

5

Who Am I?

*How can we discover the true person when we see only distorted and varied images . . . [especially] when these images derive their origin not only from the man himself, but also from ourselves, and from the whole environment to which he belongs? It is no use trying to arrive at an exact picture by adding all the many false images together. That would be like trying to get a complete picture of an individual by superimposing hundreds of different negatives of him on one photographic print.**

IDENTITY, VALUES, AND MORALITY

“Who am I?” can be a cry of despair from someone having an identity crisis and in search of a significant meaning to life. It can express the agony of young adults suddenly on their own, of the housewife whose sense of identity, worth, and purpose has vanished, or of the retiree who no longer holds a job and title.

Even with no crisis in one’s life, the question is real. For some men and women the issue never becomes a problem. Throughout their lives they accept their apparent places in life and get on with the business of living: they roll with the punches, and the question never arises. They have, nevertheless, taken an answer for granted; and as long as that answer, perhaps never consciously formulated, feels satisfactory to them, there is no crisis. Ask such individuals “Who are you?” and they may respond, “Well, I’ve never had to think about that.” If they choose to respond further, they will most likely recite a list of things they do. They may go to their graves apparently satisfied and without an identity crisis.

Philosophy and Identity

A customary philosophic approach to the identity issue is to raise such questions as: Am I more than my body? Am I my mind? What is mind? Am

*Paul Tournier, *The Meaning of Persons* (New York: Harper, 1957), p. 21.

I my soul? What is a soul? How is my mind related to my body? How are my soul and mind related to each other? Are there any reasons for supposing that "I" will survive the changes and decay of my body? These are legitimate philosophic problems, but they are not our focus here.¹ The person in an identity crisis does not seek answers to these questions. Perhaps some philosophers are convinced these issues ought to be foremost, but philosophers do not set the priorities and agendas in all human dilemmas. We rarely begin a pursuit of personal, philosophic matters with the professional philosopher's view; however, if we want to conclude the search for identity with philosophic depth, we must eventually deal with issues of mind, body, and soul.

Our philosophic focus here is on the day-to-day issue of identity, the images we have of ourselves as we live out who we are. Am I what I see in the mirror? Am I what I do? Though related to the issues of mind, soul, and body, our philosophic questions begin the search for identity differently. We begin with identity and values.

Am I as I value myself? My self-image, my own answer to "Who am I?" and its value to me determine how highly I regard myself. In my own eyes I might have the identity of "the white, Yankee, Protestant male named Cedric" or "president of Texas Enterprises." If one of these identities is mine and I highly value that image, my self-regard will be high; I know that I am worthwhile because of who I am. If one of these identities is mine and I attach a low value to it, my self-esteem will be low; I know that I am of little worth because of who I am.

Am I as I am valued by others? Regardless of how I see myself, others come to their own conclusions. Cedric might have a high regard for who he is; he thinks he's special because he's Cedric. Others who have values similar to his will also regard him highly. However, those having contempt for Cedric's image will hold him in low esteem.

Am I as I value others? Knowing that I am president of Texas Enterprises, I value other chief executives as highly as I regard myself. Others with lesser jobs are, I believe, of less value because they are less successful. I am important because I believe most people are unimportant and less valuable.

In addition, our search for identity incorporates a factor philosophers do not consider—morality. I am likely to treat myself as I value myself.

If I think highly of myself as Cedric, I could become my one and only friend! My primary moral obligation is to myself; I am at the center of the

¹For an introductory discussion of the traditional problems of identity, see the chapters on human nature, the self, and the mind in *Living Issues in Philosophy* (New York: Van Nostrand, 1979).

universe, and others ought to subordinate their desires and needs to mine. My senses of identity and morality are self-centered.

If I think poorly of myself as Cedric, I could dislike myself and be filled with self-contempt. I am worthless. My primary moral obligation might be to serve others without regard for my own desires and needs.

Of course these are two extremes, and many other approaches to self-assessment and moral obligation are possible in between. Our contention is this: an individual's identity as valued by himself and by others *and* the value the individual places on the images he or she perceives of others are crucial to the individual's relations with other human beings. My sense of morality toward myself and others depends to a large extent on my self-regard and on my value of others' identities. A moral standard for an individual's behavior is linked inescapably to his or her answer to "Who am I?" and the identity's apparent worth.

IDENTITY IS LEARNED

Trees and goldfish have no identity problems. They have few (if any) choices to make and never suffer the agony of wondering who they are. They are, for the most part, programmed by nature and complete their lives rather simply.

Human beings are, perhaps, programmed by nature to some extent with genetically acquired tendencies, but we are definitely strongly influenced by persons close to us as well as by school, the media, religious institutions, and so on. If some particular identity is rooted in our very beings, it does not announce itself with any compelling force. Because we are influenced by persons and institutions, we human beings have many decisions and choices to make. Among them, if we care to make it, is the choice of an answer to "Who am I?"

Not many individuals have been formally warned "The time is coming soon when you must decide who you are." Instead we absorb a sense of who we are from our relationships. The infant's relationship to mother, then to others near and far as the early years pass, communicates an influential message. The message varies from culture to culture—a given family might have one, clear statement to its members; another family, along with the influences of school, the media, and religious institutions, might provide varied and conflicting identity signs. In contemporary Western civilization, the messages are varied and conflicting; there is no way to exclude outside influences. Even groups that insulate themselves extensively from these influences find increasingly that their members will at least hear of alternatives. In past years, Cedric's identity would be ingrained because he would have been exposed only "to his own kind." His

identity was a matter of social definition, not of choice, and it was unquestioned.

Even with greater exposure at early ages to competing identities, those of us in Western civilization still learn from birth from our immediate families an initial sense of "who we are." We may thereafter (1) be nurtured in our initial identities such that alternatives have no significant impact, (2) be nurtured in our initial identities with options intruding and conflicting significantly or inconsequentially for our entire lives, or (3) be nurtured in our initial identities, reflect on those competing, and choose an identity we value most highly. This third option, reflecting the philosopher's bias for conscious choice, is similar to the religious concept of being "born again." A choice is made, in an enlightening moment or a gradual sustained effort in self-definition, that provides new life for the individual. The chosen identity is not the passive acceptance of the strongest influences on his or her development. The choice may be either an affirmation of the identity provided from birth or a very different one.

