security response to terrorism began in the wake of the failed attack in 1992.

Following the foiled Canary Wharf attack a multi-stakeholder area-based security liaison group was set up which incorporated representatives from Canary Wharf Ltd, the London Docklands Development Corporation (LDDC), Tower Hamlets Borough Council, the Metropolitan Police, and the Docklands Light Railway. Developing a security strategy for this area was not an easy task given the unique nature of the Docklands area which, unlike the City of London, encompassed a significant range of different functional uses – public housing estates, private residential developments and leisure facilities, as well as private commerce.

Whereas the entire Isle of Dogs, peninsula on which the LDDC site sat, was considered at risk from terrorism, particular concern was expressed about the susceptibility of Canary Wharf to further terrorist attack given its iconic status. By consequence, managers at Canary Wharf initiated a mini-*ring of steel* essentially

Figure 8.2   **Security features at the entry to the Canary Wharf complex**

shutting down access to *their* estate (Coaffee 1996a; 1997; 2001; Graham and Marvin 2001). Such an approach attempted to design-out terrorism by restricting and monitoring vehicular and pedestrian access. This involved changing the space-management strategies adopted by the police and private security industry. Security barriers were thrown across roads into and out of the area, no-parking zones were implemented, a plethora of CCTV cameras were installed, and identity card schemes were initiated. The observation deck on the 50th floor of the Tower was also closed. Motorists were further advised that their vehicles were also subject to random searches (Coaffee 1996b; 1996c). Images of these security arrangements are shown in Figure 8.2.

Comparisons were made at this time between the City of London and Canary Wharf in terms of security procedures. A Business Director in Docklands commented: 'nothing goes into and out of Canary Wharf or the other adjacent quays … without the scrutiny of a vigilant security operation'. He continued:

> Security is an intrinsic part of the design of Docklands. Close-circuit video cameras network the area, wide open spaces expose and preclude suspicious activity...Irrefutable proof that the system works was offered when a van packed with explosives outside Canary Wharf after midnight was spotted immediately, thereby avoiding loss of life and disruption. There are many secure buildings in

the City. However the lesson must be learnt that this is not enough. The whole area must be secure – Docklands is such a place.

Outside of the territorially-focused Canary Wharf security scheme, the LDDC, through liaison with their private security advisors, also deployed a number of foot patrols in the area as well as at other vulnerable target locations within the immediate vicinity such as the London City Airport and the Royal Docks. These patrols were subsequently reduced or intensified in correlation with the perception of the terrorist threat. At this time there were also calls for the LDDC to set up a centralised CCTV scheme connecting a series of public and private schemes. However, institutional problems meant this was never feasible. These were mainly linked to the proposed cost and the short life span of the LDDC (which came to an end on in March 1998), and which left questions marks over revenue funding for such a venture.

An Iron Collar for the Docklands?

The setting up of a 'mini-ring of steel' around the Canary Wharf estate was a prelude to more substantive security changes that were enacted in mid-2006 as a result of a massively enhanced level of terrorist threat, which preceded a 1996 bomb attack.

At 7:01pm on 9 February 1996 a large vehicle borne explosive device left by the Provisional IRA exploded near South Quay railway station, a recently regenerated commercial area in the London Docklands. The site of the bomb was located a quarter of a mile from the Canary Wharf Tower – which felt the blast but was not damaged in the explosion although buildings on a nearby residential estate were badly damaged. Two people were killed and 39 were injured. The bombing marked the end of a 17-month Provisional IRA ceasefire.

In the wake of the bombing, the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police stated, somewhat emotively, that a lack of security was not to blame: 'It would be unfair to describe this as a failure of security. It was a failure of humanity.'[2]

In spite this pronouncement, the bomb immediately began a process of security reassessment with proposals for radical security enhancement, modelled on the City of London, developed to form an *Iron Collar* for the Docklands. Indeed the same firm of engineers that were employed to develop in the City's ring of steel were approached to set up the Docklands scheme. Similar to previous bombings that had occurred in the City, there were fears that high-profile businesses might be tempted to relocate away from the Docklands. As the LDDC chief executive noted in the *Daily Telegraph* 'the scheme is meant to act as a deterrent and make

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2   http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/february/10/newsid_ 2539000/2539265.stm.

Figure 8.3   The Docklands Iron Collar

business and residents feel that measures are in place to prevent a repeat of last month's bomb.'[3]

Subsequently, a security cordon was initiated for the Isle of Dogs (see Figure 8.3). This comprised of four entry points which at times of higher levels of threat assessment, would have armed guards. High-resolution CCTV cameras were also installed. The system was devised so that control of the access points could be manipulated so that Police could undertake physical searches of vehicles entering the cordon rather than relying solely on the electronic monitoring of the driver and vehicle. The scheme was much easier to devise than the ring of steel in the City of London given the small number of entry and exit roads onto the Isle of Dogs.

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3   12 March, 6.

The scheme was a jointly funded venture between London Borough of Tower Hamlets, Canary Wharf Management, LDDC, and Docklands Light Railway. The Metropolitan Police agreed to manage the system when it was installed. In November 1996 a three-week trial period for the scheme passed without any major problems. Like the City of London's ring of steel, there were some objections regarding traffic congestion and civil liberties, given the large residential population. As such, it was argued by local borough council officials that 'extensive consultation would be needed before measures were finally approved – if you are looking at cordoning off the Isle of Dogs you are looking at 11,000 families.'[4] This was also compared to the City of London:

> There is a civil liberties aspect to it. Very few people live in the City, so their ring
> of steel is a completely different ball game from having your picture taken by
> security cameras day-in day-out as you go to and from your home.[5]

However, in general there was unanimous support amongst the business community for the scheme. This opinion was expressed at a series of public meetings where plans for what the LDDC called, in private, the *ring of confidence* were suggested (Coaffee 1996a; 2000b). For example the Chief Operating Officer at Canary Wharf, Gerald Rothman, indicated at this time that the South Quay bomb had only a minor impact on the success of the overall Docklands development. He pointed to the fact that the Isle of Dogs, and specifically Canary Wharf, now has highly advanced security systems, noting that 'tenants appreciate the level of security they enjoy.'[6]

The most noticeable difference between the scheme initiated in the Docklands and that in the City was the *overt advertising* of the Docklands security cordon. Messages such as "security cordon – stop if directed" – were articulated by large signs at entry points into the cordon, instead of downplaying the zones counter-terrorism purpose as in the City (Coaffee 2004). Figure 8.4 shows the large signs at entry points into the cordon.

As previously noted the ring of steel in the City was, in fact not advertised as a security cordon, rather it was promoted as a traffic and environment scheme.

A Ring of Steel for Manchester?

Whereas the City of London and the London Docklands were able to initiate a counter–terrorist scheme relatively easily given the perceived risk of attack and their powerful business communities, other urban areas in the UK did not find it so easy. This was especially true in Manchester in North West England where, on 15 June 1996, the Provisional IRA exploded a 3,300lb bomb outside the Arndale

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4   *Electronic Telegraph*, 12 March 1996.
5   Cited in *The Times*, 12 March 1996.
6   Cited in *Investors Chronicle*, 5 July 1996.

Figure 8.4   Signs at the entry points into the Iron Collar

shopping centre in the central city. This led to the Manchester business community calling for enhanced City of London-style counter-terrorist measures to secure the city's commercial heart against further bomb attacks. As the Chief Executive of the Chamber of Commerce noted the day after the blast:

No economy can stand this sort of disruption and the cost of putting it right. I think the business community will be calling for the sort of secure ring of steel that was put in place after the City of London bombing (cited in Hallsall and Lyle 1996, 6).

He continued by noting the possible impact of the city's commercial life:

The consequences of not doing it could be businesses moving away and shops not reopening. We really do have to react quickly to give the business community confidence (ibid.).

However, upon closer inspection, it was not considered viable to implement such a cordon in Manchester. According to the police:

Calls for a ring of steel were an initial reaction and given the compact nature of the city centre it was considered that it was not the most appropriate measure. A City of London system with entry points is unlikely due to cost. The City of London has a very powerful business community, which helps. That is not saying Manchester doesn't, but not to the same extent (Senior Greater Manchester Police Officer).

Recovery from the attack led to an unprecedented level of urban regeneration activity as Manchester city centre was physically remodelled, creating a series of innovative urban spaces and commercial environments. The cost of such ongoing regeneration has been well in excess of £1 billion (Williams 2003).

The post-bomb regeneration and reconstruction experience in Manchester, as in the City of London in the early part of the 1990s, highlighted the importance of attempting to design-in security features into the new regeneration areas. For example, this occurred eventually in the mid-2000s when vehicle access to the central shopping zone was restricted by retractable bollards. In addition, secure 'standoff' areas were developed for high profile (and hence high target risk) buildings, and bomb proof litter bins were installed as part of the street furniture (Coaffee and Rogers 2008; Coaffee et al 2008a). Such security design interventions were underlined by new management arrangements in terms of city-centre management strategies that had an explicit safety remit, and to the substantially expanded emergency planning remit of the city council in an attempt to increase capacity to respond to similar incidents. The subsequent retrofitting and embedding of an array of safety and security features into regeneration and corporate governance approaches obviously had an additional counter-terrorist purpose, but also boosted the attractiveness of the city centre as a safe and secure commercial district. It will be highlighted in Chapter 10 how such security systems have, over time, been significantly enhanced, drawing on the policing tactics and technologies first deployed in the City of London.

Antecedents of Resilient Planning

Clearly, new security challenges facing many cities in the post-9/11 era have had dramatic effects on the way in which policy-makers and urban planners now conceptualise, practice and manage urban security and develop what we might refer to as 'resilient planning' (Coaffee 2006). Threat-induced responses have been adopted across a range of local institutional stakeholders with roles to play in planning and regulating the governance of urban space. Key stakeholders in the 'resilient city' might include: government – at central, regional and local levels; emergency planners; the police and private security professionals; and a range of private-sector partners and inward investment agencies, and local citizens (Coaffee and Rogers 2008b, 102-3). As Bosher and Coaffee (2008, 146) have argued, the move towards urban resilience incorporates a combination of 'hard' design and 'soft' management options:

> Urban resilience is of growing importance in design, planning and civil engineering and that it should be developed in a transdisciplinary way; incorporating a wide range of stakeholders involved with the structural and non-structural approaches that are required to attain urban resilience.

The question therefore posed, is: how can the emerging resilience agenda of recent years learn from the approaches to designing-out and managing counter-terrorism activities in the City during the 1990s. This question is now turned to.

Designing-out Terrorism in the City

The obsession with urban security in certain global cities has in recent years led architects and planners to design buildings and spaces that are infused with notions of defence and security in residential, retail, leisure and commercial areas according to the preferences of wealthier residents, consumers or businesses. Examples, especially from the United States, but now increasingly from other countries, indicate that 'fortress urbanism' with its walls, security guards, pedestrian partitions, traffic barricades, gates, cameras and other physical measures are now *de rigueur* for creating well defined pockets of urban civility, community and mutual support within an urban landscape that is often perceived as dangerous or unsafe. Indeed, the 'fortress city' approach can be seen as symptomatic of the so-called postmodern city, which has a habit of 'privileging spatial form over social processes' (Harvey 1997, 2). As noted earlier, such design-led approaches have contributed to the segregation and fragmentation of the urban landscape.

This is a similar argument to that used against the ideas of defensible space developed by Oscar Newman in the early 1970s, in which he argued that safer neighbourhoods could be achieved through re-design – an admittedly environmentally deterministic approach. As will be detailed in Chapter 9 and 10, in the post-9/11 context, Newman's ideas are now seen as a cornerstone of new

urban security policies in the US, and increasingly in the UK and other Western countries, to reconfigure existing neighbourhoods and to design new urban spaces in order to reduce the risk of terrorism, alongside structural engineering approaches that use increasingly robust materials.

This is, of course, *not* a new concern. Despite a host of high-profile terror attacks against economic or iconic targets and subsequent militaristic interventions in many Western cities during the 1990s, it is common for scholars and built environment practitioners to maintain that the inception of counter-terrorism design in contemporary cities can be traced to the events of 9/11. While the events on that day were a major catalyst of this agenda, the role of planners and other built environment professionals had previously increased after other terrorist attacks, particularly in the US, from vehicle-borne explosive devices penetrating target buildings: a bomb placed in a parking area below the iconic World Trade Center in February 1993 killed six and injured over 1000 people; and the destruction of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City by a truck bomb in April 1995 killed 168 and injured over 800. These attacks, and others overseas,[7] led to increased attention being paid to the protection of buildings from terrorism (Coaffee and O'Hare 2008).

The 1993 World Trade Center attack horrified the US public which had considered itself relatively immune from acts of terrorism and solicited a swift defensive response with both individual buildings and commercial districts increasingly attempting to design-out terrorism (see Chapter 2). The Oklahoma bombing was perhaps of more significance from a structural engineering viewpoint. In response to that attack, at the time the most devastating act of terrorism committed in America, the US government passed legislation for increased security for federal buildings (Interagency Security Committee 1995) and for the potential for 'bomb-proofing' through greater structural robustness. A great deal of attention was paid to the fact that the Murrah building had been so devastated by the explosion (it collapsed like a pack of cards), with military engineering experts charged with assessing how buildings could be protected in the future. A review of the impact of the Oklahoma bombing detailed how buildings could be 'hardened' and defended, and highlighted the fact that, unlike military facilities, few standards for civilian facilities were available (Hinman and Hammond 1997). As Coaffee and O'Hare (2008, 176) have further highlighted:

> In the wake of these incidents, as the American public became increasingly aware of the threat of 'home-grown' terrorism and the vulnerability of the built environment, the practical response by statutory agencies was rather reactionary, adopting crude but robust approaches to territorial security and once again pursuing the ideas of defensible space as their key *modus operandi*. By

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7   For example, the simultaneous US Embassy bombings in Kenya and Nairobi in August 1998.

extension, the potential role that urban built environment professionals could play in 'terror-proofing' cities became more apparent.

As such in the City of London attempts to design-out terrorism in the 1990s led to the landscape of the Square Mile being significantly altered as attempts were made to reduce the City's vulnerability to further terrorist strikes. Previous methods used to 'design out crime' were adapted and modified in relation to the threat of terrorism. These changes aimed to provide both a secure and attractive place in which the City could grow and compete globally.

During the 1990s within the City, the spatial emphasis of such security approaches served to reinforce the control of space in specific ways. There was a gradual enhancement of security, both in terms of the number and concentration of strategies utilised, as well as in the ever-increasing spatial area where such strategies were focused. Alongside the ring of steel, territorial control was reinforced at the level of the individual building (or in some cases, groups of properties). This occurred through the addition of security measures in order to 'harden' the landscape, and reduce the damage that might be caused by further bombing. This was facilitated, to a degree, by insurance premium discounts for the retrofitting of such measures. Less emphasis at this time was given to the structural robustness of individual buildings, although prophetic accounts regarding the future terror-proofing of cities, placed great emphasis upon the 'target hardening' of architectural structures. For example Martin Pawley (1998, 148) in *Terminal Architecture*, argued that as a result of an upsurge in urban terrorism, especially against 'the highly serviced and vulnerable built environment of the modern world', the new-wave of signature buildings could be replaced by an 'architecture of terror', as a result of security needs. This, he argued, could well have the function of making buildings 'anonymous' and bunkered, and thus, he concluded, a less unattractive terrorist target. Pawley, using examples of 1990s terror attacks in Israel, Sri Lanka, North America, Spain and the UK, further inferred that this 'architecture of terror' would be self-reproducing as planning guidelines once drawn up would be difficult to withdraw. It was implied that such defensive architecture would become 'impossible to resist' once the threat was, in effect, realised through a successful strike.

But such accounts fail to take account of the need to strike a balance between security and effective business functioning, and the fact that militarised design modifications are not always desirable. As has been shown, the City of London began enhancing physical security, but only after the second major bomb in 1993. Prior to this, a ring of steel-solution would have been seen as an over-reaction, and symbolic of the by now stigmatised Belfast-approach to containing the terrorist threat. Indeed the approach eventually adopted was far 'softer' than Pawley might have predicted and was largely carried out on an area basis. This suggested pragmatism on behalf of the Corporation of London with regard to balancing the requirement for needs to counter terrorism with the need to promote the City as the a global financial node.

As will be returned to in the next chapter, the structural residence of individual buildings only became a priority of building owners and tenants in the wake of 9/11 when an increased emphasis was placed upon 'designing-in' counter terrorist features and to buildings and spaces from the concept design stage – as opposed to designing-out terrorism through retrofitted security elements.

Subsequently, as a result of enhanced security strategies the City was perceived by many to be a fortress, a *cordon sanitaire,* intended to produce a safe working environment. As one commentator put it just after the ring of steel was implemented:

> Motorists attempting to cross the City are getting used to closed access routes and diversions ... and few would be surprised if they were stopped at a road block by a policeman toting a sub-machine gun: welcome to Fortress London, 1993 (Pratt 1993, 20).

This view however is not an accurate reflection of the situation that developed. It is infused with the rhetoric emanating from cities where the territorial control of space is seen first and foremost in terms of the division and segregation of the urban landscape into mutually hostile units. The 'fortress London' idea was also a reflection, promoted in the media, of the parallels that were frequently drawn between the City's attempts to deter terrorism and those strategies employed in 1970s Belfast.

The City's ring of steel in this sense was far more *symbolic* as it did not rely on overt fortressing approaches to become part of the physical landscape. This approach exemplifies a less well-documented notion of territoriality – a 'landscape of symbols' – where territorial boundaries are reinforced through the often subtle manipulation of space through landscape artefacts strategically positioned within an area to demarcate space and influence movement patterns. This represented a return to the underlying principles of early CPTED practices. In the City's situation this involved measures such as such as road closures, police checkpoints, pedestrianisation and tactically positioned CCTV cameras. That said, altering the spatial configuration of the built environment developed the impression of a highly defended landscape employed by, or on behalf of, powerful groups in an effort to create territoriality but without the obtrusiveness of highly visible security.

This inquiry has also illuminated another important aspect of the fortress urbanism approach, namely to question the assumption that increased physical security will generate increased feelings of safety. During the mid-1990s a number of pieces of research have increasingly suggested that fortified landscapes, which are designed to reduce fear, can in fact exacerbate the fear of living, or working, in a particular part of a city (see for example Ellin 1997). In the City, this relationship – between fear and form – was critical after the 1993 bomb when there were calls for Belfast-style security measures to be adopted. Despite the development of a powerful pro-security discourse, the need for proactive security enhancement was tempered by the realisation that radical security measures could be detrimental to the image of the area and could generate anxiety in business communities. As a

result, the decision was taken not to construct a militarised landscape, especially given the efforts of both the City and Central Government at this time to promote London internationally. Despite this decision there were some complaints from leading businesses, especially during the Provisional IRA ceasefire period, that the ring of steel was still a powerful symbol of the risk of terrorism and that it should be completely removed. However, this view soon changed after the 1996 Docklands bomb when most businesses in the City favoured the ring of steel staying and being extended, coupled with further defensive adaptations to the landscape to deter the terrorist threat.

Importantly though, despite the pro-security agenda pushing forward the construction and subsequent expansion of the ring of steel, the Corporation of London, for both legal reasons and in an attempt to remove counter-terrorist references from the City's landscape, continually justified the ring of steel in relation to unintended improvements in traffic flow, reductions in atmospheric pollutants and falling levels of crime (Chapter 7). As previously noted, the ring of steel was initially referred to as the 'experimental traffic scheme' with prominence given to the opportunities the terrorist threat had inadvertently presented to the City in terms of enhancing the environmental quality of the street scene. For example, in November 1993 the Corporation noted, in relation to the development of the ring of steel, that 'great care will need to be taken with the works that are to be carried out where they impact on conservation areas and listed buildings and their settings, to ensure that the townscape in general, and these aspects in particular, are enhanced'.[8] Later, after the Docklands bomb, the ring of steel was officially referred to as the 'Traffic and Environment Zone'.

Strengthening the City's Position through New Institutionalism

Whilst the design of the built environment is of great importance in developing increased defence against terrorism; equally important are managerial issues. As with the 'fortress city', normative assumptions are also widespread in the field of urban governance. For example, a number of commentators have drawn attention to the dangers of uncritically using terms like 'institutional thickness' and 'institutional capacity' assuming that economic competitiveness is necessarily dependent upon successful partnerships and, that these relationships are politically neutral. Whilst inter-agency co-operation is often an important facet of developing a 'competitive edge', institutional relations also reflect broader urban power relations. In particular, it has been argued that within the development and deployment of urban policy agendas certain elite-driven 'voices' become dominant than others.

The preceding chapters exemplify a number of these aspects of contemporary governance: the merging of local and global contexts of action; strategic collaboration between key stakeholders to achieve mutual benefit; and the marginalisation of less powerful 'voices' by dominant discourses.

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8   Minutes of the Policy and Resources Committee, 11 November 1993.

It was argued that the City's counter-terrorism effort was a response not only to the localised risk of terrorism against the Square Mile, but also a reaction to London-wide agendas which were advanced by Central Government. In the early 1990s the increasing business involvement in the place promotion of London, and in particular the place of the City within this overall schema, meant that the Corporation of London, often through the work of Michael Cassidy, the chairman of its Policy and Resources Committee, began to become involved with London-wide initiatives and partnerships for the first time in decades. The City established new institutional relationships with the neighbouring Boroughs as well as Central Government, as the importance of promoting London as a world city began to permeate all aspects of London governance. Thus, when the ring of steel was suggested, it was promoted not just as increasing security for the City but also as beneficial to the reputation of London, as a whole, in the wake of terrorist attacks.

Given the broader geographic context of economic global terrorism in the early mid-1990s, London was not seen as being at greater risk than its economic rivals. Indeed, the ring of steel became a very visible symbol that, in the City, the agencies of security and the political authorities were *actively* responding to the threat in a *positive* way. The perception the City tried to convey at this time was that they were better prepared than their economic competitors to both deter bombings or to cope with the aftermath of a successful terrorist strike: in other words, that they had greater resilience.

The counter-terrorism measures put in place, far from decreasing the City's attractiveness as a financial centre as the Provisional IRA had hoped, in fact meant that the City could maintain, and even enhance, its global economic standing. Indeed, it was not long after the ring of steel was constructed that the landscape changes that occurred in the City were shown as improving the quality of life in place promotional material for London. Given concerns in many of the world's larger cities that terrorism could adversely affect their attractiveness to inward investment, the London Chamber of Commerce's 1994 and 1996 *Invest in London* publications both highlighted the ring of steel as being a key contributor to the enhanced feeling of safety in London, thus leading to an increase in 'business confidence'. As a spokesman for the London Chamber of Commerce further stated 'we feel safe inside the cordon and want to feel part of its inner sanctum'.[9] We might therefore view the ring of steel as purely a public relations exercise that aimed to increase the attractiveness of the City and limit the potential exodus of international firms who were fearful of further terrorist attacks. This trend has continued today with high levels of counter-terrorist security displayed by the City being highlighted in London-wide business investment brochures (*Think London* 2007).

