by
Major Brendan B. McBreen
The three keys for a successful attack against a prepared enemy position
are:
·
A
covered approach. The
assault element needs a covered approach to protect the force from enemy
observation and enemy direct fire.
·
A
vulnerable penetration point.
The commander must recognize and assault the enemy’s most vulnerable position.
Ideally, he recognizes where the enemy has poor mutual support, a point where
subtle terrain features conspire against the enemy to isolate and weaken his
position. This allows the suppression element to concentrate maximum suppressive
fires against specific enemy defenses and not disperse fires across a wide front
of multiple threats.
· Overwhelming suppressive fire. The assault element cannot exit their covered approach to assault the penetration point until enemy weapons have been destroyed, obscured or effectively suppressed. This is the critical task. Effective suppression is a pre-requisite for the assault, and in turn, the entire attack.
Currently, Marine infantry units are not trained sufficiently on direct
fire suppression. This represents a critical deficiency in the lethality and offensive
combat power of our infantry.
In 1937, Erwin Rommel published Infantry
Attacks, a tactical primer based on his combat experiences in World War I.1
Of its many lessons on small-unit combat, the book is especially clear on
suppression in support of the assault. As a young combat leader, Rommel
displayed a “masterful use of direct-fire weapons to gain nearly total fire
superiority…in narrow sectors in order to effect a breakthrough…”2
Infantry Attacks describes a
series of attacks that Rommel led during 1917. He organized his forces into
three elements: a suppression element, an assault element, and an exploitation
element. The assault element was small in relation to the suppression element.
As he gained experience, he further decreased the size of his assault element.3
Date
Location
Ratio of Suppression to Assault
Elements
7
January 1917
Gagesti
2 : 1
10
August 1917
Carpathians
3 : 2
11
August 1917
Carpathians
3 : 1
19
August 1917
Carpathians
9 : 1
25
August 1917
NE Italy
4 : 1 4
His large suppression element placed overwhelming suppressive fire on specific
enemy positions. Rommel closely supervised every detail of the suppression
element, personally directing the emplacement and assignments of his soldiers
and weapons. The assault element maintained a covered approach, and usually
assaulted less than 100m from its last covered position to the penetration
point.5 Once the penetration had been made, Rommel would then lead
the exploitation element into the enemy position.
In 1976, the U.S. Army conducted a series of combat tests with the
experimental MILES laser system, which was then being developed to simulate
small arms fire. Over seventy attacks, day and night, were made against a dug-in
enemy. All soldiers and weapons were instrumented to record casualties. One
analysis examined the most successful tactics for small-unit assaults:
(1)
Base of Fire
(2) Maneuver
25% success
No Base of Fire
(3) Maneuver: On-line assault
33% success
(1 + AT) Base of Fire
(2) Maneuver
56% success
(2) Base of Fire
(1) Maneuver
88% success6
Notes the last line. Heavy suppression, with a small
assault element was successful almost 9 out of 10 times. Two up and one back was
successful only 25% of the time. This result paralleled Rommel’s tactics.
One of the strengths of mechanized infantry is that in addition to
mobility, the unit carries significant organic firepower. The attack by a
well-trained mechanized infantry unit should place a small assault element
against a vulnerable penetration point, supported by the overwhelming firepower
of a vehicle-mounted suppression element.
Today, a number of factors interfere with our ability to effectively
train on the techniques of overwhelming suppressive fire. Think of the answers
to the following questions:
·
What
manuals clearly explain the details of suppressive fire techniques? What manuals
explain the benefits or recommend weighting the suppression element with 60 to
70% of a unit’s firepower?
·
What
training standards define effective suppressive fire? Does the new T&R
manual establish a combat-focused standard?
·
Where do
NCOs and officers learn suppressive fire tactics? What schools teach it well?
·
Do any
units train to do suppressive fire well? Do any units or schools train to
assault across more than fifty meters of open ground using only fire and
movement?
·
How often
do infantry units conduct live-fire supported attacks? How often does the new
T&R manual require them to be done?
·
What
suppression techniques do we recommend for rifles and SAWs, weapons with no
fixed tripods?
·
How
effective are our fire commands? Our sector assignments?
·
What
ranges and training infrastructure support suppressive fire training? What
obstacles prevent effective training?