The Choosing Process

No one would suggest seriously that the choice of an identity, whether an affirmation of one provided from birth or an alternative, is a simple matter of making up one's mind. It is our contention that identity is learned consciously or subconsciously with the nurturing support of at least one other person. Usually more than one supportive individual is involved; often an entire supportive group is involved such as family, religious community, friends, and so on. The complete choosing process does not ordinarily involve reading a book, hearing a lecture, or making up one's mind in isolation.

Significant choices and their subsequent supports are most effective when two or more caring persons are involved in the process. Both mind and heart—intellect and feelings—are components of such decisions; it is not a solo act. One reason for the organized aspect of religious and political movements is that organization provides the emotional/intellectual setting in which individuals can make important decisions and be nurtured in their choices. (How well the movements implement this context is another matter!) Required attendance at meetings of business clubs, fraternities and sororities, some religious communities, and political clubs reflects a recognition of the fundamental human need for ongoing involvement of the whole person if the individual is to be nurtured in an organization's tenets. Our understanding of this aspect of human nature may assist the reader: we feel that *any significant decision you would make about your identity as a result of reading these pages would be incomplete; for any view to take hold, it must be shared with another in a vital, ongoing way.*

MASKS

The Wearing of Masks

It is perfectly acceptable for children to wear masks on Halloween and for adults to do the same at some parties. Hiding their identities and becoming the masks they wear is also suitable for performers on stage. The children and partygoers wear masks of cloth or plastic; the performer wears the mask of a role being played.

The identities of many persons are like masks. In some cases the masks are put on so the person becomes something other than what he or she has been in full or in part. In other instances the person takes on the identity of the mask from birth, a mask provided by family and society.

Some individuals wear masks all the time. No one really knows the real human being behind the mask. "I thought I knew Pat, but I guess I really didn't," is a friend's reaction to some unexpected decision or action from Pat. Perhaps Pat, the real person, was not fully disclosed to the friend; or perhaps only a part of the real person had been shown to the friend. Perhaps Pat, the real Pat, was masked fully or in part even from Pat!

The Mask of Negativity

Have you ever heard anyone say "That's human nature" when something good has been done? Probably not. An official is caught embezzling and people say, "What else can you expect! That's human nature!" We have learned to invest human nature with inborn evil inclinations. Some theologians teach their communities just that. One pastor was overheard saying of his crying infant, "Listen to that crying, a sure sign of selfishness and inborn sinfulness."

This negative attitude toward humanity includes our bodies. Study the advertisements in the newspapers, magazines, and on television. Most carry an underlying denigrating message about your body: "You are defective! We offer a remedy!" We are told that we smell, have offensive breath, need shaping, require supports, have a poor shade of hair that's too flat, are showing wrinkles and lines, possess boring eyes/eyelashes/eyebrows/eyelids or skin and lips that are colorless, have dark teeth, too much hair there and too little here, plain fingers and toe nails! We believe this negative message and spend billions annually on so-called remedies.

Consider another negative attitude toward our bodies. Think for a moment of four of the most vulgar words used as expletives. There is a good chance that all four, or at least three, will have to do with the human body: a place or a function of our physical nature. The "worst" expression is a less than elegant synonym for sexual intercourse! When some people are really angry at someone, they shout two words at the offender that are

expressive of human reproduction. (If we valued our bodies positively, the same two words could conceivably be an uninhibited compliment!) We construct our vulgarities largely on our negative attitudes toward the human body.

Many would argue that this negativity is not a mask, that the physical nature as well as the spiritual essence of humanity is essentially depraved or inclined toward wrongfulness. Such religious positions generally provide a rite of cleansing, but the believers are still affected by the negativity the overall culture takes for granted; the negative mask remains in spite of spiritual cleansing.

THE MASCULINE MASK

Most individuals have no difficulty in discovering their sex. Few persons experience any delay in checking the "male" or "female" option on an application or information form. Masculinity and femininity are less clear. A male or female may be labeled masculine or feminine in terms of appearance, attitudes, mannerisms, and roles. This is a different matter from one's sex.

The masculinity of males in the United States has been for some time a concern of the highest priority. In an intentionally humorous poke at this near obsession, one writer has made some suggestions to parents.

1. If you catch your son playing with his sister's dolls, clip out a centerfold and hang it in the dollhouse "den." Hopefully he'll get the message.
2. And since he likes to play with dolls, go buy him one. A Barbie-type is best, with sexy hair, shapely buttocks, and perky little breasts.
3. Too much reading is a surefire danger sign. If Junior wears a pair of reading glasses, smudge them up a bit. And slip a couple of Sgt. Rock and Tarzan comic books into his copy of *Jane Eyre*.
4. Take him bowling. Let him use the little balls, but make him swear every time he misses.
5. No matter what he wants for Christmas, buy him power tools. Great big noisy dangerous power tools.
6. Teach him how to smoke cigars. If he won't smoke cigars, then give him cigarettes, but no low tars and *no* menthol 100's.
7. Take him hunting. Make him kill an animal he's seen in cartoons or in children's books. If he starts crying, cook it up and let him watch you eat it.
8. Get him drunk. This one's easy with a kid of five or six. A couple of sips should more than do the trick.
9. Now take him to a porno movie. If he gets scared and starts to bawl for Mommy, . . .
10. Beat him up. You're not trying to hurt him, just to help straighten him out. Once he learns what being unmanly is going to

mean in terms of constant pain and suffering, he'll shape up fast . . . the little fruit.²

Although the list is humorous in intent, it does not seem so farfetched when compared to the characteristics of masculinity we have come to recognize and accept.

Appearance. The biological "given" of a male, "masculine," is defined by an angular, tall, muscular, and hard appearance. The roundness of fat is acceptable under a hard-hat or some other uniform that masculinizes the curves.

Attitudes. Shaped by culture, traditional masculine attitudes encompass being competitive, aggressive, distant, detached, unemotional, outgoing, independent, self-confident, and adventurous. *Real* men don't cry, show dependence, hesitation, or vulnerability.

Mannerisms. Approved by culture, traditional masculine mannerisms, a man's "body language," include any posture that does not suggest either ballet or graceful gesturing. A sharp, salute-like wave is all right; the twiddling of fingers is not. Crossed legs with an ankle resting just above the knee is fine; knee planted above knee with pointed foot in motion is forbidden. Swishing like an excited woodfairy is censurable; the swish-swagger of a cowboy movie star in dirty jeans is laudable. Slugging a male on the arm while yelling "Ahr right!," a firm handshake in a business meeting, even a pat on the buttocks while in an athlete's uniform are all appropriate signs of approval; a hug or a pat on the buttocks out of uniform is a scandal (unless one's immediate ancestry can excuse the expressive behavior).

