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## Operations Other Than War: Organized Crime Dimension

### Graham H. Turbiville Jr.

AS US national security planners seek to define, anticipate or react to a host of security problems around the post-Cold War world, they are faced both with familiar, enduring problems, as well as with security issues, that in terms of content, scale and impact seem strikingly new. This mix of continuing and new concerns is particularly evident in evolving Army concepts, Doctrine and planning associated with military operations other than War, which will be carried out in a complex security environment characterized by diverse and shifting challenges to existing State structures and institutions around the world.<sup>1</sup>

Among these challenges are what have come to be termed by some as gray area phenomena or problems of global ungovernability. These designations have been coined recently by security specialists to capture the proliferation of nonstate security threats that are new, recently visible or have come to be of far greater concern than in the past. They include, among others, widespread population dislocations; ethnic and religious conflict; epidemic health problems and environmental damage; terrorist organizations and agendas; international organized crime; and informal economic organizations that bypass or avoid state and regional economic systems.<sup>2</sup> Country after country has come to identify these elements in various combinations as national security concerns. Individually and collectively, these problems are joining more traditional national concerns to define the security environment throughout the world.

**Organized crime... may increasingly Influence [planning for] operations other than war... in many areas of the world.... Because of its effectiveness, success and impact, organized crime is already an integral part of the overall environment in which operations other than War take place, as well as closely Intertwined with national security threats of direct concern to military planners.**

Within this environment, each of the military operations other than War operational categories-support to insurgency and counter-insurgency operations, combating terrorism, peace-keeping, support to counterdrug operations and a range of contingency operations-has acquired new dimensions.<sup>3</sup> Notable among these is the emergence of an organized crime component that may

increasingly Influence operations other than War planning in many areas of the world. That is, because of its effectiveness, success and impact, organized crime is already an integral part of the overall environment in which operations other than War take place, as well as closely intertwined with national security threats of direct concern to military planners.

Organized criminal activities-increasingly linked regionally and internationally-are centered in part on developing relationships between narcotics trafficking, arms trafficking and other international organized criminal groups in distant areas of the world that formerly had few visible relationships. In environments where state institutions have been rendered ineffective by sweeping political and economic change, War, internal challenges or other factors, criminal enterprise has been quick to fill vacuums or seize new opportunities.

**In Sri Lanka, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) turned to narcotics trafficking years ago as a means financing their separatist goals.... Hundreds of Tamils have been picked up for narcotics trafficking in foreign countries in Europe, North America and elsewhere. While the principal drug in these arrests was heroin, there are reports that the LTTE concluded an agreement with the Colombian cartels in which representatives of the former serve as drug couriers in return for arms training.**

In addition, the new or reinvigorated centers of interethnic conflict, insurgency and various forms of regional and international terrorism have acquired an organized crime content that blurs distinctions between military and law enforcement problems in many regions of the globe. Of particular importance, some security problems that had in the past been driven by ideological or other imperatives, now have strong criminal motivations as well. Thus, for example, while the Cold War framework had shaped the way we looked at most security problems in the recent past, the disappearance of the former Soviet Union, the Socialist bloc, and regional surrogates has removed immediate sources of financing, arms, training, safe havens or other support for client states, insurgencies and terrorist organizations.

To some extent at least, organized crime has provided an alternative means of support, as well as a seductive source of personal, criminal profit that may subvert ideological or political fervor. This phenomenon is not limited to specific regions, but is evident in many areas of the world in often analogous ways. Of particular importance are those areas of insurgency, Civil War and ethnonational conflict that may precipitate-or already have precipitated-US military involvement in various ways. Before addressing some of these potential operations other than war-organized crime Linkages, it is useful to look at how the United States defines strategic objectives that are likely to generate military operations other than War and simultaneously confront criminal enterprise.

