

NGO SECURITY: DOES GENDER MATTER?




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Cover Photos (from left): Robert Kellett, (photo by Mercy Corps), www.mercycorps.org/photos/img1074886139.jpg; United Nations workers plead with an angry crowd in Chabahil, Kathmandu to cease throwing rocks at a commercial building where a “vigilante” is believed to be hiding (photo by Todd Krainin) <http://www.rajeshkc.com/phalano/?p=551#more-551>; Emily Fries, Save the Children Aid Worker, www.savethechildren.org/news/images/e_fries.jpg

Section Divider Photos: The first three photos are taken from “NGO Donors Workshop on Emergency Response and Disaster Preparedness, Focused on Mindanao,” Save the Children Philippines, Philippines, 30 April 2004.

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I. Executive Summary

The research team, based at George Washington University, was commissioned by Save the Children USA to examine the question of how gender impacts security for non-governmental organizations' field staff. Currently, there is little quantitative data available on this topic. Therefore, after researching the available literature, the team developed a number of methodological tools designed to evaluate the research questions. The research questions were: Are there gender-specific security-related issues, and if so, what are those issues? How do these issues impact the ability of NGO workers to do their jobs, if at all? Lastly, if these issues are negatively impacting the delivery of aid, how can they be mitigated?

In looking at the overarching question about if and how gender may affect the security of humanitarian aid staff, the research team took a holistic approach by gathering data and information through a multi-level spectrum. We created a three-tier structure for gathering information on the macro, meso, and micro levels. On the macro level, we interviewed security directors at NGO headquarters in the United States and reviewed the current training curricula and security manuals. On the meso level, we conducted interviews to gain the perspective of staff working in the main country office as well as country level security officers. On the micro level, we interviewed field staff and conducted focus groups in the Philippines for our case study and sent out a survey to NGO workers worldwide.

Our main findings:


- NGO security continues to be a male-dominated field
- Security policies and procedures are *perceived* to be gender-neutral
- Implementation of security policies and procedures is influenced by local cultural norms
- Ad hoc data collection of incidents and lack of gendered trend analysis may limit the ability of security directors to react to changes in the risk environment
- Most trainings do not include a gendered component, but women are more likely to incorporate trainings that include a gender component
- There are specific risks unique to men and women that need to be addressed

Our recommendations:

- Further research in this area
- Better communication between gender and security specialists
- Assessment of the risks unique to men & women and incorporation of them into trainings
- Systematic security incident reporting and analysis, with consideration of gender
- Local and international NGO partnerships for enhancing security

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Introduction

NGO Security

Gender

Background of Case Study: Mindanao, Philippines

II. Introduction

Our research team and Save the Children USA were interested in gaining a better understanding of the gender component of NGO staff security. Currently, there is very little quantitative data available on this topic, as most previous research has been focused on the beneficiaries. Gender has significant impacts for threat and vulnerability and should be taken seriously as a policy, procedural, and training security issue. Because of the lack of systematic, baseline, and readily available data on this topic, security decisions, policies, and procedures are often implemented in an informal or ad hoc manner. Our findings, and therefore our recommendations, fall into three major areas. We have specific recommendations for security policies and procedures, security training, and for future research, particularly regarding the unique risks to men and to women.

III. NGO Security

In recent years, the number of NGO personnel who have been threatened, harmed, or killed around the world has gained increasing attention from those agencies and organizations working in the contexts of violence or war, as well as from international media.¹ Two perceptions are widely accepted: (1) that aid work has become more risky, with more aid workers being killed and injured in the context of their work, and (2) that aid organizations and aid workers are being increasingly targeted. Until recently there were few available statistics to confirm these perceptions, or the number of NGO fatalities, given that documentation and incident reporting among aid organizations and agencies are woefully incomplete. Yet a seminal joint study by Johns Hopkins University and the World Health Organization in 2000, collected from available records of NGOs, Red Cross, and UN programs, did confirm the belief that deaths among humanitarian workers have increased, particularly in conflicts such as those in Rwanda, Somalia, Burundi, and Afghanistan (records included deaths between 1985 and 1998).² Moreover, the researchers conclude that “most deaths were due to intentional violence (guns or other

¹ Fast, Larissa. “Context Matters: Identifying Micro and Macro Level Factors Contributing to NGO Insecurity,” *CCHS Human Security Bulletin*, November 2003.

² Sheik, Mani and Maria Isabel Gutierrez, Paul Bolton, Paul Spiegel, et al. “Deaths among humanitarian workers,” *British Medical Journal*, Vol. 321, Iss. 7254, 15 July 2000.

weapons), with many associated with banditry.”³ Still, this study mostly focused on records from UN staff.

Recently, academics at the Center for Refugee and Disaster Response at the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health examined data from 20 aid agencies (8 European and 11 North American) between September 2002 and December 2005, categorizing the events that resulted in death, hospitalization or medical evacuation. They found that:

- Intentional violence caused 60% of all deaths.
- Intentional violence accounted for 25% of deaths, medical evacuations, and hospitalizations.
- 65% of intentional violence (shootings, ambushes, and rapes) happens to staff on their way to and from projects (rather than in their homes or offices), with the majority of these *not* involving theft.
- 65% of intentional violence was targeted at national staff, while national staff also accounted for 71% of deaths due to intentional violence.
- Small arms were used in at least 56% of the reported cases.⁴

While an important step in expanding the literature from anecdotal observation to hard data, the researchers do conclude that “to say for sure whether aid workers are being targeted more, they need to build up comparable data year after year and factor in the number of aid workers potentially at risk in the field.”⁵

Regardless of the available statistics, there have been changes in the operating environment for humanitarian organizations that support and help explain perceptions of increasing risk. For example, the nature of conflict has changed – wars between states have been largely replaced by internal conflict, which put the lives of civilians and humanitarian workers at increasing risk.⁶ In this context, there is non-compliance with international law and the agreed rules on the protection of civilian populations in war. Alarming, whereas 90% of the fatalities in the World War I were soldiers, today 90% of the fatalities are civilians.⁷

³ Sheik, Mani and Maria Isabel Gutierrez, Paul Bolton, Paul Spiegel, et al. “Deaths among humanitarian workers,” *British Medical Journal*, Vol. 321, Iss. 7254, 15 July 2000.

⁴ Gidley, Ruth. “Aid by Numbers: Violence is Top Cause of Aid Worker Deaths.” Reuters. February 8, 2006.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Sheik, Mani and Maria Isabel Gutierrez, Paul Bolton, Paul Spiegel, et al. “Deaths among humanitarian workers,” *British Medical Journal*, Vol. 321, Iss. 7254, 15 July 2000.

⁷ Minimum Standards Regarding Staff Security in Humanitarian Aid, Association of German Development NGOs (VENRO), 2003.

Similarly, there is a growing culture of impunity, wherein aid organizations are seen as simple targets that can be attacked without having major consequences for those responsible.⁸ There are also more and more diverse organizations doing humanitarian work. More importantly, an increased presence of military forces in humanitarian contexts has blurred distinctions between NGOs and military, political and private sector actors, which has undermined the protection offered by neutrality. For example, in ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the military has taken on more of the roles and aspects of humanitarian aid agencies.

Although there are varying approaches to security, as will be explained later, the community acceptance of aid agencies' mission – and their reputation for operating independently of military and political actors and providing impartially to local beneficiaries—has historically been central to an organization's security. Where that independence is unclear, confusion of roles by local communities leads to insecurity for relief personnel. These activities serve to foster the perception among many that there is no difference between the military and aid workers, and the well-established principles of neutrality, impartiality, and independence adopted by humanitarian agencies become compromised.

Three Approaches to NGO Security

Gaining community acceptance is central to an organization's security. It refers to the attempt to remove the threat or have local actors control the threat on behalf of the organization by getting their (more or less) formal consent to and acceptance of the organization's presence and work. It involves a certain level of trust by beneficiaries about the organization's mission and, as explained above, neutrality. During our research in the Philippines (discussed at length later), certain non-governmental organizations operating in primarily conflict-ridden, Muslim regions of Mindanao tended to send female aid workers to deliver aid, primarily because they wanted to gain the acceptance of the community. Male workers were largely perceived as spies, rebels, or military, thus putting aid workers not only at risk of being rejected by the community, but potentially at risk of physical harm.

⁸ Ibid

Depending on the context and on the organization's values and capacity, aid organizations can also choose to adopt other security approaches – protection and deterrence. The former refers to the use of protective procedures and devices to reduce the organization's vulnerability, such as the hiring of armed guards, or installing locks and fences. This strategy, however, does not affect the level of threat, whereas community acceptance specifically aims to reduce threat.⁹ In an article for *Together* magazine, Charles Rogers, director of corporate security for World Vision, presented a number of the ethical dilemmas of humanitarian organizations arming themselves. For example, agencies with armed guards appear to be condoning the use of violence. They may appear to be just one more faction in a conflict. This approach may actually increase the organization's chance of being targeted. Also, if aid organizations are arguing for peace and a negotiated settlement, the hiring of armed guards risks subverting that message.¹⁰

Lastly, deterrence refers to an attempt to deter individual(s) from posing or effecting a threat against the organization by posing a counter-threat, such as threatening to pull out and cease operations in a particular region if the violence or threat continues.

The ability of aid organizations to act independently is one of their strengths, but in insecure situations, it can be a pronounced weakness. Incidents that happen to one may be a danger sign for all, and the response of one organization may alter the local population's view of all the organizations and thus alter their security. One agency that begins hiring armed guards can “raise the bar” and endanger others who don't, either by making the other organizations look like *softer* targets or by implying that violence is an appropriate response to the situation. Thus when an organization chooses a certain security approach, they will also affect the security of others in the field.

Threat, Vulnerability, and Risk Assessment in the Context of NGO Security

There has been some movement toward more organized methods of sharing information and increasing security coordination among humanitarian agencies. In complex emergencies, the United Nations often takes the role of lead agency,

⁹ Van Brabant, Koenraad. “Operational Security Management in Violent Environments, A Field Manual for Aid Agencies,” *Good Practice Review* 8, Humanitarian Practice Network (HPN), Overseas Development Institute, London, June 2000.

¹⁰ Rogers, Charles. “The Changing Shape of Security for NGO Field Workers” *Together*. Jan-Mar 1998: vol. 57

coordinating both aid and security. The difficulty comes not only from agencies that may or may not cooperate, but also because security policies and training differ, sometimes significantly, from organization to organization. An incident that drives one organization to pull out and leave the country may cause another organization to temporarily limit their work, to initiate stronger security regulations, or to hire armed guards. Aid workers may have had either none or very little security training and their level of training is not necessarily consistent with the threat level in the region.¹¹ Similarly, the level of threat to international and local staff of an organization may also differ, just as the level of threat to a female or male staff member of a particular organization may differ. These differences speak to agencies' particular vulnerabilities.

Vulnerability, therefore, involves the level of exposure of a particular agency in relation to a threat. It focuses on the roles and agency of staff and behavior, both of which an organization can influence. As per national staff, they may be sometimes be in more danger than international staff: either because their affiliation with the West is perceived as “traitorous” by other locals, because they are assumed to be wealthy as a result of their pay, or because local criminals assume that kidnapping a national will not have the same negative ramifications as attacks on international staff. To some extent, organizations can reduce this vulnerability by providing security training to national staff – many of whom are often excluded from trainings¹² because of a perception that (as local staff) they are less at risk because they speak the language and are presumed to be more aware of local security threats and how to defuse them. In the Mindanao case, local organizations sometimes choose to control the level of threat by sending female aid workers (often Muslim staff) into particular conflict areas, thereby reducing their vulnerability to violence. Thus, vulnerability can also be based on ethnicity and religion, as well as gender. Vulnerability also involves compliance of staff with security measures, staff interpersonal skills, and the image of staff and programs – the latter speaks to gaining community acceptance. Where an organization chooses to work, the type of equipment they use, or the value of their property can also increase the organization's vulnerability to threat. Thus, an assessment of an organization's vulnerabilities involves

¹¹ Muggah, Robert. “In the line of fire: surveying the impact of small arms on civilians and relief workers” *Humanitarian Exchange*: No. 25, Dec. 2003, pg 22

¹² *Ibid*, pg 23

an internal review of security policies and procedures, relations with local actors, and composition and preparation of staff, among others.

Threats to aid organizations involve an event or act that can bring harm to agency assets and/or personnel. In this sense, a threat assessment helps identify the nature, origin, and frequency of threats faced by all organizations working in a particular region – which differs from vulnerabilities that may impact (and can therefore be mitigated by) a particular agency. Threats can be direct – involving actions taken by belligerents, usually to aid in political or military effort, for which NGOs are the intended target, such as robbing a food aid convoy; or indirect – involving actions taken by belligerents for which the local population or other belligerents are the intended target, but organizations are unintentionally affected, such as hitting landmines on a road. Threats can include assault and rape, theft of organization’s equipment and cash, or theft of personal property. Threats can also be directed against property, but may harm personnel, such as car-jacking. In this sense, an assessment of threats should take into account the local context, including a deep understanding of political and military developments (including actors involved), and a profile of the crimes.

Combined, threats and vulnerabilities inform an agency about its risk, where risk = threat x vulnerability. Risk thus involves the likelihood and impact of an incident. By understanding risk, an organization can make plans and adopt strategies to mitigate the risk. In particular, risks can also be measured within a gender framework. By understanding the unique risks to male and female staff of a particular agency, as in the Mindanao case, based on an assessment of threats and vulnerabilities, combined with an analysis of trends and understanding of local culture; organizations can better prepare men and women for field work, as well as make decisions about the appropriateness of men and women in a particular context.

IV. Gender

Gender vs. Sex

The terms gender and sex are often used interchangeably, but the terms have different definitions. Sex is an analytical category and distinguishes males and females by their biological characteristics, for instance, in the case of sex-disaggregated quantitative data. Gender, on the other hand, is “a socio-cultural variable that refers to the comparative roles, responsibilities, and activities of males and females...Gender roles vary among societies, within societies, and over time, they are not bound to either men or women.”¹³ Put another way, “We understand gender to refer to those attributes of men and women that are shaped by society's expectations of them, rather than determined by biology.”¹⁴

During this research project, we found that there was still a great deal of confusion surrounding the use of the term ‘gender.’ Indeed, while the definitions cited above are among the most common, there is still disagreement as to exactly how to define the term, even among gender specialists. During our fieldwork in the Philippines when interviewing NGO staff, we found that we had to clearly define what we meant by gender, and that we were not talking only about ‘women’s issues.’ A statement from the Agency for Co-Operation in Research and Development (ACORD) report on gender relations in armed conflict sums it up nicely: “Both men and women live 'gendered' lives, i.e. their life experiences, behavior, and values are to a large extent conditioned by the expectations that society places on them. Yet the discourse of 'gender and development' tends to stress women as a priority.”¹⁵ In the context of our security study, we had to stress to our participants that we were interested in discussing not only the risks unique to women, but the risks unique to men as well.

Gender and Culture

In the course of our research, we found that gender was closely linked to the overall cultural context. Therefore, a clear understanding of the local context is crucial to

¹³ “Gender and Development Manual,” US Peace Corps, accessed on May 7, 2006, at <http://www.peacecorps.gov/index.cfm?shell=pchq.ol.comdev>

¹⁴ El-Bushra, Judy and Saul, Ibrahim. *Cycles of Violence: Gender Relations and Armed Conflict*, ACORD, London, 2005.

¹⁵ Ibid

understanding gender relations in that society. This is not by any means a new finding.

The ACORD study found that:

...gender is one among several factors of difference; the others might include, for example, class, ethnicity, age and religion. Gender as a factor of difference is linked to these other factors; indeed, it cannot be separated from them. Although men and women may experience war in different ways, it is also true that different clans, age categories, or occupational groups experience it differently, and that these differences may in some cases be more important than the differences between men and women.¹⁶

Gender Mainstreaming

In 1997, the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) put forth the following definition of gender mainstreaming:

Mainstreaming a gender perspective is the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programmes, in any area and at all levels. It is a strategy for making the concerns and experiences of women as well as men an integral part of the design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic, and societal spheres, so that women and men may benefit equally, and inequality is not perpetuated. The ultimate goal of mainstreaming is to achieve gender equality.¹⁷

Therefore, mainstreaming can include gender-specific activities and affirmative action whenever either men or women are in a disadvantageous position. The International Labor Organization (ILO) identifies these as “necessary temporary measures designed to combat the direct and indirect consequences of past discrimination.”¹⁸

In the basic principles of mainstreaming of the ILO, one of the most important points is that assumptions should not be made that issues are gender-neutral without proper examination. Reinforcing this point, the Peace Corps Gender and Development manual offers two definitions of ‘gender-neutral’ that frequently appear in development literature or training materials. The first is an approach that assumes that gender has no relevance to an issue. The second is an issue that has been analyzed and shown to have no gender bias.¹⁹

¹⁶ El-Bushra, Judy and Saul, Ibrahim. *Cycles of Violence: Gender Relations and Armed Conflict*, ACORD, London, 2005.

¹⁷ “Definition of Gender Mainstreaming,” International Labor Organization, accessed on May 7, 2006 at <http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/gender/newsite2002/about/defin.htm>

¹⁸ Ibid

¹⁹ Ibid

Gender-Based Violence

The General Assembly of the United Nations, in its Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, defined the term ‘violence against women’ in article one to be “any act of gender based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual, or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion, or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or private life.” The declaration goes on to indicate that “violence against women encompasses but is not limited to physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring in the family and within the general community and perpetrated or condoned by the State, wherever it occurs.”²⁰

Perhaps a more illustrative definition is one put forth by Grace Mallorca-Bernabe, a technical officer for the National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women:

It includes domestic violence, rape, trafficking in women and girls, forced prostitution, and violence in armed conflict, such as murder, systematic rape, sexual slavery, and forced pregnancy. It also includes honor killings, dowry related violence, female infanticide and prenatal sex selection in favor of male babies, female genital mutilation, and other harmful practices and traditions. These forms show that violence against women may be viewed in a “continuum” occurring at various life cycle stages of a woman’s life.²¹

She goes on to relate that this violence can arise “...from a complex interaction between, on one hand, pervasive political and social structures in which women generally have less power than men, and on the other, individual responses to these structures.”²² Violence against women is therefore closely related to this unequal power structure. This is especially true when men feel entitled to a certain type of power and may respond violently if they perceive that they are being denied it.²³

Of course, one particular sub-set of gender-based violence is violence committed because of armed conflict. Save the Children’s Field Guide on Gender Based Violence posits that “Gender Based Violence occurs in times of peace as well as during conflict,

²⁰ “Violence Against Women: Report to the Secretary General” United Nations General Assembly, 10 Aug. 2005.