Roles. Set by recent culture, traditional masculine roles, things real men do, are characteristically rough, active, controlling, spatial (engineering, building), protective, supervisory, judgmental, success oriented, and colored blue. Contact-sports athlete, ingenious criminal, hard-nosed businessman, "boss," knowing auto mechanic, provider, and decision maker are examples of successful masculine roles.

Masculinity and Morality

Many of our standards of personal and social morality for males are linked profoundly with how we believe "real men" ought to behave. We assume that if I am male, I ought to exhibit masculine appearances, attitudes,

²From "Calling All Parents . . .," *Stag Party* (June/July 1979). This article was given to one of this book's authors by a student, as an example of a prevalent narrow view of masculinity.

mannerisms, and roles; if not, there is something abnormal and *wrong* with me. For example, men readily approve of males who are aggressive—regardless of the goal of the aggressive behavior. Hidden admiration for Hitler, rapists, uncaught criminals, ruthless businessmen, and public admiration of any record setter (no matter how worthless the task) is woven into the fabric of praiseworthy masculine behavior. How many men in the United States would dare question publicly the value of professional sports as this industry has been shaped in recent years? How can one question openly any aspect of activities that so reinforce and symbolize American masculinity?

The High Price of Masculinity

In recent years the traditional understanding of masculinity has been undergoing study. The results are not good for men who embrace the usual masculine forms. Though one's appearance is a matter of the biologically given, the many learned aspects (attitudes, mannerisms, and roles) have males in trouble. Some of the conclusions attributed to masculinized behavior are:

1. Males are dying long before females.
2. Males are more susceptible to death-dealing diseases and suicide.
3. Men are emotionally more devastated by divorce than women.
4. Friendships between men are often shallow and unrewarding with a constant undertone of competition and toughness.
5. Significant, wholesome emotion is often lacking in sexual expression.
6. Sports for men have become compulsive rather than pleasurable.
7. Men are constantly striving to measure up to masculine ideals—whatever the price—and are rarely satisfied with their lives or fulfilled in their relationships.³

If these observations are correct, it is fair to ask, "Is it wise or moral to be traditionally masculine? Is there an alternative?"

Masculinity and Identity

It is our conviction that answering the "Who am I" question with "I am a man" (meaning, "I am a male who behaves in a traditionally masculine

³See Sidney Jourard's "Some Lethal Aspects of the Male Role" in *The Transparent Self* (New York: Van Nostrand, 1972); Peter Fuller, *The Champions: Psychoanalysis of the Top Athletes* (New York: Urizen, 1977); Leonard Kriegel, *On Men and Manhood* (New York: Hawthorn, 1979); Marc Fasteau, *The Male Machine* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1974); Herb Goldberg, *The New*

way") is a mask; it is, for the most part, a covering image. Valuing this identity results in a particular quality of relationships, praising moral standards that produce a psychologically and physiologically damaging identity, and moral endorsements that call for more of the same. It is, nevertheless, an option for those who accept "masculinity" as an identity.

THE FEMININE MASK

"Sugar and spice and everything nice, that's what little girls are made of." So goes one picture of traditional femininity. Being "nice" or "ladylike" continues as a norm for female behavior and appearance in many circles today. It is, however, far less obsessive than is masculinity for males; tomboys are tolerated with surprising latitude whatever their ages. Outweighing this toleration, nevertheless, is a history of general negativity toward women and their roles. Consider the following quotations intended by their compiler to demonstrate how many secular and religious sources have viewed women:⁴

The female requires the male not only for procreation, as in other animals, but also for governance, for the male excels both in intelligence and in strength. (St. Thomas Aquinas)

Women are created with large hips in order that they should stay home and sit on them. (Martin Luther)

As long as woman is for birth and children, she is as different from man as body is from soul. (St. Jerome, who had a low regard for the body)

Women are designed in their deeper instincts to get more pleasure out of life when they are not aggressive. (Dr. Spock)

Even school children know that the male is by far the more important sex. (John Calvin)

What a mad idea to demand equality for women! Women are nothing but machines for producing children. (Napoleon)

Woman is wholly subject to nature, and hence only aesthetically free . . . she becomes free only by her relation to man. (Kierkegaard)

Woman is a weakling before a show of strength, and a tyrant if she has her will. (St. Ignatius Loyola)

When a woman thinks at all, she thinks evil. (Seneca)

Woman's greatest chance for making marriage a success depends upon her willingness to lose her life in that of her husband. (Peter Marshall)

Male: From Self-Destruction to Self-Care (New York: Morrow, 1979); Joe L. Dubbert, *A Man's Place: Masculinity In Transition* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1979); Fred Hapgood, *Why Males Exist: An Inquiry Into the Evolution of Sex* (New York: Morrow, 1979).

⁴Rebecca Wenger, "Quotations from Chairman Male," in Harry B. Adams, ed., *Reflection* 69, no. 4 (May 1972), p. 16.

From the beginning, nothing has been more alien, hostile, and repugnant to woman than truth—her great art is the lie, her highest concern is mere appearance and beauty. (Nietzsche)

Order includes the primacy of the husband, the ready subjection of the wife, and her willing obedience. (Pope Pius XI)

The fact that women must be regarded as having little sense of justice is no doubt related to the predominance of envy in their mental life. (Freud)

It is shameful for a woman to even think of what nature she has, let alone glory in it. (St. Clement of Alexandria)

Most women have no characters at all! (Alexander Pope)

Sugar and spice, yes; but traditional femininity obviously has its darker side, too. Subordination and acceptance of an inferior status combined with honored niceness is material of the traditional feminine mask. Some of the characteristics of femininity we have come to recognize and accept are as stifling and damaging as are those of masculinity.

Appearance. The biological “given” of a female, “traditional femininity,” is defined by roundness, modest height, smoothness, and a generally soft appearance. However, even very angular and otherwise “masculine” women are not disqualified from their femininity as readily as “feminine” appearing males. For some strange reason vulgarities such as “Queer” and “Dyke” are not hurled as readily at a rugged woman—a degree of toleration not enjoyed by her male counterpart.

Attitudes. Shaped by culture, traditional feminine attitudes encompass being passive and accepting, close, romantic, personal, warm, tender, emotional, reserved, dependent, hesitant, and preferring safety. A woman may cry, show dependence, uncertainty, and vulnerability.