Whilst the construction of the ring of steel in the 1990s undoubtedly allowed London to continue its 'internationalisation',[10] the ever more cosmopolitan business community also made the Square Mile an increasingly attractive terrorist target,

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9   Cited in Gusmaroli (1993, 1).
10   See Jacobs (1993).

not just for the Provisional IRA, but for other terrorist groups. This illustrates how global political conflicts were capable of being played out in London's financial core (or other global cities) due to its array of foreign firms and the ability of the mass media to publicise such attacks. For example, the two main bombs in the City in 1992 and 1993 were not just targeted at symbols of the British establishment such as the Bank of England, but at 'nervous' foreign investors. The tactics of the Provisional IRA at this time were directly related to the underlying political climate. They aimed to undermine confidence in the Square Mile's reputation as a safe international business centre particularly by threatening its position within European finance. In short, the economy dictated the target, whilst the political situation determined the timing of attack. The response to these concerns came in the form of the ring of steel.

Strategic Collaboration and the Ring of Steel as a Negotiated Statement

As noted above, during the late 1980s and early 1990s the City's business community, and in particular the Corporation of London, began to take a lead role within the new governance structures of London. This involved increasingly entrepreneurial approaches to obtaining inward investment, as well as the development of institutional links both within the City, and between the Corporation, the London Boroughs and, Central Government.

The mobilisation of counter-terrorist strategies in the City served to illuminate the increasing significance of institutional context within local decision-making. In particular, it showed that a shared discourse and strategic collaboration amongst institutions and organisations is often central to urban policy and planning decisions. With regard to the setting up of the ring of steel, liaison between a number of stakeholders occurred. The police and private security personnel, planners, designers, politicians, business interests and environmentalists – together discussed how best to design a landscape that would deter terrorism, whilst maintaining and enhancing the attractiveness of the City as a place of business. The development, and maintenance, of this strong local 'institutional thickness', co-ordinated through the Corporation of London, was also essential in creating the 'capacity' to develop the ring of steel quickly, and with minimal interference from external influences.

Localisation in this context was seen as an institutional strategy which attempted, through the shared frames of reference of the key urban stakeholders, to maintain the City's strong global economic position. By the mid-1990s the City contained more than 561 foreign banks, 170 foreign security houses and 185 corporate headquarters. It also contains 37 per cent of the largest corporate headquarters in Europe.[11] This capacity-building potential was based on a number of principles. First, the unanimous financial and political backing of the Corporation of London,

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11   Figure obtained from the Corporation of London, Economic Development Unit, in 1997.

second, co-ordination between the police, businesses and the Corporation; and thirdly, 'political will' as illustrated by the dynamism and vision of certain key urban managers. Of particular note is the contribution of Michael Cassidy, the chairman of the Corporation's Policy and Resources committee, during the mid-late 1990s.[12] Cassidy became the mouth-piece for the City with regard to counter-terrorism security, but his contribution should be seen within the wider context of his role in London-wide agendas. As Hebbert (1998, 121) noted:

> Cassidy became the first City councilman within historical memory to acquire a London-wide political reputation. Without his statesmanship the Corporation might not have shaken off its introversion, and London's tissue of collaboration and partnership would have looked much weaker.

In relation to counter-terrorism, Cassidy was the primary co-ordinator of the pressure put on the Government to get involved with terrorism insurance and organised the City's response to the second bombing in 1993, liaising with business communities and 'brokering deals' with neighbouring borough councils and Central Government to facilitate the development of the ring of steel.[13]

The changes in the physical form of the landscape were not just down to the Corporation of London. They were the result of the action of different institutional groupings who strategically collaborated in support of security enhancement. Oscar Newman (1980) coined the term 'community of interest' to refer to the importance of community development and cohesion in tackling crime. Likewise management scientists (see for example, Wenger and Synder 2000) often refer to a 'community of practice' (CoP) – networks that are formed with an explicit focus on problem-solving, knowledge exchange or developing innovative or creative practices. Here a CoP can be characterised by *joint enterprise* which is negotiated by its members and *mutual engagement* that bind members together into a social entity. This allows *collective action* to ensue.

The subsequent form and function of the ring of steel can therefore be seen as a negotiation between a number of powerful interests leading to a cooperative response. This also evokes Ray Pahl's (1970) urban managerialist notion that the built environment evolves as a result of conflicts between key urban managers with different degrees of power to shape socio-spatial outcomes. In particular, the different strategies of the Corporation of London (localisation for globalisation), the City Police (the territorial control of space) and the insurance industry (risk spreading) led to the Square Mile being viewed in different ways – as a 'reputational area', a terrorist target to be defended, and a risk 'hotspot' that requires 'cooling' through risk and insurance distribution. The resulting security

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12   Prior to this Cassidy had been the chair of the Corporation's planning committee, and was instrumental in giving permission for the building of much of the new office stock (including Broadgate) in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

13   See also Ashworth (1996).

measures were, in large part, a result of the arbitration between these strategies. In addition, considerations of heritage, cost, legality, and public opinion (to an extent) also served to influence how the ring of steel subsequently developed in both form and function, though these were minor.

Negotiation was also required to deal with the associated geographical effects related to the displacement of the risk of terrorism and enhanced traffic flows to areas around the edges of the ring of steel. Within the City, complaints from prominent businesses led to assurances from the City Police that additional policing would take place in the so-called 'collar zone'. When similar complaints were made from the neighbouring boroughs, or from civil liberty groups, little change or accommodation was forthcoming from the Corporation of London whose predominant concern was for the sustained functioning and reputation of the Square Mile.

Outside discourses that emerged to challenge the powerful 'City' position through the statutory consultation process, for a while at least, had the potential to undermine the wishes of the Corporation of London to construct a permanent ring of steel by forcing a statutory public inquiry. Ultimately, however, negotiation between these interest groups, the Corporation and Central Government (leading to Memorandums of Understanding) meant that opposing voices had little impact on the overall construction and extension of the ring of steel, and the associated security initiatives employed. The City was accused of paying only 'lip-service' to consultation about ideas that it had effectively already decided to implement.

This case, like much prior and subsequent urban governance research, exemplifies the increasingly apparent trend in Western cities for the agendas of local governance to be controlled by a dominant and powerful elite of businesses and political interests, which recognises, but then marginalises, other competing discourses. This highlighted how ultimately, diversity of meaning was minimised in favour of dominant and powerful representations about the actions and outcomes required.

Risk, Security and the Protectionist Reflex

The City of London's counter-terrorism agenda exemplifies how the concept of risk has the power to shape the form and meaning of urban landscapes. Further, risk theory has also shown how insurance mechanisms increasingly attempt to distribute risk and contribute to the prevalence of fortified risk-adverse landscapes, often as a result of 'insurance redlining'. Indeed, in *World Risk Society* (1999, 153), Beck argued that in such vulnerable areas a 'protectionist reflex' is evoked where a 'withdrawal into the safe haven of territoriality becomes an intense temptation.'

It has been shown that whilst the ring of steel was seen as a 'comfort blanket' by many businesses, financial security in the form of terrorism insurance was also vital in maintaining the profile of the City in the global market place. This was conceptualised in a number of distinct stages in Chapter 6: emergent risk;

reflecting on local terrorist risk; transferring the risk nationally; concentrating the risk in the City; fluctuating risk, and alternative risk sharing mechanisms. These stages showed the different ways in which the UK insurance industry attempted to distribute the financial risk of further bombings away from the City – first, through the threat of withdrawing from the market; and second, through the insurance industry, in collaboration with the Corporation of London, pressurising the Government to underwrite terrorism insurance. This occurred amidst predictions that the insurability of the City would further jeopardise the recession-hit economy. It was feared this would make the City an unattractive area in terms of occupancy and investment. Subsequently, the zoning policies of the insurance industry helped establish and, attempt to distribute financial risk away from the City whilst also creating a risk hot-spot in the Square Mile. The dangers of economic exposure therefore became one of the catalysts for the ring of steel. The City's security cordon was therefore seen as a vital risk management measure, allowing a number of major businesses, and indeed the Corporation of London to remain insurable.

As a result of terrorist risk the insurance industry began to have an increasing influence as a regulator of the urban landscape of the City. They did this by offering not insignificant premium reductions on terrorism policies for the retrofitting of security devices and the development of advanced crisis recovery and security planning. The measures encouraged by the insurers were important in reinforcing the centrally organised security strategies of the police and Corporation of London, as well as contributing to the overall culture of security within the Square Mile.

This inquiry thus far, has illuminated a number of facets related to the changing way risk is managed within contemporary society, and in particular, how risk management is now embedded into social and institutional structures. In recent years, increased institutional demands for risk-related knowledge have occurred, most notably by insurers, who have been under increased economic pressure to minimise liability. Subsequently, judging risk is now undertaken by a plethora of institutions, all acting in their own interests and all focusing on the fear of 'bad' risks. In this sense Beck (1999, 16) argued that 'risk-sharing' can increasingly become a 'powerful basis of community', which can have 'territorial aspects'. Risk-sharing 'further involves the taking of responsibility, which again implies conventions and boundaries around a risk community that shares the burden' (ibid.). Here the active attempts to involve local businesses in collaborative security ventures – as exemplified by the CameraWatch and Pager-Alert schemes – highlight how new modes of security governance are taking effect. Ultimately this is one where responsibility for risk is seen as a shared concern. This connects to broader ideas of *risk society* where Governments and institutions begin to lose their ability to manage contemporary risk, and by which new modes of governmentality are developed as a wide range of stakeholders are drawn into collective and personal risk management through a process of 'responsibilisation' (Rose 2000).

Dislocating the City from London

The overall spatial imprinting of risk, defence and new governance agendas in the City of London during the 1990s led to a juxtaposition of landscapes of power with defence. As John Urry (2002, 64) highlighted, the ring of steel provides a 'physical and symbolic separation' between 'wild' and 'tame' zones, developing a powerful 'city of control'. The justification for such a situation has traditionally been one of a 'state of exception', that is, the abnormal circumstances created as a result of war or national emergency. Giorgio Agamben more recently has provided a comprehensive analysis of this concept, arguing that it has now become 'the dominant paradigm of government in contemporary politics' (2005, 2) with the displacement of the law by authority.

As such, the creation of the City's counter-terrorism defences can be viewed as 'exceptional', though also contextualised within the more extensive transformations that occurred within the City's urban landscape at this time, regarding to its global positioning and importance to 'UK Plc'. The City is an area that has always displayed its might globally through its built form, as well as locally, through an asymmetry of power with the neighbouring boroughs, creating what Sharon Zukin (1992) termed a 'landscape of power'. In the City, notions of power and defence formed an uneasy, yet essential relationship, as displays of economic power increasingly incorporated defensive notions of surveillance and social control. The ring of steel symbolically and functionally served to institutionalise further the separation of the City from its neighbours, through the physical imposition of advanced security measures and access restrictions. This formed a 'landscape of defence', which provided a reliable background to everyday life through formal and informal defensive strategies enacted for a variety of social, economic and political reasons. However, as has also been noted, the City historically has always displayed such notions of power and defence, and in this context, the response to the terrorist threat should be seen merely as the latest attempt by the City to defend itself physically, as well as economically. In particular, just as the 1990s ring of steel provides many of the antecedents for the post-9/11 city (as will be unpacked in Chapter 9), so too the encircling Roman defensives and the mediaeval system of walls and gates in place until the eighteenth century, served as historical antecedents for the ring of steel.

The impact of landscapes of power and defence can be graphically illustrated by the contrasts between the built form and economic power of the City, and its surrounding areas, which are often characterised by low-income housing. In the mid-1990s, the City, surrounded by the ring of steel, was situated cheek-by-jowl with some of the poorest and marginalised communities in Britain.[14] This illustrated

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14   This of course is not a new feature of cities, with similar analogies relating to the tendency of the built environment to fragment into pockets of rich and poor, being commonly made about Western cities (Chapter 2).

the paradoxical condition of increased global connectivity existing alongside increased local disconnection – a condition that was reinforced by the ring of steel, which exacerbated this separation between the City and its surrounds. In short, the ring of steel can be seen as an attempt to both physically and symbolically keep the City 'in the City'.

The development of the ring of steel and its impact on the fragmentation of the centre of London occurred at the same time as the institutional relationships between the City and the surrounding boroughs had never been better. This is exemplified by the new institutional networks and collaborative efforts being developed between the local authorities in central London. On the one hand therefore, the City was engaging with the London boroughs for the mutual benefits it could bring to London as a whole, whilst on the other hand; it was disengaging and protecting itself without significant consideration of the knock-on effect on other geographical areas.

Conclusion: The Everyday Security-scape of the City

Urban researchers are increasingly aware that processes which occur in one city are locally specific, and should not be mapped uncritically onto other areas. Great stress is also now placed on the multiple discourse communities that exist within cities, as well as upon local circumstances of place, noting that general urban transformations are occurring unevenly in different cities. In this Chapter the case of the City of London has been theoretically situated to avoid such normative assumptions.

It has been argued that the strategies by which the City adapted to the risk of terrorism were contingent upon local histories and geographies, and in particular by a combination of time dependent processes acting within, and upon, this defined geographical area. These processes provided the 'frames of reference' – the specific socio-economic, political and institutional context – in which the key urban managers operated, and which served to enable and constrain their actions and strategies.

Whilst recognising the inherent difficulties of transplanting the analysis of the City's response to terrorist attack in the 1990s into broader urban debates, a number of findings from this work illuminate the generic issues around a number of defensive urban landscapes and urban processes: approaches to 'hardening' landscapes; the relationship between landscape form and fear; the influence of new institutional mechanisms and strategic collaborations in urban planning and policy decision-making; how certain landscapes are seen as global reference points; how urban form can be seen as a negotiated statement between powerful urban actors and their differing agendas; how defensive measures and insurance policy are increasingly important regulators of the urban landscape; and how defended enclaves increasingly contribute to the spatial restructuring of the city. These are debates which were ongoing through the 1990s have been especially

prevalent after 9/11. However, these are often articulated, not as some form of protectionist reflex, but in terms of a more proactive and anticipatory resiliency approach (Coaffee 2005).

The City's initial response to terrorism in the 1990s was very much related to the time-period of the attacks during the early 1990s when prime economic sites were targeted. In particular, in 1988 there was a clear shift in Provisional IRA strategy towards attacking 'economic' targets in England. The detonation of large bombs in the City in 1992 and 1993, as well as a number of other attempts against this area, demonstrated the Provisional IRA's recognition of the important place of the City in the national and global economy.

Since the early 1990s, a number of attempts to design-out terrorism have been introduced in the Square Mile, including physical barriers to restrict access, advanced electronic surveillance in the form of three interrelated cameras networks and insurance regulations and blast protection measures, as well as innumerable lower-scale measures that were operationalised by activating individual and community responses. The City, by the beginning of the new millennium, had well over 1,500 surveillance cameras operating in the Square Mile most notably 52 high resolution Automatic Number Plate Recognition cameras which are situated strategically around the area (City of London Police 2002b).

In addition, as a result of the terrorist threat, new governance arrangements have been developed within the City, as well as *between* the Corporation of London, surrounding local authorities and Central Government. These new 'institutional pillars', necessitated by the terrorist risk, served to reinforce the City's economic position at a time when the leaders of the Square Mile were being criticised for failing to keep pace with the rapid changes in the global economy.

Through the development of a series of defensive strategies the City put itself in a better position to prevent another major bombing incident or at least to mitigate the impact of a blast through increased preparedness. The security arrangements were judged a success, at least at a corporate level, not only because they have, to date, prevented a third major bomb which would have significantly effected the City's international reputation, but ironically also because of the positive by-products of the scheme which saw crime, atmospheric pollution and traffic congestion and accidents decrease, and major improvements made in business disaster recovery planning. However, the identity of the City has been irreparably changed by terrorist attack and as a consequence of its counter-response. It became seen as a place where the demands of the global finance industry have been merged with a culture of security to create a successful and safe working environment.

The counter-terrorist security strategies employed in the City of London have been subject to both praise and criticism. At the end of the 1990s Michael Cassidy, the chief architect of the City's effort to 'beat the bombers', summed up the ring of steel in the by noting the cordon's advantages both for business confidence and the enhancement of environmental quality. It was, he stated:

> Totally positive in all areas. It's given people an extra comfort factor. The trend of banks coming here was not interrupted at all by the last two bombs. In fact the strength of the trend has built up ever since … None [of the business] left for security reasons. The typical City worker finds that the environment is better and from that point of view they wouldn't want to see it go. Not now.

This, however, only tells part of the story. It is also important to recognise the associated effects of traffic and risk to bordering areas, the concerns of civil liberty groups about the privatisation of public space, and the paternalistic way in which the scheme was constructed without many felt, was adequate consultation.

The threat of terrorism that the City faced during the early 1990s increasingly has sought to focus attention on how the Corporation has adapted to modern conditions, and maintained its influence within global finance. The ring of steel helped the City to create a secure platform from which it could continue to develop and adapt its role as the financial heart of a 'global city'. The City embraced inclusion in the globalisation process whilst at the same time excluding itself from the rest of central London through territorial boundedness and fortification strategies.

For the majority of occupiers in the City, the counter-terrorist strategy has been viewed positively. Statistically, though the ring of steel appeared to be more concerned with crime prevention. For example, Rosen (2002) argued that the CCTV operation in the City has never caught any terrorists and in fact 'most of their time [is spent] following car thieves and traffic offenders'. By 1998, 340 arrests were made and 359 stolen vehicles had been triggered by the ANPR CCTV system, all non-terrorist related (Graham and Marvin 2002). Figures for 2001/02 highlighted that over 12,000 'offences' were detected using this CCTV system with over 6,000 prosecutions made. The PACE Act led to over 3,500 person and vehicle searches and over 1,000 arrests (City of London Police 2002a). Additionally in August 2002 it was announced that in the preceding 18 months City Police officers had stopped more than 1,800 people under the anti-terrorists legislation compared with 1056 in the previous period. However only 52 arrests were made, up from 13.

These wider applications of the ring of steel in the City means that measures have remained a concrete part of the contemporary urban landscape in the Square Mile. Just as importantly from a public and social policy viewpoint, the ring of steel was 'normalised' and accepted and is seen by business coalitions, motoring organisation, commuters, residents, neighbouring local authorities as simply part of London's daily life. However, both areas became disconnected, physically and technologically, from the rest of London through the development of territorial security cordons creating a condition of 'splintered urbanism' (Graham and Marvin 2001; see also Coaffee 2000; 2004).

Entering the new millennium the City of London's counter-terrorist operations were an integral part of the 'offer' to potential and existing investors and tenants. As will be highlighted in the next chapter, the events of 9/11 have subsequently

served to reinforce the attributes of such territorial approaches to security. The next chapter will highlight the response of the City Police and the Corporation of London (and London authorities more generally) to the events of 9/11, as well as critically analysing many of the discourses surrounding the future of cities *per se* that this wholly unprecedented event has generated.

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Chapter 9
Terrorism and Future Urbanism
in the Wake of 9/11

Introduction

The attacks of 9/11 were unique, both in terms of the combination of tactics employed – the simultaneous high-jacking of planes and the targeting of iconic buildings by aircrafts which were used as missiles, as well as the intensity of the damage caused and insurance losses accumulated. 9/11 also brought to the fore wider concerns about different types of 'postmodern' or 'catastrophic' terrorism (Laqueur 1996; Carter et al. 1998), and of a society based on living with an acceptable degree of risk and danger (Ewald 1993; Lianos and Douglass 2000; Beck 2002). In the post-9/11 era it is generally accepted that the nature of potential terrorist threats has changed, requiring alteration in counter responses from Governments and agencies of security at all spatial scales; from defence of localities to the developments of international coalitions to fight the global 'War on Terrorism'. Moreover, discussions in the wake of 9/11 served to highlight the links between new forms of defensive urbanism, strategically targeted terrorism (using chemical, biological or nuclear products) and military threat-response technology.

In the post-9/11 world, reconceptualised terrorist realities led, in some cases, to new and dramatic urban counter-responses based on Belfast and LA-style fortification as well as increasing use being made of sophisticated military technology. At the urban scale a number of accounts highlighted how the events of 9/11 served to influence the technological and physical infrastructure of targeted cities so 'urban flows can be scrutinized through military perspectives so that the inevitable fragilities and vulnerabilities they produce can be significantly reduced' (Graham 2002a, 589). Whereas previously the tendency amongst those who were (or feared they were going to be) attacked was to evoke protectionist reflexes based on securing a particular spatial area, after 9/11 securitisation strategies expanded to incorporate international co-operation and attempts to generate a global consensus for tackling the global terrorist threat. At this broader spatial scale, there were, at the time, also calls for less statist approaches to International Relations research given the truly global magnitude of terrorist networks and the worldwide impact of potential attack. In this sense, using a territorial analogy, the immediate calls for action after 9/11 were on one hand *de*territorialised responses focusing on the necessity for international action – whilst on the other hand, a *re*territorialisation

also occurred as states' looked inward at 'homeland security' and in particular at defence of the city (Coaffee and Murakami Wood 2006).

This chapter tries to draw these *de*territorial and *re*territorial discussions together by illustrating accounts from a variety of academic traditions to critically highlight the rethinking of urbanism in the immediate post-9/11 era. It does this first by looking at calls for a global governance to be established to combat a growing global terrorist threat. The chapter then focuses specifically on the urban scale to expose the immediate reactions of commentators regarding the shape and function of the future (global) city. It does this through the reintroduction of ideas of defensible space and advanced technological 'fixes' which were viewed as solutions to the immediate threat of terror after 9/11. The predicted social and political impacts of urban defences after 9/11 are also discussed. The final part of this chapter focuses specifically upon the impact of 9/11 on the functioning of the Square Mile where an urgent reappraisal of counter-terrorism, and then a subsequent bolstering of security, occurred in the immediate aftermath of 9/11.

Deterritorialising Risk after 9/11

Traditionally, terrorist incidents regularly provoked a territorial security response leading to a separation between supposedly 'safe and 'unsafe' areas. Whereas the events of 9/11 provoked similar responses from agencies of security and urban managers, there was also a stark realisation that traditional counter-terrorism mechanisms were insufficient to deal with the new terrorist threats. This was especially the case in the fields of sociology and cultural studies. Zygmunt Bauman (2002, 81) for example highlighted the impact of 9/11 as the 'symbolic end to an era of space.' He argued that until recently, security had been inherently linked to territorial boundedness and the power to influence access into a particular space or area. Despite the realisation that territorial borders, be they related to spaces or nation states, have been considered less important for a long time, he argued it was only with 9/11 that this became widely accepted:

> This is all over now and has been for some considerable time – but that it is indeed over has become dazzlingly evident only since 11 September. The events of 11 September made it obvious that no one can any longer cut themselves off from the rest of the world (ibid., 82).