²¹ Mallorca-Bernabe, Grace. “Violence Against Women: The Case of the Philippines,” accessed online on May 7, 2006 at

<http://www.monitor.upeace.org/pdf/Violence%20Against%20Women%20in%20the%20Philippines.pdf>

²² Ibid

²³ Ibid

but the conditions brought about by war and other emergencies exacerbate the tendencies towards violence. During times of conflict, normal social restraints erode.”²⁴

The ACORD report studied the impacts of war on both men and women:

The research team had expected to find, firstly, that war would have different impacts on men and women, and secondly that one of the impacts would consist of changes to relationships between men and women. These expected research outcomes were broadly confirmed, but with important reservations. The impacts on men and women did differ, but they differed because their starting points (in terms of their social position) were different. There was little evidence that either men or women suffered significantly greater physical, psychological or economic harm, although the harm they suffered did in some respects take different forms. Those who had been politically marginalized before, continued to be so, and for the most part their deprivation deepened; this was the case for both men and women.²⁵

Therefore, the research found that there were, depending on the context, unique risks to men and to women, but that a person’s gender did not necessarily increase their risk. Unlike the definitions cited above, the ACORD study also considered gender-based violence that is committed against both sexes, not just violence against women. In their training materials, the organization RedR also defines gender-based violence as a vulnerability faced by both male and female staff because of their gender roles:

Gender based violence concerns violence that occurs to you where the discriminatory factor – or the *cause of vulnerability* - is gender i.e. where your actions in the context, including things expected of you because of your job, make you vulnerable to violence (but violence not necessarily of a sexual nature). Therefore, the conscription of young male staff into the armed forces can be considered a form of gender based violence.²⁶

Gender-Based Violence in the Philippines

In her report on violence against women, Grace Mallorca-Bernabe goes on to discuss the specifics of gender-based violence in the Philippines. As in many countries, it is a pervasive problem, but underreported due to the sensitivity of the issues involved. Particularly problematic in the Philippines are practices such as human trafficking, prostitution, and the abuse of women working overseas. The Philippines has the highest number of women working overseas in Asia.

There are also concerns surrounding women displaced by violence, such as by the conflict in Mindanao. In 1993, the National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women

²⁴ Benjamin, Judy and Murchison, Lynn. Gender Based Violence: Care and Protection of Children in Emergencies, A Field Guide. Westport: Save the Children Federation, 2004.

²⁵ El-Bushra, Judy and Saul, Ibrahim. Cycles of Violence: Gender Relations and Armed Conflict, ACORD, London, 2005.

²⁶ “Gender and Security: Key Learning Points.” RedR Security Training Resource Pack, Module C2.7.1, RedR, Oct. 2003.

(NCRFW) commissioned a study on the effect of conflict on women. This study found that the effects included: “economic dislocation; intense sense of insecurity; sexual harassment or assault; unraveling of traditional social structures and relations...”²⁷

Recently, there have been several positive developments for those working against gender-based violence:

In May 2003 President Macapagal Arroyo signed into law Republic Act 9208 or the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act...This is a comprehensive law that institutes policies to eliminate trafficking in persons, especially women and children, establishes necessary institutional mechanisms to protect and support trafficked persons, and sets sanctions and penalties to traffickers, those who facilitate trafficking, and those who buy or engage the services of trafficked persons for prostitution.²⁸

Another important step is the Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act, which was signed into law on International Women’s Day in 2004. This law penalizes all forms of violence within the family or other intimate relationships.

Of course, a law is one thing, and implementation quite another. Pursuing an integrated approach, fifteen agencies in the executive branch have signed a memorandum of agreement to create a Violence Against Women National Coordinating Committee. Its members include the National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women, the Department of Justice, the Department of Local Government, the Philippine National Police, and the Department of Social Work and Development. They are working together to better understand the nature and causes of the violence, to encourage social change, to deal with offenders, and to offer assistance to survivors.²⁹ In February of 2005, the United Nations Population Fund published a series of NGO assessments on the progress made in the Philippines in the ten years since the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing. The conclusions were mixed. While there had been a clear framework established for gender equality, questions remained surrounding the politics of implementation, particularly in terms of financial support.³⁰

²⁷ Illo, Jeanne Frances and Ofreneo, Rosalinda ed. “Beijing +10: Celebrating Gains, Facing New Challenges, A Report of Philippine NGOs,” UNFPA, Manila, Philippines, 2005.

²⁸ Mallorca-Bernabe, Grace. “Violence Against Women: The Case of the Philippines,” accessed online on May 7, 2006 at <http://www.monitor.upeace.org/pdf/Violence%20Against%20Women%20in%20the%20Philippines.pdf>

²⁹ Ibid

³⁰ Illo, Jeanne Frances and Ofreneo, Rosalinda ed. “Beijing +10: Celebrating Gains, Facing New Challenges, A Report of Philippine NGOs,” UNFPA, Manila, Philippines, 2005.

V. Background of Case Study: Mindanao, Philippines

Context of Field Work

The security director at Save the Children USA put forth a request to Save the Children offices globally, regarding the research project on security and gender, seeking an office that could host the team and provide a good context for the study. From the respondents, the Philippine office seemed the most interested in the scope of the project, was able to dedicate staff to the project, and was the most able to accommodate a four-person team.

Save the Children US has been operational in the Philippines since 1982. They work in Manila, as well as provinces in Iloilo, Guimaras, and Antique. More relevant to the scope of this project, Save also operates in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) and parts of Central and Western Mindanao. (See Appendix A for a map of Save the Children's operations in the Philippines) In response to the conflict in Mindanao, Save has instituted a Disaster Preparedness and Response Program (DPR). Supported by USAID and the UN Multi-Donor Program, the DPR was put in place to complement emergency preparedness through the establishment of the Mindanao Emergency Response Network (MERN), a group of 37 NGOs organized to provide rapid relief (food aid, shelter, livelihoods, water and health services) to displaced families during times of crisis.³¹ (See Appendix B for a map of MERN's operations)

The unique security challenges faced by Save the Children, members of the MERN, and other humanitarian and development actors in conflict-affected areas of Mindanao provide an opportune setting in which to assess the relationship between gender and the security of aid workers.

³¹ "Philippines," Save the Children USA website, accessed on May 7, 2006 at <http://www.savethechildren.org/countries/asia/philippines/index.asp>

Origins and Current State of Conflict

The conflict in Mindanao is longstanding, with fighting occurring primarily between Muslim secessionist movements calling for independence and the central government's armed forces. Although often portrayed as a religious conflict (the Philippines is predominantly Christian and Filipino Muslims only make up 5% of the total population), the struggle should be understood as one over political and economic disparities.

The current conflict and the development of a Muslim Mindanao (or Moro) identity can be traced back to Spanish and US occupation.³² Because Islam came to Mindanao long before colonization and the Moros had already established a process of state formation and governance, neither Spain nor the United States was able to extinguish Moro movements against the occupation. Under American rule in the early 1900s, however, a number of initiatives exacerbated hostility, including rapid transmigration of Christian Filipinos from the crowded northern Visayas islands to Mindanao. This trend continued in the post-colonial era, and the Moros began to lose majority status in their homeland. Following independence, the proportion of Moros to the total population in Mindanao fell from 98% to less than 20% currently. As demographic pressures mounted in Mindanao, political tensions heightened.

It was in this environment that the first Moro separatist group arose in the early 1970s –



³² Spanish colonizers in the mid-1500s referred to the Muslims in Mindanao as Moros, borrowing from the term they had used to refer to North African Muslims, Moors. *Morohood* thus initially developed as a reaction to Spanish occupation and as a result of centuries of struggle. Yet the Muslim peoples of Mindanao were quite fractured, and the term Moro was generally applied only by the Spaniards who viewed the Muslims rebels as a mass. In reality, Mindanao and nearby Sulu Archipelago are comprised of a number of distinct tribal groups; the largest of which, and the one from which Mindanao takes its name – the Maguindanao--McKenna, Thomas M. Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines, Anvil Publishing, Manila, Philippines, 1998, pg 29-32.

the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), with the goal of Moro self-rule or the creation of *Bangsamoro* (the Moro state).³³ Armed violence between government forces and the MNLF escalated throughout the 1970s, with both groups under great pressure to secure a peace agreement. Such an agreement was reached in 1976 – the Tripoli Agreement, which provided autonomy to 13 provinces in the southern Philippines (later called the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)). Yet for some in the MNLF leadership, this process did not go far enough, leading to a splinter group forming in 1984 – the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). The MILF considers the ARMM a vehicle for limited self-rule, demanding instead the establishment of an independent Muslim state. It is the MILF that has been engaged in most guerilla combat with the Philippine National Police and the Armed Forces of the Philippines in the last two decades. A second splinter group dissatisfied with the MNLF, the Abu Sayyaf group, is also linked to bombings and kidnappings for ransom.

Ten years of deliberations between the MNLF and the central government over differing definitions of autonomy stalled the Tripoli Agreement, during which time the MILF gathered strength and numbers. It was not until 1990 that the ARMM was finally established, but with only 4 of the 13 provinces.³⁴ Even so, as the ARMM was created, it lacked any real authority or funding, which reignited violence driven partially by the MILF.

The inability of the central government to draw both the MILF and the Abu Sayyaf groups into negotiations, and the MNLF's inability to be the guarantor of total peace in the region caused major problems for the Peace Agreement. Two unsuccessful ceasefire agreements with the MILF followed in 1997 and 2001. More recently, the new presidency of Gloria Arroyo has been marked by small gains and confidence-building measures, punctuated by lapses into violence on each side. Recently, the climate between the major parties seems to have shifted toward real peace negotiations, as the government and MILF make strides in discussions over governance, resources and territory – with the issue of land rights, or *ancestral domain*, currently under intense debate.

³³ Stark, Jan. "Muslims in the Philippines," *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 23:1, April 2003, pg 201.

³⁴ The initiative was put to a vote and only 4 of the 13 provinces voted for autonomy.

Clan Violence – Rido

There is a widely held belief that the violence in Mindanao is perpetrated by armed groups that resort to terrorism to further their political goals. The actual situation, however, is far more complex. Although the Moro armed conflict dominates media, a privately funded survey commissioned by The Asia Foundation in 2002 showed that clan violence (most commonly referred to as Rido) in Mindanao is actually more pertinent to citizen's daily lives, becoming more complicated when mixed with secessionism, banditry and military involvement.(Dayag-Laylo, 2004)

Bantay Ceasefire (an independent civil society group) also finds that for the last three years since bilateral re-declaration of ceasefire between the MILF and Philippine Government (GRP) on July 2003, most cases of ceasefire related violations stem from Rido. This clan feud has been an irritant to the MILF and the GRP, as there have been cases where forces of both are dragged into the conflict.

Further confirmation was provided by focus group discussions conducted by the research team with member organizations of the Mindanao Emergency Response Network, as aid workers reported that clan feuds often escalate to larger confrontations between armed groups (FGD by research team, 9-13 March 2006, Iligan City, Cotabato, Zamboanga, Philippines).

At the crux of the conflict are marked economic and political disparities. Mindanao lags behind the rest of the country significantly in most development indicators. Home to nearly a quarter of the country's population, the region accounts for nearly half of the people living in poverty. Five provinces in Mindanao are among the ten poorest in the country and of these, the ARMM is the poorest and has the country's lowest functional literacy rate.³⁵ Ironically, Mindanao accounts for the majority of the country's exportable crops and natural resources,³⁶ yet revenue from these is seldom retained locally. Land ownership restructuring over the last century has favored the commercialization of agriculture at the expense of communal and subsistence farming, the traditional vehicle for local income generation. The granting of extractive industry concessions to foreign companies that are exempt from paying taxes in the region further exacerbates the Muslims' sense of grievance against the policies of the national government. Once majority landowners, the Moros now own less than 17% of property, mostly in the impoverished countryside. It is estimated that nearly 80% are landless.

One of the major consequences of the conflict between government forces and the aforementioned rebel groups, including the New People's Army – yet another dissident movement, affiliated with the Communist Party of the Philippines – is internal

³⁵ "Country Strategy and Program 2005-2007: Philippines," Asian Development Bank, June 2005.

³⁶ "Mindanao," Mindanao Economic Development Council, Office of the President, 2004, accessed on May 7, 2006 at <http://www.medco.gov.ph/medcoweb/mindanao.asp>

displacement. Working from compiled data from media reports, CBOs/NGOs, and government agencies in the region, the Global IDP Project estimates that some 60,000 IDPs are displaced in the Philippines, most of whom are in the ARMM.³⁷ Forced to leave their lands and livelihoods for fear of being caught in the crossfire or ordered to leave by the military,³⁸ the already poor peasants in this region become even more vulnerable, as often their livelihoods are destroyed or looted during the fighting. Upon return, they frequently face a lack of housing and resources, poor water and sanitation, lack of access to health care, and poor education facilities for children.³⁹ Compounding their needs is the conflict's cyclical nature, which renders rehabilitation efforts unsustainable. Most IDPs are children (reported to constitute 60% to 70% of the IDP population),⁴⁰ women, and elderly – and most are Muslim. The latter is a reflection of the composition of the violence concentrated in resource-rich and underdeveloped Muslim-populated areas of Maguindanao, Sultan Kudrat, North and South Cotabato, Basilan, and the Sulu islands in Mindanao.

Meeting the needs of IDPs is the government's Department of Social Welfare and Development, members of the Mindanao Emergency Response Network (MERN) and the Philippines National Red Cross (which is also a MERN member). An exploration of some of the security challenges faced by these workers in delivering aid to IDPs and other populations in Mindanao follows the data analysis section.

³⁷ "Profile of Internal Displacement: Philippines, a Compilation of Information Available in the Global IDP Database of the Norwegian Refugee Council." Norwegian Refugee Council/IDP Project, Geneva, Switzerland, September 2005.

³⁸ Ibid

³⁹ "Humanitarian Assistance Programme, Mindanao Project," Community and Family Services International, (CFSI), Oct. 2003, accessed on May 7, 2006 at http://www.cfsi.ph/p_phil.htm

⁴⁰ "The Philippines: As stability is returning to Mindanao, IDPs need assistance to restart their lives," Notre Dame University & Commission on Population, Global IDP Report, January 2004 accessed on May 7, 2006, at <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/EVIU-69HGVM?OpenDocument>, p.34



Research Questions

Methodology

Data Analysis

VI. Research Questions

Questions addressed within the context of this study fall into three general areas. First, are there gender-specific security-related issues, and if so, what are those issues? How do these issues impact the ability of NGO workers to do their jobs? Lastly, if these issues are negatively impacting the delivery of aid, how can this be mitigated?

Within the first topic, regarding the existence of gender-related security issues, a number of further questions come into play. What is the difference in the ways that these issues affect international and national staff? How does gender impact the vulnerability of NGO staff and are there security challenges that are unique to one gender or the other? What variables (including cultural norms) exist and affect the level of security for women and for men?

The ways that these issues impact the workers' ability to perform their jobs also has subtopics. In delivering aid, how do the security risks differ for men and woman? Are there gender-based differences in the appropriate response to a high-risk situation? How has the perception of gender-based security threats motivated some NGOs to adopt different policies and procedures for men and women? What is the impact of these gendered procedures and how have they been applied?

Lastly, how can any negative ramifications of these impacts be mitigated? What are the policies and procedures that empower aid workers and managers to act appropriately to maximize service and minimize risks? What are the appropriate training procedures that will have a similar effect? What are the policies and procedures that acknowledge the cultures within which they operate, the threats unique to women and men in that context, and can best empower both men and women to carry out their work effectively?

VII. Methodology

In looking at the overarching question about if and how gender may affect the security of humanitarian aid staff, the research team took a holistic approach by gathering data and information through a multi-level spectrum. In order to detect inconsistencies or gaps in issues of NGO security policies, procedures and trainings, as well as perceptions of personal security, we created a three-tier structure for gathering information:

- **Macro-level:** This level is an examination of an organization's security policies, procedures, and trainings from the headquarters' perspective. The assessment is derived from interviews of security directors of US-based NGOs, or the individuals who are responsible for security if an NGO does not have a designated security director, as well as analysis of various NGO security manuals and training modules.
- **Meso-level:** This level is an examination of an organization's security policies, procedures, and trainings from the perspective of staff working in the main country office as well as country level security officers.
- **Micro-level:** This level is an examination of an organization's security policies, procedures, and trainings, as well as perceptions of personal security, from the perspective of field staff. Field staff includes both international and national staff working for international or local NGOs.

In order to collect information on all three levels, the research team crafted five different data collection instruments. The following is a list of the five research tools created as well as the level under which they fall in the macro to micro spectrum. A sample of each tool is contained in the appendices.

1. **Security Director Interview Questions:** These interview questions were created to understand how headquarters approaches security and how gender may play a part in an NGO's security framework. This forms the basis of our *macro-level* findings. (See Appendix C)
2. **Regional Security Staff Interview Questions:** These questions, which are almost identical to the Security Director Interview Questions, aim to capture the inconsistencies or gaps that may exist between policies and procedures prescribed by headquarters and the actual implementation of those policies and procedures in the field. These interviews took place in the Philippines and the information gathered from this set of interview questions contributes to our *meso-level* findings. (See Appendix D)
3. **Focus Group Discussion Questions:** These discussion questions attempt to draw out field staff's perceptions of the relationship between gender and security by assessing the different risks that men and women face. The group forum gives an opportunity for staff members to build on each other's

opinions and for the research team to assess agreement and disagreement within the group of the insights shared. These focus group discussions took place in the Philippines, specifically in Mindanao, and the information collected from these interviews with contributes to our *micro-level* findings. (See Appendix E)

4. ***Field Staff Interview Questions:*** These semi-structured interview questions ask field staff about their NGOs' security policies, procedures, and trainings and results will be used as a method for comparing and contrasting with the macro and meso level findings. These interviews took place in Mindanao, Philippines and the information gathered from this set of interview questions adds to our *micro-level* findings. (See Appendix F)
5. ***Survey for Field Staff:*** This tool was crafted as a way to globalize our study and expand our findings beyond just the information gathered in the Philippines. This survey consists of questions that ask staff about their NGOs' security policies, procedures, and trainings as well as questions regarding risks within their local context. The information captured from this survey will form the basis of our *micro-level* findings and help highlight the incongruities that may exist between the macro, meso and micro levels. (See Appendix G)

The interview/discussion group questions and the survey generally share similar structures; certain differences exist within each tool depending on the research objective of the tool. The following chart lists the main sections covered within each research tool.