·
For night
attacks, how do we assign and control weapons not mounted on fixed tripods? If
not assigned, how does this weaken our suppression element? What techniques does
the Marine Corps recommend for night suppression?
·
Do our
AAVs train to suppress in support of infantry assaults? Do tanks or LAR? Will
the suppressive capabilities of the new AAAV be exploited in training and
combat?
The TTECG at Twentynine Palms teaches excellent suppressive fire
techniques as part of their range 400 training package. Marine leaders are
taught to establish their suppression element and then maneuver their assault
element to within 250 meters of the objective while indirect fires suppress the
enemy. From there, the direct fires of the suppression element permit the
assault element to close to within fifty meters of the objective. The assault
element conducts fire and movement for no more than fifty meters. The TTECG
instructors do an excellent job of training Marine leaders never to expose their
Marines by moving without suppression. They publish excellent handouts that
present numerous proven techniques for conducting attacks and coordinating
direct-fire suppression.
This excellent infantry training is particularly noteworthy because it is
so unique. Ideally, units should train on these techniques with their own
leaders prior to CAX, and then hone their skills on the combined arms ranges at
Twentynine Palms. Why is our graduate-level TTECG training cadre reduced to
training kindergarten-level units? Why do our tactical manuals not include the
hard-learned lessons that the TTECG tries to teach? Are we maximizing the value
of the TTECG? Some units do not or cannot train to suppress except at CAX. This
means infantry companies might receive this one-week training every third or
fourth year! This is insufficient.
· Update our infantry manuals. Our manuals are weak when describing the specific actions needed to establish and execute a support-by-fire position. None of our manuals explain the sort of detailed preparations that lieutenant Rommel made in 1917. None of our manuals explain the additional work required to effectively suppress an enemy at night. Nowhere does the Marine Corps discuss or recommend using two-thirds of a unit’s firepower for suppression.
·
Update
our infantry training standards. Well-written and enforced training standards
should drive training priorities and training infrastructure. The new T&R
manual should clearly define successful suppressive fire in support of the
assault. The new T&R manual should recommend how often a supported attack is
trained at the infantry company level.
· Update our schools. NCOs and officers train and lead their units in the attack. Good manuals and good training standards need to be tied together in the school environment so that our infantry leaders are well taught in the techniques of effective suppressive fire in support of the attack.
·
Update
our ranges. Marine Corps range
capabilities have a direct correlation to our combat readiness. If few
ranges support suppressive fire, then few units will be trained. Ranges need to
be configured to support training standards, not vice-versa. Infantry units need
on-base ranges that permit the training of all mission tasks, especially
maneuver in conjunction with suppressive fire. Range-related training obstacles
need to be identified and eliminated.
The leaders of a Marine infantry rifle company, conducting an attack
against a prepared enemy position, need to recognize and attack a vulnerable penetration point, find and exploit a covered
approach, and concentrate overwhelming
suppressive fire on the objective while the assault element closes and
penetrates the enemy position. Infantry leaders at all levels need to train on
analyzing ground, seeing covered approaches and recognizing those terrain
features that isolate and weaken an enemy defensive position. Overwhelming
suppressive fire is critical in permitting an assault element to close and
penetrate an enemy position. Marine infantry leaders need to train their units
on the skills of suppressive fire, day and night.
As an organization, we need to publish and emphasize the basic tactics,
techniques and procedures of effective, overwhelming suppressive fire, and then
insure that our leaders and our infantry units are supported and trained well on
this critical infantry task.
Major McBreen is the operations officer of the 5th
Marine Regiment.
Notes:
1 Rommel, Erwin, Infantry Attacks, London: Greenhill
Books, 1990.
2 William E. DePuy, “One-Up and Two-Back?” Selected
Papers of General William E. DePuy, compiled by Colonel Richard M. Swain.
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and
General Staff College, 1994, p297.
3 Ibid. p297.
4 Ibid. p298.
5 Ibid. p298.
6
DePuy, General W.E., Changing an Army,
An Oral History, eds., Brownlee, R.L., and Mullen, W.J., Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Military History Institute and U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1988, pp
10, 86 as cited in Paul F. Gorman, The
Secret of Future Victories (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies
Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, February 1992), p
III-28.