He continued by noting that international coalitions to deal with this threat were essential:

> Annihilation of the protective capacity of space is a double-edged sword: no one can hide from the blows, and blows can be plotted from however enormous a distance. Places no longer protect, however strongly they are armed or fortified, nor do they give foolproof advantage to their occupiers. Strength and weakness,

threat and security have become now, essentially extraterritorial issues that evade territorial solutions (ibid., 82).

In a similar vein John Urry (2002, 58) also argued that 9/11 showed that 'globalization is never complete' and that 'it is disordered, full of paradox and the unexpected and of irreversible and juxtaposed complexity.' Indeed he argued that the linear conception of scale from local to global should be replaced by a concept of 'complex mobile connection'; what he termed 'wild and safe zones' have become 'highly proximate through the curvatures in space-time.'

These concepts were further enriched by Ulrich Beck who articulated the 9/11 events in terms of newly emerging aspects of his world risk society thesis and noted that: 'It is not a matter of the increase, but rather of the de-bounding of uncontrollable risk' (Beck 2002, 41). Indeed, he highlighted this in terms of a universalising of fear of terrorist attack, whereby the politics of fear would be crucial in developing responses to what is seen as an *inevitable* attack:

> Terrorism operating on a global scale has opened a new chapter in world risk society. A clear distinction must be made between the attack itself and the terrorist threat which becomes universal as a result of it. What is politically crucial is ultimately not the risk itself but the perception of the risk. What men fear to be real is real in its consequences – fear creates its own reality (ibid. 2001, 41).

Beck (2002, 46) further noted, like Bauman and Urry, that 'national security is no longer national security as borders … have been overthrown'. National security is therefore seen in terms of co-operation for the management of 'uncontrollable risks': 'Uncontrollable risks must be understood as not being linked to place, that is they are difficult to impute to a particular agent and can hardly be controlled on the level of the nation state' (ibid., 50).

Beck argued that global terrorism had actually accelerated globalisation through the globalisation of politics, and that the central tenant of neo-liberal economics – that the role of the nation state will reduce and that economics will become more influential than politics – is 'exposed' by 9/11:

> The terrorist attacks on America were the Chernobyl of globalization. Just as the Russian disaster undermined our faith in nuclear energy, so September 11th exposes the false promise of neo-liberalism (ibid., 47).

He further added that 'suddenly the necessity of statehood, the counter principle of neoliberalism, is omnipresent' (ibid., 48). Beck argued that in order for states to defend themselves from global terrorism, they must 'denationalize and transnationalize' themselves' (ibid., 48) rather than becoming inward looking and statist. The inherent danger Beck noted was that 'surveillance states' would be generated which could:

… threaten to use the new power of cooperation to build themselves into fortress states, in which security and military concerns will loom large and freedom and democracy will shrink' and in particular 'attempt to construct a western citadel against the numinous 'Other' (ibid., 49).

Beck instead promoted the antithesis of surveillance states – the 'cosmopolitan' state … founded upon the recognition of the otherness of the other' (ibid, 49) although clearly this has failed to materialise. Worryingly, the new ethics of risk that emerged in the post-9/11 period appears to facilitate a kind of pre-emptive protectionism where richer nations manage conflict by securing access to national resources (particularly energy) that would spark these conflicts (Greenburg et al. 2007).

Furthermore, after 9/11 the uncontrollable terrorist risks faced and subsequent *de*territorialisation of risk profiles had inevitable and dramatic effects on financial markets in general, and specifically upon insurance markets, with the boundaries of private insurability 'dissolving' (Beck 2002, 50). As Kirsch (2001) argued 'the insurance crisis actually reflects more about the risks we are living with now, including terrorism: namely, that in a society forced increasingly to share risks that are, in a sense, uninsurable.'

Beck also pointed to the deep social consequences of facing up to living within the *new* contours of the world risk society, and particularly the threat of attack derived from advances in science and technology:

> But the most horrifying connection is that all the risk conflicts that are stored away as potential could now be unintentionally released. Every advance in gene technology to nanotechnology opens up a 'Pandora's box' that could be used as a terrorist toolkit. Thus the terrorist threat has made everyone into a disaster movie scriptwriter, now condemned to imagine the effects of a home-made atomic bomb assembled with the help of gene or nanotechnology; of the collapse of global computer networks by the introduction of groups of viruses and so on (Beck 2002, 46).

Beck continued by arguing that 9/11 has increased the perceived prospect of *new* forms of terrorist attack:

> There is a sinister perspective for the world after September 11th. It is that uncontrolled risk is now irredeemable and deeply engineered into all the processes that sustain life in advanced societies. Pessimism then seams to be the only rational stance. But this is a one sided and therefore truly misguided view. It ignores the new terrorism. It is dwarfed by the sheer scale of the new opportunities opened up by today's threats that is the axis of conflict in the world risk society.

In this sense some argued that we must be, if threat predictions were to be believed, prepared for life in a constant state of emergency (Wood et al. 2003). This was especially the case in important urban areas where a combination of iconic structures and high levels of media exposure would generate spectacular devastation and loss of reputation if a further large scale terror attack were successful.

Exposing the Future City

In the immediate aftermath of 9/11 there was much speculation in relation to both the militarisation of financial centres and of civil society – for example through the construction of security cordons, exclusion zones, *cordon sanitaires*, ever expanding CCTV networks around strategic sites, as well as the 'surge' in the fortressing of residential environments and public spaces. However, as Stephen Graham (2001, 411) pointed out, such 'old defensive responses … seem almost comically irrelevant in this new age of threat.'

In the immediacy of the 9/11 attack the rhetoric was very much that of 'cities under siege' (Catterall 2001), or of cities as target (Bishop and Clancey 2004), especially those, like London, strategically placed in the global economy. Security, in this sense, became *re*territorialised to focus on the 'homeland' and its critical national infrastructure, and which would usher in changes for everyday life. Mike Davis (2001a, 389), for example, in an article on *The Future of Fear* argued that fear and a reduction in civil liberties will ensue, especially in American cities where 'deep anxieties about their personal safety may led millions of otherwise humane Americans to invest in the blind trust of the revamped National Security State.'

As I have argued elsewhere (Coaffee and Murakami Wood 2006, 514), the concept of security has 'come home.' In other words the discourses, procedures and material examples of national and international security were seen to be influencing or were directly employed at smaller urban scales. However, at the same time, the threats were positioned as global, and 'terrorism' – or now more commonly simply 'terror' – has led to the dispersion of security responsibilities to all levels of government through a host of generic social policies. In particular, a merging of crime prevention, anti-social behaviour measures and security within an array of policy agendas, underpinned by the rhetoric that we were living in a changing, uncertain and dangerous world, led to serious questions regarding civil liberties and the extent to which Western democracies are moving towards security states and surveillance societies. Here, for example, Wekerle and Jackson (2005) have argued numerous policies were 'hitchhiking' on the anti-terrorism agenda and being implicitly and were explicitly embedded within numerous social and planning policies.

Defensible Space Revisited

After the 9/11 attacks a militarised perspective enveloped urban security agendas in many western cities, with 'military and geopolitical security penetrate[ing] utterly into practices surrounding governance, design and planning of cities and region' (Graham 2002a, 589). This was, initially at least, a reactionary and *ad hoc* response. As one commentator noted:

> In the rush to respond to the threat of terrorism, a loose network of public officials, architects, developers, engineers, lawyers, planners, security consultants, and others who influence building codes are creating a new generation of planning and design regulations (Dixon 2002, 1)

However, 9/11 also signalled a surge in ongoing trends towards an ever increasingly militarised city. As Warren (2002, 614) noted 'it is misleading to assume that these military and paramilitary operations in urban centres began on September 11':

> Rather than a cause, the 'War on Terrorism' has served as a prism being used to conflate and further legitimize dynamics that already were militarizing urban space. These include the revision of long standing military doctrine to accept and rationalize multiple threats within the urban terrain; turning vast areas of cities into zones of video and electronic surveillance; and the repression and control of mass citizen political mobilization in cities. These phenomena have expanded and deepened in the aftermath of September 11.

Some commentators at this time argued that perhaps it was time that planners, developers and architects began to consider safety and damage limitation against terrorism when designing cities, particularly in relation to individual structures that, in many cases, were ill-prepared to withstand a bomb blast (Hall 2001; Coaffee 2003). There were also concerns raised that counter-terrorist defences, if constructed, could result in the virtual death of the urban areas as functioning entities. This echoed similar statements made after the 1996 Docklands bomb in London. As architectural critic Paul Finch (1996, 25) noted at this time:

> The truth is we do not design buildings to withstand bomb blasts because bomb blasts are the exception to the rule … the key point is the defining of the line between risk and recklessness. We do not generally conduct our lives on the basis of the worst thing that could in theory happen.

9/11 immediately heralded many discussions regarding how major cities might look and function in the future if the threat of terrorism persists. In particular, there was an immediate reassessment of the viability of building iconic skyscrapers, with some even predicting their demise altogether due to the fears of building occupiers:

The construction of glamorous ever-higher trophy skyscrapers will stop; the towers in Kuala Lumpur and Frankfurt have already felt the threat, closing and evaluating the day after the World Trade Center collapse; workers in the Empire State building in New York and the Sears Tower in Chicago are already reported to be afraid to go up to their offices (Marcuse 2001, 395).

Kunstler and Salingaros (2001) in *The End of Tall Buildings* went further and predicted that 'no new megatowers will be built, and existing ones are to be dismantled. This will lead to a radical transformation of city centers …'. Mills (2002, 200) further highlighted the economic arguments which might mean skyscrapers might be seen as less attractive options:

Under any positive risk of terrorist attack, tall buildings are better targets than short buildings, especially buildings that are taller than nearby buildings. Undoubtedly, the insurance costs per dollar of insured value will be an increased function of building height … Profitable building height is an increasing function of land values. However, central business district (CBD) land values are high because of the value of proximity to other similar activities. Increasingly dangers of terrorist attacks reduce the value of such proximity and therefore will lead to lower CBD land values and hence to lower office building height.

Very quickly though, this tendency to sound the death knoll of 'building tall' was proved incorrect. As Graham noted a year after 9/11:

The iconic power of the skyscraper – a symbol of urban 'progress' and modernization for a century – was instantly reversed from icon of power, progress and the dynamism of urban America, it has been transmuted into a symbol of fragility which builds deep vulnerability into the cityscape. And yet skyscraper construction continues apace and many new proposals are still emerging (Graham 2002c, 27).

Other commentators drew on the earlier work of Architectural critic Martin Pawley (1998) who suggested that signature buildings could be replaced by what he termed an 'architecture of terror' due to perceived security needs. This would have the function of making the buildings less identifiable and hence less of a target. In this vein, it was argued after 9/11 that we might see 'the massive growth of relatively anonymous, low level fortressed business spaces' (Graham 2001, 414).

Others suggested that dispersal of key functions away from city centres to protect the economic functioning of the city could be one impact of 9/11. This was equated to that of the 'defensive dispersal' in reaction to Cold War fears of nuclear attacks on American cities (Bishop and Clancey 2004; see also Ziegler 2005). For example, Vidler (2001a) writing in the *New York Times* on 'A City Transformed: Designing Defensible Space', alluded to Oscar Newman's classic work, and hypothesised about the nature of experiencing future city life:

> The terrorist attack on the World Trade Center is propelling a civic debate over whether to change the way Americans experience and ultimately build upon urban public spaces. Are a city's assets – density, concentration, monumental structures – still alluring? Will a desire for 'defensible space' radically transform the city as Americans know it?

Vidler questioned whether there will be an 'understandable impulse to flee', for cities to disperse to suburbia in search of 'space and security', and if the spatial dynamics of cities could be dramatically affected:

> Are we looking at conditions where the need for 'defensible space' will gradually transform the form of the city as we know it? Where dispersal rather than concentration will be the pattern of life and work and where monumental forms of building will give way to camouflaged sheds, or dispersed all together into home offices? Are we about to face the collapse of the attraction of density, out of fear, the over policing of access to the public realm, or simple necessity? (Vidler 2001b)

Some commentators also addressed the potential urban impacts of 9/11, highlighting both the potential desire to flee the city and the continual need for business clustering. Peter Marcuse (2002b) for example hypothesised about a number of potential consequences for urban economies and the real estate industry since 9/11, which he noted could further increase the partitioning of urban space. The net result he argued 'might be described as a decentralization of key business activities and their attendant services, but to very concentrated off-center locations in close proximity to the major centres' (ibid., 596, see also Marcuse 2000a; Marcuse and Kempton 2002). This was referred to as 'concentrated decentralisation'. He further anticipated that in both these new areas of activity and the older areas of concern (such as crime) increased 'barricading' and control of activities in public places would occur as well as a 'citadelisation' of businesses and exclusive residences. In short, he noted it was possible that 'security becomes the justification for measures that threaten the core of urban social and political life, from the physical barricading of space to the social barricading of democratic activity' (Marcuse 2000a, 276).

Like Mike Davis's bleak portraits of 'fortress LA' in the 1990s, Marcuse, and other US commentators drew heavily on examples of post-9/11 security from New York and Washington in order to draw conclusions. Moreover, in the aftermath of 9/11 some commentators asked if 'all came together in New York?' (Catterall 2002) suggesting that the measures taken in response to terrorism may have lasting impacts upon global urbanism.

After the 9/11 attacks, in these and other global cities, there was substantial pressure for key buildings, including iconic or landmark public and commercial

buildings, to be protected from future terrorist attack.[1] This led to many robust yet unrefined and obtrusive features almost literally 'thrown' around key sites, employing security designs that were effective in restricting the access of vehicles and the public to 'at risk' sites but that were not necessarily, aesthetically pleasing. For instance, it has been charged that the US-wide effort to secure 'key' buildings after September 2001 has, in its rather haphazard and makeshift manifestation, prioritised the safety of building occupants over regard for social, economic, aesthetic, or transportation considerations (Hollander and Whitfield 2005, 244).

In Washington DC, the erection of Jersey barriers and chain-link fences were almost immediately unpopular with both visitors and planners, being more suitable for construction sites, with the nations capital becoming 'a fortress city peppered with bollards, bunkers, and barriers' (Benton-Short 2007, 432) due both to a lack of funding for 'anything nicer' (ibid., 446) and a lack of strategic coordination between policy makers. Others argued that such 'security zones' were unlikely to exhibit any of the characteristics of successful public spaces for instance: 'usability, accessibility, and detailed design' (Hollander and Whitfield 2005, 248).

There were also concerns regarding the impact that such features may have upon the urban fabric and for the permeability and liveability of places. In Washington D.C., guidance was issued in the month proceeding 9/11 with a view to creating security that complements or even promotes vistas, open spaces, accessibility and the iconographic significance of the city (National Planning Commission (NPC) 2001, 1). The subsequent National Capital Urban Design and Security Plan (2002) *Designing and Testing of Perimeter Security Elements* detailed an inherent tension between threat perception and attractive and openly accessible landscapes:

> The Commission has grown concerned that these escalating threat assessments and potentially extreme security responses undermine its objectives for a vibrant capital city that showcases democratic ideals of openness and accessibility (A-8).

In the initial consultative 2001 NPC Security Plan (2001: 2), a number of key goals were highlighted in an active attempt to avoid 'fortress' style security. These included:

- Providing an appropriate balance between the need to accommodate perimeter security for sensitive buildings and … the vitality of the public realm.
- Providing security in the context of streetscape enhancement and public realm beautification, rather than as a separate or redundant system of components whose only purpose is security.
- Expanding the palette of elements that can gracefully provide perimeter security in a manner that does not clutter the public realm, while avoiding

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1   The following discussion draws specifically from reviews in Coaffee (2004); Coaffee and O'Hare (2008); Coaffee et al. (2009).

Figure 9.1   Crude defensive security outside US Embassy, London (2003)

Figure 9.2   A ring of concrete around the Houses of Parliament in central London (2003)

the monotony of endless lines of jersey barriers or bollards, which only evoke defensiveness.
- Producing a coherent strategy for deploying specific families of streetscape and security elements in which priority is given to achieving aesthetic continuity along streets.
- Providing perimeter security in a manner that does not impede the city's commerce and vitality, excessively restrict or impede operational use of sidewalks or pedestrian and vehicular mobility, nor impact the health of existing trees.

However, in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, and in proceeding years, obtrusive 'target hardening' became the defensive strategy of choice in many US cities. This pattern of reactive and retrofitted fortification was also repeated in many countries. At selected sites in London for instance, 'defences' were constructed at key government and business sites in a drive to induce confidence in employees and investors (Coaffee 2004). Such interventions, though crude, were seen as effective in that they prohibited the penetration of targets and limited the permeability of spaces by potential perpetrators of attacks. For example, The United States embassy in central London became a virtual citadel, separated from the rest of London by fencing, waist high 'concrete blockers', armed guards, and mandatory ID cards (see Figure 9.1). Furthermore, in May 2003, in response to a heightened state of alert regarding possible terrorist attack given suicide bomb attacks in Saudi Arabia and Morocco, long lines of concrete slabs were placed outside the Houses of Parliament (in the heart of the 'Government Security Zone) to stop car bombers (see Figure 9.2). This so-called 'ring of concrete' (Coaffee 2004) which was later painted black to make it more 'aesthetically pleasing', was one of a number of planned fortifications set up in central London to protect prominent and historic buildings.

Moreover, the militarisation of Government buildings and overseas embassies has continued apace since 9/11 (Coaffee et al. 2009). In the US context, which Boddy (2008, 287) calls 'a War on Terror without end', American embassies even in the most liberal of cities, have been subject to acute target hardening. This type of very overt security Boddy calls as an 'architecture of reassurance' (ibid., 279). In a further example, Jason Burke, in a study of the enhancement of security at the US embassy in Ottawa, Canada, argued that in this case 'planning has been co-opted in the name of security' (Burke 2008, 1) through the construction of a multi-layer counter-terror defence which has had significant physical, social and economic impacts. The security measures, he argued, 'detract from the aesthetic value of the street,' and reduce public accessibility around the site, whilst increasing the perceived vulnerability of neighbouring residences and businesses' (ibid., 17).

Other writers, predominantly in the US, have taken a more econometric view of the potential impacts of 9/11 on city life, questioning whether urban economies will continue to thrive in the face of further threats of large scale attack. As previously noted, the ambiguity surrounding the withdrawal of insurance and reinsurance was highlighted as a key concern which could 'slow office construction long after the

additional construction is socially justified by economic recovery' (Mills 2002; see also Glaeser and Shapiro 2002). For example work by Harrigan and Martin (2002) noted that the cost of 9/11 for New Yorkers was astronomical, both in terms of the actual disaster site and also in terms of: impacts on transportation links which become slower because of increased security and bomb alerts; increased expenditure on security; massively increased insurance premiums; and also cost to productivity through emotional impacts on workers fearing future attack. As such they argued on the one hand that the net impact, what they referred to as 'a terror tax', is to make cities 'less attractive'. However, on the other hand, they noted that:

> The forces that lead to city formation also enable cities to be highly resilient in the face of catastrophes such as terrorist attacks, because they constitute a force for agglomeration that is very difficult to overcome (ibid., 107).

Overall, the consensus that emerged soon after 9/11 emerging suggested that stronger economic forces create a clustering of economic and financial functions in cities will be more than strong enough to alleviate any short term fears of terrorist attack (Swanstrom 2002). Moreover, commentators after 9/11 have shown how global cities, such as New York, were seen as economically resilient. For example, Howard Chernick (2005, ix), in *Resilient City*, showed how 'fear that New York's competitive economic position in the world economy would deteriorate as firms fled the city' was unfounded and whilst showing initially large scale economic harm, showed little 'permanent damage to New York City as a business location' (ibid., 9).

The Promise of Technological Fixes

Immediately after 9/11, other commentators explicitly argued that technological advancement would become all-important in the battle against urban fear and terrorism. In a short space of time after 9/11 there was already widespread evidence that the 'creep' of surveillance and other methods of social control in western cities in response to security concerns was beginning to 'surge' in response to the new terrorist threat (Wood et al. 2003).

David Lyon (2003), in *Surveillance after September 11*, presented a meticulous account of how different aspects of surveillance have been advanced and integrated in the city after 9/11. He argued that this could be articulated in two different ways. First, that the reaction to 9/11 brought to the surface and clarified a number of pre-existing trends that had been developing relatively unnoticed. Second, that the events of 9/11 provided an opportunity to give 'some already existing ideas, policies and technologies their chance' (ibid., 4), or to be legitimised through public acceptance and counter-terrorist legislative powers. Ominously, Lyon noted that the result is that 'responses to 9/11 are serving to speed up and spread out such

surveillance in ways that bode ill for democracy, personal liberties, social trust and mutual care' (ibid., 5-6).

In the post-9/11 city, there were particular fears that the burgeoning of increasingly automated and hi-tech systems would be used more than other counter-terror strategies, but would, further erode civil liberties as democratic and ethical accountability will be given a back seat in the new era of 'anxious urbanism' (Farish 2002) which has followed 9/11 (Graham 2001; Wood 2002). In short, post-9/11, there was a commodification of surveillance with a technological drive to develop digital, automated and biometric systems, sometimes covering entire urban terrains (Lyon 2002a; 2002b). For example, it was reported in July 2003 that the Pentagon was developing a digitalised surveillance network capable of tracking the movements of all vehicles in a city by identifying them by physical characteristic, colour or even the biometric features of the driver. This expansive 'tracking system', attracted the interest of the law enforcement agencies keen to mainstream this, until now, military technology for non-combat use (Sniffen 2003). But how accurate were such proposed systems? Stanley and Steinhardt (2002), for example, highlighted that facial recognition software, at this time, were being trialled in surveillance systems at a number of major airports in the USA as well as at prominent sporting fixtures, with mixed success. Moreover, other commentators reported that such technology was highly inaccurate and unlikely to be of any practical use until refined (Meek 2002; National Institute of Standards and Technology 2003).

