The Knack of Burning off Old Bad Kamma

[Excerpt — Paraphrasing for meaning]

I HEAR TELL:

Once upon a time The Lucky Man, Sakkya-land, a market town of theirs name-a Devadaha, came a revisiting.
There, to the Beggars gathered round he said:

"Beggars! There are some shaman and brahmen who say:

"All of one's sense experience,
whether pleasant or unpleasant or neither pleasant nor unpleasant,
is a consequence of past action by the individual.

By burning up and destroying past deeds
and by not doing new deeds,
there is the prevention of kammic consequence in the future.

With no consequences able to occur in the future,
kamma is destroyed.
With kamma destroyed,
dukkha is destroyed.
With dukkha destroyed,
sensation is destroyed.
It is with the destruction of sensation
that dukkha is prevented from manifestation in the future."

To those shaman and brahman of such views I say:

"But do you know for a fact that you existed in the past?"
"Do you know for a fact that you did such and such a bad deed in the past?"
"Do you know for a fact that you did not do such and such a bad deed in the past?"
"Do you know now that such and such amount of your bad kamma has been burnt off by your practices?
Or that such and such an amount of your bad kamma remains to be burnt off?
Or that when such and such an amount of bad kamma has been burnt off,
all your bad kamma will have been burnt off?"
"Do you know, here and now,
how to get rid of unskilled states of mind and
acquire skilled states of mind?"

And to all these question the reply is "No."

So I say:
It is not proper, that answering "No" to all these questions
one should put forth the absolute statement:
"All of one's sense experience,
whether pleasant or unpleasant or neither pleasant nor unpleasant,
is a consequence of past action by the individual.
By burning up and destroying past deeds and
by not doing new deeds,
there is the prevention of kammic consequence in the future.
With no consequences able to occur in the future,
kamma is destroyed.
With kamma destroyed,
dukkha is destroyed.
With dukkha destroyed,
sensation is destroyed.
It is with the destruction of sensation
that dukkha is prevented from manifestation in the future."

In the same way as a man who has been shot by a poisoned arrow,
who has been able to find a doctor,
and that doctor were to cause him pain by his surgery,
removal of the arrow,
treatment for the poison,
and medication of the wound,
would know,
when he was well and able to think clearly:
"I experienced pain as a consequence of being shot by a poisoned arrow.
That pain I experienced in the healing process
was that which resulted as a secondary condition
of the skillful action needed to effect a cure;
that secondary pain was not the cure."

In the same way
if one were to have personal experience of the matter,
or if one were to have one's self,
the knowledge and skills to actually solve the problem of kammic consequences,
it would be proper to make such a statement as this;
but not having the personal experience,
it is not proper to make such statements.

Then the response I get is that
"Our teacher is all-knowing, all-seeing."
It is because he says this that we believe it.

To this I respond:
These five things prove to be an unreliable basis for judgment
concerning what one should hold to be the truth
because they can be shown to have two wrong outcomes
before you even start.

What five?

Faith,
Approval,
Oral Tradition,
Arriving at by thinking about, and
acceptance of a well known theory.

What two wrong outcomes?

Something in which one has faith,
of which one approves,
that is oral tradition,
that is arrived at by thought,
that is an accepted theory
may be wrong;
and something in which one has no faith,
of which one does not approve,
that is not oral tradition,
that has not been thought about,
that is not an accepted theory
may be correct.

So I ask, going no further than believing in a teacher:

Having examined this teacher
with the idea of determining his vulnerability
to the likelihood that his perception has been distorted
by lust, hate, and stupidity;
having asked
"Does this person possess such states of lust, hate and stupidity
that although he did not "know and see"
he would say
"I know and see"?
Or would he,
because of lust, hate or stupidity,
teach the sort of doctrine that would lead one who followed to regret it?
... based on what faith
that such and such is the Truth,
based on what appeal,
based on what oral tradition,
based on what reasoning,
based on what accepted theory,
do you place such belief in this teacher of yours?"

But I hear no reasonable response.

So then I ask:
"Is it the case
that when you make a strong effort
you experience painful sensations,
intensely painful sensations,
acutely intense painful sensations;
but that when you do not make a strong effort
you do not experience painful sensations,
intensely painful sensations,
acutely intense painful sensations?"

And the answer is that that is the case.

And I suggest that if that were the case,
then it would be proper to deduce that
"All of one's sense experiences,
whether pleasant or unpleasant or neither pleasant nor unpleasant,
are a consequence of past action by the individual.
By burning up and destroying past deeds and
by not doing new deeds,
there is the prevention of kammic consequence in the future."
But since it can be shown
that painful sensations,
intensely painful sensations,
acutely intense painful sensations
can occur both when one is making an effort and
when one is making no effort,
then it is not proper to make such a deduction.

You are simply deceiving yourselves.

And again, I hear no reasonable rebuttal.