### **Defined US Interests and Operations Other Than War**

There are broadly stated US Policy goals that will shape the role and commitment of the US Armed Forces throughout the remainder of the decade. As the administration of President George Bush was coming to a close in the early 1990s, US security objectives constituted a number of desirable

foreign Policy goals around the world that clearly included the potential for military support and served as the broad rationale for US military involvement abroad. Some of these goals were also addressed in terms of countering the most pernicious form of organized crime- narcotics trafficking- though generally speaking, organized crime did not occupy a central role as a national security threat. Several brief examples from official US government statements early in this decade illustrate these various declared National Interests and goals.<sup>4</sup>

For example, US security assistance programs were focused on providing aid in combatting threats to democratic institutions from aggression, coercion, insurgencies, subversion, terrorism and illicit drug trafficking. Regarding the latter point more specifically, it had been a US goal for some years to reduce the flow of illegal drugs into the United States by encouraging reduction in foreign [narcotics] production [and] combatting international traffickers. . . .<sup>5</sup> US foreign Policy interests were aimed at strengthening and enlarging the commonwealth of free [democratic] nations that share a commitment to Democracy and individual rights, and supporting greater economic and political unity in Europe, as well as other regions. One means to these goals was to promote the growth of free democratic political institutions around the world.<sup>6</sup> US objectives of supporting aid, trade and investment policies that promote economic development and social...progress, and promoting an open and expanding international economic system, based on market principles, with minimal distortions to trade and investment, were stated and restated in various ways for some years.<sup>7</sup>

More recently, President Bill Clinton's administration-through National Security Advisor Anthony Lake, UN Ambassador Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State Warren Christopher and Clinton himself-have reiterated these objectives in much the same terms. That is, these representatives assert that US goals include supporting existing democracies; fostering the expansion of democratic governments around the world; sustaining and encouraging free market economies; and fostering humanitarian agendas.<sup>8</sup> The extent to which these goals will be translated into policies that involve the employment of US military forces is far from clear.

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It is clear, however, that in a world threatened by a range of simmering and acute conflicts, these declared goals could underpin foreign Policy initiatives that include the commitment of US military resources in various forms of operations other than war-unilaterally or under the auspices of regional or international security organizations-if sanctioned by the national leadership and country. All of these goals are also fundamentally affected by a number of forms of organized crime in ways that include severe damage to political and economic institutions through corruption, lost state and business revenues, currency crimes and money laundering; the deterioration of social structures through heightened levels of violence, debilitating instability and damaged Value systems; and even physical threats to the continuity of government among other potential impacts.<sup>9</sup> The military and

organized crime aspects of these goals are now increasingly linked in ways that will be discussed below.

**In the former Soviet Union-which includes several hundred ethnic groups by some assessments-one of the criteria used to classify organized crime is ethnic affiliation. Thus, of the 3,500 to 4,000 organized criminal groups that existed in the Soviet Union in its closing days, and the 3,000 groups estimated to exist in Russia itself at the end of 1992, many are ethnic criminal groups formed on the basis of national communities....**

## **Criminal Content**

Organized criminal activity in the form of arms and drug trafficking, the smuggling of strategic materials and other profitable contraband, extortion and robbery, hostage taking for ransom and other crimes are increasingly, as noted, an integral part of insurgency, Civil War and ethnic conflict. Legal and illegal immigration is taking place at an unprecedented rate, as are major population dislocations associated with internal conflict and political or economic disruption. This movement of people and the creation of refugee concentrations and ethnic diasporas in many areas of the world has facilitated the operation of conflict-associated organized criminal activities. Of particular importance for US military operations other than War in affected regions is the organized crime agendas of at least some active separatist and insurgent movements and ethnic conflicts. To cite some diverse examples, Basque (ETA) separatists largely finance their terrorist activity through revolutionary taxes obtained through extortion and ransoms, while the Irish Republican Army makes heavy use of tax fraud and extortion activities (as well as more overt fundraising).<sup>10</sup> In a far different area, the emergence of a drug mafia in Nagaland (a northeast Indian state) and its possible merging with the insurgency there combines criminal enterprise with a separatist goal.<sup>11</sup> Even in Somalia, trade in the drug khat has provided a source of revenue for factions and groups, and contributed to its availability in New York, Los Angeles, Boston, Dallas and other US cities. UN peacekeepers have been charged by Somali factions with protecting traffickers and profiting from the drug trade, while the criminal motivations of some Somali leaders are well established.<sup>12</sup> In Sri Lanka, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) turned to narcotics trafficking years ago as a means of financing their separatist goals, and the organization has been characterized by some as a kind of mafia.<sup>13</sup> Hundreds of Tamils have been picked up for narcotics trafficking in foreign countries in Europe, North America and elsewhere. While the principal drug in these arrests was heroin, there are reports that the LITE concluded an agreement with the Colombian cartels in which representatives of the former serve as drug couriers in return for arms training.<sup>14</sup>

The Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK), operating inside and outside of Turkey, has the aim of setting up an independent Kurdish state in the region. The PKK has not only been credited with killing several thousand people in eastern and southeastern Turkey since 1984, but has also conducted terrorist and criminal activities in a number of West European cities, as well as in Iraq, Iran and Syria.<sup>15</sup> Criminal and terrorist charges leveled at the PKK over the last year include obtaining heavy

financial support from narcotics trafficking in Europe; producing counterfeit Turkish bank notes in Cooperation with the Italian Mafia, distributing drugs principally in the larger cities of western Turkey; producing revenues of some \$20 million a year through a narcotics trafficking network in Saudi Arabia and extorting money from the 130,000 to 150,000 Turkish workers residing in that country; cooperating with Armenian terrorist organizations such as the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) and establishing bases in the former Soviet republic of Armenia; and attacking Turkish targets in the German cities of Frankfurt, Karlsruhe and Mainz and in Brussels, Belgium, among other locations.<sup>16</sup>

In the former Soviet Union-which includes several hundred ethnic groups by some assessments-one of the criteria used to classify organized crime is ethnic affiliation.<sup>17</sup> Thus, of the 3,500 to 4,000 organized criminal groups that existed in the Soviet Union in its closing days, and the 3,000 groups estimated to exist in Russia itself at the end of 1992, many are ethnic criminal groups formed on the basis of national communities. . . .<sup>18</sup> Because of their ethnonational content, affiliations and location, these groups have become actors in the various centers of interethnic conflict. Security service spokesmen in the former Soviet Union judge that criminal groups variously provide material support, encourage or simply take' advantage of the disruptions and opportunities presented by the various ethnic hot spots and tensions. As a former KGB deputy chairman noted in early 1991 (and echoed often by other officials and analysts), our professional criminals often cooperate with extremists, terrorists and extreme nationalists.<sup>19</sup>

**Among many instructive cases from around the world-some of which have potential or ongoing US operations other than War involvement-are Colombia and the former Yugoslavia, where insurgent and ethnonational issues, conflicts and organized criminal activities are merging in ways that have an impact on regional security and US military support as well. Most notably, there are mounting indications that... the desire for criminal profit by movements and groups has in part replaced other motivations, frustrated efforts to resolve disputes, and contributed to continued conflict and instability.**

This potential for profiting is especially great in arms and drug trafficking but also includes a broad array of criminal activities ranging from primitive to sophisticated. Russian estimates have put the total number of uncontrolled arms throughout the former Soviet Union at tens of millions, many of them military automatic weapons. A trade in heavier weapons is evident as well, especially in areas of ethnonational conflict like the Caucasus.<sup>20</sup> In the Caucasus, Georgian, Azeri, Armenian, Chechen and other mafias share the region with an equally impressive collection of armies, national guards and provisional armed groups associated with states and factions. Narcotics trafficking, arms sales and terrorist allegations centered on Georgians, Azeris, Armenians and other Caucasus people reflect the complex intermixing that characterizes many other areas of the former Soviet Union and elsewhere.

The growing status of Central Asia as a drug cultivation and export region (as well as an arms trafficking center) is linked to factional conflict there as well. As one commentator noted in regard to Central Asia in 1991, it is not just coincidence . . . that ethnic conflicts in Central Asia, as a rule,

flared up during the opium poppy harvesting season.<sup>21</sup> In Moldova, continuing confrontations in that former Soviet republic are characterized by an intermixing of ethnonational conflict and criminal activity, replete with charges and countercharges of corruption and crime among all parties involved.<sup>22</sup> Parties to the Moldovan conflicts include the break-away Dniester Republic; the Moldovan government, which is contesting the separatist efforts; various mercenary groups including Cossacks and right-wing extremists; Romanian arms and training support; and large numbers of ethnic Russian residents in the area.