For years preceding 9/11, surveillance technologies were, it was argued, increasingly leading to the automatic production of space, with urban society quickly becoming a technologically managed system based on automated access and boundary control. One of the most influential pieces of work in this area, used by many commentators in the wake of the 9/11 attacks was the idea of Automated Socio-Technical Environments (ASTEs), articulated by Lianos and Douglass (2000). They argued, in a similar way to Beck in this risk society thesis, that such environments occur as a result of the pervasive 'dangerisation' of society and the increase of environments of risk. ASTEs were seen as high-tech risk management devises with a number of key features. First, the user cannot negotiate with the system as it is fully automated. Second, access to the system is achieved through specific principles. As such:

> For the system there are no good and bad, honest and dishonest – or for that
> matter, poor and less poor individuals. There are simply holders of valid tokens
> for each predetermined level of access (ibid., 265).

ASTEs it was argued, had the potential to radically change the social infrastructure of cities as they become reconfigured according to ever-changing management priorities and access demands, distinguishing and discriminating only on the grounds of the 'quality of user' rather than other social categories such as age, race and sex which the system does not recognise – 'you either insert the right ticket or

you do not' (ibid., 266). Graham (2002, 241) for example, highlighted that such systems could 'start to inscribe normative ecologies of 'acceptable people and behaviour' within the city. Employing the essence of 'redlining' Graham further notes that this could well mean that:

> … individuals will be excluded from venturing into the premium commercial spaces of their city due to their appearance, habits or challenges to the dominant power holders' normative concepts of who belongs where and when within the city (ibid., 241).

ASTEs were seen as both 'a mode of social control and a management tool where suspicion is simply pre-embedded in the system' (Lianos and Douglass 2000, 269):

> Automated regulatory procedures are not simply procedures of control. They are general management instruments for adapting the social world to the aims of the institutions that use them. Their purpose is to eliminate all those aspects of social information which prevent the institution from achieving its set targets. This is why automated environments operate on the basis of suspected potential dangers caused by their users' (ibid., 266).

With technology developing apace, and with potential threats ever-illuminated by the media, it was seen as likely that post-9/11 urban areas would see ever increasing number of ASTEs with counter-terror security concerns being integrated into the automated environment, especially within CCTV technology (see for example, Graham 2002b).

The Automated Number Plate Recognition systems used by the City of London Police since 1997 provide a perfect example of such ASTEs, which according to some after 9/11 (Rosen 2001) was to be reinforced by biometric (facial recognition) cameras.[2]

Further accounts of the potential role of ASTE's took such systems to technologically deterministic and dystopian extremes. Huber and Mills (2002) in an article entitled 'How technology will defeat terrorism?' gave some applications of ASTE's in the post-9/11 city. They highlighted that 'step by step, cities like New York must learn to watch and track everything that moves' and to have the ability to recognise threats through 'a massive deployment of digital technology' which can screen anything from vehicles, people, letters and certain types of smell and 'dust' particulates. They noted the technology was available and cost effective:

> A decade ago, none of this would have been economically feasible. It is today. It will entail a lot of new investment; but the technology is there, or very close

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2 This predication, to date, has failed to materialise.

to there – real, commercial, functional. It's going to get deployed, not only at airports but even more widely on private premises and, later, for municipal use.

They highlighted that civil libertarians will complain about invasion of privacy and restriction of access, but argued that this is a reality that we have been living with for years, with toll roads, paying to get in to civic buildings such as sports stadia, and screening people as they go into corporate buildings such as museums and schools. They argued emotively that micro-scale surveillance would be the key to terrorist threat recognition:

> Properly deployed at home, as they can be, these technologies of freedom will guarantee the physical security on which all our civil liberties ultimately depend. Properly deployed abroad, they will destroy privacy everywhere we need to destroy it.

They continued, perhaps ominously, by predicting a dystopian future for post-9/11 cities, where surveillance is omnipresent:

> It may seem anomalous to point to micro-scale technology as the answer to terrorists who brought down New York's tallest skyscrapers. But this is the technology that perfectly matches the enemy's character and strength. It can be replicated at very little cost; it is cheap and expendable. Small and highly mobile, it can be scattered far and wide... It is a horrible vision. It gives us no joy to articulate it. But at home and abroad, it will end up as their sons against our silicon. Our silicon will win.

Social Impacts and Authoritarian Politics

Commentary on the perceived consequences of 9/11 for urban development focused heavily on the physical changes that might occur, or the technology that might be installed as a result of the increased militarisation of the city. However, equally important, but less emphasised, were the potential social impacts that were predicted. Peter Marcuse (2001, 395), for example, argued that social polarisation on the basis of income and race will be exacerbated by the reaction to 9/11 'with the focus of upper-income disproportionately white households concentrated in more tightly controlled citadels, and others more and more excluded and segregated, with sharper dividing lines between and among groups.' The same argument, he argued, applied to public space which will become increasingly privatised and 'tightly controlled', through CCTV and regulated in terms of access restrictions. In short 'democratic conduct' by all, would be an essential ingredient of a counter-terrorist response in order to maintain the quality of city life.

Marcuse (2002), a year later, illustrated ways in which spatial urban planning, in particular, was becoming less, not more, inclusive as counter-terrorism security concerns became a key consideration within the planning system. This he referred

to as 'deplanning' – the neglect of open and participatory processes in planning and the neglect of issues of social equity in that process (ibid., 269). Marcuse argued this increased power of the state in urban development and planning issues, and, by contrast, reduced its role in social welfare programs (ibid., 277). As such, the danger was that the formal planning process would will be 'geared down' to represent the concerns of an increasingly elite group of participants (in this case the security services and police) at the expense of wider community concerns. Wood et al. (2003, 144) described this as part of the ever-growing 'cross-fertilization' between the military and the managerial in modernity and, increasingly, in the governance of urban areas.

Other writers have interrogated this post-9/11 tension and described how the 'guns, guards, gates' posture adopted in the immediate wake of 9/11 was, in hindsight, inappropriate. This was put down to the way such measures 'actually intensify and reinforce public perceptions of siege or vulnerability, and thus heighten the sense of imminent danger and anticipation of attack' (Grosskopf 2006, 1). Overall, 9/11 provoked an immediate, yet somewhat incongruous, response in an attempt to protect buildings, despite the fact that the events of that day were virtually impossible to defend against. Perhaps understandably, responses were, for the most part, driven by a sense of urgency and against a heightened degree of threat. It was felt important for the public to feel reassured that the State was responding to the threat in a robust way; this could be manifest through overt physical security in public places – a politically easy 'quick-win'. That said, it was quite apparent that such a balance – between reassurance and 'scaring' the public – was difficult to strike, with it later being suggested that any measures taken by authorities, or those responsible for leading counter-terrorism efforts, must accept a certain degree of risk:

> The population must accept that no system is perfect, and that no matter what steps are taken, public transportation will still remain a feasible target. Terrorists will always find ways to attack it. Reassuring the public that measures to combat the threat are in place, while also preparing it for the possibility that an attack might happen, provides the right combination of measures. (Dolink 2007: 20)

There were similar concerns raised with regard to the impact that counter-terrorism features (such as the closure of streets or even the strategic use of reinforced street furniture to limit access to buildings) have upon public accessibility and the permeability of space. For instance, Benton-Short (2007, 424) reflecting on the reaction in the US to 9/11 concluded that issues of terrorism and national security have 'trumped' concerns regarding public access. Referring specifically to the Mall as a national commemorative space, and a stage for political protest, she questions how the need for improved security can be 'translated into acceptable levels of fortification and the potential loss of public space':

> This is happening in other cities around the world-New York, London, Los Angeles, and Tokyo, for example, where bollards, bunkers, and other barriers have been placed around selected 'high-risk' targets and buildings. When security measures are particularly visible in capital cities, such as Washington, DC, the symbolic impact of fortress architecture is elevated to represent a national discourse of war, fear, and entrenchment (2007, 431).

By extension, like Marcuse, Benton-Short, critiques the lack of public input in the planning process that support these 'hypersecurity' plans, leading her to

> … wonder whether the prioritization of security over access to public space may be linked to a broader social-political agenda that seeks to restrict public space in general. While this remains to be seen, what is more discernable is that a 'security agenda' has, at the moment, captured hegemonic status and so is rewriting the meaning of the Mall in a way that tells us about ideas which are dominating national political discourse, as is often the case with 'security' in a time of war (2007, 442).

What emerged in the wake of 9/11 is a 'culture of fear' in decision-making which became increasingly focused on a 'security first' response taken by increasingly reactive decision-makers' (Briggs 2005b). As Coaffee and Rogers (2008a) note, the use of a sense of impending risk and danger to enact new civic policy is of course not a new political strategy. However, the potential impact, broadening scale, and unquantifiable nature of impending 'new' global risks (most notably, but not exclusively terrorism), combined with political leaders claims of 'unique' and 'classified' knowledge of potential threats, is increasingly justifying the implementation of a raft of security policies without critical civic consultation (see also Jenkins 2006). Related to this, the role of the private sector in homeland security, and the effective 'marketisation of fear' were also further exposed by 9/11. As Mike Davis (2001b) noted, the military and security firms [are] rushing to exploit the nation's nervous breakdown'.[3]

Other writers interrogated this post-9/11 tension between security and libertarianism through a more philosophical lens. Paul Virilio (2002) argued that we live in a time when technologies embedded within, and under the influence of, the media and military, create a local and global politics that precludes the possibility of negotiation and diplomacy, as responses must be immediate. In short, this equals the 'end of reflection', where speed of response is prioritised over deliberative decision-making (Coaffee 2005). This, Virilio further noted, necessitates an authoritarian politic:

> The place of politics in ancient societies was the public space … Today the public image prevails over public space … We are heading towards a cathode

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3   Cited in Savitch (2008), 149.

democracy, but without rules … The threat is that of fusion and confusion. No politics is possible at the scale of the speed of light. Politics depends on having time for reflection. Today, we no longer have time to reflect, the things that we see have already happened. And it is necessary to react immediately. Is real-time democracy possible? An authoritarian politics. Yes … (ibid., 42-3).

Reappraising Security in the City of London

The events of 9/11 once again focused attention on how the City of London, both as an independent entity and as an integral part of a global city, was responding to new terrorist threats.

The unprecedented events of 9/11 led to an immediate counter response from the City of London Police. Just as in the immediate aftermath of the Docklands bomb in 1996, the ring of steel swung back into full-scale operation. This was part of a co-ordinated London wide operation which saw over 1,500 extra police patrolling the streets of the capital in an attempt to 'police out' terrorism. In the Square Mile specifically, the police immediately undertook special liaison with US firms to improve their security through extra patrols, as well as instigating a far greater number of stop and search checkpoints.

The Corporation of London also re-examined its own emergency procedures through collaboration with key private sector institutions and security professionals, as well as recommending to all businesses that they reassess their contingency plans with the help of the City Police (Mayhew 2001). The initial approach adopted in the City, and drawing on the previous experiences of terrorist attack, was very much 'business as usual' and 'vigilant but calm' in order to avoid a 'siege mentality'. In short, the balancing of security needs with realistic threat assessments was seen as paramount. As a Corporation of London Press release (12/09/01) stated a day after 9/11:

> The City is carrying on with business as usual. The City of London has had robust security measures in place for many years to deal with any terrorist threat and these are in operation now, as they are 365 days a year. We have been in contact with many businesses across the City and our message to them has been to remain calm, be vigilant and ensure that their own contingency plans are in place. These security arrangements are regularly reviewed and will again be examined in the light of yesterday's events.

Given the City of London's financial position within global markets, inevitable questions were asked after 9/11 about how the Square Mile would cope with a similar attack. Views varied regarding the extent to which financial institutions were developing adequate disaster recovery or contingency plans. As noted, most claimed that it would be 'business as usual' almost immediately due to, in no

small part, lessons learnt during the 1990s. As a London Stock Exchange (LSE) spokesperson noted on the BBC news a year after 9/11:

> Put simply, if disaster were to strike, City trading should continue without interruption (Knight 2002).

The LSE however, had for a number of years, a 'hotsite' – a fully sourced back up office from which all electronic trading could continue if their main headquarters in the centre of the City was damaged in a terror attack, or any other emergency for that matter. This can be compared this with the situation in New York where no such back up was available to most major financial corporations pre-9/11. The UK's Financial Services Authority also highlighted that all of the UK's 35 biggest financial institutions have systems which will allow them to trade if they are forced to relocate away from their main centre of operations. Others, through, were more sceptical. Despite the Corporation's Security and Contingency Planning Group assisting businesses in the City with the development and exercising of their business continuity plans and appropriate disaster response preparation, it was estimated that in 2002 between 30-40 per cent of financial institutions had no such plans in place.

Furthermore, at an 'area level' the Corporation of London became involved with running disaster response scenarios, both within the Square Mile and in conjunction with other London authorities. As Knight (2002) noted:

> The Civil Contingency Committee, chaired by the Home Secretary, has been auditing disaster planning at all levels of local and national government in the aftermath of September 11 … The capital's emergency services and utilities have been regularly running through disaster scenarios. [In the City of London] The Bank of England, the Treasury, and the City watchdog the Financial Services Authority (FSA), have been charged with the task of co-ordinating the plans of financial institutions.

His article also cited a Corporation of London spokesperson who noted the new changes facing contingency planners in the City. The scenarios tested were very different given the changing nature of the terrorist threat:

> Every contingency plan has had to be measured against a new higher level of disaster. The worse case scenario is no longer a two thousand pound bomb going off … We are in a different world – planning has to take account of truly massive events.

However, he continued by noting that: 'Although those charged with disaster coordination are making confident noises that preparedness is a lot higher than in New York on September 11, the City still has a long way to go … We are in a different world – planning has to take account of truly massive events – so far so good, but more still needs to be done.'

As further noted by a senior police officer:

> The various communities of the City of London have had to reappraise their
> approach to the threat posed by terrorism … those who live and work in the
> Square Mile have … had to live with the threat of terrorist attack for more than
> three decades. The positive aspect of that experience is that it makes us uniquely
> prepared to confront the new threats posed by global terrorism.[4]

The policing response to 9/11 involved not just the City Police, but also Scotland
Yard's counter-terrorist branch and the Metropolitan Police who jointly reviewed
and reappraised the counter terrorist strategy in place around the Square Mile. In
the aftermath of 9/11 subscriptions to the City police's Pager-Alert and Email-
Alert emergency communication systems increased by 44 per cent and 139 per
cent respectively (City of London Police 2002). In addition, the success of the
City Police's Pager-Alert in effectively sending out early warning messages to
businesses in the light of 9/11 has meant the scheme is now being rolled out on
a London-wide basis with the help of the Metropolitan Police,[5] and strategies to
transfer these schemes nationwide were made. Plans to link these systems to the
mobile phone network were put in train (an SMS-Alert system became available
soon after). As a leading Metropolitan Police officer, cited in a City of London
Police press release in November 2001, noted:

> This is a time of heightened tension and schemes like pager alert can help
> businesses respond quickly to security alerts and other incidents. The system
> works extremely well in the capital and in time other UK cities would benefit
> from a similar scheme.

The City Police also moved quickly to relay messages that they were prepared for
attacks from both conventional weapons as well as unconventional biological and
chemical agents, although for the latter the risk was considered slight. Although
concern was expressed about 'unscrupulous individuals playing upon peoples
fears' by attempting to sell protective clothing and gas masks to City businesses
(ibid.). Echoing similar messages relayed in the aftermath of attacks against the
City in the 1990s, public vigilance was seen as 'the most formidable weapon
we can deploy against terrorism' (ibid.). In short, balancing security needs with
realistic threat assessments were seen as paramount. As one senior police source
highlighted:

> There is a debate between some people who think we should throw everything
> at guarding buildings, and others who want us to respond to a specific threat …
> At the moment there is no specific threat. But there was no intelligence before

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4   Cited in *City Security* (2001), 9:4.
5   City of London Police press release, 14 November 2001.

the World Trade Center, so do we assume the worst and expect the possibility of suicide bombers and throw everything at protecting London now or do we react when there is intelligence. It is a dilemma.[6]

9/11 refocused the City Police's minds on counter-terrorism, and added a new dimension to defending the City as the range of terrorist tactics that might realistically be used had expanded. In short, as the Commissioner of Police noted, some terrorists, in contrast to previous threats from the Provisional IRA are *unlikely* 'to be deterred by the high levels of technical surveillance we have successfully used against domestic terrorists who seek to avoid identification, arrest and prosecution as part of their operating methods' (City of London Police 2002a). Here, the City were preparing for the possibility that a suicide attack, person-borne or vehicle-borne, could be launched against the Square Mile.

Although the international terrorist threat was considered high in the year proceeding 9/11, the City's security regime quickly returned to normal, although security was conspicuously at a higher state of alert at specific times. Most noticeably, security was stepped up on the first anniversary of 9/11, with a large and visible increase in armed police on the streets of the City, in London generally, and particularly around prominent target buildings such as US-owned banks. At this time the fear of attack from dissident Irish republican terrorists was also deemed high given problems with the peace process in Northern Ireland.

A Reworked Counter-terrorism Strategy

Since 9/11, central London has been under increased risk from terrorism with some reports even claiming that there was a detailed plan developed by Al-Qaeda to bomb the Square Mile.[7] What is clear is that 9/11 has refocused the minds of all of London's police forces on counter-terrorism, along with the realisation that high levels of technical surveillance, which have proved relatively successful against domestic terrorism, might be ineffective against new terrorist methods such as suicide attack (City of London Police 2002).

As a result of the enhanced terrorist threat after 9/11, the City's counter-terrorist strategy to control and regulate the space within the Square Mile has been adapted and refined in an attempt to balance security with business continuity. As highlighted by one of the City of London Police's local priorities in relation to their reworked terrorism strategy:

> The City of London policing style is aimed at the prevention and detection of terrorist attacks with the use of improved technology and high profile patrols. Our target is to maintain the current level of vigilance and thereby deter and future terrorist criminality. The Terrorism Strategy will achieve these aims through

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6   Cited in *This is London (Evening Standard* online), 8 October 2001.
7   *The Observer*, 16 December 2001.

high visibility policing, directed intelligence, technology and partnership (City of London Police 2002c).

In particular, the City of London Police's 2002-7 Corporate Plan (City of London Police 2002d) highlighted six themes for countering terrorist activity, many of which highlighted links the City police were making with pan-London strategic partnerships:

- Targeting police officer deployment to focus on high visibility uniform patrols within the city in particular, with officers utilising extended powers under the Terrorism Act 2000;
- Effective use of available and emerging technology in respect to CCTV and automatic number plate recognition (including mobile units) to support our operational policing tactics and to aid post incident investigation;
- To utilise all available intelligence for the implementation of intelligence-led counter-terrorist tactics for threat assessment and pro-active operations;
- To work in partnership with the community to achieve our strategic aim. This includes working with formal bodies such as the Greater London Authority as well as Crime Prevention Associations, and the continual rolling out of schemes such as Pager-Alert and E-mail alert;
- To work with other police organisations (Metropolitan Police, British Transport Police and Ministry of Defence Police) and recognised emergency services within London to ensure a co-ordinated approach to deterring criminal terrorist activity across the capital;
- To work with other agencies (such as the London Emergency Services Liaison Panel) to deter criminal terrorist activity and to provide appropriate information and guidance to the city community and that of the capital in general.

From November 2002, specially trained dedicated Counter-Terrorist Security Advisors (CTSAs)[8] started working within the City of London Police and in liaison with the Corporation of London's planning department and the business community. The key role of CTSAs was to provide advice on protective measures that businesses could take to mitigate the impact of terrorism, as well as in assisting with the updating and rehearsal of contingency plans.

In the early months of 2003 it was also announced that the Corporation had committed itself to raise the business rate premium for City businesses in order

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8   CTSAs have been used to varying degrees in all Police Forces in the UK since 2002. The nationwide network of CTSAs is coordinated through the National Counter Terrorism Security Office (NaCTSO). In advance of 2002, the City of London and Metropolitan Police had a series of Counter Terrorism Crime Prevention Officers.

to improve security through, for example, the addition of extra cameras.[9] As the Chairman of the Policy and Resources Committee noted:

> The security of the City of London has always been a priority for the Corporation of London and the City of London Police and these extra funds will enable us to expand the 'ring of steel' and put more police on the streets … Most businesses we consulted were in general favour of spending more on security but were disappointed that central government could not help more … We've listened very carefully to the business community and we think we've struck the right balance: security remains a priority and we're confident that the new recommendation will still mean a significant increase in the resource we put into keeping the City as safe as we can.

Reasserting the environmental benefits of the schemes, the Commissioner of the City Police further noted that 'as well as traffic and environmental benefits which we welcome, the zone will assist the force in its ongoing efforts to deter terrorism and other forms of criminality'.[10] The so called 'Western Zone' of the overall Traffic and Environment Zone was introduced in December 2003 and was made permanent in 2005 after due consultation. As a result, this meant 85 per cent of the City of London was contained within the 'secure' zone.

The Insurance Impact

The events of 9/11 were by far the biggest and most complex case the insurance industry has ever had to deal with. The magnitude of its impact will take years to unravel fully and has had significant impacts for insurance and reinsurance markets and the business community in general.

The first estimates of potential losses including physical damage, loss of business, and workers' compensation, life and disability claims, were between $10-15 billion, with Lloyds of London and the larger worldwide reinsurers indicating that losses would be 'painful but manageable'.[11] Others suggested claims would be much higher; at between $40-70 billion. Before 9/11 insurers in America included terrorism as part of standard coverage because it was claimed the risk of potential losses was small.

In the aftermath of 9/11, the US government set about trying to find a way to protect insurance companies from further claims caused by terrorism. Immediately, the UK Pool Re model was put forward as a starting point for any US model, as reinsurers hinted they would raise rates and would not offer coverage against

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9   Corporation of London News Release – 'Committee recommends new business rate premium for City policing and a bigger "ring of steel"', 18 February 2003.

10   Cited in *BBC News* 2003.

11   Cited in *Electronic Telegraph*, 20 September 2001.

Terrorism, Risk and the Global City

terrorism as they feared for the industry's solvency.[12] Comments made by the insurance industry in America post-9/11 echo those almost a decade earlier in the City of London. For example, the Chairman of the American Insurance Association (AIA) noted that:

> It's not an issue of profitability for the industry; it's an issue of economic stability to the entire economy. Without insurance protection from terrorists, banks will hesitate to approve loans for real estate, construction and manufacturing.[13]

He continued: 'No one can price this risk. It's not an act of God; it's an act of man designed to inflict maximum damage and destruction.' The President of the Reinsurance Association of America further noted that 'one could assume a complete reassessment of catastrophic risk is underway.' In short, it was highlighted that terrorism could not be modelled or underwritten like other catastrophic events, as it is not susceptible to the normal 'laws of insurance'. Acts of global terrorism, it was noted:

> Exposed the insurance industry to infinite risk; as unlike natural catastrophes which can be 'zoned', have historical-temporal patterns, and are random, terrorism is not random (sites are chosen), and terrorists deliberately use unpredictable patterns to evade capture meaning such zoning is difficult with any degree of accuracy (van Aartijk Jr 2001).