Name of Data Collection Tool	Sections within Tool
Security Director Interview Questions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ? Background of security director ? NGO security policies ? NGO security training ? NGO security incidents
Field Security Staff Interview Questions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ? Background of field security staff ? NGO security policies ? NGO security training ? NGO security incidents
Field Staff Interview Questions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ? Background of staff member ? NGO security policies (informal and formal) ? NGO security training (informal and formal) ? Managing personal security
Focus Group Discussion Questions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ? Risks in Mindanao ? Ways to mitigate risk ? Risks unique to men ? Risks unique to women
Survey for Field Staff	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ? NGO security policies and procedures ? NGO security trainings ? Background of staff member ? Security within the local context

The data collection process began in early February with the research team first interviewing security directors of US-based NGOs. From March 6 – 17, 2006, the research team traveled to the Philippines to conduct field research in the capital city, Manila, and the country’s southern region, Mindanao. While in Manila, the team interviewed both donor organizations as well as international and domestic NGOs to discuss their organization’s security framework, and specifically whether gender is considered in that framework.

While in Mindanao, the research team conducted focus group discussions with members of MERN, which is a collection of 37 local and international NGOs, that have been integral in providing relief to the areas devastated by civil conflict. For organizational purposes, the MERN members are divided into three clusters (Ranaw, Central Mindanao, and ZamPenBaSulTa Cluster). The research team traveled to each cluster and conducted two focus groups per cluster. The focus group discussions took place in Iligan City, Cotabato, and Zamboanga with each focus group ranging from 5 to 11 participants. An additional two focus groups consisting of only Save the Children staff also took place in Cotabato and Zamboanga, which contributed to a total of eight separate focus groups. With time permitting, members of the focus groups were also

asked to participate in a semi-structured interview with a member of the research team after the conclusion of the focus group. For a schedule of focus group discussions and field staff interviews, see Appendix H.

After completing their field research in the Philippines, the research team returned to Washington, DC to complete the interview process with NGO security directors and to begin to analyze responses to the global survey that had been released prior to leaving the Philippines. The survey was sent to all Save the Children field offices worldwide as well as a selected number of NGOs that had expressed interest in participating in the survey process. The following table lists the number of individual participants and organizations that participated in each stage of our data collection process:

Instrument	Number of Individuals Represented	Number of Organizations Represented
Security Director Interview Questions	15	15
Regional Security Staff Interview Questions	19	19
Field Staff Interview Questions	37	15
Focus Group Discussion Questions	50	17
Survey for Field Staff	105	9

Limitations

While the research team gathered data on a number of different levels to increase the validity of their findings, there were several methodological limitations that may have a bearing on our overall findings. Because Save the Children commissioned our work, there was an inherent focus on Save the Children staff and their partners, in both the fieldwork in Mindanao and in response rate from the global survey. Organizations within the MERN network, of which Save the Children acts as the coordinating body and Secretariat, formed the basis of our fieldwork in Mindanao. It should also be noted that the individuals who participated in the focus group discussions and semi-structured interviews were not randomly selected. Each organization was responsible for selecting which staff members would attend the focus group discussion and there may have been

an inherent bias in whom to select as participants. While the global survey helps to validate our findings on a global level, it should be noted that over 80% of the survey respondents are Save the Children staff. Because Save the Children commissioned this research project, the recommendations are structured for future use by Save the Children. As the issues researched are relevant to all NGO staff operating in insecure environments, the recommendations will be beneficial to both Save the Children and other NGOs interested in the findings and results.

The limited amount of time available for gathering data on all levels is another methodological concern. The research team spent two weeks in the Philippines and as a result was only able to interview a selected number of organizations and individuals. The interviewees, while very generous in carving time out of their day to talk to members of the research team, often had a limited amount of time due to the demands of their jobs. These concerns are also applicable to the security director interviews in the States. Additionally, as Save the Children has commissioned this work to share with InterAction members, the security directors were selected largely from InterAction members, especially from NGOs that are a part of InterAction's Security Advisory Group. Therefore, all of the NGOs selected for this phase of interviewing were large US-based NGOs.

Because all focus group participants and interviewees spoke some level of English, translators were not needed. It should be noted, however, that the proficiency range for spoken English varied significantly and as a result, information may have been lost in the interview process. Moreover, at times, the language barriers prevented the research team from asking probing questions and having an in-depth interview. Additionally, while members of the research team took turns being the note-takers during focus group discussions and interviews, the lack of transcription of entire discussions or interviews may have caused some information to be lost.

VIII. Data Analysis

Macro: Security Directors

The research team interviewed fifteen security directors, primarily of international NGOs, but also including other development agencies, to gain a better understanding of their organization's security policies implementation at the headquarters level, training procedures, incident reporting and tracking, and how gender impacts each of these areas. A copy of the interview questionnaire is in Appendix C.

For this study, the term "Security Director" is used to refer to the individuals responsible for security at their organizations, regardless of whether security is their main responsibility. Some organizations do not have a specific post for Security Director, assigning the responsibility instead to the Program Director, Operations Officer or Executive Director. Organizations that do have a specific post for the Security Director had generally only established the post relatively recently. The result of this was that we generally spoke to the first or second person to hold the post and that person had often played a significant role in shaping their organization's security policies and procedures.

While there was consistency on some issues, there were also marked disparities among the organizations. On the whole, most people interviewed agreed that security is important issue, which requires more attention. However, some organizations had policies that had been established for years, while others had policies that had been in place for only a few months. Some organizations required a minimum number of annual trainings for their staff. Others agreed that trainings were important, but admitted that they occurred only on an infrequent and ad hoc basis. On the issue of security and gender, responses also varied dramatically, from organizations that had given much

Participating Organizations

Action Against Hunger (ACF)
Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA)
American Red Cross
American Refugee Committee
Catholic Relief Services (CRS)
Chemonics
Christian Children's Fund (CCF)
Church World Services
InterAction
International Refugee Committee (IRC)
Peace Corps
Save the Children USA
United Methodist Committee on Relief (UMCOR)
United States Agency for International Development/ Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance

forethought to gender in training and implementation of security measures, to organizations that had not considered it relevant or had not considered it at all.

Security Director Background

Of the fifteen Security Directors interviewed, all but two of them were men, but only a quarter of them had some sort of military background (two interviewees expressed concern about the level of *machismo* associated with the military background of many security officers). Most of the rest had developed security competencies through ‘learning by doing’- given that the post of Security Director is generally relatively nascent. For example, half of the organizations had created the Security Director positions in last four years or less.

Organizational Security Model

Not surprisingly, most organizations interviewed approached security through an acceptance model, meaning the organization relies on community consent to and acceptance of their presence and work in a particular region as the main mechanism for protecting personnel and property. The security directors, in general, felt that the acceptance method was the most preferable, but that it could not be applied exclusively, and that sometimes protection and deterrence methods might need to be used. Some organizations employ armed escorts and armed guards, and are not against using deterrence as a last resort.

Security Policies and Procedures

Of the organizations interviewed, most have only begun to address security on an institutional level in the last five years, developing the organization’s formal, written security policies during that time. For the majority of the interviewees, dissemination of formal security policies (as manuals) occurred during staff orientation. With the exception of one organization, most could not really confirm whether staff had read or absorbed the information in the security manual.

With the exception of sexual harassment in the workplace, none of the organizations interviewed felt gender was a major component of their security policies. No one referred to gender as having been “mainstreamed,” in spite of strong efforts by the development community to mainstream gender in other areas. Interestingly, one organization with perhaps the most sophisticated and developed security competencies of

all organizations interviewed did attempt to adopt gender specific security policies, but was met with resistance from female staff lobbying for gender-neutral policies.

Although headquarters staff describes policies as largely gender-neutral, gender is often enveloped within policies of ‘cultural appropriateness,’ including mode of dress, travel and for one organization, even deployment. Moreover, although policies are perceived to be largely gender-neutral, the implementation of these in the field is influenced by gender, culture, and local context. For instance, interviewees mentioned giving culturally specific briefings for some field sites, including information on gender.

Because security on the whole has not been mainstreamed into many organizations, (despite strong recommendations to do so by security experts such as the organization RedR and Koenraad Van Brabant), there is generally a lack of clarity about the degree of gender impact on policies and procedures. One reason is that many organizations have a one-person security office and it is often the policies of that individual that drive the organization’s security policies, not the other way around. This tendency is increased by the lack of institutionalization of security policies in the organizations. Some do not have security officers, some still have only a draft security manual or none at all, some do not have standard incident reports, and many keep no statistics at all on security incidents. Therefore, the degree to which gender is incorporated into security policies may be heavily dependent on the inclinations of the security director. With two exceptions, all of those interviewed, indicated they had felt no pressure from either above (board of directors, donors, superiors) or from below (field staff) to incorporate gender to a greater or lesser degree into security, so the decision seems to have been left entirely up to the individual director.

Training

The levels of training available to staff also vary widely, from sophisticated multi-level training in a simulated environment, to occasional briefings in the field office. Organizations interviewed rely on in-house headquarter or field staff to conduct the training (half of interviewees), outside contractors like RedR and the Wesbrocks (three interviewees), or a combination of training modules and facilitation from both. Some organizations tried to ensure that international staff received at least one training every year; some said it was more like every few years, at best. In general, national staff received little to no security training at all—some directors seemed to think that this was

acceptable, others expressed regrets, and very few expressed any intention of rectifying the situation. On this note, a 2001 study of security of national staff commissioned by InterAction, “The Security of National Staff: Towards Good Practices,” strongly recommends the full participation of national staff in security management procedures and training, but as one former security noted, the study’s recommendations have not been sufficiently integrated, possibly due to the costs involved.

There seemed to be a general consensus among interviewees that gender is somewhat addressed during trainings, albeit not extensively and mostly in the context of ‘cultural appropriateness.’ Examples cited as cultural appropriateness overwhelmingly included women working in an Islamic region. For the trainings conducted by outside facilitators/contractors, it is not yet clear how gender is integrated. In an interview with one training organization, they said that they had tried to include gender openly, but encountered resistance from female trainees. They have since tried to include gender in their trainings, but in a much more subtle fashion.

One former security director related that when he attempted to include a gender component in the security training it was ineffective. This may have been due either to participants’ lack of interest in the topic or to discomfort felt by the facilitator stemming from a perception that to facilitate on gender and security, one needed to be a gender expert. Thus it was perceived as technical, difficult, and beyond the capacity of security staff. Another security director noted that a gender component could be beneficial, but it should really be left up to the staff participating (and their interests and the context of their work). One organization went as far as offering a separate security training on ‘female security issues’ for female staff, but they resisted, stating they wanted the same training as men. Another director said that the organization’s training is gender neutral, but if there are specific issues, they will be discussed on a one-one basis, as people do not want to be treated differently in larger groups.

The disconnect in these responses demonstrates that gender is still perceived as a ‘women’s issue.’ With one exception, none of the interviewees cited examples of men within a security context when discussing the relationship between gender and security.

Incidents

Organizations also varied in how they handle incidents. The definition of a security incident ranged from pick-pocketing and verbal harassment to incidents that

would affect the organization's security within the country. Most organizations have a standard incident form, which is filled out and passed up the chain of command. How far up it moves in the organization and how quickly is generally based on the severity of the incident.

Many, although not all, of the security directors said that they thought there was some underreporting of incidents. Their estimates ranged from knowledge of two-thirds to three quarters of all field occurrences, with the caveat that the figures were only estimations. They suspected that there was more underreporting of incidents involving sexual violence and that security incidents involving only national staff were even more underreported.

Many organizations document security incidents, but only two have a database for trend analysis and only one disaggregates their database by gender. Some directors said they observed trends themselves, or in conjunction with the Country Director. With a couple of exceptions, no one had noted a specific gender trend to recorded incidents, though as security directors may not be looking for one, subtle differences might not be noticed.

Macro: Literature Review of NGO Security Manuals

It is interesting, if somewhat repetitive, to look at the various manuals put out by the major agencies. Since the 'field' of NGO security is so new, it is not surprising that many of the manuals have a similar look and feel, or that they cover similar content. In fact, many of these documents are based on either one or two master documents – specifically, the Overseas Development Institute's Operational Security Management in Violent Environments, A Field Manual for Aid Agencies or the United Nations Security in the Field: Information for Staff Members of the United Nations System. In other cases, they are based on another organization's security manual that was in turn based on those documents.

Indeed, there is even a standard template available for new security directors. The European Commission on Humanitarian Aid (ECHO) commissioned a 'generic security guide.' In it, they have laid out the standard security curriculum. It ranges from technical issues, to administrative issues, to how to coordinate with other organizations. Other standardized sections include dealing with the media, staff travel policies, and security planning and assessment. Particularly important sections highlight how staff will

be trained in safety and security, how incidents will be reported, and how an evacuation will be carried out. InterAction has also produced guidelines for its member organizations on what to include in a security manual.

Gender Considerations

The generic manual commissioned by ECHO is again similar to those of most, if not all organizations in this respect. The language is for most sections very much gender-neutral, though it is unclear if this reflects a true analysis of any gender issues. Rather than mainstreaming gender, many manuals have a section that deals with ‘female staff.’ (See Appendix I for the ECHO version.) However, it should be noted that many organizations do add the caveat that male staff should also read this section, as some of the same concerns may apply. In addition, virtually all of the manuals have a section on sexual harassment and/or sexual assault. Again, the ECHO generic manual offers the standard gender-neutral formulation:

Everyone, male and female, is a potential victim of sexual violence. It may take a variety of forms. It has such a serious impact on its victims that great care should be taken to minimise the risk of it happening. How to minimise the risks will depend on the local situation...⁴¹

The International Save the Children Federation manual is interesting, as it takes a more gender-specific tack on this subject. The section on sexual violence reads, “Sexual violence is a threat in any society, and all age, ethnic, and economic groups are at risk. The vast majority of sexual assaults are committed by men against women, but attacks on men do occur.”⁴² On the other hand, the manual defines sexual harassment as “any unwanted and offensive conduct, verbal or non-verbal, which is targeted at an individual because of their gender,” and goes on to state that “the conduct itself does not have to be sexual in nature and can be directed at either men or women.”⁴³

The one security manual that we reviewed which considers the issue of gender in greater detail is from Church World Services. Under the rubric of conflict management, it considers several issues, the most prominent being power dynamics and gender. In their examination of gender, the authors state that, “Regardless of how ‘advanced’ or

⁴¹ Generic Security Guide for Humanitarian Organizations, European Commission’s Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid (ECHO), 2004.

⁴² Bickley, Shaun. Safety First: A Field Security Handbook for NGO Staff, Save the Children Federation, 2003.

⁴³ Ibid

‘depraved’ (depending on your cultural perspective) the western view of gender is considered, there are some ‘differences’ which must be recognized. Not the differences of the sexes, but the differences in which some cultures view, treat, and react to them.’⁴⁴

In this examination of gender, the authors make three further points:

B. Women face a greater risk of threat than do men in certain cultures and situations. On the other hand, men may face greater threats than women in certain matriarchal societies. Regardless of the situation, the concern for gender based security threats must be recognized by NGOs.

C. Women must be cognizant of the security risks inherent in a world where they are exposed to a much higher degree of exploitation and abuse than men. For example, in some patriarchal societies, women are expected to take a position secondary to men. This secondary position may include a subtle pressure to maintain a low profile or specific laws dictating how they are allowed to dress, act and speak...

D. Men also face gender-based challenges in security situations. Too often, men of western cultures succumb to the “macho male” syndrome. This is the situation where the male feels he must “be large and in charge”. It is a situation that can get him and others injured or killed. Men must learn to “step back” in certain situations and in certain societies, for the interests of himself and the group.⁴⁵ (also see Appendix J)

Macro: Review of Security Training Modules

We found that as is the case with security manuals, the security training curricula generally come from a few key models. Several major organizations have created their own in-house security training modules, some organizations have cooperated with each other and shared training materials, and one organization allowed another to modify its training modules for their own use. Different organizations utilize their training staff to different extents in developing and conducting security trainings. A number of organizations contract out at least some of their security training, either to RedR or to other technical specialists.

The established security training curricula offer multiple levels. For instance, there may be one level of training for managers and security staff, another for headquarters staff, and another for field staff, etc. The training modules are also divided in a functional way, with different modules focusing on convoy security, personal security, travel security, landmine safety, and so on.

⁴⁴ Church World Service: Security Manual for NGOs Working in Insecure Environments, Church World Service, 2000.

⁴⁵ Ibid

There are two mindsets on how specific to a country or culture the training should be. In the RedR trainers' guide, contextualized training is appreciated as:

“...context specific training provides an ideal opportunity to learn about the context through the involvement of resource people with intimate knowledge of the situation and awareness of humanitarian action. This session, together with “Cultural issues,” has been highly valued by participants on many context specific training events. This is because it is a rare, unfortunately, opportunity for aid managers to look at the situation in which they are embroiled from a different perspective removed from the frenetic activity of day-to-day work and through the eyes of knowledgeable specialists.”⁴⁶

On the other hand, other trainers have reported difficulty in presenting training specific to a local culture, especially without being perceived as offensive by the local staff or members of local organizations.

Gender Considerations

As part of the functional division of training modules, many of the security training programs offer a module on gendered security concerns. These types of modules tend to come in two ‘flavors.’ The more basic approach is to offer a training module about sexual harassment and assault. While these issues are usually presented in a gender-neutral way, they are still perceived to be women’s issues. Another possibility is a module (such as that offered by RedR), which offers a more detailed examination of gender, and security issues, starting with an analysis of the cultural context and the possible gender-based vulnerabilities. “Gender is a key driver of vulnerability, and one of the reasons why different members of staff experience different levels of risk whilst doing the same jobs in the same environment.”⁴⁷ Regardless of which type of gender module is offered, it is almost always an optional component of the session. The choice is often left up to the training participants, and the module is presented as one of a number of possible ‘extra’ sessions. Based on our limited number of interviews, the majority of security trainers are male, which may have an impact on whether or not the gender module is included in the training and how it is presented. However, there may also be concerns for female trainers presenting this material, because of the continued perception of gender as shorthand for ‘women’s issues.’

⁴⁶ Trainer Guide to Security Management Training, RedR, 2003.

⁴⁷ “Gender and Security: Key Learning Points.” RedR Security Training Resource Pack, Module C2.7.1, RedR, Oct. 2003.

Macro: Review of Reports on NGO Security

The field of NGO security may be a new one, but it is well established enough to have produced several important reports which provide a framework for further discussion of the salient issues. Gender and security, while not a focus of any of these reports, has merited some attention.

Gender Considerations

In 2004, ECHO funded a report, which included a section that considered women's security issues. The report, which relied on opinions expressed by aid workers via ad-hoc focus groups, included such points of concern as the lack of female security staff, the specific risks faced by women, and the perception that women did not have equal access to security trainings. A major point was that there was a dearth of information on this topic, and reference was made to a forthcoming InterAction supported study, which would help to address this problem.