**The insurgents have become criminal capitalists rather than ideologically motivated revolutionaries. While many analysts would judge this view to be overdrawn, considerable data has been mustered by government spokesmen to support their assertions in the form of captured documentation and the arrest of the ELN finance minister. Intelligence received from these sources... revealed an extraordinary amount of information on FARC and ELN financing... [and] indicated that the two guerrilla groups had become the largest, best organized and most profitable criminal activity in [Colombia].**

Lieutenant General Aleksandr Lebed-the commander of the Russian 14th Army, which is ostensibly serving a peacekeeping role in the complex conflict there-accused the Dniester government of corruption and criminal activity and declared he was sick and tired of guarding the sleep and safety of crooks.<sup>23</sup> Indeed, criminal activity in Moldova is widespread, profitable and includes drug and arms trafficking.<sup>24</sup> As in other regions, conflict has provided criminal opportunities, with criminal groups in and around the divided state becoming intermeshed with the various political and national agendas.

Among many instructive cases from around the world-some of which have potential or ongoing US operations other than War involvement-are Colombia and the former Yugoslavia, where insurgent and ethnonational issues, conflicts and organized criminal activities are merging in ways that have an impact on regional security and US military support as well. Most notably, there are mounting indications that in these two illustrations, the desire for criminal profit by movements and groups has in part replaced other motivations, frustrated efforts to resolve disputes, and contributed to continued conflict and instability. That is, there appear to be strong, well-financed criminal structures beyond-or subsumed by-the contending parties in these conflicts which have interests in the outcome and terms of a given conflict's resolution. This may include, in particular, an Interest in prolonging a conflict or exploiting tensions to increase profit. This kind of factor, to the extent it is operative, has the potential of frustrating US and international efforts to broker lasting political solutions; shaping the desirability or form of security assistance, peacekeeping, peace enforcement and post conflict stability efforts; and influencing the forms that humanitarian assistance may take among other considerations.

### **Colombia**

In addition to its premier role as a center for narcotics trafficking by the cocaine and heroin cartels, Colombia also faces two major insurgencies, the National Liberation Army (Ejercito de Liberacion

Nacional - ELN) and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-FARC). It is the Colombian government's view that the guerrillas are becoming increasingly involved in organized crime to include-but not limited to-narcotics trafficking. As one Colombian government minister put it:

**We think the guerrillas have forsaken their self-attributed ideals of struggling for the redemption of the lower classes. We are in the presence of a large, profitable criminal organization that takes advantage of every mechanism of the capitalist economy and that has abandoned any revolutionary ideals its members might have had in the past.<sup>25</sup>**

In other words, the insurgents have become criminal capitalists rather than ideologically motivated revolutionaries. While many analysts would judge this view to be overdrawn, considerable data has been mustered by government spokesmen to support their assertions in the form of captured documentation and the arrest of the ELN finance minister.<sup>26</sup>

Intelligence received from these sources included a list of ransom payments and victims, extortion schemes involving businesses and individuals and other data that revealed an extraordinary amount of information on FARC and ELN financing. The intelligence also indicated that the two guerrilla groups had become the largest, best organized and most profitable criminal activity in the country.<sup>27</sup> Further, the Colombian authorities determined a close correlation between the deployment of the various guerrilla fronts and the centers of economic enterprise of one form or another, especially oil, gold, coal, bananas, coca and most recently poppies.<sup>28</sup> Guerrilla deployment shifted to these areas where revenues were greater. Guerrillas reportedly have even helped revive cattle ranches when their excessive expropriation of money has caused ranches to become of marginal financial value.<sup>29</sup>

**Active fighting, shifts in borders and control procedures, a breakdown in group affiliations, and especially the arms embargo imposed on all provinces of the former Yugoslavia in early fall 1991, changed routes and priorities for smugglers and state institutions alike and resulted in an innovative series of measures and readjustments being taken by affected states and criminal groups. Arms trafficking groups, in order to acquire requisite military materiel and other strategic materials, began to identify black and gray market sources for weapons and explore new routes for delivery.**