As such a Pool Re-type solution was called for in the US:

> If the federal Government doesn't come up with a proposal like this for the private sector, who's left holding the bag? It's not the reinsurers, it's the primary companies. What do you do? You just stop writing the coverage. You can't price it. And a primary insurer can't absorb the risk (President of the Reinsurance Association of America).[14]

He continued by highlighting its impact on the general economy: 'The alternative is insurance marketplace chaos, which means a ripple effect in the economy could be quite significant.' (*ibid.*) Subsequently the insurance industry put forward a suggested model under the name Homeland Security Mutual Reinsurance Company, based on Pool Re, as part of the 'Insurance Stabilization and Availability Act of 2001'. This was formally proposed on 10 October. Five days later, the Bush Administration published their own 'terrorism insurance plan', which proposed that the insurers picked up a great amount of the risk up to a certain level. The

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12 Terrorism insurance models operating in South Africa and Spain were also examined.

13 Cited in van Aartijk Jr 2001.

14 Cited in van Aartijk Jr 2001.

insurers would be responsible for 20 per cent of the first $20 billion losses in year 1. In year two their responsibility would be 100 per cent of the first $10 billion, 50 per cent of losses between $10-20 billion and 10 per cent of the losses above $20 billion; and 100 per cent of the first $20 billion in year 3. A further scheme was mooted on 1 November 2001 – The Terrorism Risk Protection Act which would be triggered only in the event of a $100 million loss. The federal government would, it was proposed, then pick up 90 per cent of the loss, leaving the insurance companies to pick up the remaining 10 per cent.

These three main proposals were debated for over a year until eventually in November 2002 the Terrorism Insurance Bill was signed, which in essence was a compromise between the solutions mentioned above. The eventual Terrorism Risk and Insurance Act (TRIA) was designed to facilitate the development of a robust market for terrorism insurance. It insisted that insurance companies offered terrorism coverage but also allowed for a transitionary period for markets to stabilise and build the necessary capacity to sustain any future losses. As such, the federal government agreed to pay 90 per cent of all losses until the end of 2005.

Like the Corporation of London and the City of London police, the UK terrorism insurance market also reappraising the situation post-9/11. In December 2001, the UK Government began discussions with the insurance industry to broaden arrangements for terrorism insurance given the transformed perceptions and understandings of global terrorism in the wake of 9/11, and the changing nature of the insurance market since the Government backed terrorism insurance scheme, Pool Re, was established in 1993:

> The tragic events of September 11th have forced everyone to re-examine the risks we face from modern-day terrorism. The insurance industry is working hard to ensure that as much cover can be provided as possible against exposures that can be enormous. Pool Re is an outstanding example of how Government can work with the private sector to the advantage of the whole community. We should now build upon its achievements (Director General of the ABI).[15]

This review was to be completed by March 2002 and involved representatives from the ABI and the major insurance associations. The catastrophic events of 9/11 were further highlighted at the end of the financial year when the London insurance market announced losses of over £3 billion with nearly £2 billion coming directly from the 9/11 attacks. However, it was also mentioned that the events of 9/11 had helped restructure the insurance market. As an insurance agent noted:

> The fact that the World Trade Center has acted as a catalyst for significant improvements in ratings and terms and conditions means Lloyds at least can look forward to the prospect of a decent profit with genuine optimism (cited in Cave 2002).

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15   Cited in *Property Forum News*, 23 January 2002.

In short, the insurance industry had been in difficulty for some time and had been experiencing large underwriting losses. Even prior to 9/11 it was widely estimated that insurers were paying out £1.15 in claims for every £1 received in premiums. As such, some commentators have accused the insurance industry of using 9/11 'as an excuse to raise premiums across the board to make up for falling profits in recent years' (Madslien 2002). The argument here was that the restructuring and streamlining of the insurance industry was speeded up by the tragic events of 9/11, forcing the insurance industry to be increasingly reflexive in their thinking and to introduce cost cutting and efficiency improvements. As such, the fallout of 9/11 saw premiums in many forms of insurance rise, with job losses announced at some companies. For example, in September 2002, Europe's third biggest insurer, Zurich Financial, announced around 4500 job losses as a result of $2 billion losses in the previous six months, in large part attributed to the impact of 9/11.

The new structure of Pool Re, announced in July 2002, increased the definition of terrorism to which previously had covered fire and explosion only. The new broader definition, covered 'all risks', including contamination by biological, chemical or nuclear agents (after January 2003), the use of aircrafts in attacks or, flood damage. As a result of these changes pre-9/11 premiums were doubled until the end of 2002 reflecting the greater risk profile faced. After this date insurers were able to decide premium rates on a 'case-by-case basis' according to normal commercial arrangements. This introduced a greater degree of flexibility and competition in to the market and encouraged the provision of terrorism insurance from private sector reinsurers. In addition each insurer had its losses capped per event and per annum, so insurers will know in advance the maximum they might have to pay out. Initially from January 2003, this was £30 million per event or £60 million per annum and has gradually increased over the years. This arrangement will allow the reinsurance market time to re-establish its financial capacity in the market. Table 9.1 below highlights the expected (in 2003) increase in maximum industry retentions.

Table 9.1   Maximum losses faced by the insurance industry for acts of terrorism

Start Date	Maximum retention per event (£m)	Maximum retention per annum (£m)
1 January 2003	30	60
1 January 2004	50	100
1 January 2005	75	150
1 January 2006	100	200

Given the distribution of claims within the insurance industry, it was unlikely this maximum retention would be exceeded.

Perhaps the most notable impact of 9/11 on the structuring of the terrorism insurance market was the rapid expansion of stand-alone cover being offered by private brokers, especially those wishing to offer coverage in the US market. This specifically focused on potential customers whose 'all-risks' coverage excluded terrorism.[16] This created a high demand for specific tailored terrorism coverage and made London the centre of existing knowledge regarding available products. The global market, in stand-alone cover swelled by US demand, grew rapidly, swamping the available capacity in the market.[17] This meant insurers offering cover could select their risk with great care (Aon 2006). Indeed it was reported that given the large increased in (perceived) threat level, US firms dominated the buyers market:

> In the early days, US companies were the predominant buyers of large stand-alone terrorism policies and in the 12 months after 9/11 the US market contributed 50% of worldwide stand-alone terrorism premium (ibid., 2).

By 2003, the global market had begun to 'soften', largely as a result of US Government backed terrorism insurance schemes becoming available (see Chapter 8), although in perceived risk 'hotspots' demand remained high. This however, just as it had in the City of London in the early 1990s, concerned the insurance industry particularly regarding the concentration of risk in particular locations.

Conclusions: Living with a Constant Threat of Attack

In the wake of 9/11, the City of London remained vigilant to the risks associated with international terrorism. The economic importance of the City, and its attractiveness to terrorists, was reaffirmed in 2003 when it was reported that the threat of a major terrorist attack on London had led the Chancellor of the Exchequer to consider 'radical contingency plans for the City' (Curphey 2003). It was reported that the Chancellor:

> Is seeking the power to take control of the City in the event of a terrorist attack. The measures, which are under consultation, would help to limit damage to the UK economy if terrorists were to target the Square Mile in London with a dirty bomb or biological attack. It would give the Chancellor the authority to freeze payment and settlement systems and run the Bank of England in the aftermath of an attack.

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16   This occurred particularly in the US in a similar way as it had done in the UK in the early 1990s.

17   Growth was, however, limited by the lack of reinsurance cover as the largest reinsurers tried to reduce their exposure to terrorism.

The article continued by noting that the powers were necessary because of the need to maintain London's global city reputation:

> The government's fear is that terrorists might inflict even greater damage on London than on New York in the September 11 attack. If they were to release a chemical, nuclear or biological attack on the City, the whole area would have to be cordoned off for months or years. Banking staff would be unable to return to their desks, and the millions of financial transactions which normally take place each day would stop … As banks and investment companies use just a few trading platforms between them, the whole of the financial sector in the UK could collapse. This would scare foreign investors and inflict serious damage on the UK's reputation as a world player in the financial markets.

A research report published in April 2003 highlighted that terrorism was still perceived as a significant threat by those who work in the City, with almost one in ten considering the threat of terrorism on a daily basis.[18] In the City, much attention was given by the police to maintain the culture of security and vigilance:

> Total – 100% – security can never be guaranteed. But vigilance on the part of the public is one of the best ways of preventing and detecting crime, including terrorist crime. We firmly believe that communities defeat terrorism. Please let us know if you have any suspicions. We don't mind if it proves to be a false alarm! (City of London Police 2003)

This echoed national UK policy discourse which wished to seek to provide a balance between democracy and appropriate risk and security management responses (*Counter-Terrorist Action since September 2001* – Report to Parliament, 9 September 2002):

> We are mindful of the desire and the need of people in a vibrant democracy like ours to live normal lives without a sense of constant fear. We also know that, in part because the terrorist want us to live in fear, and want to damage our economy, and the well being of our people, that they are capable of feeding false information to us in the hope that we over react …

> Getting the balance right is not easy … It is a task government cannot face alone. We face it with our allies and partners … and we must face it with the people of this country so that we have some shared understanding of these new, more complex terrorist threats, and a shared commitment to facing up to them: through vigilance, through support for the security authorities, and through an understanding of the difficult decisions that have to be faced by government.

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18   See *Facing the Future in the City* (Chiumento consultancy), 30 April 2003.

Ultimately, as Swanstrom (2002) noted soon after 9/11, 'the main threat to cities comes not from terrorism but from the policy responses to terrorism that could undermine the freedom of thought and movement that are the lifeblood of cities' (135). Responding to many calls for the decentralisation of urban functions in the post-9/11 era, he continues:

> We should resist calls to further spread out our metropolitan areas in the wake of terrorist attack. Although large and dense cities offer tempting targets for terrorists, they are also the source of our great strengths – economically, socially and politically. To abandon our cities would be to play into the hands of the terrorists (136).

Others have also subsequently pointed to the inherent paradox of counter-terrorism policy as applied to urban centres, in that by reducing the opportunities for terrorist to strike, the everyday experience of public spaces is significantly impacted upon. Savitch (2008) for example highlights how terrorists seek to 'decontrol' territory which often lead to a counter-response of 'shrinking' urban space, whilst Nemeth and Schmidt (2007, 285) summarised developments in spatial management techniques of counter-terrorism according to hard (or active) control, and soft (passive) control features. Under hard control their list of features included: the use of surveillance cameras, private security guards and laws and rules of conduct that can restrict actions, such as 'soliciting, smoking, loitering, or disorderly behaviour' (ibid.). Correspondingly, softer strategies here, concentrate on what they call more representational features and installations, which can be exemplified by restricted access, movement and territorial separation, design mechanisms (e.g. spikes on ledges) as well as the removal of food venues and public conveniences to stop 'undesirable users'. The aim appears to be generally about stopping 'targeted intrusions' – those who seem to fit the bill as potential criminals. For example, are specific groups or those fitting ethnic, national or religious identity profiles singled out for attention or are restricted/prevented in movement?' (ibid.). As David Dixon (2002, 1) also noted from a US perspective with regards to planning regulations:

> Their purpose [new planning codes] is to make terrorism more difficult and to reduce its human and material toll. Unfortunately, the broader, indirect impact of these regulations, with their focus on isolating people from buildings' and shutting buildings off from the streets, could undermine the vitality, sense of community, and the civic quality of much of urban America.

In time, the reactive policy which evolved in the wake of 9/11 in many cities has been in part, replaced by a more reflective policy making process based on the need for preparation and a proactive approach to security enhancement. This new style of policy planning – the resilience response – forms the basis of the next chapter.

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Chapter 10

London Prepared? Resilience, Reputation, and Securing the Global City

Introduction

The responses in London during the 1990s to terrorist risk elicited a growing awareness of the need for public authorities, the private sector and local communities to be prepared for a catastrophic incident. This requirement was further ratcheted up after the events of 9/11, subsequently leading to a new discourse of resilience being used to characterise emergency planning procedures for dealing with such terrorist attacks (Coaffee 2006). The vocabularies used to describe risk and related concepts have fundamentally changed. As Mythen (2004, 1) noted:

> Post 9/11, something fundamental has changed in the way we perceived the concepts of safety and danger. Following a backdraft of concern about bioterrorism, twitchy politicians have advised citizens to stock up on essential foodstuffs and bottled water. On an international stage, world leaders talk about the menaces of living in a 'post-secure' world in which an 'axis of evil' threatens to spread 'global terror'.

As noted in Chapter 4, resilience is today a term used in many academic disciplines but first came forth in the ecological literature in the 1970s to describe the way natural ecosystems recover to a steady state after a perturbation caused by external factors. Moreover, in the hazard management literature, urban resilience has been traditionally construed as being primarily concerned with protection and recovery from natural hazards (Pelling 2003; Bosher 2008). In the context of today's new security challenges the terminology of resilience – the ability of the urban system to 'bounce-back' – is assuming a new guise, as it is increasingly coupled with counter-terrorism initiatives by Governments across the globe. The primary proclaimed objective of such resilient planning is to restrict opportunities for terrorists to penetrate targets and to take measures to mitigate the impacts of successful strikes (Coaffee et al. 2008a).

Within this emerging context this chapter highlights how London authorities and business communities have responded to the risks of terrorism since 9/11 by developing a strategic framework of resilience. In order to do this, the chapter is divided into four main parts. The first section will reprise the post-9/11 security challenges facing London and the new requirements this necessitates in terms of counter-terrorist responses. Second, the chapter will illuminate the different roles

performed by the London resilience partnership, including: warning and informing the public about risk; encouraging business contingency planning; emergency plan preparation and testing; and, helping organise security preparations for the forthcoming 2012 Olympics and Paralympics. The third section, particularly in light of the attacks on the London transport system in July 2005, will highlight the current threats facing London, particularly with regard to the perceived need to defend crowded public places – the everyday city – from indiscriminate terror attack (Coaffee and O'Hare 2008). This section will detail key aspects of this type of resilient response including the requirement of partnership working, the use of technology, and the perceived necessity of designed-in protective security. It will also provide a case study from central New York, highlighting how London's security model is being transferred to another global city. The fourth and final part of the chapter, and the conclusion to the book, will argue that the requirement of security – of resilience – is driven, in large part, by the need to maintain or enhance a *reputation* of a city as being safe and secure. Using the idea of 'reputation risk', this section will connect counter-terrorism strategies to emerging agendas of economic development, urban regeneration and place branding. This section will also argue that London authorities and business communities have been, over the years, given the experiences of recovering from terrorist attacks, successful in creating a 'London prepared' brand for the city which can be utilised in marketing campaigns in order to attract inward investment.

Changing Rules of the Game – The Resilient Response to 9/11

As noted in previous chapters, the unprecedented events of 9/11 led to an instant counter response from London authorities and police forces which initially focused upon the overt fortressing of 'at risk' sites. After 9/11 the initial strategy adopted across London was that the police were uniquely prepared to cope with the threat given over thirty years of active experience of dealing with terrorism. The approach adopted was 'business as usual' with the balancing of security needs with realistic threat assessments. There was also a very real need to reassure global businesses that they should not relocate from London through fear of attack (Coaffee 2004). What is clear is that 9/11 refocused the minds of London's police forces on counter-terrorism, along with the realisation that high levels of technical surveillance, although being proved relatively successful against domestic and 'conventional' terrorism, might be ineffective against new terrorist methods such as the use of CBRN sources, suicide attack or hostile vehicle entry into guarded areas.

Counter-responses to pre-9/11 threats of terrorism, predominantly seen as emanating from vehicle bombs targeting major financial or political centres, often utilised planning regulations and advanced technology to create 'security zones' where access was restricted and surveillance significantly enhanced (Coaffee 2003). 9/11 made such counter terrorist tactics appear inadequate, and security policy

began to shift towards proactive, anticipatory and pre-emptive solutions. Post-9/11, metaphors of resilience have thus been extensively used to describe how cities and nations attempt to 'bounce-back' from disaster, and to the embedding of security and contingency features into organisations, planning systems and critical infrastructure protection in adaptable and flexible ways (Godschalk 2003; Coaffee 2005).

Most noticeably though, 9/11 has forced a rethinking of traditional emergency planning and counter terrorist tactics given the increased magnitude of the threats faced. More recently, the events of July 2005 have highlighted the reality of new threats, when central London was targeted by multiple coordinated attacks. Here, four suicide bombers attacked the central transport system on 7 July, killing 52 people and injuring more than 770.[1] Two weeks after the 7/7 blasts four attempted bombings took place, again targeting the underground and bus system. None of the devices exploded. A fifth device was found two days after the failed attacks. These attacks served to highlight once again the vulnerable nature of the city against new forms of terrorist attack and the expanded range of threats that must be prepared for in London as opposed to what the city faced in the 1990s. As Peter Clarke, Deputy Assistant Commissioner of the Anti-Terrorism Branch, New Scotland Yard, noted in 2006:

> The threat we now face is fundamentally different from the era of Irish terrorism in so many ways. Today's threat is global in origin, reach and ambition – as opposed to the essentially domestic nature of the Irish campaign ... There has certainly been little in the way of the determination to avoid capture that was such a hallmark of the Irish terrorist. And of course suicide has been a frequent feature of attack planning and delivery. There is no evidence of looking to restrict casualties. There are no warnings, and the intention is quite simply to kill as many people as possible …[2]

Counter-terrorist experts now talk about the 'new normality' we have entered after 9/11 where 'risks can only be managed, not completely eradicated' (Heng 2006, 70). Whereas during the Cold War the threat was perceived as monolithic, with the emergency planning response being controlled by Central Government with response from a small number of public agencies, the new world of 'resilience planning' is focused upon a series of complex threats and hazards (some of which are terrorist related), and where local government is expected to take a lead in response, enabled by a far higher level of involvement from a multitude of stakeholders and business interests.

Prior to 9/11 the UK government was already assessing the merits of developing a multi-scale resilience governance infrastructure as a result of the failure of institutional collaboration during severe incidents of flooding, fuel protests and

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1   Three bombs went off at or around 8:50am on underground trains. The final explosion was around an hour later on a bus.

2   Cited in *City Security* (2006), 20:13-15.

the spread of Foot and Mouth Disease in cattle (Smith 2003). The increased threat of terrorism post-9/11 sped up this process, leading to the development of a co-ordinated multi-level resilience infrastructure replacing previous emergency planning processes (Coaffee 2006). In particular, the influential Civil Contingencies Act (CCA 2004) sought to establish a consistent degree of civil protection and emergency preparedness across the UK (Walker and Broderick 2004; Coaffee 2006).[3] As O'Brien and Read (2005, 356) noted, the Act 'clear[ed] outdated legislation, re-defines emergencies, clearly identifies the roles and responsibilities of all participatory organisations, introduces a mandatory regime for responders and replaces the previous outdated system for emergency powers.'

London Prepared

In the UK, since the 1970s, London has understandably remained the focus of attention for terrorists, and this did not change after 9/11.[4] As a result, in 2002 and pre-dating the CCA, a specialist emergency planning partnership – the London Resilience Forum (or partnership) – was established to address the strategic emergency planning needs of London, which were seen as well-developed for dealing with conventional emergencies, but required re-evaluation in the light of the 9/11 attacks:

> 11 September 2001 brought sharply into focus the need for London to be able to respond quickly and effectively if a similar incident occurred in the capital. A coalition of key agencies – known as the London Resilience Partnership – joined forces in May 2002 to plan and prepare for potential emergencies. This was the first time a strategic, pan-London regime was established that could co-ordinate planning across London (London Prepared 2003).

The London Resilience forum operates as a strategic partnership and includes representatives from London's emergency services, transport sectors, the health sector, central and local government (including the Greater London Authority), private utility companies, the military, the business community, and the voluntary sector.[5] In particular, the scale and nature of the threat has necessitated that the police forces across London – the City, Metropolitan and British Transport forces – enhance their coordinated response in line with that already in place under Operation Rainbow – the operation run out of the Metropolitan Police which coordinates London's response to terrorism. Operation Rainbow, as noted in Chapter 5 was set up in the wake of the 1993 Bishopsgate bombing in the City of

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3   Such a resilience governance infrastructure applies to both terrorist attack (such as July 2005 in central London) but also other risk events such as fears over avian influenza (February 2007) or foot and mouth disease (August 2007).

4   Parts of the forthcoming discussion draw from recent accounts by Coaffee (2006) and Coaffee et al. (2008b).

5   The London Resilience Team act as a secretariat for the forum.

London. Post-9/11, and in particular after 7/7 this ongoing operation was seen as vital. As noted in the House of Commons:

> The Operation Rainbow unit provides a link between the intelligence and uniform services, a further part of the unit's role is to provide public reassurance and encourage security measures. This is achieved through Operation Rainbow co-ordinators working at a borough level with police, community and business in partnerships. The use of CCTV is a valuable tool when looking at the protection of local vulnerabilities and the development of local intelligence. It requires minimal resources thus freeing other much needed MPS [Metropolitan Police Service] resources for counter terrorism initiatives. With the ever increasing numbers of CCTV cameras being used by businesses it is a tool that can be (is) used in partnership, to prevent, disrupt and detect terrorist crime at the reconnaissance, preparation and attack phases, as well as one that would help with post incident investigation.[6]

After 9/11 the primary aims of the pan-London response centred upon restricting the opportunities for terrorists to strike and in preparing the capital for the *inevitable* attack (which came in July 2005). In other words it was not a case of whether London would be targeted but when and where – a situation that required pre-emptive anticipatory planning.

This was not a new rhetoric and was one that became particularly pertinent in central London. Sir John Stevens Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, speaking in the wake of the 2004 Madrid train attacks[7] noted that a terror attack on London is 'inevitable':

> We do know that we have actually stopped terrorist attacks happening in London but, as the Prime Minister and Home Secretary have said, there is an inevitability that some sort of attack will get through but my job is to make sure that does not happen (Stevens, cited in *BBC News* 2004).[8]

After 7/7 the rhetoric of inescapable attack was particularly prominent, not only with regard to the transport network, but also London's key business districts' where a police report talked of an 'inevitable' attack against 'the obvious target' – the financial zones of London (BBC 2005). Moreover, the Commissioner of the

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6   Memorandum from the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) (TS 29), January 2006 (http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.com/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmtran/191/191we21.htm).

7   On the 11 March 2004, commuter trains in Madrid were attacked a by series of coordinated bombings killing 191 people and wounding 1,800.

8   The BBC also noted that the then London Mayor, Ken Livingstone, who said it would be 'miraculous' if London escaped attack, and a Cabinet Minister noted that the UK was a 'frontline target' for attack by international terrorists.