Mannerisms. Approved by culture, traditional feminine mannerisms, a woman’s “body-language,” include any posture that does not suggest either a boxer or severe gesturing; women have more latitude in mannerisms than do men. Crossed legs with an ankle resting just above the knee is not ladylike; knee planted above knee with pointed foot in motion is fine. Swishing like an excited woodfairy is laudable; the swish-swagger of a uniformed male cowboy star is at least questionable. Slugging someone on the arm while yelling “Ahr right!” is inappropriate; in a business meeting a *gentle* handshake is all right. A pat on the buttocks (anyone’s buttocks) by a woman, while not causing a scandal would certainly be considered odd; a hug anywhere, anytime is almost always considered nice. Within the boundaries of niceness, expressive behavior is an ingredient of traditional American femininity.

Roles. Set by culture, traditional feminine roles, things *real* ladies do, are characteristically gentle, passive, caring, submissive, verbal (poetry,

music, reading), receiving, obedient, neutral, home oriented, and colored pink. Noncontact recreation, knowing how to cook and sew, nursing, accepting whatever financial support a husband is willing to share, and subservience are examples of successful feminine roles and traits.

Femininity and Morality

As with masculinity, many of our standards of personal and social morality are linked closely with how we believe "real ladies" ought to behave. We assume that if I am a female, I ought to exhibit feminine appearances, attitudes, mannerisms, and roles; if not, there is something abnormal and *wrong* with me. We are apt to approve of females who, for example, are home oriented regardless of the quality of the homemaking. A general acceptance of tyrannical or negligent mothers, nagging wives, sloppy housekeepers, and lazy female TV addicts is woven into the fabric of moderately praiseworthy feminine behavior (At least she's in the home where she ought to be!). How many of us would dare question publicly the "right" of all women to be mothers? How can an American question "motherhood" at all? How can one question openly any aspect of activities that so reinforce and symbolize American femininity?

The High Price of Femininity

Subtle and obvious penalties have resulted from the traditional understanding of femininity. Words such as "Dame," "Madame," and "Mistress" have negative connotations, while the male equivalents "Lord," "Sir" and "Mister" are free from derogatory meanings. "Womanly" is frequently negative; "manly" is positive. The English language uses words referring to males as the standard, normal, complementary way to praise; words referring to females have a lesser or negative standing.⁵

In a speech in the late seventies, a female judge observed that for most of the young women going before the courts the "offense" is nonconformity to a social model of what is accepted behavior for young girls. This reflects an attitude not significantly different from the nineteenth-century position that caused girls to be institutionalized for such offenses as stubbornness and disobedience. The controllers of these institutions then felt successful if the offender married and bore children after serving time. Rehabilitation was considered a failure if the offender remained unmarried, became an unwed mother, or was separated or divorced. Even today, girls not boys are brought to court for being promiscuous or fornicating; girls not boys are forced to accept the humiliation of an examination of their bodies—all in the name of protecting the helpless female.

⁵See Casey Miller and Kate Swift, *Words and Women* (New York: Doubleday, 1977).

In many homes the woman's place is still the kitchen, sometimes the family room, rarely the garage. In advertisements a woman is inadequate because she fails to remove the "ring around the collar" from her husband's shirt. The female is exploited as a sex symbol and seducer journeying from sexpot to dishpan with little in between.⁶ Inequality between men and women in salaries and employment opportunities has not been removed from American society. Though some would say "They've come a long way" (which may be true), for the most part, the norms for traditional femininity are founded on a particular, limiting notion of appropriate feminine appearances, attitudes, mannerisms and roles.⁷ Exceptions are tolerated more for legal reasons than from moral conviction. If these observations are correct, it is fair to ask, "Is it wise and moral to be traditionally feminine? Is there an alternative?"

Femininity and Identity

It is our conviction that answering the "Who am I" question with "I am a lady" (meaning, I am a female who must behave in a traditional feminine way) is a mask; it is, for the most part, a covering image. Valuing this identity results in a particular quality of relationships, praising moral standards that produce a psychologically damaging (or at least artificially limiting) identity, and moral endorsements that call for more of the same.

SOME GENDER TERMS

femaleness: Anatomic and physiologic features which relate to the female's procreative and nurturant capacities.

feminine: An adjective to describe a set of sex-specific social role behaviors that are unrelated to procreative and nurturant biologic functions.

gender identity: The inner sense of maleness or femaleness which identifies the person as being male, female, or ambivalent. . . . Group values may cause conflicts about gender identity by labeling certain nonsexual interests and behavior as mas-

⁶See the documentary film "Killing Us Softly: Advertising's Image of Women" (Cambridge Documentary Films, Cambridge, Mass.) and Erving Goffman, "Genderisms," *Psychology Today* (August 1977), pp. 60-63.

⁷See U S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics; *Women in The Labor Force: Some New Data Series* (rev. periodically); Milton Cantor and Bruce Laurie, *Class, Sex, and the Woman Worker* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1977); Viola Klein, *The Feminine Character: History of An Ideology* (Urbana: Univ of Illinois Press, 1972); Betty Friedan, *The Feminine Mystique*, 2nd ed. (New York: Norton, 1974); Mary Vetterling-Braggin, et al., *Feminism and Philosophy* (Totowa, N J.: Littlefield, 1977)

culine or feminine. Gender identity is distinguished from sexual identity, which is biologically determined.

gender role: The image the individual person presents to others and to the self that declares him or her to be boy or girl, man or woman. Gender role is the public declaration of gender identity, but the two do not necessarily coincide.

maleness: Anatomic and physiologic features which relate to the male's procreative capacity.

masculine: An adjective to describe a set of sex-specific social role behaviors that are unrelated to procreative biologic function.

From Shervert H. Frazier et al., *A Psychiatric Glossary*, 4th ed. (Washington, D.C.: American Psychiatric Assoc., 1975), pp. 55, 58, 98, 100.

THE MASK OF ETHNIC ORIGIN

An aquarium of tropical fish in a home is a never-ending source of curiosity, beauty, harmony, struggle, and diversity. Each color, each shape, each temperament and the contribution of each fish (whether by presence or function) is significant to the overall quality of the contained community. For any one kind of fish to claim overall superiority to other occupants would be ludicrous to a human onlooker. All the fish are equal in the sense of their common "fishness." All the fish are not equal in a sense of precise sameness.

Admitting to flaws in this analogy, we find some insights. You're white, black, brown, yellow, red, or various shades thereof; your ancestry is European, Middle Eastern, Near Eastern, African, Asian, native American, or whatever. While social scientists fight over inborn capacities versus cultural influences among human beings and behaviors, we are living on the same small planet, journeying within a largely unknown universe. Assuming we have more reasoning powers than do tropical fish in an aquarium, we wonder legitimately why our "aquarium" is filled with unreasonable striving for superiority among people of differing ethnic backgrounds.