The most profitable insurgent criminal enterprise, according to the Colombian police, military and government, is the per gram charge for coca leaf, paste and processors.<sup>30</sup> According to one FARC detector, his front sent the secretariat in 1991 some 2.5 billion pesos from this means (\$1 equals approximately 750 pesos). If this is multiplied by the eight fronts (recognizing that there is no evidence that this is a meaningful exercise), it would total 20 billion pesos. While not much is known about the insurgents' relationship with poppy and heroin production, there are only some rough calculations that indicate this business is growing at an accelerated rate and, in terms of FARC income, already may represent one third of that from coca.<sup>31</sup>

At any rate, between coca and poppies, the FARC is judged by some Colombians to garner close to 70 percent of its income. All of this has caused Colombian President César Gaviria Trujillo to assert that the insurgents have become the third drug cartel in Colombia and that they are promoting the new heroin business as well.<sup>32</sup> The conclusion reached by some analysts is that profit has become far more important to the Colombian guerrillas than Ideology and that peace negotiations may become more difficult because if the FARC and ELN effectively have converted themselves into such profitable criminal enterprises, how could a process of reincorporation appear attractive to them?<sup>33</sup> Other Colombian spokesmen have suggested that the loss of ideological vigor and a Dependence on sharing the spoils to maintain group cohesiveness is harming guerrilla effectiveness and recruiting.<sup>34</sup>

**The autonomous Serbian province of Kosovo and Metohija, with a predominately Albanian ethnic population and strong separatist leanings, has by many accounts some of the most active criminal groups in the region, as well as armed groups associated with the separatist cause. Serbian authorities-concerned about Albanian separatist potential and aspirations-have been particularly vehement in denouncing what they call Albanian-run drugs-for-arms deals, together with extortion, kidnapping, corrupt law enforcement and a variety of economic crimes.**

### **The Former Yugoslavia**

The continuing conflicts in the former Yugoslavia have had many consequences for organized criminal activity of all types to include, in particular, the closer association of many parties in the disputes with organized crime. A combination of pressing military requirements, economic disarray, the disruption of existing institutions and organizations, expanded opportunities for many types of criminal endeavors and the potential for enormous criminal profits, have all appeared at the same time. In addition, the large numbers of refugees from the conflicts there, coupled with large, existing emigre communities of Yugoslav citizens around the world, have provided a potential support base and infrastructure abroad for drug and arms trafficking, other criminal undertakings and terrorist activities.

Yugoslav criminals, of course, were quite active in a variety of regional smuggling activities well before the state began its slide to dissolution and active conflict.<sup>35</sup> Indeed, smuggling and banditry in many forms had been a traditional feature of the area long before there had been a Yugoslav state. Regarding the more serious forms of organized crime, Yugoslavia had a longstanding role in the international heroin trade as a part of the Balkan route leading from Southwest Asia, through the Balkans, to Western Europe and North America. By the late 1980s, like the rest of Eastern Europe, it had also become a stop on Latin American cocaine trafficking routes as well.

As shooting conflicts in Yugoslavia developed-beginning in late June 1991 with Croat and Slovene declarations of independence-traditional smuggling routes were disrupted. Active fighting, shifts in borders and control procedures, a breakdown in group affiliations, and especially the arms embargo imposed on all provinces of the former Yugoslavia in early fall 1991, changed routes and priorities for smugglers and state institutions alike and resulted in an innovative series of measures and



readjustments being taken by affected states and criminal groups. Arms trafficking groups, in order to acquire requisite military materiel and other strategic materials, began to identify black and gray market sources for weapons and explore new routes for delivery. There was a reorientation of heroin trafficking routes as well, with some of the drug traffic moving north through Hungary, Romania and Czechoslovakia. However, a substantial heroin transit trade and new distribution routes continued in Yugoslavia as well, with adjustments made to allow for disrupted drug flows due to armed clashes.

Hand-in-hand with the conflict has been the further development of a brisk trade in drugs and arms jointly, sometimes using the same routes, couriers and transport means. Local mafias in every former province cut out territory for their criminal activities and have developed international ties as well. A feature of these groups is their ethnic orientation-Croats, Serbs, Albanians, Montenegrins, Macedonians and others with numerous charges and countercharges exchanged between the groups over their alleged drug deals and criminal activities to support the armed actions of various factions. There is, in addition, a substantial trade in other scarce commodities that yield high profits.