City of London Police highlighted that there had been 'hostile reconnaissance' of the City on several occasions since the September 11 attacks:[9]

> Potential targets that had been staked out included iconic sites, businesses and prominent buildings. Every successful terrorist group pre-surveys its target. There's no doubt we've been subject to that surveillance. If you want to hurt the Government, hurt people and you want to cause maximum disruption … where better to hit than at the financial centre?[10]

Police sources still see the City of London as the central target in London. This is an area today that is genuinely an international crowded place – an area that generates 10 per cent of the UK GDP, has a $500 billion foreign exchange turnover, controls 56 per cent of the Global equity market, and has 400,000 workers and over 5,550 foreign banks (Lovegrove 2007[11]). As a result of its continued exposure to terrorist risk after 7/7, and from a physical and preventative security perspective, on 10 August 2005 the City of London's ring of steel was widened to encircle more businesses through the addition of new designated checkpoints at entrances to the cordon (see Figure 10.1). This made permanent a 'temporary' scheme that had been introduced in 2003 (Chapter 9).[12]

The Roles of London Resilience

In broad terms the role of the London Resilience Forum (LRF) in countering the threat and impact of terrorist attack is fourfold, and based predominantly on attempts to retain a competitive business edge for London.

The *first* key role of the LRF is to disseminate information to Londoners and local governments (and tourists) so that they might be better prepared to protect themselves in the event of an attack. In the context of the terrorist threat, the development of 'community resilience' or the 'responsible citizen' is seen as increasingly important where advice offered by public authorities are likely in the future to increasingly pass the responsibility of emergency response to communities and individuals as a supplement to more detailed strategic and institutional strategies (Mythen, and Walklate 2006; Coaffee and Rogers 2008a).

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9   It is now known that terrorist often plan attacks in detail over a period of time, especially multiple coordinated strikes, and reconnoitre the target area on a number of occasions in advance of any attack.

10   Cited in *Edinburgh Evening News* (2005).

11   The then Head of Counter-terrorism, City of London Police.

12   It has also been possible to make further environmental improvements within this expanded zone through the installation of traffic calming regulations for restricted speed of traffic.

Figure 10.1   A new entry point into the ring of steel

Most noticeable in London (and in other UK cities) have been a series of 'anti-terror hotline' poster campaigns. These campaigns began in 2004 with the 'Life Savers' campaign in the wake of the Madrid train bombings, which encouraged the public to report suspicious behaviour to the police. The national Government's commitment to educating the public about the 'new' threats faced by international terrorism (and other risks) was further highlighted in 2004 a booklet '*Preparing for Emergencies: What you need to know*'. This was delivered to every household in London, and across the UK, to inform the public about the 'self protection' measures they might take in the event of a CBRN attack (Home Office 2004).

Vaughan-Williams (2009, 73) further describes how the 'Life Savers' campaign was followed up by a series of posters using the headline 'If you suspect it report it' which were launched in 2006 and 2007. These new campaigns sought the public's help if they saw 'unusual' activity, for example, on the transport network,

Figure 10.2   The City of London's public alert system

in residential neighbourhoods or in central urban areas where people were taking
photographs of iconic sites or security systems. Vaughan-Williams notes of such
activity: 'thus the citizen detective is asked not only to be active in civic spaces
but also in what might otherwise have been considered domestic spaces …' (ibid.,
74). These campaigns were re-released in 2008 with the implication that it is *your
moral duty* as a *responsible citizen* to report suspicious behaviour to the police
(Coaffee et al. 2008b).

Certain areas of London have also developed public alert systems as part of
a resilient approach to mitigate the impact of terrorism. In May 2007 the City of
London police unveiled a new public warning system consisting of eight pole-
mounted loud-speakers which will be activated to warn the public of terrorist
attack or to evacuate areas of the Square Mile (see Figure 10.2).

As a senior police officer commented:

> The City of London and the City of London police already have many method of communicating with business workers and resident in the Square Mile … This system is an additional tool to ensure that the Square mile is prepared to cope with a major [terrorist] incident.[13]

This system, capable of broadcasting messages that can be heard 150m away, has been installed so that the City can demonstrate to its community that it is taking the threat of terrorism seriously, but also to meet its statutory obligations under resilience legislation. The 2004 CCA stipulated that all local authorities have a duty to 'warn and inform' the public of risks they are liable to face.

The *second* role of the LRF is to encourage business continuity planning which involves liaison with individual business and business associations to promote proactive contingency and security planning. Such plans should be updated and regularly tested so as to enable a return to 'business as usual' strategy as soon as possible after an incident. This was a particular concern as in 2004, a year before 7/7, a survey by the National Counter Terrorism Security Office (NaCTSO), the London Chamber of Commerce and Industry and London First,[14] indicated that only 58 per cent of London businesses had adequate security and contingency plans in place highlighting an degree of apathy towards the threat of terrorism (*Think London*[15] 2004). The events of 7/7 provided the impetus for many more London businesses to reassess their contingency planning arrangements:

> Despite the warnings, many businesses in London thought 'it will never happen to us'. The tragic events of July 7th were a stark wake-up call for businesses in the capital … The need for tight security and effective business continuity planning is more important now than ever.[16]

As a consequence of 7/7, at the end of July 2005, a new document – *Secure in the Knowledge: Building a secure business* – was also circulated to many businesses in London.[17]

The CCA 2004 made the promotion of business continuity planning a legal obligation of local government (from May 2006). London Authorities agreed a pan-London strategy to promote such measures which was significantly influenced

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13   Cited in *BBC News* (2007). To date (as of early 2009) this system has not been activated.

14   London First is a business membership group supported by 300 of the capital's leading businesses with the shared objective of improving and promoting London.

15   *Think London* is the official inward investment agency for London.

16   *City Security* (2005), 18:13.

17   This document was support by London First, the National Counter Terrorism Security Office and the Security Services.

by the City of London, as well as other organisations that promote business continuity such as The Business Continuity Institute and London First. The City of London, given its experiences in the 1990s had effectively been encouraging robust contingency planning for many years. Despite such a push towards business continuity planning a further report from the London Chamber of Commerce one year after 7/7 suggested that across London the number of firms with adequate contingency planning had actually reduced from 46 per cent in September 2005 to 41 per cent in May 2006.[18]

The *third* key role of the LRF is in the development and testing of a series of strategic emergency plans for London; for example for mass fatality planning, responses to flu pandemics, the setting up of Humanitarian Assistance centres, or the development of evacuation plans (called Operation Sassoon). These plans are regularly validated in tabletop or even live simulation, which also give an opportunity to test standard procedures and assess staff competencies.

Examples of such London-wide tests have included *Exercise Capital Response* in 2002 and *Exercise Capital Focus* in 2003. *Capital Response* was a table-top test which exercised the 'command, control, communication and consequence management issues following a catastrophic incident' to ascertain if current structures and provision could cope with an event on the scale of 9/11 (London Prepared 2006). *Exercise Capital Focus* (in 2003) tested the revised structures in an exercise designed to trial communication arrangements and information flows between the lead responders and Government.[19]

The most high profile test conducted to date was *Exercise Osiris II* in 2003 which aimed to test specific elements of the operational response to a chemical attack on the London Underground. This exercise focused on Bank Junction in the heart of the City of London, and followed a desk-top exercise *Osiris I*. For this day-long test the City of London was 'locked down' and London's emergency services were tested for their state of preparedness, and their ability to work in a coordinated fashion, giving emergency services the opportunity to test the effectiveness of new specialist equipment, including chemical suits (Coaffee et al. 2008b). This saw dramatic newspaper headlines (Are we ready for the worst? *Guardian* 8 September) alongside images of specially trained police wandering around the streets of the City of London in full-body protective suits (see front cover of this book). Following from this, and specifically in relation to the Square Mile, the City of London Police now carry out CBRN profiling at a number of iconic sites on a quarterly basis (Safer City Partnership 2008). Moreover, table-top exercises are regularly undertaken in the Square Mile to simulate the coordination

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18   Cited in *City Security* (2006), 21:10.

19   There is a tendency, given the amount of testing that now occurs to assume this is a reaction to the events of 9/11. It is important to note however that in London tests have been an ongoing part of emergency planning for many years. Tests, for instance, on the underground network have been a regular occurrence since the mid-1990s, stimulated by the 1995 Tokyo subway attack.

of emergency stakeholders and to show areas where enhancement is required. For example, in April 2007 *Exercise Candlewick* was conducted, using a scenario of a terrorist attack against the City. The exercise was run in real time from the Guildhall and aimed to test the setting up of a City of London coordination centre.[20]

In terms of pan-London exercises, the biggest post-9/11 transatlantic counter-terrorism exercise, *Atlantic Blue*, was conducted in April 2005 involving the UK, US and Canada (known as *TopOff 3* in the US and *Triple Play* in Canada). This was a major counter-terrorism exercise that simulated internationally linked terrorist incidents. The UK used London's transport system as its simulation test-bed in order to asses the vulnerability of passengers when bombs were left on buses and the underground (the events of July 2005 followed this pattern). The UK command scenario involved 2,000 personnel from the Metropolitan Police, City of London and British Transport police services, the Ministry of Defence and numerous government departments and agencies, two London Borough councils, the fire and ambulance and health services. This provided the opportunity to test the existing procedures for domestic and international incident management and public information dissemination. The evaluation of this test also raised serious concerns over 'soft' targets in London (Townsend and Hinsliff 2005).

An evaluation of the response to 7/7 (see later sections) has allowed further refinement to emergency plans and procedures (particularly the exposure of shortcomings in technological compatibility issues on the ground, such as frequency of radios, the ability of telecoms to operate underground, and air filtration and circulation systems). The findings of the Government enquiry into the response on 7 July stimulated another round of investment and highlighted refined certain areas of capability that was in need of future development (London Assembly 2006).

The *fourth* key role of the LRF is in the emerging security arrangements surrounding the 2012 Summer Olympic and Paralympic Games. On 6 July 2005, London was awarded the 2012 Olympic Games by the International Olympic Committee (IOC) having persuaded the voting panel that the city could organise the event efficiently, and importantly, safely (Coaffee and Johnston 2007). The London organising committee (London 2012) in their Candidate File submitted to the IOC in 2004 had argued that London was uniquely placed to offer a secure venue for the Olympics given its many decades of experience with coping with Irish terrorism (London 2012 2004, 31).

The day after the 2012 Games were awarded to London a number of suicide bombers detonated homemade bombs on the London transport system. Almost immediately the estimated cost of security for the 2012 games increased

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20   *City Security* (Autumn 2007), 25:23. Prior to this exercise the City, in conjunction with Canary Wharf Ltd and the Home Office, had run a covert terrorism role play exercise (Inside Out). The scenario enacted involved a person gaining a position in a leading firm, becoming radicalised and committing fraud by sending monies aboard to support overseas terrorist activates (*City Security*, Summer 2007, 24:3). This was the first of this type of exercise run in the UK.

dramatically from a naively low estimate of $450 million to over $1.5 billion (Coaffee and Johnston 2007).

The LRF was commissioned to scope the extent of Olympic resilience preparedness across agencies in London, and to co-ordinate pan-London resilience activity for the Games. This will involve liaison with key agencies such as the Olympic Delivery Authority, the London Organising Committee, various Government Departments involved in security-related issues, and the Association of Chief Police Officers (London Prepared 2007).

The IOC makes it clear that the Olympics should be an international sporting event, *not* an international security event (Thompson 1999). However, given the changing nature of the terrorist threat 'securing' the Olympics is increasingly difficult and costly. Here though, it is clear that solutions need to combine managerial co-ordination and innovative design approaches to physical security, to ensure the host city does not become 'siege-like' but is resilient to possible attack. In this sense, counter-terrorist security must be comprehensive, but also as unobtrusive as possible. As the then Head of Olympic security noted in 2007:

> This is a celebration of what London is about and of the Olympics … It's not about security or safety. Making the games as accessible as we can without security being obtrusive, is the trick we have to pull off.[21]

The then Metropolitan Police Security coordinator for the 2012 Games (Tarique Ghaffur 2007) in developing such resilience arrangements has argued that a number of key principles are important. *First,* the need for counter-terrorism to operate over a defined security footprint (territory). Here the City of London's ring of steel was used an exemplary example of such a security regime. *Second*, that security enhancement is seen as an end-to-end process (from initial design consultation through to legacy) that maximises the security opportunity whilst being proportionate to the risk faced. London 2012 (2004, 27) for example, argued that surveillance and security operations will begin at the start of construction or adaptation for every venue and will continue throughout the Olympic and Paralympic Games. *Third,* that the development of security plans should occur through appropriate consultation and partnership working.

Although the plans for making the Olympic venues, and London as a whole, more resilient to any potential terror attack are currently being refined, it is possible to see the beginnings of what will be an extensive security operation taking shape.

In terms of the design of the construction of stadium design it is clear that 'secure by design' techniques will be utilised as they have been for a number of prior London developments including Heathrow Terminal Five, the Millennium Dome, Wembley and Lords Cricket Ground (Ghaffur 2007). This will involve the embedding, at the concept stage, of design features such as access control and

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21   Cited in Culf (2007), 15.

Figure 10.3   Road closures at the Olympic Park site

integrated CCTV, as well as the designing-in of 'stand-off areas' for hostile vehicle mitigation, as well as the use of more resilient building materials. Around the main venues there has also been talk of setting up advanced screening access points during the Games – the so-called 'tunnel of truth' which can check large numbers of people simultaneously for explosives, weapons and biohazards – and which could utilise face recognition CCTV which can be compared against a image-store of known or suspected terrorists.

The site for the main Olympic Park in Stratford, East London, has already been partially securitised. It was 'sealed' in July 2007 and nearby public footpaths and waterways closed for public access (Figure 10.3). The encircling 11 mile blue fence – 'cordon blue' (Figure 10.4) which was put in place for 'health and safety' reasons, has been likened by some to the Belfast peace walls (Beckett 2007). Biometric checks are also routinely carried out on the construction workforce within the sealed site.

What is clear though is that security at Games time will be ratcheted up significantly with an undoubtedly imposing and visibly policed security cordon encircling the site, whilst in the Olympic Park, inside the cordon it has been suggested that, landscaped security features and electronic devices that scan for explosives could be used. These features, if implemented, would be designed to be as unobtrusive as possible, and with a view to being kept in place post-games for legacy purposes.

Figure 10.4 The health and safety cordon surrounding the Olympic Park site

Physical security will also need to extend beyond the Olympic Park sites, as fears of the 'displacement' of possible terrorist attack persists. As such, London authorities will be using advanced surveillance to track suspects across the city including London's ever expanding system of ANPR cameras (see latter sections of this chapter). This is seen as a soft–touch approach, and preferable to having a police officer on every corner, although an extra 9000 officers are expected to be on duty in London at peak time during the Games.[22] As the then Head of Olympic security noted in 2007, Olympic security is a pan-London operation:

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22   See for example Slater (2008). Concerns have also been expressed about leaving other parts of the UK venerable to attack if police officer are drafted in from other forces.

> The whole rhythm of life in London will change as a result of these events and
> for 60 days we will have to take charge of that and make it safe in a way that
> people can enjoy themselves … 9000 officers at the peak is a heck of an ask.[23]

A ticket trafficking system, which would allow spectators to be tracked from their home, has also been suggested (see for example Wilson 2008).

In the build up to the Games, different scenario table-top tests will be played-out for dealing with major incidents, including terrorism, to allow logistics such as cordon placement and evacuation routes to be planned in advance. The aim of all the security preparations and testing is to allow 'customer-sensitive' security to prevail which will provide the highest possible levels of security without resulting in having to 'lock down' the entire city, as has happened with other major sporting events (see for example Coaffee and Johnston 2007 for a review of this).

The prior discussion on London's resilience approach has drawn out a number of key principles that are worth reiterating with regard to the forthcoming discussion regarding specific counter-terrorist interventions in London. *First*, the emphasis on preparedness rather than reactive post-event recovery and management. Such anticipatory work will involve both physical design (designing-in security at the pre-construction stage in preference to costly and less effective retrofitting solutions) and managerial aspects (developing business continuity plans which are tested). *Second*, the importance of a flexible and multi-pronged approach which can deal with changing threat profiles and a range of emergency situations. *Third*, the key role of collaborative institution resilience with a variety of stakeholders being brought into the overall resiliency effort. *Fourth*, and specifically with regard to countering terrorism, importance should be placed on the social impact of security feature and media campaigns, through it is noted that some believe these might exacerbate a culture of fear or promote feeling of anxiety (Massumi 2005; Coaffee et al. 2009). These principles will be returned to as the chapter progresses.

The Emerging Threat: 'CONTEST' and the Targeting of Crowded Public Places

As noted above, today in the UK, and especially London, resilience against terrorism has undoubtedly become a relevant concept for politicians and policy makers alike (Coaffee 2007). Since early 2003, the UK has had a specific long-term strategy for developing resilience for counter-terrorism (known within Government as CONTEST). Its aim is to reduce the risk of terrorism – improve UK resilience – so that people can go about their daily lives freely and with

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23   Cited in Culf (2007, 15).

confidence. This resilience strategy aims to both reduce the likelihood of a place being attacked, and assist in responding if an attack occurs (Home Office 2006).

In March 2009, the UK's CONTEST strategy was updated (Home Office 2009) to take into account how the threat facing the UK has expanded since 2003 and how this might evolve further in the future. The refreshed document also reflects the increased amount of resources that has been made available to counter terrorism, and how, over time, national and international partnerships have increasingly characterised security efforts.

CONTEST has forced a rethinking of traditional emergency planning and counter terrorism tactics given the increased magnitude of the threats faced. More recently, CONTEST has focused upon the threat posed by person-borne explosive devices in public areas. The aim of such attacks is mass casualty strikes using multiple coordinated explosions. Such a changing mode of terrorist attack is now setting new challenges for security agencies. Such attacks, are tactically aimed at 'soft targets' and more generally crowded places – such as hospitals, schools, shopping centres, entertainment and leisure complexes, iconic and tourist sites, the rail network, and religious sites. Crowded public places, despite being considered to be at high risk, cannot be subject to traditional security approaches such as searches and checkpoints without radically changing public experience (Coaffee et al. 2008a).

This concern for the vulnerability of crowded public places has been longstanding, but has received greater policy attention at certain times, most notably after the 7/7 attacks. Importantly, the emergency plans developed by the London Resilience forum that were utilised for this incident appeared to work well, although, as noted, it was acknowledged that lessons can be learnt (London Assembly 2006).

Economically, the success of the response and recovery planning after 7/7 was summed up by the limited economic impact as a result of the bombings. After an initial fall, the FTSE 100 index at the close of trading was only 1 per cent down on the previous day. This deficit was fully recovered on 8 July (*BBC News* 2005). The major financial institutions, including The Bank of England, and The Treasury also revealed in the aftermath of the bomb that the major financial zones in London had been able to keep trading as a result of long standing contingency planning arrangements that has established up a 'secret chatroom' to allow communication between financial institutions and traders (ibid.). As a security advisor noted: 'contingency planning by banks has increased considerably in last three years, post-September 11, and what yesterday shows is that the planning has worked'.[24] The insurance impact of the July 2005 attacks was also minimal, although there was a slight increase in demand for cover. Although the damage caused was substantial, the reserves (over £2 billion was built up by the Pool over the early years of the Twenty-First century) meant Pool Re could easily cover the claims made.

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24   Cited in *BBC News* 2005.

Today's security challenges facing global business centres are ever changing, necessitating increased attention being given to both preventative and recovery strategies of urban resilience. Such strategies are varied and multiple. The next section draws out four key themes inherent in such discussions and exemplify these through a discussion of contemporary practice from London: the importance of partnership working and professional training; the expanded role of technology; the designing-in of counter-terrorism features to the physical fabric of cities; and finally, the transferability of resilience solutions to other global cities.

The Importance of Partnership Working and Professional Training

Terrorist targeting, predominantly by Al-Qaeda-linked groups against the UK, is still focused upon London, particularly the financial zones where maximum economic damage can be done to UK Plc. In this context it is important that risk management and counter-terrorist efforts in such areas are channelled effectively. Robust physical security measures are one solution, although they are only one part of the response needed to enhancing overall resiliency. As Iain Donald, Director of Control Risks, noted, training to enable business to assist the police with counter-terror operations is essential:

> Other – often more effective – solutions include the training of staff. Properly trained staff are better able to control the environment around them, and better placed to respond to emergencies. Arguably with the threat to London business well established, organisations based in the City have at least some responsibility to provide their employees with training commensurate to that risk …[25]

In 2004, responding to this challenge, the City of London Police and the Metropolitan Police launched Project Griffin as a joint partnership initiative.[26] The aim was to bring together the police and other emergency services, local authorities, and the private security sector, in order to coordinate efforts by working together to deter, disrupt and support operations in response to terrorist activity within London. The key aim of Project Griffin was concerned with training to disrupt hostile reconnaissance as well as aiming to provide cordon support and/or high visibility patrols, and supporting the police service during critical incidents. As the Assistant Commissioner of the City of London police noted in 2007: 'Project Griffin has really helped us to build relationships with key partners in the community, which has in turn given the police more eyes and ears on the streets to help identify suspicious behaviour.'[27] For example, on 7/7 in the central financial

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25　*City Security* (2007), 26:2.

26　The Griffin is the symbol of the City of London and it is contained within its coat of arms. The City traditionally marked its boundaries with statues of a single 'Griffin' carrying the City coat of arms at each road leading into the City of London.

27　*City Security* (2006), 21:3.

zones of London numerous, Project Griffin-trained private security guards assisted the police. In the UK Project Griffin has been hailed a success and has (at the time of writing) been rolled out to a further 30 cities in the UK.

Project Griffin was also designed as an internationally transferable product. For example the Mumbai equivalent – Project Sayhog – went live in the summer of 2008 and encompasses a steering committee drawn from major financial firms, security providers and the Anti-Terrorist task force. In August 2008 a similar scheme was launched in Bangalore (Sayhog Bangalore).[28] These developments in India were in response to a series of recent bomb attacks in major cities, and become all the more pertinent in the wake of the Mumbai attacks in late 2008.[29] Other locations adopting the Griffin brand are Singapore (Project Singa) (August 2008); Australia (including Sydney and Perth) (Winter 2006); South Africa (Spring 2007),[30] Canada; and, New York. Hong Kong and Macau (China) have also received presentations from the City of London Police regarding the adoption of the product. Police forces in Germany, France and Hungary, amongst others, have also expressed an interest in adopting Griffin training events.[31]

Police forces nationwide, including the City and Metropolitan police, also liaise with the National Counter Terrorism Security Office to deliver specialist courses on preparing for, and recovery from, terrorist attacks with a particular emphasis on enhancing protective security (Project Argus – Area Reinforcement Gained Using Scenarios). Specialist Argus events for structural engineers, architects and planners have also been rolled out across London and across the UK.[32] As a Counter Terrorist Security Advisor (CTSA) working in the City of London noted (2007) of such a programme:

> The project highlights the importance of businesses being prepared and having necessary plans in place to help safeguard staff, customers and company assets. It also emphasises the need to practice those plans regularly. Project ARGUS is a key part of the City of London Police's overall aim to reduce the risk of terrorism so that people can go about their daily lives and business freely, and with confidence.[33]

The Role of Technology and Traffic Management

Managing resilience through partnership working, and the provision of adequate training, are key aspects of the overall resiliency approach. Such managerial

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28   *City Security* (2008), 29:3.