In recent years an "ethnic revival," and in some cases a new ethnic separatism, has emerged. It is one thing to search harmlessly for ancestral roots and to preserve the diverse arts of the multitude of human cultures. It is less innocent if such roots and arts are symptoms and further causes of socially explosive reactions to past and present injustices. Ethnic chauvinism as a source of one's fundamental identity has consequences

very different from natural curiosity about one's roots or the preservation of enriching ways of human life. In the words of one scholar

Ethnicity emphasizes the trivialities that distinguish us and obscures the overwhelming reality of our common genetic and human heritages as well as our common needs and hopes. By emphasizing differences, ethnicity lends itself to the conservative belief in the inevitability of inequality.⁸

It is our contention that each person's ethnic background is important as a contribution to the human community. It is understandable that oppressed groups of human beings have taken an interest in their ethnic heritage; the discovery of positive roots can contribute to legitimate ethnic pride. However, "I am a white of European stock" is more adequate as history or biology than as a basis of identity. As a clue to identity, such an ethnic statement is a superficial mask or image; when valued more or less than another ethnic mask, such a statement can lead to needless disharmony and separation.

One such institution that fosters disharmony and separation is the *Social Register*. Referred to as "that archaic anachronism that presumes to extract the socially prestigious from the rest of us,"⁹ the *Social Register* functions for some individuals as a high valuing of who they are. Founded in 1887 by "a socially ambitious son of a patent lawyer whose first publishing venture was a gossip sheet,"¹⁰ the *Social Register* has never disclosed its criteria for its listings. No doubt ethnicity has some relationship to the standards. It is our conviction that whatever its criteria and uses, the *Social Register* and other such listings function poorly as a measure of human worth or adequate identity.

THE MASK OF PERFORMANCES

You have just walked into a social gathering made up of people you don't know. Your hostess introduces you by name. Very quickly you are being identified further by your hostess, or being asked by someone, or you are explaining yourself with a direct or subtle reference to what you *do*. Your name is insufficient; information about what you do is required.

If this scene were only an effort to find something to talk about, what you do may be a good beginning. If you say that you are a student, the

⁸Orlando Patterson, "Hidden Dangers in the Ethnic Revival," *New York Times* February 20, 1978, p. 17. See also his *Ethnic Chauvinism: The Reactionary Impulse* (New York: Stein and Day, 1977) and Nathan Glazer, *Affirmative Discrimination: Ethnic Inequality and Public Policy* (New York: Basic Books, 1978).

⁹Carey Winfrey, "Society's 'In' Book: Does It Still Matter?" *New York Times*, February 2, 1980, p. 14.

¹⁰Winfrey, p. 14.

subject of your studies could begin a congenial conversation. As the conversation proceeds, however, some evaluations begin to take place. If you name philosophy as an interest, or more specifically ethics, your very being and worth may be invested with whatever your conversation partners think of philosophy; as an ethicist you may be invested with superior moral qualities that inhibit any earthy comments at that gathering. On the one hand, if the other guests learn that you are studying ethics at Harvard, not only might you be of moral excellence but your overall value will increase markedly; being a Harvard student might even compensate for studying ethics in the eyes of those who view ethics as another one of the useless humanities. On the other hand, if you are studying ethics at a public community college in South Dakota, you may be identified as a lesser being! Perhaps *you* view yourself as a superior or inferior human being in terms of what you do and the status accorded by society.

You Are What You Do

We learn very early that to a large extent "*I am what I do.*" Too often we offer praise and show affection to very young children *only* when they do something acceptable. We reinforce the baby whose bowel movement is performed at the right time; we become ecstatic when our child takes its first steps in front of critical Aunt Wretchny and Uncle Tode. Through the use of this system, successes in school, in the playground (especially at Little League), and at home multiply. If our praises and affection are most demonstrative at these moments, we give a clear message to our children: "You are worthwhile when you perform well; you are what you do." We seal and reseal this sense of identity by asking "What are you going to be when you grow up?" We have implied that you are little or nothing of significance now as a child; your worth depends on what you do as an adult. You will be justified by good works.

Advertisements intended to attract young people to the armed forces or to colleges are often phrased: "Be somebody. Join (or attend) _____!" You will be a nobody until you do.

The masks of our performances, roles, or activities have become engrained in our culture. We perceive ourselves, we are perceived, and we perceive others according to what is performed and the value attached to the particular role or activity. Some common identities and their consequences are as follows:

Child. If individuals consciously or subconsciously answer the identity question with "I am my parents' child," certain consequences may follow. Their value of themselves depends on their fulfillment of the "child" role as they understand it; they judge themselves "good" to the extent that they fulfill the role.

Their relationships with others are morally good to the extent they fulfill the role; their primary moral obligation is to their parents—not to a spouse, their children, or friends. They are worthwhile as children, whatever their ages.

But who are they when their parents are dead? Possibly there will be no dilemma; the role may be well engrained, and the deceased parents' photographs remind them who they are and of their primary loyalty. Acting the part of their parents' children is good; to do differently, bad. Otherwise, an identity crisis develops.

Parent. A mother and father who view the parental role as the source of their identity value themselves to the extent that this role, as understood, is fulfilled. Their relationships with others are morally good to the extent that they are parental; their self-worth depends on parenting. Their children's successes and failures reflect directly on the quality of their parenting.

But who are they when the children grow up and leave home? An identity crisis may surface. A way of avoiding the crisis is not to "let go." They seek out continuous parenting moments with their children. In doing so, they may either alienate their children or become legendary "in-laws." In their own eyes the parents are good as long as they perform at parenting; without a parenting role they lose a sense of worth, identity, and goodness.

Spouse. Being a wife or a husband can also be a source of identity, worth, and goodness. For such a person, a divorce or the death of one's partner is more than grief; it is devastation, a loss of being someone. The possible new identity—"divorcee," "widow," or "widower" has few gratifications and a rather narrow range of good behaviors. The "other half" is gone; only half remains.

Athlete. The aging athlete stares mournfully at the trophies; they show who he or she *was*! Now, this person is an ex-athlete. Being an ex-anything is hardly an in-depth source of identity, worth, and moral rightness. And yet we reinforce this identity, especially among males; we forget that few senior citizens will be able to find a satisfactory identity as an athlete.