People in Aid has been another organization which has considered this issue. In the final section of their report, they identify a number of vulnerabilities that staff may face because of their nationality, race, religion, and/or language skills, among others. For gender, the following is noted:

Female staff members are more likely to be the victim of sexual assaults, but are less likely to be taken hostage than men. Women international staff are often not subject to the same cultural norms and rules as nationally recruited women staff, and therefore may benefit from a certain degree of freedom in negotiation and debate, which is not available to other staff.⁴⁸

Finally, in the section dealing with sexual assault and sexual harassment, Koenraad Van Brabant offers the following comment:

Does security override the gender policy? Not deploying or withdrawing female staff from high-risk zones is seen as undermining the operational objective of some organisations to reach more women among the target group or the employment policy of a better gender balance. Female staff themselves may very well resist different treatment for security reasons. The issue however needs to be looked at from a worst-case scenario point of view: is being gang raped, and possibly contracting AIDS as a result, worth the affirmation of gender equality at a particular time and place? One way of overcoming the apparent policy conflict is to base contextual decisions on a pro-

⁴⁸ "People in Aid: Information Note, Enhancing Staff Security," People in Aid, 2004.

active assessment of the threats to and vulnerabilities of different categories of staff (see Van Brabant, 2000: ch. 4, 20).⁴⁹

In the section to which he refers, Van Brabant suggests that when conducting a reactive threat assessment, after frequency and geography is considered, that “a third criterion might be vulnerability. There is not necessarily a single ‘risk profile’ for everyone in the organisation. Different staff members may face different threats because of their origin, affiliation, age or gender.”⁵⁰

Meso: Regional Security Staff Interviews

The research team interviewed nineteen security focal point persons in Manila to gain a better understanding of the implementation of their organization’s security policies, training received by staff, and how gender impacts field work (particularly in Mindanao). A copy of the interview questionnaire is listed in Appendix D.

With one exception, all interviewees handled safety and security secondary to other primary responsibilities. For the most part, security focal persons were either the director of the organization, or director of programs. One organization, with perhaps the most sophisticated security competence, established a security cluster involving staff from different departments.

For the most part, organizations adopted an “acceptance” approach to their security, with most opting against armed guards and coordination with the military/police for escorts. On a spectrum, the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Philippines National Red Cross were the least risk averse, because of their unique mandate. Donors agencies tended to rely on embassies for security information and are relatively risk averse, with a focus on protection and deterrence. Between these two on a spectrum are the NGOs/INGOs which rely on local partners for security, are less risk averse than donors, but more so than ICRC, and focus on acceptance.

Not surprisingly, international organizations had established security policies and procedures handed down from headquarters. National organizations, however, lacked institutionalized policies, with security mostly dictated by the security focal person, and

⁴⁹ Van Brabant, Koenraad. “Mainstreaming the Organisational Management of Safety and Security, HPG Report 9,” Humanitarian Policy Group, Overseas Development Institute, London, March 2001

⁵⁰ Van Brabant, Koenraad. “Good Practice Review 8: Operational Security Management in Violent Environments.” *Overseas Development Institute*, 2000.

in one case, from USAID. Incident reporting also followed a similar variance, with country offices of established international organizations filing incident reports, and national organizations not having a systematized approach. There was also a great disparity in terms of training provided to staff. When training was offered (again, primarily by INGOs), it did not include a gender component; there was no assessment of unique risks to men and women aid workers in the field.

Interestingly, in terms of security implementation and gender, there was also a wide variety, but not necessarily along national/international organizational lines. One security focal person (also the country director) expressed that for their organization, security is gender-neutral, with no limitations on men or women (i.e. in terms of travel or accompaniment), while others said there were restrictions on women (for example, in terms of appropriate dress). One organization provided numerous anecdotes of how the gender of the staff person had affected the security decisions made in the field, for example, they noted that “when the potential victims are ladies and they are being confronted by people who want to take their possessions or supplies, it’s more likely that they will let the women go without hurting them, where as if they confront a guy, they might be more likely to physically hurt him.” Another director offered, “Men will just kill men right away, but if a woman asserts herself and makes a fuss, then a man probably won’t kill a woman.” Most country offices had a better understanding of gender-based risks in the field

Micro: Focus Group Discussions with Mindanao Aid Workers

As part of the fieldwork, the research team traveled to Mindanao to conduct both one-on-one semi-structured interviews (which will be discussed later) and focus group discussions. As described in the methodology section, these interviews and discussions were comprised of staff from the organizations that belong to the Mindanao Emergency Response Network (MERN). The research team traveled to each of the three MERN clusters and conducted two focus groups per cluster. Both the Ranaw and Central Mindanao clusters had 11 participants for the focus group discussion whereas the ZamPenBaSulTa had a total of 19 participants. The research team also conducted two separate focus groups consisting of only Save the Children staff; one took place in Zamboanga with 5 participants and the other in Cotabato with 4 participants. In total, there were a total of 50 participants and 8 focus groups. The discussions lasted

approximately two hours and included a number of activities in which the participants discussed ways to mitigate the risks they face as NGO workers and which risks are unique to men and which risks are unique women. The group forum allowed the research team to determine whether the results were widely applicable or interesting outliers.

Risks in Mindanao

The participants of the focus groups identified myriad risks in Mindanao, many of which are also applicable to NGO staff worldwide. Because armed conflict has ravaged the region over the past few years, the majority of risks were either directly or indirectly related to the consequences of the conflict. One hundred percent of the focus groups indicated that the presence of armed groups posed a risk to their safety and security, while 50% cited the presence of the Filipino military as creating an additional risk.

While certain direct risks associated with conflict, such as the increased likelihood of being caught in crossfire, were mentioned in some focus groups, many of the participants focused on the secondary risks associated with conflict. For instance, over 75% of the focus groups indicated that NGO workers face a grave risk of being perceived as informers or spies, for either a rebel group or the military, when working in new communities. Moreover, NGO workers felt at risk if the community perceived them as favoring one side over another. The risk of being perceived as a spy or an informer seemed especially true for Muslims entering Christian communities or vice versa. The risk associated with perceived partiality was heightened if the NGO had a religious affiliation and was providing assistance to communities of the same religion.

The effects of sustained conflict have had a devastating effect on both institutions and infrastructure, which in turn have created an additional set of risks within which NGO workers must operate. Over 75% of the focus groups indicated that poor road conditions put staff, especially drivers, at risk of serious injury or death. The poor road conditions were attributed to the lack of capacity and political will of the government to maintain the eroding infrastructure. Poor governance and an ineffective legal system were cited by over 50% of the participants as contributing to a general atmosphere of lawlessness and banditry. The lack of effective governance has allowed terrorist groups to form in the region, which has increased the level of unpredictable violence that NGO workers face. The emergence of the Muslim extremist group, Abu Sayyaf, as well as a

general anti-American sentiment, poses a specific risk to Western NGO workers of being killed or kidnapped for ransom.

Focus group participants also cited a number of risks that NGO workers face by virtue of being part of the culture in which they work. For instance, the culture in Mindanao dictates that family is of utmost importance and showing allegiance to one's family is obligatory. This social obligation is so strong that clan wars, known as Rido, will erupt and be so intense that they can last months and destroy entire communities. While Rido is a risk that all individuals face in the area, the issue is especially complex for a NGO worker since the rest of their NGO and staff can be put at risk when a colleague's family is involved in Rido. Other cultural issues, such as the conservative relations between men and women, can engender many risks for NGO workers, such as the risk that women in Mindanao face of being kidnapped for marriage. Because divorce is culturally unacceptable in Mindanao, women that are kidnapped for marriage are effectively culturally coerced into staying in that marriage for life.

How NGO Workers in Mindanao Mitigate Risk

When focus group participants were asked to describe how they mitigate risk, the responses overwhelmingly emphasized an acceptance approach to security. What is interesting is that the majority of participants had never attended security training and therefore had never been taught the acceptance, protection and deterrence approaches to security. Utilizing an acceptance approach to security is for them both instinctual and practical. Most NGOs involved in the focus group discussions were local organizations with limited funds and therefore unlikely to have money to spend on protection. Moreover, there was a widespread agreement that measures incorporating protection strategies are not necessary since NGOs receive their security from the communities in which they work.

All of the focus groups discussed ways to earn approval from the communities in which they were working. Almost all identified the importance of being sensitive to local culture, which can be manifested in a number of ways. The two cited as the most important were speaking the local language and dressing in a culturally appropriate way. There was also widespread agreement that it is critical to coordinate with local officials before entering a community, and 75% of the focus groups also emphasized the importance of coordinating with all groups in the area, including rebels. One group

pointed out that having relationships with all groups is a difficult balance to maintain, but that NGOs should strive to show genuine respect to everyone without actually getting too close to any group. About 50% of the groups discussed the importance of demonstrating to the communities a willingness to learn by listening to their needs and incorporating such needs into project design.

Each focus group discussed some variation of being clear, honest, and transparent with the communities in which they work. Some groups emphasized the importance of taking the time to introduce yourself and explain your purpose and objectives so that the communities do not mistake you for a spy or an informer. Other groups stressed the need to explain intentions and goals as a way to prevent potential misunderstandings in which the community expects a service that the organization cannot deliver. The credibility derived from being who you say you are and fulfilling the promises you make was cited as integral to NGO staff safety and security.

The participants also identified actions that they employ to maintain their personal security. It should be noted that most of these measures were ad hoc and not mandated by their organization, as most organizations did not have any formalized security policies and procedures. With regard to travel, three of the focus groups indicated that they avoid travel at night, two groups mentioned that they travel with local contacts, and two groups specified that they adopt a random travel schedule. Three of the focus groups said it was important to maintain a low profile and suggested avoiding some of the following: dressing ostentatiously, attending political demonstrations, or publicizing the type and amount of resources your NGO has. Interestingly, three of the focus groups identified engaging in peace advocacy as way to mitigate risk, despite the increased profile that comes with being part of the peace process. When asked to clarify the discrepancy, the participants explained that to be part of the peace process is to be respected and therefore involvement does not increase your risk level. Three of the groups indicated the importance of being aware of your own limits and boundaries. This point was made in reference to issues of health, specifically not overworking yourself and knowing when to stop, but also with regard to a staff member's capacity to work in a certain community. For example, two groups believed that a staff member should discontinue work in the area if his or her family is involved in Rido.

While only minimally discussed, the need to resort to some form of deterrence measures on occasion was identified in three focus groups. For instance, one participating organization threatened to stop serving a certain community if a local community did not fix the area's impassible roads. In another group, one participant used local lore and custom by telling kidnappers that their souls would be haunted if they did not release hostages. The kidnappers were convinced and soon released the hostages.

Risks Unique to Male & Female NGO Workers

In the last component of the focus group exercise, men and women were divided into separate groups and asked to explain what risks exist for each gender. Men tried to determine what risks were unique to women and women listed the risks unique to men. Then both groups came back together and each gender evaluated the other group's assessment of their risks. This was not only useful to the research team but also proved to be a learning experience for the participants. They discovered that men and women do in fact share similar risks but also face specific risks by virtue of their gender. Moreover, sometimes men and women can face the same risks but for different reasons.

The most frequently cited risk that women face is sexual harassment, which was mentioned in all eight focus groups. Some groups believed that women were at risk for sexual harassment when they dressed inappropriately, whereas other groups believed that this was a risk that women faced even when dressed appropriately. Risk of sexual assault and abuse was only cited in two focus groups. We are concerned that this is reflective of the cultural stigma attached to rape and sexual assault in Filipino. In fact, in one of the focus groups, the women disagreed with the men when they listed them as risks that women face. On the other hand, in another group, men wrote the word rape down on their list, but never actually said the word aloud during the discussion. Two groups indicated that some female NGO workers are at risk for harassment or abuse in the home because they may be perceived as ignoring their domestic responsibilities or for disrupting the balance of work and home if they travel a lot.

The second most identified risk for women, discussed in five of the focus groups, was kidnapping for marriage. This risk was particularly high for attractive women and so prevalent in certain regions that some women purposely tried to diminish their attractive qualities as a way to lessen their chances of being kidnapped. Additionally, some single female NGO workers introduce themselves as being married when working

in communities to avoid the potential for abduction. While sexual harassment and kidnapping for marriage are risks for all women in the region, participants believed that the risks increased because of the heightened profile caused by their work.

Five of the focus groups indicated that women are weaker and slower and as a result, they face a series of risks that their male counterparts may not face. Some groups suggested that because emergency relief often includes carrying heavy quantities of goods, women, being physically weaker, are at risk of becoming exhausted. Additionally, because women are perceived as weaker, it is believed that they are softer targets for physical assault. When asked for feedback regarding the male's perception that women are weaker, the women participants agreed with the point. The male participants also believed that women faced unique risks based on certain biological differences, most notably pregnancy and menstruation. Two groups believed that it is more difficult for women to perform emergency relief when they are pregnant because they will become easily exhausted. Three groups mentioned menstruation as a specific health issue that women face and two groups suggested that menstruation made women more moody. Interestingly, women participants agreed with this point when asked. In general, women felt that these specific issues, such as a greater likelihood of being exhausted, stressed, and moody, did have a direct bearing on their security as it affected their decision-making abilities and increased their risk to assault.

There were a few points raised by the male participants with which the women did not agree. First, males seemed to believe that women are more prone to being perceived as spies and informers than women seemed to think. After discussion in one of the focus groups, it was determined that women may not necessarily be perceived as spies, but rather as good sources of information, which in turn could increase their vulnerability. Second, some male participant groups had mixed opinions on whether women were at risk for engaging in work that was sometimes considered as a male responsibility (i.e. negotiating with local leaders, negotiating at a check-point). Some males believed that such responsibilities increased a woman's vulnerability because men can feel threatened by women trying to exert power. Other groups, however, believed that because women are generally seen as non-threatening, it is beneficial to utilize them in the traditional male roles as a way to avoid potentially aggressive situations. Women generally agreed with the latter point.

When women evaluated the risks that are unique to men, seven of the eight groups believed that the greatest risk for men is mistaken identity and being perceived as a spy or an informer for the military or a rebel group. The threat is so great that many men avoid wearing particular clothing or having certain haircuts. The second greatest risk that men face is their social obligation to participate in Rido. The male's duty to defend the family until death applies to men within the immediate as well as the extended family. Interestingly, one group pointed out that as a male, it is also expected that you will be a target, even if you are just a distant relative of the clan involved.

About 75% of the focus groups indicated that male NGO workers are more prone to violence than women due to personality and cultural reasons. Some groups suggested that men feel the need to display their toughness and masculinity and this machismo often boils over into aggressive and violent episodes. Male NGO workers can be at a higher risk of violence because of certain cultural factors. For instance, men cannot look at or speak to strange women in some communities or else there will be repercussions. This puts a strain on the male NGO worker, as he cannot easily interact with women in the community; women NGO workers, however, appear to be given more flexibility in working with male or female populations in the communities. Two of the focus groups also indicated that men are more at risk for physical stress or over-exertion because they are more likely to be tasked with the responsibilities of carrying supplies and heavy loads. One group believed that men also suffer from increased emotional stress because they have a harder time expressing their feelings openly.

Micro: Interviews with Focus Group Participants

As a follow-up to our focus group discussions, we conducted a number of interviews with the participants. Not all participants were able to give us the necessary time for these more in-depth interviews, but we did interview the majority of them. We interviewed three of the four staff from the Save the Children Cotabato office, and all five of the staff from the Save the Children ENRICH program in Sulu. We also interviewed three Manila-based staff who traveled to Mindanao on a semi-regular basis. For the Ranaw cluster of the MERN, we were able to interview nine of the eleven participants from the focus group. For the Central Mindanao cluster, we interviewed six of the eleven participants. Finally, in the ZamPenBaSulTa cluster, we were able to interview fourteen of the nineteen participants.

The interviews lasted about 15 minutes on the average, but ranged from a minimum of ten minutes to a few more in-depth sessions, which lasted more than half an hour. The interviews covered the background of the participants, their organizations' security policies and training (formal and informal), their approach to personal security, and any other concerns or areas that they wished to highlight. The interview questions can be found in Appendix F. We had originally included questions about the local security context, and the unique risks to men and to women in the interview questions. However, these were clearly well covered in the focus group discussions, and so we felt no need to repeat them in the individual interviews.

Overall Trends – MERN Interviews

A number of clear trends emerged from the interviews, reinforcing trends found through the exercises in the focus group discussions. The backgrounds of the participants varied quite a bit, as did their experience level, reflecting the diversity in participants invited by the Save the Children staff, as well as the differences in maturity of the different organizations that comprise the MERN network. Most of the organizations did not have any formal security policies. Those that did were usually longer established, had direct ties to a national or international organization (such as the Philippines National Red Cross or the Philippines National Police), or both. Of the organizations that had formal policies, these were rarely comprehensive, and no organization mentioned having a security manual (though several had manuals which included sections on staff security).

Since the majority of the organizations had security policies that were either non-institutionalized, or non-existent, security concerns were generally handled through informal methods, such as conversations between more experienced and less experienced staff, or briefings specific to a particular trip or a particular community. Confirming the information from the focus groups, most participants thought that the acceptance of the community, and clear communication with community leaders were the most important aspects of their security. Organizations often hired staff from the areas in which they worked, worked in the same areas for some time, and thus were well known. Some organization reported that they had the most security-related problems when first starting operations in a new area, particularly if that area differed in culture and religion from that of the staff that was sent there.

The security policies that existed were almost always described as gender-neutral. However, the implementation of those policies depended much more on the views of the head of the organization, and their interpretation of the security situation.

Training was virtually non-existent for the majority of the interviewed organizations from MERN. A few participants had attended an earlier training carried out by Save the Children, but this knowledge was not passed on in their organizations in any sort of consistent manner. Again, the participants most likely to have received training were those with connections (other than MERN) to national or international organizations. For instance, the participating chapter heads from the Red Cross had all received some training in international humanitarian law, and how to disseminate this information to combatants, from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Most of the participants expressed a strong desire for security training, but given the nature of our research and our questions, this was hardly surprising.

Much of what the participants considered personal security was instinctual, and simply what they considered part of living in Mindanao. Many participants really had to think about this question, as they were doing what they had always done. Again most of the methods of personal security were based on the acceptance model, including having good contacts in the community whom one could trust. The other related item was good planning and coordination.

Overall Trends – Save the Children Interviews

Being an international organization, of course Save the Children tended to attract more experienced staff, often with previous experience with local organizations. As was the case with the local organizations, Save hired staff locally (i.e. from Mindanao), through not necessarily from the particular area where they would be working. Everyone interviewed mentioned formal security policies and the fact that these policies were gender-neutral.