29   A series of coordinated attacks carried out by 10 terrorists against India's financial centre. Over 170 people were killed.

30   *City Security* (2006), 22:2.

31   Interview with Senior City of London Counter Terrorist Officer, October 2008.

32   For more information see http://www.nactso.gov.uk/argus.php.

33   *City Security* (2007), 26:13.

strategies are often reinforced through the adoption of new technology. Technology is particularly utilised to improve territoriality and to provide authorities and security agencies the ability to record, monitor and track 'suspect' individuals and vehicles.[34]

It is clear that anti-crime strategies are being increasingly deployed to avert terrorism. This occurs not just through reactive design-out crime measures but through the array of surveillance devices, most notably CCTV, that now swamp many urban areas. For example, it was commonly suggested in the late 1990s that the average Londoner was caught on camera 300 times a day (see for example Armstrong and Norris 1999). As Pete Fussey (2007, 171) noted, CCTV systems are deemed acceptable as a counter-terror measure as their successes are loudly trumpeted in the media:

> Surveillance technologies are increasingly introduced and legitimized in terms of counterterrorism, and this association is routinely projected onto the public consciousness through such occurrences as the posthumous closed circuit television footage of the London suicide bombers following July 7, 2005.

In previous chapters it has been highlighted how the City of London has become one, if not the, most surveilled place on the planet, as a result of attempts to deter terrorist attack. It is, however, important to note that the London Underground metro system also has a large camera presence with more than 6,000 CCTV cameras located in trains and on stations, and overall, Transport for London uses over 10,000 CCTV cameras in its rail network, including on, roads and buses.

The rationale for the use of the majority of these cameras, until recently, tended to be for post-event identification and to aid police investigations. More recently, new types of high-tech camera have been developed which are aimed at pre-event disruption through the identification of suspicious behaviour. This is potentially an important development given the clear indication that traditional surveillance is no deterrent against the new breed of urban ('suicide') terrorist. For example, on parts of the London Underground in 2004, in response to the Madrid train bombings, a high-tech 'smart' CCTV surveillance software system (Intelligent Pedestrian Surveillance system, IPS), was rolled out. This system, in theory, would automatically alert operators to 'suspicious' behaviour, unattended packages and potential suicide bombing attempts on the Tube system. The system it is claimed 'automatically tracks and integrates 3D images with CCTV video, maps and other real-time information. As it is a software system, it can be overlaid on top of existing CCTV network architectures' (Twist 2005). The implementation of this system followed extensive trials, which initially had little to do with terrorism and predated 9/11. The original intention was to develop a crowd flow monitoring system that morphed into something more as its potential to spot those waiting on

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34   The increased role given over to technology in the fight against terrorism does of course also mean an enhanced role for the private security industry.

station platforms to commit suicide was realised (Graham and Wood 2003). As noted at the time in *New Scientist*:

> It could be the dawn of a new era in surveillance. For the first time, smart software will help CCTV operators spot any abnormal behaviour. The software, which analyses CCTV footage, could help spot suicide attempts, overcrowding, suspect packages and trespassers. The hope is that by automating the prediction or detection of such events security staff … can reach the scene in time to prevent a potential tragedy (Hogan 2003).

The City of London police have also expressed interest in integrating such tracking systems into its existing camera network at some point in the future.[35]

Another example of the adoption of new counter-terror technology comes from Canary Wharf (in the London Docklands) an area which since the late 1990s have had some of the most advanced counter-terrorism features in the UK. The mangers of the area employ their own security company and deploy measures that have sought to reassure the business community that all is safe. In late 2006, a new set of measures was introduced at the Canary Wharf complex including spectroscopy explosives detectors and hand-held explosive devices. Furthermore, a terahertz scanning system[36] was also deployed to detect concealed person-borne explosive devices.[37] This was seen as 'world first' installation of a system designed to detect potential suicide bombers (Sims 2006). The Director of Group security on the Canary Wharf estate noted that the scanning system was 'designed to detect suicide bombers by 'peering' through clothing. It is claimed the software 'can recognise hazardous liquids or chemicals, person-borne explosives or bomb-making components even if the individual being scanned has hidden them under clothing or behind a bag'.[38] In addition many of the 400 security staff at Canary Wharf have also received training in behaviour pattern recognition – related to the body language displayed by suicide bombers before they blow themselves up or those undertaking hostile reconnaissance.

The constant upgrading of counter-terrorist security systems at Canary Wharf are clearly aimed at maintaining its reputation as a safe and secure business location – an ongoing project which began in the early 1990s due to the threat of the Provisional IRA attack (Chapter 8). In 2006, a spokesperson for the Canary

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35   Interview with a Senior City of London Police Officer, 2008.

36   This device is manufactured by Oxford-based ThruVision, and is reliant upon the still-emerging science of TeraHertz waves (or T-Waves) designed to provide more detailed imagery than the average X-ray scanner.

37   Cited in *City Security* (2007), 23:13. The system at Canary Wharf is part of a wider anti-suicide bombing project (codenamed '*Nemesis*').

38   Cited in Sims (2006).

Figure 10.5 Congestion charging cameras in Central London

Wharf Group, noted that 'the system was being installed to reassure companies, their staff and the public that the site was as safe as it could be'.[39]

The new scanning system was installed to complement a series of existing counter-terror technologies already deployed in the area, such as ANPR cameras, under vehicle surveillance systems and explosive particle detector systems, as well as an extensive CCTV network.

In recent years, advanced surveillance technology has also been rolled-out across vast expanses of London under the guise of traffic management. The ANPR technology developed throughout the City's attempts to deter Provisional IRA has been deployed across central London for use in traffic 'congestion charging' which

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39   Cited in Leppard (2006).

started in February 2003.[40] All number plate images are captured when entering the zone by ANPR camera technology and automatically matched against database of those registered to pay or have exemptions (see Figure 10.5).

The City of London itself is on the eastern border of the zone. In essence Inner London has been circled by digital cameras, creating a dedicated 'surveillance ring' and affording London's police forces vast surveillance gathering capabilities for tracking the movement of traffic and people, and by inference, highlighting potential terrorist threats.

Such a counter-terrorist function for the new congestion zone was largely absent from information and promotional material circulated about the scheme. In essence it can, in many ways be considered a full scale extension to the City of London's ring of steel. As noted in *The Observer* newspaper at the time.[41]

> Security cameras will be able to zoom in on the faces of drivers entering London's congestion charge zone as part of a sophisticated 'ring of steel' around the capital.

The Observer alleged that 'MI5, Special Branch and the Metropolitan Police began secretly developing the system in the wake of the 11 September attacks'. As such, 'the controversial charging scheme will create one of the most daunting defence systems protecting a major world city.' It was also alleged that 'the system also utilises facial recognition software which automatically identifies suspects or known criminals who enter the eight-square-mile zone', although this type of technology is unlikely to have been used.[42]

Not surprisingly, civil libertarians felt 'misled' over this hidden use for the scheme which was promoted solely as an attempt to beat traffic congestion. *The Observer* article notes Gareth Crossman, policy director of Liberty who noted:

> There is an issue we are concerned about which is called "function creep" ... This is where we are told that a system is being set up and used for a certain purpose and then we find out it is being used for another totally different one. It is a dangerous precedent … We would be concerned that it would be just a "fishing" exercise where large amounts of data are passed over to the police or the security services and they just sift through it.

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40   Such a scheme was intended to reduce congestion (by 10 per cent) which was regarded as a major negative feature for international businesses locating in central London. This was part of a wider integrated transport strategy for the capital.

41   Townsend and Harris (2003).

42   Using facial recognition technology to 'snap' the driver rather than the number plate of a vehicle would also necessitate different legislation (under the 1998 Data Protection Act) and a rigorous code of conduct set up for operators and monitors of the system. There are also significant doubts over the accuracy of such technology.

In February 2007, the spatial extent of the congestion change zone was expanded westwards to cover much of the City of Westminster and Chelsea. The rationale for the scheme was seen to be the reduced levels of traffic in the existing zone after its introduction in 2003. It also permitted digital rather than analogue cameras to be installed. Soon after its implementation, and amidst a gradual roll-out of ANPR cameras across the UK,[43] a leaked Home Office memorandum highlighted that the Home Secretary had waived some of the safeguards in the Data Protection Act to allow transfers of congestion charge and CCTV data from Transport for London, *en masse* to the Metropolitan Police for the specific purpose of tracking terrorists. Civil liberty campaigners fear such data would be used to prosecute traffic related offences. As the Director of Liberty noted in 2007:

> It is one thing to ask the public for special measures to fight the grave threat of terrorism, but when that becomes a Trojan horse for mass snooping for more petty measures it only leads to a loss of trust in the government.[44]

Since the introduction of ANPR technology, developed during the first Gulf war and introduced into City of London in 1997, its growth and range of uses has expanded dramatically. As noted by Murakami Wood et al. (2006, 27):

> The story of ANPR in London also shows that function creep works in several ways: the technology was originally developed for military purposes, installed to help identify IRA bombers, and now has a role in traffic management, local government revenue raising and security against a new generation of terrorists

It is not only in London that such technology has been deployed. In central Manchester in North West England, after the 1996 bomb (see Chapter 8) one of the most notable aspects of the subsequent city centre revival has been a surge in the installation of CCTV cameras. This began as a relatively small initiative in 1998 with only 19 cameras dotted around the central city, but has expanded in line with regeneration activity. In 2008 over 80 coordinated cameras and hundreds of private cameras have been installed to monitor the city centre, including a series of ANPR cameras, creating the most advanced CCTV system in the UK outside of central London (see Figure 10.6).[45]

As the local newspaper – the *Manchester Evening News* (MEN) – under the headline 'Spy cameras sweep the city', reported:

> EVERY car coming into Manchester is being snapped by a new network of police spy cameras. Each day, 600,000 motorists' journeys are being captured,

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43   As of July 2007 there were over 2000 ANPR cameras nationwide.

44   Cited in Travis (2007).

45   The system is coordinated through a wireless network (called Manchester Metronet).

Figure 10.6   ANPR cameras in central Manchester – installed in 2008

and the data will be stored for five years. The cameras have been installed on the 12 major routes into the city, making it virtually impossible to travel into the middle of Manchester and not have your number plate recorded (Taylor 2008, 1, their emphasis).

Manchester is the first city in the UK outside of London to use ANPR cameras, developed in the City of London in the early 1990s, in this way. Despite complaints by civil rights protesters about the imposition of 'mass surveillance', the MEN further noted that:

Police will store details of the licence plate, colour of car and a time stamp on a central computer. They say it will help *combat terrorism*, crime and vehicle theft (ibid., emphasis added).

In Manchester today the professed aim is simple – to create a permeable surveillance ring around the rejuvenated city centre to improve safety, reduce the fear and occurrence of crime, encourage the influx of shoppers, residents, tourists and businesses, and provide protection for critical commercial infrastructure (Coaffee and Rogers 2008).

The advancement of science and technology in the fight against terrorism has also led to the publication of *The United Kingdom Security and Counter-Terrorism Science and Innovation Strategy* (HM Government 2007b). This strategy addresses, amongst other things, how technologies are being developed and deployed to aid the pursuit and disruption of terrorist organisations; behavioural profiling; the protection of key sites; and the aiding of response and recovery from terrorist attack.

The use of this new range of technological gadgetry in the 'War on Terror' has, not surprisingly, been subject to criticism regarding issue of freedom of access and movement, particularly regarding how the data collected through such schemes might form part of wider surveillance databases used for profiling purposes, and to justify pre-emptive and affective policy-making. There have also been a series of concerns regarding how counter-terrorism is being used as a justification for the creep or surge of surveillance into everyday life. As the authors of a report into the surveillance society noted in 2006:

> The final question for surveillance society has to do with a nagging worry that surveillance, especially that associated with high technology and antiterrorism, distracts from alternatives and from larger and more urgent questions. We may ask whether this is really the best way of pursuing these goals. Unfortunately, and without succumbing to cynicism, we have to note that procuring new technology surveillance supports the economy, helps to keep out undesirables, yields the appearance of definite action, gives the impression that the exits are sealed and supports a business-as-usual attitude (Murakami Wood et al. 2006, 5)

The routinisation of surveillance, and its expansion, is one that constantly fills the pages of policy documents and media reports. At the same time, the efficacy of technology-focused counter-terrorism policy responses has been called into question and there are warnings about the danger of seeing science and technology as a panacea to more deep seated social and cultural challenges (Durodie 2006). For example, in a 2009 report entitled *Surveillance: Citizens and the State*, published by the House of Lords, it was noted that:

> Surveillance is an inescapable part of life in the UK. Every time we make a telephone call, send an email, browse the internet, or even walk down our local high street, our actions may be monitored and recorded. To respond to crime, combat the *threat of terrorism*, and improve administrative efficiency, successive UK governments have gradually constructed one of the most extensive and

technologically advanced surveillance systems in the world (House of Lords
2009, 5, emphasis added).

Moreover, there has been a rapid rise in the popularity of so-called 'smart' CCTV
which are increasingly able to embed biometrics – not just in terms of iris scanning,
finger printing and facial recognition, but also in relation to behavioural patterns
(for example the cues given off by potential suicide bombers) and gait analysis
(walking style). These technologies are well developed in the laboratory and are
beginning to make an appearance on the high street.[46]

Protecting Soft Targets

As noted earlier, current counter-terrorism strategies are increasingly focused upon
the protection of crowded public places (Coaffee et al. 2008; Coaffee and O'Hare
2008). On 25 July 2007, shortly after failed car bomb attacks against a London
nightclub and Glasgow Airport, and two years after 7/7, the UK Prime Minister,
Gordon Brown, provided a statement on security in which he said 'the protection
and resilience of our major infrastructure and crowded places requires continuous
vigilance' (Brown 2007a). He added that 900 shopping centres, stadiums and venues
have already been assessed by counter terrorism security advisors, with 10,000
other premises given updated security advice. The July 2007 attacks elicited a rapid
response in London, with the City of London Police noting that it was 'operating at
a high level of vigilance and liasing with other forces to do everything it could to
protect the public'.[47] This included manning the entry points into the ring of steel,
increasing the number of patrolling officers more generally, and instigating a far
higher number of stop and search checks. The same occurred at the Iron Collar
on the Docklands, and with entry into the Canary Wharf complex. Businesses in
the City, and elsewhere in London, were also taking further precautions, with extra
security guards. As one investment banker working at Canary Wharf noted; 'security
is much more visible; it's been stepped up all over'.[48]

Indeed figures realised in 2009 highlighted that in 2008 somebody was stopped
and searched under Section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000 by the Metropolitan
Police every 3 minutes. For example, in 2008 a Section 44 stop occurred 170,000
times in London, up from 72,000 in 2007. The Metropolitan Police put this large
increase down to enhanced terrorist activity since the failed attacks in July 2007. As
a Metropolitan Police spokesman noted:

> The threat to London from terrorism is real and serious and these powers are a
> vital tactic in our counter terrorism strategy ... They can disrupt and deter terrorist

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46   See for example Pollitt (2009).
47   Cited in Muspratt (2007), 83.
48   Cited in Muspratt (2007), 83.

activity, create a hostile environment for terrorists and provide visible reassurance to the public (cited in *BBC News* 2009).

However, only 65 stops in 2008 led to an arrest for terror-related activity (0.035 per cent). It was subsequently proposed that the Metropolitan Police begin to restrict the use of stop and search to areas around key strategic sites after criticism that it was alienating minority communities.

In November 2007 it was announced that a new Counter-Terrorism Bill would ensure the continued protections of key sites from terrorist attack', and would include 'funding arrangements for protecting key sites.[49] The following week, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Security and Counter-Terrorism (Lord West) presented a review to Government regarding how it may best protect 'crowded places, transport infrastructure and critical national infrastructure from terrorist attack'.[50] Although the review was unpublished for reasons of national security, numerous statements were made in Parliament and to the press which provided an insight into proposed policy initiatives and its implications for counter-terrorist practice (Coaffee and O'Hare 2008).

The review highlighted the need to improve the resilience of, in the words of the Prime Minister, 'strategic national infrastructure (stations, ports and airports) and other crowded places, and to step up physical protection against possible vehicle bomb attacks' (Brown 2007a). He added that we will now work with planners, architects and designers to encourage them to 'design-in' protective security measures to new buildings, including safe areas, traffic control measures and the use of blast-resistant materials. Particular emphasises was also placed upon, wherever possible, making security features as 'unobtrusive' as possible. In this sense, security interventions were increasingly required to consider issues regarding public acceptability (Coaffee et al. 2008a), increasing pressure to adopt design features that are both more aesthetically pleasing and that are less obtrusive (Coaffee and O'Hare 2008).

In particular, the Prime Minister said that he would make 'improvements to the planning process' to ensure 'more is done to protect buildings from terrorism from the design stage onwards'. This would, he continued, be conducted with the support of relevant professional bodies (such as the Royal Town Planning Institute and Royal Institute of British Architects) in order to raise the awareness and skills of architects, planners and police Architectural Liaison Officers in relation to counter-terrorism protective security (this has occurred, in part, through Project Argus training events). In a statement coinciding with the review, the Prime Minister's Spokesman said the announcements would prepare 'the

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49   'Number 10' factsheet on the Queen's Speech, 2007 at http://www.number10.gov.uk/files/pdf/22.Counter-terrorism%20Bill.pdf.

50   Smith, J. House of Commons Debate, 14 November 2007, Col 45WS.

**Figure 10.7   Crash-rated bollard installed in 2008 in the Government
Security Zone**

Figure 10.8   Reinforced bi-steel barriers outside the Houses of Parliament

public for the possibility that they may start to see some changes to the physical layout of buildings where people gather.'[51]

The perceived threat to crowded places was subsequently reinforced by the first UK National Security Strategy launched in March 2008 (HM Government 2008),[52] and moreover, by the first National Risk Register (NRR) published in August 2008, which noted that:

> Whilst there have been attacks against well protected targets around the world, terrorists also attack crowded public places because they have less protective security and therefore offer a higher likelihood of success (Cabinet Office 2008, 25).

The impact of these protective security 'guidelines' on the urban landscape of London has, in certain areas, been very obvious, whilst in others, target hardening measures have been integrated within the design of new or existing structures in a relatively covert way.

Around Government buildings and iconic landmarks, a 'bollardisation' has occurred – the erection of numerous crash-rated toughened steel bollards. These have been particularly expansive around the Government Security Zone in Whitehall (Figure 10.7). The use of bollards was of course common in the City of London in the 1990s and has also expanded in this location. The rationale for today's 'toughened' bollards is to provide greater distance (stand-off) from a road to the protected building to mitigate the impact of a bomb blast. The Houses of Parliament's ring of concrete (Chapter 9) has also been replaced by reinforced (Corus) bi-steel barriers[53] (Figure 10.8). Additions such as these to the cityscape of London have led to further comments regarding the aesthetics of 'permanent' counter-terrorism design. As asserted by one journalist regarding the visual impact of counter-terror features around key Government buildings: 'we might live in dangerous times, but they don't have to be ugly ones too' (Bayley 2007). Moreover, some leading London architects have reacted to Government proposals to design-in counter-terror features by arguing that this promotes a culture of fear – or an 'architecture of paranoia'. For example a leading member of the Royal Institute of British Architects' cited in *The Independent* newspaper in 2008 noted that such stipulations 'can only have a negative effect both for designers who find

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51   14 November 'Afternoon press briefing'. http://www.number10.gov.uk/output/Page13763.asp.

52   The NSS is not only a counter-terrorism plan, but contains broader strategies to tackle a complex array of insecurities and risks. For a full critique, see Coaffee et al. (2008b). The NSS was updated in June 2009 (see Cabinet Office 2009).

53   These barriers are high performance steel/concrete composite material produced by Corus.

Figure 10.9   Security barriers disguised as flower bed 'planters' at Canary Wharf

Figure 10.10 The protective security features at the Gherkin in the City of London

Figure 10.11 The vehicle control barrier outside the Emirates Stadium, North London

Figure 10.12 Security balustrades along Whitehall, London

themselves subsumed by more regulations and for society at large which is forced to accommodate the culture of fear'.[54]

Other common, but perhaps more temporary, techniques for increasing stand-off or for creating robust building perimeters are the strategic placement of 'planters' in front of vulnerable points of a building (usually the entrance). Such techniques have, for example, been used to great effect in areas around Canary Wharf in the London Docklands (Figure 10.9).

Around other iconic buildings, enhanced solutions have been deployed, which embed security into streetscape features, such as seating. One such example is at the Norman Foster designed Gherkin building, site of the 1992 City of London bomb. Here reinforced seating provides enhanced protective security (Figure 10.10).

Moreover, the importance of 'unobtrusive' security was further exemplified in Lord West's (November 2007) report by the newly constructed Emirates football Stadium in North London which is regarded as a model for designing-in counter-terrorism to new developments. For example the stadium is ringed by a variety of ornaments or streetscape designs, from benches to large brass cannons (Arsenal football club's insignia) to large concrete letters spelling out ARSENAL (Figure 10.11) which are deliberately situated to prevent vehicle access. According to reports, this barrier can stop a seven-tonne lorry travelling at 50 miles per hour (Coaffee and Bosher 2008).

More recently, the Government security zone in central London has had more aesthetically pleasing security features retrofitted in the form of balustrades, in an attempt to make security as inconspicuous as possible (Figures 10.12).

This form of protecting urban spaces is representative of the increased importance of visual aesthetics in the 'War on Terror' (Coaffee et al. 2009). As Boddy noted, this potentially 'represents the future of the hardening of public buildings and public space – soft on the outside, hard within, the iron hand inside the civic velvet glove' (2008, 291).