Some individuals who yearn to be athletes but who have not had the opportunity and/or ability become avid fans: they may live a fantasy life of sports statistics and voyeuristic pleasure. An identity as a fan, though less than the real thing, permits some fans to feel right with the world, though second-best.

Possessor. Cedric feels proud of his achievements, for which he has worked hard. Strolling around his home, he sees the results of his labor:

the cars, the comfortable house and its contents, and the yard. His summer cottage comes to mind, the trips abroad with his family, and so on. In theory, he could be well satisfied. But there is that gnawing sensation within; a larger house with more furniture, perhaps an additional car, a more expensive country club, more extensive trips, and a guest cottage for the cottage—why not add these items to his possessions? He might then be satisfied with who he is, his self-worth, and the good life. Or, Cedric is hit with unexpected medical bills just as his business folds because of a competitor's successful invention; not worth much now, not living the good life, Cedric no longer knows who he is.

Leisure Activities. In his newsletter *Context*, editor Martin Marty (April 1, 1980) comments on an observation by O. C. Edwards, a fellow scholar. Marty wrote

He quotes a *New Yorker* cartoon which shows a newcomer at a cocktail party introducing himself; "Bixby of Palisades Park. I'm into wine-making and the martial arts, Gregorian chant and Zen Buddhism..." One could almost affirm: "I have hobbies. Therefore, I am."

Once upon a time people derived identity from jobs. That has changed. Today they use their leisure activities to demonstrate who they are. "When consensus breaks down in a society, one can no longer depend on social reinforcement of one's identity. Rather, the sense of who I am has to be sought privately. That sense of identity is necessary for sanity, and so the question must be answered. If the world does not tell me who I am, I have to find out for myself."

An extension or version of possessor, the individual who derives a sense of identity, self-worth, and a good life by means of leisure activities runs similar risks. How many activities are required to be somebody? What if someday the individual can't pursue as many? What if the person becomes ill and is confined to bed? Who then is he or she, and of what value? What is a good life for an individual confined to bed and wheelchair?

The Cult of Activity

"Keeping busy?" asks a friend you've not seen for a while. Most of the time we reply positively, and we are probably telling the truth. We are so busy that we schedule in moments, brief periods, for "relaxing" activities such as jogging, shopping, and gardening. Perish the thought that we should just sit quietly. We must perform at something to be someone of worth; being good is bound up with keeping busy. While sitting quietly, we're nobody, of little worth, and not really good. *Being someone of value means being active at something.*

And yet we read about excessive stress leading to ill health and poor

human relationships. In an essay, a suburban New York youth worker wrote

Last year seven high school students from an exclusive New York suburban community attempted suicide, all within six months. Two succeeded, five failed. . . . Each year an estimated 5,000 young Americans, ages 15 to 24, succeed at suicide. . . . Measuring up in our success-oriented, competitive culture subjects young people to unbearable pressures. From their tenderest years they are prodded to produce, to excel, to be somebody special. Their lives are regimented like a factory assembly line. Be busy, they are told; maximize every moment.¹¹

The next time a friend asks, "Keeping busy?" say "Not really; my life is rather quiet right now." But be prepared to be perceived as an individual who is not somebody of worth and high moral character.

THE MASKS AS IDENTITY

One view of the masks of masculine and feminine gender roles, other roles and performances, and ethnicity proposes that the sum total of the masks and any other behaviors is the only real you. You are what you seem to be; anything else is a fantasy. There is no "self" behaving.¹²

This view claims that the word "mask" is inappropriate as we have used it. Nothing is being covered up, at least no private unobservable "you." "What you see is what you get!" A person is whoever he appears to be in any particular situation; a person becomes his gender images, family roles, and other activities and performances.

If this view is correct, I am my image of the moment. My identity, worth, and goodness depend on what we have called masks in this chapter. Identities are discarded as circumstances require; I *am* according to the situation of the moment. Wife today; widow tomorrow. Athlete today; invalid, ex-athlete after the accident. Company manager this week; retired employee next week. I am a combination of inherited appearances, learned attitudes, mannerisms, negative and positive feelings, roles, activities, and performances. These images are linked to the current appraisals of the worth and goodness of each.

An extreme example serves to illustrate our reservations about this view: "I am an uneducated, poor, nonwhite, old, quadriplegic lesbian." If one is in this situation, is the acceptance of this identity, worth, and perception of moral rightness the only option? Or should we seek the combinations of

¹¹Edward R. Walsh, "Freeing Children From the Cult of Activity," *New York Times*, June 3, 1979, Sec. 23, p. 16.

¹²"Denials of the Existence of a Self" among Buddhists, Hume, and Behaviorists is discussed in *Living Issues in Philosophy*, pp. 54-59.

ingredients judged most worthwhile by society in order to "be somebody?" Should formal education encourage particular appearances, attitudes, feelings, mannerisms, and performances so that students fit right? At this point it would be better to search for an alternative.

Those of us who differ with the masks-as-identity position will look further. We cannot disprove this "sum total" position. We acknowledge candidly, however, that it is not a persuasive axiom for us; its implications are inadequate for our perceptions of life.

In looking for an alternative, we can rule out the discussed ways of answering "Who am I?" For us, an adequate identity will not rely on images. We must look for an identity that will hold all our changeable appearances, activities, and so on in perspective. We search for an identity that will provide a satisfactory answer both for the extreme situations and the day-to-day changing circumstances of our lives.

BENEATH THE MASKS

Let us now consider some of the characteristics rooted in our very beings and not dependent on the masks we may wear. Following is a list of such basic qualities and capacities we shall call "givens":

1. *Self-consciousness* Whereas all animals are conscious, we are self-conscious. We are not only conscious, but we are conscious of the fact that it is *we* who are conscious.
2. *Abstract thought or the power of reflective thinking* We can search for truth, and we have some ability to distinguish between truth and falsity.
3. *Ethical discrimination and some freedom of choice* We are conscious of a distinction between what is and what ought to be. We can distinguish between right and wrong, according to our norms, and feel responsible for our actions.
4. *Aesthetic appreciation* We search for aesthetic pleasure and make distinctions between beauty and ugliness.
5. *Discrimination among ultimate meanings of life* We are able to decide whether there is any meaning to life and which ultimate meaning suits us. As far as we know, dogs, cats, apes, goldfish, and trees cannot.
6. *Creativity* We can improvise and invent repeatedly, make complex tools, wear ornaments, fly in the air, travel beyond the earth's atmosphere, journey under the sea, and project pictures around the globe. We are creative artists and technicians.
7. *Sociability* We reach out for companionship, organization, and

cooperation; we communicate in a variety of ways from a simple touch to complicated languages. We are in relation to others; we are not isolated creatures.