All of the staff had received some sort of security training, and often several trainings, depending on their position and how long they had been with the organization. The security focal person in Manila had trained most, but several of the staff had also received training from the Security Director of Save the Children, or had participated in RedR security trainings in Australia. While the staff found many useful aspects of these

trainings, they stressed that they would prefer training in which they had more input, and which was more contextualized to their work environment.

Personal security also differed somewhat from what was mentioned in interviews with staff from local organizations. Save staff were more likely to also mentioned protective measures such as locking doors, varying routes, not publicizing operations outside of the beneficiary population, continual situational awareness, and so on. This may be in part because of their increased level of training, their awareness of the negative consequences in some quarters of being associated with an organization perceived as American, and the fact that by and large they were not members of the communities in which they were working. This was particularly pronounced when interviewing the Manila-based staff.

Interesting Outliers

Several interviewees brought up some interesting points which, though outliers, merit some attention. Several program directors (both male and female) mentioned that in the implementation of their programs, they assigned particular gender roles to their staff. Usually, this involved having the women carry out any negotiation or interaction with community members, while the men carried the relief supplies. Though our sample size was not large enough to support any definite conclusions, two Muslim organizations also were organized into two completely separate committees – one composed of men to deal with ‘male’ projects, and one composed of women to deal with ‘female’ projects. In both of these organizations, men dominated the decision-making.

Micro: Global Surveys

Our survey was designed to get a better understanding of the NGO field workers’ perceptions of their

Participating Countries

Africa

Ethiopia
Ghana
Kenya
Mali
Nigeria
Rwanda
Sudan
Uganda

Asia

Afghanistan
Bangladesh
Bhutan
Indonesia
Nepal
Pakistan
Philippines
Sri Lanka
Vietnam

South/Central

America/Caribbean

El Salvador
Guatemala
Haiti

Former Soviet countries

Armenia
Georgia
Kyrgyzstan
Tajikistan
Uzbekistan

Middle East


Egypt
Iraq
West Bank and Gaza

organizations' security policies and training. It is also intended to provide information on two main topics: first, how gender impacts those policies and trainings and second how the gender of the worker alters their perception of the policies and trainings. A copy of the survey, a map of the countries from whom we received responses, and a breakdown of the responses are in Appendices G, K, and L respectively.

The survey responses we received were largely (but not entirely) from Save the Children staff and the vast majority of them were from national staff employed by Save the Children. Because of our involvement in the Philippines, a quarter of the surveys sent back originally were from Save the Children staff in the Philippines. The research felt that this preponderance of responses from the Philippines would unbalance the survey results, so a smaller number of responses from the Philippines, equal to the highest number of responses received from any other country, were randomly selected for inclusion in this analysis.

The respondents were almost evenly divided between men and women. Unfortunately, the response pool from international staff was small enough to cast doubt on the reliability of the conclusions drawn. With that caveat, those conclusions are included to suggest directions for future research and to give some idea of the different perceptions of local and international staff.

The initial breakdown for data analysis was based on the gender of the respondent and whether or not s/he is a national of the country they are currently working in. The responses are in the chart.



First, the answers to individual, close-ended (multiple choice) survey questions will be explained and discussed. That will be followed by a discussion of the responses to the open-ended questions posed in the survey.

Individual Security Survey Questions

Background Questions

The surveys were submitted anonymously, in the hopes of encouraging increased frankness among the respondents. However, in order to develop a better understanding of the answers, we did ask the following background questions:

- Respondent's gender
- Whether the respondent was a national of the country in which they work
- How long the respondent had worked in development/relief work
- How long the respondent had worked for their current organization
- The name of the country in which the respondent currently works

The majority of the respondents were experienced NGO workers, with 37% having over ten years' experience, over 60% having at least six years' experience in the field, and 83% having at least three years' experience. Most of the respondents also had been with their organization for a number of years. Fifty-five percent of the respondents have been at their current organization for at least three years and only 15 % had been there for a year or less. Surveys were returned from twenty-eight different countries, from four different continents. (See Appendix K)

Close-Ended Questions

The survey had thirty-one questions, twenty-five of which were multiple-choice. The questions asked about their organization's security policies, security training the respondent had received, and the security environment in which they working. The open-ended questions are discussed in detail in the next section.

Please bear in mind that the pool of respondents, especially international respondents, is not large and that trends from that groups should be seen only as suggestions for future research. The research team is very hesitant about drawing firm conclusions from such a small sample size, particularly in the case of the international respondents. However, for questions where the response is overwhelmingly in one direction or another, we feel that it behooves us to point out the potential trend.

- ***Question 1—Does your organization have formal, written security policies and procedures?***

The answer to this question, regardless of gender or nationality, was overwhelmingly “yes” from over 90% of national women, national men, and international men. Overall, only five respondents answered “no” or “I don’t know.” There was no trend of gender or nationality among respondents who answered “no” or “I don’t know.”

- ***Question 2—How familiar are you with these policies and procedures?***

While it was reassuring to see that people’s organizations had security policies and procedures, the level of familiarity that respondents admitted to varied. With this question, one also has to consider the possibility that people know that they “should” know their policies well, and might be inclined to exaggerate their familiarity with them. It is also worth noting that later in the survey, people are asked if there are any differences between security policies for national and international staff. The vast majority of international NGOs have different evacuation policies for their local and international staff, but this was cited by only 12% of respondents. This casts some doubt on how well they really know their own security policies and procedures.

National and international women are the least familiar with security policies, with 59% and 54%, respectively, claiming to be extremely or very familiar. By contrast, 74% of national and 73% of international men describe themselves as being extremely or very familiar with their organization’s security policies and procedures. In the open-ended questions, several people cited “lack of security training” as a risk unique to women, leading us to speculate on why it is that women are less familiar with their organization’s security policies and procedures than men. Are the women themselves not making an effort? If not, why not? Are the security policies not addressing women’s needs and therefore women do not bother with something that they do not perceive to be useful to them? Or, are organizations not as focused on the security needs of women? This possibility was raised as a point of concern in ECHO’s Security Report for Humanitarian Organizations, as discussed previously.

There seems to be a perception among both sexes that women have more unique risks than men do (see discussion of questions 30 and 31). It seems odd, in the light of this, that women are less aware of the security policies that are meant to reduce their risks. Further discussion of this appears under the section linking questions 21 and 24.

- ***Question 3—Do you have a copy of your organization’s security policies and procedures?***

It will come as no surprise that the people most familiar with security policies are also the ones most likely to say that they have a copy of them: international men, 95% of whom had a copy. Conversely, national women, who were least familiar with security policies, were also the least likely to have a copy of them—over 20% of them did not. Security directors have expressed concerns about making sensitive evacuation information generally available (which has led to a wider distribution of policies to international staff who need evacuation information and less to national staff who do not). However, it may be worthwhile to have separate copies of security policies—one for general distribution and one with sensitive information. It seems likely that this would have the effect of increasing security policy awareness, particularly among national staff.

- ***Question 4—Are any of your organization’s security policies and procedures different for women than for men?***

The vast majority of respondents answered “no” or “I don’t know” to this question. National staff was slightly more likely to say that their organization had such policies, but it is unclear as to whether or not this is because such policies exist or because of differing perceptions of what is a security *policy* and what is generally done. For example, women working in a conservative Muslim country may choose to cover their hair when they go out, but there may not be a formal security policy addressing this.

- ***Question 5—If yes, how are these policies different?***

In general, if the policies are different, it was reflected in a few different areas. The ones most commonly named were dress, travel restrictions, and traveling alone.

However, so few people said that their organization had gendered policies, the research team feels that no firm conclusions can be drawn from this. There were also no noticeable trends in the countries where people who cited different policies were working.

- ***Question 6—Is the implementation of your organization’s security policies and procedures the same for men and women?***

There was a high non-response rate to this question, suggesting that the phrasing of it might have been unclear. Those who did respond largely responded “yes.” International women were the most likely to say that the implementation was different, with 27% of them answering “no.” Our hope had been to see if organizations had gender-neutral policies that were then interpreted in a non-neutral way in the field. However, given the high level of people who did not respond to this, and the possibility that the question was not well phrased, we feel we cannot draw any firm conclusions from the answers given.

- ***Question 7—Are any of your organization’s security policies different for national staff than for international staff?***

Over 80% of international women answered “yes” to this question, compared with about 50% of all national staff and international men. Why more international women answered “yes” is unclear. The numbers for the other three groups were fairly consistent across the board, so it is possible that the small pool of international women respondents biased the results.

- ***Question 8—How are these policies different?***

Travel restrictions were mentioned the most frequently. Lodgings, evacuation, curfew, and dress were the other areas cited, as sections where policies might differ. Many organizations have different evacuation policies for international and national staff, but evacuation was cited by only 12% of respondents. There was no noticeable trend in the countries where people who cited different policies were working.

- *Question 9—In your opinion, who is safer? (International or national staff?)*

The answers to this question differed significantly among the four groups of respondents. To be conclusive, the responses would probably have to be considered in light of the country of the respondent, however, there are nevertheless some interesting differences.

National men and women responded similarly, with approximately half of each group feeling that both groups were equally safe (or as one man put it, “equally unsafe!”). The remainder of national staff was almost evenly split between perceiving that local staff was safer or international staff was safer.

International staff responded differently not only from the national staff, but also between the two genders. Once again, we must emphasize that the small pool of international respondents limit the reliability of these numbers. However, particularly in this case, the response was significantly different from the national staff responses. While a third of international women feel that local staff are safer, a third of international men felt that international staff are safer. Also, while almost half of local staff said that both groups were equally at risk, only about a quarter of international staff felt this way.

There are two possible explanations. First of all, we suggest that the higher level of insecurity felt by international female staff may result from their perception of their vulnerabilities as both international staff and the threats against them purely as a result of their gender. These two vulnerabilities can also reinforce each other. In many countries, Western women are perceived (not necessarily accurately) as more sexually available than local women, meaning that the fact that they are Western increases the already present threat of sexual assault or rape.

Secondly, international men felt that international staff was safer at a higher rate (32%) than any of the other three groups. Without an examination of security incidents based on their nationality and gender, which is beyond the scope of this report, it is impossible to say who is correct in this assessment. However, it might be useful to note that a unique risk attributed to men (see discussion of questions 30 and 31) has been variously described as arrogance, over-confidence, and a disinclination to abide by security protocols. It is possible that the sense of safety that international male staff workers feel is unwarranted and/or that this perception leads to international men being

underserved by security directors (who are largely male) who may share this perception of safety. Once again, this is based on a very small sample size, and we do not recommend drawing firm conclusions based on this information.

- ***Question 10—Do your colleagues of the opposite sex respect you?***

The answers to this question were similar for national men, national women, and international men, with 94%+ of all three groups answering “yes.” However, when we reach the international women’s responses, the story is quite different. Only 40% of the international women answered “yes,” whereas almost 50% of them answered, “some do, some do not” and 7% answered

“no.” It seems unlikely that local women are overwhelmingly more highly respected than international female staff. It seems more probable that

“I am the Head of Administration and so many of my men colleagues find it difficult to see me [as] a leader, and do not give me the respect I deserve, but are hypocritical and pretend to show me respect...”

-An international woman working in Rwanda

international women tend to have higher expectations for equal treatment, based on the societies they grew up in. The difficulties in receiving respect and equal treatment for international women may be something to keep in mind when considering the problems that women may encounter on the job or difficulties they have in implementing or having input into security policies.

- ***Question 11—Which staff person is responsible for your security?***

In general, most people noted that a staff person in their office was responsible for security in addition to other responsibilities. This was the response of over 90% of national women, 60%+ of international women and national men, and half of international men. The remainder added their own answers to the ones listed, including “everyone is responsible,” “I am responsible first and foremost,” and others. Since, other than national women, over 20% of other respondents either checked “other” or wrote in their own answers, we reluctantly conclude that the question should have been phrased differently. However, less than 10% of all respondents answered “no one,” which suggests that organizations have generally assigned this responsibility to someone.

- ***Question 12—What is the gender of this/these staff people?***

The security staff seems to be generally male or a team of people of both genders. Over half of all male respondents had entirely male security staff and over 45% of all female respondents had male security staff. When considered altogether as a group, over half of respondents had male security staff and almost 30% had mixed gender teams. Only 13% of respondents had solely female security personnel. The high number of entirely male security staff raises some questions as to how well women’s concerns are being addressed, particularly (as we see in the discussion of linked questions 20 and 21) in their security training.

- ***Question 13—In my opinion, the current safety and security policies (greatly increase/ somewhat increase/ increase nor decrease/ somewhat decrease/ greatly decrease) my ability to do my job.***

Most national staff felt that the current safety and security policies “somewhat” or “greatly” improved their ability to perform their jobs—over 60% of both men and women. International staff was less likely to feel this way; with less than half of them feeling that the policies “somewhat” or “greatly” improved their ability to do their jobs. International staff was more likely to say either that the policies had no effect, or that the policies actually decreased their ability to perform their jobs. It is important to note that of the people who responded that the policies decreased their ability to perform their jobs, most of them were working in high-risk areas—Iraq, Afghanistan, Haiti, Pakistan, etc.

- ***Question 14—In my opinion, the current safety and security policies (greatly increase/ somewhat increase/ increase nor decrease/ somewhat decrease/ greatly decrease) my ability to socialize.***

The respondents were less likely overall to feel that security policies improved their ability to socialize outside of work. National men were most likely to feel that the policies greatly improved their ability to socialize outside of work at 26%, while only 7% of international women and no international men said that it “greatly improved” their ability to socialize. National women fell in between, with 16% saying it “greatly improved” their ability to socialize.

Almost forty percent of international staff felt that the policies “somewhat” or “greatly” decreased their ability to socialize outside of work. Some people in the more dangerous areas may not mind this—one international woman working in Afghanistan checked the answer that the policies “somewhat decrease my ability to socialize outside of work” and then typed in, “And this is a good thing, given the current situation in Kabul.”

The concern with this question is that people who feel that the policies are too restrictive may be less inclined to follow them. However, once again, we note the very small pool of international respondents, and the difficulty of drawing firm conclusions.

- ***Question 15—In your opinion, should there be different security policies and procedures for men and for women?***

There was a noticeable gender divide in the answers given to this question. While relatively few people answered “yes,” there were a number of “sometimes” responses.

However, while 47% of national men and 58% of international men answered that “yes” or “sometimes” there should be gendered policies, at least 60% of both groups of women said there should *not* be different policies for men and women, some explaining their point of view quite vehemently in their responses to question 16.

No—“After more than ten years in the field in a variety of cultures...I have yet to live in a place where there was a need to draw distinctions...such policies, when implemented, serve to marginalize women in the workplace...”

- International woman working in Indonesia

Question 16 is an open-ended question asking people to explain their responses to question 15. It will be considered in-depth later, in the section dealing with open-ended questions. However, it may be important to note here that judging from the responses to question 16, we see a real lack of understanding of the concept of gender as applying to *both* men and women. Almost everyone, when discussing their response, was reacting to

Sometimes—“In countries where women are at greater risk due to cultural or religious or other bias, this needs to be taken into consideration.”

-International male working in Tajikistan

the idea of different (more restrictive) policies for women. Almost no one expressed the thought that men might be more at risk or that policies should be created to deal with the

security of men. Many of the concerns expressed by people who objected to such policies were related to how it might marginalize or impact the job opportunities of women. The possibility that there might be situations where men would need policies specific to their needs was rarely expressed, although, as we have seen, it does seem that there are risks unique to men that may need to be addressed.

- *Question 16—Open-ended question, analyzed in the next section*
- *Question 17—Have you received any training in safety and security while working with this NGO?*

Approximately 70% of national women, international men, and national men have received some type of security training with their current NGO. International women were the least likely to have received security training, with only 61% of them having received training. It is not possible to draw any conclusions from this because of the small sample size of international women. Also, there seems no logical reason for international women to be less likely to receive security training than any other group.

There did not appear to be any trends related to either gender or nationality regarding the number of security trainings that respondents had attended.

Percentages for the next nine questions related to training will be based on the number of people who have received training as the denominator, not the total number of respondents to the survey.

- *Question 18—How long was your safety/security training or the safety/security component of your training?*

The responses here varied widely from one-hour-long trainings, to trainings that extended for over two days. National women were most likely to have attended a shorter training, with only 28% of them having attended a training of two days or more. Sixty percent of international women and 50% of international men had attended longer training. National men were in the middle, with 44% having attended longer trainings. International staff was also more likely to have attended a training given by outside contractors, who may be likely to conduct more extensive trainings.

- ***Question 19—Who conducted the training?***

Most national respondents were trained by people within their NGO. International staff was slightly more likely to have been trained by people from outside their NGO, as only 7% of national women and 17% of national men had been trained by outside experts. Forty percent of international women and 43% of international men were trained by outside experts. Many people went to trainings that were conducted by both people within their NGO and outside experts, including a third of national women 13% of national men, 29% of international men, and 20% of national women. Again, the small pool of international respondents inclines us not to draw firm conclusions, but as the difference is so striking—over 40% of international staff receiving outside training, and less than 20% of local staff—it struck us as suggestive of a trend.

- ***Question 20—What sex were the trainers?***

Forty percent of international women and over 40% of every other group attended trainings conducted solely by men. Very few people attended trainings conducted solely by women—10% or less for national and international women and international men. Twenty-two percent of national men attended a training conducted solely by women. It is unclear as to why this might be the case. Women were more likely to attend a training that had been conducted by both men and women (45% of national women and 50% of international women). International staff, on the other hand, was more likely to have been trained by men, with 60% of international men and 50% of international women having done so. This may be linked to the higher numbers of international staff attending outside trainings, as the outside organizations were more likely to have male trainers than in-house trainings.

- ***Question 21—Did your training mention safety/security procedures that were specific to women?***

International men were much more likely to say that they had attended a training that had mentioned security procedures specific to women. While only a fifth to a quarter of all women and national men attended a training mentioning women's security issues, 64% of international men had. It is unclear as to why this might be the case.

- ***Question 22—Did the training have a separate section on safety/security for women and/or for men?***

Practically no one attended a training with separate sections for women and/or men. The very few people who did attend trainings that had either a separate section for women or separate sections for both. However, only five people out of the seventy-six people who received training attended one with separate sections. There were no trends of those who received training with separate sections that were related to gender or nationality.