**The former Yugoslav province of Macedonia, where about 300 US troops are deployed, has been the target of a number of charges of criminal and terrorist activity. The Macedonian government, accused of sponsoring heroin trafficking and using the proceeds to buy weapons, in turn charges Serbs and Greeks with drug trafficking, to include the Serbian armed forces special operations component.**

In Serbia, increasing levels of violence have accompanied random and mafia criminal activities in Belgrade to include drug trafficking. Criminal groups increasingly began to compete for spheres of influence and pursued, in particular, their extortion and protection rackets as law enforcement efforts unraveled amid the general economic and societal disarray generated by the continuing conflicts.<sup>36</sup> Ethnic Albanians were singled out for their potential in organized crime because of their patriarchal ties to one another.<sup>37</sup> In any event, criminal groups became better armed and more difficult to penetrate, while the police became more corrupt and less effective. Some observers pointed to a national psychosis where high-profit state crime (the sale of oil and other high-priced commodities) existed with drug and arms trafficking, protection and extortion, robberies and other random and organized crimes by a variety of players.<sup>38</sup> Serbian leaders are widely accused of direct involvement in these activities. As one Serbian source noted in regard to the political leadership - they are not only in a position to take advantage of the War, but they are also in a position to maintain it `so long as it brings in income.<sup>39</sup>

The autonomous Serbian province of Kosovo and Metohija, with a predominately Albanian ethnic population and strong separatist leanings, has by many accounts some of the most active criminal groups in the region, as well as armed groups associated with the separatist cause.<sup>40</sup> Serbian authorities-concerned about Albanian separatist potential and aspirations-have been particularly vehement in denouncing what they call Albanian-run drugs-for-arms deals, together with extortion,

kidnapping, corrupt law enforcement and a variety of economic crimes.<sup>41</sup> Albanian criminal groups in Kosovo are reportedly deeply involved in narcotics trafficking in particular. While they are said to often use ethnic Albanians to transport and sell the drugs, they reportedly also use other nationalities as well.<sup>42</sup> Criminal links among ethnic Albanians in Serbia, other provinces, and Albania itself are widely noted as well.<sup>43</sup> The Italian Mafia and other groups are reportedly competing for influence and a share of the market at Albanian ports such as Durrazzo, while Italian police believe that Albanians are actively working Western narcotics trafficking routes.<sup>44</sup>

**The past few years have seen an increased internationalization of organized criminal activities with new, stronger linkages and relationships appearing that had not been observed or visible before....Organized criminal groups, often cohesive, well financed and with access to new technologies that enhance their effectiveness, have demonstrated a capability to thrive amid turmoil and to expand and shift their activities rapidly to meet new requirements.**

Montenegro, which remains aligned in a federal Yugoslav state with Serbia, is by most accounts a hotbed of smuggling, particularly along the Adriatic coast. Hydrofoils and other boats are said to trade illegally in profitable items such as tobacco, as well as the major commodities of heroin, arms and ammunition.<sup>45</sup> New banking and commercial establishments have been set up in Montenegro (and elsewhere) to facilitate the illegal deals. As one specialist in Belgrade noted about the role of organized crime in the conflicts, under conditions where an expensive war is being waged at any price, expenses cannot be covered by the real implementation of national economies, so that states in the territory of the former Yugoslavia are accepting crime as a source of funding and emerging as partners of the underworld.<sup>46</sup>

Croatian citizens living abroad are widely reported to participate in arms purchasing and drug trafficking deals in behalf of the Croatian state and for personal profit as well.<sup>47</sup> Serbian reports, which put the worst face on alleged Croatian arms trafficking, have drawn strong Croatian protests. Nevertheless, such charges have continued and accelerated. One report from Belgrade, for example, alleged that emigre Croat communities in Latin America are playing an active role in supporting Croatian military forces through arms and drug trafficking. Drugs are reportedly sent from Latin America to Western Europe, where profits then are used to purchase arms for Croat forces.<sup>48</sup>