8. *Embodiment* We are psychosomatic agents who interact with our environments and whose complex biological processes are dynamic, vital, interwoven aspects of our whole beings. We are not minds or souls trapped within an alien, incompatible body. Each of us is a unique, embodied creature.

Potential Abuses and Distortions

Each of these ingredients, characteristics, qualities, and capacities is subject to distortion. Philosophers and theologians disagree among themselves about the extent to which, if at all, any of these givens are naturally distorted in some or all individuals as they emerge from the womb. Clearly some human beings are born with biological handicaps; our evaluations of and responses to our handicaps vary. Whether some or all people are born with a natural tendency toward passivity, a search for ugliness, and (sinful or) antisocial behavior is still debated. That some individuals make choices that twist the givens in abusive, distorted, and alienating ways is a supportable conviction. The givens can be abused and distorted.

A Useful Concept

If the givens rooted in my nature provide an answer to who I am, we might locate a concept that can summarize them. A recitation of these eight, and perhaps more, characteristics would be burdensome and awkward in any identity affirmation.

The ordinary word *person* may be useful. Although it sounds less than exciting to exclaim "I am a person!" the concept can acquire a new meaning; the ordinary, familiar, and dull—even negative—use of "person" can be buried and a new meaning resurrected. Some reflections on "person" follow:

What does it mean when we say a human being is a person? First of all, it means that each individual human is not just an instance of mankind in the same way a piece of copper is an instance of copper. Each individual is an original center of being and action. His actions are his own. . . .

With humans . . . there is a distance between what they are and what they do, on account of the fact that they are knowing subjects with a certain degree of freedom.

... being a person is a kind of dynamic process. ... *Being* a person means, therefore, the possibility of *becoming* more and more of a person.¹³

Whatever else is true of him, then, a person is a self-conscious knower who can guide himself by norms of consistency and reasoned investigation. ... a person experiences himself not only as a self-conscious knower but also as a complex unity of remembering, feeling, desiring, perceiving and we shall argue, of willing and oughting. ... a person [is] a self-identifying active unity continuing in and constituted by basic unlearned psychic and physiological capacities.¹⁴

PERSONS AND ROLES

Let me distinguish here between role relationships and interpersonal relationships—a distinction often overlooked in the spate of literature that deals with human relations. Roles are inescapable. They must be played or else the social system will not work. A role is a repertoire of behavior patterns which must be rattled off in appropriate contexts, and all behavior irrelevant to the role must be suppressed. But what we often forget is the fact that it is a person who is playing the role. This person has a self, or I should say, *is* a self. All too often the roles that a person plays do not do justice to all of his self. In fact, there may be nowhere that he may just *be* himself. He may be self-alienated. ... It is possible to be involved in a social group such as a family for years and years, playing one's roles nicely with the other members—and never getting to know the *persons* who are playing the other roles.

Sidney M. Jourard, *The Transparent Self* (New York: Van Nostrand, 1971), pp. 30–31.

Sidney Jourard (1926–1974) was professor of psychology at the University of Florida. Also a psychotherapist, Dr. Jourard wrote several books, including Healthy Personality: An Approach From the View-Point of Humanistic Psychology.

¹³A. G. M. van Melsen, "Person," *Encyclopedia of Bioethics*, vol. 3, pp. 1207–1208.

¹⁴Peter A. Bertocci and Richard M. Millard, *Personality and The Good* (New York: McKay, 1963), pp. 172–173.

For the humanist, "person" may well conceptualize who he or she is. Those with a theological perspective may prefer "child of God." A "child of God" is also a person and, in addition, in a caring relationship with the Creator, like a child to parent. This meaning is conveyed well here:

The person belongs to the realm of quality, not quantity. It is suddenly manifested in a powerful inner movement which partakes of the nature of the Absolute. However many things we accumulated, that would bring us no nearer to it. The person resides in being, not in having. . . .

Thus the infirm, the neurotic, the aged, can experience this flowering of the person, in spite of all that hinders and limits their existence, much more intensely, sometimes, than those who are loaded with the good things of life. . . .

We must resist the temptation to give a doctrinaire answer to the question . . . "Who am I?" We must give up the idea that knowing the person means compiling a precise and exhaustive inventory of it. There is always some mystery remaining, arising from the very fact that the person is alive. We can never know what new upsurge of life may transfigure it tomorrow.

The person is a potential, a current of life which surges up continually, and which manifests itself in a fresh light at every new blossoming forth of life. At the creative moment of dialogue with God or with another person, I in fact experience a double certainty: that of "discovering" myself, and also that of "changing." I find myself to be different from what I thought I was. From that moment I am different from what I was before. And yet at the same time I am certain that I am the same person. . . .

Our life is a score composed by God. The person is the conductor who is assuring its performance by directing the orchestra—our body and mind. But the composer is not absent. He is there during the performance. He leans over to the conductor and encourages him; he whispers in his ear, making clear his intentions and helping him to put them into execution.¹⁵


Who Am I?

"I am a person" or "I am a child of God." These identities are constant. It is the person/child-of-God who is embodied male or female.¹⁶ The person or

¹⁵Tournier, *The Meaning of Persons*, pp. 231–233.

¹⁶Discussions about what is learned and innate to male and female behavior may be found in five essays in the section titled "Genetic Aspects of Human Behavior" in the *Encyclopedia of Bioethics*, vol. 2, pp. 527–548; Robert C. Solomon and Judith Rose Sanders, "Sexual Identity," *ibid.*, vol. 4, pp. 1589–1596; the November 1978 issue of *Psychology Today*; and Robert May, *Sex and Fantasy: Patterns of Male and Female Development* (New York: Norton, 1980); "The Sexes: How They Differ—and Why," the cover story of *Newsweek* (May 18, 1981), pp. 72–83.

child of God is not identified as a performance or as an inherited ethnicity, social status, or physical structure. "You are NOT what you do nor necessarily what you appear to be!" Instead, you are a person or child of God who has many changeable gender images, secondary inheritances, roles, performances, and activities. As these change or are discarded, the person or child of God as the basic identity remains constant. The "I" is the same basic "I" growing in the givens of personhood. A diagram may be helpful here.



*It is our position that a person cannot do much about his ethnic and social background or his basic physical structure; these factors are not considered as primary in being a person or a child of God.