- ***Question 23—Did the training suggest that women are more/equally/ less at risk than men)?***

International men were once again the outlier in answers to this question. While less than 15% of all women and national men attended a training that implied that women were more at risk than men, over a third of international men had attended such a training. Over 55% of national women, 80% of international women, and 65% of national men said that the training suggested that both genders were equally at risk. The remainder in these three groups said either that the training implied that women were more at risk or that they didn't know what the training implied.

- ***Question 24—Do you use lessons from your training in managing your personal security?***

Over 85% of everyone trained said that they use the training “often” or “sometimes” in managing their personal security. This question, again, is one where people know that they “should” use their security training, so they might be inclined to exaggerate the extent to which they utilize lessons learned from training.

However, it is interesting to look at the differences between people who indicated that they “often” use their training and those who “sometimes” use it. Seventy percent of international women wrote that they “often” use their training. International men and national women were more likely to indicate that they “sometimes” use their training, with 50% of international men and 62% of national women saying so. National men were more evenly split, with 43% saying that they “often” use their training and the same

percent for “sometimes” using it. Once again, the small pool of international respondents makes us reluctant to draw firm conclusions from this data, but the numbers are so much higher for international women that it might be useful to do further research to determine whether international women feel more at risk. As discussed in the next question, they were the least likely (by far) to say that their training had addressed their security concerns, so it seems peculiar that they nevertheless utilize it frequently.

- ***Question 25—Do you feel your security concerns were addressed in the training?***

Over three-quarters of national women and both groups of men said yes, but only 50% of international women felt that this was the case. It is important to note that although most people said that their concerns had been addressed, the open-ended question asking people what topics they would like to see addressed (question 28) had suggestions from half of the national women, 56% of the national men, and 57% of the international men. This does suggest that although people may be generally satisfied with their training, there are certainly further areas of concern to them.

- ***Question 26—Open-ended question, dealt with in the next section***
- ***Question 27—Do you wish your organization offered security training?***

This question was meant to be answered only by the people who had not received training. However, possibly due to the format of the survey, approximately 80% of all respondents answered. The responses were overwhelmingly in favor of training. This, in conjunction with the multiple requests for specific topics to be covered, does strongly suggest that NGO staff members, regardless of gender or nationality, are strongly interested in further training in safety and security.

- *Questions 28-31— Open-ended questions, dealt with in the next section.*

Open-Ended Questions

There were five open-ended questions in the survey. The response rate was quite good, over 80% overall. Since they were open-ended, the answers ranged quite broadly, but some overall trends could be discerned. These questions, like the multiple-choice questions above, were broken down by gender and by whether the staff member is a national of the country that they are working in.

- *Question 16—Please explain your response to Question 15 (In your opinion, should there be different security policies and procedures for men and women?)*

Among national female staff members, 65% did not support gendered policies and the reason cited was that men and women are equal and should be treated equally. A female national staff worker in Georgia wrote succinctly, “Security doesn’t have gender.” The national women who supported differing policies generally ascribed the need for them to cultural context or to their perception of an increased vulnerability of women.

National men overall were much more supportive of the idea of differing security policies, with almost half of them saying that “yes” or “sometimes” such policies should be in place. The reasons that they generally gave were less focused on cultural context and more based on the fact that they perceive women to be more vulnerable. A male national staff working in Pakistan said, “In certain cases women are more vulnerable than men and that’s why they need special attention.” The national men who felt that there was no need for differing security policies almost uniformly gave gender equity as their reason.

International women were generally not supportive of the idea of separate security policies for men and women. They cited concerns that such policies would inhibit advancement opportunities for women or be applied unfairly. The few who answered that “sometimes” separate policies would be appropriate felt that in some cultural contexts, they might be necessary. None of the international women answered, “yes” to question 15.

International men were much more supportive of the idea that sometimes there should be separate policies, with 58% of them answering “yes” or “sometimes.” Most of them cited the requirements of the local cultural context.

Some people answered “no” there should not be separate policies, but seemed to contradict themselves in their explanation. For example, an international male staff worker in Sri Lanka answered “no,” but in his explanation said, “No bias should be placed regarding sex, age, or religion. Of course, common sense also dictate[s] how people behave and act which might have a bearing on gender, i.e., men walk around in shorts, while women can’t (shouldn’t).” Similar sentiments appeared in a couple of other responses. While this may mean that they feel that there should not be official policies, but rather informal suggestions, there are dangers in not formalizing such policies. People new to the area or the organization might not receive a full explanation or understanding of the requirements of the area if there are not formal policies in place.

- ***Question 28—Which topics would you like to see covered in security trainings?***

The answers to this question were extremely wide ranging. Travel security, including convoy management, safety on the road, how to handle carjackings, and vehicle safety was mentioned by all four groups as a topic of interest. The noticeable difference was not between women and men in the responses to this question, but rather between national and international staff.

National men and women often indicated a desire for training in how to handle natural disasters and general emergency situations, but international staff did not express interest in these topics. National staff, both men and women, also requested training in first aid and more training in security management, specifically in how to develop security policies, risk assessments, security assessments, and how to inculcate security awareness into their staff. International staff, unsurprisingly, was more likely to request training that was contextualized to their location.

- ***Question 29—In the culture in which you are working, how does your sex impact your security?***

The respondents’ perception of how their sex impacted their security varied extensively, and is probably more a function of the culture that they are working in.

Some men felt that they were safer by virtue of being men, while some men felt they were actually more vulnerable, and the same was true for the female respondents.

Slightly over a third of the national female respondents felt that their gender had a slight or no impact on their security. Another third said that being a woman made them more vulnerable. Others said that women were perceived as weaker by the local culture. Ten percent said that women were actually safer and a few others said that women were more respected, although whether or not “respected” translates to “safer” is unclear, as in the quote.

A quarter of national men said that their gender has no impact on their security. Another quarter of the national men who responded said that they were safer as men in their environment. Slightly less said they were more at risk for physical violence as a result of being

“In our culture, women are paid high respect therefore they are expected to keep limited movement, avoid traveling alone, especially in dark time, and should also ensure purdah (cover themselves with shawls)”

*-National woman
working in Pakistan*

male. Other comments included that they felt responsible for any women traveling with them and that the fact that men could move around more easily in the field put them at greater risk.

International women varied in their responses--some felt that their gender put them at more risk, some that it made them safer. The same was true for international men. One international male noted that, “As a man, I probably often take for granted the (perceived) protection this offers me.” This survey is examining perceived risks and the *actual* risks of each gender and nationality are not the purview of this survey, but future research to determine the actual risk and to compare them with people’s perceptions of risk would be extremely valuable.

- ***Question 30—What risks are unique to women in your setting?***

To no one’s surprise, respondents in all four groups cited sexual assault and sexual harassment overwhelmingly as the main risks unique to women. For the purposes of this study, sexual harassment was interpreted as including “teasing” (when cited as a risk unique to women), name calling in the streets, and general aggravation. Sexual discrimination was defined as women not being allowed to make decisions or get access

to resources while on the job. Sexual assault includes rape as well as more minor forms of assault. Rape was not specifically cited often, probably because in many cultures rape is still stigmatized and there is a level of discomfort even with the word. People were more likely to write sexual assault, but it seemed to us that rape was implied as well as more minor forms of sexual assault.

National women cited sexual harassment and sexual assault the most often. Lack of training and dangers while traveling were also mentioned, but infrequently. Other than sexual assault and sexual harassment, no other risks were mentioned by more than two respondents.

National men cited sexual harassment and sexual assault the most often. A few of them said that women were less well trained in safety and security. They noted sexual discrimination as a risk, including the idea that women may not have access to the same resources as men do. A few national men also noted that travel is riskier for women than for men.

International women cited sexual harassment and sexual assault equally as the main risks for women. International men cited sexual assault in over a third of their responses. Domestic violence was mentioned by a number of the international male respondents, but none of the women mentioned it—possibly due to the cultural stigma of domestic violence in many cultures.

- ***Question 31—What risks are unique to men [in your setting]?***

While the risks to women were generally sexual crimes, the risks to men often highlighted the fact that their risks involved straight physical violence. National women listed a wide variety of risks unique to men, but no one risk seemed to generate broad support. The most popular was that men were more prone to “violent confrontations,” or that men were more likely to respond with violence. A couple of women wrote that men were vulnerable in cultures where clan or family warfare is prevalent, as the men would be targeted or expected to fight and defend their families, which is not the case for women. Being mistaken for a rebel or soldier, kidnapping for ransom, and increased risk of robbery were also cited.

One third of the responses from national men cited increased risk of physical violence, noting particularly that they are more mobile and therefore more exposed, also that they are perceived as more threatening than women. A couple of men noted the risk of becoming involved in or targeted by clan violence in their cultures. While we have already discussed the prevalence of Rido in the Philippines, there are cultures in Central Asia and Africa where similar situations prevail. The other category included risks involved for men socially. It was noted that men were more likely to go out and socialize at night and that they were more likely to have multiple sexual partners. Interestingly, one man noted that overconfidence was a risk unique to men.

International women noted similar risks for men, including increased risk of physical violence or fighting and the potential for men to have difficulties with prostitutes. International men also cited difficulties with prostitutes as a risk unique

“Men tend to take more physical risks, [be] more aggressive while driving, and overall seem to think that they ‘can handle most situations.’”

*-Male international
country unknown*

to men. The risks with prostitutes were not clearly explained, but it was interesting to see this perception of increased risk resulting from men’s social activities was mentioned by both groups of men and by international women. There may be a level of cultural discomfort on the part of national women that caused them to be reluctant to mention these issues. International men also cited increased risk of physical violence, unwillingness to follow security protocol, and overconfidence were also mentioned by international men.

Linked questions

After the initial analysis was completed, we began to examine the linkages between some questions in an attempt to come to a greater understanding of how gender impacts security. An examination of the links between questions and combining some of the responses can give a deeper understanding of how gender impacts not only security, but also perceptions of security.

Question 21—Did your training mention safety/security procedures that were specific to women?

Question 24—Do you use lessons from the training in managing your personal security?

These questions were evaluated for the female respondents, in an attempt to determine whether women were more likely to incorporate training into their lives if the training made an effort to address issues specific to them. This was not useful for evaluating international women, as only two of them had attended a training that mentioned issues specific to women's security.

However, for national women, the results were quite noticeable. Fifty-seven percent of national women who received training that mentioned women's security issues said that they "often" incorporated lessons from the training into managing their personal security. However, for women whose training had not mentioned issues specific to women, only 29% said that they "often" incorporated the training into their lives.

Only two people had received training that mentioned issues that were specific to men and issues that were specific to women. This is too small a sample to use, but of the two men, one said that he "often" incorporated lessons from the training and one said that he did so "sometimes." The analysis of the female respondents, however, does suggest that training that incorporates a gender component may be more successful training

We attempted to follow up on this question by evaluating the links between question 25—"Do you feel your security concerns were addressed in the training?" and question 24—"Do you use lessons from the training in managing your personal security?" but found that the vast majority of people felt that their concerns had been addressed. The remainder, who did not respond, constituted too small a pool for worthwhile evaluation. It is important to note here, as above, that although people generally indicated that they were satisfied with the training, when they were asked for topics they wished to see addressed in future trainings, 60% of the respondents listed topics they were interested in.

Question 20—What sex were the trainers?

Question 21—Did your training mention safety/security procedures that were specific to women?

This question was evaluated for all respondents who had received security training. Overall, only 20% of the respondents who had only female trainers said that they mentioned issues pertaining to women. The respondents who received training from male trainers said that 31% of them mentioned issues specific to women. The respondents who received training from mixed-gender teams said that 38% of them mentioned issues specific to women.

It is interesting to notice that female trainers were the least likely to mention issues specific to women. It may be that they do not wish to look biased towards their own sex, or are concerned about being taken seriously in a male-dominated field. It may also be that they worry about emphasizing risks to women but not to men.

More men than women trainers mentioned women's issues, but it was still less than a third of them who did so. This may be partially because the men feel uncomfortable broaching women's concerns, or because they worry about being perceived as sexist.

This suggests to us that an appropriate way to approach this might be for trainers to make an effort to evaluate these risks and present each gender's risks to both men and women. This might be more comfortable for the trainers, it avoids charges of sexism, it will make the training more likely to be incorporated later by women at least, and, since many respondents felt that there were, in fact, unique risks for both men and women, it will make the trainings more accurate.

Question 20—What sex were the trainers?

Question 23—Did the training suggest that women are...(more, equally, less at risk than men)?

In the absence of wide-ranging surveys evaluating security incidents (or, for that matter, an exhaustive database of such incidents, preferably with the ability to disaggregate by gender) it is difficult to determine who in fact is more at risk. When the

results were cross tabulated between the gender of the trainers and whether or not they said women were more or equally as at risk as men, the results were not statistically significant. (No trainers implied that men were more at risk than women.) The differences between the male, female, and mixed-gender teams of trainers were less than 3%, which we do not find significant.

Question of country—(Research team selected out Muslim countries for this evaluation).

Question 15—In your opinion, should there be different security policies and procedures for men and women?

A number of respondents indicated that the cultural context should be a determining factor of whether or not there are gender-specific security policies. Within, the cultural context, a few people specifically cited Muslim culture as one that might require gender-specific policies. No other culture was so specifically cited, so the research team ran an evaluation of the country that respondents worked in and whether or not the respondent supported gendered security policies.

A country was defined as a Muslim country if its population was over 75% Muslim as listed in the CIA World Factbook online. When we considered all respondents together, we found that people who worked in Muslim countries were slightly more likely to support gendered policies, with 46% of people working in Muslim countries supporting them, but 38% of those who work in non-Muslim countries supporting them. However, this is a small enough difference to cast doubt on its significance without further research.

More significant was the difference in international women who worked in Muslim and non-Muslim countries. Once again, we caution that this is a relatively small pool of respondents, and firm conclusions cannot be drawn from this data. However, it may be worth noting that while international women overall are not very supportive of gendered security policies, 75% of those women who do “sometimes” support gendered policies, work in Muslim countries. The other three groups, both groups of men and national women, showed no significant differences based on the dominant religion of the country they lived in.



Findings

Recommendations

IX. Findings

NGO Security continues to be a male-dominated field

Both our literature review and interviews with security staff suggested that there is a distinct disproportion between the number of male and female security staff. This assumption proved to be true in our research findings. For instance, more than 90% of the security directors interviewed in the US were male. Additionally, from our survey data, we found that 55% of respondents indicated that male staff members are responsible for their office's security, 31% reported a mixture of men and women and only 14% specified female staff members. While exact implications are unclear, we feel the gender of security staff has a bearing on how security management is implemented in an organization.

Security policies and procedures are perceived to be gender-neutral

Our research findings on organizational security policies and procedures first highlighted how nascent the field of NGO security really is, even for many of the larger US-based NGOs. Of the organizations interviewed in the security director level interviews, most have only begun to formalize security policies and create security frameworks within the last five years. In fact, the majority of the security directors interviewed were only the first or second to hold the position of security director in the organization. Additionally, some organizations have still not created a security director position but instead place the responsibility for security under the executive director or another upper level manager.

With the exception of sexual harassment, the overwhelming majority of security staff in the US and in Manila, and results from the survey, indicated that their organization's security policies and procedures were not gender specific. In other words, the policies and procedures generally used "staff" rather than men or women. They also referenced the need for "staff" to be culturally appropriate in manners involving the opposite sex, dress, manners, etc. One organization does allude to gender in their organization's global security policy in listing gender as one of the reasons why staff may not be deployed in certain cases. This security director also indicated, however, that the organization has never made use of that policy. Another organization did attempt to adopt gender-specific security policies but was met with resistance by female staff. This was an example of the underlying assumption that gender-neutral security policies equate

to *gender-equality*. It should be noted that many organizations indirectly address gender in the policies and procedures by requiring all staff to act culturally appropriate, a policy that often has a greater impact on the lives of female staff than on the lives of the male staff.

Of the organizations in Mindanao that participated in our focus group discussions and field staff semi-structured interviews, almost none of them had any formal security policies, which made it difficult to talk about whether their policies were gender-specific or not. In attempts to still elicit information on this research point, we changed the phrasing of our question and asked whether the staff member's organization had different rules for men and women. Answers from this question generally supported our findings from our other sources in that policies are perceived to be gender-neutral.

Implementation of security policies and procedures is influenced by local cultural norms

While the actual policies and procedures generally did not make reference to men and women, most organizations explained that on the ground level, there are different expectations and rules for how men and women should conduct themselves. These rules were related to the local cultural context and what was deemed to be appropriate behavior. Many of the interviewees felt the disparity in rules for men and women was particularly acute, or perhaps more noticeable, in Muslim countries where women staff members are often required to wear headscarves or to travel with a man.

Ad hoc data collection of incidents and no gendered trend analysis

Out of respect for the sensitivity associated with security incidents, our research team only broached the issue of security incidents with US security directors and security staff in Manila. Even then, the discussion focused on macro-level issues. The conversations highlighted the current limitations with security incident reporting. While the majority of organizations do document security incidents, most are collecting data in an ad hoc manner. Some organizations have standardized incident reporting templates whereas others simply have staff send an email to an upper level manager when an incident occurs. What is most problematic, however, is that the majority of organizations are unable to analyze trends from these incidents because they lack the technological capacity. Two organizations interviewed have databases but only one is currently disaggregating data by gender. This lack of capacity for analysis made it difficult for security directors to speak with any confidence about security trends,

including those that might be related to gender. Additionally, it impacted their ability to make informed decisions about modifications to security policy and training when needed.

Most trainings do not include a gendered component, but women are more likely to incorporate trainings that include a gender component

In analyzing security trainings, our main finding is that most organization's trainings do not have a gender component. In our interviews with security directors, security trainers and our analysis of several of the curriculums, we found that there was no systematic incorporation of gender into security training. Several organizations had developed gendered training modules, ranging from the issue of sexual harassment to an examination of the impact of gender on personal security. However, these were often optional modules, included in the training at the discretion of either the trainer or the participants.

Our survey found that when these gendered trainings did occur that the female participants were more likely to incorporate what they learned in managing their personal security. Fifty-seven percent of women whose training mentioned women's security issues responded that they "often" incorporated these lessons, in contrast to 29% of women whose training had not mentioned these issues.

A related finding was that the gender of the trainers influences the probability of their including gender in their security trainings. From our survey data, teams with both male and female facilitators were the most likely to mention security concerns specific to women. Unfortunately, we were not able to analyze security training that covered men's security issues. Less than 2% of respondents had received training that specifically mentioned these, which was simply too small a pool to evaluate.

Finally, in our literature review, we found an expressed concern that women were not given the same level of access to security training as men. Some of our interviewees in the US did think that their organization was including proportionally more men than women, particularly in the more in-depth trainings. However, this was not our experience in visiting organizations in the field, and our survey response indicated no significant differences between men and women receiving security training.