So then I say:
"Is it possible to say:
'By this severe penance,
let that kamma which is due now
be postponed to the future'?
Or, 'By this severe penance,
let that kamma which was to be experienced as pleasant
be experienced as unpleasant?'
Or, 'By this severe penance,
let that kamma which was to be experienced as unpleasant
be experienced as pleasant?'
Or, 'By this severe penance,
let that kamma which was to be experienced conclusively
be experienced only partially?'
Or, 'By this severe penance,
let that kamma which was to be experienced only partially
be experienced conclusively?'
Or, 'By this severe penance,
let that kamma which was to be experienced intensely
be experienced only lightly?'
Or, 'By this severe penance,
let that kamma which was to be experienced only lightly
be experienced intensely?'
Or, 'By this severe penance,
let that kamma which was to be experienced,
not be experienced?'
Or, 'By this severe penance,
let that kamma which was not to be experienced,
be one that is experienced?'"

And to all these questions I receive the answer:
"No, it is not possible."

So then I say:
"Then by your own admission here your severe penances are useless."

[The conclusion of the defeat of this proposition deals with its basis in the idea that "All of one's sense experience, whether pleasant or unpleasant or neither pleasant nor unpleasant, is a consequence of past action by the individual."]

§

[About those who, through severe penances, experience intensely painful sensations, he states:]

If that pleasure and pain which a person experiences
is due to previous kamma,
then these individuals were doers of deeds that were badly done.

If that pleasure and pain which a person experiences
is due to a creator,
then they were created by an evil creator.

If that pleasure and pain which a person experiences
is just a consequence of that which that individual 'needs to experience',
then these individuals need to experience some hard lessons.

If that pleasure and pain which a person experiences
is a consequence of their [class, position, cast] then they are of a low [class, position, cast].

If that pleasure and pain which a person experiences is a consequence of their efforts in the here and now,
then they are of evil effort in the here and now.

And, additionally, whether that pleasure and pain which a person experiences
is or is not caused by any of these five cases,
the painful sensations experienced by those practicing severe penances
are reasonable grounds for considering their behavior irrational.

§

By enduring the painful consequences
of past badly done kamma without reaction,
fighting only the urge to react
by flight into sense pleasure,
one "Masters the self through Pain."

This effort is, itself,
one step removed from
direct experience of the consequences of kamma.

Thus in two ways is their progress in a "benevolent cycle":
in the effort to control reaction to the situation itself indifference results, and
in the experience of the indifference comes liberation from painful experience
through that indifference and as a consequence of that
the indifference grows.

In the same way as if there were a man who was passionately in love,
painfully in love,
acutely painfully in love
with the most beautiful lass in the land.
If he were to see her laughing, singing, dancing
with some other man;
what do you think?
Would he grieve and lament,
feel pain and misery and despair?

But supposing he were to reflect:
"I am passionately in love with this woman,
painfully in love,
acutely painfully in love,
and because of this
when I see her laughing, singing, and dancing
with some other man
I experience grief and lamentation,
pain and misery and despair.
Suppose I were to let go of my desire and lust
for this woman?
And that is what he does.

Then, at a later time
he might see that woman
laughing, singing, and dancing
with some other man.
What do you think?
Would he grieve and lament
and feel pain and misery and despair
because of that?
Of course not!

How come?

Because he has let go of his desire and lust for this woman,
that's how come.

Reflecting on this he thinks:

"Uncontrolled,
unskillful conditions increase
and skillful conditions decrease.

Making an effort to master the self through pain in this way,
skillful conditions increase and
unskillful conditions decrease."

And he makes effort in this way.

And In This Way,
soon enough,
dukkha is burned off, and,
further,
after a time
there is no need
to master the self through pain in this way.

How come?

Because the self has mastered the self through pain.

In the same way as the fletcher,
or the fletcher's skillful apprentice,
when he Wishes to make his shaft straight and
. . . serviceable. . .
heats that shaft by thrusting it back and forth
in a blazing fire
until it is straight and serviceable.
But when that shaft is straight and serviceable
he no longer thrusts that shaft back and forth
in that blazing fire.

How come?

Because the purpose of thrusting that shaft back and forth
in the blazing fire
has been accomplished,
that's how come!

[Up past here this sutta describes a standard course to the final goal: A Buddha arises, one hears of sucha one, one approaches, sits down and listens, puts the system into practice, gets rid of the hindrances, attains the jhanas, attains knowledge of former habitations, knowledge of the outcome of deeds, and the destruction of the asavas, sees freedom as freedom and knows he is free, and has attained arahantship.
And the sutta concludes with a recasting of the statements concerning the cause of pleasure or pain:]

If that pleasure and pain which a person experiences
is due to previous kamma,
then the Tathagata is a doer of deeds that were well done.

If that pleasure and pain which a person experiences
is due to a creator,
then the Tathagata was created by a benevolent creator.

If that pleasure and pain which a person experiences
is just a consequence of that which that individual needs to experience,
then the Tathagata needed to experience some pleasant lessons.

If that pleasure and pain which a person experiences
is a consequence of their [class, position, cast] then the Tathagata is of a high [class, position, cast].

If that pleasure and pain which a person experiences
is a consequence of their efforts in the here and now,
then the Tathagata is of skillful effort in the here and now.

And, additionally, whether that pleasure and pain which a person experiences
is or is not caused by any of these five cases,
the pleasant sensations experienced by the Tathagata
are reasonable grounds for considering his behavior rational.