A more mundane but just as important streetscape artefact which has undergone a counter-terrorism-related make-over is the litter-bin. In London, litter bins were routinely removed in high risk locations during the 1990s, and only sporadically replaced with bomb-proof alternatives, often years later. The removal of such bins in public areas in London has been a source of frustration for Londoners for many years. They were earlier removed from mainline rails station in 1991 and from the City of London during 1992 and 1993. New bomb proof bins have now been developed which are planned to be positioned in the financial districts of London from late 2009. These bins, which will also double-up as recycling receptacles, as well as having embedded multi-media screen which can display information to passers- by, have been thoroughly tested to withstand the force of a terrorist bomb:

> The steel-plated bins have been developed to withstand at least 75% of a blast's
> force and contain the fireball resulting from an explosion (Adams 2008).

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54   Cited in Taylor (2008) 17.

The cost of each bin, weighing over a ton each, is likely to be around £3,000, meaning they are only likely to be installed in the most high-risk or prestigious locations.

At present across London there are no regulations in place to insist that developers, planners or architects regularly even consider counter-terrorism measures when designing a new building or public space. At the time of writing (July 2009) the Home Office are consulting on a supplement which they propose should be included in the *Safer Places: The Planning System and Crime Prevention* guidance document. This document is seen very much as a practical guide for planners and other built environment professionals to consider how they can 'design-in counter-terrorism, particularly in crowded places.

The application of such guidance is not new in the City of London. More particularly, in March 2004, a number of iconic sites were identified by the City Police and the security services, and aesthetic but effective security measures were recommended to building owners and occupiers to prevent vehicle bombing.[55] More recently, the Corporation of London (as of 2009) has announced plans to adopt new design principles which oblige consideration of counter-terror features within Design and Access statements that developers must submit with a planning application. A story in *Property Week* (Hipwell 2008) noted that the embedding of security-relate design features, which would add extra financial costs to development, might include:

- a ground-floor design that prevents errant vehicles at speeds of more than 30 miles per hour entering reception areas;
- an 'overriding presumption that a developer of a new building should incorporate all necessary physical [security] measures within the footprint of the site';
- an integration of security measures within a development's design from the start;
- a departure from installing visual deterrents, such as bollards, which are 'too weak to withstand a vehicle';
- a collaboration with neighbours to implement area-basis security initiatives.

A senior, planner, summarising these proposals, noted:

> The policy is that we are happy to look at individual measures, but our preference is for area based schemes rather than for individual schemes. Our preference is for schemes that are integrated into a new development.[56]

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55 Interview with Counter-terrorism officers, City of London Police, November 2008.

56 Interview conducted December 2008.

Such proposals have now been embedded within the Corporation's draft Local Development Framework – a set of local development documents that outlines how planning will be managed in a particular area.

The need to focus on area-based security has been a key feature of the City's success in counter-terrorism planning since the 1990s. In the light of the 7/7 attacks and concern about attacks against crowded places, it was deemed preferable that a coordinated approach to security should be adopted as this would be less detrimental to the City's environment.[57] As the Corporations' Local Development Framework,[58] notes:

> The current threat of terrorist crime has given rise to the need for special security measures. Buildings should be designed to minimise the threat of attack. Security measures are also needed around buildings and the most effective are those that give collective security to broad areas such as the Traffic and Environmental Zone, or to the City as a whole, such as traffic management measures that are combined with security arrangements. The implementation of such collective security measures will reduce the need for measures around individual buildings, which can have adverse effects on traffic flows and cause obstruction and visual clutter on footways and in open spaces. Collective security measures reflect the spatial principle of clustering through joint effort and cooperation (Corporation of London 2009, 72).

Here, it is also argued that the City's team of Counter Terrorism Security Advisors should work closely with the Planning Department to ensure appropriate security advice can be given to developers.

Transferring the London Security Model to Other Global Cities

At present, the UK, particularly London, is at the forefront of developing resilience policy against terrorism, providing a template that might, in the future, be adapted by other countries. Here, it is important that such policy and knowledge transfer between different areas be carried out in a pragmatic and thoughtful way in line with current or predicted institutional realities, the prevailing socio-political context, emergent threat levels, and available funding streams (see for example Dolowitz et al. 2000:3).

Increasingly, lessons learnt in London are being transferred to other global business centres. So too are experiences shared on a mutual basis with other police forces in global cities.[59] The London approach, which attempts to emphasise proportionality of response (that is trying to maintain business continuity without creating a sense

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57   Minutes of the Planning and Transportation Committee, 16 September 2008.

58   Draft Core Strategy: Section 7 Key Challenge 5: An Inclusive and Safe City.

59   In the UK context, the London security model has had significant implications for how other major cities have responded to terrorism. This lies beyond the discussion here. For a detailed account of this see Coaffee et al. (2008b).

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Figure 10.13 The proposed extent of New York's 'ring of steel'

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of undue fear or producing negative social impacts), is currently being rolled-out in central New York which has been subject to a host of intrusive and obtrusive security arrangements since 9/11 (see for example Nemeth and Schmidt 2007).

Most notably, connections are commonly made between the London resilience partnership and New York City's Office of Emergency Management. Equally the respective police forces – the NYPD and both the City and Metropolitan Police forces in London – share intelligence, have officer exchange programs, and transfer technology. For example, the City of London's Pager-Alert scheme has been rolled out to New York and a version of the City of London Police's Project Griffin initiative has also been adopted. Likewise, at a national level the terrorism insurance scheme Pool Re has helped pave the way for similar public-private partnerships in the US so that terrorism insurance can be seen as 'an important tile within the mosaic of … national security' (Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan 2004, 212).

Most recently, London-style physical and technological security has also come to New York. This was a process that began almost immediately after 9/11 but in more recent years a plan for a London-style 'ring of steel' has begun to be

Figure 10.14 New security cameras installed in Manhattan in 2007

strategically developed as part of plans to rebuild Lower Manhattan, as shown in
Figure 10.13 (Mollenkamp and Haughney 2006).

   Although the central business district in New York is now dotted with private
security cameras (NYCLU 2006), in early 2006 wireless CCTV cameras were
installed on poles 30 feet in the air – the first of nearly 500 cameras to be installed
as part of a major drive against crime and terrorism.[60] A key justification for the
scheme was the use made of London's 'panoptical' scheme to track the July
2005 bombers movements (albeit retrospectively) across the city on the day of
attack (Hays 2006). In New York, the strategic counter-terrorism surveillance
programme is constantly evolving. By the end of 2007 over 100 ANPR cameras

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   60   Similar schemes are being installed in other US cities such as Washington, Chicago
and Philadelphia.

were monitoring vehicles moving through Lower Manhattan roadblocks (see Figure 10.14).

Such developments have been facilitated by visits to London by the Major of New York and law enforcement agencies to view the ANPR technology for themselves. In London, such technology is largely situated at the 16 entry points into the traffic and environment zone and scans about 25 million vehicles per annum.[61] As Mollenkamp and Haughney (2006b) noted:

> Similarities between lower Manhattan and the City of London are likely to help authorities with their planning. Both neighbourhoods are about a square mile in area. Some 300,000 commuters travel through each area daily. Both are global financial hubs, with banks and stock exchanges that remain targets of terror attack.

Initially, the NYPD obtained $25 million toward the estimated $90 million cost of the plan ($15M from the city and $10 million from Homeland Security grants). The rest of the money will, they hope, come from additional federal grants. Buckley (2007) also noted that the scheme will cost around $8m a year to run and that 'the police department is still considering whether to use face-recognition technology, an inexact science that matches images against those in an electronic database, or biohazard detectors in its Lower Manhattan network.' Their security cordon is to be supplemented, as in the City of London and the London Docklands, by public CCTV and over 3000 private security cameras. This security system – now called 'The Lower Manhattan Security Initiative', ultimately aims to create a 'surveillance veil' in order to 'detect, track and deter terrorists' (Buckley 2007).

There are also plans to extend the scheme beyond Lower Manhattan into the Midtown area. The entire New York operation is forecast to be fully in place by 2010, in time for the projected completion of several new corporate buildings in the financial district, including the rebuilding at 'Ground Zero'. Civil liberties advocates however also feel misled about this controversial scheme. A New York Civil Liberties Union spokesperson noted 'this program marks a whole new level of police monitoring of New Yorkers and is being done without any public input, outside oversight, or privacy protections for the hundreds of thousands of people who will end up in NYPD. computers' (cited in Buckley 2007).

In August 2008, the *New York Times* further noted that plans for a City of London style ring of steel had progressed and that 'the Police Department is working on a plan to track every vehicle that enters Manhattan to strengthen the city's guard against a potential terror attack.' The updated proposal – *Operation Sentinel* – will not just detect number plates, like the London scheme, but uses integrated layers of technologies, such as using sensors to detect the presence of radioactivity due to concerns over 'dirty bomb' attacks. Such technologies would be deployed at traffic 'choke points' entering Manhattan (Baker 2008).

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61   Cited in *City Security* (2007), 26:19.

Concerns were also expressed that such a system needs be in place for when the World Trade Center (WTC) area fully reopens for business. Security Plans for the WTC site were also published at the same the as *Operation Sentinel* proposals were made public, but were a disappointment to many. As Bagli (2008) noted:

> Planners seeking to rebuild the World Trade Center have always envisioned that the 16-acre site would have a vibrant streetscape with distinctive buildings, shops and cultural institutions lining a newly restored street grid. From the destruction of Sept. 11, 2001, a new neighborhood teeming with life would be born … But now, the Police Department's latest security proposal entails heavy restrictions.

Accordingly, it is proposed 'that the entire area would be placed within a security zone, in which only specially screened taxis, limousines and cars would be allowed through [with] "sally ports," or barriers staffed by police officers, constructed at each of five entry points' (ibid.). The aim of the plan, which resembles the mini ring of steel around the Canary Wharf complex in London (Chapter 8), is to prevent a third terrorist attack against the site. However, concerns have been expressed about the knock-on effects of traffic congestion in adjoining areas, as well as the unattractiveness of the public realm which could encourage business relocation and lower numbers of shoppers. The Deputy Police Commissioner for Public Information, addressing this criticism pointed to the potential 'selling' point of the initiative for commercial business, noting:

> I think this will reassure people that this is probably the safest business environment anywhere.[62]

Conclusions: Connecting Risk and Reputation

Given the vast array of targets, strategies and technologies available to would-be terrorists, traditional, and often static counter-terrorism approaches, focused on planning-out terrorism are no longer suitable without appropriate managerial resilience.

In this context, there has been a paradigm shift from counter-terrorism towards resilience, which is quickly becoming a key discourse in shaping how global cities and their business environments are structured. Likewise, developing resilient urban responses to terrorism is a fluid process and one which must be able to adapt to changing types of terrorist threat. In particular, greater attention and government resources are now being given to the changing nature of threat to 'crowded places'. This has forced a rethinking of traditional emergency planning and counter terrorism tactics given the increased magnitude of the threats faced,

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62   Cited in Bagli (2008).

especially those from CBRN sources and suicide attacks aimed at 'soft targets'. As noted, such attacks are now seen as *inevitable*.

Moreover, in Chapter 4 it was argued that recent security and counter-terrorism policy – often presented under the banner of resilience – are increasingly pre-emptive; relying on affective 'fact' to justify effective action. The anticipatory logic of this new type of policy making – a consolidation of Beck's risk society thesis – arguably makes decision making less opaque and is commonly accompanied by societal anxiety concerning the inescapability of future threat (Massumi 2005; Anderson 2007). Here, being prepared for such inevitability is a key driver of state security policy in the post-9/11 world (Coaffee 2006; Elmer and Opel 2006). Such a discourse is, represented (some would say manipulated) through a number of mechanism, such as, 'planning for emergencies' guidance (Mythern and Walklate 2006) and public 'threat' level announcements (Massumi 2005). The need to be prepared is also continually justified through a variety of foresight documents, forward looking security strategies, 'risk registers', and associated simulated practice exercises, which in effect have attempted to embed the need to be prepared for possible terror attack into everyday experience (Coaffee et al. 2008b). In this sense, resilience policy has become a key management tool to condition populations, particularly in 'at risk' cities, to expect the worst in terms of future, often unspecified threat (Massumi 2005).

In more practical terms, recent scholarship has highlighted the risks that counter-terrorism measures pose for the functional integrity of cities; more specifically in terms of their potential to contribute to an atmosphere of fear and a culture of surveillance. Moreover, counter-terrorism measures will have consequences for social control and freedom of movement in 'at risk' urban areas and lead to a reduction in the democratic involvement in urban planning and construction. In extreme cases, counter-terror policy can lead to the increasing militarisation of urban design. Such design ensembles themselves can serve to elicit particular reactions from the urban population. On the one hand they might reassure citizens and key businesses that the State is responding appropriately to the threat, but on the other hand, fortress-type design can also cause additional anxiety (Coaffee et al. 2009). As Peter Marcuse has argued in relation to contemporary urbanism, '[security] features are implemented precisely because of their public visibility, which are potentially 'calculated to manipulate awareness of the threat of terrorism' (Marcuse 2006: 921).

In specific relation to London, over the last decade or more the city has been enveloped by ever-expanding surveillance web and an array of target hardened enclaves, which are in no small part as a response to the fear of terrorism. Such an approach has threatened to blur the boundaries between public and private space. In London, the policy responses are leading to ever-increasingly automatic control, privatisation and militarisation of urban space, and have tended to lack transparency and scrutiny and have often been promoted in terms of traffic management or crime inhibiting measures. As such, this inevitably points to

the splintering potential of such 'rings of security' which are slowly, but surely, becoming 'rings of exclusion' (Coaffee 2004, 209).

A key question that is emerging with reference to urban security and resilience, is: how might the physical and managerial manifestations of counter-terrorism impact upon the reputation of a city or particular space? In the early chapters of this book, the importance of developing a secure urban image was highlighted. This has become a key feature of the evolving rhetoric surrounding the so-called post-modern city. In the 1990s, the response of urban authorities to such insecurity in some cases was dramatic, with 'fortress urbanism' highlighted as the order of the day, as an obsession with security became manifest in the urban landscape and as a response to consumer demand. For example, the emergence of 'Fortress LA' as an unofficial moniker of Los Angeles also appeared to be about transforming the city in the mirror of middle class paranoia combined with economic vibrancy. Here, the militarisation of commercial buildings and their borders become 'strongpoints of sale' and a 'master narrative' in the emerging cityscape (Davis 1990, 223). This dystopian scenario was seen as an almost inevitable result of the way in which high levels of visible security, particularly for the middle and upper classes have become a commodity. Such practices are fuelled by the constant stream of media pronouncements that fear is all around and the resultant protectionist reflexes whereby insulation against the dangerous 'Other' is sought. In essence, security was seen as a 'prestige symbol', which provides personal insulation, protecting the rich from 'unsavoury groups' (ibid., 224).

Recent work in the social and political sciences has begun to highlight how risk, particularly terrorist risk, can have significant impacts upon a place's reputation and brand; an area that according to Van Ham (2004) remains, to date, largely outside of the place brander's 'field of vision'. Clearly, the reputation of nations, regions and cities is a key facet of place branding. As Anholt (2005, 119) suggests, place branding is 'more an attempt to manage the reputational assets of the place than sell it in the global marketplace.' The need for the strategic management of often fragile urban reputations has been further exposed by the high media profile of international disasters, health scares and terror attacks which have serious implications for maintaining a secure reputation in the nations, regions and/or cities concerned (Coaffee and Rogers 2008). As Coaffee and Van Ham (2008, 191) further note:

> Amidst an almost constant stream of government announcements and media headlines purporting to highlight the omnipresent risk that society now faces and the culture of ambient fear this engenderers, emerging safety concerns and security threats are, we argue, rapidly unlocking the potential for security to become a key selling point in the practice of place branding.

They continue by noting that security and resilience can be key urban USPs:

> The marker of security has become a scarce commodity, and most states and cities compete for it in the collective mind of a global audience. Moreover, being recognized as a provider of security offers concomitant authority and credibility. In this sense, what we might refer to as 'security branding', adds value to, or at least reconfigures, existing brand images, and create Unique Selling Points (USP's) for political actors and place.

How then might a city's reputation be altered in the light of new international security challenges, particularly in relation to how the outside world views their response to risk? Against this context, the notion of 'reputational risk' (Rayner 2003) can be used to highlight how enhanced security and proven resilience are now, in certain contexts, becoming key aspects of 'selling' a city.

In more recent times, the idea of reputational risk, which evolved in the management sciences, has begun to be associated with the need to embed risk management and crisis management into organisational culture in order to build corporate preparedness. Here, importance has been placed upon risk assessment through 'horizon scanning' and the detection of, and response to, emergent threats and disaster events. The aim is to assure stakeholders or investors that all is 'under control' and that the company has the ability to 'bounce-back' from such disruptions. For example, Sheffi (2005) in *The Resilient Enterprise: Overcoming Vulnerability for Competitive Advantage*, explored how the responses to disruptions in private sector business functioning is focusing, not only on security that might be deployed, but also on 'corporate resilience' and how it is possible that investments made to embed such resilience might in turn be beneficial in terms of competitive advantage.

Others have also highlighted how resilience attributes of a location are also a key to reputation in a neo-liberal economy. The broader place marketing and place branding literature, in particular, is also increasingly beginning to focus upon how strategies might be developed to counter unfavourable images associated with disaster events, and how to positively market places perceived to be in crisis. In the tourism sector a number of commentators (Glaesser 2006; Mansfield and Pizam 2006) have attempted to categorise such 'crisis' as follows:

1. Crime-related events such as robbery, rape, murder or kidnapping;
2. Terror-related events such as bombing of public places or plane hijackings;
3. Political unrest events such as violent demonstrations, uprisings or riots;
4. Natural disaster events such as earthquakes, forest fires, extreme heat/cold wave, hurricane or tsunami;
5. Epidemic-related event such as SARS, AIDS or foot and mouth disease (cited in Avraham and Ketter 2008, 80-81)

Clearly, a place's ability to cope with, and recover from, such crisis – its resilience – can be central to enhancing reputation. London's authorities, and its global

business communities, have been aware of this for many years. Previous chapters have highlighted how London marketing documents attempted to downplay the terror attack on the capital city by promoting the city as better prepared that its competitors to respond if there was a further attack; in other words they projected themselves as more resilient.[63]

As has been shown, post-9/11, the discourse of 'resilience' has been increasingly used to describe how cities and nations attempt to 'bounce-back' from disaster. The events of 9/11 led to an instant counter response from London authorities in order to reassure global businesses that they should not relocate from London through fear of further attack (Coaffee 2004).

Since the early 1990s, the UK, and in particular London, has sought to develop a robust and proportionate approach to counter terrorism. Today, the response to terrorist risk in London usually poses the question – 'Are we prepared?' rather than 'Can we prevent it?' (Coaffee 2006).[64] In this context, there has been a paradigm shift from reactive and protective counter-terrorism towards proactive preparedness and resilience, which is quickly becoming a key factor in shaping how global cities and their business environments are structured. London, and particularly the City of London, has undoubtedly been successful in developing a brand reputation for itself in terms of resilience to terrorism. A recent report by the London Chamber of Commerce and Industry (2005), for example, highlighted the remarkably quick return (hours not days) to 'business as usual' after the attacks on 7/7.

The 'London Prepared' brand is now used to further promote the city and its business centres on the global stage. Such promotion now plays on the importance of the safety of resilience of the city as part of 'the sell' to external investors. A recent statement by London First – a lobby group, campaigning for inward investment to maintain London international brand – summed up the commitment of London business community to work in partnership with the police and security and emergency services to enhance preparedness:

> London First aims to make the UK capital the best city in the world to do business. That includes improving our security and our resilience. We aim to help our members and London businesses generally to improve London's preparations for and protection against terrorist attack (cited in *Think London* 2007).[65]

As opposed to an image of security in the 1990s in central London of 'checkpoints and cameras', what has emerged in London since 9/11 is a well-integrated, properly resourced, and proactive style of emergency resilient planning. Such resilience

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63   Athough such terminology was largely unused at this time.

64   See: www.londonprepared.gov.uk. Cited in Coaffee and Rogers (2008a).

65   London First now works closely with the London Resilience Forum and have set up their own resilience network to act as a conduit between London's police, security services and businesses, to plan for business continuity.

is now being increasingly utilised by marketing agencies to promote the city to international investors, and retain confidence in London as an integral part of the global economy (Coaffee 2007). London is not alone in attempts to adopt such a marketing strategy. As Coaffee and Van Ham (2008, 191) have argued:

> The importance of security is an area which has long been largely absent from the place promotion and place branding literature. But in today's geostrategic environment, brand professionals have begun to recognize safety and security as key attributes which can be used to incentivise business location choices and inward investment potential.

Resilience, safety and security have become an increasingly important tool in the armoury of reputation managers as security, marketing and economic development have become necessarily intertwined.

The resilience of the physical environment – the built assets – is also important in attracting inward investment and in developing sustainable local communities (Coaffee et al. 2008). In London, recent regeneration efforts, now recognise counter-terrorism as an issue that should be considered within sustainable development as 'themes about liveable places, averting the threat of terrorism, and related issues of safety and security have become paramount in London's regeneration projects and projects' (Imrie et al. 2009, 12; see also The London Plan 2004). How such security concerns are developed in line with urban growth and urban renaissance agendas will be paramount to the continued success of the London economy and its civitas, especially if more terrorist attacks occur.

Because of its global city status, its history and response to terrorist bombings, and, because in the UK occupies a pivotal place within the so called 'War on Terrorism', London has been thrust into the limelight as far as counter-responses are concerned. Primarily, such attention has focused upon its financial heartlands – the City of London and the London Docklands which has provided two possible scenarios for the defended city: first, a security arrangement which combines territorial control and advanced surveillance through the lens of traffic and environmental improvements; second, a security cordon which overtly advertises its function as a counter-terrorist deterrent to maintain the area's image of 'safety and security'. However, the danger with counter-terror policy, and especially that which targets physical intervention, is that defended areas become territorialised, disconnected, and splintered from the rest of the city. What is also constantly alluded to in the academic and policy literature is the need to balance higher levels of security with concerns for the functionality of places. Developing resilient urban responses to terrorism is a fluid process and one which must be able to adapt to changing types of terrorist threat. In doing this the approach must attempt to balance the effectiveness of resilience response with the acceptability of such actions to the public and wider stakeholders. At present, developing resilience against terrorist threats is an area of policy which has been developed almost exclusively by politicians, the security services and emergency planning professionals, with little,

if any, discussion with citizens, the general business community, town planners, urban designers and other built environment professionals. As has also been alluded to, such stakeholders in are the future are likely to have a far greater role to play in reducing the likelihood and mitigation of the impact of terrorism. Ultimately, resilience and security solutions should be, and must be seen to be, proactive and proportional to the ongoing threat of terrorism and should be embedded within increasingly collaborative urban design and management systems so that they strike a balance between reducing risk and ensuring resilience, whilst minimising the negative impact upon the civic realm.

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