There are specific risks unique to men and women

The risks cited by focus group participants were consistent with the risks cited in the global survey. For men, these risks are more likely to include violent confrontation and/ or the greater likelihood that an aggressive response on the part of the NGO staff will lead to an escalation of that confrontation. Men, because of their gender roles, are more likely in many conflict-ridden contexts to be mistaken for a spy or a combatant. This goes along with the finding that men are perceived to be more threatening.

For women, the specific risks are sexual assault and sexual harassment. This can be related to the overall power dynamic in the society, and societal perceptions of women. In addition, participants in the focus groups and interviews in Mindanao found it hard to differentiate between risks to the population at large and risks unique to NGO workers. However, workers did seem to be at increased risk because they often operate outside of their home communities

While the risks unique to men were consistent across the data from Mindanao and the global survey, it took longer for people to come up with them in the focus groups. People seemed more likely to have previously considered sexual assault as a risk to women, but the idea of there being risks unique to men seemed to be new to many people. In the focus groups, with more interaction amongst participants and leaders, people were able to develop a list of risks unique to men if given a little time. In other words, there are risks unique to men, but that attention has not previously been paid to this topic, which may have led to men being underserved by the current security frameworks.

X. Recommendations

Further Research in this Area: We recommend further research in this area, due to the paucity of available data beyond this report and the limited data sets to which we had access. Additional case studies – either focusing on other organizations, other cultural contexts, or both, could be very useful to further understanding of this issue. These are some of our suggestions for further research.

- There should be further research specifically targeted at international staff.
 - This research could follow up on both this study and the study on the security of national staff commissioned by InterAction in 2001. There may be important differences in how gender impacts security for international and national staff that could be confirmed with a larger pool of international staff respondents.
 - One research methodology would be to examine a complex emergency where there is a large international staff presence. (as opposed to Mindanao, where due to the security situation, there are virtually no international staff assigned)
- There should be further examination of the intersection of gender and religion, particularly in the case of Muslim societies.
 - This could also be combined with research as to how a broader range of potential vulnerabilities may impact security, such as race, ethnicity, religion, etc.
 - This would feed into the third recommendation for further research, which is described below.
- There should be consideration of men's unique risks and how they should be addressed in training.
 - Because risk to women are more clearly understood than risks to men, the area of men's unique risks could benefit from further research.
 - Better publicizing this sort of research would help to further educate staff that gender does not equal 'women issues'.
- There should be comparison done of this study with one that evaluates the actual level of risk to men and women in the field.

- This study has focused almost exclusively on the *perceptions* of the field workers and security staff, operating on the not unreasonable assumption that people have some grasp of the degree of risk in which they work.
- A comparison of the degree of risk for men and women compared with the perceptions of risk held by them would lead to a better understanding of how to more appropriately structure training and policies.

Better Communication Between Gender and Security Specialists: Gender and security staff in an organization should work together to consider how gender impacts security for their organization.

- This should be a natural linkage, given as both of these concerns are often considered cross-cutting issues which should be ‘mainstreamed’ throughout the organization.
- There should also be a further examination of what effect gender and development programming has on the security of staff

Assessment of the Risks Unique to Men & Women and Incorporation into Training: Within the implementation of security policies and training, there should be an assessment of the unique security risks to men and women, given the context in which they work. This assessment does not currently seem to be happening in most, if not all, organizations that we interviewed.

- There are already good templates on which to base this sort of dialogue. The Church World Services Security Manual, the ECHO’s Security Report for Humanitarian Organizations, and training modules available from RedR all provide good examples of a thoughtful examination of the relevant issues.
- Information from the Philippines suggests a demand for gendered training. It can be a valuable learning experience for both male and female staff to better understand any unique risks to the other gender.
 - It should be stressed again that this does not mean separate or different training for men and women, but a training that examines any gender-based vulnerabilities within an analysis of the local context.

- If there is concern that a focus on only gender will put participants on the defensive, the training could be structured in the broader context of the wide variety of vulnerabilities faced by staff of different backgrounds.


Systematic Security Incident Reporting and Analysis: Organizations need to create consistent reporting mechanisms for security incidents, both in terms of what information is obtained and how that information is moved upwards in the organization to facilitate analysis. While many organizations do have a consistent reporting template, with a few exceptions, the mechanisms for reporting are ad-hoc at best.

- It may be beneficial for organizations to collaborate in establishing a standard incident form that can be used across organizations. This would ensure that similar types of information are being collected and be especially useful if organizations decide to share their statistics with their peers.
- All organizations should track security incidents in an organizational database. Organizations that cannot currently afford to purchase an extensive database system should at least track incidents through a basic relational database. Mirroring the security incident forms, these databases should be designed in a consistent manner across organizations. As already happens with security manuals and policies, organizations with systems already in place can share these design templates.
 - Organizations should begin to disaggregate their security incident data by gender and then further break the data down by local and expatriate staff. This will allow an organization to look for any trends that may be related to gender or nationality and subsequently use the analysis to modify security policies and training as appropriate.
 - A designated organization, perhaps an umbrella organization such as InterAction, could be responsible for posting relevant statistics or trends in a monthly newsletter or email.

Local and International NGO Partnerships for Enhancing Security: It is imperative that international NGOs begin to look at security beyond just their staff. There needs to be consideration of the security of the staff of their local partnering organizations. This is particularly the case in areas where it is too risky for international staff to operate effectively and local partners are the only way to aid the beneficiaries. While most

INGOs regularly include security costs in proposals to donors, security costs of local partner organizations should also be included. Security can be institutionalized on multiple levels through partnerships between international NGOs and networks of local NGOs. The MERN provides a model partnership, which can be duplicated by other INGOs in other areas of the world. Indeed, the model of an INGO with a network of partner local NGOs is already a common one for development programming, if not for humanitarian response and security. The following briefly outlines the core features of the partnership.

- The local NGO(s) should designate one staff member who serves as the security focal point person for that organization.
- The international partner should create the initial security policy framework, including templates for security policies as well as security incident forms. The local NGOs would refine this framework based on their needs.
- As part of the partnership between an international NGO and local NGO(s), the International NGO should conduct a training of trainers for the designated security focal point person for each organization. This will help build the capacity of the local organizations to provide further security training to their staff.
- International NGO helps to create mechanisms for information sharing. For instance, within a network of local NGOs, a security committee or working group could be created. This group could meet monthly or bimonthly which gives them an opportunity and forum to share information about important security incidents as well as any security concerns that are on the horizon. Additionally, this could also be an opportunity for the local NGOs to help one another through the creation of their security frameworks.



Appendices A-L
Works Consulted

APPENDIX A

Save the Children's Operations in the Philippines



- **Metro Manila**
 - Cities of Paranaque, Taguig, Las Pinas
- **West Visayas**
 - Provinces of Iloilo, Guimaras & Antique
- **Mindanao**
 - 11 provinces, 33 municipalities & 197 evacuation centers in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao and parts of Central & Western Mindanao

APPENDIX B

The Mindanao Emergency Response Network

ZAMBOANGA, BASILAN, SULU, TAWI-TAWI CLUSTER

ZAMBASULI


Katlimban sa Kalambuan
Ateneo Peace Institute
Neighbors Pop. & Dev't Serv.
Kahapan Foundation Inc
ENRich CCF-Basilan
Zamboanga Disaster & Relief
PNRC-Sulu
Nagdilaab Foundation
ACDI-VOCA
SC-Enrich Sulu

RANAW AREA CLUSTER

MARADECA
RDRRAC
BIRTH-Dev
Hope for Change
Helen Keller Int'l
Christian Children's Fund
Kahapan Foundation Inc

COTABATO CLUSTER

PNRC- Cot. Chapter
MTB, Inc.
Bangsa Moro Women Found.
Social Action Center
Immaculate Conception Parish
MYRO, Inc.
BALAY, Inc.
CFSI
MOVIMONDO
Action Against Hunger
Kadtuntaya Foundation Inc.
UNMDP3
MSF – Switzerland
Handicap International
Feed the Children
Kids for Peace
CRDC
CEMILARDEF



MINDANAO EMERGENCY RESPONSE NETWORK

March 12, 2004

APPENDIX C

Interview Questions for NGO Security Policy Makers

Background:

- What in your background led you into becoming a security director? (Note past military or police experience as well as any development or humanitarian aid field experience).

NGO Security Policies:

- How did your organization develop their security policies?
 - How often are the policies evaluated and how?
- How are your security policies influenced by gender?
 - If they are influenced by gender:
 - Do the policies affect the delivery of aid? If so, how?
 - Do they impact staff morale? If so, how?
 - If your policies are currently gender-neutral:
 - Do you feel that gender should be incorporated into your NGO's security policy?
 - Do you think the implementation of the policies is gender-neutral?
- What is the gender breakdown of your security staff?
 - Do you feel that the gender of the security officer has an effect on how security goals are met in the office?
 - Do you feel pressure from either above (donors/admin) or below (field staff) to incorporate gender to a greater or lesser degree into security policies?
 - If yes, from where, and do you agree with it?
- What are the differences in security policies for national and ex-pat staff (in general and in the Philippines, if applicable)?
 - Do you feel the different levels (if they exist) are appropriate?
- How do you disseminate your security manuals, procedures, etc. to your staff?
 - Do you feel they are generally accessible to staff?
- How would you rank your organization in the acceptance, deterrence, protection security model?
 - If your NGO is operating in the Philippines, how would you rank the country office in the acceptance, deterrence, protection security model?

NGO Security Training:

- How do you give your staff security training? (Note how training is defined by interviewee).
 - Do local and ex pat staff receive the same security training?
 - If no, how are they different?
 - If yes, should they be different?
 - When do staff receive the training and how long is it? Days, hours?
 - How often is training given - are there refreshers?
 - Who conducts the training?
 - Where did the curriculum come from?
 - If the NGO does both relief and development work, is there different security training offered to relief and development staff?
- How is gender addressed in your security training?
 - If it is addressed:
 - Is it mainstreamed throughout or is it a separate segment?

- If separate, how is it addressed?
 - Is it addressed similarly for both ex-pat and national staff?
 - If it is not addressed:
 - Do you think it should be?
 - Do women receive extra or different security training?
 - If yes, then what sort?
 - If no, do you think they should?
- Do you receive feedback from your staff on the trainings they receive?
 - If yes, have there been requests for more or less incorporation of gender into the security training?

Incidents:

- How do you define a security incident?
- How would you describe your process for dealing with a security incident?
 - What is the pathway for incident reporting? What do the incident reports look like?
 - How does the information move upwards in the organization?
 - How is the information filed –by region, by country, by type of incident?
- What sorts of statistics are maintained on incidents and how do these statistics impact security procedures and training?
 - Are statistics on the incidents disaggregated by gender?
 - Is there any way these statistics can be made available to us, on a strictly anonymous basis?
 - Are women disproportionately represented in the incident reports in one direction or the other?
 - Are there certain types of incidents that occur more often to men or to women?
 - How much under-reporting of incidents do you believe there is and is the under-reporting specific to a gender and/or to specific types of incidents?
 - Do you feel the level of under-reporting is higher or lower from the local staff?
- How would you describe recent trends in incident occurrences?
 - Has there been an increase or decrease in incidents involving your staff over the last five years?
 - If there is a trend, is the ratio between women and men remaining the same or shifting?
 - Have there been increases or decreases in types of incidents, i.e. more violent crimes, less so, those involving women, etc.

Final Questions:

- Is there anything that you feel we should have asked you?
- Do you have any final thoughts on gender and security?

APPENDIX D

Interview Questions for Philippines NGO Security Directors/Coordinators

Background

- What in your background led you into becoming a security director? (Note past military or police experience as well as any development or humanitarian aid field experience).

NGO Security Policies

- How did your organization develop security policies which were specific to your country or a specific conflict?
 - How often are the policies evaluated and how?
- How are your security policies influenced by gender –either in the Filipino cultural context or in the context of the conflict in Mindanao?
 - If they are influenced by gender:
 - Do the policies affect the delivery of aid? If so, how?
 - Do they impact staff morale? If so, how?
 - If your policies are currently gender-neutral:
 - Do you feel that gender should be incorporated into your NGO's security policy?
 - Do you think the implementation of the policies is gender-neutral?
- Do you feel pressure from either above (donors/admin) or below (field staff) to incorporate gender to a greater or lesser degree into security policies?
 - If yes, from where, and do you agree with it?
- What are the differences in security policies for national and ex-pat staff (in general and in the Philippines, if applicable)?
 - Do you feel the different levels (if they exist) are appropriate?
- How do you disseminate your security manuals, procedures, etc. to your staff?
 - Do you feel they are generally accessible to staff?
- How would you rank your organization in the acceptance, deterrence, protection security model?
 - If your NGO is operating in the Philippines, how would you rank the country office in the acceptance, deterrence, protection security model?

NGO Security Training

- How do you give your staff security training? (Note how training is defined by interviewee).
 - Do local and ex pat staff receive the same security training?
 - If no, how are they different?
 - If yes, should they be different?
 - When do staff receive the training and how long is it? Days, hours?
 - How often is training given - are there refreshers?
 - Who conducts the training?
 - Where did the curriculum come from?
 - If the NGO does both relief and development work, is there different security training offered to relief and development staff?

- How is gender addressed in your security training?
 - If it is addressed:
 - Is it mainstreamed throughout or is it a separate segment?
 - If separate, how is it addressed?
 - Is it addressed similarly for both ex-pat and national staff?
 - If it is not addressed:
 - Do you think it should be?
 - Do women receive extra or different security training?
 - If yes, then what sort?
 - If no, do you think they should?
- Do you receive feedback from your staff on the trainings they receive?
 - If yes, have there been requests for more or less incorporation of gender into the security training?

Incidents

- How do you define a security incident?
- How would you describe your process for dealing with a security incident?
 - What is the pathway for incident reporting? What do the incident reports look like?
- Are women disproportionately represented in the incident reports in one direction or the other?
 - Are there certain types of incidents that occur more often to men or to women?
 - How much under-reporting of incidents do you believe there is and is the under-reporting specific to a gender and/or to specific types of incidents?
 - Do you feel the level of under-reporting is higher or lower from the local staff?
- How would you describe recent trends in incident occurrences?
 - Has there been an increase or decrease in incidents involving your staff over the last five years?
 - If there is a trend, is the ratio between women and men remaining the same or shifting?
 - Have there been increases or decreases in types of incidents, i.e. more violent crimes, less so, those involving women, etc.

Final Questions

- Is there anything that you feel we should have asked you?
- Do you have any final thoughts on gender and security?

APPENDIX E

Focus Group Discussion Questions

- Introduction
 - Explain who research team composition
 - Discuss purpose of project
 - Clarify confidentiality of participation

- What are your risks as an NGO worker in Mindanao? (*Write responses on flip-chart paper*).

- How do you mitigate all these risks that you face? In other words, what actions does the ideal NGO worker take to ensure their safety and security? (*Divide group into 2 smaller coed groups to discuss and create a list. Bring both groups together to share findings and to compile their lists onto flip-chart paper. Ask individuals to rank the top three actions and then tally results in front of group*).

- What risks are unique to male NGO staff in Mindanao and what risks are unique to female NGO staff? (*Divide the group into two single sex groups. Ask the men's group to determine what risks women face and the women's group to determine what risks men face. Bring both groups together to share findings. When discussing findings, probe the*

Are there any final questions that anyone has?

APPENDIX F

NGO Staff Gender and Security Interview Questions:

Background:

1. Briefly, tell us how you got involved in this work.

Policies and Procedures:

2. Are men and women treated differently in terms of security?
 - a. How? (give example s)
 - b. Note: Depending on how the respondent chooses to answer this question, make them draw out any differences between policies and how they are implemented.
3. Do you think that men or women should be treated differently?
 - a. Why or why not?

Training:

4. Tell us a little about what sort of security training you have received? (how long, what topics etc.)
 - a. Were there gender-specific sections of this training? (describe)
 - b. Do you think that there should be gender-specific sections?
5. Did/do you get advice from more experienced staff about security do's and don'ts? (please describe)
 - a. Was any of this advice specific to your gender?
6. What are some of the most important things that you do to manage your security?

Local Context:

7. In the culture in which you are working, how does your sex impact your security?
8. What risks are unique to women in your setting?
9. What risks are unique to men?

Final Question:

10. How would you alter training or policies to mitigate gender-related vulnerabilities?

APPENDIX G

NGO Security and Gender Survey

Purpose: This survey has been commissioned by Save the Children. The purpose is to assess perceptions of how being a man or a woman impacts personal security, as well as associated security policies and procedures at the organizational level. The results will be used as appropriate to inform and improve security guidelines and security management and training approaches. The results of this survey will be made available to Save the Children offices and other interested organizations.

Confidentiality: All surveys will be kept completely confidential. Results from the survey will not contain information that could identify you, but will only specify your sex, international or national staff status and work location. The names of organizations will not be used in the final survey report but will be listed, with permission, in an appendix.

Instructions: Please answer all questions as appropriate. Please return the completed survey to safety_survey@yahoo.com by Friday, March 25th, 2006.

For questions or comments, contact: safety_survey@yahoo.com.

Please check one box.

Background:

What is your sex?

- ? Male
- ? Female

Are you a national of the country in which you are working?

- ? Yes
- ? No

How many years have you worked with your current organization?

- ? less than 6 months
- ? 6 months to 1 year
- ? 1 to 2 years
- ? 3 to 5 years
- ? 6 to 10 years
- ? More than 10 years

How many years of experience do you have in your field?

- ? Less than one year
- ? 1-2 years
- ? 3-5 years
- ? 6-10 years
- ? More than 10 year

In which country do you work? _____

Please check one box, unless otherwise indicated.

Safety and Security Policies and Procedures: Your organization's formal guidelines regarding the safety and security of its staff and property.