The changeable aspects of our lives become masks when in combination or singularly they hide the real person from herself or himself and/or others. When the person is mistakenly *identified* as “macho” or “ladylike,” as white or nonwhite, wealthy or poor, professor or student, and so on, the real person is obscured. Kept within the perspective of a constant identity as a person or child of God, the changeable “doings” and secondary inheritances can become positive factors in one’s life.

The Worth of Persons

If I value the givens of human nature, then I fundamentally value all persons. One view claims that this fundamental worth is inalienable and cannot be offset by anything evil done in a person’s life; no matter how terribly a person has chosen to act, his or her fundamental worth determines his or her overall worth.

Another view says although this fundamental worth is inalienable, it can be offset by evil choices and acts. The individual sentenced to die for a capital crime is still fundamentally worthwhile, but hateful decisions and actions override that basic worth. Or, in another example, a great physician and a local crook are equal in fundamental human worth, but their choices and behaviors add to and detract from their respective overall value.

These views have many differing implications. Common to both is the assertion that every person is fundamentally worthwhile just because of their *being*, not their *doing*. A person or child of God does not need to be justified as a human being of fundamental worth by busy good works!

Persons and Morality

By viewing oneself and others as persons and/or children of God, we develop a basic moral sense that includes self-respect and respect for others; I value myself and others and treat myself and others with concern. Never an It-It, I-It, or It-Thou relationship; morally good relations are between and among *persons*: “I-Thou.”

Let us conclude this exploration by restating an earlier idea of this chapter: any significant decision you would make about your identity as a result of reading these pages would be incomplete; for any view to take hold, it must be shared with another in a vital ongoing way. The nurturing process of affirming the real you beneath the masks can occur with one or more friends, a religious or humanistic group, a therapist, or other human supports. Books can provide some clarification of alternative views about identity; only live persons interacting deeply can provide the relationships needed for ongoing personal growth.

CHAPTER REVIEW

A. Identity, values, and morality

1. Everyone has a sense of identity, an answer to “Who am I?”—whether thought through or not.
2. A customary philosophical approach to the issue of identity is to raise such questions as “Am I more than my body? Am I my mind?” and so on.
3. This chapter’s focus is on the day-to-day issue of identity: the images we have of ourselves as we live out who we are.
4. My own answer to “Who am I” and its value to me determines how highly or poorly I regard myself.
5. Other people’s views of my identity determine their values of me.
6. I value other persons according to how I view their identities.
7. An individual’s identity as valued by himself and by others *and* the value the individual places on the images he or she perceives of others are crucial to the individual’s relations with other human beings; my sense of morality depends to a large extent on my self-regard and on my value of others’ identities.

B. Identity is learned

1. We absorb a sense of who we are from our relationships.
2. More than just an intellectual matter, the conscious choice of an identity requires support from others for it to take hold emotionally as well as intellectually.

C. Masks

1. The identities of many persons are like masks; they prevent disclosure of the wearer.
2. The mask of negativity is worn by many persons.

D. The masculine mask

1. The mask of masculinity provides culturally accepted appearances, attitudes, mannerisms, and roles for men; how “real men” ought to behave is linked with such masks.
2. Men pay a high price for wearing the masculine mask.

E. The feminine mask

1. The mask of femininity provides culturally accepted appearances, at-

titudes, mannerisms, and roles for women; how “real ladies” ought to behave is linked with such masks.

2. Women pay a high price for wearing the feminine mask.

F. The mask of ethnic origin

1. In recent years an “ethnic revival” and in some cases an ethnic separatism has emerged.
2. As an identity, ethnic masks can lead to superficiality in relationships, needless disharmony, and separation.

G. The mask of performances

1. We learn, to a large extent, that we *are* what we *do*.
2. Each performance mask has certain potentially negative consequences.
3. “Keeping busy” reflects the valuing of someone active, performing at something.

H. The masks as identity

1. One view holds that all the “masks” combined are the real you.
2. An alternative view proposes a “real you” beneath the masks.

I. Beneath the masks

1. The word “person” can be given new life by valuing the “givens” of personhood positively. “Child of God” is a theological phrasing of “person.”
2. “I am a person” or “I am a child of God” can provide a valuable, constant identity.
3. Consequences of this identity include the development of self-respect and respect for others on an I-Thou basis, a fundamental ingredient for one view of morally good relations.

SUGGESTED READINGS

Berenson, Frances M. *Understanding Persons: Personal and Impersonal Relationships*. New York: St. Martin's, 1981.

The conceptual significance of the notion of personal relationships and its relation to a clearer understanding of persons and the self; the author argues that since persons are “entities” who stand in various relationships with one another, an understanding of persons must necessarily involve an under-

standing both of these relationships and of their diverse emotional components.

Gould, Carol C., and Wartofsky, Marx W., eds. *Women and Philosophy*. New York: Putnam (Capricorn), 1976.

A collection of papers about women and philosophy, including insights about the journey of several women as philosophers; many issues of a philosophical nature raised by feminists and women philosophers are joined in a book of papers that concern women in one way or another.

Jourard, Sidney M. *The Transparent Self*. New York: Van Nostrand, 1971.

A classic study by a psychologist of the chosen roads of personal concealment, this plainly written book raises the question "Shall I permit others to know me as I truly am, or shall I seek instead to remain masked and be seen as someone I am not?"

Kriegel, Leonard. *On Men and Manhood*. New York: Hawthorn, 1979.

An examination of masculinity with its shallow bases in athletic and sexual competition rather than humanhood.

Lee, Donald, and Stern, Carl. "Philosophy and Masculinity," *Southwest Philosophical Studies* 3 (1978), pp. 120-125.

A reflection on the possibility that the practice of academic philosophy has been distorted by masculine values; masculine values, their undesirable effects, and suggestions for amelioration are included.

Morrow, Lance. "What Is the Point of Working?" *Time*, May 11, 1981, pp. 93-94.

The centrality of work to the American sense of personal identity and worth is explored briefly.

Richardson, Mary Sue and Alpert, Judith Landon. "Unisex vs. Androgyny," *New York University Education Quarterly* 8, no. 4 (1977), pp. 29-32.

In an essay reviewing three recent gender identity studies, the authors explore androgyny as an alternative to unisex and rigid categories of masculinity and femininity.

Vetterling-Braggin, Mary; Elliston, Frederick A.; and English, Jane. *Feminism and Philosophy*. Totowa, N.J.: Littlefield, 1977.

A collection of contemporary writings by philosophers that ranges over all the feminist issues and is readily intelligible to professionals and nonprofessionals alike.