The former Yugoslav province of Macedonia, where about 300 US troops are deployed, has been the target of a number of charges of criminal and terrorist activity. The Macedonian government, accused of sponsoring heroin trafficking and using the proceeds to buy weapons, in turn charges Serbs and Greeks with drug trafficking, to include the Serbian armed forces special operations component.<sup>49</sup> The acknowledged presence of heroin and ecstasy laboratories on the territory of Macedonia are attributed to outside schemes by the Macedonian media. Members of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party of Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE) terrorist organization (dedicated to creating a greater Macedonia that includes territory

from neighboring states), are also said to be deeply involved in drug trafficking in Cooperation with the Macedonian-Albanian drug mafia and Serbian traffickers.<sup>50</sup> Macedonia, while well situated to traffic in Turkish heroin, is also an opium poppy cultivator as well. Poppy cultivation is a legal revenue-producing undertaking in Macedonia for pharmaceutical sales (about 1,600 hectares in the fall of 1992). Even assuming that clandestine poppy crops did not exist, the potential for illegal diversion of opium products would be substantial.<sup>51</sup>

According to a Slovene Ministry of Internal Affairs official, Slovenia is well on its way to developing its own classic underground.<sup>52</sup> Criminal activities on Slovenian territory are international in nature and include drug and arms trafficking, protection, extortion and other traditional organized crime. Illustrating the complexity of the drug and arms trade was the December 1992 arrest by Italian police of two Slovene citizens with 11 automatic weapons, 1,000 9mm rounds and a silencer. The arrested traffickers were thought to be part of a Croatian-Slovene-Italian drug and arms smuggling route to the Italian Mafia and other criminal groups.<sup>53</sup>

Bosnia, as a center of continuing active conflict, and as a consequence of its geographic location, has been particularly hard hit by the arms embargo, local transportation blockades and the besieged status of Muslim forces and populations in particular. Materiel support to Bosnian Muslims from Islamic states abroad has been widely rumored, but organized crime seems to have been of far greater consequence.<sup>54</sup> That is, even with the hardships, atrocities and extreme military difficulties, criminal organizations and elements are charged with influencing the course of operations. The chief of the general staff of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Sefer Halilovic), for example, pointed to the existence of an assorted criminal-political mob composed of Serbian, Croatian and Muslim members. He charged that even Muslim criminals had an Interest in keeping Sarajevo under siege in order to ensure criminal profits.<sup>55</sup> The charge echoes that heard in other states of the former Yugoslavia, the former Soviet Union and in far more distant areas.

There are several judgments that seem justified from the examples addressed above. First, the past few years have seen an increased internationalization of organized criminal activities; with new, stronger Linkages and relationships appearing that had not been observed or visible before. In addition, there is an evolving association of organized crime with insurgencies, ethnonational conflict and terrorism that seems more widespread than was the case just a few years ago. This is centered principally on the more aggressive and sophisticated financing of activities and perhaps a change in the motivation of groups from Ideology and a desire for Power, to an emphasis on profit. Organized criminal groups, often cohesive, well financed and with access to new technologies that enhance their effectiveness, have demonstrated a capability to thrive amid turmoil and to expand and shift their activities rapidly to meet new requirements.

Criminal activity founded primarily on eth-nonational Linkages, is particularly disruptive in areas where state institutions are fragile, economic resources limited and interethnic tensions high. The vastly expanded international criminal worlds of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union alone-notable for the ethnic character of some criminal groups-represent substantial costs for the states most immediately involved and for those other nations affected. As concern grows around the world about unprecedented population migrations, the criminal (as well as terrorist) content of some of these population shifts will emerge - justifiably or not - as more visible local and regional issues.

**Regional and international organized crime increasingly influences the stability, effectiveness and reliability of foreign regimes and institutions. Considering reported criminal activities associated with the former Yugoslavia's or former Soviet Union's ethnonational conflicts, for example, would seem essential for evaluating the reliability of individual participants and their institutions. This is true as well for assessing the type and quality of military and law enforcement cooperation.**

All of this changes the environment in which many kinds of military operations other than War may take place. In this regard, international organized crime will become increasingly visible as a factor in broadened threat assessments in specific states and regions to include the security and operations of US military bases abroad and the effectiveness and reliability of states in regional security roles, such as Andean Ridge countries. Eastern European states and states of the former Soviet Union. Regional and international organized crime increasingly influences the stability, effectiveness and reliability of foreign regimes and institutions. Considering reported criminal activities associated with the former Yugoslavia's or former Soviet Union's ethnonational conflicts, for example, would seem essential for evaluating the reliability of individual participants and their institutions. This is true as well for assessing the type and quality of military and law enforcement Cooperation and interaction deemed desirable or most effective and levels of support and humanitarian assistance provided to states in many areas of the world. Shifting developments in drug, arms and strategic material trafficking that affect the United States (and allies) directly should be considered more closely in broadened threat assessments as well.