1. Does your organization have formal, written security policies and procedures?
 - ? Yes
 - ? No, we have no security policies and procedures (*proceed to question #9*)
 - ? Don't know (*proceed to question #9*)

2. How familiar are you with these policies and procedures?
 - ? Extremely familiar
 - ? Very familiar
 - ? Somewhat familiar
 - ? Slightly familiar
 - ? Not at all familiar

3. Do you have access to your organization's security policies and procedures?
 - ? Yes
 - ? No
 - ? Don't know

4. Are any of your organization's security policies and procedures different for men and women?
 - ? Yes
 - ? No (*proceed to #6*)
 - ? Don't know (*proceed to #6*)

5. How are these policies different? (*Mark all that apply*)
 - ? Travel restrictions (i.e. travel to certain locations, travel at certain times)
 - ? Curfew
 - ? Certain types of work prohibited
 - ? Traveling alone prohibited
 - ? Driving a vehicle prohibited
 - ? Lodging (i.e. restrictions on where you live)
 - ? Dress
 - ? Other (please describe) _____

6. Is the implementation (what is actually done versus what is written) of your organization's security policies and procedures the same for men and women?
 - ? Yes
 - ? No
 - ? No opinion

7. Are any of your organization's security policies and procedures different for national staff than for international staff?
 - ? Yes
 - ? No (*proceed to #9*)
 - ? Don't know (*proceed to #9*)

8. How are these policies different? (*Mark all that apply*)
 - ? Travel restrictions (i.e. travel to certain locations, travel at certain times)
 - ? Curfew
 - ? Certain types of work prohibited
 - ? Traveling alone prohibited
 - ? Driving a vehicle prohibited
 - ? Lodging (i.e. restrictions on where you live)
 - ? Dress
 - ? Other (please describe) _____

9. In your opinion, who is safer?
- ? Local staff
 - ? International staff
 - ? Local staff and international staff are equally safe
 - ? Depends on the context (please explain) _____
 - ? No opinion
10. Do your colleagues of the opposite sex respect you professionally?
- ? Yes
 - ? Some do, some do not
 - ? No (please explain) _____
 - ? No opinion
11. Which staff person is responsible for your security?
- ? A staff member in my office is responsible for security in addition to other duties
 - ? A staff member in my office is solely responsible for security
 - ? A regionally-based staff member
 - ? A headquarters-based staff member
 - ? I am responsible for my own safety first and foremost
 - ? No one is directly responsible for security
 - ? Other (please describe) _____
 - ? Don't know
12. What is the gender of this/these staff people?
- ? Male
 - ? Female
 - ? Both male and female
 - ? Don't know
13. In my opinion, the current security policies and procedures ...
- ? Greatly increase my ability to do my job
 - ? Somewhat increase my ability to do my job
 - ? Neither increase nor decrease my ability to do my job
 - ? Somewhat decrease my ability to do my job
 - ? Greatly decrease my ability to do my job
14. In my opinion, the current security policies and procedures ...
- ? Greatly increase my ability to socialize outside of work
 - ? Somewhat increase my ability to socialize outside of work
 - ? Neither increase nor decrease my ability to socialize outside of work
 - ? Somewhat decrease my ability to socialize outside of work
 - ? Greatly decrease my ability to socialize outside of work
15. In your opinion, should there be different security policies and procedures for men and women?
- ? Yes
 - ? Sometimes
 - ? No
 - ? No opinion

16. Please explain.

Security Training: Any instruction you received that addressed safety and/or security issues.

17. Have you received any training in safety/security while working with this NGO?

- ? No
- ? Yes, one training (*proceed to #19*)
- ? Yes, two trainings (*proceed to #19*)
- ? Yes, three or more (*proceed to #19*)
- ? Don't know

18. Do you wish your organization offered security training?

- ? Yes (*proceed to #28*)
- ? No (*proceed to #29*)
- ? No opinion (*proceed to #29*)

19. How long was your longest safety/security training (or the longest safety/security component of your training)?

- ? One hour
- ? Half a day
- ? Full day
- ? Two days
- ? More than two days
- ? Don't know

20. Who conducted the training?

- ? People who work for my NGO
- ? People hired from outside my NGO
- ? Both people who work for my NGO and outside experts
- ? Don't know

21. What sex were the trainers?

- ? Male
- ? Female
- ? Both men and women
- ? Don't know

22. Did your training mention safety/security procedures that were specific to women?

- ? Yes, often
- ? Yes, a little
- ? No
- ? Don't know

23. Did the training have a separate section on safety/security for women and/or for men?

- ? No
- ? Separate section for women's safety
- ? Separate section for men's safety
- ? Separate sections for both
- ? Don't know

24. Did the training suggest that women are ...

- ? More at risk than men (please explain) _____
- ? Equally at risk as men
- ? Less at risk than men (please explain) _____
- ? Don't know

25. Do you use lessons from the training in managing your personal security?

- ? Often
- ? Sometimes
- ? Rarely
- ? Never
- ? No opinion

26. Do you feel your security concerns were addressed in the training?

- ? Yes
- ? No
- ? No opinion

27. Are there topics you wish the security training had discussed?

- ? Yes
- ? No (*proceed to #29*)
- ? No opinion (*proceed to #29*)

28. What topics would like to see covered in security training?

Security in Your Local Context:

29. In the culture in which you are working, how does your sex impact your security?

30. What risks are unique to women in your setting?

31. What risks are unique to men?

Thank you for taking the time to answer these questions.

APPENDIX H Time Frame of Activities

Sunday (4/5)	Monday (4/6)	Tuesday (4/7)	Wednesday (4/8)	Thursday (4/9)	Friday (4/10)	Saturday (4/11)
Manila	Manila	Manila	Iligan City	Cotabato	Cotabato	Davao
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Travel Day 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Brief orientation with Save the Children (SC) • Set up interviews with donors & INGOs in Manila 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Full orientation with SC • Interviews with donors and INGOs (Catholic Relief Services & JICA) • Met with RSO at U.S. Embassy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fly to Cagayan de Oro and travel to Iligan • Focus Group Discussion and Interviews with Ranaw MERN cluster 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Travel to Cotabato • Worked at Save the Children Cotabato field office 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interviews with INGOs • Focus Group with Save the Children Staff • Focus Group Discussion and Interviews with Cent. Mindanao MERN cluster 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Traveled to Davao
Sunday (4/12)	Monday (4/13)	Tuesday (4/14)	Wednesday (4/15)	Thursday (4/16)	Friday (4/17)	Saturday (4/12)
Zamboanga	Zamboanga	Manila	Manila	Manila	Manila	Manila
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Flew to Zamboanga • Conducted Focus Group and Interviews with Save the Children ENRICH team 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Focus Group Discussion and Interviews with ZamPenBasulta MERN cluster • Debrief with Save the Children staff 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Flew back to Manila • Set up meetings with donors and INGOs • Interview with U.S. Peace Corps 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interviews with donors and INGOs (AussieAid & ICRC) • Interview with donors and INGOs continued (Philippine National Red Cross & USAID) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interviews with donors and INGOs (CIDA, GTZ & Helen Keller International) • Interviews with donors and INGOs/NGOS continued (Banang Mindanaw & World Vision) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Debrief with Save the Children staff • Interviews with RSO from U.S. Embassy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Travel Day

APPENDIX I

European Commission on Humanitarian Assistance (ECHO) Generic Security Manual – Section on Female Staff

Female staff

In many situations, women can be at risk from different or greater threats than men. The following personal security advice is likely to be applicable to all staff, but may be especially helpful to women. You should use your judgment as to which of them are applicable in your situation. Some suggestions follow⁵¹:

- Know where you are going, and look as though you know where you are going. If you look confident (even if don't feel confident), you are less likely to appear vulnerable to attack.
- In public, dress and behave in an unobtrusive manner, bearing in mind local culture and gender roles. This does not necessarily mean international staff adopting local patterns of dress and behaviour, but acting in a manner that is seen by local culture as acceptable for expatriates, taking into account the expatriates' culture and the needs of their work. It can be a difficult balance to strike.
- If meeting someone you don't know well, inform a colleague of your plan. Consider meeting him/her in a public place where there will be other people.
- When meeting people, if there is any risk of misunderstanding about your intentions, speak up and communicate your wishes clearly
- Listen to your instincts. If you are unsure about a location or a person, leave immediately.
- Do not use taxis unless the taxi driver and/or the taxi company is known and trusted. Agree the fare before beginning the trip.
- In many situations it may not be advisable to walk alone, or drive alone, particularly at night

⁵¹ Adapted from UNSECOORD/UNHCR Security Awareness – An Aide-Mémoire, 1995

APPENDIX J

Church World Service Security Manual

Consider these basic rules of gender conduct:

1. Expatriates, both male and female, should wear clothes considered appropriate for outsiders. Your dress should indicate respect for the local culture and convey the right message about how you expect to be treated.
2. Make sure you understand the ground rules for personal relations between men and women, especially between expatriates and local people.
 - Know and understand the levels of familiarity that are acceptable in the local culture.
 - Know how people react to public displays of affection.
 - Know the implications for local people, especially women. Who are perceived to be in a relationship with an expatriate. Know how it might affect their reputation or standing with their families and the community.
3. Recognize that it is not always acceptable for women to work or travel with men. It may be better, in certain situations, for two or more women to travel together.
4. Men should take care not to unintentionally intimidate women. For example, men should not block the path of a woman in certain societies or follow them closely at night. Definitely, men should never make disparaging comments, stare at a woman, or whistle at them.
5. Expatriate men and women are often assumed to be more sexually available than local people. Since this assumption can increase one's vulnerability to verbal or physical assault, women and men alike should avoid reinforcing this impression by their comments and/or behavior.
6. In some cultures, the gender role of expatriate female staff is ambiguous; they may be treated to some extent as honorary men. And, some expatriate women refuse to accept local restrictions regarding their dress and behavior, but as a general rule, it is safer to observe the local norms and laws of the host society.

APPENDIX L

Questions	Nat'l Women (37 total) (29 rec'd training)	Int'l Women (15 total) (10 rec'd training)	Nat'l Men (34 total) (23 rec'd training)	Int'l Men (19 total) (14 rec'd training)
1-Does your organization have formal, written security policies and procedures?				
Yes	100%	93%	91%	95%
No	0%	0%	3%	5%
Don't know	0%	7%	6%	0%
N/A	0%	0%	0%	0%
2- How familiar are you with these policies and procedures?				
Extremely	8%	27%	15%	26%
Very	51%	27%	59%	47%
Somewhat	32%	33%	15%	16%
Slightly	5%	13%	3%	5%
Not at all	3%	0%	3%	0%
N/A	0%	0%	6%	0%
Doesn't have	0%	0%	0%	5%
3-Do you have access to your organization's policies and procedures?				
Yes	78%	93%	82%	95%
No	16%	0%	9%	0%
Don't know	3%	7%	3%	0%
N/A	3%	0%	6%	5%
See survey	0%	0%	0%	0%
4-Are any of your organization's security policies and procedures different for men and women?				
Yes	11%	13%	6%	16%
No	78%	67%	85%	63%
Don't know	8%	20%	6%	11%
N/A	3%	0%	3%	11%
5-How are these policies different?				
N/A	89%	87%	94%	84%
Travel restrictions	5%	0%	6%	11%
Curfew	3%	0%	3%	0%
Prohibited work	0%	0%	0%	0%
Travel alone prohib	5%	0%	3%	5%
Lodging	5%	0%	3%	0%
Dress	11%	13%	6%	11%
Other	3%	0%	0%	0%
See survey	3%	7%	0%	0%

Questions	Nat'l Women (37 total) (29 rec'd training)	Int'l Women (15 total) (10 rec'd training)	Nat'l Men (34 total) (23 rec'd training)	Int'l Men (19 total) (14 rec'd training)
6-Is the implementation of your organization's security policies and procedures the same for men and for women?				
Yes	43%	33%	50%	47%
No	8%	27%	0%	11%
No opinion	0%	7%	0%	5%
N/A	49%	33%	50%	37%
See survey	0%	0%	0%	0%
7-Are any of your organization's security policies and procedures different for national staff than international staff?				
Yes	51%	80%	50%	53%
No	35%	7%	29%	32%
Don't know	14%	13%	15%	11%
8-How are these polices different? Mark all that apply?				
Travel restrictions	32%	40%	32%	26%
Curfew	3%	53%	6%	16%
Prohibited work	3%	7%	3%	11%
Travel alone prohib	14%	20%	21%	21%
Lodging	16%	27%	12%	16%
Dress	5%	13%	6%	16%
Evacuation	11%	20%	12%	11%
See survey	8%	7%	6%	16%
Other	3%	0%	0%	11%
N/A	51%	0%	47%	47%
9-In our opinion, who is safer?				
Local	16%	33%	29%	26%
Int'l	19%	13%	24%	32%
Equally	49%	27%	44%	21%
Depends	5%	20%	3%	11%
No opinion	8%	7%	0%	5%
N/A	0%	0%	0%	5%
See survey	0%	0%	0%	0%

Questions	Nat'l Women (37 total) (29 rec'd training)	Int'l Women (15 total) (10 rec'd training)	Nat'l Men (34 total) (23 rec'd training)	Int'l Men (19 total) (14 rec'd training)
10-Do your colleagues of the opposite sex respect you?				
Yes	100%	40%	94%	100%
Some do some do not	0%	47%	3%	0%
No	0%	7%	0%	0%
No opinion	0%	7%	3%	0%
See survey	0%	0%	0%	0%
11-Which staff person is responsible for security?				
Staff Member in my office/ other duties	92%	60%	62%	47%
Staff Member is solely responsible	0%	0%	3%	0%
Regionally based staff member	0%	0%	0%	0%
HQ based staff member	0%	7%	3%	0%
No one	3%	7%	0%	5%
Other	5%	20%	24%	16%
Don't know	0%	0%	9%	0%
N/A	0%	7%	0%	0%
See survey	0%	0%	0%	32%
12- What is the gender of these security staff people?				
Male	46%	47%	56%	58%
Female	21%	27%	3%	5%
Both	30%	13%	32%	32%
Don't know	3%	7%	9%	0%
N/A	3%	7%	0%	5%

Questions	Nat'l Women (37 total) (29 rec'd training)	Int'l Women (15 total) (10 rec'd training)	Nat'l Men (34 total) (23 rec'd training)	Int'l Men (19 total) (14 rec'd training)
13-In my opinion, the security polices...my ability to do work				
Greatly increase	19%	7%	38%	26%
Somewhat increase	46%	33%	32%	21%
Neither	30%	40%	18%	37%
Somewhat decrease	5%	20%	3%	11%
Greatly decrease	0%	0%	0%	0%
N/A	0%	0%	9%	5%
14-In my opinion, the security policies...my social life				
Greatly increase	16%	7%	26%	0%
Somewhat increase	27%	20%	32%	5%
Neither	54%	33%	24%	53%
Somewhat decrease	0%	20%	6%	26%
Greatly decrease	3%	20%	0%	11%
N/A	0%	0%	12%	5%
15- In your opinion, should there be different security policies for men and women?				
Yes	16%	0%	6%	5%
Sometimes	14%	27%	41%	53%
No	65%	60%	53%	37%
No opinion	5%	13%	0%	5%
N/A	0%	0%	0%	0%
16-Please explain				
Response	62%	60%	76%	79%
No response	38%	40%	24%	21%

Questions	Nat'l Women (37 total) (29 rec'd training)	Int'l Women (15 total) (10 rec'd training)	Nat'l Men (34 total) (23 rec'd training)	Int'l Men (19 total) (14 rec'd training)
17-Have you received any training in safety/security while working with this organization?				
No	22%	33%	32%	26%
Yes, 1	43%	27%	35%	42%
Yes, 2	14%	27%	18%	21%
Yes, 3+	22%	7%	15%	11%
Don't know	0%	0%	0%	0%
N/A	0%	7%	0%	0%
18-How long was your longest safety/security training?				
One hour	3%	20%	4%	0%
Half day	28%	10%	13%	21%
Full day	38%	0%	30%	14%
Two days	14%	10%	9%	14%
Two plus days	14%	50%	35%	36%
Don't know	0%	0%	0%	7%
N/A	0%	10%	9%	0%
See survey	0%	0%	0%	7%
19- Who conducted the training?				
People w my NGO	59%	40%	61%	29%
People outside	7%	40%	17%	43%
Both	34%	20%	13%	29%
Don't know	0%	0%	4%	0%
N/A	0%	0%	0%	0%
See survey	0%	0%	4%	0%
20-What sex were the trainers?				
Male	45%	40%	48%	57%
Female	10%	10%	22%	7%
Both	45%	50%	26%	36%
Don't know	0%	0%	4%	0%
N/A	0%	0%	0%	0%
See survey	0%	0%	0%	0%

Questions	Nat'l Women (37 total) (29 rec'd training)	Int'l Women (15 total) (10 rec'd training)	Nat'l Men (34 total) (23 rec'd training)	Int'l Men (19 total) (14 rec'd training)
21- Did you mention safety/security procedures specific to women?				
Yes, often	7%	0%	0%	21%
Yes, little	17%	20%	26%	43%
No	76%	80%	74%	29%
Don't know	0%	0%	0%	7%
N/A	0%	0%	0%	0%
See survey	0%	0%	0%	0%
22- Did the training have a separate section specific to women or men?				
No	97%	90%	91%	86%
For women	3%	0%	4%	0%
For men	0%	0%	0%	0%
For both	0%	0%	4%	7%
Don't know	0%	0%	0%	7%
N/A	0%	10%	0%	0%
See survey	0%	0%	0%	0%
23- Did the training suggest that women... safe than men?				
More at risk	14%	10%	13%	36%
Equally at risk	55%	80%	65%	43%
Less at risk	0%	0%	0%	0%
Don't know	17%	0%	17%	14%
N/A	14%	10%	0%	7%
See survey	0%	0%	4%	0%
24- Do you use lessons from the training in managing your personal security?				
Often	34%	70%	43%	43%
Sometimes	62%	20%	43%	50%
Rarely	3%	10%	13%	0%
Never	0%	0%	0%	0%
No opinion	0%	0%	0%	0%
N/A	0%	0%	0%	7%
See survey	0%	0%	0%	0%

Questions	Nat'l Women (37 total) (29 rec'd training)	Int'l Women (15 total) (10 rec'd training)	Nat'l Men (34 total) (23 rec'd training)	Int'l Men (19 total) (14 rec'd training)
25 – Do you feel your security concerns were addressed in the training?				
Yes	76%	50%	91%	84%
No	7%	20%	0%	0%
No opinion	14%	10%	4%	14%
N/A	3%	20%	0%	0%
See survey	0%	0%	4%	0%
26- If you have never had training, what topics would you like to see discussed?				
Response	41%	20%	56%	57%
No response	59%	80%	44%	43%
27- Are there topics that you wish your training had discussed?				
Yes	62%	40%	76%	53%
No	11%	13%	6%	16%
No opinion	8%	13%	0%	11%
N/A	19%	33%	18%	21%
28-What topics would you like to see covered in security training?				
Response	59%	47%	74%	74%
No response	41%	53%	26%	26%
29- - In the culture in which you are working; how does your sex affect your security?				
Response	89%	87%	91%	95%
No response	11%	13%	9%	5%
30- What risks are unique to women in your setting?				
Response	86%	60%	91%	95%
No response	14%	40%	9%	5%
31- What risks are unique to men in your setting?				
Response	78%	60%	82%	84%
No response	22%	40%	18%	16%

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