To a great extent, planning and executing post-conflict activities may benefit from considering any organized crime dimensions involved. The aftermath of Operation Just Cause in Panama and a requirement to deal with developing narco-trafficking activities and the post-cease-fire training of Salvadoran armed forces elements are two earlier cases in point. US humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping missions in Somalia and potential US peace support roles in Bosnia are current and more pressing possibilities.

Organized crime considerations may require more attention in overall campaign planning for foreign security assistance programs involving military, law enforcement and other US government agencies in support of US policies abroad. International organized crime is clearly a potential factor in many decisions regarding the type and quantities of foreign aid that should be provided; the Structure of the Country Team in US embassies, and other kinds of support provided in and out of the host country. For example, US Southern Command's Strategy explicitly focuses on eliminating threats to regional security; strengthening democratic institutions; supporting continued economic and social progress; curtailing drug cultivation and trafficking; guaranteeing US access to the region; strengthening bilateral relations; and other specific goals. All of these, as evident from the specific examples discussed earlier, are adversely affected by expanded organized criminal activities. Many specific illustrations of how organized crime potentially affects planning for the five operational categories of military operations other than War are evident, in which the illegal diversion of resources, criminal violence and other criminal undertakings undermine the effectiveness or intent of US programs. However analysts might argue the particulars of any specific

issue or activity, US interests and those of our allies and friends seem increasingly affected by security concerns that are shaped substantially by organized crime. This seems at a minimum to require a more careful consideration of the impact of international organized crime on operations other than War assumptions, planning and execution in a threat environment that is still rapidly evolving.

**MR**

**NOTES**

1. See US Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations (Washington, DC: Headquarters. Department of the Army, June 1993), for an overview of operations other than war; and FM 100-20/Air Force Pamphlet 3-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Departments of the Army and the Air Force, 5 December 1990), for a detailed discussion of low-intensity conflict (LIC), the earlier designation of what is now called operations other than war.
2. Prominent among the specialists addressing these issues are Roy Godson and associates of the National Strategy Information Center who have conducted a number of seminars addressing these and related issues. Among the works that deal with these problems are National Strategy Information Center Dangerous Links: Terrorism, Crime, Ethnic and Religious Conflict After the Cold War, A Report on the Gray Area Phenomenon Research Seminar Washington, D.C.. July 1992; Xavier Raufer, Gray Areas: A New Security Threat Political Warfare (Spring 1992); Godson and William J. Olson, International Organized Crime: Emerging Threat to US Security (Washington, DC: National Strategy Information Center, 1993); and J.F. Holden Rhodes and Peter A. Lup-sha, Horsemen of the Apocalypse: Gray Area Phenomenon and the New World Disorder, Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement (Autumn 1993):212-226.
3. These contingency operations induce: disaster relief; shows of force; non-combatant evacuation operations; recovery; attacks and raids; freedom of navigation and protection of shipping; security assistance surges; Peace-support to US civil authorities; surveillance and reconnaissance operations, maritime intercept operations; and quarantines.
4. As set out in National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office [GPO], August 1991) as well as the far more general January 1993 iteration; and National Drug Control Strategy (Washington, DC: GPO 1993), among other official pronouncements.
5. National Security Strategy of the United States (August 1991), 3-4. regards to drug trafficking, the January 1993
6. National Security Strategy of the United States further indicates that to choke off supply, our principal strategic goal is to identify, disrupt, dismantle, and ultimately destroy the trafficking organizations that produce or smuggle illicit drugs for the U.S. market. In addition defines in more detail the national security threats posed by foreign narcotics trafficking.
7. National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington. DC: GPO, January 1993), 19.

8. National Security Strategy of the United States (August 1991). and (January 1993). 7. Ibid., (August 1991), 3-4; and (January 1993), 3.

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